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CONFIDENTIAL

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Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 60

January to March 1945

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CONFIDENTIAL

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 60.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1945.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 772/772/97]

No. 1.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd February.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)

Kabul, 19th January, 1945.

Sir,
WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch, dated the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to forward as an enclosure to this despatch a political review of Afghanistan during the year 1944.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India, to the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration and to His Majesty's Consuls, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Political Review for 1944.

ON the whole the year has passed off peacefully and the position of the Afghan Government appears tolerably secure. They have never during the year had any reason to doubt that the United Nations will win the war, though victory has not come so speedily as some anticipated. In pursuing their own policy, therefore, there has been no need to pay too much attention to possible Axis reactions and, in fact, the Prime Minister was at one time reported to be in favour of breaking off relations with the Axis and evicting the German and Japanese Legations. Disagreement in the Royal Family and fear of unfavourable repercussions in the country apparently prevented the Prime Minister from getting his way. No important change in the personnel of the Government has taken place during the year. The Prime Minister's health has been almost fully restored after his illness in November 1943, but there is no doubt that he has lost a great deal of his former energy, and he now speaks frequently of his wish to retire—preferably to England. Meanwhile he has gone to Jalalabad for the winter, the first time for many years that he has been able to risk such a prolonged absence from the capital.

2. A serious threat to the security of the Government arose in the early summer from discontent in the Southern Province culminating in armed opposition from Mazrak, the Zadran leader, in Khost. Two brigades sent from Kabul were successful in dispersing his following and driving Mazrak himself into the hills on the Waziristan border. His efforts to enlist the support of the Madda Khel in North Waziristan were firmly countered by the Government of

India and Mazrak himself was evicted from British territory by air action against the tribesmen who were offering him temporary shelter. He has still not tendered his submission, but he has lost most of his following and is more or less in hiding on the Afghan side of the border. The appearance in November of a mysterious Malang who posed as the brother of Amanullah gave a temporary fillip to Mazrak's failing fortunes, but lack of money with which to bribe the tribes caused the failure of this movement also and the Malang has since relapsed into obscurity. On the Baluchistan border trouble with Daru Khan Badinzai has subsided and there have been no troublesome incidents of any importance. The northern frontier with Russia continues to give rise to minor unpleasantnesses and the Russian claim to the southern bank of the Oxus, as the rightful boundary, has neither been pressed nor withdrawn. There have been a few armed clashes resulting in casualties among frontier guards, but they have not assumed serious proportions, though ill feeling was recently aggravated by the throwing into the Oxus, by the Afghans, of carcasses of cattle which had died from rinderpest on the Afghan side of the border with the risk that this would cause the spread of the disease to Russian territory.

3. There has been some increase in the efficiency of the Afghan army, partly as a result of their successful operations against Mazrak in the southern province which enhanced their prestige and raised their morale. In this, as in other spheres, the Afghans have tended, during the year, to turn more and more to the Government of India for help. Negotiations for the purchase of further Tiger Moth aircraft for the Afghan Air Force are in progress. Requests have been made for equipment such as water bottles, A.T. carts and saddlery; a number of officers have been sent for training in survey at Abbotabad, and finally, in December, a military mission of six officers, headed by the Chief of General Staff of the Afghan army, left for India to inspect modern methods of training and military equipment, and to get some insight into the fighting in Burma.

4. Generally Indo-Afghan relations have improved steadily throughout the year. The Afghans themselves talk openly of turning a new page in their history. The most striking development has been the willingness of the Government to announce publicly for the first time their friendship for and their community of interests with India. Hitherto such protestations have been confined to the privacy of personal discussions with His Majesty's Minister and members of his staff and have been conspicuous by their absence from the press and other forms of publicity. The latter half of 1944, however, saw a spate of articles in the newspapers, openly acknowledging Afghanistan's gratitude to and dependence upon India for the help which had been so important a factor in enabling them to maintain the economic life and prosperity of their country, and in guarding it from the more serious effects of the war. A handsome donation by the Government of India to a relief fund for victims of a local flood disaster in August called forth the first grateful tribute; and this was followed shortly by a series of articles detailing the economic assistance received in many other spheres. Further articles followed on the occasion of the departure of the military mission to India and, more recently, on the arrival in Afghanistan of the remains of Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani from Istanbul, where they had been interred since his death in 1897.

Relations between His Majesty's Consuls in Kandahar and Jalalabad and the local authorities have shown steady, if not startling, improvement, and social intercourse generally is slowly getting easier.

5. Our cultural relations with the Afghans have also made satisfactory progress. They are increasingly looking to us to help them in the reorganisation of their education and are hoping that we shall shortly be able to obtain for them the three English professors for the Ghazi College for whom they have asked. Meanwhile they have taken steps to engage a further twenty-five Indian teachers who are to be employed in the provinces as well as in Kabul. They are also opening a new faculty of literature which is to form part of the university of the future and for which they are trying to get Indian professors of Sanskrit and Avestan. In all these matters they have asked for the help of the Government of India, a welcome departure from the previous practice, which was to avoid at all costs our interference, with the result that the appointments made were often far from suitable. The teaching of English is making considerable progress, and some interest is being shown in basic English as a result of a visit during the summer of Mr. Myers, of the Orthological Institute. Several of the Indian teachers in Kabul are hoping to take courses in basic English during their winter vacation with a view to giving instruction to various classes on their return. English is generally being adopted as the Afghan second language in preference

to French, and Urdu is also being more widely taught. A visit by Major Shah, of the Indian Information and Broadcasting Department of the Government of India, was warmly welcomed by the Afghan Publications Department, which is now proposing to send three representatives on a return visit to India with a view to establishing closer co-operation in the matter of broadcasting and cultural relations generally.

6. Towards the end of the year the Afghan Foreign Office instituted informal discussions with His Majesty's Legation in order to see whether their frontier policy was not capable of improvement with a view to inducing gradually a more peaceful and settled form of life on both sides of the border. These discussions, though at present only in their preliminary stages, mark a great advance on anything that has gone before. The Afghans are, however, seriously handicapped by the uncertainty of India's political outlook. As long as India remains under British rule the Afghan Government are content with their present position and with attempts at improving relations on the existing basis. They have, however, no intention of standing idly by and allowing those whom they consider to be the Afghan inhabitants of tribal territory and of the North-West Frontier to become part of a congress and therefore Hindu India. They make no secret of this, though they decline to commit themselves to any formulation of their specific intentions. It is obvious, however, that they are speculating anxiously what the results to themselves would be if the friendly British Government were to withdraw from India and leave Afghanistan to face the future and her Russian neighbour without at least the moral support she now enjoys from us.

7. In fact, the declared Afghan policy of friendship towards Great Britain and America is to a large extent motivated by fear of Soviet Russia. This is no new phenomenon. Though Russian policy towards Afghanistan appears to have been correct, almost to the point of neglect, their activities in Persia have not been such as to inspire confidence. The Prime Minister, who ever since his appointment as Ambassador in Moscow, some years ago, has always held pronounced anti-Russian views, has, of course, been confirmed in his fears and sees no hope for the independence of his country other than in reliance on Great Britain, together with such moral help as they may expect to obtain from America. He is even reported to have said that he would acquiesce in the absorption of his country in British India, which would in any case be only temporary, if that would save her from the clutches of Soviet Russia. Afghan fears of Russian intentions have by no means been allayed by the appointment of a new and forceful ambassador, M. Bakoulin, in March 1944, followed by the transfer of all the important members of his staff and their replacement by new and far less friendly officials. Tours by the ambassador to Kandahar in April and to the northern provinces in November did nothing to allay Afghan suspicions.

8. Along with their attempts at improving Anglo-Afghan relations the Afghans have been assiduous in courting the favour of America. The visit, in January 1944, of General Hurley as the President's personal representative, was a great encouragement to them and led them perhaps to expect even more assistance than they have actually been receiving. Economic help has, however, been forthcoming in the shape of lorries required for the country's transport; and the easing of the world shipping position has enabled the United States to supply Afghanistan with many of the more urgent requirements which cannot be supplied by India. Another way in which America has been willing to help Afghanistan has been in the matter of irrigation engineers, three of whom arrived during the year to take over charge of the Irrigation Department. One of these, Mr. Henry, was not a success and left, but the other two, Messrs. Alexander and Keese, seem to have settled down and are hopeful of accomplishing something to clear up the mess left by a succession of incompetent and mostly dishonest foreigners, chiefly Italians and Germans, who have been responsible for inaugurating several schemes all of which have so far proved complete failures. The Afghans are also looking to America for assistance in civil aviation and their Minister in Washington was appointed as their representative to the recent conference in Chicago. Nothing has apparently come out of these discussions, though the Afghans at one time expressed themselves as willing to allow an American Air Service to function over Afghanistan.

9. I have already mentioned the Prime Minister's proposal to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers. He still suspects the Axis Legations of improper intrigues and has done his best to keep a close watch on their activities. Of the two legations the Japanese is by far the more active. Sichida, the Japanese Minister, paid a visit to Moscow during the year, no doubt to receive

instructions, if nothing else, from his Government. The Afghans, though suspicious of these moves, have apparently been unable to discover that the Japanese are actually abusing their diplomatic privileges and have therefore taken no action. As regards the German Legation, the removal of Rassmuss, the commercial secretary, which was welcomed, if not actually engineered, by the Afghan Government in March, seems to have relieved them of all anxiety on the score of improper activities on the part of the German Legation. And, indeed, the Germans appear to have for the most part handed over their interests in this country to the Japanese. In September the Afghan Government decided to withdraw their Minister from Vichy France and later in the year officially recognised the Government of General de Gaulle. The reappointment as Minister in Paris of Shah Wali Khan, who was formerly accredited to the Governments of both France and Switzerland and who is now in the latter country, is expected shortly. The Afghan Government have also recognised the independence of Syria and Lebanon and have concluded a treaty of friendship with China which will involve the opening of a Chinese Legation in Kabul. There have been changes among the heads of diplomatic missions in Kabul during the year. Signor Quaroni, the Italian Minister, left in May on appointment as Ambassador in Moscow and M. Fouad Bey, the Egyptian Minister, on transfer to Ankara in September. The departure of the latter was as sincerely regretted by the Afghan Government as that of the former was welcomed, and it is significant that Signor Quaroni did not receive the customary decoration of the Sardar-i-Ala from the King. The Turkish Ambassador and American Minister are also under orders of transfer.

10. The economic life of the country continues much as before. The working of the State monopolies leaves much to be desired and a more liberal policy more honestly pursued would greatly increase its prosperity. But Afghanistan has one priceless advantage over such countries as Persia in the person of her Prime Minister. Sufficiently well off himself and a bachelor with no family to provide for, he has no desire further to enrich himself at the expense of the country, and, as a corollary, is not prepared to allow unlimited licence to others to do so. There is always the risk that corrupt officials may be found out and ruthlessly punished, with the result that in spite of much dishonesty and great inefficiency the Government in general is able to insist on its policy being carried out. Price control is therefore tolerably effective and, though the black market flourishes, bread at least is cheap and plentiful. In November an important pronouncement was made placing a ban on the cultivation of opium. This was in deference to American representations and if enforced will apparently involve the country in the loss of some 3½ million Afghanis annually. The contract for the supply of 10,000 tons of Afghan wool for Russia, negotiated by the U.K.C.C. in 1943, has proceeded on the whole satisfactorily and had been practically completed by the end of the year. The Afghan Government have also done their best with the limited means at their disposal to improve their road communications. Work continues on the new Kabul-Peshawar road which is to follow the course of the Kabul river the whole way to Jalalabad, and the lower half of which has recently been opened to traffic. They also allowed Mr. Flannery, the American representative of General Motors, to make a tour of the country with a view to recommending improvements in the country's transport system. He has, as a result, suggested the building of a special Chevrolet lorry suited to Afghan conditions. Meanwhile the supply of 200 lorries by the Government of India (to be replaced by a similar number ordered for Afghanistan from America) has been of material assistance in easing their most pressing transport problems. On the whole the Afghan Government may congratulate themselves on having successfully weathered a difficult year and may reasonably look forward to a great increase in prosperity once war-time restrictions are removed.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 608/195/93]

No. 2.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th January.)

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 9th January, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with standing instructions, a review of the major political and economic events in Iraq during 1944.

2. I am indebted to Mr. P. F. Hancock, second secretary to this embassy, for the preparation of this report, the concluding section of which (paragraphs 33-37, inclusive), however, I wrote myself.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Cairo, and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Political Review, 1944.

Introductory.

THE year 1944 has been a quiet one for Iraq. The recession of the enemy threat to the Middle East and the recent Allied victories have led Iraqis to believe that the war is as good as over. Apart from supplying primary products required by the Allies, Iraq, like all other countries of the Middle East, is playing no active part in the fight. Indeed, it is only the presence of British and Indian troops that provides visible evidence that she is a belligerent. On the other hand, the economic consequences of war have made themselves painfully felt. The country as a political unit has enjoyed continued prosperity, thanks to the maintenance, though on a reduced scale, of British war expenditure and to an adequate harvest. But the general population's condition of life has been further depressed by restricted imports and rising prices. The measures taken to combat these tendencies proved in the main ineffective, and the dismissal of Colonel Bayliss, the Director-General of Imports, was followed by a period of economic decontrol.

2. In the sphere of internal politics, Nuri Pasha's Cabinet was replaced in June by an administration of similar type under Hamdi Pachachi. Apart from the endemic restlessness in the Barzan area of Kurdistan, internal order was well maintained. Relations between imperial troops and the Iraqi population were unruffled. In the sphere of foreign affairs, the problems of Palestine and the Levant States were closely followed with increasing indignation against the Zionists and the French.

3. The excellent Anglo-Iraqi relations which subsisted throughout the year have again proved the value of His Majesty's Government's policy towards this country. While indications are not lacking of difficulties ahead, it is appreciated by the majority of thinking Iraqis that their country is too weak to stand alone in the world of our times, that Iraq therefore needs the help and protection of a friendly Great Power, and it is hoped that that Power will continue to be Great Britain.

Internal Politics.

4. For the first six months of the year Iraqi politics were concerned mainly with the question whether or not Nuri Pasha was to continue to direct the administration of the country. He had been Prime Minister continuously from October 1941, but he had been obliged to reorganise his Cabinet no less than nine times. Having used and discarded twenty-four different colleagues, he seemed to be coming to the end of possible combinations. His last team, formed in December 1943, was in many respects a good one, but it was strangely unpopular and never enjoyed the Regent's confidence. His Royal Highness particularly disliked the inclusion of Taufiq Suwaidi, Umar Nadhmi and Ali Mumtaz, whom he regarded as disloyal to himself. In Parliament the personal opponents of the Prime Minister and of his colleagues soon realised how the land lay, and, encouraged by Tahsin

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Ali, the chamberlain at the Palace, set out to make trouble. The Government's request for an adjournment was refused and the Opposition Deputies, abetted by a sympathetic President, were able to sustain their attacks with such persistence that in the end they wore down the strength of the Ministers and forced them to resign. The first manoeuvre of the Opposition was to call in question the legality of the appointment of Taufiq Suwaidi to be Deputy Prime Minister, a post specially instituted for him by Nuri Pasha. Having brought about Taufiq Suwaidi's resignation by compelling the Government to refer to the High Court for a ruling, they were encouraged to seek to open up a more general engagement on every occasion. The Ministers became disheartened and maintained that it was unfair of the Regent to put them into office and then to encourage their enemies by allowing it to be known that they did not enjoy his favour. His Majesty's Ambassador repeatedly warned His Royal Highness that the uncertain situation in which he placed the Cabinet was harmful to the Administration and advised him that he should make up his mind either to give them a reasonable trial or to replace them by others if he were sure that better men could be found. Throughout the spring months His Royal Highness vacillated between these two courses, while the Cabinet's critics, both in the Senate and the Chamber, continued to gain confidence and to increase the weight of their attacks. The climax was reached during the last days of the debate on the budget. The Opposition Deputies passed from criticism to abuse and an uproar ensued, which obliged the President to suspend the meeting. Nuri Pasha tendered his resignation, explaining that it was impossible for him to continue in office without the full and avowed support of the Regent. His Royal Highness thereupon called Hamdi Pachachi, a rich landowner of indifferent health, to form a Government. The invitation was accepted, but as the new Prime Minister was too unwell to collect colleagues, the Palace had to do it for him. The Cabinet which took office a fortnight later was everywhere known to be the Regent's handiwork. The principal posts were filled by Mustafa al Umari (Minister of the Interior), Arshad al Umari (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Acting Minister of Supply), Salih Jabr (Minister of Finance), Tahsin Ali (Minister of Defence). Hamdi Pachachi offered portfolios to Nuri Pasha and Ibrahim Kemal, but both refused. Nuri was genuinely in need of rest and recuperation, and Ibrahim Kemal wanted nothing less than the premiership.

5. In a statement made in the Chamber shortly after the formation of his Government, Hamdi Pachachi regretted that, owing to his indisposition, no full programme for his Administration had been prepared. The Cabinet would, however, give their principal attention to three practical tasks, namely (a) to improve the organisation and work of the Supplies Department; (b) to take all measures to establish "normal security and order" throughout the country; (c) to improve efficiency and probity of Government officials. This statement made no reference to the Kurdish problem, but in a subsequent statement Hamdi Pachachi said that it was the intention of his Government to carry on the Kurdish policy of their predecessors and to implement an extensive programme of development in the north.

6. The extreme heat of midsummer, inducing as it invariably does frayed nerves and quickened tempers, usually produces a Cabinet crisis and in 1944 this supervened in August, when the Minister of Defence violently disagreed with his colleagues over General Renton's scheme of army reform. After a reshuffle of short duration, Hamdi Pachachi resigned and reformed his Cabinet. Apart from the dropping of Tahsin Ali and a change-over in certain portfolios, the composition of the new Cabinet did not differ from that of the old. The Ministry of Supply, which for some months was held by more than one Minister in an acting capacity, was eventually filled by the promotion of its Director-General, no better-known politician being prepared to accept this invidious post or to associate himself with a Cabinet whose future by the close of the year had become very uncertain. Further changes took place in December at the Ministries of Social Affairs and Defence, the latter being awarded to the previous Chief of the General Staff. The parliamentary scene remains quiet, with the odds shortening at the time of writing on Nuri Pasha as the next Prime Minister.

7. Outside Parliament and the family circle of the Iraqi oligarchy there was a notable resurgence of political activity and discussion. This tendency was exemplified in the press. At the beginning of the year five Arabic daily newspapers were published in Baghdad. There are now eleven. Part of the press is, of course, engaged in supporting the Government. The Opposition, whether in the press or out of it, is, thanks to a gradual lifting of the censorship, throwing off the restraint of the last three years. In many cases the old xenophobia and irresponsible nationalism are apparent just below the surface, especially in attacks upon

the "imperialism" of other Powers. But the general tone of the Opposition has not been by any means unconstructive. In the sphere of internal politics it has demanded an effective tackling of the supply problem, the purging of public life, decentralisation and the formation of political parties. As for the first two demands, no one could pretend that they were not justifiable. An important step towards decentralisation will have been made if the Government succeeds in its declared intention of placing on the statute book a revised Liwa administration law. The formation of political parties is unlikely to make rapid progress in a country where personalities count for more than principles, and where the mass of the population are politically uneducated. "Communism" has undoubtedly increased during the year under review and "Communist" leaflets have been distributed on a wide scale. But these terms in Iraq imply no more than an academic and impracticable sense of frustration with things as they are.

8. Mention has already been made of the lack of confidence shown by the Regent in Nuri Pasha's administration. While His Royal Highness's behaviour in this matter seemed at the time somewhat shortsighted, it must be allowed that he is on the whole a steady and satisfactory influence in Iraqi politics and that his pro-British sympathies are above question. He is usually amenable to advice and determined to do his duty. That he is seriously alive to many of the problems facing his country is shown by a long memorandum which he drew up early in the year setting forth the lines on which he would wish the Government to work. This was by no means a contemptible document and indicated an advance in His Royal Highness's political capacity. It is not in his nature to inspire popular enthusiasm, and unfortunately over Kurdistan he has been stubborn in his reluctance to give Cabinet, Parliament and people any noteworthy lead towards the early implementation of a constructive policy. Nevertheless, throughout the year, he has been untiring in public appearances and military inspections all over the country.

9. The Regent's interest in the Iraqi army has been timely. Under a scheme prepared by General Renton, the new head of the British Military Mission, the army's strength is being reduced from four to two divisions and one training division. This plan could hardly be expected to commend itself to all Ministers, especially as it involved the retirement of many old friends among the senior officers. But, except for Tahsin Ali, they accepted it under the impetus of last year's military failures in Kurdistan. The reorganisation should improve the morale of the remaining officers, whose prospects of promotion are now better. Vigorous training is now in progress. General Renton is putting through overdue reforms which will result in better feeding and clothing of the army and a lower incidence of disease. The Iraqi Air Force now takes to the air more frequently than before. Its proper rôle having been defined as that of army co-operation, His Majesty's Government are selling it 30 Anson aircraft. They are to be delivered in February, 1945.

10. In the past, the Iraqi army has been the centre of political danger and anti-British feeling. The work of General Bromilow in winning the confidence of the younger officers is now bearing fruit. The reorganisation of the Mission by General Renton, and the introduction of young British officers who have seen war service, have had an excellent effect. Some disaffection still exists but, happily, with less force. The principal use of the Army should, of course, be to maintain order in Iraq. This is now generally appreciated. The reorganisation and training now going on are popularly interpreted as preparation for a spring campaign in Kurdistan.

Kurdistan.

11. Both Nuri Pasha's Cabinet and their successors found themselves much occupied with Kurdish affairs. In January peace was made with Mulla Mustafa, the Barzani insurgent, largely through the exertions of Majid Mustafa, a Minister without portfolio charged with advising on Kurdish policy. It was an uneasy settlement and there were several occasions during the following months when a further outbreak of fighting seemed likely.

12. The Barzan troubles had, however, awakened the Government to a sense of the need for conciliatory action and they began to consider reorganising the administration of the Northern districts. Early in the year the Prime Minister sent Majid Mustafa to tour the chief Kurdish centres, to remove some of the worst officials and to hasten the distribution of the cheap grain which had been made available for those villages where the crops had failed. A new and efficient mutasarrif, General Baha-ud-Din Nuri, was appointed to Sulaimani and plans

were considered for accelerated expenditure on the public services to bring them nearer to the standards established elsewhere in the country. This wise policy was persistently attacked by the Government's critics in Parliament, particularly in the Senate. The Ministers concerned, still finding themselves without support from the Palace, had not the heart to go steadily ahead. The Kurdish tribes soon sensed that something had gone wrong and significant rumblings of discontent were again heard from the north. His Majesty's Ambassador warned both Nuri Pasha and the Regent that they would soon be faced by an exceedingly grave and difficult situation unless they did something effective to redress legitimate Kurdish grievances. Nuri Pasha thereafter twice visited the north and during his second tour in May spoke reassuringly to large gatherings of officials, tribal leaders and notables and obtained from the mutasarrifs detailed memoranda on the administrative improvements, roads, schools, clinics and other works which were needed in their liwas. His Excellency's tours were rather too hurried. Many of those to whom he spoke said openly that they had heard fair promises before but had waited long in vain for their fulfilment. Nevertheless, his visits did something to improve the temper of the people. Unhappily, soon after his return to Bagdad, his Cabinet fell and much of the good impression he had made was effaced.

13. When Hamdi Pachachi took office His Majesty's Ambassador renewed private pressure on the Regent and his Ministers to adopt a sympathetic policy towards the Kurds and to take up the work of pacification and social and administrative development in the northern liwas from the point at which it had been left by the last Cabinet. Progress was, however, slow and the replacement of General Baha-ud-Din in August by a mutasarrif of the normal type caused an unfavourable impression. Meanwhile the Barzanis had established and cemented by marriage an alliance with their neighbours the Zibaris. Their control over the north-eastern confines of Iraq was thus complete. The state of the Iraqi army precluded for the time being the possibility of a successful punitive expedition. The Government were therefore disposed to be patient and sent Colonel Taufiq Wahbi, the Kurdish Minister of Economics, in September, to tour the north explaining the central administration's good intentions. But hardly had the Minister returned to Bagdad, when Mulla Mustafa, backed by armed retainers, demanded the surrender of 100 tons of grain from a local Government headquarters. There was nothing for it but to release the grain. In December further symptoms of unrest showed themselves, of which details need not be recorded here. Mulla Mustafa's demands of the Central Government were reported to include the fulfilment of the promises made by Nuri Pasha's administration, the release of various Kurdish prisoners, the appointment of a Kurdish commissioner with wide powers in Bagdad and an "agricultural loan" of ID.144,000 to himself. Some of the Ministers pressed for military operations but it was finally, and wisely, decided to make certain precautionary troop dispositions only. Mulla Mustafa has now retired to Barzan. In the meantime, grain and cloth have been distributed in most of the Kurdish areas.

14. This crisis and the preceding crisis—there have been quite a number of alarms—demonstrate the unsatisfactory and unstable situation which obtains in Kurdistan. Mulla Mustafa is a bandit. He is interested, not in the political or economic welfare of his people, but only in the maintenance of his feudal state. If he continues to make trouble, there would be no justification for dissuading the Iraqi Government from military action against him, provided that the operations are undertaken in accordance with the approval of the British Military Mission. It has been impressed upon the Iraqi Government that the Ambassador and General Officer Commanding-in-Chief expect, and are entitled, to be consulted beforehand in such an event. Such consultation is essential as a precaution against a situation arising in which the use of British forces would be sought to rescue their Iraqi allies from difficulties. His Majesty's Ambassador has, indeed, pointed out to the Iraqi authorities on numerous occasions that the latter can expect neither British assistance nor a solution of their Kurdish difficulties so long as they delay the implementation of their promises of relief and administrative reform. Nevertheless, it must be appreciated that in the event of serious trouble in Kurdistan, it would almost certainly be necessary to deploy British troops defensively for the protection of our interests.

Security.

15. Political security remained good throughout the year. In March the case files of men interned at Amara were reviewed and twenty-nine were released. During the rest of the year 23 further internees were released from Amara.

Some 130 persons remain in the internment camp and it is to be anticipated that more will be released as time goes on, since the majority have already been detained for three years or more. Many of these men are, of course, hostile to the Allied cause. In general it is His Majesty's Ambassador's object to see that the more dangerous of them remain interned as long as possible. It is desirable that such releases as do take place should be made gradually and in small groups so that those who are enlarged may be kept under police supervision; and to avoid the creation of a *bloc* of political "martyrs," which would certainly be exploited to our detriment once the war is over. This policy is, in fact, being satisfactorily carried out by the Iraq Government.

16. In April, 19 Iraqis who fled to Persia in 1941 and were there arrested by British troops and sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment, were returned to Iraq and taken into custody on various charges. Those accused of treason were tried and one (Kamil Shabib, a member of the notorious "Golden Square") was hanged. Eight of these internees were subsequently released.

17. Four Iraqis were dropped from a German aircraft on the 28th November west of Mosul. Two of these men remain at large.

Arab Affairs.

18. At the beginning of the year Nuri Pasha was still pursuing the promotion of Arab Unity. He visited Beirut and Damascus on his return from medical treatment in Palestine, and informed His Majesty's Ambassador that he had agreed in principle with the Syrian Prime Minister that, whatever the other Arab countries might do, Iraq and Syria should establish a close understanding including a common policy for defence and foreign affairs. No such agreement has in fact been concluded; Nuri Pasha must have over-estimated the extent to which the Syrians were prepared to go forward with him. In February the Iraqi Government advanced their charge d'affaires in Syria and the Lebanon to the rank of Minister and a few weeks later a Syrian delegation, including Jamil Beg Mardam, stayed for a few days in Bagdad on their way to discuss Arab unity with King Ibn Saud at Riyadh. They were cordially entertained and appropriately decorated. At the beginning of April a Lebanese delegation headed by the Prime Minister passed through Iraq on a similar mission. The planning of practical Arab co-operation was, however, left to the congress which, at that time, it was expected that the Egyptian Prime Minister would summon during the summer.

19. Meanwhile, there was the Palestine question. In February Nuri Pasha received from Washington news of Senator Wagner's resolution in Congress demanding that the United States Government should use their good offices to assist the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. At his Excellency's instance, the Iraqi Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber sent telegrams of protest to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. After an initial period of restraint, the press took up the theme in tones of moderated indignation. The Government refused applications made for permission to hold public demonstrations. The resolutions of the United States Republican and Democratic parties regarding Palestine came as a further blow. Displeasure was expressed in the newspapers, but no campaign was worked up. For this the Minister for Foreign Affairs was probably responsible. Unlike Hamdi Pachachi, who was now Prime Minister, Arshad-al-Umari is not at heart a keen pan-Arabist. His advice at this stage was that the Arabs should go gently until after the United States presidential elections; they should then try to make their case more widely known both in the United States and the United Kingdom.

20. The preliminary conference on Arab Unity met at Alexandria in September. Its results were felt in this country to be unexpectedly practical, but it is doubtful whether their potential importance has yet been realised. Naturally, this conference concentrated attention on the affairs of Palestine and Syria; nor was North Africa forgotten. About this time the press began to throw off its previous restraint, thus coming more into line with the press in Palestine and Egypt. Violent comments appeared on Zionism, the Palestine problem and, in particular, the murder of Lord Moyne. Many of these effusions, which continue unabated, dealt sharply with the United States. Touching the United Kingdom, their general tone was one of friendship alloyed by nervousness.

21. Towards the end of the year Iraqi delegates attended the Arab Women's Conference in Cairo. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Nuri Said also visited that city for discussions preliminary to the Conference on Arab Unity, which, it was expected, would be held early in the New Year.

22. The Iraqi press and public are united in their hatred of Zionism, and both are apprehensive about the form any eventual Palestine settlement may take. The longer the settlement is delayed, the greater the restlessness that will be felt here. The Arabs are not a match for the Jews in money, organisation or influence, and they know it. Their realisation of these facts merely increases their bitterness. Nor have the Iraqi authorities failed to notice the extent or the violence of Zionist propaganda or, in particular, the licence of the Hebrew press in Palestine—a fact which makes them unresponsive to counsels of moderation. Zionism and the Palestine problem have not been the only subjects of indignation in the press or in discussion. French designs on Syria and the Lebanon were universally condemned. Iraq has close ties of sympathy and interest with these territories; they are not only a principal outlet for Iraqi trade and oil through the pipe-line, but also the resort of numerous well-to-do Bagdadians in the hot weather. They are of more practical importance to Iraq even, perhaps, than Palestine. Their future is therefore watched with care. It is very widely hoped in Iraq that the United Kingdom will be able to assist the Syrians to become independent of France. Latterly, however, some fears have been expressed that His Majesty's Government's policy in this matter may have taken the wrong turning.

Foreign Relations.

23. War conditions continued to restrict Iraq's relations with other Powers. Nevertheless, direct diplomatic relations were established with China, Czechoslovakia and Russia. The Ministers of the first two Powers live in Tehran. Relations with Russia were established on the 11th September after long searchings of heart on the part of the Iraqi Government, the leading members of which are nothing if not reactionary. The move attracted much notice and was welcomed by the press. It is understood that a M. Gregory Titovitch has been appointed as Soviet Minister, and at the time of preparing this report the Russian Consul in Kermanshah is in Bagdad searching for a legation house and other premises. It is anticipated that Soviet representation here will be on an impressive scale numerically.

24. In May the French Committee of National Liberation sent Colonel Spillman to Bagdad from Algiers to discuss the recognition of the committee by the Iraqi Government. The ensuing talks were interrupted by the fall of Nuri Pasha's Government. Nuri's successors were disinclined to take a decision, and, rather than dally in the heat of Bagdad, Colonel Spillman returned to Algiers. No French representation exists in this country other than that afforded by a commercial agent whom the Iraqi Government do not officially recognise.

25. Iraqi-American relations were somewhat clouded towards the end of the year by evidences of pro-Zionism which have already been touched upon. The publicity given to American plans for oil development in Arabia and the Persian Gulf attracted attention. In October a United States mission under Mr. Culbertson came to Bagdad to investigate the possibilities of American-Iraqi trade. The United States authorities have shown interest in future supplies for the Iraq State railways, and they would evidently like to see the procedure discontinued by which Iraqi Government Departments order stores through the Crown agents. In addition, Iraqi students and a representative panel of Iraqi merchants have visited America. In general, United States interest in Iraq is increasing, and with it United States propaganda. Iraq's shortage of dollar exchange is a growing preoccupation to the Americans, who find in it a grave obstacle to the desired development of their exports to this country.

26. Towards the end of the year developments in Greece, Belgium and Italy were the subject of some public concern and doubts were cast upon the wisdom of the policy which His Majesty's Government were pursuing towards those countries.

Economics.

27. During the period under review it is probably true to say that it was economic developments which chiefly occupied the minds of the people of this country. As in 1943, British war expenditure, reduced imports and lack of local production combined to produce a condition of limited but burdensome inflation. The currency in circulation amounted to some I.D.6 million in 1941. In October 1944 the figure stood at I.D.40.3 million. While the rate of expansion became less rapid during 1944, the general cost of living has continued to rise, causing, as might be expected, especial hardship to the urban population and the recipients

of fixed incomes. The poorer Iraqis are hard put to it to clothe themselves, and, in view of the inordinate price of many common food-stuffs, particularly meat, fruit and vegetables, their diet is ill-balanced and often inadequate.

28. Acting on the pressing advice of His Majesty's Ambassador, the Iraqi Government had set up towards the end of 1943 administrative machinery to establish rationing and to control prices, and secured the services of Colonel Bayliss from the Middle East Supply Centre to operate it. This officer embarked on his difficult task with all energy and rationing of tea, coffee and sugar began on the 1st January, while that of cotton textiles and numerous other commodities followed. Supplies of tea, sugar and coffee were large enough to enable a fairly adequate ration to be distributed, but the available quantity of the cotton cloth used for the clothing of the common people was not sufficient to provide more than about 4 metres for each person for the year, except for those who could afford to buy in the black market. Administrative corruption and the lack of experienced supply officials combined to impede the arrangements for distribution which, as a result of the haste and keenness of Colonel Bayliss and his staff at the Directorate General of Imports, were not always simple or well conceived.

29. On the 1st May Parliament passed a law creating a Ministry of Supply, thus giving effect to a scheme advocated by Colonel Bayliss for the concentration of the supply organizations hitherto dispersed among five different Departments of State. Colonel Bayliss's anxiety to centralize this organization and to control it himself was understandable but, in the event, unfortunate. In spite of warnings, he aroused serious opposition in Ministerial and British Advisory circles and gave rise besides to many misunderstandings of M.E.S.C. policies. A series of disagreements with the Acting Minister of Supply culminated in the Colonel's dismissal. His fall was hailed with delight by all who hoped for personal enrichment at the public expense and was felt at the time as a blow to British prestige in this country, as indeed it was.

30. The dismissal of Colonel Bayliss was followed by a relaxation of economic controls. The Government's policy, so far as one could be discerned, was now to keep the price of essential goods low and to intercept the profits made on non-essentials, while maintaining the prices of such articles at a level sufficiently high to discourage smuggling out of the country. Mr. Grice, the present Director-General of Imports, has pursued these restricted aims quietly and with an understanding of the limitations which a primitive administrative system imposes. Meanwhile, there has been no reduction in the cost of living. A further distribution of cotton cloth (2 metres per person) is expected to take place shortly.

31. While Iraq is principally dependent on imports for her requirements of manufactured goods, she has a substantial surplus for export of certain primary products. Since 1941 it has been repeatedly made clear to the Iraqi Government that the main contribution of their country to the war effort is the production of cereals, especially barley. The Iraqi Minister of Finance opened this year's barley negotiations with an offer of over ID.18 a ton at collecting centres. This price was altogether too high. In the course of some three months' discussions the Iraqi authorities were brought to a more realistic frame of mind, the price being finally fixed at ID.19/500 f.o.b. Basra cleaned and bagged, and at ID.15/000 and ID.14/500 for barley not exceeding 10 per cent. dirt on sief at Basra and Bagdad respectively. The quantity to be purchased was 200,000 tons. Though this price was very considerably lower than that paid in 1943, it was nevertheless above the world level but less than the price prevalent in other Middle Eastern areas. If the maintenance of Iraq's economy is a political desideratum, then His Majesty's Government were justified in paying a special price for the Iraqi barley surplus, for which there would have been no other outlet.

32. In the field of finance, mention should be made of the Bill passed by the Iraqi Parliament on the 28th May providing for two loans, one a short-term loan for ID.1 million at 3 per cent., the other a long-term lottery loan at 4 per cent. The Iraqi Government sent strong delegations to the Middle East Financial Conference in April and to the International Monetary Conference held in the United States in July. In December representatives of the Treasury and Board of Trade after some weeks of successful negotiations in Egypt, allotted five and eight days respectively to Bagdad in an endeavour to persuade the Iraqi Minister of Finance to agree to a new system of allocating dollar and other "scarce" foreign exchange for Iraqi's essential needs in 1945. These hurried discussions unhappily led to no result and at the close of the year no progress had been achieved.

Conclusion.

33. The year 1944 saw the continuance of the good relations which subsist between Great Britain and Iraq, and it is probable that amongst Iraqis as a whole a more genuine desire exists than at any time in the past to strengthen the bonds of friendship and co-operation between the two nations.

34. As the war begins to draw to its close, however, various questions which have been held in abeyance are coming before the public notice and are causing grave anxiety to those who are interested in the preservation of Anglo-Iraqi relations. Foremost amongst such questions are the problems of Palestine and the Levant States. It was events in Palestine which produced and accelerated the deplorable deterioration of Anglo-Iraqi relations in the years 1935 to 1941. It is equally true now that good relations between Great Britain and Iraq could not survive a settlement which gave the Jews a dominating position. Indeed, any settlement which did not safeguard what the Arabs believed to be their rights in Palestine and the Levant States would profoundly affect relations between Iraq and her ally. It seems inevitable that the Arab Unity talks in Egypt, even though they do not result in a formally constituted Confederation, will lead at least to some agreed scheme among the Arab States to oppose any unacceptable policy which may be adopted by foreign Powers. It must, unfortunately, be expected that Iraq will take a prominent part in any such plan and that her opposition which in the past has been instinctive and badly organized will in the future assume a more formidable character.

35. If, however, the end of the war sees a settlement of these questions which is not unfavourable to the Arabs, the chief political stumbling block in Anglo-Iraqi relations will have been removed, and provided that we treat the Iraqis with wisdom, there is no reason why their present reliance on us should not continue indefinitely. But it must be remembered that complacency is always a mistake in this country and that the situation can change with dramatic suddenness.

36. The Iraqis are, at the moment, in the pleasant position of being wooed by the Americans, and it is probable that in the near future they will be made much of by the Russians as soon as the Soviet Minister takes up his abode in Bagdad. They feel nowadays that they have a definite position in the international scheme and that they are no longer dependent on us as they were in the past. They keep a careful watch on how we act towards their neighbours, and they are quick to notice and resent any more favourable treatment that we may give to others.

37. In these circumstances, it obviously behoves us to take nothing for granted. We must be zealous in preserving the predominant political position which we have gained, and in so acting we must realize that the Iraqis have grown up and must be treated as adults. We must take advantage of the undoubted opportunities which exist for British business enterprise, bearing always in mind that other nations are in keen competition. There are some major contracts which it is important that we should secure while a larger supply of manufactured goods to this country in exchange for its valuable primary products will both benefit our trade and assist us politically. It is worth while taking trouble over Iraq, and in this and other fields it should be treated as favourably as adjacent countries. The prompt provision of first-rate British officials for the Iraqi Government, assistance in schemes of public health and an extension of the excellent work of the British Council will also be of value. Given these things, together with the maintenance of our imperial resources, prospects are favourable for Iraq and for the strengthening of the Anglo-Iraqi connexion.

[E 627/195/93]

No. 3.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th January.)

(No. 28.)
Sir,

Bagdad, 15th January, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to my despatch No. 510 of the 31st October last, the following report on the main events that have since occurred in this country.

2. Throughout the period under review the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi has remained in office in spite of repeated rumours that it was about to fall. The belief that it could not last much longer was shared by several of its members and the criticism to which it has been subjected in the Chamber of Deputies and in the local press certainly lent colour to the rumours. Nevertheless, it now seems more stable than it did two months ago. It is generally understood that the present Cabinet will remain in being at least until Nuri Pasha and Arshad al Umari return from Egypt. On the 20th December ministerial changes were announced, consequent upon the election of Mohammed Hassan Kubba as President of the Chamber. His place at the Ministry of Social Affairs was taken by Abdul Majid Allawi, a Shia civil servant who was for long a member of the Iraqi Foreign Service, and has recently been head of the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, shortly before his departure to Egypt, gave up his position as Acting Minister of Defence to General Ismail Namiq, who since October 1941 had been Acting Chief of the General Staff. The latter appointment, which was suggested by the Regent and warmly approved by General Renton, had the fortunate effect of not making it necessary for the Minister of Finance to act as Minister of Defence in Arshad al Umari's absence, while at the same time providing General Namiq with a dignified exit from his previous post.

3. Parliament was opened by the Regent on the 2nd December. The Speech from the Throne followed in the main the lines of former speeches and after referring to the great efforts of the Iraqi Government to further Arab Unity and to the continued good relations with His Majesty's Government and with other Powers, went on to catalogue the achievements of the Government and list its aims for the future. The programme was not notably impressive, and was widely criticised in the vernacular newspapers. In particular the absence of any mention of the formation of political parties, or of the freedom of the press, two subjects which have been well to the fore in public comment recently, has caused widespread dissatisfaction. In fact, as I have already reported, the press is now being allowed far greater latitude than formerly; though it is still subject to stricter control than the newspapers of neighbouring countries.

4. In opening the debate on the reply to the Address from the Throne on the 31st December, Hamdi al Pachachi considered it necessary to make a long speech to the Chamber defending his administration, and amplifying its foreign policy. He said that Iraq had played a leading part in the Alexandria Conference, had done everything possible to hasten its meeting, and had besides insisted that something concrete must result from it. He claimed that Iraq was largely responsible for the Alexandria Protocol and the idea of the Arab League. In the second place, he said that Iraq had exerted every effort to persuade the Governments of the United States, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan to recognise the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and he gave the impression that their eventual recognition of that independence was partially, at least, the result of Iraqi efforts. The third plan in Iraq's foreign policy, said the Prime Minister, was support for the Arabs of Palestine. Concrete proposals had been put forward for this purpose. The opening of Propaganda Bureaux in London and Washington had been urged and the Iraqi Council of Ministers had just approved the spending of a sum of 10,000 dinars as Iraq's contribution to these bureaux during the current financial year, to be followed by another ID.20,000 during the coming one. Propaganda, he declared, was most necessary for the Arab cause, and he alleged that Zionism was a graver menace than Hitler. The Iraqi Government had also strongly urged all the Arab Governments to support the "National Fund" started in Palestine to buy up land there which would otherwise be sold to the Jews. There seems to be some prospect that Iraq will subscribe to this activity also.

5. As regards domestic affairs, Hamdi al Pachachi explained that the slowness of the progress in public works, particularly irrigation projects, was largely due to the lack of experts, and indeed I fear this is only too true. Not only for technical spheres, but for such things as medicine and supplies, great difficulty has been encountered in responding to Iraqi requests for British officials. It is most desirable that really capable Britons should be found in the future to make good the present shortage, and to fill future vacancies.

6. "Communism" has been a topic of conversation ever since the announcement that diplomatic relations had been established with the Soviet Union and that a Russian Minister was to be expected here shortly; but the advent of the Russian Consul from Kermanshah just before Christmas to acquire actual and imposing premises for a legation has greatly increased the flood of speculation

and gossip. The wealthy classes are, of course, particularly apprehensive, and even go so far as erroneously to ascribe the Kurdish troubles to Russian inspiration. On the occasion of "Id al Fitr" religious holiday, professedly Communist leaflets were distributed in the streets of Bagdad calling for internal reform, food and clothing for the people and the revival of political life. This manifesto was naturally ascribed to Kamil Chadirehi and his Fabian friends, who are generally labelled as "Communists." Whoever may have been responsible, there is no doubt that many educated young Iraqis are impatient with the selfish maladministration of the "old gang," though the former seem to be almost equally lacking in constructive ideas or the courage to realise them. The discussion in England of plans for social reorganisation have undoubtedly inspired a feeling that the time has come for some measure of social advance in Iraq. It might be expected that the ruling class, if only out of fear, would itself undertake measures of reform, and I and my staff lose no opportunity of impressing this on those who anxiously whisper the word "communism." That reform must come is clear, but that it should have to be the Communists, who profess to be inspired by Russia and by Marxist doctrines, who should lead the public demand, is a pity. But I doubt whether the Pashas can ever be persuaded to abandon their present attitude, and I understand that Mustafa al Umari, the present Minister of Interior, is contemplating the formation of a party to oppose communism and defend vested interests. Political parties, whether Communist or otherwise, are the subject of much talk at the moment, and we shall, I think, see their re-emergence in the not distant future.

7. As I have already reported in detail, Kurdish affairs have occupied much of the Government's time, and also much of mine. There was a violent flutter in the middle of December, when Mulla Mustafa set out on a flag-march towards Amadia and Zakho with what was first said to be 250 armed men, though this figure was later reduced to 85. When asked what he was doing he said to have replied curtly: "Training," and this did not help to make Ministers feel more comfortable. Their immediate reaction in fact has been to support more actively the reorganisation of the army by General Renton in readiness for a possible campaign against Mulla Mustafa in the spring. Indeed, people like Saleh Jabr and Mustafa al Umari are "spoiling for a fight." The Mulla's behaviour has certainly been overbearing and tyrannical; and it is a pity that the Government, by the slow development of their policy and administrative inertia, have allowed a brigand to assume something of the importance of a national figure. His immediate neighbours and many of his humble countrymen who suffer from his exactions and depredations, regard him in no such light.

8. Meanwhile, the Government have taken action, however grudging and inadequate. From the 20th November to the 26th November the Minister of Interior had toured the northern liwas and came back with certain concrete proposals. Hamdi al Pachachi displayed a most commendable spirit of conciliation, and eventually forced through the Council of Ministers an order transferring the Nahiya of Barzan and Mazuri Bala from the Qadha of Zibar (in the Mosul Liwa) to the Liwa of Erbil, where there is an energetic and sympathetic Kurdish Mutessarif, Said Qazzaz. I have considerable hope that this action may go far to restore the situation in Barzan to normal. Efforts are already being made to transport the 800 tons of free barley destined for the area, which has been lying at Aqra for four months; and the mutessarif is himself preparing to visit Barzan, a thing which the Mutessarif of Mosul would not dream of doing.

9. In the debate on the reply to the Address, the state of Kurdistan came under discussion, and Majid Mustafa and another Kurdish Deputy from Erbil made a favourable impression by their exposition of the simple nature of Kurdish grievances and the absence of any separatist ambitions.

10. The rest of Kurdistan has been quiet, the inflated price being paid for tobacco by the Government contributing much to this.

11. The tribal situation remains tranquil. There have been the usual small skirmishes over land or more trivial causes, but these are politically unimportant. I am glad to say that the Political Advisory staff have as usual played a discreet, but effective, part in settling these disputes.

12. The rains have been exceptionally plentiful in the last two months and crop prospects are good. Reports indicate that the proportion of barley sown this year as against wheat may be higher owing to the lack of enough wheat seed. In the absence of unforeseen disease or other natural developments, growers will certainly be faced with a very large surplus, for which it will be harder than ever to find a foreign market even at a price more in conformity with world prices than they have grown accustomed to expect. Meanwhile United Kingdom Commercial

Corporation purchases under last year's agreement are so far proceeding smoothly and rapidly.

13. The supply situation remains difficult, though there has been a slight improvement, particularly in the distribution of rationed commodities. The distribution of "kham," a coarse cotton cloth, has been notably more equitable than before. The efforts of Mr. C. R. Grice, the director-general of local products and acting director-general of imports, together with the activities of Mr. R. Corderoy who has toured most of the country, personally supervising the distribution of cloth, should be mentioned in this connexion. A few days before the close of the year the Iraqi Government were officially informed by Identic British and American notes, that on the 1st January, 1945, Middle East Supply Centre control over a large category of imports would be relaxed. While this announcement at first caused much satisfaction, the range of commodities still to be "screened" in Cairo and, for various reasons, still in short supply, has been found to be so extensive that it has come to be regarded as not meaning very much.

14. In December Mr. Davidson, representing the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, and Mr. Gilbert, of the Board of Trade, visited Bagdad briefly in the hope of agreeing with the Iraqi authorities on the allocation to this country during 1945 of United States dollars and other "scarce" foreign exchange. From the beginning the Minister of Finance proved difficult, and it seems clear that he resented Mr. Davidson's inability to spare more than five days for this capital after several weeks of successful negotiations in Cairo, thinking that an attempt was being made to stampede him into complex commitments without his being afforded sufficient time to consider fully their implications. Other difficulties, such as an incipient Cabinet crisis, also supervened, while there is reason to suppose that the influence of the American Minister, exerted through Ibrahim Kebir, the Iraqi accountant-general, against any arrangements involving strict control of dollar exchange, was an additional complication.

15. Briefly, and in round figures, Mr. Davidson's proposals envisaged a "target" of \$13 million for Iraq's essential purchases in 1945, of which \$3 million would be contributed from the sterling dollar pool, the remainder being obtained from present Iraqi holdings of dollars and potential receipts from exports to the United States. In return, Iraq would undertake to contribute all "scarce" currency receipts into the sterling pool, while at the same time re-imposing import control upon her trade with Turkey and Persia, such control being considered essential to guard against the latter country especially developing into a wide backdoor entrance for dollar goods into this Kingdom.

16. The request for renewed control over imports from Persia proved the principal rock on which the discussions foundered, though there was also trouble over the Iraqi desire to exempt from compulsory contribution to the sterling pool dollar exchange derived from "abnormal non-commercial transactions," that is gifts and/or special dollar credits of one sort or another. The Minister of Finance, Saleh Jabr, proved himself extremely obstructive throughout the conversations, while it has since been discovered that the American Minister was strongly opposed to the Iraqi Government limiting their freedom of action in the disposal of their dollar exchange. Mr. Henderson has indeed made it perfectly plain, in a frank conversation with a member of my staff, that rigorous control over foreign exchange here could only, in his opinion, militate against any desire on the part of the Iraqis to increase exports to the United States, and would besides react upon their schemes for capital development and the extension of cultural relations with America. He feels, I think probably with justice, that the solution lies in agreement between Washington and London.

17. At the time of writing, the position that has arisen with regard to Iraq is under examination by the interested authorities of His Majesty's Government, and I am hopeful that in time some means of overcoming the present deadlock may be found. Were it to continue indefinitely, the repercussions on Anglo-Iraqi relations could only be unfortunate. Meanwhile, pending further instructions from your department, I and the senior members of my staff immediately concerned are doing what we can to bring about a better understanding of the problem as a whole by responsible Iraqis, and to this end our offer has been explained to Ibrahim Kemal, who headed the Iraqi delegation to Bretton Woods. His reaction was very satisfactory and I understand that within twenty-four hours of hearing the story of the recent abortive negotiations, he had already consulted the British Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, and the minister himself. From what I hear, the latter is continuing his studies of the problem, which are likely to be influenced by the exact provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, the final text of which has only to-day reached Bagdad.

18. At the beginning of November, Mr. John Smith, Director-General of Agriculture and Forests in the Sudan Government, arrived here at the invitation of the Iraqi Government in the person of Tawfiq Wahbi, the Kurdish Minister of Economics) to make a report on the forests of Kurdistan. Mr. Smith made a comprehensive tour of the whole area and will be submitting a report shortly. I understand that it will recommend that before anything else is done land settlement of certain forest areas, to be created Forest Reserves, should be carried out by a responsible official. Until this is done no forest can possibly survive the attacks of man and goats. The next step would be the planting of the areas so settled as Government property and the passing of legislation to restrict absolutely all cutting of trees (except for the needs of remote villages) to the reserved areas. Cutting would, of course, be done on a definite plan in these areas and replanting would at once follow cutting. If some such programme were put into effect the forests of Kurdistan, as well as its soil, might be saved from extinction and erosion. But it would, I think, require a number of British officials to carry it out effectively.

19. In December Dr. Wright, an expert in animal products, toured the north of Iraq to make a survey of the possibilities of increasing livestock and its allied products. His report is awaited.

20. On the 28th November four Arab parachutists were dropped from a German aircraft in the neighbourhood of Tel Afar, west of Mosul. Two of them, of no account, were arrested, but two are still at large. It is believed that sabotage and propaganda in exploitation of the uneasy situation in Palestine were to be their main activities.

21. On the 18th November Hama Rashid Khan, a Kurdish leader (of Iraqi nationality) who had ruled the Baneh area of Persian Kurdistan for some two years without any interference from the Persian Government, fled with many followers to Iraq before the advance of General Hooshmand Afshar's forces and surrendered to the Iraqi authorities. He is to live in *résidence forcée* at Kirkuk. The Persian Government are reported to be pleased with the results of the operations. I am sorry to have to report, however, that the Jaf tribesmen who were imprisoned by the Persian General Afshar by a trick last summer are still detained, and no restitution has been made for property confiscated in spite of protests by the Iraqi Government, reinforced by representations made at my request by His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran.

22. An innovation this year was the official celebration on the 24th November of the Regent's birthday. There was a special broadcast from Radio Bagdad and the press published articles praising the wisdom of the Regent and expressing admiration for the Hashimite House in general. His Royal Highness held a *levée* which I and various members of my staff in fortunate possession of suitable clothing duly attended.

23. The Armenian Catholic Patriarch, from Beirut, visited Bagdad on the 23rd November for the centenary celebrations of the Armenian Catholic Church in Iraq. His Eminence called on me at the embassy during his visit.

24. I am glad to report that the B.B.C.'s Arabic broadcasts continue to exert considerable influence here. In two months ninety-eight letters were received by the B.B.C. Arabic section from listeners in Arabic-speaking countries, and of these no less than twenty-eight came from Iraq, which represents nearly a third of the whole. Considering what a hold Berlin's Arabic broadcasts used to have here, and the wide *réclame* acquired by the notorious Yunis Bahri, this spontaneous interest in the B.B.C. seems to me to be an eloquent proof of the value of the London Arabic programme and the authority it now commands.

25. The Amir Talal, eldest son of the Amir of Transjordan, visited Bagdad in October and November and the usual dinners and receptions were given in his honour. He appeared to have a great liking for military life and duties, and spent much time with the detachment of the Arab Legion which is stationed in Bagdad. I have learnt from other sources that the detachment's commanding officer is much pleased at the friendliness with which he has been treated by British officers here.

26. At last a dean has been found for the Law College, Dr. Abdul Hakim al Rifai from Egypt. I hope this will put an end to the regrettable state of indiscipline in which the college has for so long been sunk.

27. Daud al Haidari, the Iraqi Minister in London, returned, together with his two step-daughters, to Bagdad on the 6th November. He intends to have a long rest; but it is not yet known whether he will resume his post in London or not. His Excellency and the two girls are loud in their admiration of the British people's war effort.

28. The reaction of Iraq to the news of Lord Moyne's assassination was one of horror at this dastardly act, coupled with a certain amount of satisfaction that the Zionists had made such a gigantic blunder. Mr. Churchill's comments on this crime caused considerable pleasure here.

29. An interesting British memorial has recently been restored in Basra. It is, in fact, the earliest extant commemoration of the British connexion with this country. In 1836 Chesney's famous expedition started down the Euphrates, but a hurricane overtook them above Anah and one of the two ships, the *Tigris*, capsized. Twenty of the crew were drowned. The members of the council at Bombay erected a handsome memorial tablet with an inscription in English and Arabic describing the disaster and recording the names of all those who took part in the expedition. For many years past the tablet has lain neglected and forgotten in a disused cemetery. Recently, with the assistance of the Royal Engineers and the Iraqi Government Department of Antiquities, it has been re-erected at the foot of the staircase of the British Consulate-General in Basra, and the drinking fountain which it was originally designed to include has at last been added.

30. There have been two sets of Iraqi army manoeuvres in the period, the first in the north, when the Regent was present in camp for several days, and the other in the Muntafiq area and the Western Desert. General Renton appears to be satisfied with the efforts of the more junior officers and the men, but has been drastic in recommending the dismissal of inefficient commanders. The new Chief of the General Staff, General Salih Saib, should prove an energetic director of the army's work.

31. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East; to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East; and to the Government of India; also to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 1531/1190/G]

No. 4.

Sir, K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th March.)

(No. 164.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, 4th March, 1945.

IN my telegram No. 58 to Minister Resident I reported that the Regent made veiled reference to his possible resignation. I thought he was merely talking wildly, and when I delivered Mr. Churchill's message contained in telegram No. 13 from Cairo he did not give me the impression that such an idea was still in his mind. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Regent had also talked to him about resigning, but his Excellency did not take the matter seriously and asked me not to repeat the information.

2. His Royal Highness then went to Mosul for a week and when I saw him yesterday on his return he appeared cheerful and normal.

3. Last night, however, I entertained him at the embassy and on stepping into his car he handed me draft of letter which he said he was going to send to Iraqi Prime Minister to-day. In this document, which is colourless in tone, His Royal Highness refers to the trouble through which the country has passed, the improvement in the political situation which has taken place, and concludes by stating that, as his relinquishment of the regency will not harm anyone in any way, he feels justified in resigning direction of affairs. He gave no reasons.

4. I sought audience with His Royal Highness this morning and begged him to tell me frankly why he proposed to take this serious and unexpected step.

5. His Royal Highness said that he felt he could not continue to work in this country with any chance of success. He was getting little or no help from responsible Iraqis: they were all working against each other and had no thought for the good of the country: almost everything which he wanted done was blocked. He felt he was bound to fail sooner or later in what he considered was too difficult a task for him. He had for some time contemplated resignation after the war was over, but omission to invite him to Cairo recently had led him to decide to

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take the step now. It was obvious that His Majesty's Government did not rate him highly or attach much importance to Iraq now that the war was nearly over. A number of Iraqis had recently said to him that the British always cast away their friends when they were of no more use.

6. These last remarks annoyed me excessively, and I jumped heavily on His Royal Highness. After reminding him that I had explained fully why he had no reason to feel offended because he had not been invited to go to Cairo, I told him bluntly that he was ungrateful for all the friendship which had been extended to him and that the generosity which was shown by His Majesty's Government towards the Iraqis in 1941 was almost unparalleled, in view of how they had behaved. His Royal Highness hastened to retract by saying he did not agree with the remarks which had been made to him.

7. Returning to the main question, I told His Royal Highness that he could not discard his responsibilities. Existence of state of internal affairs which he had described should, if true, be incentive to him to put them right, not to run away. He must think of the consequences of such an action, both to the country and to the young King, of whom I knew he was very fond. He remarked gloomily that he expected the King would be dethroned in due course "with all these Communists about." I reminded him, seriously, that the war was not yet over and that conditions of security in Iraq, which was on our main line of communication to the Far East, were of direct interest to His Majesty's Government. It was true that the country was quiet, but that was because there was a firm hand in control. As he knew, there were many who wanted to relax the present discipline. All responsible Iraqis, and we ourselves, looked to him to rule. His resignation would come as a profound shock to the Iraqis. It would be a crippling blow to the stability of the State. It would inevitably be attributed to the British by all our enemies and might well be the cause of serious disorders in the country. I did not believe Parliament or the country would allow him to go in any case, but he would wantonly have destroyed everything that has been laboriously built up during the last four years. With these and other arguments I sought to deflect him from his purpose and to realise his responsibilities, but I could only succeed in making him promise to take no further action without seeing me first. He has made the same promise to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had audience with him later in the morning.

8. His Excellency and I have not yet decided whether His Royal Highness is merely suffering from inferiority complex of a weak man or whether he has been led astray. His Excellency inclines to the latter theory, but there is no evidence. There is no sensible reason for his attitude. He is on terms of friendship with many British people here, and his relations with me are most cordial. He does not like two of his Ministers, but there has been nothing approaching rupture. He has greatly strengthened his position with Iraqi army by attending most of their exercises and, although Iraqis do not show great enthusiasm, he is not unpopular. There is no local reason for him to be upset and I am inclined to think this disappointing display of his frailties is not to be taken too seriously. For that reason I mixed severity with encouragement in talking to him. Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that the crisis is probably over for the moment, but that danger of some foolish action still exists. Fortunately, no one else knows about it at present, but both his Excellency and the Regent himself asked that I should inform you fully of what has passed to-day.

9. There is no satisfactory alternative to the Regent. Amir Abdullah is unpopular here. Amir Zaid would not inspire public confidence as the Regent and there is no material from which to form a good Regency Council. We have, therefore, to keep to the Regent. I hope that his sense of responsibility will improve with time, but I would be failing in my duty if I did not point out that His Royal Highness was right in saying that there is a growing feeling that His Majesty's Government are treating Iraq with less sympathy than in the past. This country has given less trouble than most for the last three years, but it would be a great mistake to assume that this state of things will continue automatically. Experience has shown that Iraq can be the most troublesome country in the Middle East if its problems are not treated with understanding.

[E 1531/1190/G]

No. 5.

Mr. Eden to Sir K. Cornwallis (Bagdad).

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 8th March, 1945.

YOUR telegram No. 164.

I entirely approve the firm manner in which you dealt with the Regent's threat of resignation. I hope that your words will arouse in him a stronger sense of his responsibilities and that his mood of depression will pass.

2. If you think that it would serve any useful purpose, you may tell him that I was much disturbed by your report that he was contemplating possibility of resignation, and that I fully endorse what you said to him about the grave consequences to his country and to the Arabs in general which such a step would entail.

3. You may add, if you think fit, some reference to the interest with which His Majesty's Government have followed the progress of the Cairo discussions on Arab unity; and you may also add that I look forward to meeting the Iraqi delegation at San Francisco, where they will be able to make a valuable contribution to the great work of reconstruction which the United Nations have now to undertake.

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 39/24/34]

No. 6.

M. Gousser to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th December.)

(No. 4125-A.)

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Soviet Embassy, 29th December, 1944.

WITH reference to the notes of Sir A. Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, dated the 2nd and 20th November, on the subject of Iran, I have the honour, by direction of the Soviet Government, to inform you as follows:—

In September the Soviet Government despatched to Iran a Government commission, headed by M. S. I. Kavtaradze, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to discuss with the Iranian Government the grant to the Soviet Union of an oil concession in the northern regions of Iran. The terms of the proposed agreement, which the Soviet Government contemplated concluding with the Government of Iran on this subject, were very profitable and favourable to Iran, and naturally in nowise infringed the sovereignty or independence of the latter. It was intended at the same time to take into consideration any wishes from the Iranian side and to initiate the practical discussion of the terms of an agreement in the spirit of friendship and alliance existing between the two countries.

At the outset of the discussions M. Saed, the head of the Iranian Government, declared himself favourably disposed towards the Soviet proposals. On this basis the Soviet commission commenced their preparatory labours connected with the discussions. A month later, however, the attitude of M. Saed's Government altered under the influence of pressure behind the scenes, and M. Saed unexpectedly returned to the Soviet commission a refusal to grant the concession. The Government of M. Saed did not even attempt to become acquainted with the Soviet terms for the concession, which, as the Soviet Government expected, would be examined by the representatives of both sides under conditions of free discussion and consideration of mutual interests.

Thus M. Saed's Government carried on the negotiations in a manner obviously disloyal to the Soviet party. This disloyal attitude on the part of M. Saed to the proposals of the Soviet Government, who were sincerely striving to discover means for the practical conclusion of an important economic agreement with Iran, which would harmonise with the interests of both countries and afford Iran considerable economic assistance, together with other facts affording evidence of the hostile attitude of M. Saed in a series of questions relating to Soviet-Iranian co-operation, could not fail to evoke a negative reaction from the public opinion and press of the Soviet Union.

As may be gathered from subsequent events in Iran, the hostile line adopted by the former Prime Minister Saed in relation to the U.S.S.R. was condemned by many Iranian politicians and wide circles of public opinion in Iran.

Such are the facts of the case regarding the Soviet proposals for an oil concession in Iran. The Soviet Government consider it necessary to mention these facts in order that the British Government may be in possession of correct information on this question.

At the same time the Soviet Government cannot pass over the unfavourable attitude adopted by the British in relation to the Soviet-Iranian negotiations for an oil concession.

The Soviet Government are unable to agree with the contention that the grant of an oil concession to the Soviet Union can possibly affect the sovereignty of Iran. Should the validity of such arguments be acknowledged, they would apply first and foremost to Great Britain who, as is well known, has long held a substantial oil concession in Iran.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, there are likewise no practical grounds for asserting that the question of the grant of an oil concession to the Soviet Union cannot be decided at the present time, and that it must be deferred to the post-war period. The former Government of M. Saed were unable to produce a single convincing argument in support of this contention.

The Soviet proposals for an oil concession in Iran do not in any way conflict with the treaty of alliance with Iran of 1942, or with the declaration made by

the three Powers in 1943 on the subject of Iran. On the contrary, the proposals are in complete harmony with the latter and the spirit of both the above-mentioned instruments, which, moreover, contemplated the necessity of the Allies according economic assistance to Iran. It is obvious that a favourable decision on the question of granting the Soviet Union an oil concession would assist in the further development of amicable Soviet-Iranian relations, and at the same time would be one of the methods for giving considerable economic assistance to Iran.

In this sense the Soviet proposals for a concession fully comply with the obligations which the Allies, and in particular the Soviet Government, undertook in regard to Iran, both in the treaty of alliance with that country and in the declaration of the three Powers regarding Iran.

The following additional considerations may be added:—

Early in December, concealed from public opinion and in conflict with Iranian constitutional rules, M. Saed, the former Prime Minister, in company with a certain Seid Zia-ed-Din, succeeded in getting a resolution adopted by the Majlis forbidding the members of the Iranian Government to enter into negotiations with any party on the subject of oil concessions.

In this connexion M. S. I. Kavtaradze, the Deputy People's Commissar, visited the new Prime Minister of Iran and, by direction of the Soviet Government, made a declaration containing the statement that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the above-mentioned resolution regarding oil concessions ought to be reconsidered, as it had been adopted under the influence of the intrigues of hostile elements, such as Saed, Seid Zia-ed-Din and others. Besides this, the said resolution is inconsistent with the fact that a large oil concession held by a foreign Power exists on Iranian territory. Having made this declaration, M. S. I. Kavtaradze returned to Moscow.

In informing the Government of Great Britain of the foregoing, the Soviet Government consider it necessary to state that in the matter of an oil concession in Iran they adhere to the position set forth in the present note and in particular in the above-mentioned declaration made by M. S. I. Kavtaradze, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the new Prime Minister of Iran.

I have, &c.

F. T. GOUSEV.

[E 39/24/34]

No. 7.

Mr. Eden to M. Sobolev.

Sir,

Foreign Office, 20th January, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to M. Gousser's note, No. 4125-A of the 29th December last, regarding the Persian Government's attitude towards the Soviet Government's application for an oil concession in Northern Persia, and to request you to communicate to your Government the following reply.

2. His Majesty's Government are well aware of the decision taken by the Persian Government not to grant any new oil concessions in Persia so long as the Allied troops are stationed in Persian territory. Indeed, this decision was communicated not only to the Soviet Government's representative, but also to the representatives of a British oil company and of certain United States oil companies which had applied for concessions in South Persia some time before the Soviet Government's application was made. This decision appears to have been widely supported by Persian public opinion, as was shown by the subsequent passing in the Majlis by a very large majority of the law of the 2nd December forbidding the Persian Government to enter into any negotiations regarding the grant of concessions to foreign Governments or companies.

3. It is clear that the Persian Government have adopted an identical attitude towards the applications made to them by the Soviet, United States and British interests concerned, and His Majesty's Government feel that it is desirable for our three Governments to endeavour to agree upon a common policy to be pursued in this connexion. The letters addressed by His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to M. Molotov on the 2nd and 20th November, 1944, to which his Excellency referred, were intended to help towards the formulation of this common policy.

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4. I note that in the Soviet Government's view the terms which they intended to propose to the Persian Government were very favourable and profitable to Persia. The position, however, is that the Persian Government are not in fact willing to negotiate any concession for oil at least during the present abnormal war situation, and it does not appear likely, especially in view of the law of the 2nd December, that they will be ready to reverse this decision. His Majesty's Government, who were anxious that the British company concerned should, if possible, obtain the oil concession for which they had applied, naturally had no interest in the passage of such a law and can only regret that the persistence of the Soviet Government's representatives in pressing their demands after the Persian attitude had been made known should apparently have provoked the Majlis into passing this restrictive legislation.

5. In taking the decisions referred to above, the Persian Government and the Persian Parliament were no doubt acting as they thought would best serve the interests of their country, and it does not seem necessary to draw the conclusion that they were actuated by motives of hostility towards the Allied Powers. As an independent sovereign State, Persia has the undeniable right to grant or to withhold, as she may judge to be most advantageous to herself, concessions for the exploitation of her mineral resources.

6. These considerations have led His Majesty's Government to conclude that they must accept the Persian Government's decision, although they have made it clear that, should there be any change in Persian policy, they hope that the proposals of the interested British company will be favourably considered and form the basis of future negotiations. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government do not intend to take any further action to induce the Persian Government or the Persian Parliament to adopt a less negative attitude.

7. Any other course, if it involved an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Persian Government and the Persian Parliament to alter their decisions, would be open to strong objection. His Majesty's Government take the view, with which they trust that the Soviet Government will agree, that pressure against Persia of any kind would not be in accordance with the undertakings assumed by the parties to the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance and the Tehran Declaration of the 6th December, 1943, as regards the maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Persia.

8. As already pointed out, His Majesty's Government have not contested the right of the Soviet Government to apply for an oil concession in North Persia. Were the Persian Government in fact willing to negotiate, His Majesty's Government would, of course, have no ground for objection to a concession granted as a result of free negotiation, as was the case with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession, from which Persia would similarly derive profit and economic advantage. So long, however, as the Persian Government are not willing to enter into negotiations for any new concession, it is evidently incumbent upon other Governments, and especially upon the Governments of Persia's friendly Allies, to respect her wishes and to support her independence.

9. I have felt it necessary to set out the position in some detail owing to the allegation contained in M. Gousev's note, which does not accord with the facts, that His Majesty's Government had adopted an unfavourable attitude in relation to the Soviet-Persian negotiations for an oil concession.

I have, &c.

C. W. BAXTER.

[E 482/20/34]

No. 8.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 18.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 22nd January, 1945.

THE Persian Ambassador called on the Permanent Under-Secretary of State on the 16th January to discuss the present position in his country.

2. M. Taqizadeh said that he had received instructions from his Government to bring the facts before His Majesty's Government so that the latter might have them in mind in the event of a meeting of the three Heads of Governments in the near future.

3. His Excellency said that Russian pressure in Northern Persia was steadily increasing. The Soviet authorities refused to allow Persian armed forces

to enter the region where they were in control, and the Russians could terrorise the population into making such manifestations as they themselves desired. They were also pressing for the repeal of the recent oil concession law, but it was impossible for the Persian Government to agree to this. Generally, the Persian Government were determined to maintain firmly the position which they had so far held. The Ambassador declared that he could not understand the motives behind the Soviet action. It could not really be the need for oil. He said that he had recently read a translation of an extract from an article in *War and the Working Class*, in which it was said that Russia herself did not need the oil, but wished to deny it to the Americans and British.

4. The Ambassador enquired whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared at the forthcoming meeting to put the Persian case and endeavour to secure that Soviet policy should conform to the Tripartite Treaty and to the Tehran Declaration of 1943.

5. Sir A. Cadogan told the Ambassador that if and when a meeting took place, he expected that we should be disposed to raise the question.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 908/31/34]

No. 9.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th February.)

(No. 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, 23rd January, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 18th October, I have the honour to convey to you herein a report on Persian affairs during the months of October, November and December, 1944.

Internal Politics and the Oil Dispute with the Soviet Union.

2. At the beginning of October Sa'id's Cabinet continued to enjoy the support of the majority in the Majlis. The three fractions, the Mihan, the Azadi and the Ittahi Milli, which towards the end of August had combined to form a Government majority, still continued to hold together, although there were signs of disintegration in the largest group, the Azadi. The Majlis was busy discussing a Bill for the Independence of the Judiciary, which was also the subject of many articles in the press. The Government and Millsaugh were studying the problem of unemployment arising out of the dismissal of workmen hitherto employed by the Allies. On the 1st October article 12 of the Compulsory Education Bill, providing for an increase in teachers' salaries, for an expansion in the provision of school buildings, and for special courses for workmen, was approved by the Majlis. Steps taken by Sururi, the Minister of the Interior, to remove the worst criminals out of Tehran to prisons in the south were approved in the press and public opinion. Gholam Hussain Ibtehaj, the chief of the municipality, made a good start by dealing successfully with a strike among municipal workers. A slight temporary drop in the cost of living also had a good effect. Efforts to enlist the support of the press for the Government took the form of frequent invitations by Ministers to press representatives to meetings, at which the former explained the activities of their departments. As a result, the Government was free, for a brief period, from the usual violent attacks in the press.

3. These events were, however, soon overshadowed by a Russian demand for an oil concession in North Persia. Kavtaradze, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who had been in Persia for about two weeks, had informed the Shah on the 1st October that the Soviet Government sought permission to explore for oil over almost the whole of North Persia during a period of five years, after which they would indicate the areas they wished to exploit (the exact figures for the exploration area were 216,000 square kilometres and for the concession area a maximum of 150,000 square kilometres). Kavtaradze further informed His Majesty that he had already approached the Persian Government, whom he found slow to move, and intimated that the Russian Government were not satisfied with Soviet-Persian relations and that the future of Russo-Persian economic relations might depend on the Persian reply to the Russian demand.

4. The news that the Russians were seeking an oil concession was given to the public on the 5th October, when the newspaper *Ittihad* published an interview on the subject with Kavtaradze. Much anxiety had for some time been felt

by Persians in Tehran at Soviet penetration in North Persia. The news that they now wanted an extensive oil concession caused widespread alarm, and the controversy it aroused in Persian political circles put other issues into the background for the rest of the year.

5. The Russians immediately began pulling all possible wires to influence Persian opinion and were supported by a section of the press. The Shah, however, informed His Majesty's Ambassador on the 8th October that the Russian demand for oil rights in the north would be refused, and a few days later Sa'id informed Kavtaradze that the Government had decided early in September to postpone until after the war the question of granting oil concessions. This decision was most unwelcome to Kavtaradze, who said that there might be unpleasant consequences, while acceptance would be most advantageous to the Persian Government, who would enjoy, among other things, the support of the Soviet Government at the Peace Conference. There was little doubt, however, that the decision represented the will of the Persian people. At a secret session of the Majlis only one Deputy, Taimurtash, son of the former Minister of Court, who was elected to the Majlis with Russian help, spoke in favour of the Russian request. Even the Tudeh members, who were for the Russians, at first showed embarrassment, because some weeks earlier, when it was only a question of British or American requests for concessions, they themselves had recommended that no concession be given till after the war.

6. The Persian Government's decision was followed by a violent campaign in the pro-Russian press against Sa'id, whom they accused of being opposed to Russian interests and of adopting a one-sided policy. They argued that the balance in foreign relations upset by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession in the south must be restored by giving the Russians a concession in the north. It was even said that, as Russia did not need more oil, her demand was prompted solely by the altruistic desire to help Persia by developing her resources and providing employment for her people. Few newspapers had yet dared to come out on the side of the Government in this dispute, but as public opposition to the grant of a concession gradually hardened a number of them plucked up courage and began to oppose the Russian demand, in spite of the fact that the editors of the first three papers to do so were threatened by the Russians. In some quarters, however, it was feared that Sa'id might have to resign in the face of the violent Russian opposition, and Taqizadeh, Persian Ambassador in London, now on a visit to Tehran, was mentioned as a successor. The Shah, indeed, was said to be urging Taqizadeh to accept the premiership, but Taqizadeh, after attending a number of conferences to discuss Persia's post-war problems, returned to London on the 28th October.

7. On the 19th October Sa'id made a statement in the Majlis explaining and defending the Government's attitude, and although no vote was taken, there was no doubt that he had the House with him on this issue. The Russians, meanwhile, continued every form of pressure and intensified their war of nerves. They allowed no grain to be moved to Tehran on the Northern Railways. They interrupted telegraphic communication with Tabriz for a few days. On the 22nd October lorry loads of armed Russian troops were seen in the streets and in particular near the Majlis. Deputies were subjected to pressure. Violent attacks on the Prime Minister continued, and in a broadcast from Tehran, which purported to be by the Persian-Soviet Cultural Society, the Soviet Embassy broadcast the Soviet point of view in a most violent form. Moscow radio and papers proclaimed that the Persian Government's decision was not based on public opinion and that the Persian press was in favour of the Russian demand for a concession. Sa'id and his supporters were, of course, described as Fascists. Finally, the story was put about that the Russians considered that their relations with Sa'id's Government were severed. In the circumstances Sa'id was prepared to go, to provide a way out of the deadlock, but the Majlis remained solidly behind him and the Shah was as yet opposed to his resignation.

8. On the 24th October Kavtaradze gave an interview to the Tehran press, in which, after describing in vague terms the advantages to Persia of granting a concession to the Russians, he stated that Sa'id had originally signified complete agreement and promised his help, but that his subsequent refusal had strained relations between Persia and Russia. Sa'id's reply to this was that in the talks to which Kavtaradze referred only the Khourian oil business had been mentioned. In reply to a question put by one of the journalists as to the conditions offered by the Russians, M. Kavtaradze said that that would be discussed afterwards. He thereby confirmed the statement of M. Sa'id that M. Kavtaradze had insisted on the concession being granted in principle without consideration of any conditions

except the areas demanded by the Soviet Government first for exploration and then for development.

9. On the 27th October a demonstration organised by the Tudeh was held in the streets of Tehran. The crowd was accompanied by lorries of armed Russian soldiers. Various Tudeh leaders made speeches demanding the removal of Sa'id and the grant of the concession to the Russians. The effect on public opinion was, however, the reverse of what was intended and merely aroused indignation against the Russians and the Tudeh. By now, too, some six or seven newspapers had come out strongly in favour of the Government, the *Bakhtar*, in particular, urging the Russians not to be misled by Persian quislings, and pointing out that the Persians did not expect such treatment after they had given all possible assistance to the Allies in their war effort. The Government was also moved to action by these events, and a warning was issued by the Military Governor that the regulation forbidding gatherings of more than three persons in the streets would henceforth be enforced. The Prime Minister also issued a statement to the press giving a complete reply to the statement issued by Kavtaradze on the 24th October. Trouble was now reported from Tabriz, Resht, Isfahan and Sultanabad. In Tabriz the mob tried to rush the police headquarters and was fired on, one man being killed and several wounded. Russian troops intervened and prevented the Persian police and military from interfering with the mob. The officer commanding the Persian troops was given twenty-four hours to leave the town. At Resht the shops were closed and the Persian police were similarly prevented from dispersing the crowd. In Isfahan and Sultanabad, where there are no Russian troops, the demonstrations were small and soon dispersed without incident.

10. All the efforts of the Russians to incite the press and the Tudeh to agitate in their favour served only to show that public opinion was opposed to the grant of this concession and was being antagonised and disillusioned by the methods adopted by the Russians. An increasing number of newspapers began to support the Government on the oil question. The Russian censors did their best to ensure that only Moscow's partisan account of the matter should reach the outside world. They not only stopped any press telegrams giving an objective opinion, but suppressed the official Persian version which M. Sa'id tried to telegraph to Persian representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere, first in plain language and then in cypher. In spite of Russian censorship obstruction, however, the Persian Government's version of the matter eventually reached the newspapers abroad. As a result of the publicity which the dispute had now acquired, Russian propaganda began to shift its ground. Sa'id was attacked, not so much for refusing the concession as for upsetting Russo-Persian relations, and he was accused of trying to establish in Persia a base for Fascist aggression against Russia; and the facts were falsified so as to appear to justify Russian indignation.

11. Nevertheless, in spite of public support of Sa'id and the Government, a number of deputies began to find the strain intolerable and the opinion in the Majlis was gaining ground that Sa'id should resign, as a sop to the Russians. The various fractions in parliament began to hold meetings to discuss Sa'id's successor. The majority appeared to favour Dr. Musaddiq, who on the 29th October made a very long speech in the Majlis which created some impression. In this, he went over a lot of old history and criticised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession but finished by advising the Government not to give a concession to the Russians but to form a Persian or an international company to exploit the Northern oilfields and sell the surplus oil.

12. By the 3rd November there seemed to be a slight *détente* in the crisis and it was said that the Russians were prepared to drop their demand for a concession. The Russians permitted the transport of grain to Tehran to be resumed on the Northern railways and the Russian censor passed oil crisis telegrams, albeit very discreet ones, addressed to Reuter and American agencies. But pressure on Sa'id to resign was intensified. The campaign against him in the Russian sponsored press increased in violence and on the 6th November Moscow radio broadcast in Persian "a national protest against the Government of Sa'id," giving reports of alleged mass meetings throughout Persia against his reactionary Government. The Government also had to take steps to suppress another Tudeh demonstration on the 7th November by sending troops to occupy their premises and by arresting some of their leaders. Sa'id was by now receiving information by indirect means from the Russians that if he resigned they would drop their demand for a concession and Kavtaradze would go. Sa'id therefore on the 8th November invited some twenty deputies representing all sections of the Majlis to a meeting and told them to choose his successor.

13. Finally, on the 10th November Sa'id resigned. The Shah informed His Majesty's Ambassador that Sa'id's resignation had been accepted for fear lest the Russians should resort to extreme measures such as instigating a separatist movement in Azerbaijan. For some days after Sa'id's resignation Majlis discussion continued to centre round the nomination of Dr. Musaddiq. On the 14th November the deputies voted almost unanimously for Dr. Musaddiq, but almost equally unanimously against accepting his condition that special legislation be passed authorising him to resume his seat in parliament if he had to resign from the premiership at any time before the end of the 14th Majlis. The various Majlis fractions therefore went into conclave again to choose a Prime Minister, and it was not until the 20th November that Mustafa Quli Bayat was elected Prime Minister with fifty votes against forty-five given to Sadiq Sadiqi. Until the last moment the favourite was Sami'i, formerly a diplomat but now a Court official, but he withdrew and Bayat was apparently chosen, in spite of his defects, as an alternative to Sadiq Sadiqi, who had been heard recommending compliance with Russian demands.

14. Bayat presented his Cabinet to the Shah on the 25th November and to the Majlis the next day. Two of the new Ministers, Khalil Fahimi, Minister without Portfolio, and Sururi, Minister of Interior, had occupied the same posts in Sa'id's Government. With the exception of Nadir Arasteh, the new Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, all the new men had previously held Cabinet rank. Nasrullah Intizam was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs after Muhsin Rais, Persian Ambassador in Bagdad, had refused the post. Kemal Hidayat became Minister of Commerce; Amanullah Ardalan, Minister of Finance; Dr. Issa Sadiq, Minister of Education; Ibrahim Zand, Minister of War; Dr. Said Malik, Minister of Health; Mustafa Adl, Minister of Justice; and Ali Akbar Siasi, Minister without Portfolio. On the whole the new Cabinet was thought to be a fairly good one.

15. On the 2nd December a new turn was given to the oil dispute when Dr. Musaddiq tabled a bill in the Majlis making it illegal for any Persian Government to give an oil concession to any foreign Government or company, but authorising the Prime Minister or Ministers to discuss the sale of oil or the manner in which the Government should undertake the exploitation and administration of its oil resources, and to inform the Majlis. The bill was passed immediately. The Tudeh deputies were completely nonplussed by this new development and asked for time to collect their fraction and discuss the bill, but were refused. The next day Rahimian, deputy for Kuchan, tried to bring forward a bill to cancel the Anglo-Iranian oil concession but could find no backers and dropped it. Discussion on the new Government's programme was concluded on the 4th December and Bayat received a vote of confidence by a majority of seventy-two to nine with sixteen abstentions.

16. In the Majlis itself the coalition of the three fractions, the Mihan, the Ittahadi Milli and the Azadi, did not survive the crisis which led to Sa'id's resignation. The Azadi group had disintegrated until by the end of December it contained only seven to eight members. Two new fractions composed of ex-Azadi members and a number of independents were reported to be taking shape during December. These were the Mustaqil group which claimed about seventeen members, and the Democrats, said to number about twelve. The attitude these two new fractions intend to adopt remains to be seen. During the period under review the Majlis passed the credentials of a number of deputies from the North who had been elected with Russian help. The credentials of Mujtahidi, deputy for Tabriz, and of Ovanassian, deputy for the Northern Armenians and a founder member of the Tudeh party, were passed on the 15th October. Those of Ipekchian and Lankarani, both creatures of the Russians, were passed early in December. Lankarani was elected by a particularly shameless exercise of Russian influence. The pro-Government majority in the Majlis, which had long obstructed the acceptance of these Russian-sponsored deputies, had finally deemed it unwise, in view of the crisis in Russo-Persian relations, to maintain their opposition. The credentials of four other deputies were also passed during this period; those of I'timad Toulieh, deputy for Rey; of Murad Aryeh, member for the Jews; of Pur Reza, deputy for Firuzabad; and of Muhammad Hussein Qashgai, who had recently been elected deputy for Abadeh.

17. The Tehran press was divided by the oil crisis into two violently antagonistic groups—the Freedom Front and the Independence Front. The former, consisting of newspapers which receive money, paper and promises of future help from the Russians, violently attacked Sa'id when he refused the oil concession and continued to attack him after his resignation. They also

attacked the ruling classes whom they accused of being the instruments of reaction and imperialism. Seyid Zia, who is a particular object of their hatred, was said to have been brought back by his "masters" from Palestine to prepare another *coup d'Etat*. Taqizadeh was also said to have returned from London with some sinister scheme in connection with the oil question. Towards the end of the period under review some of the Freedom Front papers were comparing conditions in Persia to conditions in Greece and Belgium and were alleging that a fight was going on all over the world between the proletariat and the ruling classes. Meanwhile, however, the number of papers which opposed the Russian demand for a concession had increased until in December they formed an Independence Front in opposition to the Freedom Front. Ra'd Imruz, one of the principal papers of the Independence Front, published on the 21st December a very outspoken "declaration" on the crisis by Seyid Zia, containing a reasoned criticism of Russian policy and methods in Persia which caused a great impression and sent Seyid Zia's stock up considerably.

18. Kavtaradze left Tehran for Moscow on the 9th December but he had previously informed the Prime Minister of the Soviet Government's displeasure at the Oil Bill which, he said, the Majlis would do well to reconsider. Meanwhile Russian propaganda was intensified among all classes and even in the schools. There were further Tudeh demonstrations in Maragheh, Shahpur and Tabriz and trouble in a factory in Shahi where some workmen were reported to have been killed. The year ended in an atmosphere of growing uneasiness and uncertainty as regards Russian intentions in North Persia where they had already begun to exercise a considerable measure of direct political control.

Soviet Affairs.

19. In connexion with the oil dispute, this embassy suggested to the Foreign Office that discussions should be held as to the possibility of withdrawing British forces at least from Tehran as soon as war material and goods despatched to the Soviet Union from overseas were diverted to some other route in Persia. There were many complications, e.g., the arrangement to send a large quantity of aviation spirit from Abadan to the Soviet Union until the middle of 1945; the fact that the presence of Royal Air Force personnel in Tehran enabled the British authorities concerned to maintain their connexion with the Persian Air Force and aircraft factory, and to supply the necessary technical services for the British Airways line to Tehran. On the other hand, withdrawal offered several advantages: (1) if the British evacuated Tehran, the Soviet authorities must either do the same or expose themselves as less considerate than the British. (2) the evacuation of Tehran by the foreign troops would in itself strengthen the Persian Government. (3) if the touchiness of the Soviet authorities was due in part to the suspicion of British motives (as it probably was) an offer on our part to evacuate Tehran, and perhaps other places, might help to calm them down, even if at first they did attribute the offer to a wish to remove Soviet influence from the capital. His Majesty's Embassy pointed out in addition that in a number of cases actions which seemed innocent enough to the doers aroused profound suspicion in the Soviet mind, e.g., attempts made by British parties during the first year of occupation to enter the Soviet "zone" to make surveys or reconnaissances. Moreover, the defenders of the Soviet Government's demand for an oil concession represented it as prompted by the manoeuvre of capitalist concession hunters in Persia. However mistaken, and even dishonest, Soviet accusations in such matters might be, His Majesty's Government should consider seriously all possible causes of suspicion with a view to their elimination or diminution wherever possible. (Possible innocent causes of Soviet suspicion are the continued maintenance by the British authorities of the 300 mile road from Zahidan to Kerman and the 600 mile road from Zahidan to Meshed, and the completion of the Kerman aerodrome, although aid to Russia by the East Persia route has ceased and the danger of a German attack from the Caucasus has passed.)

Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.

20. Our difficulties with the Soviet authorities over the political censorship of books and periodicals continued and, indeed, increased during the period under review. In spite of reminders the Soviet Ambassador did not reply to the protest sent by Mr. Lascelles on the subject in September, and the Soviet censor extended his activities against British publications. Previously he had been opening parcels addressed to the British Council and to booksellers, c/o the Public

Relations Bureau, British Embassy. Early in December, however, the Soviet censor complained that the Public Relations Bureau were selling at their premises copies of publications condemned by him. He therefore gave notice that he would examine all parcels addressed to the Public Relations Bureau direct. This embassy thereupon requested the British censor to inform his Soviet colleague that the publications in question would be withdrawn, but at the same time to protest against the examining of parcels addressed to the Public Relations Bureau, which was an integral part of the embassy and covered by diplomatic privilege. The Soviet censor, however, refused to abstain, so this embassy requested the British censor to express regret to his Soviet colleague that, so long as the latter continued this practice, the British censor would examine all parcels addressed to the Soviet Trade Delegation (who are the main channel through which Russian publications are put on the Persian market and for whom the Soviet authorities claim diplomatic privilege). At the same time the British censor was to reiterate the suggestion that both parties should cease to conduct political censorship.

21. The question now arises whether the British organisations concerned should or should not put on the Persian market copies of publications condemned by the Soviet censor, which reach them by channels not liable to censorship (*e.g.*, by diplomatic bag). This embassy expressed the view to the Foreign Office that the Public Relations Bureau should not sell such publications in their own shops, but it seemed a pity to forbid their distribution to private booksellers, as the Soviet censor had by now condemned a wide range of publications, mostly on preposterous grounds, and many of them standard works. The instructions of His Majesty's Government on this point are awaited.

22. The American Embassy in turn are now worried at the large proportion of American newspapers and periodicals which fail to reach American subscribers in Persia, and they unofficially informed this embassy that they were thinking of reporting to their Government that this was presumably due to the Soviet censor. This embassy replied that they understood the anxiety of the American Embassy, and that, for reasons of their own, they would not regret it if the matter was brought to the attention of the United States Government.

23. The Soviet censor has slashed unmercifully the material submitted by the Polish Legation for broadcasting in the time allotted to them by Tehran Radio, so much so that often their programme had to be confined to gramophone records. To restore the balance, the British censor was requested by this embassy to cut objectionable material from the material submitted for broadcasting by the Soviet-sponsored Polish Patriots. The Soviet authorities countered this by broadcasting the whole of the Polish Patriots' material without submitting it for censorship, prefacing the broadcast with an announcement that it was given under the auspices of the Soviet Embassy (and consequently not liable to censorship).

Security.

24. There are signs that the Soviet authorities are planning to use as agents some of the Persians interned for activities directed against the Allies.

25. The Persian internees are divided into those who are mainly a British and those who are mainly a Soviet concern. The British authorities allowed the Soviet authorities to take to Resht for interrogation two Persians on the British list: the Mullah Kashani, who is perhaps the most important and most dangerous of the Sultanabad internees, and Naubakht, who also played an important part in the plot against the Allies. It was noted with surprise that the Soviet officers who returned them to the British security authorities treated them with the greatest consideration, shaking hands with them and parting with them on the most friendly terms. Kashani expresses the greatest detestation of the British and says openly that when he is released he will do us all the harm he can. He would make an ideal Soviet agent.

26. Neither side releases any internee without the concurrence of the other. The Soviet Embassy recently sent to this embassy their first list of internees whom they proposed to release. Among the names was that of General Aghevli, who at the time of his arrest was commanding the gendarmerie. For some time the Soviet security officers had been trying, without success, to persuade the British security officers that Aghevli had not taken any serious part in anti-Ally activities. The attitude of the British security officers was that both written and oral evidence showed conclusively that Aghevli held a key position in the plot, and this, combined with his intelligence and his official position, made him a most dangerous enemy of the Allies. This embassy therefore felt bound to refuse his release, giving the above reasons, and adding that, if his name had not

been on the Soviet list, we should have put him on ours. There is no doubt that the Soviets expect assistance from Aghevli if he is released, in return for their unexpected and undeserved leniency.

27. A number of the less important Persians on the British list of suspects have been released, with Soviet consent, during the period under review. Piqued, however, by our refusal to release General Aghevli, the Soviet Embassy refused to allow this embassy to release four unimportant suspects, alleging that they were highly dangerous. This embassy replied that, in view of the Soviet Embassy's objections, these men would not be released, but took the opportunity of pointing out that it would not have submitted their names to the Soviet Embassy if the British security authorities had not previously ascertained from the Soviet security authorities that there was no objection from the Soviet side to their release; it was unfortunate that the Soviet security authorities had failed, apparently, to keep their embassy fully informed in this matter.

"Aid to Russia."

28. The assembly of United States aeroplanes for the Soviet Union at Abadan ceased at the end of November. The assembly of British aeroplanes continued at Shaiba but on a very reduced scale.

29. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the United States Army Motor Transport Service ceased lifting "Aid to Russia" cargo during the period under review. The United States trucks are being transferred to other war theatres. Transport of freight through Persia for "Aid to Russia" is now confined to the railway, except for such freight as can be carried in trucks assembled in the south for the Soviet army.

30. On the 15th December, 1944, the United States truck assembly plant for imported cased motor transport was closed down and the plant and equipment was dismantled and is now *en route* to the Soviet Union for re-erection in a Black Sea port, preparatory to the opening up of direct shipping from the United States to Black Sea ports. The only truck assembly plant now working is the United States plant at Khorramshahr, and the output from this has been raised to 5,000 imported trucks per month. There are enough cased motor transport on hand and *en route* to keep output at this rate until the end of April, when this plant will be available for transfer elsewhere. With effect from the 1st January the British Army vehicle assembly plant at Rafidiya will no longer be required to assemble cased motor transport for the Soviet Union.

31. From the 1st January, 1945, the port of Bandar Shapur will not be utilised for discharging "Aid to Russia" cargoes as the number of ships is now so limited that Khorramshahr can easily handle and despatch all "Aid to Russia" cargo now arriving. February 1945 is the latest month in which United States "Aid to Russia" ships will arrive in the Persian Gulf. They will thereafter proceed to Black Sea ports. It would appear that from the 1st March, 1945, the only ships entering the Persian Gulf with "Aid to Russia" cargoes will be occasional ships from India and Ceylon.

32. A considerable number of United States motor truck and port operational personnel are now being despatched to other theatres of operation.

33. The supply of motor spirit to the Soviet Union from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refineries at Abadan ceased in November, but the supply of aviation spirit will continue till the end of June 1945.

American Interests.

34. In the course of their talks with the State Department regarding the Soviet oil crisis, His Majesty's Embassy in Washington reported that Mr. Wallace Murray, who deals with Middle East affairs in the department, was constantly preoccupied with the fear of Soviet penetration in the Balkans and the Middle East, and his views about the Soviet Union were increasing his desire to co-operate with the British on every issue and in particular to consult with the British in advance on all matters and to concert action.

34A. At the end of December Brigadier-General Booth took over from Lieutenant-General Conolly the command of the American Persian Gulf Command.

American Advisory Mission.

(a) Millspaugh Mission.

35. The oil crisis very much overshadowed the Millspaugh crisis during the period under review and there were fewer attacks upon Dr. Millspaugh. This

was also partly due to the improvement in the economic situation. Much of this progress was due to the course of the war, though Dr. Millspaugh claimed the credit in an open letter which he sent to the Prime Minister early in October. In this letter he stated that everything possible had been done to secure adequate quotas for imports, that prices were falling, that monopoly goods were being distributed, that road transport had improved, that a large stock of grain was in hand and that revenue had increased. He added, however, that as the special powers in economic matters conferred on him by the Majlis were held by some to conflict with the Constitution, he intended in future to act in economic as in financial matters, *i.e.*, under the supervision of the Minister of Finance.

36. Dr. Millspaugh, however, spoilt whatever effect this letter might have had by sending at the same time a letter M. Ibtihaj, the Governor of the National Bank, dismissing him from his office. M. Ibtihaj, a clever but very arrogant and bad tempered man, had for some time been attacking Dr. Millspaugh, whom, with the assistance of M. Sa'id and of the Shah, he tried to unseat during a visit to the United States as Persian delegate to the Bretton Woods Conference. The Persian Cabinet decided that Dr. Millspaugh had no power to dismiss Dr. Ibtihaj, and Dr. Millspaugh countered by writing to all the banks informing them that Dr. Ibtihaj's signature should not be recognised. This violent action had no effect; M. Ibtihaj remains in his post and the affair has so far constituted a defeat for Dr. Millspaugh.

37. In December the new Prime Minister found himself under strong pressure from his supporters among the Deputies to get rid of Dr. Millspaugh or to rescind his special powers. After negotiations between the Prime Minister and Dr. Millspaugh a Bill was presented to the Majlis revoking the exceptional powers under which he administered economic affairs; he would, however, still retain his original powers in financial matters. This Bill had not been passed by the end of the year as the Deputies were unable to reach a decision as to who should inherit the economic powers.

38. Although the Prime Minister would be glad to get rid of Dr. Millspaugh altogether, he appears anxious to keep the rest of the Millspaugh Mission, and His Majesty's Government have instructed this embassy to do everything possible to secure their retention. Meanwhile that stubborn old gentleman seems to have given up any idea he had of resigning in February.

(b) Military Mission.

39. General Ridley has gone to America. From confidential sources it is known that he is to discuss the future of the American Military Mission, whose contracts expire this spring, and to arrange for the shipment of equipment for the Persian army. There is a general lack of enthusiasm among the officers of his mission, a feeling that there is little that they can achieve. They have, in fact, improved the supply and transport arrangements of the Persian Army, but their control ceases as soon as issues leave the depots. Even so, a greater proportion does perhaps reach the man in the ranks than reached him two years ago.

(c) Gendarmerie Mission.

40. The State Department succeeded in persuading the War Department in Washington of the importance of helping the Persian Government to improve their police. They did not, however, feel justified in proposing the matter to the Persian Government; the latter, either of their own accord or at British prompting, must make a definite request that Colonel Schwartzkopf should take over the police as well as the gendarmerie, and that additional American officers should be engaged to train the former. His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to impress on the Persian Government the importance of acting quickly in the matter. Approaches to the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have, however, produced no result so far. It may be that the known hostility of the Russians in the presence of American advisers in Persia makes the police unwilling to add to the number of such advisers when Persia is already being accused by Russia and the pro-Russian Persian press of following a "one-sided" policy.

Anglo-Persian Public Relations.

41. The British and American attitude in readily accepting the Persian Government's decision to postpone consideration of the granting of oil concessions until after the war has reflected to our credit by comparison with the aggressive reaction of the Russians. The increased fear of Russian post-war designs on

Persia caused by this has not been balanced by any great reliance upon Britain's ability to restrain them. It has rather resulted in a general desire to be rid of all foreign interference in and control over local affairs. The decrease in the activities of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has not attracted much attention, and public opinion looks forward to the end of the war for a more general relaxation of all foreign control such as that exercised by the Middle East Supply Centre over local imports.

42. The Persian press has continued to report favourably upon Allied successes and, in spite of being very much occupied with reporting local problems, has devoted just as much space as formerly to the war. The Greek situation has been much commented upon from both points of view.

British Propaganda Activities.

43. A slight increase in the sales of the *Tehran Daily News*, published by the Public Relations Bureau, was noted during the last three months. The continued and growing success of the *Children's Newspaper*, published in Persian, has aroused a certain amount of comment in the Persian press probably caused by a feeling of envy that their own publications have not achieved the same measure of popularity amongst their own people.

44. The showing of Ministry of Information newsreels in public cinemas throughout Persia has suffered on account of the strike of the Tehran cinemas which have remained closed for some six or seven weeks as a protest against new municipal taxes. The Films Section of the Public Relations Bureau is, however, more active than ever, operating seven touring cinema vans and nine portable 16-mm. projectors in British Council Institutes and local colleges and schools in addition to its own Tehran Newsreel Theatre where free educational programmes are shown to school-children twice every morning during term-time. There is a constantly growing demand for film shows from all varieties and classes of Persian associations. British feature films have hitherto been conspicuous by their absence from Persian cinemas, and it is good to report that in December the first important sale of British films was completed by the Public Relations Bureau with contracts placed for twenty-four films.

45. His Majesty's consulates continue to be fed with publicity material for distribution although this is hampered by the arbitrary holding-up of apparently innocuous material by the Russian censors. It is remarked that there are increasing requests for new reading rooms in the provinces. The Irano-Soviet Cultural Society is trying to increase its influence in the provinces by methods which are not always popular.

46. This embassy has had under review the question of broadcasting in foreign languages from Tehran Radio. This embassy and various other Allied Missions in Tehran each have short periods allotted to them every week for propaganda broadcasts. It was in any case clear that this was one of the first propaganda activities which this embassy would have to close down when things began to return to normal in Persia; certain other Allied Missions, such as the Netherlands Legation and the French delegation were already losing interest in their own broadcasts; the Polish Legation broadcasts were becoming less and less necessary as the number of Polish evacuees diminished; finally (as reported in an earlier section) these foreign propaganda broadcasts had led to an undesirable censorship squabble between this embassy, defending the interests of the Polish Legation, and the Soviet Embassy, defending those of the Polish Patriots. This embassy therefore recommended to the Ministry of Information that they should take the lead in giving up these broadcasts, and it has been decided to withdraw on the 21st March, the Persian New Year's day.

Indian Affairs.

47. In October an Indo-Iranian Cultural Society was formed in Tehran and was given its official baptism on the 17th at a public meeting which was attended by the Persian Prime Minister and His Majesty's representative and leading Persian educationalists. By the 4th December the statutes and rules of the society were finally approved and published, and a Managing Committee of fourteen chosen, *i.e.* :—

- (1) Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- (2) Persian Minister for Education.
- (3) The Chancellor of the Tehran University.
- (4) The head of the Persian College of Arts.
- (5) The representative of the British Council in Persia.

- (6) One representative of the British Embassy (the Government of India counsellor).
- (7) The attaché for Indian affairs.
- (8) The Indian Trade Commissioner; and
- (9) Six prominent savants of Persia approved by the Minister of Education.

The society meets weekly and is at present busy trying to find Persian lads capable of taking up the seventeen scholarships generously offered by the Government of India, viz.: (1) Six at the Aitchison College, Lahore; (2) four at the Agricultural College at Lyallpur; (3) two at the Forest Rangers course in Dehra Dun; and (4) five at the Delhi Polytechnic (three in engineering and two in textiles). The work drags partly because it is essential that no student should be sent to India unless his knowledge of English is really sufficient to enable him to follow the course, and partly because there is much anti-Indian prejudice to be overcome.

48. The four Indian teachers of English have just reached Meshed (2), Kerman and Yezd, and are already finding a great demand for their services in Persian schools, and also in private classes and for individual tuition. On the success of these four teachers depends the question of obtaining more Indian trained teachers of English to supplement the excellent work being done by the British Council.

49. Major Hassan of the Indian Army has been selected to be the first Indian Trade Commissioner to Persia and is undergoing a course of training in India before taking over his post in January or February. Suitable offices for him have been rented in as central a position as possible.

50. The British Indian Community in Tehran having represented that they would like to entertain Indian troops stationed there, a combined military and civil Indian Troops Welfare Association was formed in October with the object that every week some fifty Indian officers and other ranks should be entertained by members in turn either in their own houses or in the Indian Young Men's Christian Association building. These parties are purposely kept small in order that the personal aspect should be maintained and have been a great success. A fund is contemplated in order to cover large-scale entertainment on certain Indian religious festivals and holidays.

51. The Government of India continue to interest themselves in post-war propaganda in Persia as is shown by their generous offer of seventeen scholarships varying from two to six years in technical, agricultural, forestry and education colleges in India, and also by the appointment of an Indian Trade Commissioner at Tehran. Enquiries are also being made whether an Indian film company could operate in Persia.

British Military Interests.

52. Thanks partly to better co-operation from the Persian authorities, there has been a reduction in the stealing of telephone wire which has been the cause of great inconvenience to the Allied military authorities. It still continues, as does the pilfering on a considerable scale of Allied military stores, but an improvement may result from the application of military government law to offences committed on the railway and on roads used by Allied troops. This will allow of the more speedy trial of offenders and the award of more severe sentences than are permissible under the ordinary law.

Persian Forces.

53. *The Army.*—The army remains handicapped by shortage of funds; the current year's budget not yet having been passed by the Majlis, it lives from hand to mouth on monthly credits on the scale of 1/12th of the previous year's budget. An additional credit of 15 million tomans, particularly for the purpose of increasing the pay of officers, was sanctioned by the Majlis in October but Dr. Millspaugh has not yet made the funds available. In spite of this, morale of the lower ranks has slightly improved; the troops are generally a little better fed, a little less ragged; the condition of animals in Tehran has markedly improved and there is now sufficient transport for the distribution of supplies and clothing. Certain operations, to which further reference is made later, have met with a success which has done something to restore the army's confidence in itself. But political intrigues, personal ambitions, dissensions among officers, favouritism, and the always existing uncertainty that arises from the ambiguous positions of the Shah and the Ministry of War in relation to the army, all combine to prevent the consistent execution of a practical policy to reform. Tudeh party

propaganda has recently been directed towards junior officers and non-commissioned officers urging them not to allow themselves to be used as tools of the reactionaries, particularly in the suppression of the legitimate aspirations of their oppressed brothers, inciting them against the exploitation of their corrupt seniors and encouraging them to become politically educated and politically minded. As this propaganda is generally believed to be inspired by the Soviet Authorities, it is not without effect on those who expect that Soviet favour may affect their prospects.

54. Ibrahim Zand was re-appointed Minister for War after an interval of three months and almost immediately came into conflict with the vigorous personality of General Razmara, the Chief of the Staff. The latter had offended the Shah by some rather arbitrary actions, lost some favour with the Soviet authorities who considered him to blame for repressive action taken by the Military Governor against Tudeh demonstrations and antagonised a number of the Deputies by his successful and selfish exploitation of various sources of income, by his widespread intrigues and by his boundless personal ambition. He was dismissed on the 21st December, but he will be heard of again. He is about the ablest and most energetic officer in the Persian army, but quite unprincipled. There is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities are annoyed at his dismissal, the indications of their displeasure having been intended only to bring him to heel. He has been succeeded by General Hassan Arfa, who has some ability, but is little respected in the army and has faults of character that make his success doubtful. His mother was Russian; he himself has a very lively fear of Soviet designs, and, although inclined to be xenophobe, he is not, at present, unfriendly to us.

Air Force.

55. Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakhchevan, at that time commanding the Persian Air Force, left Tehran on the 28th October, 1944, accompanied by Colonel Bayendor, Persian air attaché in London, for a visit to England. General Nakhchevan returned on the 12th December, 1944, greatly impressed by what he had seen in England and by the courtesy and hospitality he had experienced. During his absence his enemies had succeeded in getting him replaced in the command of the air force, by Sartip Ahmad Khosrovani, an air force officer, who had, however, no connexion with the air force for about three years. General Nakhchevan was offered the new post of Inspector of the Air Force, but declined it. On the 27th December, 1944, accompanied by Colonel Siah Poosh, an English-speaking technical officer of the Persian air force, he left for America in the aircraft that took General Connolly of the United States Persian Gulf Command back to the States. This visit, according to General Nakhchevan, had been provisionally arranged while he was in London, as an antidote to that of Colonel Khosrovani, brother of the General, who had been sent to attend the Chicago Conference on civil aviation and is still in America.

Civil Air Lines.

56. Two of the three Dominies ordered by the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones were delivered in October 1944, and are now operating on the Tehran-Bagdad route. The third force landed on its way to Tehran and was taken back to Habbaniyah for repairs, where it still is.

57. The group who are seeking to establish a commercial air line have formed their company and are about to approach the Majlis for the necessary authority to operate. G. H. Ebtehaj is managing director and the board includes some good names. They seem anxious to work closely with British Overseas Airways Corporation, and this attitude shows signs of provoking the usual Russian reaction. Meanwhile the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones declare they will not relinquish their own services to anyone. They too are anxious for British help, so they say.

Tribal Situation.

58. The tribal situation has on the whole remained remarkably quiet. The operations against Hama Rashid of Baneh, which were referred to in my last quarterly despatch, resulted in the occupation with little opposition of Baneh and later of Sardasht and in the expulsion of Hama Rashid from Persian territory. He has now been removed from the vicinity of the frontier by the Iraqi authorities. The Persian Government have given up the plan to ask for Hama Rashid's extradition but are asking for the sheep and other property which he carried off to be returned. On the other hand the Persian Government

have not yet released the Jaf chiefs who were imprisoned some months ago, apparently in inhumane conditions, on the charge of crossing the frontier into Persia (1) without permission and (2) carrying arms. Most of the chiefs of this area have made their peace, for the time being, with the Persian authorities, and if the Persians were capable of just administration and a consistent policy they would now have the opportunity of relieving Kurdish fears and laying the foundations of a permanent settlement. Little has been heard recently from Persian Kurdistan of aspirations to autonomy, but Russian contacts with the Kurds, for whatever purpose they may be, are maintained.

59. Disarmament of the Arab tribes of Khuzestan continues. After some 1,000 rifles had been collected from the Arabs of the Ahu Dasht area the Persian troops turned their attention to the Beni Turuf, who, with opposition from only a small section who fled to Iraq, surrendered some 1,300 rifles. The Beni Tamim have now begun to hand in their arms.

60. In Kuh i Galu a delicately-balanced situation exists between the conflicting sections of the Boir Ahmadi. Both sides are wearying of the tension and showing a tendency to come to terms. Whether this will be to the benefit of their neighbours only time will show. There has certainly been less than the usual Boir Ahmadi raiding since the tribes were occupied in sparring with each other.

61. The so-called union of the tribes of the south continues to attract the interest of the Russians and the hostility of the Tudeh press. To both it looms as a plan organised by the British for the support of feudalism and reaction as a defence against the purer tenets of the Tudeh party, or more simply, as a scheme for the establishment of an armed *bloc* under British influence to be used, if necessary, against a Russian-inspired revolution of the working classes. According to this unfounded theory, not only do the reactionaries, by whom the British are clearly meant, oppose any suggestion that these tribes should be disarmed, but they connive at the supply to them of arms and ammunition and may even supply them themselves.

Finance.

62. Although over nine months of the financial year (which began on the 21st March, 1944) have gone by, the budget has not yet been passed by the Majlis and Government expenditure has been authorised by votes on account from month to month. Nor have the monthly figures of revenue and expenditure been published, but this embassy is informed that those for the first eight months of the year are as follows (figures for the preceding year are shown for comparison):—

	1943-44. ⁽¹⁾	1944-45.
	(million rials.)	
Ordinary Revenue	2,871	2,582
Ordinary Expenditure	2,263	2,544
Surplus	608	38
Commercial Revenue	1,364	2,355
Commercial Expenditure	2,228	2,841
Deficit	864	486
Net Deficit	256	448

63. The estimates for 1944-45 show a deficit of 611 million rials on the Ordinary budget, and a surplus of 612 million on the Commercial budget. It is impossible to say at the moment how the Commercial budget will turn out, as the magnitude of the Government's commercial operations, i.e., purchase and distribution of food-stuffs and other goods over the remainder of the year, has not yet been determined. It is clear, however, that the estimates for the Ordinary budget have proved over-optimistic. In particular, receipts from income tax will be very much below those estimated; so far they have been less than for the same period in 1943-44, when the rates were considerably lower. It seems hardly possible that expenditure can be kept to a sufficiently low figure to compensate for this failure.

⁽¹⁾ The figures for 1943-44 differ to some extent from those previously given, and are indeed the third set of figures produced. The differences are the result of adjustments made between the Ordinary and Commercial budgets. It is to be hoped that the present figures are final.

64. Sales of gold for the account of His Majesty's Government have continued during the quarter. The bulk of this gold is, as is known, smuggled over the border into Iraq; and sales have varied according to the demand there and in other Middle-Eastern countries, and the comparative ease or danger of the smuggling traffic from time to time. The price is adjusted periodically to the changing demand; but the market is a difficult one to forecast. The proceeds of sales during the quarter have been equivalent to £1.57 million. The question whether sales of gold should be continued has been raised separately.

65. The draft of the agreement covering the administration of the Persian railway system since September 1941, which is to be presented to the Persian Government by His Majesty's Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly, has still not been agreed by the Soviet authorities in Moscow, although there can no longer be any possible points of difference outstanding. It can only be concluded that the Soviet delay is deliberate.

Economic Situation.

66. The course of the war since last June has resulted in some reduction of the cost-of-living figure. From 855 in August (July 1939=100) it went down to 656 in November; but there were fluctuations in the interval, and in December it increased again to 684. There will no doubt be periodical upturns rather than a steep decrease unless the war comes to an earlier conclusion than is now generally expected. It is satisfactory, however, that wholesale and retail prices, between which there has been serious discrepancy in the past, are showing a tendency to come more closely together.

67. Credit restrictions by the banks and moneylenders continue to discourage the passage of goods from hand to hand among speculative merchants (which is a feature of Persian commerce), but the quarter has seen the usual steady purchases for provincial consumption after the sale of harvest.

68. The supply of goods from overseas under the aegis of the Middle East Supply Centre has been satisfactory throughout the quarter. Tea stocks are, in fact, so high that the Persian Government have decided in principle to forego their next (1945) allocation of tea from India. In addition to the sugar supplied by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, Persia continues to receive small imports by dhow and relatively small quantities from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but the price of sugar on the open market (as distinct from the Government rations) has risen slightly during the period under review. Textiles are in good supply (but dear) and Swiss artificial silk remains plentiful although, of course, there have been no new arrivals.

69. During the quarter interest has been shown in the re-equipment of some local industries. The Tehran power station is to be extended and new machinery is to be installed in the country's biggest glass factory as soon as deliveries can be effected. No such moves have been noticed in the textile industries, which are not expected to be able to compete with overseas production under peace-time conditions.

Cereals and Agricultural Development.

70. In spite of a fortnight's vindictive hold-up by the Soviet authorities of grain movements from the north of Persia to Tehran (as recorded in the first section of this despatch), grain has been coming in in good quantities and the stock of food grains in the Tehran silo amounted on the 31st December to over 53,000 tons including 31,897 of wheat and wheat-flour, and this ensures sufficiency for 265 days at the present rate of adulteration with barley. In general the Persian Government has in hand the unprecedented stock of 260,000 tons of bread grain.

71. The 1,000 tons of seed-wheat from India reached the Persian Gulf ports in November and was distributed by the Persian officials of the newly-created "Selection of Agricultural Monopolies" of Dr. Millspaugh's Mission.

72. Of the twenty British army officers seconded to the Cereal Collection Team in the Millspaugh Mission, fourteen are to be released for grain collection work in Bengal (7) or return to military duty (7). Their good work has been much appreciated by the American Chief Administrator of Persian Agricultural Monopolies.

Transport.

73. Civil traffic on the railway was well maintained on the whole during the quarter. A lift of about 14,000 tons from south to north was achieved in

October and was raised to over 22,000 tons in December. The average percentages of the target figures which were achieved in the past year are announced as: Goods from ports 91 per cent., cereals 89 per cent. and sugar-beet 57 per cent. The Persian officials concerned deserve some of the credit for the way in which they are learning the task of movement control in difficult circumstances.

74. The Road Transport Administration's position has been greatly improved by their taking over the contracts of Persian lorry owners who were formerly employed by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation on "Aid to Russia." As a result it was possible (on the 22nd December) to make a slight relaxation in the Government's control over privately-owned lorries.

75. The seasonal demands for haulage of cereals, sugar-beet and coal have been met, and the stocks of petroleum supplies throughout the country have been well maintained, except in Tehran where a large unexpected increase in the use of oil-drip stoves has caused a temporary reduction in reserves.

Locust Control.

76. No locusts were present in Persia during the quarter.

77. The normal invasion of desert (i.e., migratory) locust swarms from India during the autumn and early winter was prevented by efficient control in Sind and Rajputana, but there remains the probability that swarms will enter South Persia as a result of breeding which is now occurring in Arabia.

78. This danger was considered by an international conference at Tehran in November, and preliminary arrangements were made to meet it. The Persian Ministry of Agriculture's probable requirements of motor vehicles have been placed before their Road Transport Administration, and the Ministry's stocks of bran and poison in the south are adequate. However, their probable commitments are very large, and the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit has therefore undertaken to carry out any control which may be necessary between Lingeh and Jask. Its locust officer disposes of transport and radio vans supplied by the Persia and Iraq Force, and His Majesty's Government are paying for the hire of local labour and have provided poison and bran.

79. The Government of India have agreed under certain conditions to carry out both survey and control work in the south-east corner of Persian Mekran, on the Indian frontier. Ways and means are now under discussion.

80. Moroccan (i.e., non-migratory) locust egg-deposits which have now been completely mapped indicate that over 110,000 hectares will have to be controlled at the hatching next spring—mainly in Azerbaijan and Gurgan. The Ministry of Agriculture is negotiating with the Soviet authorities for the purchase of oil-cake meal as a bait material; and they have put before the Road Transport Administration a demand for the vehicles which will be required in this campaign.

81. During the period under review the Middle East Supply Centre office in Tehran took over from the embassy the work of co-ordinating locust reports, of representing the United Kingdom and Indian Governments on the Tehran International Locust Control Committee, and of maintaining liaison between the British locust officer in Persia and those concerned in and outside the country.

United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration, and the Polish Evacuees.

82. The total number of Polish evacuees in Persia diminished during the period under review from 5,440 to 4,435. Among those who left were seventy-nine students bound for Beirut University. Attempts are still being made to evacuate the remaining half of the Children's School at Isfahan and their attendant grown-ups. Once they have gone, there will be no Poles left in Persia apart from (a) those employed by the British and American Armed Forces and Government organisations and (b) those living by their own efforts, who consequently are their own masters and free to leave or stay as they wish, subject only to Persian regulations regarding *permis de séjour*.

83. United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration take no financial responsibility for these Polish refugees and, in fact, no responsibility other than that of ultimate repatriation. They are, however, prepared to act (without commitment) in a certain measure as regards transport, through what personnel they may have in the countries concerned. It is understood that the reason for the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration's attitude is that these Poles are not war refugees within the Administration's definition of the term.

British Council.

84. The Council is now responsible for instruction in English to over 4,000 Persians throughout the country, and the demand is increasing. Applications for teachers have been received from many provincial centres where there are as yet no Anglo-Persian Institutes, and textbooks have been sent to schools in these areas. The Institute in Tehran has overflowed into an Annex. The Council has sponsored a series of concerts by the newly-formed Tehran Symphony Orchestra. The Orchestra has given two concerts, both of which were attended by more than 500 persons. In view of the absence in Tehran of a suitable hall for dramatic performances, the cellar of the Anglo-Persian Institute in Tehran has been converted into a little theatre. The theatre was inaugurated with five most successful performances of Wilde's "The Importance of Being Earnest."

85. Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's Representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Minister Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1075/464/34]

No. 10.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th February.)

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, 30th January, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 410 of the 26th October, 1944, and to enclose herewith copy of a further report by the financial counsellor to this embassy on the financial situation in Persia.

2. Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, the Minister-Resident in the Middle East, and to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 10.

PERSIA.

Financial Situation.

THIS report follows in series my general reports of the 3rd July and the 23rd October, 1944 (enclosed with despatches No. 283 E. of the 9th July, and No. 410 of the 26th October, 1944).

Public Finance.

2. The figures of revenue and expenditure for the first nine months of the financial year 1944-45 (beginning on the 21st March, 1944—the Persian year 1323 A.H.) are now available. They compare as follows with those for the corresponding period in the previous year:—

		(Million rials.)	
Ordinary Budget—		1943-44.	1944-45.
Revenue	...	3,287	2,972
Expenditure	...	2,841	2,716
Surplus	...	446	256
Commercial Budget—			
Revenue	...	1,537	2,640
Expenditure	...	2,820	3,115
Deficit	...	1,283	475
Net Deficit	...	837	219

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3. The estimates for the whole year 1944-45 are as follows:—

Ordinary Budget—					Million rials.
Revenue	3,958
Expenditure	4,569
Deficit	611
Commercial Budget—					
Revenue	6,367
Expenditure	5,755
					612 ⁽¹⁾

It may be noted here for reference that the budgetary deficit for the year 1943-44 was 1,052 million rials.

4. As to the Ordinary Budget, the situation is less favourable than appears from the figures in the second paragraph. For one thing, the expenditure does not include the salaries of Government servants for the ninth month (some 200 million rials). The budget, although submitted to the Parliament (Majlis) last June, has not yet been approved, and expenditure is being authorised in the meantime by periodical Votes on Account, the last (like some of the others) having been passed too late for the punctual payment of salaries. More important, however, is the fact that receipts from income tax, which were estimated at 885 million rials for the year, are likely to fall far short of this figure. Although the rates are considerably higher than in 1943-44, receipts in Tehran have been no more than 284 million rials in the first nine months of the year, compared with 273 million in the same period of the preceding year, and this figure has only been reached because the income tax paid by the National Bank has amounted to 140 million as against 40 million last year. Similarly, receipts (including income tax) from the provinces over the period have so far been 430 million as against 500 million in the first nine months of 1943-44.

5. The recent history of income tax in Persia has been unfortunate. There was long and widespread opposition to any increase in the previous inadequate rates, and the new rates were only voted, as from the 21st March, 1944, after Dr. Millspaugh, the American Administrator-General of the Finances, had threatened resignation. Their operation was further delayed by lengthy deliberations of the Parliament over the tax regulations. When these were finally passed, there ensued a widespread movement of something approaching passive resistance on the part of the taxpayer; refusal to fill in returns, obstruction, threats of strikes fomented by the industrialists and bribery on a scale remarkable even for Persia have all contributed to the present position. Dr. Millspaugh attributes the smallness of the collections to the elaborate provisions for appeal against assessment which were attached to his draft Bill by the Parliament; but there is no doubt that he underrated the difficulty of making a country such as Persia submit to heavy direct taxation at short notice, and as matters stand at the moment his scheme must be accounted a failure. If an adequate staff were available, the taxation, or a great deal more than at present, could in fact be collected, as has happened in one province in which the American finance director is of outstanding ability. It may be possible to balance the Ordinary Budget by cutting expenditure. But, except for the army (which accounts for 25 per cent. of total expenditure, with a return of *nil*), the public services of the country, education and public health in particular, are already starved. As to the future, taxation will be even more difficult to collect when deflation sets in.

6. The shortage of income tax receipts has also, as stated in an earlier report, affected seriously the finances of the municipalities, since they were to be financed by a 10 per cent. surtax on income tax payments, in place of other taxation which has been abolished. They are for the present subsisting on loans from the National Bank guaranteed by the Central Government, which will have to honour its guarantees sooner or later. At the present time the Government has reached its statutory limit for borrowing from the National Bank.

7. The activities covered by the Commercial Budget fall into two chief parts: (a) purchase and sale to the public of food-stuffs and piece-goods; (b) administration of the Government factories and properties. Under the latter heading, outgoings during the first nine months of the year have been 820 million

⁽¹⁾ Overall surplus 470,391 rials.

rials as against receipts of 376 million; Dr. Millspaugh's plans for closing or turning over most of the factories to private ownership have not yet materialised. Under the former, large stocks are being held by the Government, particularly of cereals and grain; the budgetary position at the end of the year will depend partly on the extent to which they have been disposed of, and partly on the cost of food subsidies. The figures on each side of the account are likely to be considerably short of the estimates.

8. The general financial situation is aggravated by the Russian occupation of the northern provinces of Persia, which has impeded the collection of taxation in that area, where in normal times two-thirds of the country's revenue is collected. Further, until about a year ago the Russians refused to pay customs duties on their imports; and, although they now pay, they estimate the amount payable themselves and do not allow the Persian officials to examine the goods. Again, they are dilatory in their payment to the Persian Government for purchases made (although there is some sign of improvement in this respect), while they demand immediate cash for their sales. They are also in arrear in their payments for munitions from the Persian factories; and they obtain local currency which they require largely by selling goods imported from Russia (and possibly Japan) on the open market at prices much higher than the Government-controlled price.

9. As a result of the change of Government, M. Ammanullah Ardalan succeeded M. Zarrinkafsh as Minister of Finance towards the end of November. He is a former official of the Ministry of Finance, and has already been Minister. He is about as good a man to fill the position as anyone whom Persia can provide.

Banking, Currency and Price Indices.

10. The following table brings up to date the figures given in previous reports of notes in circulation and bank deposits:—

(Million rials.)		
	Notes.	Deposits.
June 1941	1,312	671
June 1942	1,913	1,222
June 1943	4,070	4,553
June 1944	6,262	8,753
July 1944	6,234	8,933
August 1944	6,125	8,511
September 1944	6,215	8,388
October 1944	6,333	8,254
November 1944	6,600	8,852
December 1944	6,640	9,003

11. The following index (prepared by the National Bank) shows wholesale prices and the cost of living:—

(1939=100)		
	Wholesale Prices.	Cost of Living.
June 1941	141	145
June 1942	239	254
June 1943	422	629
June 1944	513	850
July 1944	507	846
August 1944	534	855
September 1944	506	798
October 1944	442	717
November 1944	445	656
December 1944	497	684

12. It appears from these figures that (a) the inflationary process is still continuing after a break following on the invasion of western Europe, and (b) prices which fell partly from the same reason and partly because of improved distribution have now begun to rise again. There is probably, however, some seasonal element in this increase. It is satisfactory to note that the marked difference between the wholesale and cost-of-living indices, the reasons for which were given in a previous report, is now tending to disappear, and the two sets of figures are coming more closely together. The general trend of prices should

now be on the decrease, apart from seasonal factors and such fluctuations as may occur in the course of war operations. Generally, however, it is of advantage to Persia that the decline in prices should be cushioned and gradual. The country is far from ready to meet the shock of post-war economics.

13. Sales of gold in Persia for the account of His Majesty's Government, which began in the summer of 1943, were suspended on the 15th January, 1945. During this period they amounted to a total of £6.95 million. These sales have had no appreciable effect in checking inflation, the purpose for which they were originally designed, but have been useful in the past in enabling His Majesty's Government to obtain local currency at a cheaper rate than that fixed under the Anglo-Persian financial agreement of May 1942. Ultimately, however, the market for gold in Persia reached saturation point, and it appeared about two months ago that (on the best estimates available) about 90 per cent. of the gold sold was being smuggled into Iraq for Iraq itself, Egypt, Syria and beyond. Since the volume of goods obtainable in Iraq in exchange for this gold is very small and the supply of Persian currency there has greatly decreased, the result has recently been that Iraq dinar notes have been finding their way into Persia, with the result that the Government's sterling balances have correspondingly increased. In view of the provision in the Anglo-Persian financial agreement that 60 per cent. of the increase in sterling balances from quarter to quarter is to be converted by His Majesty's Government into gold, its gold sales in Persia have, for the present at least, been discontinued.

Prospective Position.

14. A few months after Dr. Millspaugh came to Persia as Administrator-General of the Finances in February 1943, he took over at the request of the Persian Government certain economic powers in addition. These were mainly (a) the purchase, transport, distribution and rationing of food-stuffs and certain other goods, (b) price control, and (c) administration of the Government factories. When the Government proposed, in the summer of 1944, to take these powers away from him on the ground that he had not exercised them with sufficient competence, he resigned; the Government then withdrew from their position and Dr. Millspaugh withdrew his resignation. Not long afterwards he issued a letter of dismissal to his sworn enemy in Persia, M. Ibtihaj, governor of the National Bank, from his post; but the Government considered that he had exceeded his powers and M. Ibtihaj continued in office. Largely as a result of this exceedingly ill-judged (even if possibly legal) action on Dr. Millspaugh's part, the agitation against him was renewed; and the Parliament, after a typical two or three weeks' debate punctuated by public holidays, lack of a quorum and interpellations on other subjects, passed early in January an Act depriving him of his economic powers as distinguished from his functions in the Ministry of Finance. They did so, however, without having reached, or attempted, any conclusion as to how these functions should be discharged; but they have now appointed a committee (consisting of Persians only) to deliberate on the subject. Some are in favour of establishing a new Ministry of Economic Affairs for the purpose; but it is to be hoped that this will not be done since it would be many months before the Ministry would function with anything approaching efficiency. A better solution would be to attach these functions to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and to appoint a more energetic Minister than the present aged M. Hedayat. This new organisation, if it is to be at all effective, will need to be bolstered by those of Dr. Millspaugh's American staff who have been concerned with this work in the past, using executive rather than merely advisory authority; but the Government's decision is to be deplored.

15. At this juncture Dr. Millspaugh has stated that unless the Government uphold his action in dismissing M. Ibtihaj, he will resign; and a number of his staff have announced a similar intention. These resignations have been deferred for the present until the issue between the two protagonists has been discussed and determined by the Parliament; but it is unlikely that they will decide against a Persian in favour of a foreigner. Nevertheless, Persia is a country devoted, perhaps excessively, to compromise; Dr. Millspaugh does not wish, if he can avoid it, to leave Persia as the failure which he would be accounted to be if he went at the present time, and he has not yet made up his mind whether to leave or to stay. In view of his defects in temperament it is not desirable that he should remain here much longer; but his presence in the country at a time when the financial situation is serious and plans for the post-war period are inchoate would present certain advantages, especially since if he leaves now the more

competent of his American staff may go with him. If he remains for a few months (as at any rate M. Ardalan, the Minister of Finance, hopes he will do), he will be able to see the end of the current financial year, to present the budget for 1945-46; to do something through the American staff to set the new economic organisation on its feet; and to prepare the way for the successor from abroad who is required if the financial affairs of this unhappy, incompetent and corrupt country are to be administered with any degree of success.

E. N. R. TRENTHAM

Tehran, 30th January, 1945.

[E 1466/1466/34]

No. 11.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th February.)
(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 28th February, 1945.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just informed me and my American colleague that the Shah will sign this evening decree declaring Persia to be in a state of war with Japan from the 28th February.

2. The news may be released at noon, Tehran time, 8 hours 30 G.M.T.

[E 1801/103/34]

No. 12.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 53.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, 7th March, 1945.

THE Persian Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, when he said that his Government were most anxious to learn whether there was any information we could give them about the Crimea Conference discussions in relation to their country. His Government's anxieties as to Russian behaviour in northern Persia continued, and his Government would be greatly relieved if I could give them any reassurance on the subject.

2. I replied that some reference had been made at Yalta to the position of Persia, though not formally at the conference table nor at the meetings of the three Heads of Governments. My impression was that the Russians fully understood the concern with which we had watched certain recent developments in Persia and the sincerity with which we held to the terms of the Tehran Declaration, which the Soviet Government had signed together with the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom at Tehran in the autumn of 1943. Though our discussions on the Persian issue had been neither formal nor lengthy, I had the impression that they had resulted in reduced Russo-Persian tension. This impression had been confirmed to me by a recent message I had had from you.

3. The Ambassador seemed slightly comforted by this information, but hinted that there could not be any real easement of the situation while foreign armies remained in Persia. I replied that the Ambassador would be aware that by the terms of the Tehran Agreement the three Great Powers were obliged to withdraw their armies within six months of the end of the Japanese war and that this date might not now be very far distant. So far as we were concerned, we were not opposed to Allied examination to see whether some withdrawal could not be made before that date. In any event our policy remained unchanged, which was to see a strong and independent Persia. The Ambassador thanked me, but left still murmuring under his breath his suspicion of Soviet Russia's intentions.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th March.)

(No. 73.)

Sir,

Tehran, 9th March, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 127 of the 20th March, 1944, I have the honour to transmit herewith a review of the principal events affecting our interests in Persia during 1944.

2. I am indebted to Mr. Lascelles, Lieutenant-Colonel Gastrell, Mr. Trentham, Mr. Monypenny, Colonel Pybus, Air Commodore Runciman, Mr. Somers Cocks, Mr. Seager, Mr. Mackenzie, Mr. Simpson, Colonel Robbins (Military Movements) and Mr. Owen (British Council) for contributions to this report.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Minister Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Introduction.

THE report for 1943 recorded a stormy and eventful year, at the end of which the Persian ship of state appeared to have reached comparatively calm waters. Serious tribal disturbances in the south, fomented by German agents, had been survived, though with small credit to Persian arms. A start had been made, with the help of the American experts, on the formidable task of bringing order out of the chaos of the economic and financial administration. Other American experts had been engaged to assist in the regeneration of the army, the police and the gendarmerie. Persia's declaration of war on Germany, and her subscription to the Declaration of the United Nations, seemed to have brought her down finally on the right side of the international fence. The special pronouncement concerning Persia which had been issued by the participants in the Tehran Conference appeared to have assured for the future her position as an independent and sovereign State.

2. No such major events marked the course of the year 1944 in this country. There were no really serious tribal disorders. No crisis comparable with those of the preceding year occurred in the collection and distribution of food supplies. For more than half the year the Government was headed by a man who, though neither forceful nor experienced, had at least the distinction, very rare in Persia, of being honest and patriotic.

3. Nevertheless, it was a year of all-round disintegration, and by the end of it the country's prospects of survival were perhaps as dark as they had ever been before. For this, three principal causes must be assigned: Persian degeneracy, American inexperience and Russian ill-will. For the most part the Persians holding office thought of nothing but the promotion of their personal interests, and obstructed even such elementary measures of social reform as the introduction of an income-tax law. The new Majlis, after months of wrangling over the credentials of some of its most suspect members, showed itself even less honest, cohesive and capable than the circumstances of its election might have led one to expect. The American economic experts, some of whom were not of a very high calibre and all of whom were constantly thwarted by a massed array of vested interests, proved in the main unequal to their task. At the head of them, Dr. Millspaugh himself spoiled what chance he ever had by a rigidly authoritarian manner, an inability to delegate work, and indulgence in a whole series of political indiscretions, so that before the year was out he had become almost completely discredited and was about to be deprived of a large part of his powers. The American military advisers accomplished little, but were inclined to pretend that their allotted task was completed, on the grounds that they were not called upon to supervise the execution of such measures as they had recommended. The American police adviser died after accomplishing nothing at all, and was not replaced. The American gendarmerie advisers, though able and invested with wide powers, battled against incredible corruption without any appreciable sign of headway. And evidence accumulated on all sides that the Russians not only viewed this general deterioration with pleasure, but were actively engaged in accelerating its tempo, working mainly through the agency

of the Tudeh party and a number of more or less genuine labour organisations. Of the many groups which were bent on stultifying the work of the Millspaugh Mission, the Tudeh, whose subservience to the Russians became more and more open, was by far the most virulent and—by reason of its Soviet-inspired internal discipline—effective. Innumerable scurrilous newspapers, believed with good reason to be on the Russian pay-roll or supplied with Russian newsprint, unceasingly attacked as "reactionaries and Fascists" all those, whether Persian or foreign, who made any effort to stop the rot. Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai (recently returned to Persia after twenty years' exile in Palestine), perhaps the only politician enjoying sufficient personal prestige to have the least chance of effecting serious reforms, was the object of their most venomous slander, being invariably represented as a British agent.

4. Throughout the northern zone the Russians steadily tightened their grip. They openly encouraged the separatist tendencies endemic in Azerbaijan. They constantly interfered with the attempts of the Persian police and local troops to preserve law and order. They refused to allow the Persian Government to despatch additional troops to the unruly Kurdish areas on the Turkish frontier. They obliged the local governors to expel Persians hostile to the Tudeh. Their presence, if not their active policy, prevented the northern provinces—by far the richest in the whole of Persia—from contributing a fair share towards the country's economic prosperity.

5. Even outside "their" zone the Russians were guilty of extensive economic exploitation. Although towards the beginning of the year they abandoned their original refusal to pay customs dues on imported goods, they maintained their refusal to allow Persian customs officials to check, or even to see, the goods imported. They demanded cash down for all sales to the Persian Government, but were most dilatory in paying for their own purchases. Having originally obliged the Persian Government to supply munitions and small arms without any discussion of prices, they eventually consented to pay on terms which involved the Persian Government in definite loss—and, even on that unfavourable basis, had by the end of the year paid only about one-tenth of what they owed. Having been prevented by Dr. Millspaugh from repeating the arrangements of the previous year for the barter of Persian rice against goods, some of which were unsaleable—arrangements which had involved the Persian Treasury in a loss estimated at 250 million rials—they effectively hampered his attempts to achieve financial and economic reforms in the northern zone by refusing or delaying the issue of passes to his assistants. Moreover, they sold their goods to merchants at such prices and on such a scale as to promote inflation, and one commodity they sold, viz., sugar, must have been rendered surplus to Soviet needs by lease-lend supplies if it was not actually, as some informants believe, lease-lend sugar repacked in Soviet wrappers. They flouted the American efforts to direct road transport into essential channels by using Iransovtrans (a Soviet Government organisation) for unlicensed commercial transport business both within and without the northern zone. They ignored Persian "cabotage" rights by operating unlicensed Russian aircraft on a commercial basis on internal Persian lines. In short, their economic policy, no less than their political influence, was uniformly indifferent to Persian sovereignty and prejudicial to the country's welfare.

6. Towards the end of the year, it is true, the Russians considerably overreached themselves by putting forward a categorical demand for the immediate grant of extensive oil concessions the terms of which were to be discussed thereafter, and this demand, backed by a most violent campaign of intimidation, galvanised even the moribund Persian body politic into a positive reaction and some show of national solidarity. But nothing, unfortunately, led one to suppose that they would not have succeeded immediately had they employed slightly less clumsy tactics; or that they would not ultimately achieve their object by sapping methods. Soviet exploitation of the North Persian oil would unquestionably spell the end of real Persian sovereignty in what is already known—inaccurately but not without cause—as "the Russian zone"; and once these rich northern provinces had been virtually detached the independence and integrity of Persia would be past praying for. Despite the categorical nature of the Tehran Declaration concerning Persia, it is not too much to say that, in the light of all the local Russian activities during the year under review, the disintegration of Persia as a national entity appeared to be the Kremlin's long-term objective. Nor is it possible, for anyone acquainted with the Soviet system and Soviet practice, to comfort himself with the theory of a local policy insufficiently controlled by Moscow.

7. From the point of view of the conduct of the war, the close of the year saw one very important development: with the opening of the Black Sea route, Persia would shortly cease to be a channel for the supply to Russia of any appreciable quantities of Allied war material except aviation spirit. Even aviation spirit would possibly cease to be sent to Russia across Persia after June 1945, and the main justification for the presence in Persia of Allied troops in areas other than those contiguous with the southern oilfields would thereby be removed. But His Majesty's Government considered that British troops could only be withdrawn *pari passu* with the withdrawal of the Russian forces; and although the presence of these forces was probably not essential to the realisation of the Russian political objective referred to above—for which, indeed, a "Baltic States" technique of mock plebiscites and "spontaneous" popular appeals was far better suited—there seemed on the face of it very little prospect of inducing the Russians to evacuate promptly any part of the rich areas of Persia which they had made so nearly their own.

8. Throughout the year the weight of Russian pressure was such that Anglo-Persian relations were largely conditioned by it. There was no cause of direct friction of the slightest importance. Barring one or two minor incidents, the comparatively few British troops in the country behaved admirably. British military intervention in Persian affairs was as unobtrusive as the protection of our vital interests allowed, and was indeed scarcely perceptible outside the oilfields area, except in regard to the internment of undesirables. His Majesty's Embassy, it is true, lent their full moral support to the unpopular Millspaugh Mission, though towards the end Dr. Millspaugh's indiscretions made it impossible to continue to support him personally; but the disinterested character of their motives for doing so should be self-evident. Active pro-German sympathies automatically waned as the tide of war turned more and more strongly in our favour. British officers, seconded for service under the Persian administration, played a useful part in grain collection and the organisation of transport. The local personnel of the Middle East Supply Centre—mainly British during the greater part of the year—were manifestly out to afford the maximum of help to Persia within the limits imposed by world shortages and shipping difficulties.

9. It might be supposed that, since in all these and many other ways we compared so favourably with the Russians, there would have been a marked swing of Persian sentiment towards us. That this was not at all obviously the case is due to the fact that cowardice, moral and physical, is an outstanding trait of the Persian character. Probably most Persians realised in their heart of hearts how favourable the comparison was to us; but very few were prepared to displease the Russians by shaping their words and actions accordingly. Vanity, moreover, is next only to cowardice in the Persian make-up, and the national habit is consequently to ascribe all the country's shortcomings and misfortunes to foreign interference. Criticism of the Russians being too dangerous, the British had to serve as scapegoats; and a large proportion of the Persian press was highly critical of British policy. This was true not only of the newspapers known to be controlled or subsidised by the Russians, but also of a good many others. In the matter of the Persian internees, for example, there was much agitation against the actions of the British, while the equal responsibility of the Russians was scarcely ever mentioned. In tribal matters it was the same story: the Persian military were free to conduct operations against the southern tribes without let or hindrance from us, whereas, as stated above, they were not allowed by the Russians to deal with unruly Kurds in the north; yet the press freely accused the "British imperialists" of the most sinister machinations in the south, and carefully abstained from all criticism of the Soviet attitude. It is true that the Persian press (which boasts upwards of seventy papers in Tehran alone) exists largely on blackmail and is not genuinely representative of Persian public opinion. Since, however, it is almost the sole purveyor of information to the public, its influence is by no means negligible; and it would be a mistake to dismiss as unimportant for the future the fact that, during all the year under review, but particularly towards the end of it, Anglo-Persian relations were grossly distorted in the mirror of the local press.

9. In one important respect this fundamental dishonesty of the Persians in their attitude towards their two principal allies brought upon them an early retribution. Although His Majesty's Government had obviously suffered much annoyance from the wrong-headed nationalism of Reza Shah, many Persians continued to foster the belief—at once pleasing to the Russians and soothing to Persian national vanity—that the tyrant had been maintained in power by the British, who had only discarded their puppet at long last under the stress of

circumstances beyond their control. The manifest incapacity of the Persians to govern themselves in the post-Reza period was ascribed, under this convenient theory, to the after-effects of the ex-Shah's tyranny, and hence to the British. In particular, the press never tired of denouncing the alleged greed of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which is in fact the main source of the country's wealth) and of asserting that Reza Shah's attack on the company's former concession had been a put-up job. When, therefore, the Russians demanded of the Persian Government the immediate grant of an oil concession without prior discussion of its terms, and pretended that in doing so they were only asking for parity with the British, it was impossible for the Persians to retort, as they might otherwise have done, that the British concession had been properly negotiated and freely accorded. This lesson to liars was, however, small consolation to the British victims of the lie, since the resultant weakening of the Persian case was by no means in British interests.

10. Since the Russians became our Allies in 1941, loyalty has damped down criticism of Soviet Russia to such an extent that the foregoing paragraphs, which consist largely of a catalogue of Russian misdemeanours, might give an impression of prejudice. The attempt to avoid giving such an impression has, however, been sadly hampered by the facts. The purpose of an annual review of this sort is to record salient events and observed tendencies; and in Persia the actions of the Russians have always been of paramount importance. It would have been almost a relief to have been able to record one or two resounding British misdemeanours in order to give a semblance of balance and objectivity, but here again the facts have been most intractable. British policy, propaganda and action in Persia during the year under review—and, indeed, throughout the whole course of the war—have been monotonously unimpeachable and strictly loyal to our Soviet ally.

11. It is indeed probable that the Soviet authorities, to whom suspicion is second nature, entertain the deepest suspicions of British policy in this country, but unless we are to hark back for ever to "intervention" after the last war we can only regard their suspicions as we regard some of their actions, as easier to explain than to justify. When a Soviet Ambassador, in discussing a financial claim for a few hundred pounds which a Panamanian would settle out of shame, uses the meanness and effrontery of a fraudulent bankrupt, our realisation of the fact that he may be feeling the breath of the N.K.V.D. hot on his neck leads us to understand his attitude but hardly to consider it either honourable or fair. This embassy has deprecated certain small British indiscretions committed since the occupation, not because we thought that reasonable men would be justified in thinking them hostile, but because we know that men who live in constant danger of being liquidated on suspicion cannot themselves be good judges of straightforward conduct. In only one instance—the aerodrome construction mentioned in the section entitled "Soviet Interests"—could it be reasonably held that our action gave good ground for suspicion. Did the Russians demand an oil concession in the north because they observed with suspicion our attempts to obtain one in the south? It may be so; but the suspicion is thereby merely explained not justified. To an important extent Russia owes her salvation during this war to oil supplies from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whether sent to Russia or employed in Persia in the transport of other forms of aid; and the whole record of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company contradicts the allegation that His Majesty's Government exploit British-held oil concessions for unfair political ends. Moreover, if suspicion had been the sole motive for the Russian action, the Soviet Government should have been satisfied once that action had ruled out the grant of a concession to the British, even to the Americans during the war. Do the Russians suspect us of intriguing with the southern tribes against the Central Government? The Soviet-inspired Persian press has much to say on this subject; yet, whereas we in the south permit and even facilitate the Central Government's disarmament operations in tribal territory, they in Azerbaijan do nothing of the kind. Do the Russians resent the extent and success of our war-time propaganda in Persia? No doubt they do; but they know it to be concerned mainly with the winning of the war and strictly loyal to them. Our publicity has given to the Soviet war effort a share of recognition and eulogy which makes a handsome showing beside the ungenerous attempt obvious in almost every number of every Soviet newspaper to minimise the British and American part in the war. Our Public Relations Bureau has tried to draw Persian doctors into contact with British, American and other foreign medical men. Do the Russians consider these purely medical activities as warranting the appointment as head of the Soviet hospital

of a man who is known from several sources to have mysterious political functions, who is apparently behind student troubles at the medical school which have resulted in a lock-out; and who recently suggested to a Persian general the formation of a mainly military Government which should be not merely pro-Russian but anti-British. Is it a ground of suspicion that officers of the Persian Air Force are being trained in England? The Soviet Army might have trained a considerable number of Persian officers in the use of tanks and aircraft if they had not attached to the offer conditions which not even Persians could accept. But the Soviet case was given away when the Soviet Government accused His Majesty's Government of hostility to them in the matter of the oil concession. This accusation is based in part on the appearance in the British press of articles which mildly attempted to do justice to the Persian case when the Russians, not satisfied with sending forth a stream of falsehoods and abuse against the Persian Government, had through their section of the tripartite censorship in Tehran stopped all messages from foreign correspondents in Tehran which ran counter to the Russian thesis; and in part on our own protest against the violation of the censorship charter by the Russians in the suppression of telegrams despatched by the Persian Prime Minister to Persian diplomatic missions abroad. From this it became clear that to obviate Soviet suspicions we must connive at and even facilitate anything, however nefarious, which the Russians might think important to their interests. The test will come when we suggest to the Russians that the time has arrived for the foreign troops to evacuate most if not all of the parts of Persian territory where they are at present stationed. There are indications that they will stay until the latest possible moment, *i.e.*, until six months after the cessation of hostilities with Japan. This would leave Russian troops established throughout the north during the elections, if these are held at the time prescribed by the Constitution; and we know from the Soviet Ambassador, as reported by Mr. Averell Harriman, that he intends to see, so far as he can, that the elections go the right way. The Russian-inspired press has already found a pretext for the retention of the foreign troops in Persia as long as possible, *viz.*, that their withdrawal would not liberate Persia but would leave her at the mercy of outside, *i.e.*, British, influences, as in Reza Shah's time. Undoubtedly the great Russian grievance against Reza Shah was that he suppressed subversive tendencies, since these were all Russian tendencies.

Negotiations for Oil Concessions.

(A) British and American.

12. During the greater part of the year representatives of the Shell group, of the Standard Vacuum Company, and (somewhat later in the field) of the American Sinclair Company were in competition for oil concessions over an extensive area of South Persia. Overt Anglo-American rivalry being undesirable, it was agreed at an early stage between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government that neither should exert pressure on the Persian Government in favour of its nationals. His Majesty's Embassy afforded unobtrusive support to the Shell representative within the limits of the instructions laid down by the Foreign Office, which were to go no further than was usual on behalf of reputable British interests and no further than the United States Embassy. The quality of the latter's support of the American oil men turned out to be considerably more active and ostentatious—for a time the United States Embassy carried an oil attaché on its staff—than the Anglo-American understanding had led the Foreign Office to expect; and His Majesty's Embassy were therefore instructed in September to afford more active support on their side should the need for prompt intervention arise. Actually, however, all parties had bogged down at an earlier stage in a quagmire of Persian suspicion and procrastination in which diplomatic support counted for little.

13. There was, indeed, some excuse for the Persian Government's procrastination, since they were totally ignorant of the technicalities involved. On Dr. Millspaugh's recommendation, therefore, they eventually agreed to seek the assistance of two American experts, Messrs. Hoover and Curtice, who represented a firm with a high reputation for supplying foreign Governments with disinterested technical advice on oil matters. These gentlemen arrived in July, and within a few weeks had presented the Persian Government with the results of their study of the competing offers. The Persian Government thereupon formed a committee of their own to examine the whole question; but added constantly to its numbers, as time went on, in response to the suspicious reactions

of the Majlis and in the vain endeavour to cover themselves from every angle of fire. The committee, in these circumstances, made very little progress.

14. It should be noted, in view of the subsequent developments, that the Persian press and public as a whole, despite some disparaging talk of "concession-hunters," did not appear to be opposed in principle to the grant of concessions to an American or British firm. The suspicions voiced were chiefly to the effect that M. Saed's Government could not be trusted to extract for the country's benefit the maximum advantage which the occasion offered. This was, in fact, no more than the inevitable reaction of those not in office, who scented big money and were distressed at the thought of the pickings going into other pockets than theirs. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a general realisation of the political advantages which would accrue from increasing the stake in Persia either of Great Britain or of the United States—particularly the latter. Broadly speaking, only the Tudeh, obviously acting at the behest of the Soviet Embassy, opposed in principle the grant of any concession; demanding both in the Majlis and in its newspapers that none should be granted until, the war over and Allied troops withdrawn, Persia was left mistress in her own house. This demand was to prove embarrassing both to the Tudeh itself and to its masters when, a few weeks later, the Soviet Government demanded the immediate grant of an oil concession in the north; and it seems to show that the Russians, while inclined at first merely to try to prevent their Allies from obtaining oil concessions in an area of no commercial interest to themselves, awoke with a surprising suddenness to the realisation of their own pressing need for Persian oil.

(B) Russian.

15. The crisis precipitated by the Russian demand inevitably deprived the British and American companies of all further prospect of obtaining concessions. M. Kavtaradze, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who arrived in Tehran in mid-September, complained to the Shah barely a fortnight later that the Persian Government were being slow in responding to his demand for an extensive oil concession in the north; adding that his Government were not satisfied with Soviet-Persian relations, and that on the economic side the future of these relations might depend on the Persian reply. Five days later he announced, in an interview given to a local newspaper, that the demand had been made on his arrival. According to M. Saed, whom there is no reason to disbelieve, the Persian Government had not even had as long as this to consider the question in secret, for M. Kavtaradze had begun by mentioning only the relatively insignificant Khurian oil area (to which in point of fact the Russians had a shadowy but not wholly imaginary claim).

16. The major demand, as eventually put forward, was for exploring rights over almost the whole of North Persia during a period of five years, and thereafter for a concession covering a maximum of well over two-thirds of that area. This, even in the exploratory period, would have given the Russians ample opportunities for continuing the subversion of Persian authority in a region where the process had already been carried far. But the Persian Government were asked, in addition, to signify their consent without any discussion of terms.

17. M. Kavtaradze's statement to the press, which naturally caused widespread alarm, was immediately followed up by an agitation in the local Soviet-controlled newspapers. The Persian Government, however, stood their ground, and M. Kavtaradze was informed towards the middle of October that they had, early in the preceding month, decided to grant no oil concessions while the war lasted. This action was taken after a secret session of the Majlis, at which it had been almost unanimously approved. (The Tudeh, as explained above, were embarrassed by the fact that they had openly advocated an identical ruling in regard to the British and American attempts to obtain a concession in the south.)

18. The Persian Government's reply was received very ill by M. Kavtaradze, who talked of the possibility of unpleasant consequences and hinted at Persia's need for Soviet support at the Peace Conference. M. Saed immediately became the subject of a virulent campaign in the Russian-controlled press. Nevertheless, public opinion, after the first shock of dismay, gradually hardened; and on the 19th October the Prime Minister justified his action before a Majlis which was clearly in his favour.

19. The Russians thereupon gave several turns to the screw. They stopped the transport of grain by rail within "their" zone; temporarily cut off telegraphic communication with Tabriz; paraded lorry-loads of armed troops in Tehran; intimidated deputies; broadcast false reports of popular and press reactions in their favour; and finally gave it out that their relations with the

Persian Government were severed. M. Saed himself, of course, had by this time become a "fascist" of the deepest dye. A particularly disquieting feature of Soviet-inspired comment, in view of the general attitude of the Soviet wolf towards the Persian lamb, was to the effect that the Persian Government had been the first to violate the spirit of the Tripartite Treaty of alliance by obstructing the passage of supplies to Russia. In a second press interview, M. Kavtaradze alleged that the Prime Minister had originally signified his complete agreement with the Russian demand, only to go back on it later. Apart from the fact that this was categorically denied by M. Saed, it is inconceivable that that honest but timorous man, who had for months past been badgered by the Majlis and the press in regard to the British and American concession-seekers, should have committed himself immediately in regard to the far more disquieting demand from the Russians, whom he knew well from long years of service in the Soviet Union.

20. On the 27th October there was a Tudeh demonstration in Tehran, accompanied by armed Russian troops in lorries; and this was followed by similar demonstrations at Tabriz, Resht, Isfahan and Sultanabad. At Tabriz, where one man was killed and several were wounded during an attempt to rush the police headquarters, the Russians prevented the police and military from dealing with the mob, and had the commanding officer expelled at twenty-four hours' notice. Public opinion, however, was hardening more and more against them, and the Persian Government were emboldened to enforce the existing prohibition on street gatherings. M. Saed issued a full reply to M. Kavtaradze's second press statement, and this further strengthened the public reaction. The Russians grossly abused their censorship powers to prevent the Persian Government's case from reaching the outside world (or even the Persian diplomatic representatives abroad), and passed only the accounts of Persian public sentiment which had been fabricated by their own dependents. But the real facts gradually filtered through, and the Russians were consequently obliged to shift their ground by attacking M. Saed less for his refusal to grant the concession, than for his alleged desire to upset Perso-Soviet relations generally and to convert Persia into a base for fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. By the beginning of November, indeed, the Russians were rumoured to be prepared to drop the demand for a concession; and as though to mark the *détente* they restored grain deliveries by rail and adopted a relatively restrained attitude in regard to the censorship of press messages. But M. Saed, in his new and vaguer rôle of fascist reactionary, was attacked with ever increasing virulence. The Moscow radio disseminated completely false accounts of nation-wide popular protests against his administration; and preparations for a further Tudeh demonstration in Tehran obliged the Government to occupy the party's headquarters and to detain some of its leaders for a few hours. The Prime Minister was simultaneously informed by the Russians, through intermediaries, that if he resigned M. Kavtaradze would depart and the demand for an oil concession would be dropped.

21. M. Saed had for some time past been very willing to go, but had been persuaded by the Shah and the Majlis to stay. By now, however, the strain had become intolerable; and on the 10th November the Shah, fearing lest the Russians should resort to extreme measures such as the acceleration of the separatist movement in Azerbaijan, accepted the resignation of a man who had become almost a national hero.

22. Of the new Government formed after some delay by his successor, M. Bayat, it need only be said here that they maintained during the rest of the year the stand which M. Saed had taken. The Russians had no doubt hoped that M. Bayat, warned by the fate of his predecessor and with no great reputation for honesty or patriotism to maintain, would prove more amenable. But, if so, they reckoned without the Majlis and the popular resentment which their actions had aroused. On the 2nd December a Bill was tabled by Dr. Musaddiq, and passed immediately, which made it illegal for any Persian Government to grant an oil concession to any foreign government or company, and imposed on the Government the duty of informing the Majlis of any discussions that might take place concerning the sale of oil or the method of exploiting and administering the country's oil resources. Confronted suddenly with this Bill, the democratic character of which was undeniable, the Tudeh were completely taken aback, and were not given time to collect their wits or discuss it amongst themselves. The Russians subsequently asserted that the Bill had been forced through the Majlis unconstitutionally, but this is untrue; the use of the double-urgency procedure is entirely constitutional and by no means uncommon, and the Bill

was passed by a large majority. There is no doubt whatever that it expressed the wishes of the Persian people as a whole. An attempt, made immediately after the passage of the Bill, by a deputy who owed his seat to Russian influence, to introduce another cancelling the concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was dropped for lack of a single backer, although in previous debates during the crisis Dr. Musaddiq himself had sharply criticised the company.

23. M. Kavtaradze left Persia on the 9th December, having previously informed the Prime Minister of his Government's displeasure at the new oil law, which, he said, the Majlis would do well to reconsider. The Russians continued till the end of the year (and after it) to agitate in this sense by all the innumerable means at their disposal, and made it quite clear that they were far from regarding the matter as closed. The Tudeh became, if not more influential, at least very much more active, the Soviet-controlled newspapers more abusive and outspokenly anti-British. There were several further demonstrations in the North, including one at Shahi in which lives were lost and the police were thwarted and publicly humiliated by the Russians in the now customary manner. M. Saed, living thankfully in completely inactive retirement, continued to be attacked with as much ferocity as though he had concluded a military alliance with Hitler himself. So too did Seyyid Zia, who was accused by the Russians—apparently without the slightest justification—of having inspired and rushed through Dr. Musaddiq's Bill in collaboration with M. Saed and at the behest of his fascist masters (*scilicet* the British). Both, if the Russian chorus had had its way, would have been arraigned for treason. The Seyyid retorted, indeed, with a vigorous public indictment of Soviet methods, which caused a considerable stir and enhanced his prestige. (In it, incidentally, he made the telling point that the Soviet insistence on the need for a "protective belt" in North Persia against potential fascist enemies was virtually identical with the Nazi clamour for *Lebensraum*.) But his chances of coming to power in the more or less immediate future were undoubtedly lessened by these violent Soviet attacks. It is not difficult to conduct a war of nerves in Persia, and at the end of the year the whole country was in a state of apprehension bordering on panic.

24. The Russians, in fact, had not retired from the field empty-handed. True, they had not obtained the north Persian oil; but it is very doubtful whether they needed it for other purposes than the subversion of Persian authority and the deflection of a part of the Baku output from post-war internal consumption to competition with Great Britain and America in foreign markets. They had, however, acquired something which is often more useful to a great and unscrupulous Power: a permanent "grievance value." As long as any Persian Government maintained the stand adopted by M. Saed's administration—and no other stand was compatible with the preservation of Persian territorial integrity—it could be bullied and blackguarded as reactionary and Fascist, as rejecting the proffered hand of Soviet friendship in the interests of a foreign clique. If the withdrawal of Allied troops and the inevitable post-war deflation brought about unemployment—as indeed they were bound to do—that would be the criminal fault of a Government which had rejected a charitable Russian scheme for providing employment. Furthermore, the denial to the Russians of an oil concession was in itself an obstacle in the way of the prompt withdrawal of Allied troops; for was not a Government that denied the Russians "parity in oil matters with the imperialists" already sold to the latter and committed to a "re-establishment of the dictatorship under foreign tutelage" once the field was clear? To abandon the Persian people to such unprincipled masters would be a positive betrayal.

25. These and many similar themes were being tirelessly developed in the Soviet-controlled press towards the end of the year. The Russians, by their clumsy brutality during the oil crisis, may have lost a good many genuine Persian admirers; but they had got a very neat double-nelson on all future Persian administrations that evinced the slightest independence of spirit.

26. The theme of the "denial of parity" having been constantly developed, not only in the Soviet-controlled Persian press but also in Russian official statements and in the Soviet Government's correspondence with His Majesty's Government, it is worth pointing out that this theme is fallacious on at least three counts: none of which, however, is easy to handle in public. In the first place, while it is true that His Majesty's Government own a controlling financial interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, they do not run the company as a governmental organisation nor use it as a stalking-horse for the subversion of Persian authority. Any Soviet company exploiting the North Persian oil would, on the other hand, be simply and solely a Soviet Government organisation; and

would, as such, promote by every means the subversive policy which that Government has already carried so far in North Persia through other agencies. This is a fundamental difference of which the Persians themselves are fully aware, though they cannot afford to mention it publicly.

27. The second main difference is this: The original Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession was freely negotiated on a commercial basis and under no threat of coercion; the present concession was, it is true, negotiated in an atmosphere of crisis, but the crisis had been brought about by Reza Shah's greedy violation of a legally valid contract, and resulted in a new concession considerably more favourable to Persia than the original. In so far as the "parity" which the Russians claimed was genuinely commercial, not political, the Persians were no more called upon to grant it than they would have been to grant the British (or the Chinese) a concession balancing the former Russian fisheries of the Caspian littoral. In commercial matters a foreign Power may fairly claim equality of opportunity to obtain concessions (and this the Russians had had), but not, of course, equality of advantage with every other successful competitor. In so far as the parity claimed was in reality political (which the Russians do not and cannot admit in terms), the demand for it could only imply their sudden determination—after a "disequilibrium" lasting more than forty years and in the midst of a war in which Great Britain was their ally—to counteract the static influence of that ally in the territory of a third party. Unfortunately, as explained above, the Persians are debarred from using this valid argument by reason of the past mendacity of some of them and the credulity of others. They have too long stifled the consciousness of their own futility by declaring that the late Shah, as a British puppet, staged the crisis of 1933 at the behest of his masters.

28. There remains, however, a third point of dissimilarity which can scarcely be dismissed as unimportant: whatever may be said or believed of the circumstances attending the grant of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's present concession, it was certainly not granted without prior discussion and settlement of the financial terms. The Russians have attempted to dispose of this awkward point by pretending that M. Kavtaradze was empowered to offer "very favourable and profitable terms." If he was, he made no use of his powers. He offered no terms whatsoever, and he himself stated at the press interview referred to above that the discussion as to the currency in which payment would be made was to take place after the concessions had been obtained, and the general tenor of his statements at that interview makes it clear that what the Soviet Government had demanded was the grant of a concession in principle without previous discussion or even revelation of the Soviet Government's detailed proposals. There is, moreover, no reason, on past form, to suppose that the terms which the Russians would eventually have imposed would have been favourable; they forced the Persian Government to supply ammunition and small arms without discussing terms, and "consented" long afterwards to terms which involved the Persian Treasury in considerable loss.

29. The Persian case eventually secured some support from His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. On the 2nd November His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow addressed written representations to M. Molotov, pointing out that, while His Majesty's Government were far from contesting the right of the Soviet Government to seek a concession in North Persia, they considered that the Persian Government had the right to refuse, and they themselves had consequently accepted the Persian Government's decision to grant no further oil concessions till after the war. To coerce the Persian Government would not, they considered, be in accordance with the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration.

30. This communication did not specifically ask for a reply, and none was received during the crisis. At about the same time the United States Ambassador made representations which are understood to have been on broadly similar lines. Oral representations were also made to a member of the Soviet Embassy in London on the 18th November. As it was decided in the first instance not to inform the Persians that any representations had been made on their behalf, and as it was a long time before the British press and the British Broadcasting Corporation began to give a reasonably balanced account of the dispute, M. Saed was not aware for many weeks of the extent to which his attitude had the moral support of the British and American Governments; and in these circumstances it was all the more creditable that he and his colleagues should have stood up so well to Russian intimidation. The British and American representations may, however, have served to prevent the Russians from resorting to even more violent measures.

31. It was not till the 29th December that the Soviet Government replied, through their embassy in London, to the representations of His Majesty's Government. Their reply, an unsatisfactory document containing several gross mis-statements of fact and a reference to Soviet public opinion which His Majesty's Government were probably not expected to take seriously, reproached His Majesty's Government with the "unfavourable attitude" they had adopted in regard to the oil negotiations, and ended with an ominous reassertion of M. Kavtaradze's warning to M. Bayat that the oil law of the 2nd December (described as a "resolution" unconstitutionally adopted) "ought to be reconsidered."

Suggested Withdrawal of British Forces from Persia.

32. In connexion with the Soviet oil dispute, His Majesty's Embassy suggested to the Foreign Office that the possibility should be considered of withdrawing British Forces, at least from Tehran, as soon as aid to Russia was diverted from Persia. There were complications, e.g., the arrangement to send aviation spirit from Abadan to the Soviet Union until the middle of 1945 and the fact that the presence of the Royal Air Force in Tehran enabled the British authorities concerned to maintain their connexion with the Persian Air Force and aircraft factory, to supply the necessary technical services for the British Airways line to Tehran. On the other hand, withdrawal offered several advantages: if the British evacuated Tehran, the Soviet authorities must either do the same or expose themselves as less considerate than the British; the evacuation of Tehran by the foreign troops would in itself strengthen the Persian Government; if the touchiness of the Soviet authorities was due in part to the suspicion of British motives (as it probably was) an offer on our part to evacuate Tehran, and perhaps other places, might help to calm them down, even if at first they did attribute the offer to a wish to remove Soviet influence from the capital.

Soviet Interests.

33. The post of Soviet Ambassador in Persia, which had been vacant several months, was filled in January by M. Constantin Mikhailov, but he left Persia in May, ostensibly for medical treatment, and did not return. It is thought he was removed in disgrace because the Persian Government refused to accept the conditions attached to the offer of war material made by Marshal Stalin to the Shah at the Tehran Conference. The Persian Prime Minister saw the ambassador the day after the refusal was made and he found him looking "like a man condemned to death," yet maintaining that he was perfectly well. The British and American Embassies found him cold and suspicious and did not regret his departure. M. Mikhailov was succeeded by the former chargé d'affaires, M. Maximov, who is an old Persian hand and a clever intriguer, but is human, has a sense of humour and can be teased into taking routine action. The change, therefore, was for the better in spite of the difficult behaviour of the Soviet Embassy regarding the Soviet Government's oil dispute with Persia and regarding the policy of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship.

34. During the course of the year there were several scares regarding Soviet troop movements in Persia, but these turned out to be routine replacements.

35. There is one aspect of British activities in Persia which may have given the Russians reasonable cause for suspicion. The aerodromes at Mirjawa and Zahedan were completed at a time when, as a result of the discontinuance of the East Persia supply route, they were no longer needed for military aid to Russia; and work on the aerodrome at Kerman was still continuing at the end of the year. The Zahedan-Kerman and Zahedan-Meshed roads are still being maintained, though they too are no longer needed for sending supplies to the Soviet Union. It seems that the work begun on the aerodromes when the Germans were in the Caucasus was continued with a view to their eventual use as communication airfields on what is, in fact, the most direct route between India and Europe. The Meshed road has been kept up as a potential route for aid to China through Soviet Central Asia and the Kerman road is being maintained in connexion with the work proceeding on the airfield at Kerman. A visit to South-East Persia late in the year by the Soviet military attaché suggests that the Russians are not without interest in these activities.

36. The Soviet authorities attempted to develop cultural activities in the course of the year, but did not make very much progress. In February the inauguration ceremony was held of a Committee for Soviet-Persian Cultural Relations, of which the Persian Prime Minister and Soviet Ambassador are

honorary presidents. In the course of the spring the society issued some impressive statutes, but its sole activity in the course of the year was to organise classes for learning Russian. (There is considerably less demand for Russian culture than for British culture, and this perhaps intensifies Russians suspicions of us.)

Soviet-sponsored "Union of Polish Patriots."

37. The Soviet-sponsored "Union of Polish Patriots" set up an office in Tehran early in the year and began to angle for support among the Polish refugees, using as bait the offer to allow them to rejoin their relations in Russia or to communicate with them and send them parcels. The Polish Legation told His Majesty's Embassy that these blandishments would not have much effect, since one taste of the Soviet "Paradise" was enough for most of the refugees however much they loved their families. The Polish Legation's prophesy proved correct.

38. The Union of Polish Patriots succeeded, however, in being a nuisance to His Majesty's Embassy, since their written and radio propaganda was liable to censorship by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship, and the censoring of their material by the British section led to difficulties with the Soviet section.

Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.

39. In this, as in so many other matters, the year 1944 saw a regrettable reversion to type on the part of the local Soviet representatives. The so-called Tripartite Censorship Commission (in reality an Anglo-Soviet organisation with a Persian sleeping partner) functioned smoothly enough as long as Russia was in desperate need of the support of her Allies. Censorship was confined to its legitimate sphere—the suppression of material damaging to Allied war interests. But in the spring of the year under review the Soviet section of the commission suddenly began to exercise a rigid ideological censorship, and suppressed large quantities of English newspapers and books, including standard works such as H. A. L. Fisher's *History of Europe*. Under the terms of the commission's charter, each of the three sections had the right to condemn material which it judged to be—

"detrimental to the interests of Persia or the Allies, such as giving away State or war secrets, or spreading anti-Allied propaganda; and any message likely to weaken the political or economic strength of the Allied Governments, or to prejudice their friendly relations."

But provision was also made for close co-ordination between the three sections and hence, by natural implication, for the exchange of all necessary explanations. The British section, therefore, while not disputing the right of its Russian counterpart to act as it had done, attempted to obtain reasoned explanations of its action. No explanations in the least satisfactory or detailed were ever forthcoming. The truth is probably that the Russian section, true to Soviet political principles, considered wholesale suppression as laudable and natural action, from the performance of which it had only refrained in the past owing to the necessity for accommodating valuable Allies. Some of the suppressed British material was indeed critical of Soviet affairs in varying degrees; but for the most part the criticism was not only fair, but also extremely mild—far more so than the habitual tone of the Soviet press in regard to the Western Allies. For example, one British newspaper which the Soviet section condemned—at a moment when the Soviet press was most critical of the Western Allies for their failure to establish a so-called Second Front—merely pointed out that the splendid Russian victories had been to some extent facilitated by Anglo-American air attacks on German industrial targets. Moreover, it was clear that the Soviet section, in its new-found zeal for Stakhanovite methods, had taken to the regular suppression of certain British publications out of hand, without troubling to examine their contents.

40. The Russians unfailingly suppressed all British war maps which showed the re-1939 frontiers of Eastern Europe (marked as such), although these maps were for the most part designed as propaganda for the Russian victories. Soviet maps imported into Persia showed, as finally incorporated in the Soviet Union, the earlier Russian victories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop period.

41. In one respect the Soviet section transgressed the letter, as well as the spirit, of the censorship charter; it regularly suppressed large quantities of publications addressed to Persian Departments of State, and even, on occasion, material addressed to the heads of Allied diplomatic missions. When tackled on this subject its only excuse was that it had in the past connived in the British

section's unofficial suppression for military reasons, of certain categories of printed matter addressed to neutral diplomatic missions and consulates from neutral countries bordering on Germany and German-occupied Europe. This was true, but scarcely justified the Soviet section's action in depriving the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs of copies of *the Sphere*, and the Persian Ministry of Finance of copies of *the Economist*.

42. The Soviet publications entering Persia contained plenty of material calling for suppression on a reciprocal basis. Some of them were doctrinaire works on communism, which, though recently published, repeated the savage attacks on British policy and reference to "the second imperialist war" which had been normal in Russia before Hitler forced her to range herself on the side of the democracies. Most of them indulged in venomous abuse of the Polish Government in London. Before deciding on retaliation, however, a determined effort was made, on instructions from the Foreign Office, to persuade the Soviet authorities to take a more reasonable line. The Soviet Ambassador was given a detailed analysis of the voluminous material suppressed by his section; was reminded in polite circumlocutions that two could play at this game; and was told that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the suppression of material on ideological grounds was out of keeping with the spirit both of the alliance and of the censorship charter itself. M. Maximov adopted the customary Soviet line. While promising to examine the censorship material afresh, and to report the British representations to Moscow, he refused to admit for a moment that the Soviet section could possibly have erred, or that any Soviet publication could conceivably be found objectionable from the point of view of inter-Allied relations.

43. This was in August; and by the end of the year M. Maximov was still "awaiting Moscow's reply." Meanwhile, British (and American) material continued to be suppressed in very large quantities. Consequently the British section, which had in the meantime acquired a reader in Russian and Polish, was authorised to suppress an appreciable but relatively insignificant quantity of objectionable Soviet material consisting for the most part of scurrilous attacks on "the Polish émigré clique." Up to the end of the year the Soviet Embassy had not reacted to these measures, though the Soviet section of the Censorship had complained in tones of outraged innocence to its British counterpart.

44. Until late in the year the Public Relations Bureau of His Majesty's Embassy and the Soviet Trade Delegation, both of which were importers of books and periodicals destined for the Persian public, remained exempt from the control of the Joint Censorship Commission. Then, however, the Soviet censor complained of the fact that the Public Relations Bureau was selling, at its own premises, copies of publications which had been condemned by him when sent through the ordinary post. Shortly afterwards he began to examine the parcels addressed to the bureau. His Majesty's Embassy caused the publications in question to be withdrawn, but protested through the British censor against the examination of material addressed to an organisation which was an integral part of the embassy. This protest was ignored, and the British censor was therefore authorised to examine the material addressed to the Soviet trade delegation, for which diplomatic privilege is claimed by the Russians.

45. The Soviet authorities adopted an equally unreasonable line in regard to local broadcasts. They played havoc with the material—for the most part quite unprovocative—submitted by the Polish Legation for its allotted time on the Tehran Radio, and when, in order to restore the balance, the British censor suppressed the more objectionable features of the material submitted by the Soviet-sponsored "Polish patriots," the Soviet Embassy countered by broadcasting subsequent instalments without submission to the censorship, as programmes put out under their own auspices.

Security.

46. At the beginning of the year the Persian suspects on the British and Soviet lists were all interned at Sultanabad under British control, but as a result of the strong pressure exercised by His Majesty's Embassy during the preceding months, the suspects not on the British list were transferred to Resht, in the Russian "zone," in February. Joint investigation by the Anglo-Persian Commission of the suspects on the British list was completed in February, and it was decided to release twenty-three; only one of them, however, was found to be completely innocent: the remainder were made to sign an undertaking to refrain from anti-Allied activities. The Soviet Embassy were consulted as to the release of these persons and they concurred. Further releases of lesser fry were made by the British authorities in the course of the year. In April the internees still

remaining at Sultanabad were transferred to an internment camp in Tehran and placed under Persian control, but under general British supervision.

47. After prolonged negotiations the Qashgai tribe handed over to the British authorities early in the year four Germans whom they had been harbouring for a number of months. A fifth German had been allowed to escape two or three weeks before and he has so far evaded capture. He is known to be with the Beir-Ahmedi tribe. There are no other German undesirables loose in Persia. After further negotiations, the Qashgai tribe surrendered the Persian Deputy, Naubakht, in the month of May. Naubakht had fled from Tehran and taken sanctuary with the Qashgai in August, 1943, after His Majesty's Embassy had informed the Persian Government that they had documents showing that he was one of the chief instigators of the anti-Allied plot of 1943. In June the British Security authorities located the Mullah Kashani, the most dangerous member of the conspiracy, in a villa in the hills north of Tehran and effected his arrest in collaboration with the Persian police. Out of the list of Persians whose arrest by Persian authorities was demanded by the Allies, there are some minor ones still at liberty about whom we do not think it worth while to bother, and a few more important ones have escaped to Turkey, in some cases with the obvious connivance of Persian officials.

48. There are signs that the Soviet authorities are planning to use some of these internees as agents. The British authorities allowed them to take Naubakht and the Mullah Kashani to Resht for interrogation, and it was noticed that the Soviet officers who returned them to the British Security authorities treated them with the greatest consideration, talking with them on the most friendly terms and shaking hands with them in farewell. Kashani expresses the greatest detestation of the British and says openly that when he is released he will do us all the harm he can. Again, the Soviet Embassy sent to this embassy towards the end of the year their first list of internees whom they proposed to release. Among the names was that of General Aghevli, who, at the time of his arrest, was commanding the gendarmerie and against whom there was conclusive written and oral evidence that he held a key position in the anti-Allied plot. For some time the Soviet Security authorities had been trying, without success, to persuade their British colleagues that Aghevli was not seriously guilty, and the Soviet Embassy's proposal was the sequel. This embassy felt bound to refuse Aghevli's release and to say that if his name had not been on the Soviet list, he would have been put on ours. There is no doubt that the Soviet authorities expected assistance from Aghevli if he had been released through their efforts.

"Aid to Russia."

49. The total "Aid to Russia" tonnages transported on the (American and Russian operated) Persian State railways in 1944 was:—

1,601,381 tons.

This includes ocean-borne cargo for Russia landed at Persian Gulf ports, also 32,500 tons of aviation spirit and 5,000 tons of alkylate per month, and in addition 60,000 tons of motor spirit despatched between August and November inclusive, all from the refineries of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at Abadan.

50. The total "Aid to Russia" cargo carried by the United States Motor Truck Service, United Kingdom Commercial Corporation trucks, British Army General Purposes Transport Companies and by imported trucks for Russia assembled by United States truck assembly plants at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr and by the British Army Vehicle Assembly Unit at Rafidiyah, Iraq, was:—

950,359 tons.

This includes the weight of the trucks imported into the Soviet Union.

51. The British Army General Purposes Transport Companies employed on "Aid to Russia" lift ceased operations at the end of February 1944. United Kingdom Commercial Corporation trucks ceased operations from Khanagiqn at the end of September. United States Motor Truck Service finished their "Aid to Russia" lift at the beginning of December. The only motor trucks continuing to lift "Aid to Russia" cargo at the end of the year were those imported as cased motor trucks and assembled by the United States truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr.

52. In December the United States truck assembly plant at Andimeshk was dismantled and despatched to Odessa. The Soviet Government advised the British army that the vehicle assembly plant at Rafidiyah would not be required

to assemble any more trucks after December 1944. The United States truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr therefore remains the only plant assembling imported cased motor trucks for Russia. It has a capacity now of over 5,000 units per month. When all three above-mentioned truck assembly plants were working they averaged 8,500 truck units per month in 1944.

53. About 1,000–1,500 tons net weight per month of aircraft were assembled at Abadan by the United States Plane Assembly Plant and at the British Aircraft Assembly Plant at Shuaiba and flown to Russia via Tehran. Both the aircraft plants ceased to assemble aeroplanes for Russia in December 1944.

54. In April 1943 the average ship turnaround in the Persian Gulf ports, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shapur and Basra was no less than fifty-one days. By October 1944 it had been improved to seven days.

55. As regards 1945, with the opening of the Black Sea ports Odessa and Kherson the "Aid to Russia" ocean-borne tonnage via the Persian Gulf from January 1945 is rapidly falling off, i.e.—

January 1945	...	61,588 actually forwarded.
February 1945	...	45,000 estimated.
March 1945	...	20,000 estimated.

56. The aviation spirit at 32,500 tons and alkylate at 5,000 tons per month will continue to the 30th June, 1945. No motor spirit for Russia will be forwarded in the period to the 30th June, 1945.

57. The assembly of cased motor trucks for the Soviet Union will continue at approximately 5,000 units per month up to the end of March and will then fall to about 300 units in April. The Russians are negotiating for the transfer of the United States Truck Assembly Plant at Khorramshahr to a Black Sea port, which will mean that the import of cased motor trucks for Russia will cease after April.

58. The United States Persian Gulf Command has closed its operations in Bandar Shapur and this port, together with the railway from Bandar Shapur to Ahwaz is being handed back to the Persian Government. The Soviet transportation directorate in Persia have stated that they will reduce their personnel and commitments in the northern zone as the "Aid to Russia" cargo diminishes and that after the aviation spirit and alkylate commitment is finished in June their organisation in Persia will probably cease to function as from mid-July 1945.

Allied Co-operation in Persia.

59. During their visit to London in April, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Wallace Murray raised the question of Allied co-operation in Persia. It was agreed to suggest to the Soviet Government that conversations should be held between the Allied representatives in Tehran to implement more fully the provisions of the Declaration of the Tehran Conference regarding economic assistance to Persia. The Soviet Government concurred, and the first meeting was held on the 3rd June. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador suggested that the Soviet Embassy, together with the Persian Government, should be represented on the new Inter-Allied Higher Supplies Committee. (This would supersede the existing Combined Supplies Committee which was only Anglo-American and confined its attention, so far as imports were concerned, to entering the country from the south or east.) A second meeting was held on the 21st June. The British and American representatives impressed on the Soviet Ambassador that it was in Russia's own interests, if only as beneficiaries of a trans-Persian route, to contribute to Persia's well being. The British and American representatives proceeded cautiously with a proposal made by the State Department that the Soviet Ambassador should be pressed to support the American advisers. Since the latter were mistrusted by the Soviet authorities, it was not desirable to endanger the future of the joint economic discussions by bringing up this dangerous matter too brusquely. The meeting then discussed the grain situation and agreed that all possible help must be given by the Allies to ensure the collection of the Persian Government's share of the grain. The Soviet Ambassador, on instructions from Moscow, asked for further information about the proposed Higher Supplies Committee. It was clear that the Soviet Government were afraid that they might be voted down. The British and American representatives explained that the committee would not vote and would have no executive powers, but would only try to ascertain Persia's resources and needs and the possibility of meeting these needs from Allied sources. In the course of June the American

Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Soviet Ambassador a scheme by the American Director of Road Transport⁽¹⁾ in the north. The Soviet Ambassador promised to study this, but he was guarded and tended to throw doubt on the need for Americans. No further meetings were held pending the reactions of the Soviet Government to the proposal made. No reply was ever given, but what with the Soviet oil dispute with the Persian Government on the one hand, and on the other the improvement in the grain situation and the better war news, both the feasibility of the scheme and the need for it diminished.

60. In 1944 Persia was the one country where British, American and Soviet civil and military authorities met on a broad land front and the necessary contacts at the various technical levels proceeded reasonably smoothly and efficiently, in spite of the difficulties in the political sphere. One excellent reason for this was, of course, that "Aid to Russia" through Persia really delivered the goods during 1944.

The American Advisory Missions.

(a) General.

61. It is regrettable to have to report that the American Advisory Missions did not on the whole do well in the course of the year, in spite of the strong support given them by His Majesty's Embassy, who cannot envisage the possibility of their disappearance with equanimity, since this must inevitably increase the chaos and corruption in Persian administration which in turn might give the Russians a pretext to step in.

62. In the course of the summer, His Majesty's Government explained to the United States Government that they were most anxious for the missions to remain and in certain cases to be strengthened, since they were convinced that Persia's need for foreign assistance would continue to be great, particularly in the immediate post-war period; they were specially concerned about the future of the Persian police. When Allied troops are withdrawn, a large measure of responsibility for internal security would fall on the police, which in its present state was quite unable to bear it; this might have particularly serious consequences in the oil refinery area. His Majesty's Government were anxious, therefore, that reforms should be put in hand before the departure of British troops. This could not be carried out without foreign assistance and they would prefer that this should be provided by the United States if possible. If, however, the United States Government felt unable to provide it, His Majesty's Government would have to consider advising the Persian Government to look elsewhere. The State Department replied that the United States Government were not losing interest in Persia, but they had no fixed policy of retaining advisory missions there. They had, for instance, always made it clear to the Persian Government that American advisers must not be exposed to vilification. If attacked the Persian Government must defend them, otherwise they would be withdrawn and would not be replaced. The United States Government had now decided that:—

- (1) Colonel Schwartzkopf and his five assistants would be left for a further year with the gendarmerie.
- (2) They would investigate whether Colonel Schwartzkopf might take over the police as well.
- (3) General Ridley would remain until the 1st March, 1945, by which date the United States War Department thought that he would have done everything possible to accomplish his task; the War Department would probably decline to appoint a successor and were inclined to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police.

63. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires' comment on these decisions was that, if General Ridley left in March 1945, he would not have accomplished all the work covered by his contract and that such work as he had achieved would in any case be rapidly undone if he left. Mr. Lascelles went on to discuss how far the possession of an efficient army would really be useful and necessary to Persia in post-war conditions. As long as the present Shah remained on the throne, the army would play a preponderant rôle in the country's affairs and remain the chief instrument of internal security. For the Americans to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police would be all very well if they obtained an increasing share of the revenue at the expense of the army; the continued presence of General Ridley's Mission would not entirely solve this problem but would at

⁽¹⁾ For the management of road transport . . .

least limit it sufficiently to give Colonel Schwartzkopf a fair chance. His Majesty's Government thereupon urged the United States Government to let Colonel Schwartzkopf have additional staff so as to enable him to take over the police, but as regards General Ridley they confined themselves to asking whether, in the event of his task not being completed by that date, the War Department would let him stay on until he had finished. The State Department replied that the War Department did not hold out much hope of keeping General Ridley on beyond March 1945 unless he himself recommended it. They succeeded in persuading the War Department of the importance of improving the police, but did not feel justified in proposing the matter to the Persian Government. The latter, either of their own accord, or at British prompting must make a definite request that Colonel Schwartzkopf should take over the police. His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to impress upon the Persian Government the importance of acting quickly in the matter. Approaches to the Persian Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, however, produced no result, probably because of the known hostility of the Russians to the presence of American advisers in Persia, and the opposition to Dr. Millspaugh in the Majlis which was becoming more and more violent and tended to prejudice the question of the employment of American advisers in general.

(b) Dr. Millspaugh's Mission.

64. From April onwards there was a campaign against Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues both in the Majlis and in the press. The more important criticisms were:—

- (1) That the mission had not reorganised the finances nor prevented a rise in prices nor assured supplies.

(This charge is in many ways unfair. Dr. Millspaugh did his best during a period of inflation to increase revenue and reduce expenditure but was faced, through no fault of his own with a considerable deficit on the previous year's working. It is perhaps true, however, that his attempt to impose a much higher income-tax than before was unsound psychologically. Even in more civilised and less corrupt countries it usually takes a number of years before people can be persuaded to pay income-tax honestly and before an administrative cadre can be developed that will ensure collection. Dr. Millspaugh's income-tax has therefore been a failure, but the Persians, whose fault it is, are the last people who are entitled to criticise him for it. Again, the rise in prices is largely due to the presence of the Allied forces in this country and it is unlikely that the price level will fall until they are withdrawn or until the end of the war with Germany is in sight; Dr. Millspaugh's measures were probably responsible for a marked slackening in the rate of increase of the price level. On the other hand there is more substance in the third part of the charge, that supplies have not been assured. Although large quantities of commodities such as piece goods, tea, sugar and drugs are in the country and under Government control, they do not for most part reach the consumer at reasonable prices. Here again Dr. Millspaugh was defeated by the dishonesty of the average Persian; you cannot distribute goods far and wide through the land when you cannot trust anybody to distribute them honestly. In so far as country districts have received rationed supplies at all it is mainly due to personal supervision by the local American officials.)

- (2) That the expenditure of Persian Government money on the administration of the Supply Department, the Price Stabilisation Section and Road Transport organisation was excessive.

(The pay of the American personnel in these departments is very high by Persian standards, but their work is essential to Persian economy and the expenditure is consequently justified.)

- (3) That some of the members of the mission were incompetent.

(This is true to some extent but it is due (a) to the difficulty of securing good men in war time, and (b) to the inexperience of Americans in the field of adviser to foreign Governments. Nevertheless at least a dozen of the Millspaugh Mission are capable men. As regards Dr. Millspaugh himself, his qualities could be described as follows: He is honest and tenacious, but extremely obstinate. He has administrative ability up to a point, but (a) he tended to centralise all powers in himself—this hampered and offended his American colleagues and caused delay; and (b) he was inclined not to discuss proposals sufficiently before issuing orders—this led to the commission of avoidable mistakes. In any case, the mission had many enemies on account of its virtues as well as its faults.

The Shah disliked Dr. Millspaugh, who was unwilling as well as unable to provide money for so large an army as the Shah would like to have, and was imprudent enough to say, in an interview to the press, that the security forces in Persia were not worth the money expended on them. The Russians, in turn, were suspicious of, and unhelpful to, the mission. Finally, there were the many powerful Persians who stood to lose by the mission's efforts to bring down prices and to control financial abuses.

65. The campaign against Dr. Millspaugh led to the tabling of a Government Bill in the Majlis on the 22nd June depriving him of his economic powers, on the ground that he had not shown sufficient results. (As stated in paragraphs 86 and 87 of this embassy's report on political events in Persia in 1943, Dr. Millspaugh had been given, in addition to his financial powers, wide economic powers under the "Millspaugh Special Powers Law.") Dr. Millspaugh forthwith resigned. The Government then decided—quite rightly—that they could not do without him. The Bill was withdrawn, and Dr. Millspaugh agreed to remain in office; but he continued to be under strong criticism, justifiable and unjustifiable. In August Dr. Millspaugh granted another unfortunate interview to the press, in which he said that the United States was the only country which had championed Persian freedom and that if his mission had not been present in Persia one of three things would have happened: (a) disturbances leading to the occupation of North and South Persia, by the Russians and British respectively; (b) occupation of the country by an international force; (c) a dictatorship even more rigorous than Reza Shah's.

66. Again, in the autumn, he dismissed Mr. A. H. Ibtihaaj from his position as governor of the National Bank (without consulting persons, such as His Majesty's Ambassador or the American Ambassador, who would have been in a position to give good advice). The Government thereupon cancelled the order of dismissal as outside Dr. Millspaugh's powers. It is true that Mr. Ibtihaaj had for long been a violent and open critic of Dr. Millspaugh's and obstructed his work; but Dr. Millspaugh's action showed a want of political sense which was inexcusable. The result was an increase in the agitation against him; at the end of the year a debate was taking place in the Majlis on a renewed proposal to deprive him of his economic powers.

67. Although it was clear that Dr. Millspaugh must go, the Persian Government appeared anxious to keep the rest of the Millspaugh mission, and His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to do everything possible to secure their retention.

(c) American Military Mission.

68. General Ridley's mission now consists of the full complement of twenty officers.

69. General Ridley himself paid a visit to the United States during the summer in order to obtain equipment and, it was learnt confidentially, to discuss the future of his mission. Its achievements are described in the section on the Persian army. General Ridley himself, never a forceful character, seems tired and his influence is less and less in evidence. The members of the mission, catching his infection and appalled by the magnitude of their task, have become dispirited. The activities of the mission are now limited to matters of transport and supply, and to giving unheeded advice about the medical services. His scheme for the centralised training of recruits has been abandoned after a limited and unhappy trial. He says that his task, which he now interprets as little more than the organisation of systems of supply, transport and accounting, will be finished in a few months.

70. One is forced to the belief that the army authorities engaged the mission as a Santa Claus who would fill their stocking with exciting weapons of the latest design while relying on their powers of passive resistance and "sabotage with a smile" to nullify any disturbing tendencies on the part of the mission to act the part of a new administrative broom.

(d) American Gendarmerie Mission.

71. (See under "Persian Gendarmerie.")

(e) American Police Adviser.

72. Mr. Timmerman, the quite useless American police adviser, died suddenly in May. He has not been replaced (see also (a) above).

Raising of His Majesty's Legation and United States Legation to the Status of Embassies.

73. At the end of 1943, the President of the United States decided to raise the American Legation at Tehran to an embassy; as a result of the Tehran Conference declaration regarding Persia, the United States Government regarded the latter as a co-belligerent, and it was their policy to have embassies in co-belligerent countries.

74. His Majesty's Government decided to follow suit, and on the 10th February the two legations announced the change. His Majesty's Ambassador presented his new credentials on the 9th March. The Persian Legation in London was likewise raised to an embassy.

American Interests.

75. The American Minister, Mr. Dreyfus, went on leave after the Tehran Conference and did not return, and Mr. Leland Burnette Morris was appointed as first American Ambassador. His Majesty's Government, at the instigation of His Majesty's Embassy, urged the United States Government to send him to Tehran soon, on the grounds that the lack of co-ordination between the American advisers in Persia was disturbing and that it should be the function of the American Ambassador to supply that co-ordination; for instance, Dr. Millspaugh, the head of the financial mission, and General Ridley, the head of the military mission, were unable to agree on the sums which should be allotted to the Persian army. Mr. Morris, however, only arrived on the 12th August, and if he came with any instructions to co-ordinate the efforts of the American advisers, he did not reveal the fact, although he seemed to be impressed by the arguments of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that such action was necessary.

76. The Hitlerian methods used by the Soviet Government in pressing the Persian Government to grant them an oil concession appear to have contributed to a change in the views held by Mr. Wallace Murray, who deals with Middle Eastern affairs in the State Department. In the past he has had a reputation of being extremely suspicious of British imperialist machinations. His Majesty's Embassy in Washington reported, however, that he was now constantly pre-occupied with the fear of Soviet penetration in the Balkans and the Middle East, and that he was anxious to co-operate with the British on every issue.

77. The reduction at the end of the year of aid to Russia through Persia led to the departure of Lieutenant-General Connelly from the command of the American Persian Gulf Command. He was replaced by Brigadier-General Booth.

British Propaganda Activities.

78. Propaganda and publicity material have been put out by the Public Relations Bureau throughout the year through channels which have consistently developed since the bureau was opened in Victory House (the former German Brown House) in January 1942. The press attaché's section produces a weekly publication *Tafsir* containing articles translated from material received from the Ministry of Information on subjects of world-wide interest with special emphasis laid upon Britain's and the British Empire's part in the war. This illustrated weekly is sent freely to some 11,400 leading Persians throughout the country, including every member of the Majlis. The bureau's other Persian publications include the *Nau Nehalan*, a fortnightly children's newspaper with a circulation (20,000) only limited by the amount of newsprint available. It has a larger circulation than any other newspaper in Persia and is distributed almost entirely through the co-operation of the Ministry of Education to schools throughout the country. The editor is assisted voluntarily by a Persian editorial board. The Shah sent a personal message to the children of Persia through the medium of this paper over a year ago and his example was followed by Queen Fawzia when she sent a message to the women of Persia through the medium of *Alame Zanan*, a monthly woman's magazine, started by the Public Relations Bureau in July. It is popular amongst those who read it but unfortunately Persian women form but a small proportion of the country's exiguous reading public and circulation is not likely to increase greatly above its present level of 4,000.

79. The *Tehran Daily News*, the English paper published by the Public Relations Bureau now has three two-page and three four-page issues weekly and contains world news and leading articles from *The Times* and other papers

as well as feature articles received from the Ministry of Information in London and Cairo. The paper has now risen to a daily circulation of just on 4,000.

80. The broadcasting section has throughout the year continued its half-hour daily programme "The Voice of Britain" from Radio Tehran. The Sunday time was surrendered to the French, Poles and Dutch, who arranged their own programmes. Political and world affairs were covered by three weekly newsletters. For the rest, the programmes were made up of Persian guest speakers who gave talks on various aspects of social welfare, on English literature, education, and kindred subjects. In December it was, however, decided that the time had come to cease broadcasting "The Voice of Britain" from Radio Tehran and the authorities have been told that as one step in the return to normal this half-hour will be returned to them at Naruz (21st March). The chief reason for deciding to take this step was the hope that it might lead to the Russians' also ceasing to broadcast their Irano-Soviet Culture Society's programmes from Radio Tehran as these had become progressively less and less cultural and more and more aggressive and objectionable political broadcasts.

81. The films section issues Ministry of Information newsreels to the commercial cinemas throughout the country (some fifty in number), and in order to maintain their equipment and programme, assists them in importing essential parts and in smoothing transport difficulties. In December a contract for twenty-four British films was completed, the most important British film contract yet placed in Persia. In addition, this section has seven touring mobile cinemas and nine portable sound projectors. Educational film shows at institutes, colleges and schools throughout the country are organised and arranged in co-operation with the Ministry of Education and the University Faculties.⁽¹⁾ All film shows are extremely popular in Tehran, and His Majesty's consulates report similar enthusiasm for films in the provinces and in the places visited by the vans.

82. Throughout the year window displays and reading-room exhibitions have been prepared by the Visual Publicity Section for showing both in Tehran and by all consulates in the provinces. Reading material has been widely distributed both through Persian newsagents and booksellers and from the Public Relations Bureau's own show-rooms at most centres.

83. His Majesty's consulates report continued efforts by the Russians to extend the field of their own publicity. There is to-day no apparent effort on the part of the Persians to resist our publicity; on the contrary, more Persians than ever now advise us as to how our campaigns should be conducted to be successful. Co-operation is generous and appears to be whole-hearted since much help is given both voluntarily and without payment.

British Council.

84. The British staff of the council in Persia numbers twenty-five; they are assisted by twenty local staff and twenty-four part-time teachers. These control the English teaching of upwards of 4,000 students in institutes, evening classes, universities, Government and private schools and agricultural and technical colleges.

85. Institutes at Tehran and Isfahan cater for 1,500 and 400 students respectively and the new institute at Shiraz, officially opened in November, has already over 600 students. These three institutes provide English teachers and class-rooms as well as club amenities and games, a library, film displays, reading rooms, lectures, concerts and drama.

86. Three evening schools teach over 900 students outside the institutes. A summer school near Tehran taught 250 students in outdoor classes and provided concerts, a swimming pool and Shakespearian performances in an open-air theatre.

87. Over 80,000 books, including text-books, periodicals and technical bulletins have been distributed. Sets of books have been presented to universities, colleges and clubs.

88. Educational film displays were seen by over 60,000 persons and were given in schools and colleges. Radio lessons in English are broadcast five days weekly.

89. Other activities include an art school, physical training and dress-making classes, a debating society, drama, chess and universities clubs; a medical association, art exhibitions, a theatre and restaurant in Tehran, as well as private tuition and coaching classes.

⁽¹⁾ The Public Relations Bureau also run a newsreel cinema, built at their instigation, which shows a weekly change of programme of one hour, consisting of newsreels and Ministry of Information shorts.

90. Six scholarships have been granted for post-graduate scholars to England. Students are prepared for Cambridge and matriculation examinations and children are placed at schools and colleges in England.

Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Polish Refugees.

91. At the beginning of the year the total number of Polish civilians in Persia was 9,622. By the end of the year it had been reduced to 4,435. The Poles who left went to the following destinations: Palestine, the Lebanon, India, East Africa, Rhodesia, and New Zealand. Others went to join the Polish armed forces. Half of the children's school at Isfahan and their attendant grown-ups still remain to be evacuated. Once they are gone, there will be no Poles left in Persia apart from (a) those employed by the British and American armed forces and Government organisations, and (b) those living by their own efforts, who consequently are their own masters and free to leave or stay as they wish, subject only to Persian regulations regarding *permis de séjour*.

92. Expenditure on the Polish refugees in Persia at the beginning of 1944 was the equivalent of £119,000 per month, but it diminished to £36,900 per month by the end of the year. This expenditure is difficult to control since, although the money is advanced by His Majesty's Government (under the Polish civil credit), the funds are Polish. At the instance of this embassy a number of economies have been effected, but there are probably still some items of extravagance which it is not possible to check.

93. On the 2nd August, 1944, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration took over from Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Administration the handling of the Polish refugees in Persia. These Poles, however, are not war refugees within the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration's definition of the term; and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration take no financial responsibility for them and, in fact, no responsibility other than that of ultimate repatriation. They are, however, prepared to act (without commitment) in a certain measure as regards transport.

Economic Warfare.

94. The necessity for contraband control in Persia has naturally declined during 1944, particularly since the closing of the Balkan route to Switzerland and the occupation of Roumania and Bulgaria. In fact the only enemies with whom the Persians could now trade are specified persons in neutral territory, and such trade is easily prevented by liaison with the British section of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship. Merchants are generally anxious to follow such guidance and warnings as are given to them by the Economic Warfare section of the embassy.

95. On the other hand a number of contraband control prohibitions continue to exist for which the merchant can see no valid justification, e.g., the prohibition of all carpet exports to Switzerland and of lambskins to Turkey. Fortunately the merchants concerned are not politically articulate, and it may be hoped that the end of the war with Germany may soon remove the cause of their complaints; and incidentally of some embarrassment to the embassy, since the Soviet authorities who are in practical control of the frontier with Turkey allow Persian exports to pass which have not been authorised by the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

96. The weeding out of the statutory and black lists in Persia continued during 1944, and by the end of the year both were very small. Some persons remaining on the statutory list have been recommended as eligible for retention after the close of hostilities with Germany owing to their dealings with the German intelligence service.

97. There has been during the year a considerable move by Persians to send financial relief to their relatives in the crumbling fortress of Europe. Accordingly an informal arrangement was made with the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs whereby they identified the beneficiaries and the Economic Warfare Section examined each case (in secret liaison with the security authorities) before the censor passed the relevant telegraphic transfer. This arrangement has worked smoothly, though some remittances have been disallowed because the beneficiaries were working for the enemy. In such cases the refusal was accompanied by the grounds for rejection.

Relations with India.

98. In response to the Government of India's invitation a small cultural mission of three Persian scholars toured India during March and April 1944. They were able to see for themselves the great progress in scientific and industrial matters in India and the richness of Persian culture there. On their return to Tehran they enthusiastically set about the dissemination of the facts and at the end of the year an authoritative and representative Indo-Iranian Cultural Society was inaugurated at a meeting of savants and other persons interested in Indo-Persian culture.

99. The Government of India made a generous offer of eleven valuable scholarships for post-graduate courses in (a) forestry (2); (b) agriculture (4); (c) engineering and technical (3); (d) textile (2); and six at the Aitchison College, Lahore, for younger boys. The selection of candidates by a sub-committee of the society (which includes a member of the British Council) was not completed by the end of the year, but it is hoped that sufficient suitable young men equipped with an adequate knowledge of the English language will be found.

100. Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, and Sir Denys Pilditch, Director of Intelligence, and the Home Department of the Government of India, visited Tehran for a week in June and discussed problems of mutual interest. Their visit coincided with the climax of Soviet obstructionism, for in spite of strong pressure by His Majesty's Embassy, they were refused permission to fly to Meshed, where the Government of India have large interests, until after their departure for India.

101. Four members of the Indian Defence Consultative Committee travelled to Persia in May to visit the Indian troops here.

102. As the British Council could not furnish enough English teachers to meet the great demand the Government of India carefully selected four Indian graduate experts to teach English at Meshed (2), Kerman (1) and Yazd (1). On the success of this experiment depends the sending of other Indian teachers to Bushire, Ahwaz, and elsewhere, where the demand would justify the expenditure involved. The reports for the difficult initial month's work in the three centres are most encouraging. The British Council gave valuable assistance with English text books.

103. The Indian community in the capital, having been purged of its most undesirable elements, is beginning to show a greater interest in the part which its members must play as ambassadors of their country and their change of heart has been shown in the very generous contributions which the community has made to India's war effort in the form of charitable donations and investments in Government of India War Bonds, and also in the excellent arrangements made in conjunction with the British welfare authorities to entertain Indian troops stationed at Tehran.

104. India's interest in the expansion of her post-war export trade is shown by the establishment of a Trade Commissioner in Tehran. The first Indian Trade Commissioner is expected to take up his duties in the spring of 1945.

Internal Politics and the Majlis.

(a) Majlis.

105. At the beginning of the year the elections for the 14th legislative period had not been completed and the Majlis was not in session. The formal opening fixed for the 22nd January was moreover postponed as a result principally of the opposition of the Shah who wanted a more subservient Parliament and was apprehensive of what might happen when Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai took his seat. It was, however, formally opened on the 26th February. Muhammad Zaghi Assad (Amir Jang) was elected temporary president for the examination of the credentials of the Deputies. Later he was succeeded as president by Seyyid Muhammad Sadigh Tabatabai who continued to be president for the rest of the year.

106. Examination of the credentials of the Deputies occupied much of the time of the Majlis for the first few months. Opposition to Seyyid Zia was strong, but after a full-dress debate, in which the Seyyid's oratory made a good impression, his credentials were passed with a substantial majority by secret ballot. Although a number of objections were tabled in the course of the year, the credentials of only three Deputies were definitely rejected.

The Deputies concerned were Durri, member for Daragez, and Khoyi and Pishavari, both of Tabriz, whose election was said to have been secured by irregular means.

107. The Tudeh group in the Majlis originally numbered eight, but was reduced in August to seven by the expulsion of one member, Khalatbari, Deputy for Babul. In October, however, the passing of the credentials for Ovanassian, Deputy for the Northern Armenians and a founder member of the Tudeh, again raised the number of the group to eight. This group published at the end of February its programme for the 14th legislative period. It was a surprisingly moderate programme of reform which might have been produced by any of the progressive elements inside or outside the Majlis. The Tudeh may indeed have started as a genuinely left-wing Persian movement, but its subservience to Soviet influence had become increasingly clear by the end of the year, and the cohesion and well-organised activities displayed throughout the year by its representatives in the Majlis confirmed the belief that the party owed much to Russian influence and support.

108. Other groups or "fractions" continued to exist and function in the Majlis but they were more like associations of friends than political parties. Efforts to form an effective Government majority in the Majlis by a coalition of various "fractions," however, achieved temporary success towards the end of August when about eighty-five Deputies agreed to combine to support Saed's reconstituted Cabinet. This coalition survived until October, when the Russian demand for an oil concession caused a crisis which eventually brought about Saed's resignation, whereupon the coalition of fractions formed to support him began gradually to dissolve. The process of disintegration was accelerated in December by further disagreement among the Deputies over the Millspaugh question.

109. By the end of the year 130 out of the full complement of 136 Deputies had taken their seats in the Majlis, though the credentials of two of their number still remained to be examined.

110. The Majlis passed little legislation during the year, having been preoccupied with the credentials of elected Deputies, the Millspaugh question, intrigues over the composition of Cabinets and the crisis caused by the Russian demand in October for an oil concession. The Chamber had failed by the end of December to approve the Budget for the year 1323 (21st March, 1944, to 20th March, 1945), and adopted the course of financing Government expenditure by Votes on Account. Among the measures passed was article 12 of the Compulsory Education Bill providing for increases in teachers' wages, new school premises and facilities for the education of workers; a Bill for an additional credit of 150 million rials for the army; and a Bill tabled by Dr. Musaddiq on the 2nd December prohibiting the grant of an oil concession to any foreign Government or company.

(b) Internal Politics.

111. Soheily's Cabinet, which had been appointed on the 16th December, 1943, remained in power until the end of the elections when, realising it had lost the support of the Majlis, it resigned. Soheily was succeeded by Sa'ed who, on the 26th March, presented the following Cabinet to the Shah:—

Prime Minister: Muhammad Sa'ed Maraghe'i.
Agriculture: Mahmud Fateh.
Commerce and Industry: Amanullah Ardalan.
Communications: Hamid Sayah.
Education: Sarlashkar Ali Riazi.
Finance: Mahmud Nariman.
Foreign: Muhammad Sa'id Maraghe'i.
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.
Justice: Asadullah Mamaqani.
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Abdul Qasim Furuhar.
Health: Dr. Qasim Ghani.
War: Ibrahim Zand.
Without portfolio: Murteza Quli Bayat, Mustafa Adl.

The Majlis did not take long to signify its disapproval of this Cabinet. The Deputies wanted more of the young and progressive elements. Much of their opposition was concentrated against Zand, Dr. Ghani and General Riazi, who were thought to be nominees of the Shah. His Majesty's continued intervention in the affairs of the Cabinet, the Majlis and the army had caused increasing resentment. There was a strong feeling in the Majlis that the Shah's activities should be confined within strictly constitutional limits. At the end of March Sa'ed had only announced his programme and had not ventured to present his

Ministers for the approval of the Majlis, and he was obliged a few days later to reconstitute his Cabinet. General Riazi, Mahmud Fateh and Mahmud Nariman were dropped. Furuhar became Minister of Finance; Dr. Ghani, Minister of Education; Nasir I'timadi, Minister of Agriculture; and Dr. Saed Malik, Minister of Health. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs remained vacant. The new Cabinet was, however, not greeted with any enthusiasm in the Majlis or the country, and Dr. Ghani had resigned before the end of April. Nevertheless, in the absence of any alternative to Sa'ed, the Majlis gave the new Cabinet a vote of confidence on the 16th April.

112. In May Sa'ed asserted himself sufficiently to admonish the press for its irresponsible virulence and shameless blackmail. He also caused a stir by introducing a Bill to apply military law to Government employees and factory workers. The Bill was attacked by the Tudeh as reactionary and was rejected.

113. Criticism of Sa'ed soon began. His detractors said he was weak and reactionary and, owing to his long residence abroad, ignorant of conditions in his own country. Nevertheless in the absence of any general agreement as to who should succeed him, his Cabinet continued precariously in office until the end of August. By then Majlis opinion had decided that the best temporary solution would be for Sa'ed to reshuffle his Cabinet, and he was promised the support of a coalition of eighty-five deputies of the Mihan, Ittehad-i-Milli and Azadi fractions. On the 31st August Sa'ed presented his reconstituted Cabinet to the Shah as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Sa'ed Maraghe'i.
Commerce and Industry: Dr. Muhammad Nakhai.
Communications: Muhammad Nariman.
Education: Baqir Kazimi.
Finance: Ali Asghar Zarinkafsh.
Interior: Muhammad Sururi.
Justice: Allahyar Saleh.
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Yusuf Mushar.
Health: Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal.
War: General Muhammad Hussein Firuz.
Without portfolio: Khalil Fahimi.

General Muhammad Hussein Firuz, Governor General of Fars, however, refused to accept the Ministry of War, which was left under the charge of Brigadier Abdullah Nidayat, as Acting Minister.

114. The new Cabinet was opposed by the Tudeh who objected to the return of Sa'ed and by the Independents in the Majlis who had not been consulted about its formation. Discussions lasting a fortnight followed before the Cabinet finally obtained its vote of confidence on the 17th September. Although Sa'ed continued to enjoy the support of the coalition majority in the Majlis, the position of his Cabinet remained unstable owing to the opposition of the Tudeh and the Russians and of the Shah who was displeased because none of his nominees were in the Government.

115. A notable feature of political life in Persia during the year was the growth of the power of parties and unions. Labour unions had existed for some time in the Russian occupied zone where they were affiliated with the Tudeh party. Other unions also existed in Isfahan and Khuzistan. In Isfahan the Tudeh and the workers' union combined caused trouble in April and the Government had to send a strong Governor-General to that town to deal with the situation. Agitation was also fomented in Tabriz in July when the Majlis ventured to reject the credentials of a Tudeh sponsored deputy from that district. From the 1st to the 12th August the Tudeh party held its first general conference in Tehran. The conference confirmed the programme of moderate constitutional reform adopted by its representatives in the Majlis in February. Other resolutions passed confirmed the hostility of the party to Seyyid Zia and to all foreign advisers, and to the grant of economic concessions "which constrict or weaken the economic independence of the Persian nation." Labour unions affiliated to the Tudeh played a large part in the demonstrations and street disturbances organised by that party in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan and other towns in October and November, as a result of the refusal of the Persian Government to grant the oil concession to Russia. The Tudeh had indeed so clearly revealed itself as an instrument of Russian policy by the end of the year that it had become seriously discredited in the eyes of the public. Other parties, such as the "Hamrahan," the "Adalat," and the "Mardum" were of little importance. But Seyyid Zia

was reported to be making progress with the foundation of a party of his own, by a process of forming circles of "progressive" elements throughout the country.

116. Seyyid Zia's vigorous personality was throughout this period a source of constant provocation to the Tudeh and the Russians who could not get out of their heads the theory that he was a creature of the British. His relations with the Shah, which at first were extremely bad, gradually improved. Increasing fear of Soviet penetration in the north may have driven the Shah to the conclusion that he might before long need the strong personality of Seyyid Zia to stand up to the Russians. After several interviews the Shah and Seyyid Zia were believed to have reached a considerable measure of agreement by the end of August, but nothing further had come of the apparent reconciliation by the end of the year.

117. The Persian Government's rejection in October of the Russian demand for an oil concession precipitated a crisis which brought about Sa'ed's resignation. Although Sa'ed clearly had the support of public opinion and of a growing section of the press, the Majlis decided finally that he should go, as a sop to the Russians. Sa'ed therefore resigned on the 10th November. The various Majlis fractions thereupon went into conclave to choose a successor, but it was not until the 20th November that Murteza Quli Bayat was elected Prime Minister with fifty votes against forty-five given to Sadiq Sadiqi.

118. On the 25th November Bayat presented the following Cabinet to the Shah:—

Prime Minister: Murteza Quli Bayat.
Foreign: Muhsin Rais.
Commerce and Industry: Kamal Hidayat.
Communications: Nasrullah Intizam.
Education: Dr. Issa Sadiq.
Finance: Amanullah Ardalan.
Interior: Muhammad Sururi.
War: Ibrahim Zand.
Justice: Mustafa Adl.
Health: Dr. Said Malik.
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Nadir Arasteh.
Without portfolio: Khalil Fahimi, Ali Akbar Siasi.

Muhsin Rais, Persian Ambassador at Baghdad, having refused the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Nasrullah Intizam was appointed to the post. Two of the new Ministers, Khalil Fahimi, Minister without portfolio, and Sururi, Minister of the Interior, had held the same posts in Sa'ed's Government. On the whole, the Cabinet was considered a fairly good one. Discussion on the new Government's programme was concluded on the 4th December and Bayat received a vote of confidence by a majority of seventy-two to nine with sixteen abstentions.

The Press and Public Relations.

119. The tone of the press during the past year was, on the whole, more favourable to the Allies. This may be ascribed largely to their improved fortunes on the battle-front. As the end of the war drew nearer, there was a growing tendency to emphasise Persia's claims at the Peace Conference and to urge the Government to draw up Persia's case.

120. Towards the end of the year the press crystallised into two, at least temporarily, clearly defined groups; the so-called Freedom Front and the Independence Front. In addition to this were a few neutral papers. The former group is comprised of those papers run by the Tudeh party and their sympathisers and is under Russian influence. Many of the papers belonging to this group are in all probability financed directly or indirectly by Russian sources. Their columns are largely occupied by diatribes against capitalism and reaction and more recently against "international imperialists," and to some extent by Marxist dialectics. The troubles in Greece gave them an opportunity to attack British policy, which they were not slow to seize. Similarly, the oil crisis in the autumn also caused strong support of the Russians and violent attacks on the Government, the ruling classes and the "agents of reaction and imperialism." This, however, did much to discredit these papers in the eyes of the public.

121. The Independence Front came into existence in December, largely as a result of the oil crisis. The papers belonging to this group, together with a number of papers supporting Seyyid Zia, took a strong line over the oil crisis and asserted that Russian intimidation was an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the country.

122. From time to time there were fulsome articles in praise of Russia, such as the occasion of the formation of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society, but there is little doubt that fear of Russian intentions towards Persia increased with growing rapidity. In proportion, as the attitude towards Russia deteriorated so did the attitude towards Great Britain improve. The oil crisis induced certain papers to stand up to Russia. To their surprise they found they were not visited immediately with some terrible punishment. The result has been that a juster balance has been observed in the allocation by the press and public of blame among Allies for Persia's ills.

123. There was a growing tendency from the summer onwards to accuse the United States of having imperialist designs in Persia and the Middle East.

124. In internal affairs the press showed itself extremely sensitive to any supposed attack on its freedom or to any attempt to establish control over it. Any measures which were thought to be a reversion to the dictatorship and its methods were also violently attacked. The general tone towards internal affairs has been one of pessimism. The governing classes were persistently accused of corruption and incapability.

125. The Millsapugh mission was virulently attacked by the Freedom Front papers and the majority of neutral papers. Its only support came from a number of Independence Front papers and papers supporting Seyyid Zia.

Tribal Situation.

126. The tribes have remained comparatively peaceful during 1944 having been allowed, in a large measure, to manage their own affairs. The Government, perhaps as the result of three years of pressure by this embassy, has at least condescended to recognise that among the people of Persia, for whose welfare they are responsible, are tribal communities—outlandish barbarians in the opinion of most of the Ministers—whose way of life requires special consideration. A Tribal Commission was formed composed of two Ministers without portfolio and two tribal Deputies, one from the Bakhtiari and one from the Kurds. This commission in turn recommended the formation of a Tribal Affairs Department in the Ministry of the Interior which was to have branches in all the provinces. However, as the result of the successful conclusion of some very minor operations for disarming some of the weaker and more accessible tribes and, as time passed by without any serious uprising, the Persian Government's fear of, and interest in, the tribes declined and the commission ceased to function and finally disintegrated with that imperceptible decay so common to Persian institutions. Seyyid Zia also, with the object of gaining tribal support, made known his sympathy with the neglect and oppression tribes had suffered in recent years, and his views that they merited much greater consideration from the Government and that they should be allowed to retain their arms to protect themselves against oppression until they were assured of just administration. This put the Tudeh party, always in opposition to Seyyid Zia, in a difficult position. They had themselves for political purposes been championing the cause of the tribes, but their hostility to Seyyid Zia obliged them to cry loudly against what they alleged was incitement of the tribes to rearm and oppose the Government. The Shah, too, was disturbed by the thought that Seyyid Zia was trying to secure the support of the tribes with a view to using them to bring off a *coup d'Etat* as the Bakhtiari had done some decades before. For a time it seemed that he was himself going to make a bid for popularity among the tribes, but he seems to have reverted to his father's idea that they must be disarmed as soon and as ruthlessly as possible and kept in a state of weakness lest they became a dangerous instrument in the hands of foreigners or schemers against the throne. The pact of friendship between Qavam-ul-Mulk and Nasir Qashgai, later joined by Murteza Quli Khan Bakhtiari, has contributed to peace by removing, for a time at least, some of the causes of unrest which lay in long-standing mutual antagonisms. This pact has been represented as an alliance of the tribes of the south and Tudeh press has been loud in proclaiming that this is a sinister move by Persian reactionaries and their masters to form an imperialistic zone of influence in the south.

127. Affairs worthy of note in the various tribal zones may be summarised as follows:—

(a) *Bakhtiari*.—Some discontent is becoming evident with the rather arbitrary government of Murteza Quli Khan, who, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, appears to be reverting to the customs of the days of Ilkhani rule, the return of which would be hardly more welcome to the tribesmen than the return of the military régime of Reza Shah's days. Murteza Quli Khan is

reported to be levying on the tribe the old taxes levied by the Ilkhanis and abolished by Reza Shah. Moreover, he is departing from a well-established custom of the old days when the lucrative posts in tribal administration were evenly distributed between the two rival branches of the ruling family. Now only his own relatives get these opportunities, and the disgruntled Khans of the other branch heartily encourage all the discontent they can find.

(b) *Qashgai*.—With the handing over of the Germans and of Naubakht our relations with the Qashai diminished in importance. Nasir Khan has still failed to make his submission to the Persian Government in the person of the Shah but has had frequent contacts with the Governor-General of Fars and His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. He hankers after but has not yet been given the title of "Rais-i-Intizimat" (chief administrator) which is the furthest the Persian Government were prepared to go in recognising his position as head of the Qashgai. On the whole the tribe has been quiet, occasional acts of robbery serve as a reminder that brigandage is endemic in Fars.

(c) *Kuh-i-Galu*.—On the borders of the northern oil field area in Khuzestan the Bahmai tribe of Kuhgali has been indulging in some minor raiding. Earlier in the year plans had been made by the local Persian commanders for the disarmament of this tribe and the western Janeki tribe, but at the last moment fears that the Bahmai might be supported by other Kuhgalu tribes modified the plan, and only the Janeki lost some arms. It is through their territory that the Bahmai are now raiding, and the Janeki plead their disarmament as justification for being unable to prevent them. A delicately balanced situation exists between the conflicting sections of the Boir Ahmadi. Both sides are wearying of the tension and showing a tendency to come to terms. Whether this will be to the benefit of their neighbours, only time will show. There has certainly been less than the usual Boir Ahmad raiding since the tribes were occupied in sparring with each other.

(d) *Khuzestan*.—A measure of the disarmament of the Arab tribes has been effected and continues. After some 1,000 rifles had been collected from the Arabs of the Ahu Dasht area the Persian troops turned their attention to the Beni Turuf who, with opposition from only a small section who fled to Iraq, surrendered some 1,300 rifles. The Beni Tamim have now begun to hand in their arms. Further operations have been successfully undertaken between Ahwaz and Bandar Shahpur, east of Ahwaz near Khalafabad and on Abadan Island.

(e) *Kurdistan*.—The tribal situation in Southern Kurdistan has on the whole remained remarkably quiet. In August, however, the Persian Government conducted an operation against Hama Rashid of Baneh, who had rebelled against them in 1942 and had wrested from them a settlement leaving him in effective control of his district. For some time past some Persian authorities had held the view that his position was a dangerous encouragement to Kurdish aspirations. This embassy's advice was that any measure against him should be combined with concrete evidence of an intention to provide benefits for the Kurdish tribes. Hama Rashid, however, played into the hands of the Government by attacking a neighbouring village. The Government thereupon despatched a column against him as a result of which Baneh and Sardasht were occupied with little opposition and Hama Rashid driven from Persian territory. He has now been removed from the vicinity of the frontier by the Iraqi authorities. Most of the chiefs of this area have made their peace, for the time being, with the Persian authorities, and if the Persians were capable of just administration and a consistent policy they would now have the opportunity of relieving Kurdish fears and laying the foundation of a permanent settlement. In North Kurdistan the situation is not easy to describe. It is known that the Russians are in close touch with the Kurds and have not permitted any offensive measures, and disarmament operations or even free movement to the few small garrisons of Persian troops allowed to be stationed in Azarbaijan. The Russians, or rather the Russian-controlled Tudeh party, have close contacts with the Kurds and fifteen notables of the Shakkaq tribe were invited to the recent Tudeh conference in Tabriz. It is probably true to say that the Kurds have no real affinity with the Russians and realise that a separatist movement in Azarbaijan, culminating possibly in a republic under Soviet control, would hold out no especial benefit for them (their object being Kurdish autonomy); but they would stand to benefit from a complete breakdown of Persian Government authority in Azarbaijan following the withdrawal of Russian troops and are watching the situation without committing themselves too deeply.

Tribal Lands.

128. Early in February the Persian Ministry of Justice prepared a complicated but comprehensive plan for the formation of sub-committees of three to examine and decide the many long-outstanding claims of individual tribesmen and their chieftains to lands which had been forcibly seized from them, and exchanged or merely requisitioned and sold to third parties, during the régime of Reza Shah. Though no case has yet been completed, the work is progressing and it would seem that the Persian Government genuinely wish to settle once and for all these claims which have remained a festering sore in the country. The policy of His Majesty's Embassy has been to refrain from sponsoring any individual claim but to press for the early settlement of them all by means of these sub-committees.

Persian Army.

129. 1944 has not been a year of great progress for the Persian army but, on balance, at the close of it they are materially better off and morally no worse off than at its beginning. The defects and shortcomings are the same as those noted in previous reviews and will persist until the microbe of perverted individualism is eliminated from the Persian system.

130. A lack of continuity in direction has always been a weakness in Persian military affairs and four changes in the post of Minister of War and five changes in that of the Chief of the General Staff have resulted in much shuffling of posts and bewilderment among the subordinate officials. There is still no clear-cut division of responsibilities as between the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff and, even if their functions were to be clearly defined, the intervention of H.I.M. the Shah, either through that unnecessary body, his military Cabinet, or directly as titular commander-in-chief, through the Chief of the General Staff, produces confusion and opens the door to backstairs intrigues.

131. The close of the year finds the post of Minister for War occupied by Ibrahim Zand, a patriotic and honest man with background of military training in the Russia of Tsarist days. He has sound ideas of eliminating corruption in the army but lacks the courage to enforce his will against such formidable odds.

132. The present Chief of the General Staff is General Hassan Arfa, an officer of undoubted courage, energy and patriotism. His rough manner, excitable temperament, his violent likes and dislikes, his suspicious nature and his record, not entirely blameless as regards peculation, lower his respect in the army and diminish his chance of success. He has a lively fear of Russian designs and, although inclined to be xenophobic, is not, at present, unfriendly to us. Though he recognises the weaknesses in the Shah's character, he worships him as Shah and the present danger is that his ebullient nationalism and his fanatical belief that an army commanded by the Shah and controlled by himself is invincible may lead him and his royal master into rash enterprises and trials of strength with the tribes in which, at their present level of training, equipment and administration, they are likely to come off the losers.

133. The army still suffers from shortage of funds and still lives from hand to mouth on doles of one-twelfth or two-twelfths of the military budget which the Majlis periodically sanctions and which a Treasury, said to be nearly empty, doles out with reluctance and the maximum of delay.

134. Out of the original budget for 1,530 million rials the Director-General of Finances has only sanctioned 1,000 million rials. An extra allotment of 150 million rials to be found from Government profits on the sale of monopoly goods, though sanctioned, has not yet been received.

135. The officer cadre of the Persian army is riven by internal dissensions. Many belong to so-called political parties—not political parties as we understand the term, but mutable combinations of crooks banded together to further some intrigue or obtain some temporary advantage. Many attach themselves to some patron from whom they expect to derive personal advancement.

136. Some of the junior officers and warrant officers have been receptive objects of Russian propaganda. Their low rates of pay, their slow rates of promotion, their inability to rise under the dead weight of sloth, corruption and ignorance of their seniors have been pointed out to them with, it is said, some effect.

137. Indiscipline among all ranks of officers attains serious proportions. The recipient of an unpalatable order will evade it by malingering, procrastination or bribery; or, if these methods fail, obtain the support of a Majlis Deputy to air his grievances. In the last resort he may purchase the vituperative skill

of a journalist, who will pour out in his columns such a torrent of slander on the author of the order that he will be glad to rescind the order in order to obtain relief.

138. To dissipate the gloom of this picture of the Persian army there are some bright features.

139. The American military mission has obtained some much-needed equipment, chiefly medical stores, clothing, boots, and 600 trucks. Two further long lists of stores have been forwarded to the United States.

140. The mission has laid down a rudimentary organisation for the issue, control and maintenance of military transport and a system of supply depots which will check the widespread misappropriation of stores at the centre, but, because control ceases as soon as issues leave the depots, will not eliminate petty peculation by commanders of units. A scheme for centralised recruit training at divisional centres instead of in regiments met with such opposition that it had to be abandoned.

141. As a result of certain successful minor operations to disarm the tribes, of which particulars are given under the Tribal Affairs Section, the morale of the troops has improved, and provided that the General Staff refrain from operations beyond their means, this improvement should continue as the memories of the inglorious collapse before the British and Russian troops in August 1941 grow dimmer.

142. Stalin's tanks and aircraft have never materialised. The conditions subsequently attached to the offer stipulated that the units of mixed Russian and Persian personnel which were to be formed for the purpose of training in these arms were to be under the command of Soviet officers, who were themselves to be under the command of the Red army; that the Persian personnel were to be selected with the approval of the Russian commander, and that the units were not to be removed from their appointed places of training (Meshed and Kazvin), nor could the material be used for any other purpose without the approval of the Red army. These conditions were too full of alarming possibilities to be acceptable to the Persian Government, who replied that they would accept the material gladly—without conditions. The offer was thereupon angrily withdrawn.

Persian Gendarmerie.

143. In the gendarmerie, as in the army, plans for improvement are held up by lack of funds. The credit demanded by Colonel Schwarzkopf for the modified organisation he had in view for the current year, that is, eighteen regiments of gendarmerie with a total strength of 28,000—the number he considers to be really necessary is 40,000—amounted to 600 million rials. The amount allotted in the budget by Dr. Millspaugh is 290 million rials, which is the bare cost of ten regiments at the increased rates of pay; these rates are, in fact, the minimum at which officers and men can be expected to refrain from partnership with brigands and thieves. Even among gendarmerie officers the opinion is forming that in the present financial and economic situation of the country the interests of internal security would be better served by devoting the available resources to the army and the police. Colonel Schwarzkopf's insistence that the gendarmerie should be independent of the army has accentuated the lack of co-operation that became immediately evident when the force passed from the control of the Ministry of War to that of the Interior.

144. Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission has now been completed to the maximum strength of six officers sanctioned by the United States. Although Colonel Schwarzkopf has extensive powers it is obvious that six officers can exercise no very effective influence over the actions of personnel scattered in small packets over an area of 628,000 square miles, and consequently in the provinces gendarmerie shows no improvement as the result of Colonel Schwarzkopf's eighteen months' hard work.

145. Encouraged by some Deputies and other influential persons who would like to see the gendarmerie established in a more important position than the army, he aims at an organisation which he estimates would require three years to build up and whose cost would be justifiable only if the army were reduced to a small striking force. However desirable that might be, it does not seem to be realisable in the near future; and it is the efficiency of the gendarmerie in the near future that is of primary interest to us. Towards that very little progress is evident. But it is reasonable to expect that Colonel Schwarzkopf's energy and drive will produce results in time. Handicapped, as he is, by inadequate funds, inadequate American staff, the lack of any co-ordinated policy on the part of the

Government and an unwillingness on his part to admit that the best may sometimes be the enemy of the good, he could perhaps not fairly be expected to have effected much improvement in an organisation as demoralised, as lethargic and as uninspired by any laudable ideal as the Persian gendarmerie.

Persian Air Force.

146. The fighting value of the Persian Air Force remains as it was a year ago—virtually negligible. During the second half of 1944 no fuel was available and flying was brought to a standstill. In the air therefore the force is probably even worse than it was, though a short conversion course on Ansons which was given to ten pilots in Egypt in the summer did some good. On the ground, steady, though very slow, progress under Royal Air Force guidance has been made with the maintenance of airframes and engines, but the continued loss of senior technical non-commissioned officers to civilian employment is a grave handicap.

147. The fifteen Ansons supplied by His Majesty's Government in exchange for ten Mohawks taken over in 1941 were delivered in August. Now that the Persian Air Force at last has some fuel and can fly them they should prove increasingly useful for operational and communications purposes.

148. Sarlashkar Hassein Firuz, who was commanding the Air Force at the beginning of the year left it to become Governor-General of Fars in the early summer. He was succeeded by Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakhchevan, a very senior officer who had built up the Force in the 1930's, but whose prestige was greater than his energy. He paid a formal visit to the United Kingdom in November, partly in connexion with a scheme for training his Air Force on Hurricanes, but he had hardly left this country when he was replaced by Sartip Ahmad Khosrovani, another Air Force officer, who had, however, not been employed in the Air Force since 1941 but who was a friend of the Under-Secretary of War and had suddenly become available on his expulsion by the Russians from Tabriz where he had been commanding troops. Sartip Khosrovani is showing commendable energy in his command, but his ideas about most things are out of date. Sarlashkar Nakhchevan, whose training scheme fell with him, was offered but declined the post of Inspector-General of the Air Force and left almost at once on an official visit to America where he still is.

Civil Airlines in Persia.

149. During the year the Iranian State Airline has continued its Tehran-Bagdad service. Following the delivery in the autumn of two of the three Dominies ordered from the United Kingdom by the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones the frequency has been increased to a nominal twice a week in each direction. The airline is operating from Mehrabad airfield under Royal Air Force control with crews seconded from the Persian Air Force, who are trying with some success to conform to present-day airfield and control procedure. The third Dominie met with a minor accident on its delivery flight at the end of the year, but is expected in Tehran shortly. An experimental service from Tehran to Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire was run once or twice in the summer but was not established owing to shortage of aircraft. It may soon be revived.

150. During the summer a group of prominent Persians formed a company which is seeking the monopoly of air transport within the country. Part of their scheme may be also to take over the existing postal service to Bagdad. Sarlashkar Nakhchevan is acting as technical adviser and the moving spirit is G. H. Ibtihaj, the present Mayor of Tehran. The company professes to be anxious to work with British interests, particularly the British Overseas Airways Corporation, and some of its members are genuine in this. There is, however, reason to believe that Ibtihaj himself is at the same time in close touch with the Americans. The company has yet to secure formal acceptance of its proposals by the Government.

151. The frequency of the British Overseas Airway Corporation service to Bagdad, Damascus and Cairo was increased in the summer to thrice weekly in each direction. It runs to capacity, the small space left over after meeting official demands being readily taken up by non-official passengers and freight.

152. In the spring the Russians began to carry non-Soviet passengers for payment, on their military aircraft plying between Meshed, Tabriz and Pahlevi and the capital. This led the Persian Government to issue a circular to the foreign missions saying that they did not "allow" any Power to use the internal air services and that as soon as aircraft ordered in the United Kingdom and the United States arrived the Persian Government would reorganise all air services.

Finance.

153. The budgetary deficit for the year 1943-44 (ending on the 20th March, 1944) was 1,052 million rials, as against 7,500 million in the preceding year. Of the two budgets, the ordinary and commercial, into which the main budget is divided, the ordinary showed a small surplus while the deficit on the commercial budget was 1,214 million rials. This deficit was due partly to the necessity for subsidising food-stuffs, and partly to the wasteful and often corrupt management of the Government factories. For the current financial year, the estimates laid before the Majlis last June (but even now not yet approved by them) showed both the ordinary and commercial budgets practically in balance, with a small surplus on both taken together of 470,000 rials.

154. The actual out-turn for the first nine months of the year up to the 21st December, 1944, shows a net deficit of 219 million rials as compared with 837 million for the same period last year. The situation, however, is less favourable than it appears, partly because the salaries of Government servants have been allowed to run one month in arrear, but mainly because the receipts from income tax, the rates of which were increased from the beginning of the year, are likely to be much below the optimistic estimate. It is not possible at the present stage to give any reliable estimate of the final out-turn; but it would appear that if the ordinary budget is to be balanced it will only be done by severe economies in expenditure, although it is difficult to see where (apart from the army) economies on a sufficient scale can be made without grave detriment to the public services. The out-turn of the commercial budget will depend mainly on the stocks of food-stuffs held at the end of the year and the cost of subsidies. The Government have reached their statutory limit for borrowing from the National Bank; and both the Minister for Finance and Dr. Millsaugh realise that the position generally is very far from satisfactory.

155. There was a slight check in the inflationary process at the time of the favourable war news towards the end of the summer, but it has been only temporary. Thus the figures of note circulation, which were 5,515 million rials in January and 6,262 in June, were 6,640 in December; while bank deposits which were 6,103 million in January and 8,753 in June, were 9,003 in December. Wholesale prices which were 498 in January rose to 534 (August), declined to 442 (October) and were 497 in December. The cost of living figure was 772 in January, rose to 855 (August), decreased to 656 (November) and was 684 in December (for both indices 1939=100). Although the price indices were rather higher in December than in November, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a further fall from now onwards, although it is to be hoped that it will be gradual.

156. A Persian delegation headed by M. Ibtihaj, Governor of the National Bank, attended the Middle East Financial Conference, which was held in Cairo during April. With the other delegations, it subscribed to the resolutions of the conference calling upon the countries concerned (a) to balance their budgets (b) to absorb surplus purchasing power by taxation, internal loans and savings and (c) to ensure the progressive reduction of prices. In the case of Persia, however, this was more easily said than done. Dr. Millsaugh fully saw the measures required to bring its finances into order, but he was faced on the one hand by the native inertia, and on the other by widespread and organised obstruction on the part of the more prosperous classes with a view to avoiding payment of direct taxation. Moreover, it is almost impossible to raise an internal Government loan in Persia owing to the high rates of interest current in the country generally.

157. Dr. Millsaugh's difficulties (described in greater detail earlier in this despatch) naturally interfered both with day-to-day administration and with the urgent work of post-war planning. As long ago as last June he was proposing to set up a series of inter-locking committees composed of Persians and members of his American staff to study the various post-war problems. Instead, however, the Government decided a few months later to set up a "Supreme Economic Council" of twenty-four members (Persians only) for this purpose; the Council, however, disintegrated after a few meetings.

158. Sales of gold on behalf of His Majesty's Government continued throughout the year. The amount sold since sales were begun in June 1943 up to the 31st December, 1944, has been £6.6 million. Although these sales have been of little effect in combating the inflationary movement in Persia, they enabled His Majesty's Government to acquire rials for military expenditure at a lower rate than that laid down in the Anglo-Persian financial agreement. Recently, however, it appeared that, the market in Persia having reached saturation point, the gold was being smuggled into Iraq and the proceeds were

returning in the form of dinar notes. Since this results in an increase in the sterling balances of the Persian Government and since under the financial agreement 60 per cent. of the increase in such balances must be converted by His Majesty's Government into gold, it was decided (after the end of the year under review) that sales should be discontinued.

159. The financial agreement with the Persian Government covering the operation of the Persian railway system by the Allies has not yet been signed, or even presented to the Government, although the railways were taken over as long ago as September 1941. Its preparation was delayed for some time as it was expected that the United States Government would be a party to it. When they decided that they would not, the draft was placed before the Soviet Government in order that that Government and His Majesty's Government might agree a text to be presented jointly to the Persians. The draft was given to the Soviet Government some months ago, but although some small points of difference have been settled it has so far proved impossible to obtain their approval of it. It seems probable that the delay is deliberate. In the meantime the difference between expenditure and receipts is being made up by His Majesty's Government.

160. Lists of the fixed installations and other capital assets which will not be required by the British and United States military authorities on their evacuation of Persia are being prepared for presentation to the Persian Government with a view to their purchase by that Government or by private individuals; although the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company may be given first refusal of those items which they require. Both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are in agreement that these assets shall not be transferred to the Persian Government without payment as it is fairly clear that the Government have hoped, if not expected; and that if reasonable offers are refused demolitions will be carried out in order to make it clear that the two Governments remain unmoved by Persian protestations. In the meantime it is understood that the Persian Government are preparing (with the help of an American engaged for this purpose) a comprehensive list of claims against the United Nations for financial compensation in respect of damage or alleged damage caused to Persia as the result of its "sacrifices" in the Allied cause.

161. The Bretton Woods Conference in July was attended by Persian representatives. The contribution of Persia to the stabilisation fund was fixed at twenty-five million dollars, and its contribution to the capital of the bank at twenty-four million dollars. These contributions have not yet been ratified by the Majlis, but it is understood that the then Persian Prime Minister authorised a token payment to be made.

Economic Situation.

162. In spite of the various political disturbances during the year that have had as their setting the economic administration of the country or have related directly to important aspects of Persia's economy, the period under review has been one of steady progress in supply and organisation. Such troubles as were encountered arose from the normal instability of the Persian character (which hates to leave even a good thing alone for long) aggravated by pressure from outside. If the economic picture is cleansed of the blemishes caused by the opposition to the work of the Millspaugh Mission, the insolvency of the Government, side issues such as the conflict between Dr. Millspaugh and M. A. H. Ibtihaj, Governor of the National Bank, discussions in the body of the mission, and finally the upheaval following the rejection of the Soviet oil demands, it leaves a view of a country in a greatly improved position compared with the breadless days of 1942 or the chaotic periods of 1943. The Tehran silo is full of grain; agricultural prospects are good; stocks of essential commodities are sufficient for many months (though distribution, greatly improved over last year, still leaves much to be desired); and rail and road transport is no longer the bottleneck it was in the past just after the Allies began to send supplies to Russia across Persia.

163. This satisfactory state of affairs is the culmination of over two years' hard work by the Anglo-American civil and military authorities in Persia. The Millspaugh Mission has in 1944 been the façade behind which many Americans and British have done excellent work in almost every important aspect of Persian economy. British officers and civilians have played an important part in cereals collection and the organisation of road transport.

164. Soviet commercial activities were considerable. The Soviet authorities have never co-operated with the other Allies in supplying Persia on a governmental basis with her essential requirements. Nevertheless large quantities of

such goods were imported from the Soviet Union and sold by the Soviet Trade Delegation on the open market. Sugar and cotton piece goods formed the bulk of such imports. The rials obtained in this way were used to buy rice, cattle, sheep, small arms and ammunition made in the Tehran arsenals and other Persian products required by the Soviet Union, and doubtless also to finance other Soviet activities (e.g., subsidies to the Tudeh party and certain newspapers). Soviet survey parties have been active in the central area (Dasht-i-Kavir), and are believed to have been prospecting for oil and other minerals.

Cereals and Agricultural Development.

165. Failure of the rain and snow-fall of the winter of 1943-44 caused grave apprehensions at the beginning of the year, and there was the prospect of a bread and transport crisis in the Spring. Only the active intervention of the Middle East Supply Centre, with the loan of twenty British officers for a Cereals Collection team, and of the British and American Military Authorities, with transport (17,000 tons of wheat were moved from the Hamadan/Kermanshah area to the Persian railway for Tehran) saved the situation. The grain stocks in the Tehran silo and in store-rooms elsewhere in the country were gradually built up, and at the end of the year there were 260,000 tons of flour-grain in store including 53,000 tons in the silo at Tehran, enough for 265 days' supply to the city. This result was attained only by hard relentless work of the cereals control (Department of Agricultural Monopolies) organised by Dr. Black of the Millspaugh Mission. The Soviet authorities were much less helpful, but they did allow grain to come to Tehran from the north, except during the oil crisis when they maliciously cut off supplies for about twenty days. The excellent fall of snow in December removed all fears of a serious water-shortage and failure of crops in 1945. The Government of India sold 1,000 tons of seed-wheat for use in the Persian Gulf area where dearth of rain necessitated this valuable assistance. Similarly the Government of India agreed to take wheat and barley from the Zabul (Seistan) area of East Persia and to supply an equivalent value of wheat-flour in the Persian Gulf. The bargain was not fully implemented by the Persians who, owing to internal maladministration and greed of local officials, were unable to persuade the Zabul cultivators to release the full 4,000 tons of wheat and barley.

166. Various projects for the development of agriculture in the country, chiefly by the construction of irrigation works, have been under consideration by the central government. Requests for supplies of machinery and other equipment for these projects have led to the deputation by the Middle East Supply Centre of two experts to enquire into the soundness of the schemes and the need for the plant demanded. Such investigation is very necessary in order to prevent the initiation of unsound projects whose failure would cause disappointment and make Persians sceptical about other projects. It has been impressed on promoters of such schemes that it is essential that expert opinion should be obtained before any project is initiated.

Transport.

167. The Millspaugh Mission assumed charge of the Road Transport Administration in February, with a team of British and American officers to assist in the control of vehicles in the provinces and the issue of tyres. With the release by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in the summer of contracted lorries engaged on "Aid to Russia," the Road Transport Administration were able to reinforce their fleet considerably and to relax to some extent the restrictions on the use of certain classes of lorries. The Soviet Transport organisation Transovtrans in July began to compete against the Road Transport Administration for the carriage of civil goods in Isfahan, Kerman and other towns outside the Soviet "zone" (regardless of the Government "monopoly"). Otherwise there were few hitches in the progressive improvement of vehicle control and operation. The arrival in the country of some hundreds of new vehicles and a large consignment of spare parts helped to maintain this position. Tyre supplies, however, were scarcely adequate for the country's needs. No passenger cars and only a small quantity of tyres for passenger cars were received, and the Government complained that the shortage of this type of vehicle hindered the administration. Nevertheless, no effort was made to requisition private cars, with which Tehran is, by the war standards of the United Kingdom, incredibly well supplied.

168. Rail transport functioned smoothly; and generous quantities of civil goods and cereals were carried to Tehran, northwards in spite of the demands of "Aid to Russia" supplies, and southwards from the Soviet "zone." Oil stocks were adequate. For a short while, in December, the unexpectedly heavy civil

demand caused some anxiety, but it was found that the increase was genuine, being due to the great increase in the use of oil instead of coal or wood for heating and cooking.

The prospects for British trade.

169. With the end of the war in sight almost all the principal merchants in the country turned their attention to the possibilities of trade with Great Britain. There is no doubt that as long as Persia's supply of sterling lasts it will be possible to export to Persia anything that United Kingdom exporters can offer in the way of woollen and cotton piece-goods and yarns, dyes, chemicals, vehicles, machinery for irrigation and agricultural use, power generation, &c., factory equipment of many kinds, building materials, domestic utensils, pottery, clothing, footwear, bicycle lamps, ironmongery and haberdashery of all kinds, and a host of capital and consumption goods. We shall in fact have to decide what kinds of goods we can best spare, and endeavour to steer demand towards them and away from the goods we do not wish to export. Engineering services and other kinds of technical help would be one of the best ways of providing Persia with what she needs and at the same time of maintaining British influence in this country. A useful step in that direction has been the signing of an agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for the survey of an irrigation and hydro-electric project in the Lar valley, in the vicinity of Tehran. Another agreement reached by the same firm with the Tehran municipality for the preparation of plans for a proper water supply and sewerage system in the capital is being obstructed by the Minister of the Interior on a legal technicality.

170. The development of trade between Great Britain and Persia will depend very largely on the exchange situation. Persia is outside the sterling area, but the rial is not a "hard" currency. It is doubtful whether there is any advantage to be gained from increasing trade between the sterling area and Persia beyond the amount represented by the latter's sterling balances and the £5 million odd per annum represented by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company royalties and the proceeds of Persian exports (carpets, gums, dried fruits, nuts, opium, oxides) to the sterling area. If Persia had industrial raw materials other than oil to export the position would be different. On the other hand, we have in the shape of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession a valuable stake in the country, and for that and for political reasons connected with the position of Persia in relation to India and the Middle East it is necessary for Great Britain to ensure that her influence in this country is at least as great as that of any other foreign country. It may, therefore, be advantageous in the end to promote trade with Persia, especially of a kind that brings British nationals to work in this country, even if the exchange advantages are not all we could desire.

Locust Control.

171. It had been expected that the control of the desert locust (*i.e.*, migratory) in 1944 would call for considerable efforts, not only by the Persian Plant Defence Department but also by the British military units and the Royal Air Force Anti-Locust Flight, which were stationed on the coastal plain between Jiwani and Lingeh ready to deal with swarms arriving from India and Arabia.

172. By March the consistently reassuring reports from both these countries had led the British Locust Officer in Persia to decide on the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force Anti-Locust Flight. The organisation in the Jiwani area was also greatly reduced and the area was placed under the control of India entomologists, mainly for observation purposes.

173. Unfortunately, several swarms, borne on high winds from West Arabia, did, after all, reach Persia during March and the British ground forces were not sufficiently forewarned or mobile to attack these adults before they passed inland beyond the coastal plain. However, only one of the swarms laid eggs on Persian soil (in Laristan) and the resulting hoppers were effectively destroyed by the Persian control organisation, while the parent swarm and other invading bands flew eastwards towards Baluchistan and Afghanistan without further oviposition in Persia.

174. In addition, during March and during April and May, the Persian Plant Defence Department were fully occupied with the control of the Moroccan (*i.e.*, non-migratory) locust both in the interior (Fars and Laristan) and in the Caspian provinces (Azerbaijan and Gorgan). Their campaigns were successful in the interior, where they provided all materials from their own resources, but they were seriously delayed in the north by the non-arrival of oilcake-meal, which

they had expected to buy from the Soviet Union, and by their inability to make alternative arrangements with the requisite speed.

175. Soviet experts and aeroplanes were sent to help the Persians, but the combined forces could not prevent the maturation of very large numbers of Moroccan locusts, which laid eggs over what has later been mapped and estimated at over 110,000 hectares. Arrangements are now being made between the Persians and the Russians for a joint campaign on a very large scale in the Caspian provinces in the spring of 1945.

176. The usual autumn examination of the desert locust situation in the Indo-Persian-East Arabian zone (which took place this year at Delhi in the presence of British, Persian and Soviet members of the Tehran International Locust Control Committee) led to the conclusion that no swarms would enter Persia from India, and up to the end of the year this forecast had been justified. On the other hand, the chief locust officer of the (British) Middle East Anti-Locust Unit attended an extraordinary meeting of the Tehran Committee in November, and formally warned all countries represented that a number of desert locust swarms would probably escape control during their eastward movement from Africa this winter, and that countries east and north of the Persian Gulf must expect an invasion by desert locusts at any time during the first quarter of 1945.

177. In view of this threat the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit has organised for the Persian Government a hopper-control party under a British anti-locust officer (and provided with British military transport and British poison and bran), which has already taken up its positions to defend the coastal area between Jask and Lingeh. The Persian organisation, which, of course, retains responsibility for the defence of the whole country, has also been put on a "war footing."

[E 2051/464/34]

No. 14.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th March.)

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Tehran, 15th March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 269 of the 28th June, 1944, concerning the budget (*i.e.*, both the ordinary and commercial budgets) of the Persian Government for the financial year 1944-45 (beginning on the 21st March, 1944) and to state that the ordinary budget for the year 1945-46 has recently been presented to the Majlis. Detailed figures of the budget are given in the enclosure⁽¹⁾ to this despatch.

2. This budget balances at 4,412 million rials. The following figures, covering the ordinary budget only, show for comparison the out-turn for the financial year 1943-44, the estimates for the year 1944-45 and the out-turn for the first ten months of this year:—

	Millions of Rials.		
	1943-44 Actual.	1944-45 Estimates.	1944-45 Actual. (first ten months).
Expenditure	3,697	4,569	3,200
Revenue	4,385	3,958	3,183
	+688	-611	-17

It will be observed that the figures of out-turn for the year 1943-44 differ from those given in my despatch of the 28th June, owing to certain corrections and adjustments subsequently made between the ordinary and commercial budgets.

3. It is to be noted that the ordinary budget for 1945-46 is only balanced by the transfer of a hypothetical surplus of 500 million rials from the commercial budget, which has not yet been prepared. The estimate of 885 million rials from income tax during 1944-45, which has proved to be much too high owing to passive resistance on the part of the taxpayer and an inadequate system of collection, has been written down to 644 million in 1945-46, which will still be too high unless the law can be more strictly enforced. This figure provides only 16 per cent. of the estimate of total receipts. Indirect taxation (including the monopolies on opium, tobacco, sugar and tea) accounts for 50 per cent., and the Anglo-Persian oil royalties account for 12 per cent. The estimated revenue from posts and telegraphs of 120 million rials will not cover the expenditure on the service, which is estimated at 145 million. The budget also includes receipts

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

of 125 million from the public domains and ceded properties which previously formed part of the commercial budget; expenditure under this head is estimated at 76 million for the year.

4. The expenditure side of the budget is divided up much in the same proportions as in 1944-45. Thus, expenditure on the army is estimated at 1,100 million rials, or no less than 25 per cent. of the total. Army, gendarmerie and police expenditure together account for just under 40 per cent. of the total. Administration of the tobacco and opium monopolies is estimated to cost 550 million rials, representing 11 per cent. of the total, while the Ministry of Finance require rather over 300 million, mainly for the collection of taxation. The percentages of expenditure allocated to education and public health are respectively six and three, although it is true that there is an increase in expenditure on education of 25 per cent. in 1945-46 as against the preceding year (300 million compared with 240 million).

5. It is hardly necessary to comment on the lack of proper proportion (a) as between receipts from direct and indirect taxation, and (b) on the expenditure side in general, caused by the starvation of essential public services in favour of a military body which, on account of its size, corruption and inefficiency, is regarded by most with suspicion, dislike and ridicule.

6. Nor is it possible at this stage to comment, with any certainty, on the probable accuracy of the estimates. The year 1945-46 is one in which it appears likely that the Persian Government will have to begin to face its post-war problems, including the difficulty of collecting taxation, for which it is far from prepared. It is impossible to consider the finances of the Government as a whole without a knowledge of probable revenue and expenditure under the commercial budget. When this budget is prepared, and when the figures of out-turn for 1944-45 are available, it may be possible to view the situation more clearly.

7. In the meantime, the Majlis has turned over the ordinary budget for 1945-46 to its Budgetary Commission for examination. That body is not conspicuous in expediting its business; and, indeed, the Majlis itself has not yet approved the budget for 1944-45.

8. Copies of this despatch with the enclosure^(*) are being sent to the Government of India, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors, Washington and Bagdad, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

(for the Ambassador).

D. W. LASCELLES.

(*) Not printed.

(B) Weekly Intelligence Summaries.

[E 70/70/34]

No. 15.

(1)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th January, 1945.)

(No. 478.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the period the 11th December to the 17th December, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 18th December, 1944.

Enclosure in (1)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the Period
11th-17th December, 1944.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

BEFORE his departure Kavtaradzeh informed the Prime Minister that he regarded the passing of Dr. Musaddiq's Bill by the Majlis (see Summary No. 47/44, paragraph 1) as an act unfriendly to Russia and that its revision was essential to the re-establishment of good relations between the Soviet and Persian

Governments. In an account of this interview published in a news-sheet in Persian which is issued in Tehran by the Soviet Embassy it was added that Kavtaradzeh had told the Prime Minister that he realised that the law had been passed as a result of pressure by enemies of Perso-Soviet friendship, such as Sa'ed and Seyyid Zia, and that such a law was inconsistent with the existence of concessions already enjoyed by foreigners in Persia. The Prime Minister and his Government have been considerably perturbed by the menacing attitude of Kavtaradzeh, and they are in a mood to make concessions to placate the Russians. These might take the form of asking them to provide the experts and the machinery for the exploitation of the oil in the northern provinces by a so-called Persian company.

2. The Russians realise that the opposition of the Majlis must be overcome, and it is on that body that their attention is now concentrated. Bribes have been offered to Deputies and, it is said, have been accepted by some. Others are being intimidated by threats. Many are beginning to waver, and it cannot now be assumed with any confidence that a majority would be found ready to oppose proposals by the Government to give concessions to the Russians that would in effect be tantamount to surrender. Faith in the courage of the Government has been shaken by their failure to make any vigorous protest against the expulsion from the northern provinces of officials and other Persians displeasing to the Russians or to recall the Governor-General of Eastern Azarbaijan for sending a clear telegram recommending the grant to the Russians of the concession they were demanding.

3. It seems clear that in the northern provinces the Russians are succeeding in intimidating all opposition. Some 150 workmen who refused to join the Tudeh party have been expelled from factories in Gilan and Mazandaran. Deputies owning land in the provinces occupied by Russian troops, although they would be the first to lose by the triumph of Russian designs, seem prepared to go to almost any length to propitiate the Russians in the vain hope of saving their estates.

4. The Prime Minister has laid before the Majlis a Bill for the abrogation of Dr. Millspaugh's special economic powers and for the transfer of those powers to the Government. It is expected that the Bill will be passed and that Dr. Millspaugh will accept the position where his functions will be limited to those of Administrator-General of the Finances.

5. Following on an interpellation of the Government (which was, however, withdrawn) on two matters—the alleged illegal suppression of certain newspapers on the demand of the Soviet Embassy and the acquiescence of the Government in the expulsion by Soviet officials of Persian subjects from the northern provinces—the Government was given a vote of confidence by 72 votes against 5, with 15 abstentions.

Economic.

6. For the anti-locust campaign in Persia this year the British military authorities are giving assistance by lending a transport unit of some fifty-six vehicles with the necessary personnel. This unit will operate in the area Lingah-Bandar Abbas-Jask and it will be used for transporting poison bait and working parties and for maintaining communications.

Appointments—Civil.

- 7.—(i) Hassan Farzaneh (F.O. 63) to be Governor-General of the 1st Ustan (Gilan).
- (ii) Abbas Tabatabai to be Farmandar of Khoi.
- (iii) Dr. Buzurgmihir to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Health.

Persian Forces.

Army.

8. It is reliably reported that the Shah has lost faith in the Chief of the General Staff, General Razmara, and has realised that he is an ambitious and self-seeking adventurer, all the more dangerous since he is both energetic and able. General Razmara has also lost the favour of the Russians, largely owing to the action taken to suppress Tudeh demonstrations by the Military Governor, a nominee of General Razmara's. His obvious desire to be restored to favour has raised doubts of his patriotism. The Shah wishes General Yazdan Panah to succeed him, and in present circumstances he is probably the least objectionable choice the Shah is likely to accept. It may be difficult to persuade General Yazdan Panah to accept.

9. General Ridley has returned to America. It is reported from confidential sources that he is to discuss the future of the American advisers to the Persian army and also to endeavour to arrange for the shipment of supplies for the Persian army. He is expected to be away for at least a month.

10. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis to legalise the selection by ballot of the number of conscripts required each year by the army, the quota for each town or district being assessed according to its population. In the preamble to the Bill it is stated that the average class that becomes liable to conscription each year amounts to 120,000, but that not more than 40,000 are required by the army.

Gendarmerie.

11. Following on the issue of new winter uniforms, of extra blankets and of transport and the more regular payment of salaries, an improvement is now noticeable in the morale and appearance of the gendarmerie of the Tehran district. This has resulted in a notable improvement in recruiting.

Russian Affairs.

12. Persian papers that receive their inspiration from Russian sources have recently been publishing articles accusing Great Britain of a reactionary and imperialist policy and arguing that Russia must protect herself against the establishment in Persia of a Government under British influence. Two examples of these articles are attached to this Summary. If these articles were not, as is generally believed, dictated by the Russians, they were certainly not published without their approval.

13. Within the last few days the Russians have brought to Tehran sixty Mk. V Yak fighters and ten Mk. I trainers, which are now in hangars at the Russian-controlled airfield. This part of the airfield is now closed to British personnel.

14. At the same airfield the Russians have some 400 lorries, although for their needs they require no more than fifty or sixty; and some 800 men stationed there are regularly trained in battle drill, anti-tank action, &c. Reports are circulating to the effect that some thousands of suits of civilian clothing have been ordered, and the popular theory is that Russian troops will be dressed in these to take part in Tudeh demonstrations.

15. The Persian committee that was formed for the collection of funds for Soviet sufferers from the war has published its final accounts, showing that a sum of 7,801,651 rials has been handed to the Soviet Ambassador.

French Affairs.

16. General de Gaulle passed through Tehran on his return from Moscow, leaving Tehran on the 14th December.

Appendix.

Extracts from Russian subsidised Persian Press.

Azhir, 10th December, 1944.

LEADER entitled "Is the New British Policy Right?" prints at the top of the article the following verse from Sa'di: "I heard that a lamb was saved by a great man from the mouth of a wolf. In the evening he brought out his knife and began to cut the throat of the lamb. The lamb complained and said: 'You, who rescued me from the clutches of the wolf, I see that at the end you are wolf.'" The writer states that he had learned the meaning of this story when he was a child. He then goes on to say that in spite of the loud protestations and announcements and charters, nevertheless there was abundant witness that force still prevailed in the world. On the previous day the Belgian people were fired upon and they were told that they had no right to take steps against a Government which had left them without a guardian in the savage war of the Nazis and had taken refuge in London, where it had passed its time with ceremonial visits. Although the youth of Belgium had shed its blood for the freeing of its homeland and suffered hunger, imprisonment and exile, and crimes had been committed against it by the Nazis, it had finally driven out from its homeland the evil forces of fascism and puppets of foreigners. It was now

considered as rebels and was obliged to lay down its arms without query and to surrender to a Government which threatened it, in the event of refusal, with the great forces which it (that Government) had rescued from the battlefields of Hitler and stored up for such a day. The youth of Belgium was told by this Government that it had been freed in order that it should act in accordance with the will of that Government and that the Atlantic Charter could not be interpreted in any other way. Of course, the people should decide their own destinies. The British people would do this, but under the force of arms and the yoke of that Government. After Belgium came the turn of Greece. The British Prime Minister in his speech revealed the hidden plan of British Conservative statesmen. The world had opened its eyes and realised the true meaning of these charters. It had realised that the colonial policy of the leaders of the Conservative party and other reactionary British elements would not change so easily. The British reactionaries, contrary to the desire of the British people, would not refrain from using force and holding down weak peoples with pressure. Churchill said the Greek people naturally were free to decide their own destiny. They could choose whatever régime they liked, but they had no right to take action in this matter, and the different classes in Greece could not struggle with each other in order to determine what régime they should have. If they took up arms Churchill had said that the British, in the name of the preservation of security, would prevent any kind of violent action. These apparently logical words had a frightening meaning which Churchill's recent speech confirmed. Churchill in his recent speech had said that, although the Greek crusaders had shown self-sacrifice in turning out the German invaders, they had not a majority, and the Greek people would decide upon the Government of Greece. With these apparently logical words the fight against the proud crusaders of Greece had begun. Thus those who had liberated Athens became the targets of the British forces and the streets of the capital were turned into rivers of blood. This was the blood of young men who had risen up against Hitler, in spite of hunger and other hardships, with the most primitive weapons, even with sticks. The British Parliament two evenings ago had supported this ungenerous fight with a vote of confidence for Churchill of 179 to 30. Action similar to this tyrannical action, with minor differences, was being witnessed in Italy. There also in the name of the preservation of security, interference was taking place in the destiny of the people. If the American forces had not been there, perhaps the streets of Rome would have witnessed the same terrible scenes as the streets of Athens, and Churchill, in the name of the preservation of the rights of the majority, would have made the Italian people, the real enemies of fascism, targets and would have set up a Government which was 100 per cent. obedient to the orders of the Conservatives in London. It was apparent that any Government which was contrary to the taste or policy of the British Prime Minister and rose up against the puppets of London was not the representative of the majority of the people. To establish this view it was not necessary to refer to the votes of the people; the words of Churchill and the majority of the British Parliament were sufficient proof. It was not clear that this policy would not extend to France and other liberated countries and that Churchill, to preserve security, would not interfere officially in deciding the Government for the whole world. Although the American Government had expressed its dissatisfaction in Italy and announced officially that it would on no account interfere in the internal affairs of the country and that the Italian people, like other peoples of the world, had the right in accordance with the Atlantic Charter to decide their own destiny and bring to power any régime and any Government which they pleased, the conduct of Mr. Churchill's Government had caused great anxiety among the great masses of the world. Persians had not detailed knowledge of world affairs, but it seemed to them that the British Government and the majority in Parliament had caused affairs, with their rough policy, to reach a critical point. People were already becoming suspicious of the unity among the Allies. In Persia, over the oil question and the Government of Sa'ed, the British press had not followed a good policy. It seemed as if the London press was not much attached to unity among the Allies. The questions of Belgium, Greece, Italy and Poland confirmed this view. Did the British Government think the enemy was completely defeated? Did it not think that such manifestations might be made use of by Hitler? Was the real English people in agreement with this policy? Had the majority in Parliament voted for the shedding of the blood of the Greek crusaders in accordance with the desires of the British people? Were British soldiers in agreement with Churchill that they should use their arms against their allies who had shown self-sacrifice and that they should impose upon them a Government

which had not taken the smallest step to help them (the Greek crusaders) in their struggle? Would history repeat itself? Would reactionary elements and Conservative diplomats take control of world affairs and keep the peoples in slavery and darkness? Would parasites and executioners oppress the peoples in the name of the majority. The paper did not think that this plan would be easily or profitably accomplished or that the British people could succeed in such a heavy task.

Rahbar, 10th December, 1944.

LEADER states that Kavtaradze had left Persia after a stay of a little over a month. None of the Persian authorities were prepared to listen to him or to consider the proposal which he brought. Sa'ed, with the formula "oil after the war," put an obstacle in his way; Dr. Musaddiq went further than this and placed the responsibility for the exploitation of oil on a Government which could not even asphalt the streets of its own capital. There was, perhaps, no precedent for the refusal to consider a proposal brought by the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs of another country. Supposing Kavtaradze's proposal had been unacceptable, what international exigencies could have made it proper to refuse to consider it? Kavtaradze had not left Persia because the oil problem was solved but because it was apparent that the ruling classes were not prepared to ask for a solution and were increasing the difficulties in his way. As the paper had stated before, the object of the Russian Government in applying for an oil concession was not to obtain an imperialist concession, but on the contrary the Russian Government had an urgent need to prevent imperialist influence in Persia, and it considered an oil concession a means of achieving this. What Power could guarantee that a second dictator would not appear in Persia after the war and recreate the period of Reza Khan, which suffocated all democratic inclinations and friendly feelings towards Russia? Dr. Musaddiq, in his speech on oil, had shown that the royalties received from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were spent on the railway and the purchase of arms, neither of which were in the interests of Persia, but were to be used against the Russian Government one day. As it happened, world events were such that they were used for the benefit of Russia. But who could guarantee that this would be the case in the future and they would not be used against Russia by a reactionary Government? The Russian Government had not undertaken all these sacrifices for a reactionary barrier to be put up against her as had been in the last twenty odd years, and for a Government like the hired Government of Poland or the dictatorship of Reza Khan to be put up. It was neither in the interests of Russia or of Persia that Russia's interests should be neglected. The Russian Government could not tolerate a Government which had been born of the Government of Reza Khan or a similar Government. The Persian people also, from the point of view of both internal and foreign policy, were not prepared to tolerate such a Government. If the paper was criticised for talking about Russian interests, it did so because Persian interests could only be assured by taking into consideration the interests of other Governments and peoples, and in particular the interests of powerful neighbouring Governments. Thus there were reasons why the paper should talk about Russian interests which, in the above-mentioned case, were in harmony with the interests of the Persian people in the opposition which they showed to reactionary elements in Persia and the Government of Reza Khan. Apparently after the war the armies of the three Powers would leave Persia, but the real situation was that, if the condition of the Persian Government remained as it was at present, only the influence of Russia would be removed from Persia, because everybody knew that the Persian Government, the Persian Majlis, Persian politicians and the Administration did not belong to the Persian people and were merely agents who had no will of their own. Consequently it was natural that the Russian Government was anxious at this "set-up," and the Persian people had the right to strive with all their might to change the nature of the Government. The reactionary Government of Persia opposed with all its force the grant of an oil concession to Russia and welcomed with joy the Bill of Dr. Musaddiq, which, like the orders of Reza Khan, was ratified without discussion, lest any deviation from his one-sided policy as a result of the grant of this concession should occur. The paper would repeat that the way taken by the Persian Government had not solved the problem. The Majlis and Dr. Musaddiq had merely shown that they could not solve such problems. Dr. Musaddiq and his followers had not removed the problem; they had merely removed its solution from the competence of the Persian Government and handed this over to foreign circles. In conclusion, the paper asks the Russian Government not to consider the conduct of the Persian

Government, which was based upon reactionary circles, the expression of the Persian people, and to be assured that the Persian people were disgusted at the one-sided policy of the Governments which were imposed upon them, and would never take any measures against nations which respected their independence and freedom.

[E 318/70/34]

(2)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th January, 1945.)

(No. 490)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 49 for the period the 18th–31st December, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 31st December, 1944.

Enclosure in (2)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 49 for the period the 18th–31st December, 1944.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

IT is reliably reported that the Soviet Ambassador has told the Persian Prime Minister that he had been instructed to inform him that the Soviet Government considered that, until the law prohibiting the granting of an oil concession to any foreign organisation was revised, good relations could not be established between the Soviet and Persian Governments. This intimation has dispelled the hope that Kavtaradze had perhaps gone further than Moscow intended; and the consideration of means to placate the Soviet Government is now occupying the Government's attention to the exclusion of nearly all other business.

2. Russian or Russian-inspired activities are being intensified among all classes of Persians. Propaganda has been extended to the schools. Anxiety is increasing in the middle classes, particularly among the Deputies and Cabinet Ministers. Threats are being circulated from some source or another that in the next demonstrations organised by the Tudeh party attempts will be made on the lives of landowners, priests and Government officials. Prominent Tudeh leaders, such as Iraj Iskandari, have been sent to Mazandaran, allegedly to organise opposition to the Vatan party, which has some following there. In many places there is labour unrest. After meetings of factory workers convened by the leader of the Tudeh party in Yazd, where they were incited against their employers, the workers of the most important textile factory went on strike. In one of the mills in Shahi (Mazandaran) a demonstration by the workers led to rioting and to shooting by the gendarmerie, which resulted in the wounding of some workers and the death of a Soviet soldier who was in the vicinity. The Russian troops thereupon disarmed the gendarmerie and, according to one fairly reliable report, have expelled them from Shahi. A partial strike also occurred in the Tehran municipal power house, which was prevented from spreading by the introduction of Persian military technicians to operate the machinery. From Meshed it is reported that the Soviet Consul-General has taken eleven Persians to Tashkent to attend the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Turkmenistan Republic. In Azarbaijan propaganda for the formation of provincial and district councils continues.

3. The Russian-inspired Persian press continues to make hardly veiled attacks on the imperialist nature of British policy in Europe and the east and to stress the argument that Russian policy is directed towards ensuring that Persia does not fall under the influence of imperialist powers. The Russians, says the Tudeh paper *Rahbar*, do not fear the Persian people but only those elements who may make them their tools. The Russian desire for a security zone is natural, since by that is meant a zone adjacent to the Russian people where

those elements will not be allowed to take root. Between the two wars the British established paramount influence in Persia with the object of making it a base for hostile action against Russia. They first intended to do so by means of the 1919 agreement, but they found a better way by bringing Reza Shah to power. A situation similar in some respects to that of 1918 exists to-day.

4. Another example of this propaganda is attached to this summary as the first appendix. It is having some effect, inclining Persians to think that Russia might modify her policy if British influence was less evident and that it might even be as well if Persians showed themselves to be a little anti-British. They are not without justification for believing that hostility to the British is a passport to Russian favour.

5. Seyyid Zia recently published in one of the Persian papers a frank and courageous criticism of Russian policy in Persia. A summary is attached hereto as the second appendix. It created a considerable impression. The paper published about five times its usual number of copies, and even then copies were selling for up to 30s. each. Seyyid Zia's reputation now stands higher among his countrymen, but there are some who think that it was his return to Persia that provoked the Russians to take aggressive measures to counteract British influence and to prevent the establishment of a pro-British Government.

6. The Prime Minister has tabled a Bill for the establishment of a Supreme Supervisory Council whose function it would be to make detailed study of Bills drafted by the Government before they are tabled. Its composition would be the Ministers without Portfolio, the Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's office and five experts in various branches of administration.

7. The Bill for the abrogation of the economic powers of Dr. Millspaugh has not yet passed the Parliament. The Deputies have now had to face the fact that it is not easy to find an alternative arrangement for the effective control of the national economy. Various proposals have been made: the creation of a Ministry of National Economy; the distribution of economic affairs among existing ministries; the appointment of a Superior Economic Council who would continue to control economic affairs through changes of Government; and the transfer to the present Prime Minister personally of the powers held previously by Millspaugh. The last proposal has found little favour. There is a fairly general appreciation that the economy of the country cannot be put on a sound footing without a long-term programme consistently carried out. This the Deputies realise would not be the case if full economic powers were to be vested in anyone so short-lived as a Persian Cabinet Minister. There is now some appreciation of the advantages there were in having all economic powers concentrated in the hands of a permanent and impartial official; and as a result Dr. Millspaugh's stock has gone up.

8. The Independent Front newspapers (see Summary No. 47/44, paragraph 5) have published a manifesto expressing disapproval of the policy of the Government whom it accuses of showing hostility to democracy, of illegally suppressing newspapers, and of general weakness and inactivity.

9. An expert review of the Persian press shows that of 107 papers, including weeklies, with licence to publish in Tehran, about 70 can be classed as having negligible influence; very few have a circulation large enough to cover the cost of publication; 13 draw their inspiration from Russian sources. Not all publish regularly.

Appointments—civil.

- 10.—(i) Taqi Nabavi (F.O. 150-M.A. 188) to be Persian Minister in Portugal;
- (ii) Riza Fahimi to be Farmandar of Zinjan;
- (iii) Zein ul Abidin Sadri to be Farmandar of Malayer.

Persian Forces.

Army.

11. Discord was not long in showing itself between the recently-appointed, or rather reappointed, Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff. In the four months during which there had been no Minister, General Razmara had done more or less as he liked in the army, and in the provinces, particularly in the tribal areas, he had usurped more and more of the functions of the Ministry of the Interior. The Shah had become distrustful of his intrigues and ambition; the Russians were displeased with him since they held him responsible for the action taken by the Military Governor of Tehran to suppress Tudeh demonstrations; and he had for one reason or another antagonised many of the Deputies.

Consequently there was little opposition to his removal. He was the most able, knowledgeable and energetic Chief of the Staff that has been seen during the last three years, but he is unscrupulously ambitious, corrupt and an inveterate intriguer. He has been succeeded by General Hassan Arfa, a strong Nationalist, resentful of foreign interference in Persia, obsessed by fear of Russian designs and consequently, for the present, not unfriendly to the British. He has neither popularity nor much respect in the army.

Air Force.

12. General Ahmad Nakchevan, now appointed Inspector-General of the Persian Air Force, who recently returned from an official visit to England, has now left to visit America on the invitation of the United States Government. He travelled in the same aircraft as General Connolly.

Appointments—military.

- 13.—(i) Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa (F.O. 30-M.A. 37) to be Chief of the General Staff *vice* Sarlashkar Razmara, relieved;
- (ii) Sartip Kazim Shaibani to be Military Governor of Tehran *vice* Sarhang Hejazi, relieved;
- (iii) Sarlashkar Abdul Reza Afkhami (F.O. 2-M.A. 2) to be a Military Governor for the purpose of applying military law to offences committed on Allied lines of communications *vice* Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa;
- (iv) Sartips Itimad Muqaddam, Qadar, and Amidi and Sarhang Atapur to be army inspectors.

Internal Security.

14. For some time past the Tudeh press, which previously had been inclined to champion the tribes as sufferers from the tyrannous British-supported régime of Reza Shah, has been accusing them of being the supporters of reactionaries and of feudalism. The reactionaries are accused not only of opposing proposals for disarmament but also of supplying arms and ammunition to the tribes. Reports have been published of consignments of arms landed on the Persian shores of the gulf and distributed among the tribes. It is made clear that the reactionaries referred to are the "masters" of Seyyid Zia and his like. The alleged union of the tribes of the south comes in for much attack. One of the Russian subsidised Persian papers says that it is no surprise that Qavam ul Mulk and Morteza Quli Khan Bakhtiari should fall in with the designs of those whose servants they had long been but expresses amazement that Nazir Qashgai, who like his father had always posed as a great patriot, should now have become a Persian Quisling. Such attacks are likely to have some effect on Nasir and they may discourage him from being too openly friendly with British officials.

Khuzestan.

15. It seems that the Persian authorities are satisfied with the number of arms collected from the Beni Turuf. Attention has now been diverted to the Bani Tamim who have begun to surrender their arms.

Russian Affairs.

16. The following is believed to be an accurate list of Russian general officers in Persia:—

At Kasvia—

Lieut.-General Sovietnikoff: Commanding all Russian forces in Persia.
Major-General Gaidukov: 2nd in command to above.
Major-General Russov: Chief of Staff.

At Tabriz—

Major-General Glinski: Commanding troops in Azarbaijan.
Major-General Lobov: Chief of Staff.

At Rezaieh—

Major-General Smirnov: Commanding troops in Western Azarbaijan.

At Gurgan—

Major-General Trantin: Commanding troops.

At Sari—
Major-General Soboleff (?): Commanding troops.

At Semnan—
Major-General Filiatov: Commanding troops.

At Tehran—
Major-General Kargin: Soviet Transport Directorate.
Major-General Zorin: Iransovtrans.

It is understood that the two last-named are independent of General Sovietnikoff.

17. It is reported, but not yet confirmed, that, of the sixty Yak fighters that the Russians had brought to Tehran (see Summary No. 48/44, paragraph 13), thirty have returned to Russia.

French Affairs.

18. It is reported on fairly reliable authority that the French Government has invited the Persian Government to send five officers to France to visit the front.

Egyptian Affairs.

19. The Persian press reports that Mahmud Sabet Pasha has been appointed Egyptian Ambassador to Persia.

Turkish Affairs.

20. Kamal Kuprulu, said now to be Turkish Ambassador in Afghanistan, has been appointed Turkish Ambassador to Persia.

American Affairs.

21. Major-General Connolly, commanding the United States Persian Gulf Command, has been recalled to America for another appointment. He has been succeeded, temporarily at least, by his second-in-command, Brigadier-General Booth.

Appendix 1.

Extracts from Russian-subsidised Persian Press.

Rahbar, 21st December, 1944.

Furthermore, if the Imperialist Powers needed a "sphere of influence" to preserve their colonies, if Persia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Egypt were called "colonial annexations" in their political lexicon, then Russia, whose régime was anti-imperialistic, could not tolerate being surrounded by the imperialistic Powers, their colonies or their sphere of "influence," which would when the time came flood over her new world. For this reason Russia, after having made enormous sacrifices to save herself and the world, would not submit to being encircled by the imperialist Powers.

She wanted to clear her boundaries of the nefarious influence of imperialism. Otherwise her security and her existence would be in danger. For this reason the territories of the neighbours of Russia could be called a belt of security, i.e., places where no bee-hive against Russia could be built.

No doubt to-day Britain was the ally and friend of Persia and was not considered as the country which had signed the 1907 and 1919 treaties, and the writer did not want his opponents to use his statements as evidence against him, but, in order to elucidate the matter, he would mention the following few examples:—

(1) In 1312, when a plan for a trans-Persian railway linking the east of Persia and the Afghan borders with the Gulf was under discussion, Lord Curzon had stated that for fifty years the principle of the defence of India consisted of surrounding her with a belt of impassable mountains and deserts and the projected railway would rob the defence of India of the strategic value of the Persian Desert and would bring the Russians 1,000 miles nearer to India, &c.

(2) In the 1907 treaty Persia was so partitioned that the Russians had no common frontier with Afghanistan and the neutral zone was very narrow in the west and very broad in the east; this was another measure which was taken for the defence of India.

Now, of course, Britain had reconsidered the problem of the defence of India, but one could not forget that before this war Russia was surrounded by countries which were under the influence of an anti-Russian policy and great damages were inflicted upon her. Now Russia, in order to secure her interests, was compelled to eradicate the influence of the nefarious anti-Russian policy from these districts. These regions were considered the belt of security for Russia not in the sense of being under Russian influence, but that anti-Russian influences should not be implanted there.

Appendix 2.

Summary of the statement published by Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai in Ra'di Imruz of the 20th December, 1944.

KAVTARADZEH'S statement that the Oil Bill was the work of enemies of Soviet-Persian friendship such as Sa'ed and myself is an unforgivable calumny as well as a blunder against the Majlis. Persia has never been a menace to Russia—witness my own actions twenty-four years ago when Britain, then in occupation of Persia, could, had she wished, have threatened to have disreputed Russia. I welcomed the first Soviet representative to Tehran; now, thanks to the errors of Soviet representatives, I am accused of anti-Russian activities. No patriotic Persian is so stupid as even to wish to work against Russia. Such statements by Soviet representatives are deliberate attempts to find pretexts and confuse the issue. The claim that the northern provinces are a "security zone" is only a prelude to further, and at last total, encroachment. If this principle is admitted, other countries will claim a security zone in Persia.

Even if Great Britain and India were a menace to Russia, "security zone" has no meaning in view of the modern development and range of air power; and Persia does not come into the picture as a bulwark. In any case, the question does not arise; the world is fighting for peace and does not accept the "Lebensraum" principle—for that is what the "security zone" claim is.

If, after the war, the Majlis should decide to grant a concession to a foreign Power, the U.S.S.R. should be given precedence; because we are bound to her by ties of gratitude, of admiration and of propinquity.

The interference of the Allies in the internal affairs of Persia is contrary to the letter of the Treaty; and encroachment on Persia's integrity daily increased. The Persian Government is now incapable of enforcing its authority. British officials in the west and south, Soviet officials in the north interfered in the elections: this interference was the direct result of the presence of Allied troops in the capital, and of the intimidation of the central Government. Soviet troops prevent Persians travelling about their own country; Soviet authorities expel Persian citizens from the northern provinces; the Cabinet has to have Soviet permission to send out its own troops to preserve security. Persians have become suspicious of the political intentions of the Allies.

Even in this atmosphere an amicable solution of the oil question could have been reached—had not the statements of Kavtaradzeh and the anti-Sa'ed agitation of Tudeh demonstrators and the Russian-backed press deliberately exacerbated the situation. Kavtaradzeh, whose intentions were good, was not of reality to blame. He was misled by the Soviet Embassy and the Tudeh. Still, his statement was inconsistent with common courtesy and international rights. He had no legal power to break off diplomatic relations. We realised that the Soviets had the power to bully us; but we could not suppose that a Government professing the principles of Lenin would support its Embassy in humiliating us; especially after our sacrifices on its behalf.

Sa'ed's only fault was trust in the Soviet Government and in Stalin's declaration, made at Tehran. He was not discourteous, much less criminal. He did his duty. But the demonstrators against him on the 27th October were protected by Russian machine-guns—not only in Tehran. Telegrams to our representatives abroad, telling them of our humiliation, were held up by the Allied censorship. We realised that we had lost our independence. Sa'ed stood

firm: but the shameful behaviour of our Allies drove him to resign. The heart-breaking letter of resignation should be read to future generations in Persian schools.

The base, unfounded calumny of accusing certain people of enmity to Soviet-Persian friendship is the result of bad advice given to Soviet representatives in Persia by a handful of Persian traitors: their object being to save the face of the Soviet officials who had blundered.

As to the points of Kavtaradze's statement—

- (1) It is no business of a foreigner to point out the mistakes of the Majlis; which is alone competent and independent.
- (2) The Majlis was compelled by the threats and other mistakes of Soviet representatives in Persia to ban future oil conversations. Still, I had myself wished for the Oil Law to remain valid only for so long as Allied armies remained on Persian soil.
- (3) Foreign concessions already existed at the time of the Treaty of the 24th February, 1921, and the southern oil concession still exists. So long as Allied representatives are prepared to honour the Tehran declaration they have no right to put forward interpretations or alterations detrimental to Persian sovereignty.
- (4) The Majlis decision was not a mistake: whether some day it may be revised depends on whether Soviet representatives change their policy of interference. It will not be revised so long as a single foreign soldier remains on Persian soil, nor while the fate of Cabinets depends not on the Majlis and the Shah but on foreign Embassies and synthetic demonstrations.

Our first duty is to clarify our external relations, which is impossible without a Government which will stand up to foreigners, invite foreign Governments to withdraw their troops and refuse to tolerate interference. A declaration should be issued that, if our relations are not clarified soon, the capital will be transferred elsewhere.

Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill have the right to know what their representatives, the interpreters of their declaration, are doing in Persia. The aggressors rely on force, tyranny and military supremacy; Persia on right and justice. A definite date should be fixed for the departure of all foreign troops. This is possible only through a Government which will maintain both the integrity of Persia and the best possible relations with the U.S.S.R. The present Government cannot.

[E 388/70/34]

(3)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th January.)

(No. 4.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period the 1st to the 7th January, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 8th January, 1945.

Enclosure in (3)

(Secret.)

Military Attachés Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period 1st to 7th January, 1945.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. Dr. Millsbaugh still retains his powers. Although there is among the Deputies some measure of agreement that he should be deprived of them, argument still persists as to how the national economy should in future be controlled.

2. The Tudeh party is reported to have greatly extended their activities in Tehran and to be making great efforts to increase their numbers and to organise bands, it is presumed with a view to demonstrations of some kind in the near

future. The Persian police and military authorities are apprehensive of disturbances and are revising and elaborating their plans for the suppression of civil disturbance. Their anxiety is increased by the readiness shown by the Russians to send troops to the scene of a demonstration. This happened not only in the Tudeh demonstration at the end of October (see Summary No. 41/44, paragraph 1) but again on the 26th December, when there was a disturbance in connexion with an Ashura procession. On the latter occasion the mob had been dispersed before the arrival of the Russian troops who, they explained, had come to assist the Persian authorities.

3. A section of the press continues to attack British policy and to argue that Russia is justified in trying to prevent the establishment of British influence in North Persia.

4. A circular has been sent to all Governors-General and Governors instructing them to give wide publication to the following statement of the Government's intentions:—

- (a) To prepare and put into execution plans for the improvement of the lot of villagers and workmen, ensuring that each individual receives recompense according to his deserts.
- (b) To extend and improve the State medical services.
- (c) To construct the schools and provide the instructors necessary to give effect to the law of compulsory education.
- (d) To reform and reorganise radically all the departments of Government administration.
- (e) To prepare plans for the development of agriculture, for the improvement of irrigation and for the exploitation of mines and mineral deposits by the formation of companies for that purpose.
- (f) To reform certain existing laws.

Economic.

5. The Middle East Supply Centre has announced that its control over imports into Persia would in future be limited to—

- (a) Certain supplies which require much tonnage, such as tea, sugar, cereals and similar products.
- (b) Certain articles which are in short supply, such as textiles, tyres, motor vehicles.

6. The Administrator-General of the Finances has sent instructions to all Ministries to the effect that they are to prepare lists of all damages that can be attributed to the war, including that done to buildings and other constructions that have been at the disposal of the Allies.

Appointments—civil.

7. Ali Akbar Rasuli to be Farmandar of Dasht-Mishan.

Appointments—military.

8. *Army.*

- (i) Sepahbod Morteza Yazdan Panah to be Inspector-General of the 1st (Tehran) Military District.
- (ii) Sarhang Ali Naqi Gulpera to be 2nd in command of the 7th (Kerman) Division.
- (iii) Sarhang Assadullah Naqdi to be Military Prosecutor-General.
- (iv) Sartip Amir Nizami to be head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, Army Headquarters.

Gendarmerie.

- (v) Sarhang Hussein Humayun to command the gendarmerie of the 2nd (Azarbaijan) District.

Erratum.

Ma's Intelligence Summary No. 46/44, dated the 4th December, 1944, paragraph 8, line 6—

For "Muhammad Hussein Qashgai," read "Malek Mansur Qashgai."

[E 593/70/34]

(4)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th January.)

(No. 12.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period the 8th-14th January, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 15th January, 1945.

Enclosure in (4)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period the 8th-14th January, 1945.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE Bill to deprive Dr. Millspaugh of his economic powers has, after much heated discussion, been passed by the Majlis by 69 votes against 6, with 20 abstentions. The Government has been charged with responsibility for the control of the economic organisations set up by Dr. Millspaugh. Within a month the Government must decide which of these should be abolished and whether those remaining should be distributed among existing ministries or transferred to a new Ministry of Economic Affairs. Within three months the Government must present to the Majlis a report on the accounts and activities of all the economic organisations controlled by Dr. Millspaugh; and must further, within the shortest possible period, set up a Supreme Economic Council to advise the Government in the preparation of a scientific plan to suit the country's economic requirements. Particular attention is to be paid to preventing the transfer abroad of capital and to increasing exports. Some now fear, and some hope, that Dr. Millspaugh's control of the finances, which he retains, will allow him to continue to exercise some control over economic measures. Agitation for his dismissal continues in the Tudeh press, among aspirants to Russian favour and among the wealthy, who would suffer from his income tax law. Dr. Musaddiq, perhaps in the hope of placating the Russians, prepared a Bill for Millspaugh's dismissal, but he has not yet been able to obtain enough signatures to qualify it for presentation to the Majlis. It is understood that Dr. Black, at present head of the Cereals and Bread Section, may be asked to take temporary charge of the economic organisations previously controlled by Dr. Millspaugh.

2. Anxious speculation continues as to what the next move of the Russians through the agency of the Tudeh party will be. Tehran is full of rumours of a large influx of Caucasians and of Persians who had fled to Russia in Reza Shah's reign, brought into Persia as Russian troops and then turned loose in civilian clothes, but armed, to occupy the many houses the Russians are alleged to have hired in various quarters of the town. There is considerable anxiety with a corresponding desire either to seek Russian favour or to ask what British support will be forthcoming.

3. In Azerbaijan there is a lull in Tudeh and Russian activities, although some mild agitation for the formation of provincial and district councils continues. A Tudeh meeting organised to protest against Seyyid Zia's manifesto, to which reference was made in Summary No. 49/44, paragraph 5, was attended by only about 100 people.

4. The Persians who visited Tashkent at the invitation of the Russians (see Summary No. 49/44, paragraph 2) have now returned and have described their experience with apparently genuine enthusiasm. They have sung high praise of the culture, prosperity, contentment, national pride and the respect for and vitality of the Islamic faith which they found in Uzbekistan.

5. A few Tudeh and pro-Russian papers have been suppressed for unseemly attacks on the Government and on British policy, but as they have reappeared under different names no useful effect has been created.

6. In paragraph 4 of Summary No. 1/45 a statement was given of the Government's intentions. The laws mentioned in sub-paragraph (f), which it is intended to revise, are those relating to the formation of provincial and district councils.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

7. The Minister of Finance has tabled a Bill asking for a credit of approximately 3 million dollars for the purchase of arms and supplies for the army in the year March 1945-March 1946 and authorising the Ministry for War to place orders in the United States to the value of that amount.

Appointments—Military.

8—(i) Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari (F.O. 22) to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

(ii) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet to be Persian Military Attaché in Paris. (It is not yet certain that he will accept the appointment.)

Internal Security.

9. It is reliably reported that the Shah is becoming increasingly impatient with the continued existence at liberty of tribal chiefs, such as Nasir Qashgai and Abdullah Zarghampur of the Boir Ahmadi, who show no sign of recognising the authority of the Central Government or their duty towards their sovereign, and it is considered that it may be difficult to restrain him from ordering military operations to enforce their submission. The Tudeh press continues to attack tribal chiefs of the south. Morteza Quli Khan is dubbed a Bakhtiari outlaw, but Nasir Qashgai is the chief villain. The alleged union of the tribes of the south is said to be connected with the Pan-Arab movement, which was well known to have been devised as an obstacle to the spread of Russian influence.

Khuzestan.

10. The second stage of the disarmament of the Arabs, which affects the Bani Tamim and the Bavi, is said to be proceeding satisfactorily and to be nearly completed.

Russian Affairs.

11. It is reliably reported that the Russians have informed the Persian Government that they no longer require the production of the Persian munition factories. It will be remembered that they made a contract for the monthly supply of a number of rifles and machine pistols and a quantity of ammunition. A certain amount of each was delivered, but owing to the failure of the Russians to supply necessary raw materials in adequate quantities and to other causes, deliveries fell far short of the contracted amounts. The Russians did not seem to be greatly concerned, and this lent colour to the theory that they were more interested in making contact with the 5,000-6,000 workmen and in keeping the British out of the factories than in the munitions that might be produced. They are now free to stir up trouble among the workmen without damaging their own interests.

12. There appeared in the Russian-subsidised paper *Rahbar* a rather ominous statement to the effect that Russian policy was directed not only to the crushing of all Fascist States but also to the encouragement of movements among the working and middle classes of other countries against fascism or reaction and of the establishment of free national Governments, particularly in those States along Russia's borders.

13. It is reliably reported that the Russians recently spent some days in the vicinity of Zarand⁽¹⁾ reconnoitring for, surveying and measuring out a landing ground.

14. Russian troops are now preventing the entry into the Russian "zone" of anti-Tudeh papers and confiscating any that are found there.

British Affairs.

15. The Tudeh papers have begun attacks on the A.I.O.C., alleging bad treatment of their Persian employees and inefficient direction of the technical school where Persians are trained. The public is warned that the company's

⁽¹⁾ 55 miles south-west of Tehran.

lubricating oil is of such bad quality that it seems to be specially designed to wear out engines. This is perhaps in preparation for a campaign which may be launched by the Tudeh party against the company when Russia no longer requires the company's products.

16. The matter of Persia's claims to Bahrein has also been raised in the Tudeh press. It is hazarded that the object is to remind Persians of a matter on which Russian help might be of value at the Peace Conference.

[E 712/70/34]

(5)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st January.)

(No. 20.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the period the 15th January to 21st January, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 22nd January, 1945.

Enclosure in (5)

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the Period
15th to 21st January, 1945.*

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government has been concerned mainly with consideration of the measures that should be taken to replace the control of economic affairs exercised by Dr. Millspaugh through his American assistants. Certain appointments, detailed in paragraph 8 below, have been made supplanting the American heads of departments by Persians. The Americans, it was hoped, would continue to act in an advisory capacity. It is doubtful, however, whether any important American will agree to serve on without some power of control. Dr. Millspaugh has played into the hands of those who want to get rid of him altogether by notifying the Prime Minister that, unless the present governor of the National Bank is dismissed by the 23rd January, he will himself leave Persia. There was never much chance that the Government would be willing or would dare to dismiss the governor of the National Bank, a man who, whatever his faults, is honest and exceptionally able; and it is believed that Dr. Millspaugh is already aware of that, so he has presumably made up his mind to give up his work in Persia. His arbitrary action has dealt a blow not only to his own supporters, the number of whom has increased since he was relieved of control over economic affairs and limited to his responsibilities for the finances, but also to those who, while disapproving of Dr. Millspaugh personally, are convinced of the value to Persia in the present political situation of an American mission with some financial control. Dr. Millspaugh's self-opinionated obstinacy has been of great assistance to all the opponents of American interest in Persia, of the establishment of stability and of economic and financial reforms.

2. There is growing discontent with the Prime Minister's weakness and ineffectiveness, and it has been increased by his choice of his own friends as advisers to him on economic affairs and for lucrative employment in economic administrations. It is only the lack of a suitable successor that keeps him in power. Even that may not save him much longer.

3. Jealous to protect its honour against accusations made in the press to the effect that Deputies take advantage of their position to gain benefits for themselves, particularly in commercial transactions, the Majlis has passed a law authorising the appointment of a commission of five members to be elected by the Deputies to investigate any such charges made.

4. The Tudeh press has been making venomous attacks on Great Britain and on British policy. It is repeated *ad nauseam* that after the last war Great Britain had prepared Persia to be a "springboard" for hostile action against Russia. Two papers suggest that Seyyid Zia, on behalf of his masters, is organising a pseudo-Communist party who will create disturbances and bring the Tudeh party into disrepute and give the Government an excuse for breaking

up the party. Further attacks are made on the A.I.O.C. One paper asks whether it is realised that thousands of unqualified Palestinians are employed by the company while the Persian workers of Khuzistan are naked and hungry.

5. The Tudeh leaders have openly said that it is now their intention to improve their organisations in the south with a view to showing their strength by organising demonstrations there which it will be impossible to attribute to Russian influence. They have recently established a centre in Shiraz, where they already have two papers, and have begun an active campaign against those whom they believe to be the agents of British policy, notably Qavam-ul-Mulk and Nasir Qashgai. In Ahwaz also, with the arrival of a new Russian Consul, there has been an increase of Tudeh activity in the Workers' Union.

6. The internees have been getting much publicity in the press. The Persian Government is urged to stand up for the rights of Persians and to bring the internees to trial so that their innocence or guilt can be established. Great Britain is taunted with having departed from her usual standards of justice. Much was made, first of all in the leading Tudeh paper, of an alleged insult by a junior British officer to an interned Persian colonel.

Economic.

7. Unusually plentiful snow and rain throughout almost the whole length and breadth of Persia has raised hopes of a superabundant harvest. This has not, however, yet had any notable effect on prices.

Appointments—Civil.

8.—(i) Muhammad Hussein Jahanbani (F.O. 104) to be head of the Road Transport Department.

(ii) Muhammad Mehdi Qahrimani to be head of the Distribution Department.

(iii) Taqi I'tesan to be head of the Foreign Trade Control Department.

(iv) Colonel Muhammad Ali Safavi to be head of the Cereals and Bread Section.

The above appointments have been made in place of Americans who were at the head of those departments until the abrogation of Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers.

(v) Ismail Navab to be Farmandar of Gulpaijan.

(vi) Mehdi Ferouhar to be Persian Consul in Karachi.

(vii) Feraidun Adamiyat and Izzeddin Kazemi to be attachés at the Persian Embassy in London.

Persian Forces.

9. General Razmara is very busy intriguing to undermine the position of General Arfa, the present Chief of Staff. The latter is trying to strengthen his position by substituting his friends for Razmara's in important posts. Unfortunately, his friends are few, and some of those on whom he would place most reliance (since he believes that if they were once pro-German they are now certainly anti-Russian) are in the internment camp. It is reported, although not on the best authority, that both the Shah and the Russians already regret the dismissal of Razmara and that they have told him so. There is nothing improbable in this. He suits their book much better than General Arfa.

10. The following Persian officers are leaving shortly to visit the French front at the invitation of the French Government: Sartip Jawadi, Sarhang Hejazi, Sarhang Mazheri, Sarhang Mozayenni, Naib Sarhang Amini.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

11. Qazi Muhammad, the Kurdish notable of Mahabad, and the chiefs of the Mangur, Mamish and Gavrik who had accompanied him to Tehran (see Summary No. 43/44, paragraph 13) in the hope of persuading the Government that they were not plotting against the integrity of Persia either with the Russians or with the leaders of some movement for Kurdish independence, have been allowed to return to their homes. Although not entirely cleared of suspicion, they have managed to reassure the Government to some extent. The Mangur and Mamish are to be paid from gendarmerie funds for the maintenance of sixty-seventy riflemen each, in return for which those tribes will accept responsibility for the protection of the roads from Mahabad to Sardasht and from

Haidarabad to Khaneh. Abdullah Ilkhanizadeh has been appointed Bakshdar of Bukan and will draw pay for fifty riflemen in return for keeping order in that area. With the setting in of winter conditions Kurdistan is quiet. Twenty unfortunate Jaf tribesmen who were taken as hostages by the Persian military authorities at the time of the incident in August, reported in Summary No. 32/44, paragraph 10, have not yet been released in spite of lengthy negotiations between the Iraqi and Persian Governments.

Khuzistan.

12. It is reported that with the collection of some 700 rifles from the Bani Tamim and Bavi tribes the second stage of the disarmament of the Arabs is said to be complete. The Persian Government has, however, some doubts whether the disarmament is being carried out as effectively and impartially as the local commander reports and a special officer is being sent to investigate.

Fars.

13. Nasir Qashgai recently paid a visit to Mamassani and to Gach Saran in the hope that he might be recognised as a sort of tribal overlord and be accepted as the arbitrator between Abdullah Zarghampur and his enemies in Kuh-i-Galu. He is reported to be now returning to Shiraz with deflated pride and to be talking again of divesting himself of the responsibilities as regards the good order of the Qashgai which he accepted, and even of going abroad.

Russian Affairs.

14. The headquarters of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Association in Tehran has now been turned into "The House of Culture." The speeches at the opening ceremony made it clear that the purpose of the House of Culture, which would be managed by V.O.K.S., was to publicise the cultural achievements of the Russian people and to teach the Russian language. It was promised that similar centres would be opened in other towns in Persia.

15. M. Hashimov has replaced M. Kommissaroff as Soviet Vice-Consul at Rezaieh. The latter returns to Tehran.

16. It is reported from a fairly reliable source that the Russians have now completed the widening, bridging and asphaltting of the road Kazvin-Resht-Astara. The road is two-way throughout, and it is said that it will take all classes of traffic. It was built to higher specifications than British or American roads in Persia and, according to one source, it is much the best road in the country.

[E 871/70/34]

(6)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th February.)

(No. 27.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the period the 22nd January to the 28th January, 1945. Compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 29th January, 1945.

Enclosure in (6)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 4, Secret, for the period
22nd January to 28th January, 1945.*

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. No decision has yet been reached on the resignation of Dr. Millspaugh who has been granted 15 days local leave.

2. The Persian Prime Minister's stock is said to be declining. Having achieved the abrogation of Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers (and possibly his resignation also) he has done as much as his supporters could have hoped for.

Having been in office for over two months and having used his power of patronage for the benefit of his relatives he is regarded as having had a good run for his money. Among the names of his possible successors that of Ali Scheili (F.O. 217; M.A. 283) has also been mentioned of late.

3. Dr. Black the American Chief of the Cereals and Bread Section tendered his resignation on the 18th January. It has not yet been accepted.

4. After the recent publication of His Imperial Majesty The Shah's invitation to the three leaders to hold their next meeting in Tehran and his offer of his palaces to accommodate the party, many of the Persian newspapers have deduced that the next conference will take place in Tehran, and have urged the Persian Government to make certain requests to the three leaders for the relief of Persia's present ills.

5. The Economic Commission, appointed to advise on the redistribution of the economic powers recently taken from Dr. Millspaugh, has submitted a preliminary report. Among its recommendations are:—

- (i) That the economic section of the Ministry of Finance should be separated from that Ministry and administered as a separate department until such time as a Ministry of Economics is created.
- (ii) That this department should be run on commercial lines.
- (iii) That Government control of certain commodities, such as key commodities, commodities in short supply or commodities imported after consultation with foreign Governments in control of trade in their own countries, should continue.
- (iv) That the Rent Stabilisation Department should be transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and that the Inspection Department of Foreign Trade and the Anti-Hoarding Department should be transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

6. As the result of further misstatements in the Persian press about the interneers and the alleged insult to Colonel Bahrami (see Intelligence Summary No. 3, paragraph 6) His Majesty's Embassy have sent to the press a communiqué which gives a correct account of this incident. This communiqué has been published in the newspapers *Sitara* and *Kushish* of the 26th January. It is reproduced as an appendix to this summary.

The Majlis.

7. The chief business of the week has been as follows:—

- (i) The appointment of a commission to investigate the alleged implication of Majlis Deputies in transactions with the Government for their own profit. The members are Hishmati, Mukhbir Faramand, Malik Madani, Engineer Farivar and Dr. Muazzami.
- (ii) The grant of a further delay of three months for the commission appointed to study the reforms of the Electoral Law.
- (iii) A request by the President of the Majlis that the Government's letter to Dr. Millspaugh (informing him that the dispute between him and the Governor of the National Bank would be referred to the Majlis) should first be discussed by the Deputies outside the chamber.
- (iv) The debate on the Budget Bill was resumed. Some further proposals were accepted and others rejected. No final decision on the whole Bill was reached.
- (v) The tabling by the Ministry of Justice of a Bill for the formation of a supreme council of Registration. This council will examine the qualifications and conduct of notaries public.

Persian Army.

8. A passing out ceremony was held on the 24th January at the Officers' College in the presence of His Imperial Majesty The Shah. 950 cadets received their commissions. The parade was on the lines of past years, and consisted of a reception of His Imperial Majesty The Shah by the college in review order, a homily by a mullah, presentation of epaulettes to a selected cadet and a march past. The small size and poor physique of the cadets, in contrast to last year, was most noticeable. An innovation was the inclusion in the parade of a number of medical and engineering students who, by a recent regulation, now carry out their compulsory military training concurrently with their technical studies.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

9. The Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh party met in session in Tabriz during the second half of January. Delegates from all parts of the province attended. The results of the session have not been made public and many wild stories are circulating about the completeness of the Tudeh preparations for achieving autonomy. They included the arming by the Russians of Tudeh members and of a force of 5,000 Shakkak Kurdish horsemen, the murder of Persian officials, the seizure of power and preparation to do battle with any force sent from Tehran at chosen positions on the Qafan Kuh.

Sarhang Darakhshani, the Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan, does not believe the above in their entirety, but is of the opinion that something may happen in the spring and deplores the supineness of the Persian officials and the unlikelihood of their being able and willing to do anything in case of an emergency.

Khuzistan.

10. For a long time pilferage of railway wagons containing military and Aid to Russia stores has been causing the Allies great concern, and the uncanny certainty with which only wagons containing stores of saleable value have been rifled has led the Allied security authorities to suspect that the thieves were led by persons having inside information. An ambush was recently laid by a combined British and American military party. A box car containing cloth was left at Faliyeh railway siding and covered by the party in ambush. A gang of 150 natives attempted to raid the box car. The gang was led by two American coloured soldiers and was engaged by the fire of the ambush party and left twenty-six dead on the site. Twelve more are believed to have died of wounds in a nearby village. One American coloured soldier was killed and the other captured.

11. General Humayuni has now embarked on phase 3 of his Arab disarmament operation by despatching two companies of infantry, one machine gun company and one battery of 75-mm. guns from Khorramshahr to Pul-i-Nau. The Sheiks of Mahaisen, Deris, Naser, Bahmanshir and Abadan have been called and have agreed to surrender rifles. Phase 4, against the Arabs of Shadgan, is being undertaken concurrently and a battalion of infantry has been despatched to Gor-Gor. Phase 5, against the Arabs of Khalajabad and Hindian, was due to begin on the 23rd January.

Mekran.

12. A false rumour to the effect that Kahn Sahib Idu Reki and his son Murad Khan Reki had been arrested in Shiraz and Tehran respectively for their supposed complicity in the Farrukhzad murder case led to the desertion of some Reki gendarmes and their officer from Kerman. About 2,000 Reki families also prepared to migrate to British Baluchistan. The General Officer Commanding, Kerman Garrison, accompanied by two Reki sardars, went to Khwash and was successful in allaying the fears of the Rekis. The situation is returning to normal.

British Interests.

13. A detachment of the Arab Gulf R.A.F. levies recently mutinied at Jask. Thirty-one out of fifty-nine men deserted with their arms and 5,000 rounds of ammunition. A party of Assyrian levies has been flown to Jask and the disbandment of the remainder of the detachment (most of whom are believed to be Persians) has been effected.

14. Major-General W. A. K. Fraser, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., military attaché, left Tehran on the 27th January for London on duty for a liaison visit to the War Office.

15. Three Persian students have left Tehran under the auspices of the British Council to continue their studies in the United Kingdom.

Chinese Interests.

16. Colonel Huang Tzi An has arrived in Tehran to replace Colonel Tang Te-Hang, who will be leaving shortly for China. The new military attaché was commissioned in 1923 and is a graduate of the War Academy of Nanking. He has held numerous staff appointments, mostly on the operations directorate of the National Military Council.

American Interests.

17. The American Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, has been recalled and will be leaving shortly. The United States Government has asked for the agreement of the Persian Government to the appointment of Mr. Wallace Murray.

Polish Interests.

18. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 15th January, 1945, was:—

	Men.	Women	Children.	Total.
In Tehran	405	1,357	401	2,163
Isfahan	70	431	494	995
Ahwaz	176	715	319	1,210
	651	2,503	1,214	4,368

Appendix.

As many false statements have been published regarding an incident at the internment camp in the 500-bed hospital, the British Embassy considers it necessary to state the facts.

The incident occurred when a British officer, in the normal execution of his duty, went to the camp to call the roll. When, as a mark of confidence, it was arranged that the internees at Sultanabad whose interrogation had been completed should be transferred to Tehran, no provision was made for a roll-call because it was expected that the Persian authorities concerned would observe the agreement strictly. It was soon found, however, that the internees were allowed to go out into the town and even to stay away from the camp for days at a time, without even the knowledge of the security authorities, and it therefore became necessary to institute a roll-call. But for this the Persian officer in question would not have had to appear for a roll-call and would not have made certain excited remarks which led to the incident.

It is not true that a British officer has made an apology in connexion with this incident. There was no ground for an apology and none will be given.

It should be added that the visit of the British officer to effect the roll-call revealed yet another serious breach of the regulations under which the internees were transferred to Tehran. Although it was a Thursday, when the internees are forbidden by the regulations to receive visitors, there were, in fact, a number of visitors in the camp.

[E 1120/70/34]

(7)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th February.)

(No. 35.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 5 of the 29th January to the 4th February, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 5th February, 1945.

Enclosure in (7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5, Secret, for the period 29th January to 4th February, 1945.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The affair of Dr. Millspaugh still drags on. The obstinate doctor has further played into the hands of his enemies by a renewed insistence on the dismissal of A. H. Ibtehaj, the Governor of the National Bank, and by a further request that, according to the terms of the law by which he was engaged, all economic functions should be placed again in his charge. This letter is now under examination by the Council of Ministers and the Persian Prime Minister

has announced in the Majlis that, as the doctor's recommendations cannot be accepted, there is no need to refer the matter to the Majlis for arbitration as previously announced (see paragraph 7 (iii) of Summary No. 4).

The Majlis.

2. The chief business has been as follows:—

- (i) A statement by Fahimi, Minister without portfolio, on his recent tour of inspection in Kurdistan. He stressed the loyalty and patriotism of the Kurds and mentioned the need for increased medical and educational facilities;
- (ii) The passing of two Bills (with double urgency procedure) tabled by the Minister of Health. The first empowers the Ministry of Health to enforce all public health regulations previously enforced by the Ministry of the Interior. The second Bill was for the preparation of a two-year plan for the reorganisation of the Ministry of Health after approval by the Majlis Public Health commission;
- (iii) The tabling of a private member's Bill for the prohibition of the cultivation of opium;
- (iv) A spirited discussion arising out of a remark by the Azarbaijan Tudeh Deputy Ovanessian to the effect that, as far as Persia was concerned, the Atlantic Charter was a "scrap of paper";
- (v) A parliamentary question by Dr. Musaddiq (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh) regarding the legality of the internment of certain Persians suspected of anti-Allied activities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, though supplied by the British and Russian Ambassadors with ample material for a convincing reply, made a weak statement in which no mention was made of the seriousness of the offences or of the possibility that death sentences would have been passed on some of the internees if they had been brought to trial instead of being interned. He said that, while no legal grounds existed for their internment, there was moral justification for internment in view of Persia's obligations as an Ally. He further said that efforts had been made and would continue to be made to procure the release of those whose guilt was not adjudged to be serious.

The Press.

3. The chief topics of discussion have been—

- (i) The forthcoming conference of the three Allied leaders and the belief that the problem of Persia would be one of the main items on the agenda;
- (ii) Further attacks by the Russian-inspired press on the tribal *bloc* in the south and the rearming of the tribes by "imperialists and reactionaries";
- (iii) The third anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Treaty. Most of the articles stress the fact that as Persia had undertaken and fulfilled certain obligations so she should obtain corresponding benefits. Though she had sent no soldiers to the front her people had worked on Allied communications and had made Persia "the bridge to victory";
- (iv) The usual attacks on Sa'ed's "one-sided" policy, on Seyyid Zia and, more recently, on Bayat, the Prime Minister, for his failure to achieve anything;
- (v) Gratification at the impending withdrawal of American troops and the hope that Russian and British troops would soon follow suit.

4. The tone of the Persian press has become so bad lately and abuse of the Allies so frequent that a joint approach to the Minister for Foreign Affairs was made by the British and Russian Ambassadors. The Minister for Foreign Affairs attempted to defend the press by saying that their abuse was only provoked by acts of unwarranted interference by the Allies in the internal affairs of Persia and so served a useful turn by drawing public attention to these acts. It was pointed out to him that the press, at the level at which it worked in Persia, was not the best judge of what constituted unwarranted interference.

Finance.

5. An extract from a report dated the 30th January, 1945, by the Financial Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy is published as an appendix to this summary.

6. His Majesty's Government have stopped the sale of gold to Persia with effect from the 15th January, 1945. The market had reached saturation point and most of the gold recently sold had been smuggled out of Persia into Iraq. As the supply of goods and rial notes in Iraq had also diminished, Iraqi dinar notes in payment of this smuggled gold were being brought into Persia, thus increasing Persia's sterling balances and, hence, His Majesty's Government's obligations to convert 60 per cent. of these holdings into gold.

Appointments.

7.—(i) Said Samii to be Governor-General of the 4th Ustan (Western Azarbaijan) *vice* Colonel Darakhshani who becomes General Officer Commanding Azarbaijan Division;

(ii) Muhammad Hussain Muhtashami to be Governor of Tabriz;

(iii) Jamshid Qarib to be First Secretary to the Persian Embassy at Angora;

(iv) Mahmud Mir Fakhrai to be Secretary to the Persian Legation in Brazil *vice* Khushnawis recalled.

Persian Army.

8. The High Military Council, whose meetings General Razmara contrived to suspend, is now functioning again. Its members comprise the Minister for War, the Deputy Minister for War (General Muqtadir), the Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (General Ansari), General Yazdan Panah, the Secretary of the Shah's Military Cabinet (General Riazi), and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division (General Muzayyini).

Internal Security.

9. With reference to Summary No. 4/45, paragraph 9, further details of the proceedings of the Tudeh conference have been received. 142 delegates attended. 43,000 members are claimed for eastern Azarbaijan alone and 7,000 for the city of Tabriz. The resolutions passed may be summarised as follows: To oppose imperialism and a one-sided foreign policy; to establish provincial committees; to defend workers and peasants against the oppression of local authorities and landlords; to combat unemployment; to urge the exploitation of the province's mineral resources; to work for the abolition of oppressive legislation passed under Reza Shah's régime. The conference also pledged its friendship to the Soviets and for all small nations fighting for freedom. The conference also thanked the Kurds for their offer to co-operate with the Tudeh for the benefit of Persia. These thanks appear to have been cheaply earned, as the fifteen Kurdish chiefs summoned to Tabriz refused to attend the conference.

Kurdistan.

10. Some months ago a party of fifteen Roghzadeh Jaf tribesmen were lured into Sennandaj by false promises on the part of the local Persian military commander, Hushmand Afshar. They were thrown into prison and their sheep and other belongings stolen. They were forced to sign a document admitting their guilt in having entered Persia under arms. They were never brought to trial. They were kept in conditions of barbarous severity and two of their number died. Protests by the Government of Iraq have led to the promise of their release in a week's time. They have been told to remove their property but have protested that most of it has been stolen.

Khuzistan.

11. The Persian Government has been issuing passports for pilgrims to Kerbela without ascertaining from the Iraqi Consulate the numbers of applicants for visas with which they could cope. They have also been running three special pilgrim trains to Ahwaz per week without concerning themselves with the arrangements for the onward transport of pilgrims from Ahwaz to Iraq. The resulting accumulation of pilgrims without food or shelter in Ahwaz is causing the local authorities much concern. Many pilgrims, tired of waiting their turn at the Iraqi Consulate, will have gone south without Iraqi visas, and the trade of the Shatt-el-Arab boatmen in smuggling them across at extortionate rates is likely to be a brisk one.

12. The military governor of Abadan met the sheikhs of south-east Abadan on the 29th January and obtained promises from them to hand over their arms. While complying with the military governor's orders the sheikhs pointed out that they would remain at the mercy of the tribes on the Arab side of the Shatt-el-Arab who still retain their arms.

Mekran.

13. Security around Zahidan has deteriorated and further hold-ups have been reported. The area near Hormuk is particularly bad owing to its proximity to the Afghan border and the numerous safe exits afforded to bandits by the tangled mass of hills near Kuh-i-Malik Siah.

Turkish Interests.

14. Jahid Hayta, Second Secretary to the Turkish Embassy, Tehran, has been transferred to Rome.

Russian Interests.

15. Major-General I. V. Kargin, Chief of the Soviet Transport Directorate and commander of all Russian personnel in Tehran, has returned to Moscow on completion of his appointment. His successor is Colonel Kostikov, who is carrying out the same duties previously performed by Major-General Kargin. Major-General Zorin, Chief of the Transovtrans, is occupied with that organisation only and is not commander of Soviet troops in Tehran.

Appendix.

Extract from report dated the 30th January, 1945, by the Financial Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy.

Public Finance.

2. The figures of revenue and expenditure for the first nine months of the financial year 1944-45 (beginning on the 21st March 1944—the Persian year 1323 A.H.) are now available. They compare as follows with those for the corresponding period in the previous year.

	1943-44.	1944-45.
	(Million rials.)	
Ordinary budget—		
Revenue	3,287	2,972
Expenditure	2,841	2,716
Surplus	446	256
Commercial budget—		
Revenue	1,537	2,640
Expenditure	2,820	3,115
Deficit	1,283	475
Net deficit	837	219

3. The estimates for the whole year 1944-45 are as follows:—

	Million rials.
Ordinary budget—	
Revenue	3,958
Expenditure	4,569
Deficit	611
*Commercial budget—	
Revenue	6,367
Expenditure	5,755
Surplus	612 (Overall surplus 470,391 rials)

It may be noted here for reference that the budgetary deficit for the year 1943-44 was 1,052 million rials.

* The activities covered by the Commercial budget fall into two chief parts: (a) purchase and sale to the public of food-stuffs and piece-goods; (b) administration of the Government factories and properties. Under the latter heading outgoings during the first nine months of the year have been 820 million rials as against receipts of 376 million.

4. As to the ordinary budget, the situation was less favourable than appears from the figures in the second paragraph. For one thing, the expenditure does not include the salaries of Government servants for the ninth month (some 200 million rials). The budget, although submitted to the Parliament (Majlis) last June, has not yet been approved, and the expenditure is being authorised in the meantime by periodical votes on account, the last (like some of the others) having been passed too late for the punctual payment of salaries. More important, however, is the fact that receipts from income tax, which were estimated at 885 million rials for the year, are likely to fall far short of this figure. Although the rates are considerably higher than in 1943-44, receipts in Tehran have been no more than 284 million rials in the first nine months of the year, compared with 273 million in the same period of the preceding year, and this figure has only been reached because the income tax paid by the National Bank has amounted to 140 million as against 40 million last year. Similarly, receipts (including income tax) from the provinces over the period have so far been 430 million as against 500 million in the first nine months of 1943-44.

Banking, Currency and Price Indices.

10. The following table brings up to date the figures given in previous reports of notes in circulation and bank deposits:—

	Notes.	Deposits.
	(Million rials.)	
June 1941	1,312	671
June 1942	1,913	1,222
June 1943	4,070	4,553
June 1944	6,262	8,753
July 1944	6,234	8,933
August 1944	6,125	8,511
September 1944	6,215	8,388
October 1944	6,333	8,254
November 1944	6,600	8,852
December 1944	6,640	9,003

11. The following index (prepared by the National Bank) shows wholesale prices and cost of living:—

	Wholesale prices.	Cost of living.
	(1939 = 100.)	
June 1941	141	145
June 1942	239	254
June 1943	422	629
June 1944	513	850
July 1944	507	846
August 1944	534	855
September 1944	506	798
October 1944	442	717
November 1944	445	656
December 1944	497	684

[E 1305/70/34]

(8)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th February.)

(No. 43.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 6, for the period the 5th February to the 11th February, 1945. Compiled by the Military Attaché to this embassy.

Tehran, 12th February, 1945.

[31336]

H 2

(Secret.)

Enclosure in (8)

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the period 5th February to 11th February, 1945.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The latest steps taken by Dr. Millspaugh to retain his post have not been very dignified. Having received no answer to his letter to the Persian Prime Minister (referred to in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary) he addressed another in which he said that, as he had received no reply, he understood that his demands had not been acceptable and that in consequence he tendered his resignation. Subsequently he wrote yet another letter to the Persian Prime Minister in which he accused him of participating in attacks and criticisms designed to expel him from the country and sabotage the work of his financial mission. He finally appealed to the Majlis to arbitrate on the justice of his case. On the 6th February Bayat made a long speech to the Majlis in which he gave details of the correspondence between himself and Dr. Millspaugh. His statement to the effect that the Persian Government could no longer work with Dr. Millspaugh on any conditions was greeted with cheers.

2. Bayat's position as Persian Prime Minister has further deteriorated, and there are but few who would estimate his chances of retaining office at more than a few weeks or who would regret his passing. The Parliamentary fractions are already busy in making their selections for a new cabinet. The qualifications demanded of any future Prime Minister are not easy to find. He must be acceptable to the Shah, the Majlis, the Russians and the British and, with vested interests as strong as they are at present in Persia, be a man who can be trusted not to show reforming zeal in putting an end to a state of administrative chaos from which a great many classes of the population derive advantage.

3. The Tudeh party have not slackened their efforts in Isfahan. Dr. Kishawarz and Kambaksh are reported to have left for Tehran but their place has been taken by Dr. Radmanish and Iraj Iskandari. The Soviet Consul is active on their behalf and battle has now been joined with the two rival unions supported respectively by the mill owners and Daulatabadi. It is reported that Yezd is to be the next scene for Tudeh activities.

4. A reliable report discloses a strong Tudeh element in the Persian Broadcasting Department.

5. The Military Governor has published two proclamations concerning the suppression of four newspapers and the necessity for registration by immigrants. (It is thought that this last edict is directed against a number of Caucasians who, it is rumoured, have been imported by the Russians to swell the ranks of the Tudeh party.)

Gendarmerie.

6. The headquarters of the Mekran Gendarmerie district has been transferred from Iranshahr to Zahidan.

7. Fifty Ismailzais have been recruited into the Mekran gendarmerie. A hundred Bakhtiari were enlisted in 1944 (see Intelligence Summary No. 42/44, paragraph 11), and Colonel Schwarzkopf has intentions of accepting Qashgai and, eventually, other tribesmen.

Economic.

8. The Cabinet has received the report of the special commission set up to advise on the reorganisation of Persia's economic administrations. A Bill embodying the commission's recommendations is to be presented to the Majlis at once.

9. The Minister of Finance has tabled a Bill to provide for the payment of the final two-twelfths of the budget to cover the period the 21st January to the 21st March.

Industrial.

10. Strikes have been reported from Isfahan, Ahwaz and Yezd. In most cases the owners were prepared to grant benefits in the form of shorter hours and better hygienic facilities, but were not prepared to raise existing wages.

Educational.

11. The first group of eleven Iranian students selected to study at Indian universities will leave Tehran shortly. Four will complete their training at Lyallpur Agricultural College (Punjab) and two at the Rangers College, Dehra Dun, for forestry. Three of the group will take a course of high engineering at Delhi University, while the remainder will study in the Textile Department of Delhi University. The entire cost will be borne by the Government of India.

Internal Security.

Bakhtiari.

12. Morteza Quli Khan has not yet obeyed the summons to come to the capital to discuss the proposed operations against the Bahmai and Tayebi. His excuse is that his absence from the garmsir will adversely affect security as he has under his eye in that area all the leading kedkhudas having permitted none to remain in Isfahan during the winter.

The death is reported of Sardar Bakhtiar, son of the late Sardar Jang.

Fars.

13. Muhammed Hussein Qashgai is still in Tehran and his brother Khosro has also arrived. They have been advised that it is high time that Nasir Khan clarified his equivocal position and met His Imperial Highness the Shah. The added importance of this was stressed in view of Nasir Khan's often expressed desire to take his son abroad.

French Interests.

14. The contract of M. Godard, Director of Archaeology and sometime head of the Free French delegation, has been renewed.

Russian Interests.

15. Lieutenant-General Yamuskevitch, Chief of Staff to General Sovietnikoff, has been killed in an aeroplane crash.

16. The following is the latest list of Soviet generals in Persia:—

Kazvin—

Lieutenant-General Sovietnikoff, Commander-in-chief.

Major-General Gaidukov, Second in command.

Major-General Russov, Staff.

Major-General Dannilov, Chief of anti-aircraft troops.

Tabriz—

Major-General Glinski, Commander of troops in Tabriz area.

? Lobov, Chief of Staff to Glinski.

Rezaieh—

Major-General Smirnov, Commanding brigade.

Resht—

Major-General Shafranski, Commanding Resht area.

Gurgan—

Major-General Trentin, Commanding troops in Gurgan area.

Sari—

Major-General Sobolev, Commanding brigade.

Major-General Filiatov, Commanding brigade.

Tehran—

Major-General Zorin,⁽¹⁾ Iran-Soviet transport.

(¹) Proceeded to Moscow believed on permanent transfer.

[E 1516/70/34]

(9)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th March.)

(No. 49.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the period the 12th to 18th February, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 19th February, 1945.

Enclosure in (9)

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the Period
12th-18th February, 1945.*

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Tudeh party's activities in the provinces have been much in the news recently. In Yazd the anti-Tudeh party of Dr. Tahiri sacked and burnt the Tudeh headquarters, attacked the Tudeh leaders and chased them out of the town. The instigator of the strikes referred to in paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary, Abbas Ustadan, escaped from the first affray but was later caught and wounded. In Azerbaijan, as a result of the recent Tudeh conference, a Tudeh recruiting drive has started among the townsfolk of Tabriz, the peasants and the Kurdish tribes. The enthusiasm of the latter for the Tudeh cause has probably been much exaggerated by the wealthy burghers, who fear for their property and skins. It is unlikely that the Kurds have any affinity with the Tudeh's Russian masters. In a separatist movement culminating, possibly, in the formation of an Azerbaijan Soviet republic the Kurds would hold no favoured place, but they would stand to benefit, temporarily, in a state of chaos between the withdrawal of Russian troops and the reassertion of Persian Government authority—a period during which they could indulge in their predatory habits to the full. The Shakkag tribe has been the main recipient for Tudeh propaganda and is under the leadership of Taha Agha, son of the notorious rebel Simko, who was killed at Ushnu in 1930. In Hamadan the party has shown more activity of late, and, though Hamadan is not an industrial centre, a number of artisans recently thrown out of employment there by the diminution of Allied Aid-to-Russia activities may present a worth-while target. In Isfahan strikes and street-fighting continue and Persian troops were recently called out in aid of the civil power. To offset these provincial activities, an unconfirmed report states that Tudeh membership in the capital has declined from 15,000 to 1,000 and that the weekly meetings are attended by only 150 as against the average of 500 of some months ago. The reason for this falling off is said to be the Russian-escorted Tudeh demonstrations of October last, as a result of which it became manifest to all Persians that the Tudeh was no longer (if ever it had been) a genuine Persian labour movement but a Russian-controlled political movement.

The Majlis.

2. A press report gives the strength of the various Majlis groups as follows:—

Ittihad-i-Milli (National Unionists) ...	30
Democrats ...	8
Azadi (Freedom Front) ...	11
Independents ...	16
Tudeh (Labour) ...	8
Mihan (Fatherland) ...	23
Ungrouped ...	31

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American Financial Mission.

3. Following on the resignation of Dr. Millspaugh, his functions have been temporarily distributed as follows:—

Mr. Pixley—Accounts and Audit, Treasury-General, Exchange Commission, Internal Revenue, Financial Tribunal, Personnel, Banks and Customs.

Mr. Black—Opium and Tobacco Monopoly, Debts, Ceded Properties and Public Domains, Inspection, Industrial Supervision and Supply.

Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers are to be placed in the charge of a committee whose names are to be selected from among Hikmat, Dr. Amini, Dr. Sajjadi, Salih, Muqbil.

Appointments—Civil.

- 4.—(i) Ali Asghar Itisam to be Farmandar (Governor) of Khoi.
(ii) Isa Ihtishami to be Farmandar (Governor) of Ardebil.

Internal Security.

Khorassan.

5. On the 11th February six bandits held up twenty-one lorries (including a Persian mail lorry) 12 miles from Meshed on the Turbat-i-Haidari road and decamped with 20,000 toman. This is said to be the first act of highway robbery on this road since December 1943.

6. Smuggling into Afghanistan on a large scale of A.I.O.C. and Russian petrol and kerosene has been brought to light by the A.I.O.C. manager in Meshed. High Russian and Persian officials are said to have connived at this. The Russians have doubtless used these products to produce rials or to barter them for livestock.

Qashgai.

7. The Darashuri have been raiding recently near Gach Saran, but, following representations by the A.I.O.C., have removed themselves from the area and promised compensation for losses inflicted.

Kuh-i-Galu.

8. The situation is still disturbed, where Muhammad Khan Ariani of the Boir Ahmad Sarhaddi is at loggerheads with his nephew Zargham Ariani. The Bavi tribe has joined in the fray by coming to the assistance of the latter.

Bakhtiari.

9. Reference paragraph 12 of the last Intelligence Summary, Morteza Quli Khan has refused to come to Tehran and gives as his reason that both he and General Humayuni think it too late in the season to start operations to disarm the Bahmai and Taiyebi. Morteza Quli Khan has stipulated for a daily payment of 20 and 30 rials respectively for every foot soldier and horse soldier which he provides. Their rations and arms are to be supplied by the Persian Government. He undertakes to provide 400 infantry and 200 cavalry. General Humayuni is of the opinion that his own forces are inadequate and is, moreover, nervous about hostile repercussions among the Kuhgalu in his rear. It is doubtful whether the known enthusiasm for these operations on the part of the Shah and the Chief of the General Staff will succeed in overcoming the objections now raised by Morteza Quli Khan and General Humayuni.

British Interests.

10. Three members of a British parliamentary delegation which has toured Soviet Russia recently passed through Tehran on their way home. They were Commander King-Hall, Mr. Jewson and Mr. Manningham Buller. While in Tehran they met a number of newspaper editors and a representative selection of Majlis Deputies. The remainder of the British delegation, delayed by an extension of their tour in Soviet Central Asia, are expected to arrive in Tehran next week.

Chinese Interests.

11. The Persian and Chinese Governments have raised their respective legations to the status of embassies.

[E 1596/70/34]

(10)

(No. 55.)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th March.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period the 19th March to 25th February, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 26th February, 1945.

Enclosure in (10)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the Period 19th February to 25th February, 1945.

*Persian Affairs.**The Majlis:*

1. The chief business has been:—

- (i) The tabling by the Minister of Finance of a Bill empowering Government to return to their rightful owners lands and properties unlawfully confiscated from the tribes and other landowners. The wording of the Bill is woolly and vague, and in its present form it is, like most Persian legislation, quite impracticable.
- (ii) Passing of the Bill to provide credits for the months of Bahman and Isfand—21st January to the 21st March—(two-twelfths of the budget).
- (iii) The tabling by the Persian Prime Minister of two Bills to provide for the formation of agricultural councils and for the development of Persian agriculture. The text of the former has been received and will be published in this summary when the Bill is passed. It looks imposing enough on paper, but the lack of the necessary funds, energy and knowledge will probably prevent its ever being of any practical use.

Obituary.

2. By the death on the 24th February of Hassan Esfandiari Haji Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 99; M.A. 125) a notable landmark of modern Persia has disappeared.

Appointments.

3. Sartip Gulshayan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to be a Military Governor of Tehran vice Sartip Kazim Shaibani. The reason for the change is said to be Shaibani's inactivity in general and his neglect of duty in particular on the occasion of a riot at Muharram when he failed to visit the scene in person and finally despatched a force so inadequate that it was overpowered by the crowd and one soldier was killed. The incoming Military Governor, though pleasant mannered and intelligent, is not remarkable for his energy.

Persian Army.

4. The Conscription Law continues to be debated and amended. One criticism of the existing procedure seems justified. Owing to Government's temporary inability to enforce conscription in areas not under its control (i.e., the Russian occupied zone and the fringes of tribal territory where its writ no longer runs) the annual call-up in other areas exceeds the army's requirements. Where a surplus exists, conscription is effected by casting lots. Those who are not taken only receive exemption for one year and may also in following years be fortunate enough to escape. They do not, however, receive permanent exemption and have the disturbing liability hanging over their heads for a number of years. The greater the number of possible conscripts the greater is the opportunity for rigging the casting of lots and the exemption, after payment of a suitable bribe, of the fit and the intake of the physically second rate.

Persian Navy.

5. After repeated requests by the Persian Government for the return of all or some of their naval craft still afloat, the Royal Navy has agreed to the return of the admiral's barge and two motor launches after repair. While these, if efficiently handled, may go some way towards prevention of smuggling and frontier control in the Shatt-el-Arab they will not suffice for other needs said by the Persian Government to be equally pressing, i.e., general preventive duties and as a means of communication between the scattered garrisons along the whole Persian coast from Bushire to Jask.

*Internal Security.**Bakhtiari.*

6. The Chief of the General Staff has decided to postpone till a more suitable occasion the operations for disarming the Bahmai and Taiyebi for the reasons given in paragraph 9 of the last Intelligence Summary. According to a consular report, General Humayuni has submitted an alternative proposal to disarm the Hajiwand sub-tribe of the Chahar Lang Division of the Bakhtiari. This alternative proposal has not yet reached the Persian General Staff. It will require examination for two reasons. Firstly, at this late season, the Hajiwand will soon be starting their upward migration to their summer grazing grounds near the Ushtarinan Kuh, thus putting themselves beyond the reach of their attackers. Secondly, the Hajiwand live, both in their winter and summer grazing grounds, in close proximity to another sub-tribe of the Chahar Lang (also an off-shoot of the Fuladwand tribe), the Hivedi, to whom it is believed the murderers of Mr. Vice-Consul Harris and Dr. Griffiths and his son belong. His Majesty's Embassy has been pressing the Persian Government for more than two years to bring these murderers to justice, and their reply, so far, has been to the effect that their habitat is not under Government's control. If military operations against the Hajiwand are considered feasible it is difficult to see why the Hivedi should be regarded as beyond the reach of a punitive column.

Isfahan.

7. A number of persons have been arrested by the Persian military authorities for smuggling arms. One of them was a member of the Tudeh party. One unconfirmed report says that vehicles of Iransovtrams were used for the purpose. The above information is especially interesting in view of the numerous reports in the Tudeh press of late to the effect that "Mysterious Hands," "Fascists," "Imperialists" and "Reactionaries" were busy arming the tribes of the south.

8. On the 15th February some fifty members of the Tudeh ambushed a car containing Abbas Quli Dehesh, a factory owner, and Saifpur Fatemi, the Majlis Deputy. On the timely arrival of a party of soldiers about twenty members of the gang were arrested, among whom was the local Tudeh leader, Bahrampur. The Soviet consul, Marchenko, demanded his release from the Governor-General and, on being treated to some plain speaking by the latter, demanded the recall of the Governor-General and some other officials. The Governor-General, who seems to have behaved with admirable firmness, courage and impartiality throughout, has asked his Government to procure the recall of Marchenko. The situation is tense with Tudeh and anti-Turkish factions spoiling for a fight.

Kuh-i-Galu.

9. Some progress has been made in settling the disputes between Abdullah Khan Zarghampur and his half-brother, Khosro. The former was last reported to be near Behbahan, but to be reluctant to enter the town without some form of British guarantee.

Kurdistan.

10. On the 15th February a crowd of Kurds attacked the police station at Mahabad (Saujbulagh) and attempted to loot the Finance Department's offices. Five policemen and a Kurd were killed. The ringleader of the Kurds, Aziz of the Faizullahbegi tribe, in an inflammatory speech, urged the expulsion of all Persian officials and claimed to speak as a pro-Russian, pro-Communist Nationalist. According to a Russian source the Kurds were enraged at the unfair distribution of monopoly goods. On the 14th February, at a village a few miles north of Rezaieh a small detachment of Persian infantry on tactical training encountered a party of Herki Kurds. The latter opened fire and the

commander of the Persian detachment, a Major Mafi, rashly charged them and was killed. According to a Persian General Staff report, as yet unconfirmed from consular sources, the Persian detachment a day or two later located these same Kurds in position on a hill north-west of Rezaieh on the Rezaieh-Shahpur road and attacked them inflicting casualties of fifty killed and wounded with no loss to themselves. The Persian Government feel particularly sore with the Russians over the first incident because the Russians, though they withdrew their garrison from Mahabad some time ago, refused to allow the Persian army to install their own. A battalion of Persian infantry has been moved from Saqqiz to Bukan about 35 miles south of Mahabad and, if Russian permission is obtained, this battalion will subsequently move on and garrison Mahabad.

Khuzistan.

11. A fairly reliable estimate of the arms recovered in phases 3, 4 and 5 of General Humayuni's operations against the Arabs of Khorramshahr and Abadan, Shedgan and Khalafabad is 1,300, 750 and 400 respectively.

French Interests.

12. General Catroux, French Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., passed through Tehran on his way to Moscow. He was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

13. The Persian Military Mission referred to in paragraph 18 of Intelligence Summary No. 49 of 1944 is scheduled to leave Tehran on the 1st March, 1945.

Tehran, 25th February, 1945.

[E 1750/70/34]

(11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 9 (Secret) for the Period 26th February to 4th March, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 66 of the 5th March, 1945; received in Foreign Office 14th March.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

DR. MILLSPAUGH left Tehran on the 28th February and, unless he is rash enough to try and write another apologia as a sequel to "The American Task in Persia," which he published after the completion of his previous tenure of office, the hubbub may be expected to die down.

2. Persia declared war on Japan with effect from the 28th February.

3. Bayat's position has strengthened slightly during the past two weeks. Inability among the Majlis parties to agree on a successor and a disinclination to mar the festivities of the Nau Ruz, now approaching, may be the chief causes. Dr. Musaddiq may have strengthened Bayat's position by a speech in which he referred to the current trend of thought in the Majlis with regard to the Government:—

"For several days it had been quite clear that the Government was not in very great favour with the Majlis, but reasons for opposition to the Government should be clearly stated; if the Government was bad then it should go, but if not then it should receive full support. If the Government had to go great attention should be paid to its successor. Persia of to-day found herself living in a period when the leaders of great nations gathered together, took important decisions and drew up world plans, and if Persians really gave serious thought to Persia's position in international politics at a time when the slightest negligence would bring down great misfortune on Persia, they would be bound to confess that it was necessary for the Majlis to be respected, and for a clear and permanent policy to be established which would settle disturbed public opinion on the one hand, and which would enable Persia to deal with current important international problems with success on the other. Exactly what the present Government had achieved, good or bad, should be clearly defined; the Government had kept its promise to abrogate Millspaugh's powers and had thus rendered great service to Persia. If it was proved necessary that the Government should go then the Majlis should take care to avoid a political crisis and should not appoint an inefficient successor."

Financial.

4. The budget for the Persian year 1324—the 21st March, 1945, to the 20th March, 1946—is to be tabled shortly. Expenditure is believed to be round about 400 million tomans (approximately £31 million).

5. The Treasury is empty and Government salaries are one month in arrears.

Appointments—Civil.

6. (i) Jawad Sadr to be first Secretary and Consul at the Persian Consulate-General at Jerusalem.

(ii) Dr. Abul Qasim Sheikh has been presented to the Majlis as Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Mines.

Persian Army.

7. The conscription bill is still being debated and one of the latest amendments proposed is to reduce the period of compulsory military service from two years to one. With administration and training at their present levels this would render conscription a farce. Between a quarter and a third of the conscripts on joining know only Turki and take six months or a year to learn sufficient Persian to understand the orders given. The amendment is also very unpopular with officers who, quick to select as batmen the more presentable and intelligent and the handymen from each draft, thus secured for themselves two years' free domestic service.

8. Sarhang Khodadad, General Officer Commanding the 8th Khorassan Division, has been recalled to Tehran to answer charges made against him and his officers of peculation especially in the matter of certain recent disarmament operations near Kuchan. A commission had recently gone to Meshed to investigate these rumours. Sarhang Khodadad had been favourably noticed by His Majesty's Consul-General for Khorassan, and it is known that he was not regarded with favour by the Russians. He was, moreover, a nominee of General Razmara.

Persian Air Force.

9. General Ahmad Nakchevan (F.O. 159; M.A. 193) and Colonel Siahpush have returned to Persia from their tour in the United States. Their itinerary was a lengthy one and they were lavishly entertained. They are reported as having been greatly impressed with American factory war production but not at all with the war effort in general.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

10. The small force which the Chief of the General Staff had ordered to proceed to Bukan has not, as yet, arrived. It is to be larger than the single battalion as stated in paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 8/45 and is to consist, in addition, of a squadron of cavalry, a section of tanks and a mortar detachment. General Hushmand Afshar has not yet assembled this column from his scattered command. Amir Asad of the Deboukri Kurds has been instructed by Afshar to collect his followers and meet him at Mahabad. Uncertainty as to the Russians' reactions, the known enmity between Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad and Amir Asad, the evil reputation of General Hushmand Afshar among the Kurds and, lastly, the intention of Colonel Schwarzkopf to form a gendarmerie battalion at Mahabad, of which Kurds will form the majority, are all factors which may produce some startling results in the neighbourhood.

Kuh-i-Galu.

11. Abdullah Zarghampur, according to a consular report, has arrived at Behbahan and, from a message sent in by General Humayuni, seems prepared to submit to the Government. It is to be hoped that General Humayuni's moderate outlook (moderate, that is to say, in comparison with other Persian Generals) and his knowledge of his own Government's weakness will induce him to propose terms which, while securing tranquillity for the area, will not prove too onerous for Abdullah's acceptance.

Isfahan.

12. The situation is reported as quieter and there have been no more disturbances.

Shiraz.

13. The Russian Consul at Isfahan, Mr. Marchenko, accompanied by the Assistant Russian Military Attaché and two agricultural experts, visited Shiraz between the 10th and the 17th February. Mr. Marchenko was very curious and his questions to the Persian officials and His Majesty's Consul covered a wide range of subjects. He asked for information about the tribes; the reported smuggling of arms to them from Koweit and Bahrein; the real reasons underlying the reconciliation between Nasir Khan Qashgai and the Qavam; the training and administration of the Persian army; the establishment of the British Consulate; the capacity of the local hospitals; local political parties; the local press and even the number of converts made by the Church Missionary Society.

14. Khosro and Muhammad Hussein Qashgai have left Tehran for Shiraz. It remains to be seen whether they will attempt to persuade Nasir Khan to come to Tehran to make his peace with His Imperial Majesty The Shah and whether Nasir Khan will consider it as a trap. There are grounds for believing that Nasir Khan regards Khosro with suspicion as attempting to undermine his authority with the Qashgai and also as a convert to the Tudeh.

British Interests.

15. The remainder of the British Parliamentary Delegation (see paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 7/45) has passed through Tehran. While here they were entertained at the Majlis, where they met the Cabinet Ministers and Deputies. This part of the delegation consisted of the following:—

Colonel The Right Honourable Walter Elliot, M.P.

Colonel C. E. Ponsonby, M.P.

Mr. Wilfred Roberts, M.P.

Lord Farringdon, M.P.

Mr. T. Fraser, M.P.

Mr. John Parker, M.P.

French Interests.

16. The motion to renew for a further period of five years the contract of Mr. Paul Godard, the Director of Archaeology, has caused a stir. To most foreign observers Mr. Paul Godard, a mild and genial savant, encouraged by his talented and energetic wife, had rendered good service to Persia during his tenure. Some papers have now come out strongly against him. Not only did xenophobia express itself in demanding the appointment of a Persian, but Mr. Godard has been accused of selling improperly, smuggling out of the country and even converting to his own use articles of value excavated by him at various sites in Persia.

Armenian Religious Interests.

17. A Soviet national, Vahar Kestanian, has been elected by the religious authorities at Etchmiadzin to the vacant Archbishopric of Isfahan (Julfa). His see comprises all Persia (except Tabriz), India, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies.

Tehran, 5th March, 1945.

[E 1898/70/34]

(12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10, Secret, for the period the 5th March to the 11th March, 1945. Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 79 of the 12th March.—Received in Foreign Office 20th March.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. Bayat, the Prime Minister, is expected to resign to-day. His supporters had been falling away rapidly. His relative and supporter, Dr. Musaddiq, had come in for much unfavourable notice on account of a speech in the Majlis and an episode arising out of it which is described in a later paragraph in this summary. The Tudeh party, having achieved their object in getting rid of Dr. Millspongh, had no further use for Bayat. The Shah is reputed to be

very displeased with him for accepting the Presidency of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society and for being bounced by the Russians into giving a large reception in honour of the Red army at the premises of the Persian Officers' Club, to which not only Persians but members of the diplomatic corps and Allied officers were invited. The Independent and Freedom factions in the Majlis had decided to join forces to oppose the Government. Up to date there is no clear indication of who his successor will be, but it is rumoured that the various factions have already ruled out as unsuitable two possibilities in the shape of Soheili and Rajab Ali Mansour, at present Governor of Khorassan.

2. On the 4th March, in the course of a debate on the submission of reports by Majlis commissions, a Deputy objected to a previous remark by Dr. Musaddiq to the effect that the Majlis Justice Commission had acquitted an embezzler in acquitting Tadayyun, who had been impeached for accepting bribes in connexion with the last elections. Dr. Musaddiq requested that Tadayyun's dossier should be placed at his disposal for fifteen days, by the end of which period he undertook to find ample evidence of Tadayyun's guilt. He was told that, as a Deputy, he had the right to study the dossier in the Majlis but not to remove it. The doctor, in one of his hysterical outbursts, demanded a vote on his proposal but was shouted down. In a fit of rage he left the chamber turning at the door to remark that the Majlis was a den of thieves. This unpalatable truth estranged many of his, and hence Bayat's, supporters. On the 6th March a crowd of young students, having heard of Dr. Musaddiq's outburst and refusal to attend the Majlis, persuaded the hysterical demagogue to allow himself to be carried by them in procession to the Majlis. A posse of soldiers, drawn up at the gates to prevent the entry of this crowd, opened fire after, it is said, a shot had been fired at them by an unknown person in the crowd. In the inane fashion prevalent in the Persian army when called out in aid of the civil power, the troops fired a few rounds over the heads of the rioters and thereby killed a young student who was peacefully watching the scene from the balcony of his house some distance away. An enquiry into the incident is being held and, in the meanwhile Sartip Gulshayan, the newly-appointed Military Governor of Tehran, has been suspended, and Colonel Shah Rais, his deputy, is officiating.

3. Some publicity has been given of late in the Persian press to the closing of the internee's camp at Rasht and deductions were drawn to show that, despite the Russians' magnanimity, the British continued to keep their numerous internees in Tehran. To counteract this mischievous propaganda a press communique has been issued by His Majesty's Embassy, which explains that internees are held jointly and that the British and Russian security authorities work in the closest co-operation.

4. H.I.M. the Shah, in an interview given recently to the representative of the *Evening Standard* newspaper, stated that the best course for Persia to pursue was to abstain from all negotiations or treaties leading to the according of economic, financial and commercial concessions with other countries as long as foreign troops were on Persian soil.

5. The Deputy Masudi asked for information in the Majlis on the 4th March regarding the rumoured arming of the Southern tribes. The Prime Minister, previously supplied with ample material by His Majesty's Embassy for a convincing answer, gave a much watered-down version in reply. He stated that such false rumours only served to weaken confidence in Government and were without foundation. He admitted that the tribes were plentifully supplied with arms which they had acquired on the disintegration of the Persian army at the time of the entry of British and Russian troops. Furthermore, a trickle of smuggled arms had always reached the tribes and would doubtless always continue to do so despite the vigilance of the preventive service. He assured the Majlis that the Government was pursuing a gradual policy of disarmament. He reassured the Majlis that the recent pact between certain tribal leaders made for added security and was not in any way directed against the Government.

Financial.

6. *The Budget.*—The Finance Minister tabled a single article budget bill in the Majlis on the 4th March. Income was shown as 4,412,200,000 rials and expenditure as 4,412,170,000 rials. As the last year's budget was never passed, and this year's budget may meet a similar fate, it is reproduced for purposes of reference as an Appendix to this summary. Army expenditure consisting of the Ministry of War budget at 1,000,000,000 rials and Conscription Department at 1,400,000 rials, and "Ministry of War requirements from United States" at

96,000,000 rials, total 1,097,400,000 rials and represent 25 per cent. of the total expenditure. When 398,246,100 rials are added for the gendarmerie vote and 237,000,000 rials for the police vote there is some justification for the criticisms by Majlis Deputies that Persia is spending more than she can afford on her security forces.

Economic.

7. Most of the members of the economic council (see paragraph 8 of Summary No. 6/45) have resigned, giving as their reason the unwarranted interference of the Ministry of Finance in the economic sphere.

Appointments—Civil.

- 8.—(i) Baqir Kazemi (F.O. 105; M.A. 142) to be Persian Minister at Stockholm. This appointment was announced in February 1944 (see paragraph 10, Summary No. 5 of 1944), but Kazemi did not proceed on his mission and the appointment was thought to have lapsed.
- (ii) Mustafa Muqaddam to be Director of the Sipah (Army) Bank.
- (iii) Tahmureth Ademyat to be Third Secretary at the Persian Embassy in Moscow.

Military.

- (i) Colonel Mahmud Imami to be Director of the Army Ordnance Department.
- (ii) Colonel Dehimi from Officer Commanding Jahrum Brigade to be Military Public Prosecutor.
- (iii) Colonel Majlesi from Chief of Staff 9th Fars Division to an appointment in Tehran.
- (iv) Colonel Sarami to be Officer Commanding Saqqiz Brigade *vice* Colonel Bayendor.
- (v) Colonel Bayendor to be Officer Commanding Kermanshah Brigade *vice* Colonel Shahrukhsahi.

Persian Army.

9. The military mission (see paragraph 13 M.A.'s Summary No. 8/45) which has left for a tour of the French battlefields consists of:—

Sartip Reza Jawadi.—Head of Geographical Section, General Staff—accompanied Military Mission to Middle East in 1943—G.O.C. Tabriz—Chief of Personnel Bureau, General Staff.

Sarhang Abdul Hussein Hejazi.—2nd in command Officers' Training College—Military Governor of Tehran.

Colonel Mazheri.—Instructor Staff College—accompanied Military Mission to Middle East in 1943—Staff Officer General Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel Muzayyini.—Staff Officer General Staff—brother of Sartip Muzayyini, General Officer commanding 2nd Division.

Lieutenant-Colonel Amini.—Secretary H.I.M. the Shah's Military Cabinet.

10. The proposal to reduce the period of compulsory service for conscripts from two years to one year has been rejected by the Military Affairs Committee of the Majlis.

11. Colonel Atapur, C.B.E. (late-military attaché in London), has returned from his tour of inspection in those areas of Khuzistan where disarming operations have recently taken place. This unbalanced and embarrassingly anglo-philic officer was warned before his departure against excessive zeal and the folly of saying what he believed, *i.e.*, that everyone of his countrymen was a thief, his country on the brink of disaster and that its only salvation lay in the immediate acceptance of a British mandate for an indefinite period. His report is couched in moderate terms and merely accuses General Humayuni of making reasonable profits out of the allowances for his troops' rations; out of the distribution of monopoly goods among the tribes and out of forewarning tribes of coming disarmament.

12. The Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff state that they are determined to check and punish corruption in the army and that the summoning to Tehran to answer charges of peculation of Colonel Khodadad from Khorassan and Colonel Shahrukhsahi from Kermanshah are the first steps in that direction. The appointment of Colonel Dehimi as public prosecutor

in place of the allegedly dishonest Colonel Shah Quli is, they say, another earnest of their endeavours. If these charges are proved and the officers punished the deterrent effect should be good, but the apparent impossibility of securing a conviction in Persia and the fact that the two officers recalled and also the outgoing public prosecutor were friends of General Razmara (and hence enemies of General Arfa) detract from the value of the protestations of the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff.

Internal Security.

Azərbayjan.

13. A consular report states that there are signs that the Tudeh and Workers Union have been told to draw in their horns by their Russian masters. Both have published notices condemning acts of violence committed in their names and announcing that unruly members will be expelled. A flag march of 1,200 Persian troops through Tabriz has had a steadying effect on local nerves and has done much to enhance the waning prestige of the Persian army.

14. The newspaper *Iran* reports that Mehdi Dadvar (Vossuq-us-Saltaneh) has been recalled. It has been known for a long time that the Persian Government has been very dissatisfied at his feeble handling of the situation and his complete subservience to the Russians.

Khuzistan.

15. A decline in security in the Gach Saran area is reported where Boir Ahmadi tribesmen have been damaging the A.I.O.C. telephone lines.

16. General Humayuni has been summoned to Tehran for consultations. He has left a committee sitting on the settlement of the dispute between Abdullah Zarghampur and his half brother Khosrow. He is hopeful of a settlement by which Abdullah, in return for his submission to Government, will be recognised as Kalantar of the Boir Ahmadi Sarhaddi (lower) tribes only.

Isfahan.

17. A reliable report states that Tudeh influence has suffered a severe setback, as a result of the Governor's firm handling of the situation and the clumsy intrigues of Mr. Marchenko, the Soviet Consul. Another cause for the decline in Tudeh influence is said to be the anti-religious bias in their propaganda which has offended that respect for the truth of religion, if not for religious practices, which is latent in all Persians.

18. *Correction*—see paragraph 17 of last Intelligence Summary. Vahar Kestanian is to be like his predecessor, Archimandrite and not Archbishop of Julfa.

British Interests.

19. As from Nau Ruz (21st March) the time on the Tehran radio reserved for the past three years for the service "Voice of Britain" will be given up. It is hoped that this will assist the Persian Government in their return to normality. The Russians, therefore, will from that date be the only foreigners with a radio time reserved for themselves.

French Interests.

20. The renewal of the contract of Mr. Godard for a further period of five years was passed by the Majlis by the narrow margin of 46 votes to 43. See paragraph 16 of last Intelligence Summary.

Polish Interests.

21. Discussions with the colonial and other authorities concerned are in progress with a view to making one more and final transfer of Poles from Persia to the number of 2,200 distributed among Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Uganda.

Tehran, 12th March 1945.

Appendix.

Detailed Revenue and Expenditure of the General Budget for the year 1324 (21st March, 1945-20th March, 1946), tabled in the Majlis by the Minister of Finance 4th March, 1945.

REVENUES.		
	1324.	1323.
	Rials.	Rials.
<i>Ministry of Finance—</i>		
<i>Direct Taxation:</i>		
1. Income Tax and Stamp fees ...	643,800,000	885,000,000
2. Inheritance and transfer tax ...	15,000,000	15,000,000
<i>Indirect Taxation:</i>		
3. Oil and petrol ...	180,000,000	150,000,000
4. Excise and manufacture of alcohol ...	180,000,000	110,000,000
5. Slaughter tax ...	6,000,000	10,000,000
6. Registration fee motorless vehicles and cycles ...	2,200,000	3,253,500
7. Misc. taxes gained from auctions, stamped documents, &c. ...	16,000,000	19,000,000
<i>Tobacco and Opium Monopoly:</i>		
8. Opium Monopoly ...	201,000,000	410,000,000
9. Tobacco Monopoly ...	1,100,000,000	1,015,000,000
<i>Customs:</i>		
10. Customs Revenues ...	275,000,000	185,000,000
11. Sugar and tea monopoly ...	105,000,000	220,000,000
12. Road Tax ...	59,500,000	47,000,000
13. Port charges ...	2,400,000	1,270,000
14. 4 per cent. tax on exported skins ...	310,000	430,000
15. Lighthouse tax ...	120,000	300,000
16. 6 per cent. tax on imports and 1 per cent. tax on exports ...	120,000,000	87,200,000
17. Mines tax collected by Ministry of Finance ...	6,000,000	7,500,000
18. Profit on Government shares in Banks and Companies ...	44,224,000	64,000,000
19. Shares in A.I.O.C. ...	6,615,000	7,464,600
20. Government claims on public ...	1,000,000	1,000,000
21. Miscellaneous and unforeseen ...	1,592,800	1,500,000
<i>Concessions:</i>		
22. Concession fees on fisheries and river rentage ...	2,800,000	800,000
23. Concession fees on telephones and revenues from other concessions and arrears ...	1,000,000	1,000,000
24. Salaries of Government employees payable by A.I.O.C. ...	358,400	358,400
25. Concession fees from A.I.O.C. ...	512,000,000	460,958,160
26. Ceded Properties and Public Domains ...	125,000,000	140,456,000
27. Commercial Transactions, Economic affairs and factories ...	500,000,000	...
28. Majlis, Majlis Printing House and Baharistan garden ...	7,000,000	7,000,000
<i>Ministry of Justice—</i>		
29. Public Courts ...	7,400,000	6,000,000
30. Criminal and Profiteers' Courts ...	600,000	800,000
31. 25 per cent. registration of documents and property ...	12,200,000	10,000,000
32. Registration of documents and property and percentage fee on executed warrants ...	50,000,000	40,000,000
33. Revenue on profit gained by owners of Notaries public ...	5,000,000	4,500,000
34. Sale of documents and books ...	4,000,000	2,500,000

	1324.	1323.
	Rials.	Rials.
<i>Ministry of the Interior—</i>		
35. Police revenues and passports sold in the provinces ...	4,120,000	3,500,000
36. Civil Status Department ...	1,725,000	1,500,000
37. Ministry of Health and Pasteur Institute ...	580,000	400,000
38. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, passports, identity cards, &c. ...	1,700,000	1,300,000
<i>Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones—</i>		
39. Post ...	30,000,000	23,400,000
40. Telegraphs ...	91,000,000	76,500,000
41. Supervision of Telephone Company, &c. ...	500,000	100,000
<i>Ministry of Education—</i>		
42. Tuition fees in schools other than primary ...	1,850,000	1,500,000
43. Stamp fees on permits, certificates, &c. ...	800,000	800,000
44. Miscellaneous ...	150,000	150,000
45. Sale of Year Books ...	15,000	20,000
46. Public endowments ...	1,000,000	1,000,000
47. Hospital affairs ...	600,000	600,000
48. National relics and museums ...	35,000	35,000
<i>Ministry of Commerce and Industry—</i>		
49. Ministry of Commerce and Industry ...	260,000	78,000
50. Sale of weights ...	2,000,000	310,000
51. Tiles and brocade ...	120,000	72,000
52. Fees for analysis and dyes ...	100,000	...
<i>Ministry of Agriculture—</i>		
53. Sale of agricultural implements and tools and incomes from experimental farms ...	8,500,000	1,000,000
54. Examination of skins ...	1,500,000	1,500,000
55. Irrigation Department ...	2,500,000	...
<i>Other Revenues—</i>		
56. Transferred to 1322 account ...	70,000,000	70,000,000
Grand total ...	4,412,200,000	4,098,075,660

	1324.
	Rials.
<i>EXPENDITURE.</i>	
1. Ministry of Court and Special Office ...	11,792,460
2. Upkeep of Royal preserves, salaries, palaces' expenses and repairs ...	3,000,000
3. Majlis ...	23,500,000
4. Prime Minister and Prime Minister's Office ...	3,340,000
5. Radio Department and Pars Newsagency ...	3,200,000
6. Ministry of War ...	1,000,000,000
7. Ministry of War Requirements ex-United States ...	96,000,000
8. Ministry of the Interior ...	35,444,000
9. Gendarmerie ...	398,246,100
10. Police ...	237,000,000
11. Statistics Department and civil status ...	39,959,000
12. Conscription Department ...	1,400,000
13. Ministry of Health ...	150,784,500
14. Pasteur Institute ...	4,000,000
15. Ministry of Justice ...	69,184,655
16. District Court Officials and Public Prosecutions ...	20,000
17. Criminal Court and Profiteers' Court ...	300,000
18. Registration of Documents and Property ...	42,740,000
19. Fees to Owners of Notaries Public ...	4,500,000
20. Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Representation ...	53,211,460

	1324. Rials.
21. Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs ...	145,018,000
22. Ministry of Education ...	303,038,000
23. Students sent abroad ...	2,500,000
24. Endowments ...	1,000,000
25. University and Hospital Affairs Department ...	73,747,980
26. Ministry of Agriculture ...	124,726,000
27. Expenses incurred by the examination of skins and the certification of meat in the slaughter houses...	1,500,000
28. Irrigation Department ...	50,000,000
29. Ministry of Commerce and Industry ...	27,519,940
30. Ministry of Communications ...	3,584,000
31. Railway Construction Department ...	47,280,000
32. Port Affairs Department ...	12,686,000
33. High Roads Department ...	115,000,000
34. Ministry of Finance, including Customs and the Mint ...	306,811,600
35. Opium Monopoly Department ...	130,000,000
36. Tobacco Monopoly Department ...	413,524,800
37. Ceded Property and Public Domains Department ...	76,013,890
38. Pensions and upkeep of holy shrines ...	1,623,973
39. Red Lion and Sun Society Tabriz and Meshed ...	778,575
40. Welfare Institutions ...	1,318,200
41. Construction and preservation of slaughter houses ...	6,000,000
42. Government exploitation and undertakings ...	8,000,000
43. Capital for manufacture of weights ...	1,354,680
44. Construction of Government buildings ...	100,000,000
45. Interest on Treasury Bonds and debts, bank commissions and instalment on National Bank Debt ...	155,000,000
46. Foreign debts ...	8,957,790
47. Debts of former Government companies to Agricultural Bank and Commercial Bank ...	26,627,558
48. Debts and undertakings ...	15,000,000
49. Salaries of Government representatives with A.I.O.C. ...	462,441
50. Salary and expenses of Government inspectors with National Bank ...	64,440
51. Salaries of Government employees <i>en disponibilité</i> ...	9,000,000
52. Expenses of Government tribunals ...	1,000,000
53. Government credits and undertakings ...	14,000,000
54. Instalment on purchase of Washington Embassy ...	1,430,000
55. Transferred from 1323 ...	50,000,000
	4,412,170,000

[E 2049/70/34]

(13)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 11, Secret, for the period 12th March to 18th March, 1945. Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 85 of 19th March, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 27th March, 1945.)

Political.

THE situation in the Majlis is obscure. Bayat has not yet resigned and refuses to do so. According to one report he has threatened, if further pressure is put on him, to announce in the Majlis the names of all those Deputies who have asked him for Government posts. He also stated that the fall of the Government and the long period which, in view of the approaching Nau Ruz holidays, would elapse before a new Government could be formed, would delay to Persia's disadvantage the selection of representatives for the forthcoming San Francisco

Persian Affairs.

Conference. The wildest rumours are abroad. Some say that the Tudeh party are keeping him in office, others that the British alone are preventing the fall of his Cabinet. Some sixty Deputies are opposed to him, but their number may increase if the various political factions can coalesce and agree on a successor.

2. Dr. Musaddiq has apologised for his angry outburst reported in paragraph 2 of Intelligence Summary No. 10. He is variously reported as having explained that he did not refer specifically to the Majlis or that he did not mean to infer that all the Deputies were thieves. This apology, though hardly handsome, induced the Deputy Jemal Imami (son of the Imam Jumah of Khoi) to make his apology for slapping the face of General Gulshayan, the Military Governor at the time of the fracas at the Majlis.

3. The Majlis has passed a single article bill empowering the Government to borrow 200 million rials from the National Bank to meet current expenditure. This loan is to be repaid from sums set apart for this purpose in the budget for 1324 (21st March, 1945-20th March, 1946).

4. The office of the control of foreign trade has been removed from the control of the Economic Section of the Ministry of Finance and placed under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Mines.

5. Hussein Pirnia (Mutamin-ul-Mulk) (F.O. 171; M.A. 212) has refused to accept the Persian Prime Minister's invitation to lead the Persian delegation at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. The following names have since been put forward by the Council of Ministers as representatives:—

Nasrullah Intezam: Minister of Foreign Affairs (F.O. 92; M.A. 121).
Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Saltaneh): Minister of Justice (F.O. 1; M.A. 1).
Hassan Taqizadeh: Persian Ambassador in London (F.O. 226; M.A. 294).
Majid Ahi: Persian Ambassador in Moscow (F.O. 4; M.A. 7).

6. The *Tehran Daily News* of the 16th March published an account of German Fifth Column activities in Persia in the form of a press article and not a communiqué. The Kurds and Qashgai are specifically mentioned as implicated and Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani and the Deputy Naubakht are mentioned by name. It is to be hoped that this article will persuade some Persians that the internees are not, as usually described in the Persian press, honest and patriotic individuals wrongfully detained on grounds of ill-founded suspicion and hearsay.

7. The Minister of Finance has tabled a bill for the increase in stamp dues on bonds, cheques and other documents.

Economic.

8. Musharraf Nafisi (F.O. 154; M.A. 190) has also resigned from the Government Economic Council.

Persian Army.

9. Corrigendum: Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10/45, paragraph 8 (Appointments—Military) sub-paragraph (iii)—for "9th Fars Division," read "6th Fars Division."

Appointments.

- 10.—(i) Dr. Fazlullah Mushawir to be a member of the Government Economic Council.
- (ii) Hadi Jazayiri to be 1st Secretary, Persian Consulate-General, Delhi.
- (iii) Abbas Mir Aslani to be Counsellor, Persian Embassy, Angora.
- (iv) Mukhbir Farahwand to be Majlis representative on the bank council for the fiduciary banknote cover.
- (v) Ardelan (Fakhr-ul-Mamalik) to be Farmandar of Kashan *vice* Miftah appointed special inspector to the Ministry of Interior.

Internal Security.**Fars.**

11. In general security has improved. Three A.I.O.C. tankers were recently shot at near Kazerun, but this is an isolated incident and thought to be the work of Farajullah Kamaraji who is incensed at the detention of his brother by the Persian military at Kazerun.

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British Interests.

12. A party of ten journalists from India visited Tehran during the past week.

13. His Excellency the Ambassador left on the 12th March, 1945, for a week's tour in Bagdad, Khuzistan and the Gulf.

British Military Interests.

14. The scheme whereby village headmen guarantee the security of British military telephone cable in their areas in exchange for gifts of tea and sugar has met with success, and thefts in these areas are less than in areas where the scheme has not been introduced. Recently the area has been extended and now covers the stretch Kangavar-Khasrovi.

Czechoslovak Interests.

15. Dr. Beneš and party passed through Tehran on their way to Moscow. Dr. Beneš was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

American Interests.

16. Six more of the American financial advisers have resigned.

Tehran, 19th March, 1945.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 952/952/25]

No. 16.

Mr. Jordan to Mr. Eden.—(Received 9th February, 1945.)

(No. 22.)

Sir,

Jedda, 27th January, 1945.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on Saudi Arabia for 1944.

2. I am indebted to Mr. M. C. C. Man for his assistance in the preparation of this report.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 16.

*Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1944.**Introduction.*

1. In many respects the year 1944 heralded a new era in the history of Saudi Arabia. The tradition of mutual trust and friendship between King Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government continued unbroken and was indeed strengthened throughout the year in spite of the impact of new developments, chief among them being the prospect that His Majesty's Government could no longer agree to continue their financial assistance to the King on the same scale as during 1943. Ibn Saud's loyalty to his friends, however, remained steadfast and prevailed against the counsels of those of his advisers and officials who began to turn to the United States as the goose that could lay the biggest golden egg.

2. Among the most significant events of the year was the emergence into the foreground of Saudi internal affairs of the United States, the closer if reluctant participation of Ibn Saud in Arab unity discussions, his increasing interest in the Yemen and King Farouk's request to visit His Majesty.

3. The annual pilgrimage numbered some 42,000 pilgrims, approximately the same number as in 1943, and included a token pilgrimage of about 4,600 Indian for the first time since 1941.

Arab Affairs.

4. Throughout the year the King adhered closely to his policy of consulting His Majesty's Government on all matters relating to Arab affairs, particularly Arab unity, and gave further ample proof of his wisdom and foresight. As he himself stated, he was guided throughout by three principles: (1) to maintain his own position in the Arab world and accept domination by nobody; (2) to avoid embarrassing His Majesty's Government and their Allies in the prosecution of the war, and (3) to avoid the creation of a bloc of Arab States against him. His suspicions of Hashimite intrigues remained as strong as ever.

5. In March Ibn Saud sent Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to advise Nahas Pasha to postpone the Arab Unity Conference and Nahas agreed. The King also sent a letter confirming this. He was deeply offended, however, when he heard in July that Nahas had double-crossed him and invited Iraq and Syria to attend the meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Arab Unity Conference in Alexandria. He was incensed, too, that Nahas had not even bothered to answer his letter. In spite of a long apology from Nahas, Ibn Saud decided not to participate in the conference and told Nahas so in no uncertain terms. Finally, however, he agreed to send a delegate after the assembled Arab delegates had appealed to him in a joint telegram. Anxious not to commit himself, however, Ibn Saud instructed his representative Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to act as an observer only, thereby reserving his agreement to any resolutions until after he had studied them carefully.

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6. Ibn Saud considered the Alexandria Protocol went too far and objected to anything which might conflict with the religious principles on which his kingdom was founded. On His Majesty's Government's advice, however, he showed himself more accommodating, although maintaining his reservation regarding religious principles. In this mood he discussed the question with Abdur Rahman Azzam Bey, the Egyptian special envoy who came to persuade him to accept the protocol, and at the end of the year there seemed a fair chance that he would do so. Later he agreed to allow his delegate to sign the protocol with certain reservations.

7. As regards the establishment of Arab propaganda offices in Washington and London Ibn Saud agreed in principle but here again was opposed to any precipitate action. He advocated that representatives of each Arab State should be sent to London and Washington bearing letters setting out the Arab case to His Majesty King George VI, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, and only in case these representatives advocated the establishment of propaganda offices would he agree to it. His reluctance to agree to the establishment of these offices is probably due to the embarrassment he feels in not being able to contribute towards their expenses on a scale commensurate with his predominant position in the Arab and Moslem world.

8. Ibn Saud continued to pay the closest attention during the year to the Palestine question which in his own words he described as "the king-pin of Arab unity." Though he himself admitted that as an Arab and a Moslem he could not but oppose Zionist ambitions in Palestine he never allowed his feelings to prevail over his conviction that it was not in the interests of the Arabs to raise this question during the war. One of the main reasons why he agreed to participate in the Alexandria Conference was the assurance given him by the various Arab leaders that the Palestine question would not be raised in an acute form. Quietly and without fuss Ibn Saud worked on the leaders of Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and the Yemen to damp down controversy over Palestine and avoid precipitating a crisis. The Wagner resolution, followed by the Democratic and Republican parties' planks and the British Labour party resolution provoked no outbursts from Ibn Saud as they did in other Arab countries. In order to make sure that his policy was in accordance with His Majesty's Government's wishes the King at the end of the year asked His Majesty's Government to restate their views and agreed to be guided by them in future discussions on Arab unity.

9. In Syria and the Lebanon Ibn Saud did his best to pour oil on troubled waters urging their leaders not to take any action prejudicial to Great Britain and her Allies while the war continued. Early in the year he took the opportunity of visits from Jamil Mardam and Riyadh as Sulh to emphasise this point of view. He was, as usual, in constant touch with Shukri Kuwatli on whom he exercises considerable influence. He was dismayed when Shukri accepted Nahas's invitation to the Alexandria Conference and tried hard to dissuade him. When Shukri appealed to him to support his protest against the proposed conclusion of a treaty with France Ibn Saud replied that he had himself to blame because of his intransigent attitude towards the French. He advised Shukri to follow His Majesty's Government's advice and warned him not to embarrass them in Syria. Although concerned over the question of a treaty with France Ibn Saud was reassured when His Majesty's Government declared that their policy regarding Syria remained unchanged.

10. The Iman Yehya, whom the King describes as a man living out of touch with the world, came increasingly under his influence during the year, and allowed himself to be guided by the King's wise counsels, not only over such seemingly remote issues as Arab unity but also over matters directly affecting the Iman as, for instance, the Haudh al Ma dispute. As regards the former, the Iman, on Ibn Saud's advice, sent a delegate to the Alexandria Conference with the rôle of an "observer." Over the dispute with the Government of Aden he accepted the King's strong hint to climb down and evacuated Haudh al Ma.

Relations with Foreign Powers.

11. King Ibn Saud continued to remain His Majesty's Government's firm friend and consulted them, as always in the past, on all major matters affecting the external and internal affairs of his kingdom. His trust in them remained unshaken, although anxiety about the future darkens the horizon. With the Americans he kept his relations on a friendly but not too intimate basis and, while naturally welcoming their increased assistance to his country, made it clear to his sons and officials and to the Americans themselves that he regarded His

Majesty's Government as his first friends and would always do so. Ibn Saud is cautious towards the Americans for to him the shadow of Zionism looms behind all their activities in the Middle East; on the other hand, he is prepared to reap such advantages as he can from a rich friend like America.

12. The great Allied victories of 1944, culminating in the invasion of France, were sincerely welcomed by the King, who, as our staunchest friend in the Middle East in this war, has stood firm even in the darkest hour.

13. Relations with Egypt suffered somewhat owing to Nahas's discourteous treatment of the King, and it may be that King Farouk had this in mind when, towards the end of the year, he asked to visit Ibn Saud. The latter agreed, but preferred to postpone the meeting until after the pilgrimage, i.e., towards the end of January.

14. There was some tension in Saudi relations with Iraq at the beginning of the year owing to the frontier measures adopted by the Iraqi Government to prevent the smuggling of sheep from Iraq. Ibn Saud was highly incensed and threatened retaliatory action, but the measures were subsequently relaxed. The joint Saudi-Iraqi commission appointed to settle minor frontier disputes worked smoothly and efficiently during the year. The Haram incident at Mecca during the 1943 pilgrimage did not make Ibn Saud any more popular with Iraqi Shias and, mainly as a result of Shia agitation, only some 400 Iraqi pilgrims came on the Hajj in 1944 compared with 1,500 the previous year. Needless to say Ibn Saud was not perturbed at this development.

15. Owing to the King's close personal friendship with Shukri Kuwatli relations with Syria were excellent. The King's influence, moreover, played a large part in Syria's relations with other Arab States and the Great Powers. During the year the Saudi Consulate-General in Damascus was raised to a legation. Although no Syrian representative had yet been appointed to Saudi Arabia at the end of the year the head of the Syrian pilgrimage delegation described himself as temporary representative of his Government and issued visas for Syria. The French Legation, who have hitherto represented Syrian interests in Saudi Arabia, did not object. As regards the Lebanon, the King early in the year wished to appoint Hussain al Uwaini, his trade agent in Beirut and a notorious character, as first Saudi Minister to the Lebanon, but, on His Majesty's Government's request, abandoned the proposal.

16. The Haram incident during the 1943 pilgrimage nearly provoked a break in Saudi relations with Persia. In reply to a telegram from the Shah, King Ibn Saud sent a letter justifying his action and there the matter appeared to rest, but relations remained at best strained for the rest of the year. The ban imposed by the Persian Government on pilgrims for the 1944 pilgrimage indicated the mood they were in.

17. Evidence of Ibn Saud's keen interest in, and possible designs on, the Yemen was to be seen in the despatch of a special envoy to Sana' to advise the Imam to improve his relations with Britain and to warn him to put his house in order. The envoy, on his return, reported great dissatisfaction among the people with the Imam's régime and a strong desire to place themselves under the rule of Ibn Saud.

18. With the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan the King maintained outwardly correct and friendly relations and there were no serious frontier disputes. The Amir, however, indulged in some gratuitous criticism of the way Ibn Saud allowed American companies to operate on the soil of the Holy Lands. Ibn Saud sent the Amir a firm reply refuting his criticisms and telling him not to listen to false rumours. The King also had cause to complain during the year to His Majesty's Government of some wild statements which the Amir was reported to have made regarding a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia by his forces.

19. On His Majesty's Government's advice the King agreed to recognise the Provisional French Government. Relations with Turkey were normal.

Finance and Supplies.

20. Early in the year His Majesty's Minister warned the Saudi Government that the subsidy which His Majesty's Government had granted to the Saudi Government during the war years to offset falling pilgrimage revenues had multiplied each year until it now bore no relation to pilgrimage revenues, and that, owing to the war situation, His Majesty's Government would, in the future, have to restrict the subsidy to the actual requirements of the country. It would be difficult in the post-war period, when, judging the future by the past, a wave

of economy would sweep over Great Britain and, indeed, over the whole of the United Nations, for His Majesty's Government to justify a subsidy on anything like the scale of that accorded in 1943. The Saudi Government were, therefore, advised to take measures for the reorganisation of their finances and economy in order to avoid any crisis likely to arise from a drastic reduction or, indeed, a cessation of subsidies in the immediate post-war period which might threaten the internal stability of the country. They were told that this could best be done by reducing their expenditure and increasing their revenue by the larger sale of goods and the sale of foreign exchange to merchants. They were reminded, too, that His Majesty's Government had only granted the subsidy to offset falling pilgrimage revenues, which were now accruing to the Saudi Government on something approaching the pre-war scale, thanks to the facilities which His Majesty's Government had created for pilgrims to visit the Holy Land.

21. The King asked His Majesty's Minister to discuss the whole matter with him at Riyadh. His Majesty admitted the need for financial reform and showed his desire for improvement by dismissing Nejib Salha, his Druze Director of Mines and Public Works, who had long exploited his position to line his own pockets. He replaced him by Izzet Din Shawa, a refugee Palestinian who enjoyed the King's confidence and has proved honest and reliable. The King also asked for a British Moslem financial adviser. At the same time, however, and while admitting the need for reform, the King pointed out that this was a long-term policy and could only be effected gradually, especially in a country like Saudi Arabia. He stressed the present penury of his realm and the need for immediate assistance, particularly as the last pilgrimage dues which had been paid abroad had not yet accrued to the Government.

22. At the end of March His Majesty's Government submitted their new programme of assistance to the King. Its main points were a free gift of 200,000 sovereigns and the cancellation of the Saudi Government's debt of 20 million riyals to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation against the revenue derived from the pilgrimage tariff items. While accepting it in principle Ibn Saud pressed for the payment to the Government of the pilgrimage dues, which, under the baneful influence of his advisers and the attitude of Mr. Landis, had now become a very sore point with him. In the meantime a useful bargaining counter had turned up in the shape of a generous America, which offered to make up any reduction which His Majesty's Government were for any reason obliged to make in their assistance to the Saudi Arabian Government. A group of the King's advisers and officials, notably Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, realised that this was the easy and profitable way out and played on the King's natural anxiety for his country in order to get the best deal. Abdullah Suleiman, in particular, was opposed to any reform which would weaken the position of Minister of Finance, which he had successfully and most profitably held since 1932. He and many others feared the prospect of a new order in Arabia, and their attitude, though entirely censurable, is understandable and shared by the majority of their fellows in Government positions in every Arab country, though not by the commercial community or the population in general.

23. The King's attitude towards His Majesty's Government's offer subsequently stiffened and it was clear that he felt that he could not manage with the help they were willing to give him. At this stage the Americans stepped in, and when the British proposals were discussed with Mr. Landis and other American Middle East Supply Centre representatives, they criticised them as too drastic and argued that if the financial and economic stability of the country were to be maintained on a reasonable basis greater assistance was needed. Owing to the wide divergence of views the matter was referred to Cairo for discussion between the British and American Middle East Supply Centre authorities and later to Washington and London. From May to late July the matter was thrashed out on both sides of the Atlantic, but it was obvious that if the principles of friendly collaboration in Saudi Arabia, as in the whole of the Middle East, which had been agreed upon as a result of the visit of Wallace Murray to London, were to mean anything, a satisfactory agreement regarding joint Anglo-American assistance to King Ibn Saud was essential. Finally, the State Department and the Foreign Office agreed that the subsidy to Saudi Arabia should be a joint one shared equally between the United States and His Majesty's Government and that any approach to the Saudi Government on finance and supply matters should in future be made jointly. Accordingly a joint supply programme for 1944 was communicated to the King at Riyadh at the beginning of August. Briefly it consisted of an overall supply programme comprising supplies allocated to Saudi Arabia under the Middle East Supply Centre

programme, supplied through commercial channels and paid for by importing merchants, and a supply programme of essential commodities supplied by His Majesty's Government and the United States in the form of a subsidy. In addition, His Majesty's Government undertook to provide £10,000 a month to cover the cost of Saudi missions abroad and the United States to provide 10 million riyals on credit Lend-Lease. At first the King asked for still further help, but after some of his requests had been met, gratefully accepted the programme. It should be noted here that His Majesty's Government's contribution under the joint programme was additional to the sum of £450,000 paid by them to the Saudi Government as subsidy at the beginning of the year, the gift of 200,000 sovereigns, and the payment of the balance of the Saudi Government's debt to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation after the deduction of the 1943 pilgrimage tariff revenue.

24. Anglo-American discussions regarding the 1945 joint subsidy had not yet begun at the end of the year as the State Department had not yet reached a decision on the matter.

25. The question of the financial adviser whom the King had asked for was finally dropped owing to the desire of the United States to create an Anglo-American economic mission under United States leadership, as they claimed that the United States commercial interests in Saudi Arabia were greater than those of the United Kingdom. This contention was refuted by His Majesty's Government.

26. Towards the end of the year it became apparent that the King had indeed begun to realise the necessity for re-organisation and reform of the finances and administration of the country and there were signs of this which augur well for the future. (See below, paragraphs 36 and 39.)

27. An agreement was signed in October between the Saudi Government and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Company, under which the latter granted the Government a loan of £100,000 against the security of the 1944 pilgrimage revenues. The purpose of this loan was to provide the Government with funds which, owing to the collection of the pilgrimage dues abroad, were not immediately available to them.

Activities of the United States.

28. Much greater activity in Saudi affairs was displayed by the Americans during 1944 than in previous years. The staff of their Legation was greatly increased, and the former Minister Resident replaced by a full Minister, Colonel William A. Eddy, a member of the Office of Strategic Services, with long experience of the Middle East and a good knowledge of Arabic. In finance and supplies the United States became an equal partner with His Majesty's Government as described above. In addition to the assistance granted to the Saudi Government under the subsidy, which included ten million lend-lease riyals, some three million dollars were advanced by the Arabian American Oil Company (formerly the California Arabian Standard Oil Company). The United States Government also advanced to the Saudi Government, under Lend-Lease, a further sum of 10 million riyals to meet the riyal requirements of the Oil Company, the Mining Company, and the United States Legation in Jedda. The dollar proceeds of these sales to the companies and the Legation were credited to a Saudi account in Washington, 60 per cent. being retained to pay for the silver content and the minting of the riyals and the balance placed at the free disposal of the Saudi Government, with permission to purchase gold if required. The National City Bank of New York also began negotiating with the Government for the establishment of branches in Dhahran and Jedda. In all this the Americans' desire, naturally enough, was to play mother bountiful to the Saudis in order to strengthen their position in the country. Notable among increasing American activities were:—

Oil.—The construction of a refinery at Dhahran with a capacity of 50,000 barrels a day and a pipeline between Ras Tanura and Bahrain. In addition there was the proposal to lay a pipe-line across Arabia to the Mediterranean.

Aviation.—The United States Government early in the year asked the King for permission to construct airfields at Riyadh, Jedda and Dhahran to facilitate their ferrying service to the Far East, but he refused. The question of the Dhahran airfield was again raised later, but the Americans do not for the moment appear to be pressing it. A request to establish an air-training centre in the Hejaz to train Saudi pilots was also refused by the King.

Military Training and Arms.—A joint Anglo-American gift of arms and equipment was made to the Saudi Government, the United States supplying mainly rifles, automatic weapons and transport. American insistence on equal participation with the British in training and equipping the Saudi army led to the establishment in Taif of an American and a British military training team. The idea of a British Moslem military mission which the King had requested earlier in the year was dropped. The Americans also offered to train Saudi personnel in Egypt.

Agriculture.—An American mission of eight experts was accepted by Ibn Saud in order to assist the development of agricultural pursuits in Saudi Arabia. The first members of the mission arrived at the end of December.

Roads.—The Americans made an aerial survey of the country during the year ostensibly to facilitate the alignment of the proposed north-south and east-west highways, which they had offered to construct, but in reality to gain a greater knowledge of the physical features of the country and to assist the oil company to ascertain the probable oil-bearing areas in Saudi Arabia. A ground party also operated for a short period from Taif.

Wireless.—A request by the Arabian-American Oil Company to establish a wireless station at Dhahran for direct communication with America was referred by the King to His Majesty's Government, and at the end of the year was under discussion between Washington and London.

Consulates.—On His Majesty's Government's advice the King agreed to the appointment at Dhahran of an American consul to look after the affairs of the increasing number of oil company's employees.

Education.—The Americans offered facilities for a number of Saudi students to study at the American University, Beirut.

Propaganda.—Towards the end of the year there was a considerable increase in the distribution of material received from the Office of War Information and an Arabic-speaking attaché of the Legation was put in charge of the work.

Pilgrimage.

29. The number of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz was about 42,000, as last year, and included for the first time since 1941 a token pilgrimage of some 4,600 pilgrims from India. No special financial arrangements were made by His Majesty's Government, as in 1943, to assist the Saudi Government, and the latter fixed their own tariff rates abroad, which were considerably higher than for 1943. As a result there was considerable criticism of the Government and only some 10,000 Egyptian pilgrims arrived, as compared with over 16,000 in 1943. Generally speaking, however, the pilgrimage was a success and there were no hitches in transport and supply matters. Shipping arrangements were as last year co-ordinated in Cairo by the office of the Minister Resident in co-operation with His Majesty's representatives in the various countries concerned. There was the usual close collaboration between His Majesty's Legation and the Saudi Government on all pilgrimage matters. As last year, these combined efforts played a large part in ensuring the smooth working of the pilgrimage.

30. King Ibn Saud did not come on the pilgrimage, but was represented instead by the Amir Faisal, who made no speech at the annual banquet for pilgrims at Mecca.

31. There were no incidents during the pilgrimage. As already stated, the Persian Government refused to allow their pilgrims to do the Hajj. Six Soviet Moslem pilgrims from the Central Asian Republics arrived in the Hejaz, the first to come from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since 1927.

Middle East Supply Centre.

32. 1944 saw a rapid expansion in the organisation and control of the Middle East Supply Centre in Saudi Arabia. As a concession to the Americans, an American head of the centre was appointed early in the year. An Anglo-American-Saudi Co-ordinating Committee was set up to deal with the demands of local merchants and regulate imports through merchant channels. The Middle East Supply Centre became the machinery for the supply to Saudi Arabia of all commodities included in the Anglo-American subsidised supply programme. As such it ensured the arrival before the end of the year of most of the essential commodities such as cereals, tea, sugar, vehicles and spare parts included in the joint programme. The shipment of cotton piece-goods was unfortunately delayed owing to technical difficulties with the Government of India and of the 1,000 tons programmed from that country and some 430 tons under Lend-Lease from the United States of America only some 380 tons had arrived by the end of the year.

Royal Family.

33. King Ibn Saud's health took yet another year, a year full of new developments and activities, in its stride without visible effort. He continued to show himself as able and energetic as ever in the conduct of the multitudinous affairs of his Kingdom. There were no tribal troubles and public security remained excellent. In May the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, General Sir Bernard Paget, visited the King at his hunting camp north of Riyadh, together with His Majesty's Minister. At the end of December the King came down to Mecca to prepare for the meeting with King Farouk. The Amir Saud has been appointed Commander-in-chief of the Saudi army and the Amir Mansur Minister of Defence. The latter accompanied His Majesty's Minister on a visit to Khartoum to inspect facilities for training Saudi army personnel (see paragraph 34).

Miscellaneous.

34. **Military Training and Arms.**—(Reference paragraph 28.) Of the joint Anglo-American gift of arms the British share comprised heavy equipment such as armoured cars, anti-tank guns and mortars, in addition to lorries. Instruction of Saudi army personnel in the use of these was begun in June. Arrangements were also in hand at the end of the year for Saudis to be trained in the Sudan and Egypt as drivers and mechanics.

35. **Locusts.**—The large British locust mission which began operating in Saudi Arabia at the end of 1943 completed a successful campaign in June 1944. A second campaign was under way at the end of the year, but on a reduced scale owing to lack of transport. The Saudi Government are becoming more locust-minded and are co-operating with the mission by furnishing regular locust and rainfall reports.

36. **Agriculture.**—Increasing attention was paid during the year by the Middle East Supply Centre to the question of agricultural development in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Government were represented at the Middle East Agricultural Conferences in Cairo and elsewhere, and a Middle East Supply Centre mission visited Saudi Arabia in March to study the possibilities of developing Al Kharj, the Government agricultural centre near Riyadh. A report was drawn up with recommendations and submitted to the King later in the year. As a result, the administration of Al Kharj, which has long been an expensive white elephant, was cleaned up and efforts are now being made to place it on a sound economic basis.

37. **Education.**—Evidence of Ibn Saud's appreciation of the need for a wider education of the youth of his country was shown by his agreement to the proposed appointment of a number of British Moslem teachers in Saudi schools to teach English and to the education of selected Saudi students at Victoria College and in the Sudan. Unfortunately, Victoria College was at the last moment unable to accept them, but arrangements were subsequently made for the sons of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and a Jedda merchant to enter the college. Books and sports equipment were presented to the Saudi Education Department during the year by the British Council.

38. **Roads.**—A small party of Royal Engineers operated for some months in the Hejaz instructing Saudi road gangs in the work of repairing some of the worse stretches of the Jedda-Riyadh highway.

39. **Transport.**—The new Director of Mines and Public Works, Izzet Din Shawa, who is also Director of Transport, began on a large-scale reorganisation of the Government garage at Jedda. Corrupt officials were dismissed and a number of Egyptian technical experts appointed. As a result it is hoped that the transport situation will improve.

40. **Wireless.**—A number of Saudi operators were trained by the Eastern Telegraph Company in Port Sudan and six were sent to Cairo for special training by the British Overseas Airways Corporation with a view to operating the new wireless telegraphy station which was erected in Jedda at the end of the year for communication with aircraft.

41. **Meteorological.**—A selected Saudi operator was trained in Iraq by the Royal Air Force. King Ibn Saud also agreed to operate at Saudi expense certain meteorological stations which had been established in Saudi Arabia as a result of the visit of a Royal Air Force meteorological party in 1943.

42. **Commercial.**—The Basra manager of the Eastern Bank visited Jedda to discuss with the Saudi Government the opening of branches at Jedda and Al Khobar. It was decided, however, to postpone definite proposals and await the outcome of negotiations between the National City Bank of New York and the

Saudi Government (see paragraph 28). Reference paragraph 25 of report for 1943. The Netherlands Trading Society continued its operations during the year. It is thought that the necessary gold is imported from Egypt through the Netherlands Legation.

43. *Concessions.*—Lieutenant-Colonel de Gaury visited Saudi Arabia at the end of the year on behalf of a British company in order to negotiate with the Saudi Government for the grant of a concession to exploit minerals other than oil. The Government agreed to grant him a preferential position for one year provided his terms were not less favourable than any others offered to the Government during that period.

[E 1480/209/25]

No. 17.

Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th March.)

(No. 1415.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 3rd March, 1945.

MY telegram No. 1347.

State Department informed us to-day that Saudi Arabia was formally admitted as a United Nation as from the 1st March.

[E 7646/1154/25]

No. 18.

Mr. Graftey-Smith to Mr. Eden.—(Received 9th March.)

(No. 42.)

Sir,

Jedda, 23rd February, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 103 of to-day's date, in which I reported the presentation of my letters of credence to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz ibn Abdurrahman Al Saud on the 22nd February. Mr. Jordan, who had travelled with me from Cairo on the 20th February, remained in effective charge of this legation until yesterday's ceremony.

2. It is unusual for the head of a diplomatic mission to remain at his post until his successor arrives to replace him, and the circumstances imposed by your instructions in this sense to Mr. Jordan, and by King Ibn Saud's return to Jedda from his visit to Egypt, did not permit procedure in accordance with any strict precedent of protocol. I was willing to await Mr. Jordan's departure before raising with the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs the question of the presentation of my letters of credence, but I was given to understand that His Majesty might be surprised if I made no approach to present them to himself during his sojourn in the Hejaz. I therefore requested Shaikh Hafez Wahba, his minister in London, who is at present in attendance on King Ibn Saud, to take His Majesty's pleasure in the matter, and I was informed that King Ibn Saud was prepared either to receive me at Shumaisy on the 22nd February or to make a special journey from Mecca to Jedda for the purpose on the 23rd February. As the first alternative was obviously the less exhausting to His Majesty, I requested that audience might be granted me at Shumaisy.

3. Shumaisy lies fifty kilometres to the east of Jedda, and twenty kilometres from Mecca, just outside the sacred area of the Haram. No non-Moslem may approach more nearly to the Holy City than the boundary stones which stand there. It was at Shumaisy, after the "Pledge of the Tree" that the Prophet signed an historic truce in the year 628 A.D. with the Qoreish tribe by which he bound himself not to enter the Haram precincts for a twelvemonth. Thither I proceeded yesterday afternoon in His Majesty's private car, accompanied by the Commander of the Royal Bodyguard and by all members of the legation staff authorised to wear uniform. My own uniform was borrowed plumage, Mr. Jordan being fortunately no slimmer a figure than myself.

4. Having inspected a guard of honour, which was to make frequent later appearances at various unexpected points, I was welcomed by Shaikh Hafez Wahba and by Shaikh Hamad Sulaiman and took the first of many cups of coffee in a tent placed at our disposal. I was then conducted with my staff to His Majesty's tent, outside which we were greeted by His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal. His Majesty was alone, except for a distant group of attendants. He rose to receive us and welcomed myself and my staff, whom I formally presented, and he remained standing while I presented Mr. Jordan's letters of recall and my own credentials, and delivered a short speech, the English text of which

is enclosed herein.⁽¹⁾ I delivered this speech in Arabic, which appeared to please His Majesty, who listened with close attention and uttered grateful and appreciative noises at the end of each paragraph.

5. In reply, he expressed sentiments of admiration and sincere friendship for His Majesty The King and for His Majesty's Government, and made me warmly welcome to his dominions, offering the fullest measure of co-operation and assistance in my mission. We then sat down, and, after coffee and a further exchange of compliments, I withdrew.

6. Mr. Jordan and I were received again a little later, and stayed talking with His Majesty, with Mr. Man as interpreter, for rather more than an hour. We were by then in Arab clothes, which are the accepted wear for Europeans visiting His Majesty elsewhere than in Jedda, and at the banquet offered to us after sunset all of the Legation staff present were picturesquely enrobed. I took my leave shortly after this meal and we returned to Jedda, accompanied by the Commander of the Royal Bodyguard, in time to celebrate George Washington's birthday at the American Legation.

7. I had requested Shaikh Hafez Wahba, when we met earlier in the day, to renew previous representations to His Majesty with a view to restraining his somewhat embarrassing tendency to shower presents on official visitors on such occasions, and I am glad to report that no gifts were made. It is, however, possible that His Majesty's intentions in this matter as regards myself are to become effective later, when the Minister Resident in the Middle East pays his visit to Riyadh. King Ibn Saud invited me to journey to Riyadh as his guest, to be there during Sir Edward Grigg's visit.

8. I cannot close this despatch without recording the extremely happy impression made upon me by this initial contact with King Ibn Saud. It is indeed difficult to resist a charm so obviously uncalculated, in which a salty intelligence and great natural generosity of mind combine with simple sincerity of speech and very great dignity of demeanour. His manner of utterance and use of the unfamiliar Nejd dialect of Arabic unfortunately prevent me, and will continue to prevent me for some time, from completely intimate conversation with him, but I feel that our relations will always be marked, and made either easier or less easy as circumstances dictate, by His Majesty's manifest sincerity and by his no less manifest conviction that his confidence in the righteousness of British intentions is based on a correct reading of British character. The frequent reflection of this attitude of His Majesty in his words and, indeed, in his acts, may be designed to render more difficult any contrary or unsympathetic action on the part of His Majesty's Government, and the constant advertisement of King Ibn Saud's confidence in British intentions may itself be intended as an additional plea for their integrity. The fact remains that His Majesty has been our most consistent propagandist and supporter among the rulers of the Middle East, and will be judged by our actions as well as by his own.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident in Cairo.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 320/8/89]

No. 19.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th January, 1945.)

(No. 147.)

Sir,

Beirut, 28th December, 1944.

WITH reference to paragraph 9 of my despatch No. 146 of the 26th December, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a record of Colonel Furlonge's conversation with the Syrian President on the 23rd December.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident at Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Cairo, Bagdad, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Record of Conversation with the Syrian President.

THE Syrian President having expressed a desire to see me, I arranged to visit him on the 23rd December. He received me alone, and explained that he wished to talk to me freely and informally, as he felt he could do in view of our long acquaintance, about the situation between the Syrians and the French. The following is a résumé of the ensuing conversation:—

2. He said he was much worried at the situation. The French officials in this country were not like the French in France or elsewhere; they had a colonial mentality, and were incapable of realising that the situation had changed here and that they could no longer act as though they were the governing Power. As a result, the Syrian Government spent their time in repelling French aggressions, when, as he was fully aware, they ought to be getting on with the task of administration.

3. The immediate trouble was the stiff note which Colonel Oliva-Roget had sent in to Jamil Bey Marden demanding, with veiled threats, that press attacks on the French should cease. The particular article which seemed to have annoyed the French, was one in an obscure Damascus review entitled "El-Alamein," rebuking the French for having made Professor René Cassin acting head of State in General de Gaulle's absence because he was a notorious pro-Zionist. This, in his view, was perfectly fair comment; in any case, Paris newspapers like the *Figaro* had more than once printed virulent attacks on the States Governments (and, for that matter, on the British representative in this country). He had ordered his Council of Ministers to meet him that night to consider the question. He proposed that they should ask Colonel Oliva-Roget to withdraw his note as being quite unacceptable; if he would not, they would reply to it in the terms it deserved.

4. I said that I knew the French were exercised over the lack of a French military censor in Damascus, and reminded him that we had ourselves told the Syrian Government that we thought the French had the right to have one. He said he disagreed; there was one supreme military authority in this country, Ninth Army, which had the right to impose military censorship; there was a British military censor and he could not admit that the French had the right to have one too. I had no doubt seen, he said, that the Syrian Chamber had recently recommended the abolition of all political censorship although admitting the right of the Allies to impose purely military censorship; in these circumstances it was quite impossible for his Government to allow the French to install a censor who would undoubtedly try to do political censorship.

5. He went on to give a series of examples, from all over Syria, of recent unwarranted or tactless actions by French officials, and concluded from all this that it was quite hopeless for his Government to try to make any agreement with the local French. He reiterated the view that no general agreement was necessary, since the Catroux Agreement of the 22nd December, 1943, had in effect terminated

the mandate by providing for the cession to the States of all the powers formerly held by the French.

6. I said I had recently re-read this agreement, which seemed very vague in its terms and left unresolved certain important questions, particularly military ones. The President agreed that the Troupes Spéciales question, which was of the highest importance, was still outstanding. In the view of the Syrian Government, the Troupes Spéciales were part of the Intérêts Communs and should have been handed over. One of their main grievances against the French was that a satisfactory agreement for the transfer had been reached in July, the French had referred it to Algiers, and two months later they had been told that it could not be accepted except as part of a treaty settlement. This question of the Troupes Spéciales, he repeated, was vital; the Syrians did not particularly want them, and would be quite glad to see them disbanded; but they could not allow them to remain under the French command. He understood that General Beynet and Count Ostrorog were visiting Damascus on the 27th December, presumably to resume talks on this subject. I asked what he proposed to do if they did not bring what he regarded as an acceptable offer. He said his Government did not want to start another 1925 revolution against the French, but what they could do was to announce that all the Syrian Troupes Spéciales could come over to them, or resign, failing which they would lose their Syrian nationality.

7. As for the more general question of France's military rights, the President refused to admit that they had any; his Government would under no circumstances give them the right to retain military bases. If they did not get the Troupes Spéciales, they were determined to form their own army and to apply in succession to Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Iraq, and anyone else they could think of for the necessary arms and equipment.

8. I asked what he thought would happen if the French at any time wanted to send their own troops here, for example, to train. He said that he considered the Allied High Command should keep them away; if, of course, the Allies took the view that Syria was still under mandate and that the French could send in as many troops as they liked, this was quite a different matter; but he could not believe that this would happen. He had been surprised to learn that the British naval authorities had allowed the *Emile Bertin* to come to Beirut alone. Had she come with British ships in attendance this would have been taken as a routine war measure; as it was he feared for the effect on Lebanese public opinion.

9. On the more general treaty question, Shukri said that public opinion in Syria was solidly behind him and his Government; no Deputy or other public man could stand up and advocate a treaty without being torn to pieces by the population. The reason for this was that the Syrians were perfectly well aware what sort of treaty the French would wish to impose on them. I asked him (having in mind paragraph 5 of Foreign Office despatch No. 208) if the Syrians had ever asked the French what their terms were. He said that the French had asked for five different conventions; the only one actually produced was the "Convention Universitaire," which he was sure I would agree was a monstrous document, and there was no doubt that the others would be on the same lines. With this mentality amongst the French officials, treaty discussions were a waste of time.

10. I remarked that, whilst public opinion in Syria might be as he had related, the situation was more difficult in the Lebanon, on account of the existence of the large party headed by Emile Eddé. He agreed, but said that the Eddists were quite unrepresentative even of the Christians; the Greek Orthodox, for example, were solid with the Lebanese Moslems in objecting to future French domination of the Lebanon. In any case, the Maronites had better be careful; Syria had always claimed that the Lebanon should be united with her, or at the very least, that those provinces taken from Syria and added to the Lebanon in 1920 should be restored. So long as the Lebanese pursued a policy of independence parallel with that of Syria the Syrians would never put forward this claim, but if any section of the Lebanese started to demand French protection, the claim would be pressed. For the moment, not only were the Syrians doing nothing to embarrass the Lebanese Government, but they were doing everything to help them; he instanced the recent Chtaura Economic Agreement, under which the Syrians had given the Lebanese concessions over the price of wheat and the allocation of quotas, which the actual situation did not justify.

11. At the end of the interview he again referred to his Government's determination to obtain a satisfactory solution of the Troupes Spéciales question by any means in their power short of the use of actual force. If and when they

obtained it, they would be satisfied. He made it clear, however, that he considered that, in that event, the French would have lost all right to military bases in Syria and would have to withdraw their troops at the end of the war when the British troops went.

12. Shukri Kuwatli gave me the impression of deep sincerity in all he said. I have seldom seen him so bitter, nor yet so resolute. He was obviously anxious, but his anxiety seemed to come more from the knowledge of a long and hard struggle ahead than from any self-questionings as to the position which he had taken up.

[E 7567/217/89]

No. 20.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Paris).

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 10th January, 1945.

YOUR despatch No. 327 [of the 2nd December: French relations with the Levant States].

Please press M. Bidault again for an immediate reply to the proposals which I made to him in Paris last November as regards the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, and especially as regards the supply of reconnaissance cars and automatic weapons to the Levant States gendarmeries.

2. As regards the gendarmeries, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we are seriously concerned at the failure of the French authorities to agree to the issue of the small numbers of weapons concerned. It is a clear prerogative of the States to maintain order themselves, and we could not accept the implication of French policy that the States are not to be independent in this respect. We have the best possible advice from the Middle East that the States are not at present able to maintain order adequately with the forces at their disposal and that trouble is to be expected when the period of tribal migration starts in March. It will take two months to get the arms concerned delivered to the gendarmeries in outlying areas and an immediate reply is therefore now essential. I should in any case have hoped to receive by now M. Bidault's reply to the proposals which I made to him in November, especially as he has been reminded twice.

3. Please also take an early opportunity to warn M. Bidault orally that we could not acquiesce in any policy of force or intimidation by the French towards the Levant States. The French are admittedly likely to encounter many difficulties in the Levant during the next few months, but there must be no attempt to impose a solution, as this would have disastrous consequences not only in the Levant States but in far wider spheres.

[E 362/14/89]

No. 21.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th January.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, 14th January, 1945.

YOUR telegram No. 43.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th January and handed him a note (copy by bag) conveying the substance of your telegram.

The French had already handed practically the whole of the civil administration to the local governments and had received nothing in return, not even goodwill or an expression of willingness to conclude a treaty. It was very difficult for them to make further concessions in return for nothing. He had suggested in his conversation with you in Paris that some special troops should be relieved in return for an undertaking from the local governments that they would eventually conclude a treaty, but the government had refused to give any such undertaking.

No one regretted more than he did that this thorn in the foot of Anglo-French relations should prevent the opening of negotiations for a general treaty which he desired more than anybody, and for the conclusion of an Anglo-French alliance which did in fact exist, but which in his opinion should at an early date be signed and sealed.

3. He revealed to me in confidence that his own views were much more accommodating than those of his government, and he gave me clearly to understand that by his government he meant General de Gaulle. The latter, he said, was inclined to take the view that relations between France and the States were not the concern of Great Britain, and when it was suggested to him that special troops should be handed to the native governments he was inclined to reply with the demand that the British Army of Occupation should be withdrawn and should cease to build barracks which had a definitely permanent rather than a temporary nature.

4. I reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we had given a guarantee to the States that their independence should be recognised. Therefore it would not be held that we were not concerned. He replied that France had quite definitely recognised their independence as was proved by the fact that both Syria and the Lebanon had now their representatives in Paris who were given full diplomatic privileges and treated as representatives of other independent countries.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he himself would like to see the question of the Levant form part of a general Anglo-French understanding on the lines of what took place in 1904, and he thought the sooner such an understanding was concluded the better. At the same time, he warned me that he could not be sure that this view would recommend itself to his government.

6. I then warned him that lack of any reply to our various communications on this subject was producing an unfavourable impression, and that I was afraid the situation was not improving. He said he did not think the situation was getting any worse and that in the Levant itself he felt the present extremist governments which were not permanent might quite possibly be replaced by more moderate ones. He excused himself for the delay which had occurred in replying to our notes, but said that no reply was better than a reply which might be totally unsatisfactory.

Please repeat to Beirut as my telegram No. 3 and to Resident Minister, Cairo, as my telegram No. 1.

[E 355/52/89]

No. 22.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th January, 1945.)

(No. 146.)

Sir,

Beirut, 26th December, 1944.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 812 of the 21st December, I arrived on that day at Beirut and took charge of His Majesty's Legation.

2. As weather conditions in Cairo were very uncertain, it was clearly essential to leave on the 21st December, despite the arrangements made for my farewell audience of King Farouk, in order to ensure that the presentation of my Letters of Credence to the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents should take place, according to plan, on the 22nd and 23rd December respectively. His Majesty was so good as to send one of his chamberlains to His Majesty's Embassy to bid me farewell, in place of the audience. I was thus enabled to leave Cairo and reach Beirut on the afternoon of the 21st December, in accordance with your wishes. The Royal Air Force kindly placed an aircraft at my disposal for the journey.

3. I was met at the Beirut airport—in a downpour of rain—by the General Officer Commanding Ninth Army and a guard of honour. Also present at the airport were representatives of the Lebanese authorities and senior officers of His Majesty's navy, army and air force.

4. On the 22nd December I called on the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs before luncheon and I presented my Letters of Credence and my predecessor's Letters of Recall to the President of the Lebanese Republic at 4 p.m. The Staff of His Majesty's Legation accompanied me to the ceremony, which was less formal than usual as his Excellency had recently fallen and broken his arm. The Chef du Protocole remarked to me that the fact that the President had had this fall almost immediately after the departure of Major-General Sir E. Spears from Beirut had been the subject of unkind comment in quarters ill-disposed to the Government! His Excellency received me with great courtesy and amiability.

5. On the evening of the same day I and the staff of His Majesty's Legation went to Damascus. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs entertained me and

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senior members of the staff, including His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, at an informal dinner party; and on the following morning the presentation of letters to the President of the Syrian Republic took place with the customary formality. Here again the atmosphere was cordial, though I had been given to understand that the Syrians were rather hurt that I had not presented my letters in Damascus first. After the ceremony, I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and on the President of the Council of Ministers, who had been good enough to invite me to luncheon. It was arranged that this invitation should be deferred until my next visit to Damascus as I was anxious to return to Beirut as soon as possible. Jamil Mardam Bey returned my call and I then left Damascus again for Beirut.

6. There is no doubt that despite the announcement that the change of Minister here betokened no change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government, great anxiety on this score has persisted both in the Lebanon and in Syria. It was impressed upon me here, with even more force than in Cairo, that a bare statement in my speeches to the Presidents of the two republics that there was no change of policy would not suffice to restore confidence and that a specific reference to the guarantees which have been given with regard to the independence of both States was essential to the establishment of good relations with their Governments at the outset of my mission. This I conceive to be my primary duty; and I trust that the speeches, of which I enclose copies (together with the replies of the two Presidents) will have your approval.

7. I was no less desirous of establishing as soon as possible relations of friendship and confidence with the French Delegate-General, but according to local protocol it is not usual, in view of his anomalous status, to call officially on him until a visit has been paid to the senior diplomatic representative accredited to the two republics (at present the Iraqi Minister). It was represented to me strongly that any departure from this procedure would be ill-received by the local governments and by my diplomatic colleagues—notably the United States Minister. This is a good example of the ticklish little problems which arise here in the present situation. In view of the possible delay in making further official calls during the Christmas holiday, I suggested to Lieutenant-General Sir G. Holmes the possibility of arranging an informal luncheon party at which I could meet General Beynet, but the latter regretted that he was fully engaged during the next few days. In the end I was able to make my call on the Iraqi Minister on Christmas Day and on General Beynet this morning. I have reported thereon in my telegrams Nos. 817 and 818 of to-day.

8. From the first reports of local reactions which have reached me, I gather that my prompt presentation of letters has done something to allay the anxiety and depression of the Lebanese and Syrian Governments. I need not record at length the interviews which I had with the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs before presenting my letters. Suffice it to say that both expatiated on the determination of their Governments not to conclude a treaty with France which would give the latter a position of predominance or privilege. Jamil Bey Mardam treated me to a long discourse on the history of Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations and took the line that it would only be possible now for Syria to conclude agreements with France as between one independent country and another. Fares Bey el-Khoury spoke in a similar strain.

9. The Syrian President asked Colonel Furlonge to remain in Damascus until the following day in order to unburden himself on Syrian relations with the French. Colonel Furlonge's account of the conversation is being sent under cover of a separate despatch.

10. I have reported in my telegram Number 816 of the 25th December on the stiff note which has just been presented to the Syrian Government by the French delegate at Damascus, Colonel Oliva-Roget, and on the despatch of twenty French tanks to the Syrian capital. A close watch is being kept on this situation.

I have, &c.
T. A. SHONE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Speech by His Majesty's Minister to President of the Lebanese Republic.

I AM very sensible of the honour done me by my august Sovereign in accrediting me to be His Majesty's Minister to the Lebanese Republic.

While I have hitherto had the pleasure of visiting your country only once, but in no official capacity, I have in the course of the last five years of my official

service in a neighbouring country been an interested observer of developments in other Middle Eastern countries, and not least in your own.

The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to the Lebanon has been clearly stated on many occasions. I am glad to take the opportunity of confirming to your Excellency that there has been, and there is now, no change in that policy, which continues to be based on the guarantees which have been given as regards the independence of the Lebanon. I shall be glad to cement with your Excellency the cordial relations of confidence and friendship which have so happily been built up between our two countries in the time of my predecessor.

The war in which Great Britain and her Allies are engaged is not yet over and His Majesty's Government still look to those countries whose independence and security depend upon the victory of the United Nations to play their part in contributing to that end, which is of paramount importance to the world in general. It is their desire, not least in so far as the countries of the Middle East are concerned, to assist, in so far as they can, in the solution of outstanding problems and difficulties in that spirit of mutual understanding which alone can ensure harmony and stability in the future.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

Lebanese President's Reply to His Majesty's Minister's Speech on Presentation of his Credentials on the 22nd December, 1944.

C'EST avec plaisir que j'accueille en votre personne le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique au Liban.

Je me félicite de ce qu'un précédent voyage et un long séjour dans un grand pays voisin vous aient déjà permis de connaître, non seulement l'aspect physique de notre pays, mais aussi son évolution vers la phase décisive dans laquelle il se trouve aujourd'hui.

Ainsi que votre Excellence vient de le rappeler, la politique du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en ce qui concerne le Liban a été maintes fois et clairement définie. Je suis heureux de vous entendre confirmer que cette politique ne subit aucune modification et je note avec une très vive satisfaction qu'elle reste basée sur les garanties qui ont été déjà données quant à l'indépendance absolue et à la complète souveraineté du Liban. Une telle continuité est bien faite pour raffermir et développer encore les étroites relations qui, dans un esprit de mutuelle confiance et d'amitié, avaient été instaurées entre nos deux pays au cours de l'heureuse mission de votre éminent prédécesseur.

La collaboration de nos deux pays est appelée à rendre plus efficace encore le rôle que le Liban a volontairement adopté, dès le début de cette guerre, aux côtés de la Grande-Bretagne et des Nations Unies. Notre ferme désir est de poursuivre cet effort commun, jusqu'à la victoire complète des Alliés et l'organisation d'un monde où prévaudront la sécurité et l'harmonie entre les nations. J'ajoute que le Liban a apprécié à sa juste valeur l'aide qui lui a été déjà fournie pour la solution des divers problèmes surgis pendant ces dernières années et j'assure votre Excellence, dans l'accomplissement de sa haute mission, de mon entier concours et de celui de mon Gouvernement.

Enclosure 3 in No. 22.

Speech by His Majesty's Minister to the President of the Syrian Republic.

I AM profoundly aware of the honour done me by my august Sovereign in accrediting me to be His Majesty's Minister in Syria.

It is my hope that such experience as I have gained in the last five years, during which I have served in a neighbouring country, may be of some help to me during my term of office here. Although I have only had the pleasure of seeing your country once, and that only as a visitor to your ancient and beautiful city, I have always followed with the keenest interest the course of events in the countries of the Middle East, among which Syria occupies so historic and eminent a position.

The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to Syria has been clearly stated on many occasions. I am glad to take the opportunity of confirming to your Excellency that there has been, and there is now,

no change in that policy, which continues to be based on the guarantees which have been given as regards the independence of Syria. I look forward with pleasure to cementing with your Excellency those cordial relations of confidence and friendship which now so happily exist between our two countries and to the establishment of which my predecessor contributed so much.

At present the world is still in the throes of a devastating and disastrous war. That the Allied nations will be victorious is now beyond doubt. But until victory is ours and the independence and security of all free peoples is secured it is in the interests of all these peoples to continue to play their part in the common effort.

His Majesty's Government desire, not least in so far as the countries of the Middle East are concerned, to assist, in so far as they can, in the solution of outstanding problems and difficulties in that spirit of mutual understanding which alone can ensure harmony and stability in the future.

Enclosure 4 in No. 22.

Syrian President's Reply to His Majesty's Minister's Speech on Presentation of his Credentials on the 23rd December, 1944.

IT is with pleasure that, at the moment you present to me the letter of credence accrediting you as His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the Syrian Republic, I express to you the great satisfaction I feel for this happy choice of a man like yourself with your long experience and wide knowledge of the affairs of the Middle East, in which, as you said, Syria occupies a historic and eminent position.

I am also glad to hear you confirm once more the statements which His Majesty's Government have declared on many occasions in regard to Syria and the guarantee of her independence. I am confident that the policy which inspired these statements will never suffer any change, for it has its roots in that noble tradition of liberty which your great country cherishes with such pride and holds to with such praiseworthy tenacity.

I have no doubt that the relations between you and the Syrian Government will continue to be animated by the spirit of sincerity, friendship and co-operation which existed during the term of your eminent predecessor, whose name Syria will always remember with fondest recollection. As to me, you can always count on my assistance in the discharge of your mission in Syria.

I certainly share your view that the present war will end in a great victory for the United Nations. All the free countries, whether participating in this war or in some other way affected by it, must do the utmost in their power to prompt the common effort so that victory might be attained in the shortest time, and to solve their problems and overcome their difficulties in a spirit of mutual understanding based upon respect for the legitimate rights of nations and their sacred ideals and aspirations.

Syria has participated to the full in that effort and is determined to hold firm to those rights and ideals.

[E 403/8/89]

No. 23.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th January.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, 16th January, 1945.

FOLLOWING from Sir Edward Grigg, Minister Resident:—

It may be of use to you to have my impressions of the situation in the Levant States, where I have just spent some days and met leading personalities, including both the Presidents and Prime Ministers.

2. As a result of my conversations I am deeply impressed by their quiet determination to conclude no treaty with France according to her a privileged position. They are convinced (not without reason) that the position which France desires to claim in Syria and Lebanon is inconsistent with independence achieved by other Arab States, and with the recognition already accorded them not only by ourselves but by the United States and Soviet Union. The American Minister here entirely [? group omitted]s their views in this respect, and mentioned to me a letter written by President Roosevelt to Syrian President, which reinforces American note of the 5th October to French delegation.

3. Every representative man to whom I have spoken has emphasised the continued interference by French officials in matters now solely within competence of States Governments, and perpetuation of intrigues designed to undermine the authority of their Administrations. Evidence of this was reinforced by stories told me by foreign representatives, who themselves complained of tactlessness and overbearing behaviour in matter of protocol.

4. In Syria I was left in no doubt regarding strength of feeling on the question of transfer of Troupes Spéciales. The tribal trouble there (about which His Majesty's Minister is reporting separately) reinforces the urgent claim of the Syrian Government to have gendarmerie adequately equipped with sufficient automatics and armoured vehicles, and for transfer to Mehariste companies, which, in the view of Government and of 9th Army, should have been handed over with Contrôle Bedouin.

5. In his telegram No. 47 His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, postulated that it was impossible to compel French to adopt British methods in dealing with native populations. It is clear to me that, unless they change their methods and manners, we shall find ourselves alone with them and completely at variance not only with Arab world but with our other principal Allies. In his conversation with me the Syrian President reported a conversation which General Beynet had recently had with Saudi Arabian Minister at Angora, the sense of which was that he (the General) was sick of trying to work with present Governments and that, if they continued [group undecipherable: ? unjustifiable] transfer of Troupes Spéciales, it would lead to war. Fuller details of this story are contained in a letter sent by Shone to Butler.

6. Incidentally, and with reference again to above telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, it is surely unfair to cast up against Arabs the part played by a clique in Iraq, and omit to mention the treachery of French in allowing German aeroplanes through Syria and, later, in resisting British forces sent to restore the situation in Levant. The memory of this page of history is very alive in Middle East, and it is accentuated by the fact that the great majority of French officers and officials are Vichistes, who do not attempt to disguise their dislike and suspicion of us. Having made a new appointment here to conciliate French sentiment, we are, I suggest, entitled to expect an equal consideration in the matter of French personnel.

7. I have met General Beynet himself, who does not impress me greatly, and who, from all accounts, is surrounded by a group of undesirable and reactionary officials, who habitually mislead Home Government as regards real state of public opinion here.

8. As I see things gulf between local Governments and French is at present so wide that all the tact and persuasion in the world is unlikely to bridge it. Indeed, it seems impossible to gain confidence of one party without forfeiting that of the other.

9. In Paris telegram already referred to it was suggested that we should tell the States that continued recognition of their full independence by us depends upon them according to France special position to which we alone have subscribed. But we ourselves made it clear in Lyttelton-de Gaulle exchanges that France's special position must be "without prejudice" to independence of States. Much has happened since 1941, including full recognition of the independence of the States by our two chief Allies. Latter made no qualification of any kind in favour of France and will supplant us in friendship of States if the latter should have reason to fear a repetition of what happened after the last war. Syrian President and both Prime Ministers have made no secret to me of their anxieties on this score.

10. Remedy lies in the hands of French Government and higher command, who must somehow be induced to appreciate strength of feeling against them, and to clear out in their own interests a number of present French officials here. Shone and his staff will, I know, do all in their power loyally and competently to carry out instructions which they have been given, but they cannot achieve the impossible. Cannot the more enlightened of the French Ministers and higher officials be approached on these lines? I firmly believe it to be in their own vital interests to face facts as they really are, and to change their technique. Unless they do so, our continued support of them will undermine friendliness with which not only local Governments but the whole Arab world regard us, and which it is surely one of our own major interests to preserve.

[E 564/8/89]

No. 24.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd January.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, 23rd January, 1945.

THE Syrian President asked me to see him alone yesterday evening in order to speak to me "with complete frankness" about the present situation. He did so for nearly two hours.

2. He went over the history of Franco-Syrian relations since the establishment of the mandate and maintained that past experiences made it impossible for Syria ever again to contemplate French predominance in any form, or to recognise any privileged position for France. Syria's independence had been recognised by many Powers and our admission of a privileged position for France in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle letters had clearly stated that this would be without prejudice to independence. We had also made it clear that we would not seek to impose a state of affairs on Syria which she was unwilling to accept.

3. The President described negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales last summer and the proposals for a treaty or agreements put to Syria last autumn. As regards the former he claimed that General Beynet, after saying he was authorised to sign an agreement on lines accepted by the Syrian Government, had run out on the plea of having to convince a committee at Algiers. Since then the French Government had so acted as to make it clear that they intended to use the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales as a bargaining counter for a treaty according to France a special position. This, he repeated, was out of the question. As for treaty talks, the heads of conventions proposed by the French in October, coupled with the draft University Convention they had presented, were more than enough to show that French aspirations in Syria were utterly unreasonable and unacceptable.

4. The President went on to say that he fully appreciated the importance to Great Britain of France's friendship, and he himself wished France to be strong and prosperous in Europe; but it was not right that Syria, whose future was bound up with Arab countries, should be a cat's-paw in European politics, or that she should again bear a burden which had proved so grievous in the past.

5. The President then said that he had received Ibn Saud's letter (Jedda telegram No. 27). He had great respect for the King, who was an old friend, but he had felt bound to reply that Syria would not conclude a treaty with France or accord her a privileged position; to do so would separate her from the policy followed by Arab States, and it would be contrary to the real interests of Great Britain and of Arab countries in the Middle East.

6. I asked the President whether he really meant that he would never agree to a treaty with France. He replied, only a treaty such as we would sign with any other Power on a basis of equality. In any case he would not make a treaty with a provisional Government in France. Before the war the French had alienated Syrian territory to Turkey and other neighbouring States contrary to article 4 of the mandate, and during the war they had broken their pledge to protect Syria by letting in the Germans and Italians. No one knew what the result of an election might be in France, and Syria would not tie her future to any country whose past behaviour had been so unsatisfactory and whose own future tendencies were so uncertain.

7. Speaking again of the Troupes Spéciales the President referred to Churchill's remarks in his last speech in Parliament on Greece regarding the right of every independent country to its own army. This, he said, surely applied also to Syria. He particularly wished me to report this to His Majesty's Government. He was grateful for the efforts made by His Majesty's Government to secure the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and the armament of the gendarmerie, and he also emphasised that the Syrian Government and people had been patient for a long time. They could not wait indefinitely for satisfaction of a just demand.

[E 276/8/89]

No. 25.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th January.)

(No. 47. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, 11th January, 1945.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, telegram No. 2713 and your telegram No. 24 to Cairo.

The doubts which His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, expresses with regard to direction of British policy in the Middle East are deeply rooted in the minds of the French Government, where they create an even greater disquietude.

2. Arab union is a new fact in the political situation which has to be faced. Two European Powers are concerned, Great Britain and France. (I am unaware of what is intended with regard to the former Italian colonies.) Is it not possible for these two Powers to agree upon a common Arab policy?

3. In Syria and Lebanon His Majesty's Government are committed to the grant of independence by France to the native populations. His Majesty's Government are also committed to recognise France's predominant position in those territories. Native Government while urging that the former should be implemented without delay refuses to agree to the latter. Might it not be firmly explained to them that one depends on the other?

4. There is no reason why we should do so until we have reached complete agreement with the French on this and all other outstanding questions. It must, however, be borne in mind that after the war France may well be in a more bellicose mood than any other of the belligerents. She was the first nation to go to war after her defeat in 1815. The defeat of 1870 was followed by a phase of French colonial expansion. His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, rightly observes neither British public nor British private soldier will favour a large permanent garrison in Middle East. Nor in my opinion will either of those important entities be prepared to go to war with France for the independence of the Syrians and Lebanese. The British have short memories, but some of them will not have forgotten the sorry part played in this war by the only Arab country to which comparable independence had been granted. The record of Iraq can hardly be used by us against the French, who are very proud of the loyalty of their empire in [group undecipherable] of their defeat.

5. We have to choose between two policies with regard to the French in Levant. Either we can turn them out or we can come to terms with them. The former would not present any great military difficulty after the war, but it would entail permanent estrangement and hostility to France. The latter may but need not antagonise a number of Arabs in many countries. The one policy which is quite impossible and towards which there sometimes seems a danger of drift is to attempt to compel the French to adopt British methods in dealing with native populations.

6. With regard to paragraph 4 of the Cairo telegram under reference, I gather that the visit of the French cruiser to Beirut passed off without any untoward incident.

[E 276/8/G]

No. 26.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper.

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 26th January, 1945.

YOUR telegram No. 47.

I agree with your general theme that co-ordination of British and French policy in the Middle East is necessary and desirable. It is for that very reason that the Prime Minister and I raised Levant States questions personally when we were in Paris last November. We have constantly endeavoured to meet French views so far as we reasonably can, because, as you know, our post-war foreign policy will be founded on the assumption of a friendly France. I am

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myself convinced that, provided France follows the policy she is committed to and gives the Levant States full independence French and British interests there run parallel and do not conflict in any major respect.

2. But it does not follow from this that we can allow the French to do as they wish in Syria and the Lebanon or that we can make a bargain with them at the expense of the independence of the Levant States. You were right to point out to M. Bidault that we had given a guarantee to the Levant States that their independence should be recognised. But it is much more for us than a matter of pure obligation. Lord Killearn has pointed out, and I entirely agree with him, that Great Britain's whole position in the Middle East would be gravely threatened if the French followed in the Levant States a policy which was inconsistent with ours and with what the whole Egypto-Arab world has come to regard as essential and right. I am confident that we should meet with very great criticism both at home and in the whole Commonwealth and Empire, if by failing to keep the French up to their promises, we found our whole position threatened in the Middle East, where we have fought so hard to maintain it. We are entitled to expect the French not to put us in this position and I am sure that, were they to do so, not the Arab world alone, but also the United States and probably Russia, would take the side of the Syrians and Lebanese against them, and that they would not be able to maintain their position. I should like to re-state the dilemma in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 47 as follows: Either the French are prepared to come to terms with the Levant States on conditions which the Arab world and the Great Powers can regard as acceptable, or they will be faced with a general attack on their position which must prove highly embarrassing to them in the coming years.

3. Paragraph 3 of your telegram seems to be based on the assumption that His Majesty's Government ought to assist the French to secure a predominant position in the Levant against the wishes of the local Governments. There must be no misunderstanding on this point. While we are willing to help in reaching a freely negotiated settlement and to use our influence as a mediator to bring the two sides together, there can be no question of our joining the French in an attempt to coerce the States if they maintain their refusal to agree to a French predominant position.

4. The French must be made to see that there are limits to the extent to which we are prepared to incur odium and hostility or still more endanger our position in the Middle East on their behalf. I earnestly hope that you and your staff will make your influence felt in this respect. So far as I can see, that is the only hope of avoiding a head-on clash which will involve France in grave trouble and in which Anglo-French relations and incidentally important British and Imperial interests will suffer a grievous blow. We shall do our best to make the Levant States reasonable and I am repeating to you my instructions to Mr. Shone to pursue this subject. We must, however, rely on you and your staff to see that the French do not persist in a stiff-necked attitude and refuse reasonable concessions. I have every confidence in our present representation in the Levant States and hope the French will co-operate closely with us there and avoid the mistakes of the past.

5. From various reliable indications which have reached us, I am greatly concerned lest the French may feel that now Sir E. Spears has left they can treat the Levant States with less consideration. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am quite sure that any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Levant States to produce artificially complaisant Governments or to overawe them with troops or tanks would have the worst possible effect. We have a very difficult road ahead of us and I earnestly hope you will be able by wise and timely counsel to avoid any surges of Gallic impatience.

[E 276/8/G]

No. 27.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Shone (Damascus).

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 26th January, 1945.

I HAVE considered your full and enlightening reports on the situation in Syria and the Lebanon revealing a complete deadlock. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments refuse even to begin negotiations for a final settlement of their

relations with the French, while the French insist that they will only discuss making certain concessions within the framework of a final settlement. His Majesty's Government feel that they cannot allow the deadlock to continue without a serious risk of the situation deteriorating. There clearly must be a settlement of sorts between the Levant States and the French. The best course seems to be to endeavour to get discussions with the French started on the less contentious issues.

2. I should accordingly be glad if you would take an early opportunity of tackling the Syrian Government seriously on the necessity for arriving soon at an agreed settlement of their future relations with the French. Ever since 1941 we have made clear our expectation of a negotiated settlement of some sort between the French and the Levant States to regularise the situation. The States themselves seemed to acquiesce—see the Lebanese President's reply to Catroux's Proclamation of 26th November—and in our view the need has not been removed by the events of 1943. For a start, I should like you to press them to explain what it was in the French proposals made last autumn which caused them to fear that their independence was threatened (see paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 208). If there is any real cause for this fear, I should like to know precisely what it is. But if it transpires from your representations that they do not even know what the French intended to suggest that the various proposed conventions should contain, you should urge them to find out forthwith and to consider the French proposals on their merits. It is not enough for them to say that the heads of conventions and the draft educational convention show that their independence is threatened.

3. There might well be something in the proposals which they may not like, as in the case of the proposals for the educational convention. But that is no reason for a flat rejection of all proposals altogether or for refusing to enter into any negotiations. The Syrians should at least make counter-suggestions or explain clearly to what points they object. It is not reasonable for the Syrians to continue to refuse to enter into negotiations with the French, and at the very least they should offer them as a basis of discussion the same rights as they have granted the Americans. When accepting American recognition recently, the Levant States agreed to apply in their relations with the United States the Franco-American Treaty of 4th April, 1924, thus granting American citizens all the rights accruing to members of the League under the Mandate, as well as rights to maintain educational and religious institutions and to teach in the English language. They surely do not propose that the French should, for instance, have no security or understanding regarding their schools, commercial interests or the treatment of their nationals, *e.g.*, in taxation matters. Yet as long as they refuse to negotiate on these and other subjects requiring settlement, their attitude amounts to that. Syrians assume that any agreement must give French predominance. This is by no means necessarily so and at any rate they cannot know it until they have at least opened conversations. It is essential that the Levant States should drop their impractical and unco-operative attitude, if we are to be in a position to do anything to help them.

4. Another question which will need an internationally agreed settlement in due course is that of the position of racial and religious minorities. We could not, for instance, agree that the Mandate should disappear without the Syrian and Lebanese Governments reaffirming their obligations not to discriminate against their racial and religious minorities.

5. I leave it to your discretion how much, if any, of this should also be said to the Lebanese Government. There is much to be said for treating the two Governments on a parallel basis as we have done so far.

6. I appreciate that the Levant States will not be pleased at receiving these representations, but if they expect us to help them to realise their independence, they must not continue to adopt a completely intransigent attitude.

7. I shall be telegraphing separately about the question of the Troupes Spéciales.

8. See also my immediately following telegram.

CAIRO CONVERSATIONS, FEBRUARY 1945.

Record of Conversation with the President of Syria at the Minister Resident's Villa, Cairo, on 17th February, 1945.

Present:

The Prime Minister (present at the later part of the conversation).
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Minister Resident, Middle East.
Sir A. Cadogan.
Mr. T. A. Shone, His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States.
Mr. R. M. A. Hankey.

THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT, in reply to a question by the Secretary of State, said he hoped that the situation in Syria would improve and that the Syrian Government would enjoy the help and support of Great Britain so as to overcome the present difficulties. Their ambition was to have peace and tranquillity in their country, but they had suffered much provocation, and though every effort had been and would be made to preserve tranquillity, he was afraid that, if this state of affairs continued, the situation might get out of hand.

As regards the question of the Troupes Spéciales, the President recalled that a special agreement had been on the point of signature in the summer of 1944 but the French had suddenly said that there would be no transfer because of the presence of the British Army in Syria. They were not prepared to be replaced in Syria by the British.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE emphasised that there was no question of the British replacing the French.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Troupes Spéciales were composed of Syrians, and the fact that they might be used against the Syrian Government was a standing provocation to them. There had been a number of other causes of public perturbation. The French Government had issued a statement recently that France was responsible for the maintenance of order in Syria. Later de Gaulle had said that France required a special position; then more recently still there had been an incident at Lattakia where the French had been encouraging the followers of Suleiman Murshid. The Syrian Government had sent the gendarmerie to liquidate the incident and the French had then sent troops and had prevented the gendarmerie from carrying out the task assigned to them. The President said he was afraid of disorder if this type of provocation continued.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said that Mr. Shone had proposed a commission with Syrian, British and French members. THE PRESIDENT said he could not accept a Frenchman on the commission.

MR. SHONE pointed out that the French had made complaints against the British as a result of the incident. If there was no French member, the commission could not very well summon Frenchmen to give evidence. He very much hoped the Syrians would accept this solution.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE asked the President to discuss the commission further with Mr. Shone.

Reverting to the fundamental question of the relations with France the Secretary of State told the President that the French had been urged to communicate their proposals to the Syrian Government. If some points were unacceptable the Syrians should put forward counter-proposals and get down to details.

THE PRESIDENT thanked the Secretary of State for this action. He was afraid that the French would not reply, or only reply very slowly, to the Syrian request for French proposals. The French would certainly ask for a privileged position, and he emphasised that it would be impossible to grant to the French anything which could not be granted equally to Russia, Turkey and other Powers.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said he disliked words like "privileged position." It all depended on what they meant in practice.

THE PRESIDENT recalled that the French had produced a draft educational convention which would have given them a large measure of control over Syrian education. The Syrians, however, were not prepared to be bound hand and foot.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said that individual French proposals might be unacceptable but that the Syrians should make counter proposals. Great Britain and America would then be in a position to support them if the counter proposals were reasonable.

THE PRESIDENT emphasised that the Syrian Government were anxious to co-ordinate their policy with that of other Arab States. They were not prepared to link their fate with that of France. They would never have any certainty what type of Frenchman might be in charge of France the next day and France might follow quite a different policy to Great Britain.

(Sir E. Grigg left the room at this point.)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE pointed out that Ibn Saud, the Iraqis and others all found it possible to take part in the Arab conversations. An agreement would not necessarily mean that Syrian foreign policy should be subordinate to French foreign policy. He was not asking for anything contrary to Syrian independence. Everything ought to be arranged before British troops left the Levant. He was quite sure that Monsieur Bidault wanted an agreement and he was also sure that Monsieur Bidault did not believe that we were trying to replace the French.

(The Prime Minister entered the room at this point.)

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was anxious to convince the French that we did not aim at replacing them. We wanted nothing for ourselves. France must recognise the independence of the Levant States, but if they made arrangements with the Syrians by which they got a somewhat better position than His Majesty's Government there, we should not object. It was, of course, understood that this should not affect the independence of Syria or the Lebanon. In his opinion the Syrians should arrange something reasonably satisfactory. They should not throw the French out altogether.

THE PRESIDENT said he was grateful for the sympathy which the Prime Minister had shown to Syria. He was himself sure that it was not the British aim to replace the French.

As regards the French position in Syria he said the Syrians were unwilling to give the French any privileged position. They would guarantee them rights to establish hospitals and schools but to grant them a privileged position would be contrary to the interests of tranquillity in the country. He was afraid that we aimed at creating a zone of influence for the French in Syria. He emphasised that this was impossible.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said he was glad to note what the President had said about giving rights to the French as regards schools and hospitals. He urged him to put his proposals in writing as soon as possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the French should say what they wanted, the Syrians should say what they were prepared to give. Then the situation could be examined and an agreement reached. He emphasised that the Syrians must give something reasonable to the French; the French must have a position of some sort.

THE PRESIDENT said the French would receive "most-favoured-nation" treatment.

Reverting to the question of the Troupes Spéciales the President said that the French must transfer them soon. They were Syrians and it was intolerable that the Syrians were liable to be attacked by their own children. This was a vital question. He emphasised that the Syrians hoped to participate in the war in the Far East. They would not like the war to come to an end leaving them with the feeling that they had not done their part to help the Allies, especially as this would be contrary to their interests at the Peace Table.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said that M. Bidault would make no concession about the Troupes Spéciales without getting anything in return. This was one of many questions which needed to be settled.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not think that now that the war against Germany was nearing its end there would be many opportunities for Syrian troops to be used.

THE PRESIDENT said that the essential was to hurry up the French proposals and that meanwhile the French should not provoke the Syrians. If there were provocation he would ask for British help.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE agreed as regards hastening the French proposals but said that the President should, on his side, hasten the preparation of Syrian counter proposals and should give the French the maximum.

MR. SHONE pointed out that if discussions were beginning that would enable the President to reply to any Parliamentary criticism that the matter was under negotiation.

Discussing the question of the Troupes Spéciales further the PRIME MINISTER said that in view of the small number of French officers he felt sure that the Troupes Spéciales would be unwilling to take action against the Syrian Government. Surely if the French asked them to do that there would be a mutiny.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that they would be unwilling to take action. But the Syrian Government on their side would be unwilling to call upon the Troupes Spéciales to mutiny. He realised that that would produce a very serious situation.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE emphasised that the French had given every assurance that they would not try to take action of this sort. We had made repeated representations in Paris to this effect. He was quite sure that M. Bidault did not wish to provoke the Syrians. He was, however, afraid that he did not always get very good information in Paris and he thought that a visit by some prominent Frenchman might do good.

THE PRESIDENT agreed provided that there were no delay and provided that pressure were not put on the Syrians. Several times in the course of conversation he expressed fear of foreign pressure.

THE PRIME MINISTER in the course of conversation emphasised repeatedly that the Syrians should handle the question tactfully and settle it without serious quarrels. They should give the French a reasonable settlement and not trample on French *amour propre* which had been greatly shaken by the war. They should maintain their rights but they should be confident in their friends and in the world organisation which would be set up. Constant rows with the French were very annoying to His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government were friends both with the French and with the Arabs. We should be pleased with any arrangements which could be made. We should not oppose any arrangements which gave the French a somewhat better or different position from ours. That need not affect Syrian independence. He had said publicly that the situation of the French in the Levant might be similar to ours in Iraq. As he understood the position the Syrians were not prepared to go so far (the President confirmed this). Nevertheless, they should go as far as possible. If they remained intransigent and gave no consolation to the French there would certainly be trouble. De Gaulle was a dangerous man and he himself could not foresee the outcome. It might be very unpleasant for all parties. He pointed out that British troops would not stay indefinitely in the country and the building of barracks in the country was no sign of the opposite. He urged that negotiations should begin soon.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was essential, in their view, that the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales should be settled before British troops left.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that while discussions should begin as soon as possible the Syrians should not try to force the issue prematurely. Their long-term position was not a bad one. At the Peace Conference many general arrangements would have to be made. France would be a permanent member of the world organisation and she would have many things to demand all over the world—in the Rhineland, in Indo-China, &c. That would be the moment

for the Syrians to make a reasonable arrangement. There was no need to force the issue abruptly and they should have confidence in their friends and in the Great Powers who would assure the peace of the world and whose orders would be obeyed.

THE PRESIDENT thanked the Prime Minister for his advice and said that the Prime Minister could count on him to handle this situation carefully. But he earnestly hoped that there would be no undue provocation.

Annex.

MINUTE BY HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER, BEIRUT.

When I took the Syrian President back to Zaafaran Palace last night after his interview with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, he expressed great satisfaction at the conversation. In particular, he was pleased at the assurances that we should not impose agreements with the French on Syria and at the Prime Minister's apparent recognition that Syria could not be expected to conclude a Treaty with France on the lines of ours with Iraq. (There have been suspicions of late in both Syria and the Lebanon that we and the French might have made or be contemplating some agreement behind their backs—this is the meaning of Shukri Kuwatli's reference to the Sykes-Picot agreement last night—and that our pressure on the Levant States to conclude agreements with France might amount to imposing terms on them.)

The President said more than once that he had been much impressed by the understanding of Syria's problems shown by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. This, not merely from the language they had held to him, but from their manner towards him.

As I felt that the President might be taking account mainly of the points which had emerged in favour of Syria, I impressed on him again the need of giving full consideration to the French proposals, point by point, when they were received, and of making every reasonable concession possible. The Prime Minister had told him that Syria's position before the future world organisation would be a strong one and that he could and should be generous to France. I also emphasised that no time should be lost. To this the President replied that it was up to the French to make the first move; he was grateful for the action we were taking in Paris to hasten matters. He repeated his fear that unless some concession were forthcoming about the Troupes Spéciales it would be extremely difficult for him and the Syrian Government to restrain the Chamber of Deputies and public opinion.

The President then asked what I thought of the suggestion that the Syrian Government should present the draft of a composite Treaty to the Four Great Powers. I replied that it was a pity he had not asked about this at the meeting. I had, as a matter of fact, spoken to the Secretary of State about it the night before and I had had the impression that he considered it might provide a possible method of procedure. But in my view, it was best now to stick to the procedure in view, namely, that the Syrians should examine the French proposals and see how far they could meet them. The Four-Power Treaty might be an alternative later on. The President asked me to put this idea before the Secretary of State if I saw him again before his departure.

I tried to move the President to accept the proposed Tripartite Commission to enquire into the recent incidents in the Alawite territory, but I am not sure that I made much headway. I had also urged this yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, I thought, was more receptive than heretofore. Unfortunately—a point which must always be borne in mind in dealing with the Syrians—the President does not altogether trust his Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jamil Mardam Bey).

TERENCE SHONE.

18th February, 1945.

[E 1188/420/89]

No. 29.

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th February.)

(No. 1147.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 17th February, 1945.

FOLLOWING is the text of aide-mémoire from the State Department about the Levant States:—

"The Department of State is in essential agreement with the views expressed in the British Embassy's aide-mémoire of the 1st February, 1945, regarding the situation in the Levant States, which is a source of continuing concern to the United States Government.

"The American Minister at Beirut and Damascus has accordingly been instructed to make representations to the Lebanese and Syrian Governments similar to those being made by his British colleague with a view to persuading them to alter their present attitude of refusing to enter negotiations of any kind with the French. The American Ambassador at Paris is being instructed at the same time to urge the French Government to adopt an attitude of moderation and to take steps to meet the reasonable desire of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments as regards the transfer of *Troupes Spéciales*, the equipment of gendarmeries and establishment of normal diplomatic representation at Beirut and Damascus."

[E 1191/420/89]

No. 30.

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th February.)

(No. 1149.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 18th February, 1945.

FOLLOWING is a paraphrase of instructions from the State Department to the American representative in the Levant States:—

This Government is obviously in no position to support the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in refusing to undertake negotiations of any kind with the French, since it has itself concluded executive agreements with both States which provide for the recognition and the protection of the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals in their territories.

The Department is instructing the American Ambassador at Paris to discuss the situation in the Levant States with the French Foreign Minister. The text of this instruction is being repeated to you. You should inform the local Governments of these representations and urge them to adopt a more realistic and moderate attitude. Specifically you should propose that they consent to undertake negotiations for treaties with the French which would be non-discriminatory as regards third Powers and consistent with their independence, but which would still provide assurances which the French reasonably desire as regards the recognition and protection of French rights and interests in Syria and the Lebanon.

There is no intention on the part of this Government to diminish or retract its recognition of the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. We desire to be helpful in every possible way, and in this spirit we informally advanced for the consideration of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments the suggestion that the submission of acceptable treaty proposals simultaneously to France and to the major Allied Powers would satisfactorily serve their purposes. The Department would not desire, however, to make [group undecipherable] official proposal of this suggestion. In our view the explosive potentialities of the situation are limited to relations with the Levant Governments with France. This is the fundamental problem which must be solved in the last analysis whatever the developments may be with regard to the relations of the two States with other countries.

Foregoing has been repeated to the embassy at Paris.

[E 1191/420/89]

No. 31.

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th February.)

(No. 1148.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 18th February, 1945.

FOLLOWING is a paraphrase of instructions from the State Department to the American representative at Paris about the Levant States:—

This Government continues to be concerned about the potentially explosive situation in the Levant States resulting from the conflicting and unyielding attitudes of the local Governments and the French with regard to problems connected with Lebanese and Syrian independence which still remain unsettled. It seems to us that all these issues could easily be settled by amicable negotiation or arbitration in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration. This Government therefore desires that both sides show moderation and would regard with disfavour the use of military force in the present *impasse* either in the form of French-controlled native levies or of French troops. The Department therefore hopes that the French will instruct their representative in Syria and the Lebanon to seek amicable agreement and is instructing the American Minister in Beirut and Damascus to urge the Syrian and Lebanese authorities similarly to show moderation and specifically to undertake friendly negotiations for the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements defining the relations of Syria and the Lebanon with the French.

We can see no reason, if it is French intention sincerely to implement the independence promised to the Levant States, why they should not agree to—

- (1) The conversion of French representation in Syria and the Lebanon to the status of diplomatic missions.
- (2) The transfer to the local Governments of the *Troupes Spéciales* subject only to such offer of supervision as may be considered necessary by the French and British military authorities in the theatre for the duration of the war in Europe and agreed by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.
- (3) The provision of reasonable equipment in accordance with the plan approved by General Holmes, of the Lebanese and Syrian gendarmeries. (We understand that this would call for only 33 reconnaissance vehicles and 100 automatic weapons.)

We appreciate at the same time the French desire to obtain assurances regarding the protection of reasonable rights and interests of France and of French nationals in the independent States of Syria and the Lebanon. The American Minister in the Levant is accordingly being instructed specifically to urge the Levant Governments to change their present negative attitude and to undertake negotiations for conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements defining their relations with the French which do not infringe the rights and interests of others, including those of this country. Departmental instructions to Mr. Wadsworth are being repeated to you.

We must state, however, in this connexion that we have seen the draft of a "Convention Universitaire" which the French are trying to conclude with the Lebanon and Syria and that a preliminary examination thereof indicates that the terms of this convention would seriously injure American cultural and educational interests in the Levant States and would provide discriminatory privileges for France. The Department will be prepared for the presentation of its views in greater detail following the completion of a study now being made. Meanwhile we assume that the French do not wish to promote their own interests at our expense and that appropriate modifications would willingly be made in the proposed text.

You should be taking this matter up urgently with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing this Government's strong interest in seeing a solution reached which will confirm and ensure the full independence of the Levant States while adequately providing for the protection of French interests therein. If the occasion arises you should make it clear that our policy towards the independence of Syria and the Lebanon is in our view entirely distinct and independent of our policy towards France and the French Empire.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th March.)

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Beirut, 1st March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith (Enclosures 1 and 2) the most recent official statistics of the populations of Syria and the Lebanon, divided according to districts and religious communities. These statistics, which have been obtained from the two Governments, cannot be regarded as wholly reliable, but at least form a useful indication.

2. The following points emerging from them are noteworthy:—

(a) *Christians.*

The total number of Christians in the Lebanon is 601,651, or 57 per cent. of the total population. The great majority of the registered emigrants are also Christians.

The Christians of Syria total 393,660.

(b) *Sunni Moslems.*

The Sunni Moslems of Syria, according to the statistics, number 1,971,053; to these must be added some 400,000 nomad Bedouin who are not included in the official figures. Taking these into consideration, the Sunnis represent some 73 per cent. of the population.

The Sunnis of the Lebanon are 21 per cent. of the total.

(c) *Armenians.*

There are 118,537 Armenians in Syria and 69,797 in the Lebanon, a total of 188,334. The greatest concentration is in Aleppo, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and Damascus.

(d) *Jews.*

There are 29,770 Jews in Syria and 5,666 in the Lebanon, a total of 35,436. They are almost entirely concentrated in the three main towns of Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and of its enclosures to the Resident Minister at Cairo.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

LEBANON.

Distribution of the population of the Lebanon by religious confessions and districts as on 31st December, 1944.

MUHAFAZAT.

Sect.	Beirut.	Mt. Lebanon.	N. Lebanon.	S. Lebanon.	The Bekaa.	Total.
Sunnis ...	59,593	20,369	102,462	23,418	29,753	235,595
Shias ...	10,979	18,948	1,017	126,701	51,693	209,338
Druzes ...	1,926	59,303	34	6,167	6,881	74,311
Maronites ...	15,404	176,248	86,476	27,992	21,726	327,846
Greek Catholics ...	5,840	15,470	1,841	17,118	24,011	64,280
Greek Orthodox ...	20,075	22,373	47,522	6,911	13,002	109,883
Protestants ...	3,760	3,025	750	1,795	1,110	10,440
Latins ...	2,191	540	63	179	144	3,117
Armenian Orthodox ...	36,264	15,379	1,025	1,695	5,386	59,749
Armenian Catholics ...	5,362	3,091	194	273	1,128	10,048
Syrian Catholics ...	4,089	275	169	9	442	4,984
Syrian Orthodox ...	2,070	209	100	22	1,352	3,753
Jews ...	5,022	65	31	506	42	5,666
Chaldeans ...	974	120	1	10	225	1,330
Various ...	452	359	5,279	52	119	6,261
Total ...	174,031	335,774	246,964	212,848	157,014	1,126,601

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

SYRIA.

Distribution of the population of Syria by religious confessions and districts, as on 31st December, 1943.

MUHAFAZATES.

Sect.	Damascus.	Aleppo.	Homs.	Hama.	Hauran.	Euphrates.	Jezireh.	Jebel Druze.	Latakia.	Total.
Yazidis ...	6	1,307	1,475	2,788
Druzes ...	15,394	1,601	1,496	49	107	616	1,863	70,185	...	87,184
Armenian Catholics ...	2,170	9,644	1,523	615	24	1,679	7,925	150	695	16,790
Armenian Orthodox ...	10,852	67,598	554	38	3	71	56	354	5,177	101,747
Maronites ...	1,075	3,659	1,746	529	27	27	453	106	7,787	13,349
Protestants ...	1,589	3,053	2,381	1	...	243	1,944	389	3,374	11,187
Chaldeans ...	190	6,127	3,052	259	...	697	2,851	4,719
Syrian Catholics ...	1,014	5,492	14,309	682	59	763	17,793	16	...	16,247
Syrian Orthodox ...	483	3,938	431	12	...	25	29	40,135
Latins ...	13,673	14,066	10	72	1,038	10	1,074	29,770
Jews ...	20,552	11,064	3,792	364	4,857	25	70	2,755	2,374	46,733
Greek Catholics ...	23,791	9,411	20,297	17,395	2,852	159	336	4,660	58,156	136,957
Greek Orthodox ...	4,022	2,698	22,219	15,083	370	78	93	95	280,633	325,311
Alawites	31	13	20,541	...	12	8	...	7,904	28,527
Isma'ilis ...	18	...	2,725	205	326	56	...	12,742
Shias ...	355	9,071	140,245	101,685	4	...	99,665	1,498	85,207	1,971,053
Sunnis ...	499,444	718,198	104,529	220,552	9,176	9,176
Nestorians
Total ...	663,889	870,139	312,424	157,458	112,842	225,023	146,001	80,128	452,507	2,860,411

(1) Bedouin, numbering approximately 400,000, are not included.
(2) Inhabitants of Damascus and district at present living abroad, numbering approximately 28,000, are included in the census.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th March.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, 2nd March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from a report written by Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the head of the British Security Mission in the Levant States, regarding the present state of these two countries. Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, who has spent some two and a half years here, is a shrewd, impartial and well-informed observer, and his conclusions are deserving of careful consideration.

2. I am in general agreement with Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill's remarks under the heading "Syria." As regards the section headed "Lebanon," I would offer the following comments on the statement in paragraph 13, that the Lebanese Christians would mostly welcome living under the French umbrella. It is undoubtedly true that a large section of the Maronites are still possessed by an underlying fear of the Moslems, which leads them to feel that any foreign protection is preferable to the risk of Moslem domination; that these fears have of late been played on with increasing success by French-inspired propaganda, particularly in connexion with the Alexandria Protocol; that the inefficiency of the administration of the Governments of the past 18 months has disillusioned many; and that the long-standing sympathy of the Maronites for France and French culture still exists. But my impression is that the nationalist spirit which flamed out at the time of the crisis of November 1943 is far from extinct, and that dislike and mistrust of the French are still widespread amongst the Christians—and almost universal amongst the Moslems. The Christians as a whole will continue to hope for some degree of protection, as remote as possible, from the Western Powers, in contradistinction to the Moslems, who seek their protection in the Arab world; but unless and until they are convinced that this protection can only be obtained from France, and that France is capable of giving it, I do not consider that the majority of these Christians would welcome a return of French domination.

3. Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill's remarks on the attitude and activities of the local French officials are unfortunately only too well justified. General Beynet himself, if he speaks at times unguardedly, usually acts with moderation and good sense; but the remarkable lack of co-ordination between the different French services, civil and military, and of discipline amongst the French officials, of whom he himself has complained, seems in practice to result in a free hand being given to those elements which suffer from a "colonising" mentality. There can be no hope of the avowed policy of the French Government being loyally pursued until a number of these officials have been replaced by reasonable men who, in General Beynet's own words, are prepared to "move with the times."

4. I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Resident Minister, Cairo, the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad, His Majesty's Consul at Damascus and His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure in No. 33.

The Present State of Syria and Lebanon, 10th February, 1945.

THIS paper is based on reports from all parts of Syria and the Lebanon, except the Mohafizats of the Euphrates, the Jezireh and the Jebel Druze.

(A) Syria.

1. Official relations between French and Syrian officials may be said to be non-existent. When they do meet, they are cold and formal. The French Délégués adjoints only address themselves to the Syrian officials personally or by letter when they wish to criticise or make complaints. The Délégués adjoints of Homs and Lattakia have had no personal contact whatsoever with their respective Mohafizin for nearly three months.

2. In Damascus relations with the Délégué are extremely bad, but conversations have reopened between the Government and the delegation on the vexed subjects of a treaty and the *Troupes Spéciales*.

3. Nowhere is there any evidence of the slightest effort on the part of the French to get on good terms with their opposite numbers. Everywhere they hold themselves aloof and look down on the "sala Syrien" as being beneath contempt, especially if he is a Moslem.

4. Only in the Alaouite State is there any large-scale attempt to get on terms with the population, and here intense subversive activity prevails with the object of uniting all the big local leaders against the Government and the maintenance of Alaouite independence. There is little reasonable ground for doubt that arms have been distributed in this area, or that the troubles culminating on the 10th February were the direct result of French instigation. In this connexion the unasked for presence of French troops on the scene, though it probably prevented considerable bloodshed and may have localised the disturbance, effectively prevented the Gendarmerie from imposing their will on the Murshid partisans and the re-establishment of the authority of the Syrian Government in that area.

5. In other parts of Syria French Political Officers concentrate on weakening the Government by making advances to opposition and minority groups and cultivating the gangster elements in the towns.

6. French propaganda, apart from subversive efforts in the Alaouites and attempts to curry favour with the underworld, is inept. It reveals three main lines: the first, addressed to the French themselves or French-speaking natives, extolling the efforts of General de Gaulle's Cabinet to place France on an equal footing with the Big Three and their firmness with collaborators; the second line is addressed to Christian minorities, pointing out France's historic rôle as their protector as opposed to British backing of Moslems, and thirdly that the British are behind all the unrest and the Army demonstrations as we desire to get the French out of the country before the end of the war—but France will stay as she is backed by Russia.

7. French policy is entirely Fabian and obstructionist. Their immediate object is to delay any settlement, except on their own wholly unacceptable terms, until after the war in Europe is over. Their hope is that the British will then be too preoccupied with difficulties in Palestine or will be forced by political pressure at home to withdraw from the Levant States, thus leaving them a clear field. They have no real intention of clearing out, except on their own terms and in their own good time.

8. There are no indications of French intentions to make a *coup d'Etat*. The Syrians consider the danger to be real but it is believed that they base their fears more on past experience than on present information.

9. There is no doubt, however, that if the Alaouite troubles were to spread and a general state of anarchy prevail, the French would welcome the opportunity as an excuse to reoccupy the country militarily.

10. The only successes that French propaganda seem to have had is among the Alaouite chieftains, where by the renewing of subsidies—to the Kinj family for one—and the distribution of arms, the normal separatist tendencies and dislike of the threat of control from distant Damascus naturally are highly receptive to such propaganda.

11. Otherwise, it is considered the French position *vis-à-vis* the Syrian Government has weakened recently, partly owing to the deterioration in relations and partly owing to the strong stand the Government seems to be making in the matter of the treaty and the army.

12. The vast majority of Syrians are determined to be rid of the French. In this connexion it should be recalled that in the Anglo-Arabian negotiations from 1915 onwards, the Arabs always specifically refused to have the French in the country—so anti-French feeling is not only deep-seated, but of long standing. It is likely that but for the presence of British troops, they would have tried to get rid of them long before—and their efforts would probably have been actively helped by Iraq.

13. The Syrians feel that they must win their point, at least over the army, before the end of the war as they fear that once the war is over the British will withdraw, the French will bring troops in and their chances will be over, as England and the other Great Powers would not be prepared to risk a major dispute with France over Syria, their hands being full in the Far East and elsewhere.

14. At the moment the Syrians are pro-British and they pin their hopes of real independence on us, but this attitude would quickly change if we showed we were not prepared to support their claims. Francophobia would then become Xenophobia.

15. The broad conclusions are that the graph showing the tension between French and Syrians shows an ever-steepening curve, the steepness of which will increase as the war in Europe approaches its end.

16. The two main factors are the French determination to let go of nothing and the efforts of the Syrians to achieve their full independence before British support in the shape of physical presence of our troops is withdrawn.

(B) Lebanon.

1. All over the Lebanon the French are displaying intense activity in all directions, except in their relations with Government officials. In Beirut, when the President's illness was obviously serious, General Beynet had a conference with Emile Eddé. In the provinces the Service Politique is for ever making and receiving visits, making themselves accessible and affable, and endeavouring by every means to prove to all that the helping hand of France is essential to the Lebanon.

2. They are being particularly attentive to the Maronite community, which is not surprising, but they are also reported to be making a good impression in the south among the Metwalis, who dislike the present Government, and the turbulent Metwali tribes in the Bekaa—notably among the Dandash of the Hermel region.

3. They lose no opportunity of denigrating the British as grasping imperialists playing the Pan-Arab game, which spells ultimate extinction of the Lebanon, and as being responsible for all the local difficulties.

4. The Communists are also getting more than their share of French attentions and favours.

5. That arms have been distributed by the French, in the Bekaa particularly, is currently reported. Definite proof is lacking, but it is reasonable to suppose that here as in Syria there is no smoke without fire.

6. It is noted that the purely Sunni Moslem circles are not being courted by the French.

7. Local reaction to this French drive, which is helped by the Solh family's disloyalty to the Karami régime, is mixed, but not entirely unresponsive, and the feeling is growing that unless the British put all their weight in support of Lebanese independence, it will be necessary to compromise with the French.

8. In this connexion it is noteworthy that a leading Communist stated in a public speech that his party was prepared to make a treaty with the French—that is, the real French who have helped to drive the Germans out of France, but not with the "Vichy Embusqués of Beirut."

9. There is a working agreement between the Lebanese and Syrian Governments and all the appearance of solidarity, but it must constantly be borne in mind that there is a marked cultural difference, the Lebanese having been far more gallicised than the Syrians; there are more Christians who have genuine reason for gratitude for French protection in Turkish times, and most important, it is a mistake to consider the Lebanese as Arabs. They are Levantinised Alpine stock and not Semitic. They are spineless compared to the Syrian and far more likely to give way under pressure.

10. There are moreover considerable misgivings in Maronite and other Uniate circles of Arab federation.

11. Generally, pro-French sentiments are on the increase and it is doubtful if another French *coup* on the November 1943 lines would unite the country so solidly against the French as on the former occasion.

12. The French have no intention of giving up either Syria or Lebanon, but in the case of Syria they look upon the problem in terms of military force while to the Lebanese they are prepared to act as the benevolent and forgiving father to an erring child—though there would be no fatted calf at the reconciliation party.

13. The broad conclusions are that the French have recovered much of the ground lost in November 1943 and that a large number of Lebanese would not seriously object to living under the French umbrella. The Christians would mostly welcome it, the Metwalis would be relatively indifferent and only the Sunni Moslems would resent it implacably.

14. With an apparent or real withdrawal of our support and a change of Government with more pro-French leanings, they would be quite capable of doing a deal with the French.

[E 1825/808/89]

No. 34.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th March.)

(No. 37.)

Sir,

Beirut, 5th March 1945.

IN paragraph 12 of the instructions to me contained in your despatch No. 210 of the 20th December you asked to be kept informed regarding the Soviet attitude towards events in this area.

2. I now have the honour to enclose an interesting memorandum, prepared by Mr. Mackenzie, setting out in detail such information as is available on this subject. Broadly speaking, the position at present appears to be that the Russians are as yet making comparatively little effort to exploit opportunities existing in the Levant States. M. Solod, the Soviet Minister, whose arrival was preceded by a spate of stories of the enormous staffs, hoards of platinum, and quantities of caviare that he was to bring with him, appears to be a genial young man with only a small staff, who is so far not throwing his weight about and appears, as yet, to exercise little, if any, influence on the local governments. While the latter have adopted the practice of communicating to M. Solod, as well as to the United States Minister and myself, copies of notes which they have addressed to the French Délégation Générale on controversial subjects, I have not the impression as yet that they take M. Solod into their confidence to any great extent. As Mr. Mackenzie remarks at the end of his memorandum, it is still a matter for speculation how far the Syrians and Lebanese would be prepared to go in soliciting the support of the Soviet Union. And in this connexion it must be borne in mind that there is undoubtedly a strong bias against the Soviet system and way of life at least amongst the more rigid Moslems and the privileged classes in both States.

3. It may well be Soviet policy merely to hold a watching brief here at present and await developments, in the hope perhaps that if British and French influence wanes, a vacuum may result which they themselves can fill. Here, again, the future is too speculative to warrant an expression of opinion, at all events on my part, as to Soviet intentions. I would only direct attention to the conclusions to be drawn from Mr. Mackenzie's memorandum, that this area offers tempting prizes to a powerful neighbour and that there exist within it not a few elements which would facilitate a Russian penetration.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow and Paris and to the Minister Resident, Cairo.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Memorandum.

ALTHOUGH it is less than half a year since the Soviet Government appointed a representative to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments the prestige of the Soviet Union here has increased so rapidly during these months that it may be useful to examine the reasons for this development, and to estimate the possible effect which it may have upon the future political situation, particularly in relation to British and imperial interests.

2. So long as the Soviet Government were intent upon the cultivation of friendship with the erstwhile French Provisional Committee in Algiers they took little or no interest in the affairs of the Levant, and even the crisis of November 1943 in the Lebanon, which excited the press in even the remotest quarters of the globe, only aroused, as far as I am aware, the most perfunctory echoes in Russian newspapers. In the summer of 1944, however, when the two Governments were canvassing the recognition of various foreign Powers, in order to obtain support for their independence, which was they felt threatened by continued French intrigues and propaganda, they sent an emissary to Cairo to visit M. Novikov, the Soviet representative there. As a result M. Novikov visited the Levant States, and last autumn, after exchanges of telegrams between the Lebanese, Syrian and Soviet Ministers for Foreign Affairs, M. Daniel Solod was appointed Soviet Minister to the two countries, and legations were set up in Beirut and Damascus.

[31336]

3. It was therefore a considerable time after Great Britain, the United States and France were represented here that the Soviet Government began to evince a practical interest in these countries. Potentially, however, their influence here is already such as to put them on more or less the same footing as the other Powers. This astonishing, and in some respects dismaying, fact is, of course, partly due to the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union and also to the deep impression made upon public opinion here, as elsewhere, by the success of the campaigns of the Red army in the West.

4. There are, however, also, certain important elements in the population of both countries which, by their readiness to support the Soviet Union, if only for selfish ends, give that Power a stronger position in these countries than the mere propaganda effect of military exploits would otherwise assure her.

5. The most important of these elements is undoubtedly the Greek Orthodox Church. In countries such as these, where confessionalism is still a basis of parliamentary election, and a Patriarch occupies a position in the political life of the land not dissimilar to that of an elder statesman elsewhere, the Greek Orthodox Church with a large and influential community, among Christian sects second only to the Maronites in size and probably wealthier, has an important part in the political scene. In the days of the Ottoman Empire, when each minority had the protection of one of the European Powers, the Greek Orthodox Church had a peculiarly favoured position, for they enjoyed the diplomatic and financial support of the Tsarist Government. No Patriarch was more influential, no bishops better paid. With the Russian Revolution, however, they lost their financial backing, and the French found it politic to cultivate the favour of the Maronite Church, with the result that the prestige of the Greek Church suffered considerably. But they still hanker after the past and when the Soviet Government decided to recognise the existence of the Orthodox Church within the boundaries of the Soviet Union itself, they saw a possible chance of recovering their pristine power and wealth. Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities spoke openly of enlisting Soviet support, and from all accounts the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, who recently returned from Moscow, left this country with the full intention of asking the Soviet authorities to endeavour to reinstate the Orthodox Church here in its old position of prestige, and to accord the Greek Orthodox communities the official protection of the Soviet Union.

6. In different circumstances and for different reasons the minorities, particularly in Northern Syria, view the Soviet Union with much the same feelings. They live far from the capital, and the Government's writ runs uneasily in these remoter parts. The Syrian officials sent to assure administration are, the minorities complain, over eager in their new-found independence, and discriminate against the poor protectorless minorities, in a hundred irritating ways. They feel that only in the protection of a strong Power lies their chance of a safe and settled future but that they have little now to hope from the French, and will be able to count even less on their support in the future. As for the British, His Majesty's Government have repeatedly disclaimed any wish to occupy the position of the French in the countries. It is, in the circumstances, not surprising that these minorities should be inclined to turn for support to the Soviet Union; it is the nearest geographically of the Great Powers, and both the Armenians and the Kurds have connexions with the Soviet Union through their compatriots resident there.

7. Since the establishment of this legation spasmodic reports of Soviet propaganda among the minorities in Northern Syria have been received, but despite careful enquiry it was never possible either to ascertain their origin or to establish their veracity. Such rumours are endemic in this part of the world, where persons and parties are only too apt to boast of foreign patronage or support in order to enhance their own prestige amongst their compatriots.

8. One of the most persistent rumours of Soviet activity here has been the legend of a Kurdish Republic within the framework of the Soviet Union and composed of the parts of Turkey, Persia and Iraq inhabited by Kurds. The Soviet Minister, when questioned by the Iraqi Minister about it, replied that his Government had taken no initiative in the question and that, on the contrary, it was the Kurdish leaders themselves who had approached the Soviet authorities in Northern Persia with a view to enlisting their support. However that may be, and, even if in fact it were nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Syrian Kurds, it is evidence enough of their sympathies.

9. The Armenians, too, constitute generally speaking a pro-Soviet element among the minorities within the Levant States. Until recently it would, I think, be correct to say that the members of the Armenian community in these two

countries, who settled here as refugees after their expulsion from the Soviet Union, were predominantly anti-Soviet and consequently Tashnag in sympathy. There is evidence now, however, to suggest that the majority of the Armenians are convinced that the best guarantee for their security lies in the support of the Soviet Union, and a tendency on the part of the young members of the community to look to the Soviet Union as their protector against Turkey, of whose persecution they also retain vivid memories. The bonds between the Armenian community here and the Armenian Republic in the Soviet Union were greatly strengthened by the visit paid to Armenian communities in these two States last summer by Dr. Aphramian of the University of Erivan. Although Dr. Aphramian claimed that his visit was solely to enable him to establish contact with the Armenian religious leaders in this country, and was devoid of any political importance, it was nevertheless interpreted by the Armenian community as proof of Soviet interest in their fate, and sympathy for their future.

10. The third element in these countries upon whose support the Soviet Government can count is certain Left-wing para-Communist organisations, i.e., the Communist party proper and two bodies styling themselves the Friends of the Soviet Union and the anti-Fascist League respectively. These parties have a comparatively restricted but extremely active and fairly influential following in Syria and the Lebanon, not only amongst what might euphemistically be termed the youthful *intelligentsia*, but also amongst the labouring class in Beirut and Damascus, which is becoming more susceptible to Communist propaganda on account of the continued rise in the cost of living. Their particular brand of communism consists much more of what would elsewhere be termed trade unionism than any profound interest in the works of Engels and Marx. Although these parties have not in the past played any outstandingly conspicuous part in Syrian or Lebanese public life, Soviet military successes have stimulated interest in their activities and won them increased support. In the last two years their membership has more than doubled with a similar increase in the number of adherents. The Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Mount Lebanon, for instance, told a member of the legation staff that he was seriously dismayed by the number of Communist coteries which were springing up, at the instigation of the local para-Communist parties, in Lebanese villages which had shown no previous communistic leanings. It is not clear how far in the past these parties were in contact with or received directives from the Soviet Union (though the consensus of evidence suggests that they did), but they are certainly now in touch with the Soviet representative. They are also in touch with similar organisations in Palestine and there can be no doubt that they would welcome and support any attempt by the Soviet Government to play a more conspicuous rôle in this country.

11. Not only are there these elements actively interested in Soviet participation here, but Soviet official policy *vis-à-vis* the French and the attitude which their representatives, presumably on instructions from their Government, have adopted towards the French claim for a predominant position in Syria and the Lebanon has gained them wide sympathy amongst the population. No secret has been made of their opposition to the French. M. Novikov, during his visit in the summer, made it clear, not only to the members of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments but also to the foreign representatives as well, that while the Soviet Government were in favour of the restoration of France to her former position as a Great Power in Europe, they did not and would not recognise any privileged position for France here, and would, in particular, be strongly opposed to any attempt by the French to re-establish her mandate. He was even reported to have informed the Syrians that the Soviet Government could only recognise Syria's independence so long as she made every effort to maintain that independence and to refrain from binding herself politically or economically with any other Power or from showing favour to one Power rather than to another. M. Solod, since his arrival here, has continually taken the same line in conversations with the local politicians, and even after General de Gaulle's visit to Moscow, he informed the late Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that Soviet policy towards the Levant States remained unchanged, viz., support for their complete and untrammelled independence. They would not, he said, countenance any contrary French policy here. Although Selim Tacla told me at the time that he had got the impression that M. Solod had not been specifically instructed by his Government to make this declaration, he added that M. Solod had repeated it several times as the official view of his Government and stated that the question of the Levant had not even been discussed at Moscow.

12. These assurances coming from the authorised representative of the Soviet Government here have naturally given the two Governments considerable

encouragement. In fact, since His Majesty's Government made it clear to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that they favour the conclusion of a treaty with the provisional French Government, it is largely upon American and Soviet support that the two Governments count in their refusal to conclude any agreement enabling France to retain predominant influence here; and in view of their belief in the close identity between British and United States world policy they are doubtful of the extent to which they can depend on American support.

13. With regard to Soviet intentions in the future towards these two countries, it is difficult to form a clear or even precise impression. The Soviet Minister, for his part, has on all occasions gone out of his way to assure local authorities and diplomatic colleagues alike that his instructions are merely to watch the local situation without interfering in it, and if the Soviet Government have, in fact, an eye on these countries he has so far given no inkling of it.

14. Nevertheless, there are constant and widespread rumours of Soviet ambitions and intrigues; that Soviet agents are interested in the possibilities of oil prospecting in northern Syria (the Jebel Bihri district north-west of Deir-ez-Zor, and the Derik district in north-east Syria are particularly mentioned): that the Soviet Legation here is employing members of the Armenian community to wage a rumour campaign against the Iraq Petroleum Company and Syrian Petroleum Company, suggesting that the Syrian Government are getting no return from the Iraq Petroleum Company pipe-line running through Syrian territory, and that the Syrian Petroleum Company are not exploiting its controlling concession in Syria; that the Soviet Government are arranging for Lebanese students to receive scholarships in Soviet universities; that the Soviet authorities hope eventually by arrangement with the Lebanese Government to acquire Tripoli as a treaty port; that they are proposing to start a shipping line between here and Black Sea ports.

15. While so far it has been impossible to ascertain how far, if at all, there is any truth in these reports, one of the most striking indications of a Soviet bid for popular favour here is the fact that, since the establishment of the Soviet Legations in Beirut and Damascus, there has been a marked increase in propaganda material coinciding with the appointment of a Tass Agency representative, who keeps in frequent personal touch with the editors of the Arabic papers and the local Communist leaders. Some indications of the immense amount of propaganda material which is being supplied from the Soviet Government to the local press is provided by the fact that, while last summer the Soviet Souppresse service was averaging about 8,000 words a day, it has now risen to over 12,000 words a day. Large quantities of books, newspapers and propaganda pamphlets in the Russian language are being imported, and recent issues of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* figure prominently among the copies of the *Sphere* or *Life* on bookstalls. To all this should be added the propaganda pamphlets in Arabic extolling the life and social conditions obtaining in the Soviet Union, which the Friends of the Soviet Union (with the assistance of the Soviet authorities) are engaged in printing and distributing. They are, furthermore, organising a large exhibition in Beirut covering Soviet activities in cultural, artistic, scientific and industrial spheres, which has received considerable publicity.

16. This increased interest is also confirmed by the little information available of the activities of Soviet agents in these two countries. I have been reliably informed that, while up to the end of 1943 the majority of N.K.V.D. (Narodni Komitet Venutrenix Dyel) agents here appeared to be acting as passive observers engaged primarily in collecting information, they are now taking a more active line.

17. The foregoing suggests that the Soviet Government are not disinclined to make their influence felt in Levant affairs and may well intend to play a larger part in them. In that case does the attitude of the Soviet authorities in opposing any attempt by the French to acquire a predominant position here betoken a desire on their part, as in Persia, to occupy such a position themselves? The scale on which propaganda is being carried out at present, coupled with the persistence of the rumours mentioned above, suggest that they may eventually, should a favourable situation develop, take advantage of the strength of their position and try to obtain the obvious advantages, strategic and commercial, which a hold over the Levant States would bring them.

18. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments are not, so far as I am aware, unduly (or even remotely) perturbed by the attentions of the Soviet Government; indeed, they are inclined to be flattered by them. But they are far from being anxious to adopt the Soviet system here, and I feel reasonably sure that if these

Governments became convinced that their independent status was in fact being undermined by Soviet intrigues, they would do all in their power (even if it were not much) to frustrate such intrigues. The difficulty lies, as far as the local Governments are concerned, in the possibility that, if the Soviet authorities relied on a method of infiltration based on their propaganda and the active support of pro-Soviet elements within the country, the process might have gone too far before the Syrian and Lebanese Governments awoke to the realisation of the danger by which they were encompassed.

19. Although in the face of Soviet imperialism they would do all they could to defend their independence, it is still a matter for speculation how far the Syrians and Lebanese would be prepared to go in enlisting and even soliciting Soviet support if at any stage they felt their independence threatened from another quarter: if, for example, after the conclusion of hostilities and the withdrawal of British forces, the activities of the French seemed to menace their existence; or if they felt that His Majesty's Government and the French were forcing upon them a policy which they adjudged to be contrary to their own interests.

20. On the short-term view it would be poor consolation if, as a result of such pressure, the Levant States should open the door to the Soviet Union, who are avowedly pursuing a policy of their own towards these States, and should give her the position which we desired the French to occupy. On a long-term view—so long as for strategic reasons we attach importance to that group of countries loosely called the Middle East—it cannot be in His Majesty's Government's interests to pursue a policy which would do anything to encourage or assist the Soviet Union to increase her influence or position in these countries. It would afford her that free access to the Mediterranean which I believe it is popularly alleged the Soviet Government is anxious to obtain; it would bring an additional powerful complicating factor into the Palestine question (for Soviet propaganda in the Middle East has been so far consistently anti-Zionist in tone); and, finally, it would constitute a permanent threat to the Suez Canal and the safety of our imperial communications with the Indian Empire, New Zealand, Australia, and our Far Eastern possessions.

[E 1982/8/89]

No. 35.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd March.)

(No. 38.)

Sir,

Beirut, 8th March, 1945.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 133 of the 28th February, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the official text of the speech⁽¹⁾ made by the Syrian President before the Chamber of Deputies on the 26th February.

2. Certain passages in this speech and in the speech made by the President on his return from Cairo, have aroused lively criticism in Syria, notably in Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. The principal point to which objection is taken is his assertion that the Syrian people would favour a Greater Syria provided that it was a republic with its capital in Damascus. Critics have pointed out that the President had no right to lay down the law as to what form of Government Syria should have, this being a prerogative of the people. The President himself told me on the 6th March that he had spoken of Greater Syria as he had because there was reason to believe that the Hashimites were intriguing for the establishment of a monarchy. He said he hoped something could be done to prevent the Emir Abdulla from "poking his nose" into Syrian affairs.

3. The President's call for "implicit obedience" from the people is considered unreasonable in view of his failure so far to produce tangible results in his negotiations with the French, particularly on the question of the Troupes Spéciales. His advocacy of Arab collaboration is considered by extremists to be no substitute for the Arab unity which is their declared aim. And finally, his reference to negotiations with the French have been taken as indicating that his attitude has weakened *vis-à-vis* the French.

4. Pamphlets on some of these points have been issued by two of the more extreme political parties in Damascus, and three lawyers from Homs have telegraphed to the President accusing him of "treachery" in declaring war without having obtained the army (a criticism also expressed, though more

(1) Not printed.

moderately, in the Syrian Chamber), and demanding a Greater Syria under a monarchy. Attempts by the Government to suppress these lawyers had to be abandoned in the face of popular outcry. The tone of the press in Aleppo has been almost violent in its attacks on the President and the Government's policy.

5. While too much importance must not be attached as yet to these ebullitions of ultra-nationalistic feeling, it seems clear that the position of the President and Government has weakened of late. This is due partly to their having been some time in office, the natural fickleness of the Syrians inclining them to prefer constant changes, and partly to the fact that they have signally failed in the last few months to "deliver the goods" in their relations with the French: not only is there no sign of the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, but the people are now told that negotiations are being started for a settlement (popularly interpreted as a treaty) with the French, when the Government had hitherto, with full popular support, declared that any such treaty was out of the question. The Government's handling of the administration does, of course, leave much to be desired; and the Government can only hope to escape violent opposition on this score so long as they can rally popular support behind them in real or fancied opposition to the French. When, as is now the case, the Government, at our behest, show signs of adopting an attitude of moderation, criticism at once and inevitably becomes vocal.

6. Apparently, in an attempt to appease the critics, the President has just added two new Ministers to the Government, Ahmed Sharabati taking over the Ministry of Education, and Sabri-el-Assali that of the Interior, both portfolios previously held by the Prime Minister. This change has, however, given little satisfaction except in certain circles of Damascus: both men are Damascenes and both, particularly Sabri-el-Assali, are known as personal adherents of the President. The Aleppo Deputies thus remain unsatisfied and their one representative in the Ministry, Dr. Kayali, is reported to be resigning.

7. The disquieting nature of these developments is that the President may, if they continue, before long be in a position to plead either that he cannot control the people any more, for example, over the question of the army, or that he cannot pursue his policy of treating with the French because he cannot take the Chamber and the country with him. This might be of less moment if there were any personality other than Shukri Quwatli, who could take over in a crisis with greater hope of succeeding; but there is none in view.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the High Commissioner at Jerusalem (2), and His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2005/5/89]

No. 36.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden:—(Received 24th March.)

(No. 498.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, 24th March, 1945.

IN debate on estimate of Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Consultative Assembly the 21st March, M. Gorse, Overseas Resistance delegate, recently returned from visit to the Levant, made interesting speech about French relations with Syria and Lebanon. After usual references to British interference, he spoke with great frankness of fall of French prestige in the Levant and of mistakes made by French administration there over many years. He added situation had improved slightly since beginning of year and paid tribute to restraint of Syrian Government. He urged that France, instead of clinging desperately to last vestiges of her mandate, should make generous settlement with Levant States, welcome and support formation of Arab League and, in particular, should take initiative in securing representation of the two Levant States at San Francisco.

2. In course of his reply, M. Bidault made important statement about Levant States. "Attitude of France," he said, "though ill-understood occasionally by certain Frenchmen, is one of progress, good faith and independence. France is mindful of her mission, what she represents in world, of characteristics of her thought and of her history, without which her own sons would not recognise her. In Syria and Lebanon, you know situation in general terms. We have proclaimed independence of these States. There are now present in Paris diplomatic representatives accredited by Syria and Lebanon. I refuse, as outrage to France, to

permit anyone to cast doubt on her faithfulness to promise she has given or to imagine that she wishes to quibble over execution of this promise." As regards representation of Syria and Lebanon at San Francisco Conference, he said—

"Assembly should know that decision, as it results from information which I have received in various ways, is characterised by certain obscurity. We have great difficulty in knowing what has been decided by one Government or another in our absence, all the more so because different versions have reached us. As you know, France was not invited to give her opinion about constitution of list of invitations to San Francisco Conference. Consequently, I am not in a position to give latest details on this point: but as French Government has to-day opportunity to do something to dissipate present obscurity, I am glad to make here clear statement: France raises no objection to presence of Syria and Lebanon at San Francisco Conference, and when I go there I shall be delighted to see their representatives there, if this is possible."

(B) Weekly Political Summaries.

[E 5/5/89]

No. 37.

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 141, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th December, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 1st January, 1945.)

1. General.

THE departure of His Majesty's Minister has been made the occasion, in both Syria and the Lebanon, of widespread and obviously sincere expressions of appreciation of the services which he has rendered to these countries during his tenure of office, and unprecedented marks of esteem have been bestowed on him in both countries. The farewell ceremonies in Damascus on the 9th December included a luncheon given in his honour by the President, a reception by the municipality, during which the freedom of the city was conferred on him, and a dinner (the first to be given for twenty-five years in the Government Offices) by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which the President, in defiance of protocol, attended.

In Beirut on the 12th December the ceremonies included a luncheon given by the Government, receptions by the Chamber of Deputies and the municipality (during which the freedom of Beirut was similarly conferred on him), and a dinner by the President. In addition, the Chamber, on the 11th December, unanimously voted him an Honorary Citizen of the Lebanon.

The tone of the speeches made at these functions and of press comment generally bore testimony to the real sense of loss felt by both Syrians and Lebanese at his departure.

Reports from all areas stress the vigorous attempts made by French-inspired circles to represent His Majesty's Minister's resignation as being due to French pressure on His Majesty's Government, and to convince the populations that Great Britain has now agreed to give France a free hand in the Levant States.

The official announcement in London that no change in policy was envisaged, and the tenor of the various speeches made by General Spears at his farewell celebrations, have done something to reassure the people, but uneasiness undoubtedly persists on this score.

The newspaper report (paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 140) regarding a Greek Orthodox delegation to Moscow has been denied and appears to be at least premature.

3. Syria—Damascus.

It has been rumoured for some time that it was the intention of the Prime Minister to broaden the basis of his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of several of the younger Deputies, the names of Sabri al Assali, Ahmed Sharabati and Michael Elian being mentioned in this connexion. The Prime Minister, when questioned as to the truth of this rumour, stated that it was correct, but he mentioned no names and gave no date for the change.

An ugly quarrel occurred between the Syrian Government and the French over the question of a guard of honour of Senegalese troops outside the Orient Palace Hotel, where a Franco-Syrian Red Cross ball was in progress. The President of the Syrian Republic, who was intending to visit the ball, refused to do so unless the French guard were withdrawn. Acrimonious discussions took place on the following day, and the President refused to receive Colonel Oliva-Roget when he called to apologise that evening on the instructions of General Beynet. While this affair arose out of a matter small in itself, it shows how small an incident can upset the existing state of unstable equilibrium.

A Bill has been passed by the Chamber establishing procedure for summary jurisdiction in cases of offences against supply regulations.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has issued a communiqué stating that the Chinese Government has officially notified its recognition of Syrian independence, and have stated their intention of accrediting a representative to the Syrian Government.

6. *Jebel Druze.*

A French officer, Capitaine Rochat, commanding the Druze Squadron at Chahba, is reported to have spoken in public disparagingly about the Syrian Government and Syrian independence. Demonstrations occurred in Chahba the following day and the kaimakam caused a written *mise en demeure* to be served on Capitaine Rochat warning him that, if he did not leave immediately, he would be driven out by force. According to the Acting Muhafez, Colonel Oliva-Roget, on hearing of the events, instructed the Délégué at Soueida to move troops into the area, and undertook, if they should prove inadequate, to send reinforcements of Senegalese. The Délégué, however, did not immediately act upon these orders and allowed the Acting Muhafez and the commandant of the gendarmerie an opportunity of calming the demonstrators. They were successful in doing so on the understanding, however, that Capitaine Rochat should be transferred. The French Délégué is understood to have agreed in principle to Rochat's removal, but insists that it must be deferred, as French prestige would suffer if he were transferred immediately as a result of the present incident.

A further incident occurred four days later, when a trooper of the squadron under Rochat's command, without authority, stopped and searched a car which was passing through Chahba. Demonstrations again followed in the town. According to the latest reports, the town is now quiet, but feeling is running high and further trouble is expected if Rochat is not soon withdrawn.

The Muhafez has withdrawn his resignation (reported in Weekly Summary No. 140); there is general relief at his decision, even amongst his opponents, who realised that the possibility was slight of a new Muhafez being chosen from amongst their number.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

The Muhafez of the Euphrates is planning to plant about 75,000 fruit trees of various varieties along the Euphrates between Raqqa and Abu Kemal; these will become the property of the local landowners.

11. *The Lebanon.*

On the 10th December a murderous attack was made by a gang of six persons on Abdul Hamid Karami and his brother near Tripoli. Luckily, both received only slight injuries, though their driver was seriously injured and their car riddled with bullets from automatic weapons. The driver, despite his wounds, managed to drive the car some 7 kilom. to the nearest hospital, thus undoubtedly saving the lives of the occupants. The Lebanese Government sent the Vice-President and Procureur Général immediately to Tripoli with strong gendarmerie reinforcements, and up to the present several persons have been arrested, though the assailants have not so far been identified. The town of Tripoli closed for three days in protest, but has now reopened. On the 11th December the Lebanese Chamber unanimously passed a motion condemning the outrage and calling on the Government to take active measures to punish those responsible.

There seems no doubt that the assailants were members of the Mokaddem family, who were responsible for a similar attack on Karami's life during the 1943

elections; one member of this family, Mazhar el Omari, has ever since then been wanted by the Lebanese gendarmerie, but he has always succeeded in eluding arrest, it is said because he had been given protection by an officer of the Troupes Spéciales, in whose car he had been seen. This man's father and several other members of the Mokaddem family are amongst those arrested.

The Emir Jamil Chehab, the Director-General of Supplies, is understood finally to have resigned on the grounds that he was not being supported by the Government and was being excluded from their councils on supply matters. The Prime Minister has temporarily taken over charge of the Supply Department, the effective working of which is at present seriously impaired.

Although talk of an impending re-shuffle of the Ministry continues, there have been no further developments.

[E 203/5/89]

(2)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 142, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, dated 20th December, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 9th January, 1945.)

1. *General.*

In both Syria and the Lebanon the arrival of Mr. Shone has been eagerly awaited in the hope that he himself will confirm the assurances already given concerning His Majesty's Government's policy towards the independence for the two States.

In a sitting of the Syrian Chamber held on the 11th and 13th December a new Education Bill was brought forward. As presented the Bill proposed that the only language to be taught for the first five years (in the elementary schools) should be Arabic, during the next four years (in the intermediate schools) Arabic and French, and during the last two (higher educational school) Arabic, French and English. After a heated debate in the Chamber the Bill was amended so that "a foreign language" is to be taught in the intermediate schools and "two foreign languages" in the higher schools. As a result of the passing of this Bill the amount of French taught in Syrian schools will be considerably diminished and opportunities created for an increase in the teaching of other foreign languages which in practice will almost certainly mean English. The final form in which the Bill was passed leaves no doubt of the Government's and Chamber's attitude to the French proposal for a Convention Universitaire under the terms of which the position of the French language would have been maintained and even increased and a considerable measure of French control would have remained over the Government's educational programme.

3. *Syria—Damascus.*

There is continued discontent in the Syrian civil service over the inadequacy of emoluments and the employees of the Ministries of Finance and Justice are agitating for higher salaries. The press reports that the Government are preparing a new wage scheme for civil servants, providing for considerable increases in the existing rates of pay.

It is understood that the Colonel commanding the Syrian gendarmerie is drawing up, on instructions from the President of the Republic, a scheme for an increase during 1945 of 1,000 men in the numbers of the local gendarmerie. Colonel Rafiq Azmeh has also asked the Iraqi Minister to Syria whether the Iraqi Government would be prepared to receive thirty Syrian cadets at the Iraqi police training school, and he and the chief of police will shortly leave for Iraq to inspect the school and to study police methods there.

The Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs has notified the International Postal Union that Syria is now independent and desires to become a member of the union.

4. *Aleppo.*

Local economic matters have been the main preoccupation and unrest continues to exist about the movement of textiles. At the end of a month's trial of the official regulations by which the local spinning mills were to deliver cotton

yarn to the Ravitaillement who in turn were supposed to deliver the yarn to the weavers, two of the big mills started to deliver their own yarn direct to workmen for weaving at a fixed price, thus cutting out both the Ravitaillement and some of the middle men. This action has emphasised the bad official handling of the problem and has strengthened the general opposition to the present ministry.

The only event of political significance was the first appearance of an official of the Soviet Legation, who on the 11th December attended a ceremony arranged by the local Armenians in honour of Soviet Armenia. The Muhafez and Allied representatives were present. Speeches were mainly in praise of the Russian war effort, the Syrian welcome to Armenians and the early and complete Soviet recognition of Syrian independence.

5. Homs and Hama.

It is learnt from Fadeh Bey Atassi that the Government have refused to accept his resignation from the post of President of the Municipality (see Weekly Summary No. 141).

A meeting of the Homs Armenian Community was held to celebrate the 24th anniversary of their independence. No French or British officials attended, but the Muhafez and Chief of Police were present. Meanwhile the Muhafez has received a request from the Council of the Armenian Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus to forbid the Armenian pastor in Homs to exercise his religious functions. He belongs to the Tashnak party, which is opposed to the party predominating in the Council Chamber in Damascus.

The Greek orthodox community published their decision to send their bishop in Homs, Bishop Djeha, to accompany the patriarch to Moscow in the new year. Bishop Djeha is also stated to have received a request from the Russian Government to give an account of the various properties formerly belonging to them in the Homs area. Presumably this is a reference to the school and religious properties owned during the Tsarist régime.

The textile position is still acute. The allocation of thread to Homs is less than a tenth of the amount required, but it is hoped that some arrangement can be made to find work for the more desperate cases.

6. Jebel Druze.

The French have now withdrawn Capitaine Rochat from Chahba (see Weekly Summary No. 141).

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

A Bill was passed giving an increment of 25 per cent. on the salaries of civil servants serving in the Jezireh and Euphrates Mahafazats.

The four most northerly villages of the Assyrian settlement on the Khabour have been deserted for at least 5-6 years. This was partly because the Turkish authorities objected to them being so near the frontier and partly because of the high mortality of the villagers due to malaria. These villagers moved downstream to land at the southern end of the settlement. Since then the lands of these four villages, two on each side of the river, have been uncultivated. A move has now been made by the French to have the use of this land for some French sponsored agricultural company. Some of the chiefs of the Assyrians are also desirous of reoccupying these villages or at least of recultivating the land. The Muhafez of the Jezireh has been approached by Comdt. Pommarede, French P.O. at Hassetché, but has stalled him off for the time being with the excuse that the Tchatchane tribe between Tell Tamer and Ras el Ain has a long standing claim on these villages which is at present being dealt with in the court at Deir-az-Zor. Land which remains unploughed for over three years automatically reverts to the State, so the Assyrians have no legal claim to these villages apart from the fact that they were asked to vacate them officially and did not do so wholly voluntarily, but it is regrettable that this good land should not be in cultivation. The Muhafez of the Jezireh would prefer to favour the request of the Assyrians as they are hard-working farmers, but he fears that they in turn might come to some arrangement with the French and allow them the use of their land.

The Euphrates gendarmerie have now received some 400 British rifles in exchange for their existing arms, together with 250 rounds per rifle. Two more trucks have also arrived, but a third had an accident *en route* and is presumably being repaired.

9. Tribal.

The proposed settlement of outstanding differences between the Baggara and the Shammar-Zor (see Weekly Summary No. 141), has been postponed till the close of the present session of the Chamber in Damascus, since it is impossible for some of the local tribal Deputies to leave the capital at the present time. The differences between the Baggara and the Kikieh have now been settled by the payment of blood money by the latter.

An unconfirmed report suggests that there has been a clash between elements of the Fedaan and Afadla tribes north of Raqqa.

10. Frontier.

The arrival of an occasional Turkish deserter at a Syrian frontier post is quite a common occurrence, but last week eight deserters, including two airmen and two Customs officials, crossed into Syria.

11. The Lebanon.

His Majesty's Minister left Beirut for Palestine on the 15th December. At a farewell ceremony held outside 84 Sub-Area he inspected a Guard of Honour mounted by IXth Army in company with the army commander and senior naval, military and air force officers. Most of the Lebanese Ministers and members of the diplomatic corps came uninvited but no French representative was present.

The keynote of public opinion since his departure is one of uncertainty and anxiety as to the future. The publication of articles from *The Times* and the Egyptian press, suggesting respectively that Anglo-French relations in the Levant are entering on a new phase and that Mr. Shone's task will be to persuade the local Governments to conclude treaties, have increased the general uncertainty as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government. The Prime Minister is again speaking of resigning. There is, however, a tendency to postpone judgment until the attitude of the new Minister can be estimated.

The authors of the attempt on the life of Abdul Hamid Karami have still not been arrested despite vigorous efforts on the part of the Government. There is considerable dissatisfaction amongst the Karami adherents at the delay in bringing them to justice.

The President of the Republic has broken an arm through a fall in the street and will be confined to his house for some time, though he is still capable of transacting some business.

No successor to the Amir Jamil Shehab as Director-General of Supply has yet been found, and the supply services are consequently getting into an increasingly unsatisfactory position.

The Government have officially denied the statement attributed by a news agency to their Minister in London shortly after his arrival, to the effect that he recommended a conference in London to discuss the Palestine question. The report seems, in fact, to have been a fabrication.

[E 269/5/89]

(3)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 143, Secret, Syria and The Lebanon, dated 27th December, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th January, 1945.)

1. General.

Mr. Terence A. Shone arrived at Beirut by air from Cairo on the 21st December to take up his post as His Majesty's Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in succession to Sir E. Spears. He was met at the airport by the general officer commanding Ninth army, senior naval, military and air force officers and members of the legation staff. On the 22nd December he presented his credentials to the Lebanese President and on the 23rd December to the Syrian President. The usual formalities were observed in both capitals, except that the Lebanese President, having recently broken his arm, was obliged to receive him seated and swathed in a black cloak.

There were no public demonstrations on either occasion, but indications are that this prompt establishment of contact with the two Governments has done something to allay the anxiety which they had been feeling since the departure

of his predecessor. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministers of both States took advantage of the formal visits paid to them by His Majesty's Minister to stress the determination of their Governments not to conclude any treaty which would give a pre-eminent position to France.

His Majesty's Minister called on General Beynet on the 26th December and was cordially received. General Beynet stated that he hoped to visit Paris in the near future as he had not been home for a long time, and that he had no fresh instructions regarding the negotiations with the States on the *Troupes Spéciales* or other questions. Count Ostrorog was, however, expected to return from France shortly and might have further news.

Anxiety continues, however, to be expressed in both States as to Great Britain's future attitude towards them, and this anxiety is constantly being exploited by the pro-French section of the press. An alleged message from the *Daily Mail* to the effect that the conclusion is expected of an Anglo-French pact regarding the Levant, following *The Times* article on a new era of Anglo-French relations in the Levant, are examples of disturbing factors on public opinion.

A French cruiser, the *Emile Bertin*, arrived at Beirut on the 23rd December on a four-day visit, with Admiral Auboyneau on board. The French Government and the French authorities in Beirut had been previously urged to prevent any provocative behaviour by the admiral or crew of the ship during her visit, and, no doubt as a result of this, they behaved in the event with the utmost correctness, paying calls on the Lebanese Government and showing them hospitality on board. The visit passed off without any untoward incident, and the ship sailed on the 27th December carrying with her the Lebanese Minister-Designate to Paris and his staff. Public opinion seems to have been largely unaffected by the visit. The Lebanese Prime Minister expressed to His Majesty's Minister his appreciation of the part which he attributed to us in ensuring that the visit passed off without any untoward incident on the French side.

The question of press censorship is coming to the fore in both States. The Syrian Chamber on the 20th December unanimously voted a resolution calling for the abolition of internal press censorship. They were informed on the following day by the Speaker that this was insufficient, and that they must pass a definite law abolishing the existing legislation on the subject. A law to this effect has already been tabled in the Lebanese Chamber, and it is expected that the Syrian Chamber will shortly follow suit. In the meantime, there have been difficulties in both States about Allied military censorship. In the Lebanon, constant attempts by the French to cut out articles which had no military significance, but which they regarded as derogatory to France or as merely contrary to local French policy—the French censor unsuccessfully endeavoured, for example, to forbid the production of an interview given by General Spears to the *Sunday Times*—have resulted in local newspapers tending to bypass both the French and British censors; all papers have, however, now undertaken to submit to British military censorship because they realise that it will not be abused. In Syria, there is a British military censor, but the Government have for several months resisted repeated French claims to install a French military censor as well, although these claims were supported by the British authorities. The French claim that, as a result, the Syrian press has been publishing constant attacks on France. On the 21st December the French delegate in Damascus addressed a stiff note to the Syrian Government demanding, with veiled threats, that these attacks should cease. The Syrian reply, which has not yet been sent, is expected to be even stiffer.

Reshuffles of both Syrian and Lebanese Governments appear to be in the offing. It is reasonably certain that the Syrian Prime Minister has now offered himself as Syrian Minister in Egypt, while the Lebanese Government as a whole seem persuaded that they will have to resign early next year owing to progressive lack of support in the Chamber.

It now appears certain that a Greek-Orthodox delegation will, in fact, proceed to Moscow for the enthronement of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch.

2. Economic.

The German thrust in France has caused a marked rise in the prices of gold and textiles.

3. Syria—Damascus.

The regular autumn session of the Syrian Chamber ends on the 31st December, but as many clauses of the budget have not yet been debated, the Chamber is

expected to reassemble in extraordinary session early next month. Until the budget is passed expenditure will be covered by *Douzièmes Provisoires*.

On the 18th December the Chamber resumed the debate on the Government draft bill to pay a 25 per cent. increase of salary to civil servants serving in the Euphrates and Jezireh provinces. Several Deputies criticised the bill as being bad in principle and as likely to affect the efficiency of the Civil Service, but the argument that only thus could a good type of official be obtained prevailed and the bill was passed.

The Council of Ministers has sanctioned the incorporation of the Jebel Druze into the Syrian administration to take effect as from the 1st January, 1945.

According to press reports, the Government have decided to publish an appeal encouraging retired officers of the Ottoman army to join the Syrian police and gendarmerie forces, the fusion of which into a single security service is stated to be imminent.

The Syrian Government, having informed the D.H.P. Railway that their agreement to operate the Hejaz Railway in Syria is terminated as from the 1st April next, are reported to have set up a commission of Government officials to take over the direction and operation of that railway.

On the 19th December the Government were briskly criticised in the Chamber because the Ministry of Finance has contracted with a Tel Aviv Zionist firm for the supply of paper. The Ministry was blamed both for dealing with Zionists and for indulging in commerce. At the same sitting the Chamber approved the underwriting by the Ministry of Finance of a loan of 1 million Syrian pounds for a waterworks at Hama.

4. Aleppo.

The attitude of the public is reported to be one of expectancy as regards the line to be taken by His Majesty's Minister. Anti-treaty feeling in Aleppo is less strong than elsewhere, both because of the very large minorities and because French interests have been well served by an industrious and very experienced French *Délégué*. Furthermore, economic interests largely outweigh politics in Aleppo, and it is generally realised that the present relative prosperity results from the Allied, particularly British, occupation rather than from any measures taken by the Nationalist Government.

On the 23rd December the Government sealed certain cotton stores belonging to both the local spinning mills because the latter were unwilling to pay the full rate of taxation on a proportion of their profits which they had placed in reserve for post-war replacements of machinery. The action caused a stoppage in the mills, and on the 26th December a demonstration took place which was easily dispersed. Shops remained closed in the town, however, and on the 27th December a further crowd was fired on, casualties resulting. The Government's action which caused the trouble appears to be largely due to local intrigue and the outcome depends on conversations which are to take place in Damascus between the President and the spinners.

Local officials of the Finance department struck on the 19th December for equality of treatment with their colleagues of Damascus, but their demand was

7. Alaouite Territory.

The Syrian President has stated that his Prime Minister has been instructed to prepare a Bill for presentation to the Chamber prolonging by six months the period during which appeals against land registrations may be made by persons domiciled in the Haffé area. This, while not mentioning Suleiman Murshid, will have the effect of allowing all peasantry whose land Murshid's family is alleged to have filched to re-open the registration cases and, in all probability to obtain reversals of the judgments concerned.

The President has also confirmed that, contrary to rumours which have been persistently circulating in Lattakia, his Government will not allow Murshid to return to the Alaouites.

The French *Délégué* and political officers in the territory have been carrying out intensive touring programmes, and the Mohafez, who has no direct contact with them, appears to be nervous of the effect of their activities in the mountain areas.

11. *Lebanon.*

See "General" above.

The search for the authors of the recent attack on Abdul Hamid Kerami continues. The assailants have definitely been identified as members of the Mokaddem family, and are understood now to have escaped into the Alaouite territory where the assistance of the Mohafez has been invoked with a view to their apprehension.

[E 434/5/89]

(4)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 144, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 3rd January, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th January.)

1. *General.*

HIS Majesty's Minister has now had the opportunity of holding informal discussions with members of both Governments. In an interview in Damascus the Syrian President and his Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether he had any reply to give to the Syrian note of the 7th October, which had closed with a request for British arbitration of the Troupes Spéciales question. The President stressed the Syrian sense of grievance at the action of France in breaking off negotiations after agreement in principle had been reached in July, and pointed out the necessity for Syria to have her own armed forces. He made it plain, however, that the main preoccupation of his Government was to remove these Troupes from French control lest they should be used in the future as an instrument of aggression. He indicated that if these Troupes were not to be transferred the Syrians would be ready to see them disbanded, after which they could either raise their own forces or strengthen the gendarmerie. He stated categorically that the question could not remain in suspense much longer as the failure to achieve results was weakening the position of his Government.

At the same interview the President reaffirmed with every appearance of bitter determination the refusal of the Syrian Government to consider any treaty or agreement giving a pre-eminent position to France, in which attitude, he declared, his Government had the unanimous support of the Chamber and of the country as a whole. He added that they wished to come to the final peace settlement unfettered by any international obligations, though, if necessary, they would be prepared to sign equal treaties with all the Great Powers.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Minister that the Soviet Minister had, at his request, asked his Government whether they approved of the Syrian policy of refusing to conclude any treaty giving a non-Arab Government any special privilege or pre-eminence. No reply had yet been received, but M. Solod had given him a personal assurance that his appointment as Soviet Minister meant that his Government fully recognised the independence of Syria. M. Solod has also informed the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, since the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, that this pact only concerns Europe and does not affect the policy of his Government towards the Levant States, viz., support for their complete independence and a refusal to recognise a pre-eminent position for any other Power.

In both Syria and the Lebanon there are many signs that changes in the Cabinet will shortly take place. The Syrian Prime Minister wishes to resign for reasons of health but has been persuaded to remain in office for the moment, since, with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cairo, the Chamber shortly going into recess and the French authorities in their present mood, his resignation would be ill-timed. Discontent with the internal administration, especially in economic matters, is growing, but there is no sign that the proposed changes in the Cabinet are in any way a result of the recent French pressure. Lufti Haffar and Jamil Mardam are being mentioned as possible Prime Ministers.

In the Lebanon a Cabinet reshuffle is now generally expected to take place, at latest, in the middle of January. Chief interest centres in whether any Moslem other than Riad Solh will be able to form the new Ministry, or whether Riad himself, despite his loudly-expressed desire to be relieved of the cares of office, will nevertheless allow himself, or be forced by circumstances, to undertake the task of forming his third Ministry.

No law to abolish press censorship has yet been tabled in the Syrian Chamber (see paragraph 6, section 1, Weekly Political Summary No. 143). The Lebanese

Chamber, however, passed a Bill to this effect on the 30th December after a heated debate, with only one dissident. All speakers admitted that the Allied military censorship must continue and the terms of the Bill specifically cover this point. Certain speakers pressed also for the abolition of administrative suspension of newspapers for misbehaviour, but this proposal was defeated. The Government is much perturbed by the abolition of the press censorship, and maintains that the principle, however desirable itself, is wrong in the Lebanon because of the strength of the French-inspired opposition to the régime and the ease with which newspapers can be suborned to print views subversive to the régime.

The Turkish Government has communicated to both States Governments draft notes proposing recognition of their independence and the exchange of diplomatic representations on condition that they pledge themselves to extend to Turkish subjects all the rights and privileges which are granted to the subjects of other Powers, or which might be granted in the future. The two Ministers for Foreign Affairs, after consultation, have agreed on a reply consenting in principle, but substituting for the suggested proviso a mere assurance of most-favoured-nation treatment, which they propose shall be reciprocal.

3. *Syria—Damascus.*

Franco-Syrian relations, which were not improved by the despatch of French tanks to Damascus simultaneously with the delivery of a stiff note by the French delegate (see paragraph 6, Section 1, Weekly Political Summary No. 143), are at present very bad. The Syrian Government have replied to the Délégué-Général expressing astonishment at the tone of Colonel Oliva-Roget's note and giving a list of anti-Syrian actions alleged to have been perpetrated by the French since September of last year. There seems little or no likelihood of an improvement in relations unless the French Government and French officials in Syria revert to the more conciliatory attitude adopted by General Catroux a year ago, though the French may well doubt whether further concessions would induce such a change of heart in Damascus as would lead eventually to a treaty according France a privileged position.

The Chamber on the 21st December held a brief discussion on the report submitted by the committee appointed to investigate the scandals in the Ministry of Supply; the Deputies insisted that the report should be printed and discussed publicly by the Chamber. On the 27th December a private members' draft Bill for the creation of a national army was read and passed into committee. At the sittings on the 27th, 28th and 29th December the question was raised of the application to the present Government of article 92 of the Constitution, which stipulates that no Minister shall be a member of a board of directors of any public company. Dr. Kayali, Khaled Azm and the Syrian Prime Minister all declared that they had severed their connexion with the public companies in which they had formerly been interested.

A draft Bill has been laid before the Chamber incorporating the Jebel Druze into the Syrian Administration from the 1st January, 1945, and giving Druze religious courts a legal existence and the right to deal with the matters of Druze personal status.

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has announced the appointment of Najib Armanazi as Minister to London, Adnan Atassi Minister to Paris and Nazim Qudsi as Minister to Washington.

The adviser to the Ministry of Education, when questioned by the press as to whether it was proposed to institute Government control over foreign schools in Syria, replied that at the moment there was no such intention. He added, however, that the recent legislation passed by the Chamber on education made the Syrian baccalaureate the only legally recognised examination for admission to public offices.

4. *Aleppo.*

Disturbances have continued in connexion with the closing of the Moudarres and Shabarek mills (see paragraph 2, Section 4, Weekly Political Summary No. 143). The present trouble dates back to July 1944, when the Syrian Government sent an official to take over the mills. The project was, however, abandoned shortly, but again in October the mills were requisitioned. As the official team were unable to run the industry it was agreed that the mills should hand over to the Ravitaillement a quantity of yarn during a trial month. Only a small proportion of this yarn was, however, passed to local weavers, and none of the

cheap material promised by the Ravitaillement appeared on the market. In the middle of December Mohamed Khalil Moudarres announced that the mill-owners were not out to exploit the poor, but they objected to partial and inefficient Ravitaillement control; and would themselves shortly provide cheap cotton material for sale in Aleppo. Soon afterwards the Government seized the raw cotton in the stores of the two mills, on the grounds that the mills had taken no action within the ten days' time-limit regarding a claim for some £Syr. 2 million income tax.

There is little doubt that the dispute chiefly arises from the enmity existing between the Moudarres family and Saadullah Jabri, President of the Chamber, but the latest information received is that an agreement has been reached in Damascus which will enable the mills to reopen.

5. Homs and Hama.

Khaled Agha Darwish Barazi has returned to Hama after a two-year internment in Kamaran for wheat hoarding.

The first pilgrims returning from the Hajj arrived in Homs during the week. They are reported to be full of complaints about their treatment during the ceremonies in Mecca, and to be expressing resentment against King Ibn Saud for the slackness and corruption of his Administration, in particular as regards the appalling transport situation from Jedda to Mecca, the constant extortion of petty officials *en route*, and the filthy condition of the sacred square round the Kaaba at which they perform their principal devotions. They report also that there is considerable unrest among the Saudi population of the Holy Cities, and much complaint against the King both for his moral behaviour and financial rapacity; that very few Shia pilgrims attended the ceremonies this year owing to the execution last year of a Shia for allegedly defiling the Kaaba; and that, according to Koranic law, this execution has been proved to be illegal, and blood money has been assessed against the King at the sum of 15,000 gold pounds. Whatever the truth behind these stories, they point to a considerable anti-Saudi propaganda.

11. Lebanon.

In the Chamber on the 28th December the Government was attacked for not having yet passed the budget. The Minister of Finance explained that the budget had been held up by delays in the promulgation of the Income Tax Law and the new Land Tax, arrangements for executing which were in process of elaboration.

The first instalment of £Syr. 2 million in respect of arrears of War Profits Tax was duly paid over by the Lebanese merchants on the 26th December. The other two instalments will be due at two months' intervals.

According to the Chief of Gendarmerie, the members of his force are becoming increasingly discontented with their scales of pay, and all his applications to the Government to secure increases have been left unanswered.

Considerable activity has taken place in clerical circles as a result of the suggestion that the Maronite Patriarch should convene an episcopal congress to discuss the general position of Christians in the Lebanon, with special reference to the Alexandria Protocol. Opponents of the Government have been active in advocating the suggestion, in the hopes that resolutions embarrassing to the Government would be passed; but the latest information suggests that the more influential archbishops have persuaded the Patriarch that the congress would be harmful to Christian-Moslem relations and would therefore be inopportune.

A decree appeared on the 28th December organising the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It appears to have been quoted textually from a European model.

The President, who is still ill, was obliged to cancel his usual New Year's Day receptions. General Beynet received "the French colony and Friends of France" at a large reception at the Residence in the afternoon.

The assailants of Abdul Hamid Karami have still not been brought to justice and some of them are thought to have fled into the Alaouite territory. Gendarmerie have been displaying great energy and it is thought that their efforts will eventually succeed.

[E 631/5/89]

(5)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 145, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th January, 1945.—(Received 27th January.)

1. General.

ON the 7th January the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad Solh, tendered his resignation to the President of the Republic, who accepted it and charged Abdul Hamid Karami with the formation of the new ministry.

It had for some weeks become obvious that the Government was unlikely to survive much longer in the face of the steadily growing opposition both inside and outside the Chamber. There was increasing public dissatisfaction at the failure of the Government to check the constant rise in the cost of living, to effect economies or to improve the standard of efficiency of the Administration. In addition, a substantial section of the Christians had been persuaded by the Government's opponents that the Alexandria Protocol, which the Government had signed, would place the Christians under Moslem domination. The country as a whole was, in fact, ready for a change, though the immediate cause of the Government's resignation was undoubtedly intrigue amongst Deputies, the majority of whom had decided that their personal interests would be better served by a new ministry anxious to gain credit than by one which had now been in power for what, in the Lebanon, is regarded as a long period.

The new ministry cannot be considered strong and is particularly weak in administrative experience. Its composition was as follows:—

Prime Minister, Ministries of Finance and Defence: Abdul Hamid Karami (Sunni).

Vice-President, Ministries of Commerce and Industry, and Posts and Telegraphs: Nicola Ghosn (Greek Orthodox).

Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Justice: Selim Tacla (Greek Catholic).

Ministries of Supply and Agriculture: Dr. Jamil Talhouk (Druze).

Ministries of Interior and Education: Wadih Naim (Maronite).

Ministries of Public Works, Health and Public Assistance: Ahmed el Assad (Shia).

On the morning after the formation of the new Government Selim Tacla died.

The French authorities were not consulted and took no part in the discussions which surrounded the fall of the old Government and the formation of the new, although they and their agents had undoubtedly played a part in bringing about the downfall of Riad Solh by a systematic campaign of misrepresentation and of magnification of the Government's failings. Abdul Hamid Karami likewise made no approach to this legation, and the President confined himself to enquiring privately whether any of the persons suggested would be objectionable to His Majesty's Government.

No further progress has been made in the matter of the rearming of the gendarmerie. The Governments feel that the French are deliberately withholding their agreement to a further supply of arms in order to ensure that the central Governments will be unable to enforce internal security without calling in French assistance. British military authorities regard the issue of additional cars and automatic weapons as a matter of real urgency from the security aspect. Further representations in the matter have been made to London by His Majesty's Minister.

2. Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 23rd-31st December amounted to 432 tons, a daily average of 48 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944 crop up to 173,070 tons.

3. Syria—Damascus.

The political situation has not changed. The Prime Minister, though anxious to resign, will probably remain in office until the Chamber has gone into recess at the end of January. The Minister for Foreign Affairs left for Cairo on the 1st January and the various portfolios held by him were temporarily taken over by the Prime Minister, who was thus temporarily in charge of six

ministries. Owing to the delay in convening the Conference on Arab Unity in Cairo, Jamil Mardam Bey has since returned to Damascus.

The Judicial Committee of the Chamber has been studying the draft Bill on the formation of an army, but during the week reached the conclusion that it was useless to go further without ascertaining the views of the Government. The Syrian Prime Minister, therefore, attended one of the meetings of the committee and stated that the Government were thinking of resuming discussions with the French on the basis of the immediate cession of 5,000 Troupes Spéciales to the Syrians, as had been previously agreed, and the subsequent handing over of the rest by stages until the end of hostilities. He said also that it was impossible for the Government to obtain arms from the Allies for the formation of a new army and expressed himself in favour of the principle of conscription as a means of raising additional revenue.

Orderly organised demonstrations in favour of the formation of an army took place at the beginning of the week in Damascus and in the other principal towns.

The first sitting of the extraordinary session of the Chamber, which was originally fixed for the 6th January, was postponed until the 13th, leaving only eighteen days for the discussion of the budget, which must be passed by the 31st January; otherwise the draft budget submitted by the Cabinet will, according to the Constitution, be enforced by presidential decree, thus becoming law without the agreement of Parliament.

4. Aleppo.

The mills partially reopened on the 9th January. Almost all the taxation claims have been paid, but the question of a 50 per cent. fine is still under consideration; the Government is in process of returning the cotton which it has seized.

6. Jebel Druze.

The Bill incorporating the Jebel Druze community in the Syrian State, after the abrogation of its administration and financial autonomy, was passed in the Syrian Chamber. A further Bill has been passed under which religious courts of the Druze community are given power to decide cases of personal status in conformity with Druze custom.

The publication of these decrees is reported to have given great satisfaction amongst the Druzes.

7. Alaouite Territory.

The Mohafez of Latakia believes that it may be possible to make the port an important commercial harbour after the war, serving Aleppo, the whole of North Syria and even Mosul. It was thought that the late Director of Public Works in Damascus would be a suitable man to visit Latakia and draw up plans for the work of enlarging the port. No action, however, was taken as the Mohafez understood that the Syrian Government had hopes of securing the services of a British port construction expert. Meanwhile a French naval lieutenant has been to Latakia recently, taken a number of soundings in the port and informed the Mohafez that it would be a simple matter to obtain the services of a capable port expert from France.

11. Lebanon.

Little work has been done by the Government in the past few days, the whole time of the ministers being taken up with political discussions. The Ministry of Finance made some progress in organising the collection of the income tax, which becomes operative as from the 1st January, but the complicated machinery required is still far from ready. The passing of the budget is now clearly still further postponed.

M. Selim Tacla told a member of the legation staff that M. Solod, the Russian Minister, had called on him to protest against what the latter described as the anti-Soviet tone of the local press. He cited as a case in point, a headline "Chaos in Hungary," which he considered anti-Russian on the grounds that it meant chaos in Hungary because the Russians were there. M. Tacla did not seem put out by M. Solod's *démarche*, but undertook to investigate the complaint.

12. Press.

During the week it became clear from the tone of the Lebanese press that the Lebanese Government was heading for a ministerial crisis. The crisis materialised and has resulted in a complete change of Cabinet.

Despite Government assurances of a wider measure of freedom for the Syrian press, censorship in Aleppo during the week reached its highest peak.

The Damascus press is unanimous in declaring that the Syrian Government's rationing measures have resulted in complete failure.

The Syrian press expresses satisfaction with the Prime Minister's statement that, failing the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales from French to Syrian control, Syria will organise a new army.

The lifting of certain import restrictions by the M.E.S.C. has been reported in the local press with lively satisfaction.

In Syria the press has taken up the question of Cabinet Ministers maintaining their interests in commercial enterprises.

The meetings of the Arab Preliminary Committee in Cairo have aroused interest in the press and Arab unity is again being discussed.

Comment on the Zionist question has almost completely subsided.

The Syrian decision to enlarge the port of Latakia has been prominently reported.

On the question of a treaty with France, the statement made by the British Minister-Resident, Middle East, has aroused interest. In general the attitude of the Levant States press remains unchanged: complete independence and no treaty.

An Aleppo Armenian paper has made an attack on the policy pursued by Major-General Spears, ex-British Minister in the Levant States. It now appears that the article in question was inspired.

[E 864/5/89]

(6)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 146, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 17th January, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 6th February.)

1. General.

A slight increase of tension became perceptible in Syria during the week, chiefly as a result of a strong speech delivered by Jamil Bey Mardam in the Syrian Chamber on the 13th January, when several Deputies demanded a debate on a Bill already introduced for the creation of a Syrian army if the French refused to hand over the Troupes Spéciales. Replying as Minister of Defence, Jamil Mardam refused the debate on the grounds that the subject should be considered under the appropriate heading of the budget, but then went on to declare that the Government was determined to have an army, that the Troupes Spéciales were Syrian and should not be asked to continue under foreign command, that the Government would not conclude a treaty with France because it would impede the country's progress, and that any treaty they concluded must be on the basis of equality without preference or privilege. The speech was probably designed mainly for internal consumption; a change of Government is expected before long, and both Jamil Mardam, and other Nationalist leaders may well feel it essential that the present Government should give proof of their resolution in defence of nationalist aims beforehand.

As, however, it followed on a series of demonstrations on the question of the army in all the principal towns of Syria and came from the most moderate of all the Syrian leaders, it aroused considerable comment.

There have been no definite incidents between the French and either of the States' Governments except for a somewhat unwise protest by General Beynet against the promulgation of the Syrian Government's new measure on educational reform (see Weekly Summary No. 142 of the 20th December), which produced a sharp retort from the Syrians. But the French and the Governments, especially the Syrian, continue to be barely on speaking terms: both Governments complain bitterly of alleged French intrigues amongst their political opponents and the minorities, and the Syrians are becoming increasingly impatient at the lack of any progress in the matters of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and the issue of arms and motor vehicles for their gendarmerie. The possibility of a serious clash sooner or later cannot, therefore, be ruled out.

The Lebanese Government has not yet issued its official programme, but is expected to adopt the same foreign policy as its predecessor, while emphasising its intention to remedy defects in the internal administration. Veiled attacks on the new Lebanese Ministry have already begun in the newspaper controlled by Riad Solh, and it is clear that the Government will have to face formidable opposition in the Chamber both from the opponents of the régime and from the ex-Ministers who seek to return to power.

Recognition of the Levant States by Turkey seems no nearer. The visit of a Turkish delegation to discuss an exchange of notes for the purpose was announced, but was then countermanded by the Syrian Government, who came to the conclusion that the Turkish Government were endeavouring to ensnare them, by the terms of the recognition formula, into accepting the Turkish annexation of the Hatay, as well as granting them the right to open schools for the teaching of Turkish and to have access for their nationals to the Mixed Courts. The Syrian Government, however, set great store on the recognition and have now requested His Majesty's Government to use their influence to induce the Turkish Government to accord the recognition without linking it with acceptance of the annexation of the Hatay, to which no Syrian Chamber would ever consent in view of its commercial importance in North Syria.

2. Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 1st-7th January, 1945, amounted to 248 tons, a daily average of 35 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944-45 crop up to 173 318 tons.

3. Syria—Damascus.

A Workers' Conference, to which all the principal towns sent delegates, met in Damascus on the 12th January and passed a number of resolutions; some of these were political, including demands for the complete independence of the country, the creation of an army, and the institution of an Arab Workers' Congress, while others dealt with purely internal affairs, such as industrial insurance against accidents, the limitation of hours and the regulation of conditions of work.

It has been announced in the press that exit permits for persons wishing to leave Syria will henceforth be granted by the Syrian *Sûreté Générale*.

4. Aleppo.

There have been further demonstrations in the town and in outlying districts demanding the formation of a national army; the latest information is that the town is partially closed for fear of damage. In addition there has been a demonstration against the Government arising out of a ban on the publication in the press of certain stories concerning local Ravitaillement irregularities.

5. Homs and Hama.

There is still no sign of an alleviation in the economic situation in Homs, where half the weavers are still idle or semi-employed for lack of thread; meanwhile numbers of the weavers continue to leave the city for work in Palestine and Iraq.

The investigation ordered by the Soviet Government into Russian-owned properties in Homs has resulted in a "nil" return. It appears that the Turkish Government did not allow foreign Governments to make purchases of property in their own name, and the purchases in Homs were made by a Russian financed society called The Imperial Beneficial Society, while the title deeds of the properties, now valued at about £S. 180,000 were lodged in the hands of the Greek Orthodox Church. It has been ruled that these now belong entirely to the Greek Orthodox Community.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

Demonstrations against the Government broke out in Deir ez Zor towards the end of December following the announcement of the proposal by the Government to increase the salaries of those officials working in the Euphrates and Jezireh who are not natives of these areas. The flag of the Arab Rebellion was reported to be carried by some of the demonstrators, and speeches, meetings and telegrams were the order of the day.

Méhariste sources in Deir ez Zor report that the French officer commanding of the company there has asked his men to apply for French nationality, which will ensure greater permanency and more pay and promotion. The response among the Méharistes is stated to be negligible, but a similar offer to the *Troisième Bataillon du Levant* is thought to have had greater results.

9. Tribal.

There has been a sharp outbreak of hostilities between the Agaidat and the Shammar. No official details are yet available, but the latest news suggests that a raid by the Agaidat took place on the 13th January at Tchaib, 5 kilom. east of the Iraqi frontier north-east of Abu Kamal in retaliation for a Shammar raid earlier in the month; that it was led by Abdul Aziz el Hiffel with a force of about 2,000 horsemen; that a camp of 25 Shammar tents was completely looted together with 800 camels, and that about 30 Agaidat were killed and considerably more Shammar, including women and children. The Shammar are reported to possess machine guns. The Mohafez has received reinforcements of extra gendarmes from Aleppo.

11. Lebanon.

Selim Bey Tacla, who had been Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs since September 1943, and who was the only member of Riad Solh's Government to retain his place in the newly-formed Ministry, died unexpectedly of heart failure on the 10th January. His funeral the next day was attended by all Allied representatives except General Beynet (who is stated to have been ill). His place in the Ministry was filled by Henry Pharaon, a rich banker related to the President and a consistent supporter of the present régime, who is, however, an inveterate political intriguer; he is indeed generally thought to have been mainly responsible in bringing about the fall of the previous Government by marshalling opposition to Riad Solh amongst Deputies at the behest of the President, and his presence in the Ministry is likely to increase internal opposition to it.

The suggestion of a conference of Christian prelates under the presidency of the Maronite Patriarch was finally shelved at the instance of those who feared a recrudescence of Christian/Moslem friction, but in substitution the Patriarch celebrated the anniversary of his enthronement on the 14th January by a large crowd at Bkerke. Speeches delivered were for the most part anodyne, but the usual reaffirmation of the devotion of the Lebanese Christians to France was made.

On the same day the Communist party held a mass meeting in Beirut, at which the principal Communist leaders spoke. In addition to eulogies of Communist principles and condemnation of fascism, speakers stressed the determination of the party to support Lebanese independence and condemned Zionism. Criticisms were made of previous Lebanese Governments for not having suppressed profiteering or granted their rights to working classes; and some speakers exhorted the Lebanese to maintain their friendship with France, on the grounds that the new France differed from the old one.

12. Press.

The Lebanese press, in the main, welcomes the change of government, but is doubtful whether, in view of the complex nature of the problems to be solved, Abdul Hamid Karami can succeed where his predecessor failed.

The Damascus press is insistent on the immediate transfer of the Hejaz Railway from French to Syrian control.

General Spears's alleged remarks in the United Kingdom on the two dangers threatening the Arab world—Zionism and French insistence on a treaty—have been prominently reported. The pro-French Arabic press and a French-language paper have commented sarcastically on these remarks.

The Lebanese Arabic press utters a warning that the Greater Syria plan is inspired by Zionists with a view to Zionist expansion.

The French-inspired papers have made capital out of an article entitled "France-Angleterre" written by Sir Edward Grigg in August last. One French paper urges close Franco-British co-operation in view of the tremendous power of certain "Leviathan" States. On the question of a treaty with France and the transfer of the armed forces, the Syrian press remains adamant; no treaty and the transfer of the armed forces to Syrian control, failing which Syria will form her own army.

The nationalist papers express satisfaction that King Ibn Saud has authorised the signing of the Alexandria Protocol in his name.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese press announce the forthcoming arrival in the two Levant States' capitals of Turkish missions to discuss Turkish recognition of Syrian and Lebanese Independence.

The Syrian press welcomes the appointment of M. Othman Kassen as Syrian press director, vice Dr. Shakib Jabri.

13. *Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*

On the 12th January, the Free-Arab Station said that General Spears had forgotten to mention the third danger threatening the Lebanon—the Maronite Patriarch, who has always worked for French domination over the Lebanon.

On the 15th January, the Free-Arab Station praised Henry Pharaon as a "brilliant Lebanese leader" who has always opposed French colonisation of the Lebanon.

[E 1271/5/89]

(7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No 147, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 24th January, 1945.—(Received 22nd February.)

General.

THE week has brought a sharp increase in tension between the Syrians and French, mainly over the question of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales.

Following Jamil Mardam's strong speech in the Chamber on the 13th January, orderly students' demonstrations took place in Damascus and in other Syrian towns calling for the creation of a national army, but in some cases shouting anti-French slogans. There were few incidents, but the French took certain military precautions to defend their installations, and their delegate at Damascus on three successive nights broadcast a proclamation to the people reminding them of the French responsibility to ensure the safety of the Allied armies in the country. The Syrians regarded the measures taken as unwarranted and provocative, and sent a note of protest to the French. When this remained unanswered, the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd January summoned all diplomatic representatives in Damascus, and gave them a copy of a further and very stiff note to the French demanding that French troops should be taken off the streets of Damascus. On the 24th January more demonstrations took place in Damascus. The Chamber also began a debate on the budget estimates for a national army, during which several Deputies made violent speeches demanding the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and reaffirming their determination not to conclude any treaty with France. Jamil Mardam, as Government spokesman, was comparatively reasonable, and later in the debate indicated that he still had hopes of obtaining French agreement to the transfer. As a result of this, the Chamber finally passed a unanimous resolution calling on the Government to take over what they described as the "Syrian troops under French command" at the earliest opportunity, and voted the necessary credits for the purpose; they then resolved to continue the present extraordinary session after the 31st January, when it was due to end, obviously in order to keep the Government up to the mark on this question. The press has published several strong articles, one paper quoting Mr. Churchill's statement on the Greek question, to the effect that an independent State has a right to a national army, and that he disapproved of private armies, as supporting the Syrian thesis over the question of the Troupes Spéciales.

In the meantime the Syrian Government have addressed three more notes to General Beynet, the first reiterating their previous demand for the Troupes Spéciales and asking for an early reply; the second asking that French representation in Syria should be placed on a diplomatic basis, as was that of the other Allied nations which had recognised Syrian independence; and the third replying to a French protest against the passing of the recent Syrian Education Reform Bill by stating bluntly that this was a matter of purely internal concern, adding that the French proposals for a university convention were unacceptable as being an infringement of Syrian national sovereignty.

His Majesty's Minister has strongly represented to the Syrian Government the danger of allowing the continuance of demonstrations by students and school-children, which might at any time lead to tragic incidents, and has also urged

General Beynet to prevent any of the defensive military measures which the French authorities might take from assuming an appearance of intimidation. Both sides have indicated their desire to avoid a clash, and the Syrian President stated that he had asked the students to return to work.

On the more general treaty issue the Syrians have on several occasions restated their categorical refusal to make any treaty giving France a pre-eminent position. The Syrian President, having received a note from Ibn Saud urging him to consider the possibility of treating with the French, at once replied stating his inability to do so because to accord France a privileged position would separate Syria from the other Arab States and would be contrary to the interests of those States and Great Britain. It would, however, seem clear that some at least of the Syrian Ministers are coming to the conclusion that a complete refusal on their part to discuss outstanding questions with the French will get them nowhere, and are therefore considering the possibility, first put them some months ago by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and subsequently recalled to their notice by the American Minister, of themselves getting out a draft treaty for presentation to the Four Great Powers. Their view, however, still appears to be that satisfactory solution of the Troupes Spéciales question must precede any discussions on the treaty issue, and that in any case they could not consider making any concessions to France which they could not also make to the other three Powers.

The new Lebanese Government faced the Chamber for the first time on the 20th January. The so-called National group of Deputies comprising most of the former supporters of Emile Eddé did not attend, but sent a spokesman to explain that their abstention was caused by their objection to the Ministry having been composed on party lines. The Prime Minister, in a disappointing speech, declared that the new Government was not a party Government; he expressed confidence that France would fully abide by her promise to the Lebanese and assured the Chamber that one aim was to safeguard Lebanese independence. After a short debate a vote of confidence was passed unanimously by the thirty-seven Deputies present. The new Foreign Minister, M. Henry Pharaon, has issued a statement to the press declaring that his Government would follow the same foreign policy as their predecessors, and that this would never vary whatever difficulties had to be faced.

The Turkish Consul-General in Beirut has asked the Lebanese Government to use their good offices with a view to promoting a settlement between Syria and Turkey over the terms of the formula by which Turkey is to recognise Syrian independence (see Weekly Political Summary No. 146).

Mgr. Alexandros Tahan, Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and all the East, and two of his archbishops, left Damascus by B.O.A.C. aircraft on the 18th January for Tehran on his way to take part in the enthronement of the Patriarch of all the Russias.

Syria—Damascus.

The demonstrations on the army question (see "General" above) were mild for Damascus and were entirely confined to students and school-children. The population did not participate, and appears so far largely indifferent to the subject. The Chamber of Deputies, however, is clearly solidly behind the Government in the stand they are taking. The French authorities, so far as can be judged, have done little which can be described as provocative, though at one time it was reported that the troops in charge of French military installations had orders to shoot at the slightest provocation.

Apart from the army issue, the Government's position is not strong and up to forty Deputies are now said to have been pressing the President for a change of Ministry. Present indications are that the President has been left a free hand to make the change whenever he considers the moment opportune.

Four sessions of the Chamber have been held during the week to discuss the budget estimates. The debate on the army estimates has been reported above. On the 20th January a motion to abolish the President's free disposal of his funds and to place these under the responsibility of a Minister was wholly defeated. On the 22nd January, on the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, the Chamber abolished the credits proposed for the salaries of the French advisers, and also defeated a Government amendment that the services of certain French "technical advisers" should be retained. On the 25th January, on the estimates of the Ministry of Justice, certain Deputies criticised the Government

for not having abolished the Mixed Courts. On a further debate on the estimates of the Ministry of National Economy, one Deputy criticised the O.C.P. on the remarkable grounds that it kept the price of cereals uneconomically low. The responsible Minister merely advised that the question should be brought up when the Ministry of Supply estimates were debated.

The Chamber has also decided to send a telegram to General Spears thanking him for his defence of the Syrian cause. A similar telegram will be sent to the House of Commons.

The Chamber has also voted £5,500,000 as a first contribution towards the proposed Arab Propaganda Bureau.

The Syrian Posts and Telegraphs Department have installed a private telephone system connecting the Presidency, the Ministers, and certain Government offices. It is proposed eventually to duplicate all important telephone lines throughout Syria. The existing telephone system is run by the French military authorities and the purpose of this new development is to ensure Government communications during times of political crisis.

Aleppo.

A further demonstration took place on the 20th January by students in favour of a national army; speeches uncomplimentary to the French were made and some leaflets distributed denouncing the idea of a treaty with France, reminding the people that France had gone back on her previous promises and blaming the French for having handed over the Hatay to the Turks.

The local press, with one exception, has continued to criticise the Government and the unpopular Ravitaillement Department.

The filature on the 22nd January began to sell 5-metre lengths of cotton material at less than 40 per cent. of last week's prices to impecunious holders of ravitaillement cards. It is intended that 100,000 such packets should be sold in Aleppo, after which sales will continue in the surrounding districts.

Homs and Hama.

Further demonstrations took place in Homs by students from schools of all creeds in favour of a national army. Most of the speeches were anti-French but there were no dangerous developments. In Hama, however, demonstrations were of a more serious nature and the suqs remained closed for two days. A French ambulance was attacked with stones and a Syrian officer of the Troupes Spéciales was mistaken for a French officer and severely manhandled; an attempt by one section of the mob to attack the S.S.A. office and the Troupes Spéciales barracks was prevented by the wiser counsels of the leaders.

It is reported that Helmi Atassi, the Homs Deputy, a Monarchist and leader of the Government Opposition element, is proposing again to visit the Emir Abdullah in Amman in order to discuss the question of a Syrian monarchy. He is said, however, to have been warned by Saadullah Jabri that he will be arrested if this visit is made.

Jebel Druze.

Colonel Oliva-Roget visited Soueida, where he is reported to have complained to the Mohafez of his close connexions with the Syrian Government and to have urged him not to forget his oldest and most sincere friends, the French. Colonel Oliva-Roget subsequently visited the head of the A'ssali family and, in answer to a question put to him concerning the army, is said to have declared that there was no question of handing over the Troupes Spéciales to the Syrian Government as long as "a foreign army" was in occupation of the country.

Alaouite Territory.

Recent demonstrations in favour of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales has resulted in some tension between members of this force and the local inhabitants, and there have been a few minor incidents.

The Mohafez considers that the soldiers are unnecessarily rough in dealing with civilians and are not sufficiently controlled by their French officers, but has instructed the gendarmerie to exercise restraint in dealing with them and to use the minimum force necessary to keep the situation under control.

Contact between the Mohafez, who is an exceptionally level-headed and able official, and the local French *délégué* has now virtually ceased to exist. This lack of liaison may cause difficulties in case of serious trouble in the future.

No further developments regarding the union of the Alaouite Territory with Syria have taken place, but reliable reports suggest that the French authorities are encouraging certain of the Alaouite leaders to maintain a policy of separtism.

Tribal.

No further incidents have been reported between the Agaidat and Shammar (see Weekly Political Summary No. 146). After discussions between the Mohafez of Deir-*ez-Zor* and the *Délégué* one troop of *Méharistes* have proceeded to the Abu Kemal area; an additional 100 gendarmes have also been sent from Aleppo, though, since they are without adequate transport, they will be able to do little more than settle down in some inhabited locality.

A meeting has taken place at Ana in Iraq 50 miles east of Abu Kemal between the Iraqi authorities and the Kaimakam of Abu Kemal, accompanied by the commandant of the Euphrates gendarmerie and a French officer of the *Contrôle* Bedouin, but no official figures of casualties and lootings have yet been received. Iraqi mobile police are now reported to be patrolling the battle area between the two tribes with armoured cars.

If adequate action is taken by the Iraqi authorities the trouble may remain localised, though it is probable that, if the Amarat in Iraq should join with the Shammar, other semi-sedentary tribes in East Syria, such as the Bagarra and Afadla, will give help to the Agaidat.

Sheikh Mohamed el Faraj of the Wulda has returned to his tribe; he paid an early visit to the British Consul in Aleppo to express his gratitude for good treatment and his intention of helping in any way possible.

Lebanon.

Great interest is being taken in the Lebanon in the present excitement in Syria in connexion with the Troupes Spéciales question and Franco-Syrian relations in general. The Syrian Foreign Minister paid an official visit to Beirut on the 22nd January with the object of showing Syrian-Lebanese collaboration and inducing the new Government to support actively the Syrians in the representations they have recently addressed to the French. Whilst in entire sympathy with the Syrians, the Lebanese Government seem to consider that in the present circumstances the Lebanon should leave it to Syria to take the initiative in treating with the French and should content itself with showing passive support.

The new Government is displaying the usual new-broom tendencies and a number of corrupt officials are stated to have been arrested as a result of the Prime Minister's enquiries into the working of the departments. Conferences on supply and internal security have been held, but no important measures have yet been issued. The removal of internal press censorship has allowed a number of newspapers to publish more or less open strictures on Riad Solh and other members of the outgoing Ministry and to ask for enquiries into alleged abuses committed by them during their term of office.

Violent criticisms of the recently passed income tax law in the Lebanon have appeared in several papers. The law is characterised as oppressing the poor and letting off the rich, and demands for its revision have been addressed to the Prime Minister. The law is not, so far as is known, yet being executed.

Abdul Hamid Karami's assassins are still at large and the gendarmerie are no nearer making any arrest.

Some uneasiness in Christian circles is reported from the Bekaa at Abdul Hamid Karami's formation of the new Ministry, and the French appear to be encouraging the Christians to believe that the Karami Government cannot last, as the Christians of the Lebanon, particularly the Maronites, are unwilling to support it.

[E 1272/5/89]

(8)

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 148, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon*, 31st January, 1945.—(Received 22nd February.)

General.

THE appeals for calm made by the Syrian Government to the students were successful in preventing any recurrence of demonstrations in Damascus from the 25th to 29th January. On the 28th January the students of Beirut, apparently inspired by emissaries from Syria, staged a demonstration which caused the town to close; Tripoli and Sidon closed on the same day. There was no disorder in Beirut, apart from a slight fracas at the French school, the principal of which endeavoured to prevent the students from joining the demonstration. On the 29th January there was more serious trouble in Soueida, where all the windows of the French Club were broken, and the crowd at one time appeared menacing towards the French. Other demonstrations took place on different dates in Homs, Hama, Latakia and Aleppo. News of these incidents was largely responsible for a recrudescence of demonstrations in Damascus on the 30th January, but things returned to normal on the following day.

There was no lessening of tension between the French and the Syrian authorities. Count Ostrorog saw the Syrian President on the 27th January and had to listen to what appears to have been one of the strongest expositions of Syrian grievances against the French yet to be put to the French authorities. In reply, Count Ostrorog complained of Syrian insults to France. He later expressed the opinion that negotiations between France and Syria could not be started in the existing atmosphere.

Both the French and the States authorities seem, however, convinced of the necessity of taking all possible steps to avoid incidents which, in the present highly-charged state of the atmosphere, might result in a serious clash. The efforts of His Majesty's Legation have been directed towards pressing both sides to display moderation.

Public utterances abroad have done nothing to ease the situation. Sir E. Spears's lecture before the Royal Empire Society and other public statements have infuriated the French and their supporters, but have, on the other hand, drawn a telegram of thanks from the Syrian Chamber and numerous approving articles in the Nationalist press of both States. General de Gaulle's ungracious reference, at a press conference in Paris, to "foreign interference" between France and the States, have similarly provoked Nationalist opinion, which is particularly incensed at his assertion of France's determination to retain her pre-eminent position.

Rumours have begun to circulate regarding the state of health of the Lebanese President. It will be remembered that in mid-December he broke his arm; whilst still suffering from the sleeplessness caused by this accident he had to undergo the strain of the Lebanese ministerial reshuffle; and directly after the formation of the new Ministry he suffered the loss of his life-long friend and collaborator, Selim Takla. For the last fortnight he has been confined to his room and has been unable to attend to any business or to receive any of his Ministers; and it is being freely said that he is suffering from a form of melancholia so acute as to have affected his reason. Since the Lebanese Constitution does not provide for any delegation of the President's powers of signature in circumstances such as these, no major legislation can take place until he is fit to resume work. It has now been decided that he shall spend two or three weeks recuperating in Palestine; if at the end of this period he cannot resume his functions, the Council of Ministers will be obliged to take a decision as to what is to be done.

Syria—Damascus.

Abdul Rahaman Haqqi has presented his letters of credence as Egyptian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the President of the Syrian Republic on the 21st January.

Aleppo.

The general situation deteriorated during the week, though no really serious incidents have as yet occurred.

On the 26th January, at the Mosque services, there were speeches demanding the army, but the demonstrations that were expected to follow were prevented by the Syrian authorities. On the following morning, however, many schoolboys paraded the streets and some of the shops closed. There were shouts against the

French and a few for the British; a separate Armenian group was reported to have shouted for Russian help. On the 29th January the students started to threaten shopkeepers that they would suffer unless they closed, and most of the town ceased business, thus liberating many undesirable elements from their normal work. Efforts were also made by the students to stop the tramway services. The French had guards ready inside certain of their buildings, but these were kept out of sight and did not have to act.

Homs and Hama.

Half-hearted demonstrations continued during the week in Homs and the suqs were partially closed. In Hama there were no further demonstrations. Printed pamphlets were posted over the town signed "The Students of Syria." The most interesting of these contained the well-known phrase of the late Emir Faisal: "Independence should be taken, not given."

Jebel Druze.

Demonstrations in favour of a national army took place in Soueida on the 29th January, when school-children and older students, joined by some 200 of the general population, marched to the Serail, where the Mohafez made a speech promising to transmit the wishes of the population to the competent Syrian authorities. The demonstrators then proceeded towards the house of the French Délégué and *en route* stopped at the French Officers' Club, the windows of which were broken by stones. The demonstrators were driven back towards the Serail by French officers and French-commanded Druze troops. Shots were fired into the air by both French troops and by gendarmes stationed outside the Serail, and later some of the demonstrators broke several windows in the French Délégué's house. No serious casualties were reported.

When news of these incidents reached Damascus the President of the Syrian Republic ordered the Druze Deputies, the Inspector-General of Gendarmerie and the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior to proceed immediately to Soueida and to use their influence to calm the population. A further manifestation took place the following day, but the demonstrators dispersed without incident.

The French Délégué placed guards on all French installations and houses occupied by French personnel.

If serious disorders occur elsewhere similar troubles may be expected in Soueida, and subsequently elsewhere in the Jebel Druze. There is undoubtedly strong feeling on the subject of the army, but the Druze are unlikely to play a lone hand unless their own interests are immediately at stake.

Alaouite.

Further demonstrations for the handing over of the army took place on the 27th and 28th January and assumed an openly anti-French tone. Although no incidents have yet taken place, their likelihood is increasing.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

Interest in the Communist party continues to grow, though there are no indications that there is any direct Russian sponsorship. Conditions of life in the area are feudal and the Central Government enjoys little popularity, since it has brought no obvious advantages to the Euphrates and Jezireh areas, which is therefore ready to accept a new, and successful, political system.

Tribal.

As a result of the measures taken by the Iraqi Government and by the Syrian and French authorities, no further clashes have taken place between the Ageidat and the Shammar. The causes of the clash, however, will not be removed until such time as a settlement takes place of all outstanding claims between the two tribes.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has made no secret of his satisfaction that the Lebanese should have manifested sympathy with the demands of the States' Governments for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. His Government has addressed a note to Colonel Beynet asking that the transfer of the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales should take place as soon as possible; a further note asked that French representation in the Lebanon should be put on a diplomatic basis. The despatch of these notes obviously followed the visit last week of the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Lebanese Government, though recognised as well-intentioned and honest, is being attacked not only openly by the regular Opposition but covertly by Riad Solh and his partisans, who maintain that Abdul Hamid Karami's ministerial declaration was too weak in tone and that the Government is not capable of defending the cause of Lebanese independence. Riad Solh himself, whilst outwardly prepared to encourage and support the Government, is obviously anxious to return to power at the earliest possible moment and may be expected to spare no efforts to that end.

A communiqué published by the Lebanese Government on the 25th January announced that all Lebanese in foreign employ must within two months register their names, occupations and rates of pay with the Ministry of the Interior. The communiqué refers to the Lebanese Nationality Law, under which Lebanese accepting employment under foreign occupation without permission are liable to be deprived of their nationality. It is understood that the Government's intention is merely to obtain a record of such persons and to reserve the right to take action against them if the occasion arises.

The press reports that the Soviet Minister has visited the Prime Minister in order to discuss a project for sending Lebanese students to Moscow, Kiev and other centres of education in the U.S.S.R.

The Government have cancelled a decree passed by their predecessors which prohibited the transport of all food-stuffs within the Lebanon. The prohibition is maintained as regards the transport of food-stuffs beyond the frontier.

The reinforcement of gendarmes sent to Tripoli after the attack on Abdul Hamid Karami are being withdrawn, with the exception of 100 men who are to be posted permanently at Tripoli as a special reserve. The Mohafez of Tripoli has been in constant touch with his opposite number in Lattakia in connexion with the Karami case and has asked that the local leaders in the Alaouite territory be approached with a view to assisting in the search for the assailants.

A free distribution of cloth is to be made to local orphanages and workmen's organisations in Tripoli by the directors of the Arida mills.

[E 1400/5/89]

(9)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 149, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 7th February, 1945.—(Received 28th February.)

General.

THE statement issued by the French Council of Ministers after their meeting of the 2nd February to the effect that France was responsible for internal security in the States caused a recurrence of large-scale demonstrations throughout Syria on the 4th February. The Syrian Government continued to preach calm, and after two more days the towns returned to normal.

As a result of a further approach made by His Majesty's Minister to the President of the Syrian Republic on the 3rd February, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for Count Ostrorog on the 5th February with a view to reopening discussions. He suggested that the French should state exactly what they wanted, adding that the Syrian Government would consider their proposals, subject always to the proviso that Syria's independence would not be prejudiced in any way. The only demand which the Syrians had was for the *Troupes Spéciales*. Count Ostrorog replied that he had no instructions from the French Government, but would immediately ask General Beynet to telegraph an account of the conversations to Paris, although a reply was not to be expected for a week or so. He added that, in his view, the only way of reaching a final settlement on outstanding matters was for a representative of the Syrian Government to go to Paris in order to convince the French Government on the spot of the Syrian point of view. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, felt that it would be better for the French Government to put their proposals first, as a visit resulting in discord would only make matters worse.

Rumours about the state of health of the Lebanese President have continued to circulate. He left for Tiberias on the 14th January for a period of complete rest and reassuring bulletins have since been issued announcing that he is rapidly recovering; there are, however, some grounds for believing that these are over-optimistic. No special arrangements have been made for dealing with major business during his absence.

Syria—Damascus.

Reports current in Damascus on the 4th February that the Syrian Government had resigned proved to be unfounded. The Prime Minister had, in fact, apparently pressed for his resignation to be accepted, but the Government had decided that in the present tense state of relations with the French no change of Ministry could be envisaged.

On the 29th January the revenue side of the budget was passed, including additional taxes imposed to meet the expenditure of £8.15 million under the army vote. These included additional taxes on kerosene, benzine, entertainment, stamp dues, postal services, cigarettes, sugar, electricity, cattle and a new poll tax to be applied on men between the ages of 20 and 40. The budget was finally approved, four members only having voted against it.

The first sitting of the extraordinary session took place on the 1st February. A suggestion by the Speaker that the House should adjourn for fifteen days was not well received and the Government was invited to make a statement regarding the army. Jamil Mardam, in reply, stated that they were making every endeavour to assure that the result desired by the nation should be achieved, and added that, if the Chamber would continue to give the Government its confidence for a few more days, he hoped that he would have good news. In a secret session later in the day it is reliably reported that a demand was made that the basis of the present Government should be widened; the Prime Minister is said to have replied that he and his colleagues had considered this, but were afraid lest any change should be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Referring to General de Gaulle's recent declaration on the subject of French pre-eminent position in Syria, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Government had already informed the Allies that Syria was not prepared to allow such a position to any nation.

The Iraqi Government is reported to have replied favourably to the Syrian Government's suggestion that Syrian nationals should attend the military and police schools in Iraq.

A delegation of Syrian university students will shortly leave for Iraq and a group of law students are expected to leave for Egypt within the next few days. The technical adviser to the Ministry of Education has stated that the *Futuwwa* (Youth movement) will be included in the school curricula for next year.

On the 31st January the President gave a luncheon-party in honour of Soltan Pasha Atrash which was attended by the Deputies for the Jebel Druze.

Aleppo.

The demonstrations and excitement in the town on the 29th January died away more quickly than was generally expected, but the statement of the decision of the French Cabinet has caused considerable resentment. It is noteworthy that the Syrians have taken special care to emphasise Christian and Moslem solidarity in their demonstrations, and, though much sympathy for the French exists among the minorities, this has not been loudly expressed.

The French as a whole have shown sensible restraint under provocation in recent days.

Homs and Hama.

In general, the situation in Homs and Hama has remained tense and demonstrations by students have continued, though there have been no actual clashes between demonstrators and French representatives.

The sheikhs of the two towns are reported to have decided to attack the French should the occasion arise, but to have declared that they would not act under Government orders, preferring to place themselves under Fawwaz Shaalan; they estimate that they could raise some 10,000 armed men with seventy automatic guns.

Jebel Druze.

There have been no further demonstrations and the area is at present quiet. Soltan Pasha Atrash has visited the President of the Republic and is thought to have urged him to sanction a national revolt, which he (Soltan Pasha) would be prepared to lead. The President rejected this proposal, but is reported to have told Soltan Pasha that, if the French had not given way on the question of the army before the 20th February, he would summon a conference of national leaders to decide what action should be taken. Meanwhile, Soltan Pasha is said

to have been instructed to return to the Jebel Druze to direct a campaign to foster disaffection amongst the officers of the French-commanded Druze squadrons. The civilian population is well armed with rifles (a large proportion of which are British), sub-machine guns and possibly a few machine guns, and the situation must be regarded as potentially dangerous, for, apart from the danger that the French may themselves provoke a clash, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Soltan Pasha and the Atrash clan may disregard the directions of the Government and decide to raise a revolt themselves.

Alaouite Territory.

On the 5th February fighting broke out in the Jobit Burghal area, home of Sulaiman Murshid, whose followers are fighting the men of Hassan Abbud and other Alaouite chiefs of the Mhelbe area. It is reported that this state of affairs has followed two visits to Imfatih, chief wife of Sulaiman Murshid, by Lieutenant Berge of the French Political Office on the instructions of Captain Boussiquet. The facts are not yet clear, but by pure chance a British major carrying out a route reconnaissance of the road to Jobit Burghal two hours or so behind Lieutenant Berge was stopped at a road block of stones by about ten armed Alaouites. On finding he was British, the men allowed him to pass. In view of the recent French advances to Alaouite chiefs and the differences of opinion between the Délégué Adjoint, Lieutenant-Colonel Gausson, and his Political Officer, Captain Boussiquet, which have resulted in the resignation of the former, trouble in the area was expected.

Lebanon.

Beirut rapidly returned to normal after demonstrations of the 28th January, and a further demonstration announced for the 3rd February did not materialise.

On the 3rd February the Lebanese Foreign Minister informed the Chamber of Deputies of the notes which he had addressed to General Beynet asking for the transfer of the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales and for the establishment of French representation in the Lebanon on a diplomatic basis. A lively debate followed, during which many Deputies spoke strongly in favour of the immediate creation of a national army. Speakers described the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales as being composed of Lebanese and paid for by Lebanese money, and criticised the French authorities for not having handed them over under the terms of General Catroux's agreement of the 22nd December, 1943. One speaker quoted Mr. Churchill's words, spoken in connexion with the Greek situation, to the effect that every State had the right to a national army and that he did not approve of "private armies" (translated as "Troupes Spéciales"), and applied them to the present situation in the Levant States. After the Prime Minister had announced that the Government had set aside £Leb.5 million for the expenses of an army and were continuing to press the French for the transfer of the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales, the Chamber, by a unanimous vote, expressed its support for the Government's policy in regard to the settlement of the Troupes Spéciales and all other questions outstanding with the French authorities.

The bye-election in Mount Lebanon to fill the vacancy in the Chamber caused by the death of Selim Tacla will take place early next month, and various parties are already nominating candidates. First in the field were the Phalangists, who nominated their general secretary, but Riad Solh is understood to be opposing them on the grounds that their present hostility to the Alexandria Protocol shows that they are not good Lebanese Nationalists; and it is possible that the Constitutional party may also produce a candidate. It is therefore likely that this unimportant election may provide a forum for general and embittered expositions of the rival political theories in the Lebanon.

Communist leaders in the Bekaa are reported to be maintaining close contact with the French through the Sûreté aux Armées.

Mazhar Omari has recently been in contact with the Foreign Minister and Colonel Nouredine Rifai in Beirut and it is probable that, having quarrelled with the Mokaddem family, he will shortly surrender to the authorities together with other members of his gang and will furnish the gendarmerie with information which may ultimately lead to the arrest of the assailants of Abdul Hamid Kerami.

[E 1401/5/89]

(10)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 150, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 14th February, 1945.—(Received 28th February.)

General.

Everyone is anxiously awaiting the return of the President of the Syrian Republic from his visit to Jedda and Cairo, and for the past week there has been an expectant lull in both Syria and the Lebanon. It is freely hinted that as a result of the President's discussions with King Abdul Aziz and with Arab statesmen in Cairo the Syrian Government will shortly be able to release good news. In addition, while no official statement has been made concerning the resumption of negotiations with the French, rumours have leaked out, and in consequence the students have been persuaded to refrain from renewing their demonstrations before the 20th February; on the surface therefore all appears to be quiet.

The Lebanese President is still in Tiberias; a bulletin issued on the 10th February, stated that his health was improving rapidly, and it is known that he has signed a number of decrees on routine matters. On the other hand, no one outside his own family has seen him since his departure, and the Lebanese Prime Minister has stated in confidence that according to his information the President cannot be expected to recover for two months at least. The Government seem, however, content to let the matter drift for the moment.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments have issued communiqués in similar terms replying to the reported decision of the French Council of Ministers regarding internal security of the Levant States; they state that the Lebanese and Syrian Governments are alone responsible for internal security in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol signed in July 1944, and add that no other authority has the right to interfere in this matter.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 1st-7th February, 1945, amount to 326 tons, a daily average of 46 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944-45 crop up to 174,604 tons.

It is reported from Aleppo that the local crop prospects are good, although unfavourable conditions may still seriously affect the ultimate crop.

Syria-Damascus.

The President accompanied by Mohsen Barazi, Secretary-General, Issam Inglisi, Chef de Bureau and Captain Daghistani, A.D.C., left Damascus on the 8th February in aircraft provided by His Majesty's Government for Jedda; the news of his departure was communicated to the press the same day in an official statement.

At a sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th February, in reply to searching questions by the Deputies regarding the army, the Prime Minister made out a strong case that the only way to reach a solution was by negotiation. He explained that the Troupes Spéciales could either be handed over by the French or by the Allied High Command or, alternatively, they might be persuaded by the Syrians to transfer their allegiance; this last alternative was fraught with danger, and it was of vital importance that no disturbance should take place. He reminded the Chamber that the Allies had given assurances that the rights of Syria would be respected. He added that the Government were confident that they could rely on the full support of the other Arab States. The Chamber then adjourned until the 20th February.

Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, left Damascus for Cairo on the 12th February to represent Syria at the Cairo conference of the League of Arab States.

Dr. Najib Bey Armanazi and his staff left for London on the 5th February. It is believed that he will be accredited to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Lebanese Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs visited Damascus on the 6th February when they are reported to have discussed with their Syrian opposite numbers the question of the army, the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League and economic relations between Syria and the Lebanon.

Aleppo.

The town has remained quiet during the week; one reason given by the Mohafez in his appeal to the students to return to work was that opponents of Syrian unity were describing their protests and demonstrations as being made against the new taxes for the army rather than against the retention of the army by the French.

The Moudarres Filature continues to sell cotton material to the poor at much under market rates. Distribution has extended even to Damascus, always under the President's patronage.

Homs and Hama.

Homs and Hama remained closed during the first part of the week, but partly reopened on the 9th February, following a report that negotiations were going on in the Hedjaz and in Cairo on the subject of the Syrian army. The town has remained out of bounds to French troops during most of the week, and as a result there have been no incidents.

Jebel Druze.

On his return to Soueida, Soltan Pasha is reported to have advised the more important notables to be patient, at least for the time being, and a demonstration planned for the 10th February did not take place.

The French Délégué has assured the political officer that there is no intention of drafting Sengalese troops into the area.

Alaouite Territory.

The fighting in the Jobit Burghal area (see Section 7 of Weekly Political Summary, No. 149) did not spread to other areas of the Jebel Alaouite. On the 9th February Colonel Bonnot, the new French Délégué Adjoint for Lattakia called on the Mohafez and suggested sending French forces into the mountains to prevent further bloodshed. The Mohafez refused, explaining that he had 300 gendarmes advancing on the rebels and was confident of taking Jobit and crushing the revolt. Nevertheless on the 10th February three French companies in lorries with five armoured cars were sent up, arriving in Jobit on the same evening. In the early hours of the 11th February Commandant Rissac, the officer commanding the French force, sent word to Commandant Muhammad Ali of the Gendarmerie to the effect that if the Gendarmerie would cease fire the French would see that the rebels also did so. The commandant of the Gendarmerie accepted, the fighting stopped, the Gendarmerie withdrew and the French occupied Jobit and the positions previously held by the Gendarmerie.

The Mohafez of Lattakia is convinced that the followers of Sulaiman Murshid were egged on and provided with arms by the French to rebel against the central Government, and there have been a number of incidents reported which support this theory. While there is little doubt that the intervention of the French Troupes Spéciales prevented further bloodshed, it is equally certain that as a result of their intervention the Syrian nationals in open revolt against Government forces received protection from French troops.

His Majesty's Minister and General Holmes discussed the incident with General Beynet and all agreed that a British, French and Syrian commission of enquiry should be set up to investigate the causes leading up to the incident and the steps to be taken to prevent any repetition. His Majesty's Consul in Damascus pressed the President of the Council of Ministers to agree to such action, but Fares Bey maintained that the point of interest to the Syrian Government was not the incident itself but the intervention of the French troops, which he held was contrary to the Sûreté Protocol of the 22nd July, 1944. He handed His Majesty's Consul a copy of the letter he had sent the previous day to General Beynet, objecting to the interference of Captain Boussiquet, the French Political Officer at Lattakia and members of his staff and asking for his removal.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese delegation to attend the Cairo Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers left Beirut on the 11th February. It was composed of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, two Moslem Deputies, Saib Salam and Abdullah Yafi, and two Christian magistrates. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, before leaving, stated

that his intention was to propose to the Congress the following three suggestions for the statutes of the future Arab League:—

- (a) that any signatory shall have the right to withdraw from the League at any time;
- (b) that the decisions of the League shall not become operative unless they have been unanimously approved by all the members of the League;
- (c) that each independent nation forming part of the League shall have the right to conclude treaties with any other State, provided that such treaties are not unfriendly towards the other members of the League.

The declaration made to the London press by Camille Chamoun caused considerable local comment. Extreme Christian circles seized on one phrase, which implied that signatories of the Alexandria Protocol could not conclude treaties with other Powers without the consent of the other signatories, and made it an occasion for hostile comment. The Government, under the influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has recently been displaying over-anxiousness to placate these elements, on the 7th February issued a communiqué denying that this version of Chamoun's declaration was correct. For this precipitate action the Government has been bitterly criticised by Nationalist circles, amongst which Chamoun's prestige has risen high. An abusive article in the French controlled newspaper *L'Orient*, which has earned that paper its suspension, has also aroused sympathy for Chamoun.

It is reported from Bekaa that an attempt is being made to form a Communist party in Hermel, and that the move is being inspired by the French Political Officer at Baalbek to counter the influence of the Najjade and Parti Populaire Syrian parties.

[E 1647/5/89]

(11)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 151, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 21st February, 1945.—(Received 9th March.)

1. General.

THE Syrian President, whose return from Cairo had been eagerly awaited, arrived at Mezze airport on the 18th February with Saadullah Bey Jabri in an aircraft provided by the United States Government, and was received by members of the Government and Diplomatic Corps and some notables. Before returning to the Presidency he made a speech in which he referred to his discussions with King Abdul Aziz and King Farouk and with leading Arab statesmen and representatives of the Great Powers. He said that he had received assurances of support for Syrian aims, but that the way might be long; and he called for obedience from his people. His speech was widely reported in Syria and the Lebanon, and while it has done little to allay apprehensions about the future course of events it has on the whole had the effect of discouraging any suggestion of precipitate action by the Syrians. The President is expected to visit Bagdad in the near future.

A sitting of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies was held on the 22nd February at which the Government were questioned concerning the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. The Prime Minister, answering for the Government, asked that the Deputies should remain patient and follow the advice of the President to take no precipitate action.

The statement by Mr. Richard Law in the House of Commons, to the effect that the British endorsement of the independence of the Levant States did not amount to a guarantee, has been much publicised in the Lebanon and has aroused considerable comment. The Syrian Government imposed a censorship stop and there was, therefore, no newspaper comment, although various garbled versions rapidly spread throughout the country and caused some uneasiness. In the Lebanon press, articles expressed varying degrees of criticism; one paper welcomed the declaration as proving that Great Britain did not envisage any sort of control over the States, but other papers reproached the British Government for lack of frankness and suggested that Great Britain had no right to

use the States as a bargaining counter in her relations with France or to make secret agreements at their expense. The Communist newspaper, *Sa'at Esh-Shaab*, declared roundly that Great Britain was failing to support the States' independence, and that their hope, therefore, could only be placed in the U.S.S.R. Fears have been widely expressed in conversation that British policy was following the same lines as in 1919-20, and that Great Britain intended to let down the Levant States by withdrawing her support from them in their struggle to achieve liberation from French control, in the interests of her relations with France. Although the multiplicity of statements abroad on the Levant States during the past few weeks has confused public opinion to such an extent that this new one is not regarded too tragically, there is no doubt that confidence in Great Britain has, for the moment at least, been shaken and the prestige of pro-French elements enhanced.

The Lebanese President is still in Palestine, and reassuring statements as to his improvement are still being made. It is understood that he has been able not only to sign but to discuss certain decrees taken down to him by his Ministers for his consideration; no indication has, however, yet been made as to the date on which he may be expected to resume his functions.

2. Economic.

Total purchases during the period 8th-15th February, 1945, amounted to 285 tons, a daily average of 36 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 174,862 tons.

On the 18th February the Chamber of Commerce in Aleppo was asked to state immediately the amount of dollar exchange required this year by Aleppo merchants. After discussion the Chamber replied that the merchants felt so dissatisfied with their treatment in regard to import quotas, as compared with Damascus competitors, that they were unable to state any figure. This was presumably not intended as a final word, but as an indication of local feeling.

3. Syria—Damascus.

There have been no student demonstrations or strikes and the situation has returned more or less to normal in the commercial quarters and in the Suqs. The news, however, of clashes in the Lattakia area between Suleiman Murshid's supporters and their opponents, and the subsequent unsolicited intervention by the Troupes Spéciales (see section 7 of this report) caused considerable perturbation in Syrian Government circles, and the Prime Minister was only with difficulty dissuaded by the British authorities from sending a strong letter of protest to General Beynet. These incidents, serious in themselves, may well have an unfavourable effect on any negotiations between the French and Syrian authorities. Laudable restraint, however, was observed by the Syrian authorities as far as the press was concerned, comments being restricted to statements that differences between two families had occurred in the Lattakia Mohafazat which had called for the intervention of the Government, but that the situation was now under control.

Dr. Nazim Kudsi, Syrian Minister to Washington, and Mr. Adnam Atassi, Syrian Minister to Paris, left Damascus on the 12th February for Egypt to take up their posts.

The conclusion of an Iraqi-Syrian trade agreement is reported in the press, as is also the Iraqi Government's request for six additional Syrian doctors.

The Tutuwwa (Youth Movement) draft law has been approved by the Council of Ministers. Invitations to the Students' Congress, the date of which has been fixed for the 20th July, have been sent to the Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine.

The Greek Orthodox Patriarch arrived in Damascus on the 16th February after his visit to Moscow for the enthronement of the Patriarch of all the Russians.

4. Aleppo.

Aleppo has been quiet during the week though the journey of the Syrian President and the arrival of General Catroux in Beirut has naturally raised much interest and speculation. Incidents in the Alaouite territory (paragraph 7 of this report) have also been much discussed, and the French action is generally considered to have been incorrect and is resented.

The visit of a certain Najet Kassab from Damascus was made the occasion for Communist meetings at which it was reported that the ineffectiveness of the Government's ravitaillement administration came in for special criticism.

5. Homs and Hama.

No further demonstrations have taken place during the week except for a short-lived strike of the Tajhiz in Hama on the 13th February.

Villagers of the Keilani and Azem villages west of the Orontes are demanding protection or failing that arms. A raid by Alaouites has been reported from the Ain el Kroum area in which two villagers are said to have been killed.

6. Jebel Druze.

Colonel Oliva Roget arrived at Soueida on the 15th February and on the following day reviewed the Druze squadrons. He subsequently addressed the officers and n.c.o.s and is reported to have thanked them for their loyalty to France during the recent disorders, and to have stated that the transfer of the army to the control of the Syrian authorities was under discussion, but that an early solution was not to be expected; he asked them in the meantime to maintain an attitude of calm. He concluded by announcing that increases in pay were under consideration in Paris.

Colonel Oliva Roget asked Captain Hamad el Atrash, cousin of the Emir Atrash, about the morale of the Druze squadrons and the extent to which their loyalty to France could be relied upon in the event of insurrection breaking out under the leadership of Soltan Pasha. Captain Hamad states that he warned Colonel Oliva Roget that the morale of the squadrons was low and that they could not be relied upon to support the French cause in any dispute in which the Druzes were involved.

7. Alaouite.

There has been no further development in the situation in the Jobit Borghol area (see *Weekly Political Summary* No. 150, section 7) though all reports state that fraternisation is taking place between members of the Troupes Spéciales and Murshid partisans and that the latter, inflated by French support, are actively canvassing for the support of other Alaouites. French forces remain at Jobit and another company arrived on the 18th February. The bulk of the gendarmerie forces are at Meten east of Qerdeha, where they were withdrawn after the intervention of the Troupes Spéciales.

On the 21st February His Majesty's Minister and the Army Commander, in the course of a long conversation with the President of the Republic, persuaded him to agree in principle to a Tripartite Commission to enquire into the recent events in Alaouite Territory (see paragraph 3, section 7, *Weekly Political Summary* No. 150). The President, however, maintained the attitude that he did not want any enquiry into the cause and origins of the trouble (which might have revealed that Suleiman Murshid had been detained for seven months although a deputy, without any legal enquiry into his depredations). The President was urged to arrange immediate adjudication of all important claims against Murshid and to discuss the Jobit situation frankly with General Beynet, who called upon him later in the day. He and the President agreed that French troops would be withdrawn at once and the gendarmerie shortly afterwards. The General may have agreed to this action in view of the possibility that the Commission would have brought to light facts concerning French encouragement of a separatist movement.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

During the past three weeks there have been demonstrations on five occasions in support of Syrian independence in Deir-az-Zor, but these came to an end after the Mohafez on the 3rd February had published notices calling on the people to return to their work.

9. Tribal.

A joint report by the Kaimakam of Abu Kamal and the Commandant of the Euphrates Gendarmerie has now been received giving details of the Ageidat/Shammar clash referred to in a previous *Weekly Political Summary*. It appears that the Shammar Khrossa under Sheikh Jennah el G'ait were camping at a place called Mghailit, some 20 kms. from the Syrian border inside Iraqi territory. On the morning of the 12th January they were attacked by about 1,700 Ageidat footmen and horsemen. The Shammar Khrossa lost 14 killed, amongst which was el Sharabi, son of Sheikh Jennah el G'ait, and a woman; about 70 were wounded, about 50 tents looted and 125 camels taken. The bodies of 69 dead Ageidat have been found in the neighbourhood. The bodies of

the Ageidat were found naked with their faces turned towards the ground, many of them having received several bullets or had their heads cut off by a sword. Only one Ageidat was wounded.

The report adds that as a result of the killing of a gendarmerie corporal by the Shammar during their raid against the Ageidat on the 7th January, the Iraqi police authorities had sent two armoured cars to investigate the matter at the Shammar encampment. It so happened that the arrival of these two armoured cars coincided with that of the Ageidat raiders. One of these cars withdrew but the other, which had broken down, took part in the fighting. The report concludes by saying that the Shammar are believed to be massing for a return raid against the Ageidat, and in the circumstances it is in the interests of the two Governments to expedite an early settlement.

The Mohafez is reluctant to recognise that he has French forces to thank for putting an end to the fighting and for keeping the tribes apart, and has informed the Political Officer that, once he is sure that the Iraqi authorities are maintaining their armoured car patrols, he will ask the French to withdraw their forces. He has applied to Damascus for more effective weapons for his gendarmerie, and adds that if neither the Allies nor the Syrian Government will produce the requisite arms, he himself will buy locally ten machine guns.

10. Lebanon.

General Catroux paid a short visit to Beirut on his way from France to Moscow. He called on the Lebanese Prime Minister and on His Majesty's Minister, and General Beynet gave a large tea-party in his honour at which the Government, the Diplomatic Corps, and many local notables were present. Amongst notable absentees from this function was ex-President Naccache, who, although counted amongst the French supporters in the Lebanon, has never forgiven General Catroux for having unceremoniously deposed him from the Presidency in 1943.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Henry Pharaon, is reported, before his departure to represent the Lebanon at the Cairo Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers, to have had interviews with the Maronite Patriarch and with the head of the Phalange party, during which he assured them that his policy was to ensure that the Lebanon should gradually drop out of the Arab orbit. Although he has taken two Moslems, as well as two Christians, with him, it is understood that these do not form part of the Lebanese Delegation and that Henry Pharaon is, in fact, in process of advocating modifications to the Statute of the future Arab League which will prevent the Lebanon being in any way tied to the foreign policy of the Moslem Arab States. While this line of conduct is intended to appease the extreme Christian elements, it is providing ammunition for those Nationalists, led by Riad Solh, who are in process of working up agitation against the present Government on the grounds that it is not sufficiently Nationalist. It is, in fact, clear that Abdul Hamid Karami, although liked and respected, has not sufficient force of character to control his Foreign Minister, and the chances of his Ministry being swept away by a wave of Nationalism are therefore increasing.

[E 1824/5/89]

(12)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, No. 152, 28th February, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 16th March.)

1. General.

ON the 26th February the Syrian President addressed the Chamber of Deputies in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps. He first defined Syrian foreign policy as complete independence and close co-operation with Arab States, and assured the House that any agreement between France and Syria would be such as could be concluded with any of the Great Powers, and that no State would be given preference or a privileged position. He went on to say that his Government would welcome the formation of Greater Syria, provided that it was a republic with Damascus as its capital and that there was no Zionist infiltration; Lebanese independence within its present frontiers would, however, be guaranteed in accordance with the Alexandria Protocol. The President then thanked Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. for the recognition they had accorded to the

independence of his country; France, he continued, had merited gratitude in December 1943, and he hoped that the goodwill she had shown during recent negotiations justified the expectation that she would again merit the thanks of the Syrian people. The President finally stated that the Government would submit a proposal to the House declaring a state of war between Syria and Germany and Japan. After a short debate the House passed a proposal for a declaration of war, with one abstention.

The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the 27th February unanimously passed a declaration of war on Germany and Japan.

General Beynet went to see the Syrian President on the 21st and again on the 25th February. Both had previously been urged by His Majesty's Minister not to miss the favourable opportunity created by the Cairo talks and by the advice tendered by the Allied Governments. In the course of these talks General Beynet informed the President that he would go to Paris to secure French proposals on all outstanding questions and that in the meantime an effort would be made to elaborate locally reasonable proposals on the *convention universitaire*.

The Lebanese Prime Minister visited his President in Haifa on the 25th February, and on his return reported that the President's state of health had markedly improved: he had been able to discuss much business without fatigue and might be expected to have recovered sufficiently to return to Beirut before the end of March. This report, added to a further official communiqué, has largely allayed the doubts expressed as to the President's powers of recovery, and discussions as to the choice of a successor have consequently lapsed.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has been informed of the results of the talks between the Syrian President and Messrs. Churchill and Eden in Cairo, and has been urged, like the Syrians, to examine carefully any proposals for an eventual settlement which may be put to his Government by the French. He has agreed to do so, although expressing profound scepticism of the possibility that the French proposals would be reasonable or acceptable.

2. Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 16th-22nd February, 1945, amount to 273 tons, a daily average of 39 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944-45 crop up to 175,135 tons.

3. Syria—Damascus.

On the 25th February the Syrian President informed His Majesty's Consul that his Government had decided to declare war on Germany and Japan. His Excellency was informed on the following day, on instructions from His Majesty's Government, that this action would not entitle Syria to take part in the San Francisco Conference. Though clearly disappointed at this development (he had understood from the press that other Arab States would be invited), he decided to proceed—see paragraph 1 above.

In the debate following the President's speech on the 27th February in the Chamber of Deputies some members expressed doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by a declaration of war when the army had not been handed over; others enquired whether the army would be handed over once the declaration of war had been made. The Syrian Prime Minister was also asked whether Syria would take part in the San Francisco Conference, and he explained that only signatories of the United Nations declaration would be invited to attend; the Syrian Minister in Washington was being instructed to take the necessary steps for Syria to sign the declaration. One Deputy asked why Syria should declare war, since she had been at war since 1918!

The murder of the Egyptian Prime Minister was universally deplored in Syria and was the subject of a motion in the Syrian Parliament. Wide publicity had been given to the declaration made by him in the Egyptian Parliament that Egypt supported Syria and the Lebanon and would stand by them in their efforts to secure an agreement with France.

5. Homs and Hama.

Apart from a half-hearted strike of the schools and a demonstration by students of the Tajhiz school, there have been no further signs of political disturbances in Homs and Hama, but there is no doubt that elements opposed to the Government are making their dispositions for a renewal of the disturbances. Members of the minority communities in the towns are reported to have been perturbed by the speech made in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies by the Hama

Deputy, Akram Haurani, in which he demanded legislation and penalties, including that of death, for the crime of high treason; it is feared that if any such legislation is passed the Moslem courts may put a variety of interpretations upon the definition of high treason and make use of the proposed powers for oppression of non-Moslems.

Colonel Oliva Roget visited Homs on the 26th February, and in a speech to the French and Syrian officers of the garrison announced that any officer leaving or attempting to leave his post would be court-martialled; those deserting or refusing to obey an order would be shot. He then announced rises in pay for all officers and the distribution of promotions among certain Syrian officers.

The Délégué of Homs tried to persuade the Syrian Government to ban the local newspaper "El Taufiq." The offensive article purported to describe semi-starvation in France, alleging that the French in certain areas were driven to eat cats. The editor of the newspaper later went to Damascus to see the Prime Minister and nullify the complaint.

6. *Jebel Druze.*

Five men were killed and twelve wounded—four seriously—in a shooting affray at Loubbaine in the Leja on the 18th February, but the trouble was prevented from spreading by the arrival of gendarmes. The incident arose out of a purely personal quarrel, and the Kaimakam of Chahba has persuaded the disputants to agree to a twenty-day truce.

7. *Alaouite Territory.*

The situation is still uneasy in the Alaouite district, though the tension is less. There has been some fighting in the Ain al Kroum area between Murshid followers and villagers of Muhammad Jneid, in which gendarmes were attacked by the Murshid partisans: fighting ceased by the 22nd February. All the gendarmes taken prisoners by the rebels have been handed over to the French and released. A half squadron of French cavalry has arrived at Ain al Kroum via Massiaf with one mountain gun.

Following the talks in Damascus between General Beynet and the Syrian President—see paragraph 2, section 7, of Weekly Political Summary No. 151—Colonel Bonnot informed the Mohafez of Latakia that he had received orders to withdraw the French troops; it was agreed that the gendarmerie should reoccupy the police posts at Fakhouira and Mzeiraa with ten men at each, but there is no confirmation that this action has been taken nor have French troops been withdrawn.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

There is a growing feeling of unrest both in the Euphrates and Jezireh areas, and an invitation by the Mohafez, Wijih Azhari, to all political and religious leaders to remain calm in these difficult times had little effect, since he stressed Syrian independence too much for the liking of his hearers. There is little support in the Jezireh for Syrian independence and little respect for Government authority; and there are therefore opportunities for the French to fish in troubled waters, supporting the Arab tribes in their efforts to assert themselves against the Government, assuring the Kurds of their protection from the Arabs, and playing up the line that they are the sole protection of the Christians against the oppression of an independent Moslem Government.

9. *Tribal.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, Officer Commanding British Military Headquarters at Deir ez Zor, has discussed the settlement of the Agaidat-Shammar dispute with military and civil authorities both at Mosul and Bagdad. At present the Délégué-Adjoint is maintaining most of his forces in the battle area, and he has agreed, at a meeting attended by the French Officier Politique, Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis and the British Political Officer, to arrange for a reconnaissance aircraft to patrol the area in order to note any movement. Colonel Lewis reports that patrols are being maintained on the Iraqi side of the frontier and that regular liaison between military authorities in Iraq and Syria has been arranged.

In a few weeks' time the Shammar would normally cross back into Syria. When that time comes the Délégué-Adjoint proposes that the Control Bedouin should be asked to fix a limit to the Shammar grazing zone in Syria.

The Mutassarif of Mosul suggested to the Mohafez of Euphrates that a first meeting should take place on the 20th February to discuss the settlement of the

Agaidat-Shammar dispute, but the Mohafez replied that he considered this was too soon, as feeling was still running too high.

It is reliably reported from the Jezireh that Sheikh Meizer Ibn Abdul Muhsin of the Shammar Zor visited Iraq recently in order to persuade the Feddagha to return to Syria. News from the Jezireh is not encouraging and it is reported that the Shammar Zor are intriguing to attack the Baggara.

Errata.

Reference Weekly Summary No. 151 for week ending the 21st February, paragraph 9, third sub-paragraph, first sentence—

Please delete the words from "is reluctant" to "the tribes apart, and."

11. *Lebanon.*

The campaign for the bye-election to fill the Greek Catholic vacancy in Mount Lebanon is being waged vigorously between the two candidates, one of whom is the brother of the late Selim Tacla and the other the secretary of the Phalange party. Whilst the Government have declared their neutrality, Tacla has the support of all the pro-Government elements, including Riad Solh, whilst the Phalange candidate is being vigorously supported by his party and also by the Opposition group. The Phalange party has in the past supported the régime of independence, and its present alliance with those normally in opposition to it is partly due to reasons of political expediency and partly because the Phalange, a Christian party, have been affected by the propaganda put out amongst the Christians against the Alexandria Protocol.

The Lebanese Government has been concerned at reports that the French military authorities have disbanded the Lebanese Brigade of *Troupes Spéciales* and have attached its various formations to French units. The French have denied that any change has taken place, but other reports suggest that the French have, in fact, taken action designed to nullify the protocol signed in June 1944, under which a battalion of these troops was placed at the disposal of the Lebanese Government to be used for the maintenance of order, in support of the gendarmerie. Further enquiries are being made to ascertain where the truth lies; in the meantime, the Lebanese Government have addressed a note to the Délégation Générale on the subject.

It is reported from the Bekaa that Christian circles are showing uneasiness over the result of the Arab talks in Cairo, which they believe to be dominated by Moslem interests, and there is a recrudescence of Sunni-Shia antagonism in the villages and the area to the east of the Rayak-Hermel road.

[E 1914/5/89]

(13)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 153, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 6th March, 1945.—(Received 21st March.)

General.

GENERAL BAYNET has had a second interview with the President of the Syrian Republic with a view to finding a basis of Franco-Syrian agreement. The President agreed to discuss a revised University Convention which General Beynet is having prepared locally and stated that the Government were ready to conclude establishment and consular conventions with France in accordance with international usage. In reply to a question of General Beynet's as to whether preference would be given to Frenchmen in the choice of technical advisers, the President said that his Government must be free to choose these where they liked. With regard to the *Troupes Spéciales*, the President said they were ready to take them as a whole, but not by stages, that they must be under Syrian command but would be placed at the disposal of the Ninth Army, and that the Syrian Government did not consider a military mission necessary as they would be taking over the troops as they were with French officers.

His Majesty's Minister and the Army Commander subsequently saw General Beynet, who confirmed that he was leaving for Paris during the next week to report on his conversations with the Syrians and to receive instructions; he indicated that he was ready to go to London as well, if necessary. He also confirmed that discussions about a University Convention would be resumed. He evidently regarded the attitude of the Syrian Government as stiffer than that

of the President, but he considered that there were "elements" for a basis of agreement. He complained of the Syrian Government's decision to dismiss a number of French advisers (see below) which would inevitably make a bad impression in Paris.

There has been considerable unfavourable reaction in Damascus and other principal towns to the speech which the President of the Republic delivered before the Chamber on the 26th February (see Weekly Political Summary No. 152) on the lines that the President should not have recommended the declaration before Syria had regained control of its army and that his reference to Greater Syria as a republic should be considered merely as an expression of his own personal opinion, since this was a matter to be decided by the people and not by the President.

It has been learnt that the Lebanese Foreign Minister, while in Cairo, arranged with the Egyptian Government for their Minister in Washington to put forward an application for the Lebanon to adhere to the United Nations Pact. Both Governments have strongly represented to His Majesty's Minister the desirability of the two States being invited to the San Francisco Conference, and have enquired the reason for their present exclusion. The press has been publishing vehement articles on the subject, and the impression appears to be widespread that the Allies, in not extending invitations, have yielded to French pressure.

Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons has been well received in Lebanese Nationalist circles, which take the view that the future position of the Lebanon has now been defined beyond all doubt. Pro-French elements are stated to be correspondingly depressed as they feel that after this speech it can no longer be maintained that Great Britain is prepared to give France a completely free hand in the Lebanon. On the other hand, there has been some attempt to exploit publication of the British White Paper in the contrary sense.

In Syria, however, the reaction seems to have been less favourable; the more extreme Nationalists considered that the speech did not respond to their aspirations, and at a demonstration in Homs (see paragraph 5 below) shouts against Mr. Churchill and the British Government, which are very rare these days, were heard.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 23rd-28th February—total 28, daily average of 4 tons; which brings the total purchases for the 1944-45 crop up to 175,171 tons.

Syria-Damascus.

The criticism of the President and of the Government, referred to in paragraph 3 of section 1 above, is a symptom of the general dissatisfaction felt at the apparent lack of progress made in negotiations with the French. A very large proportion of Syrians, particularly the Moslems, are determined to ensure the end of the French privileged position, and are prepared to back wholeheartedly any régime and any Government which vigorously pursues this aim, but the moment it appears that no progress is being made they begin to express dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the Government's administration. Accusations are being made that the President of the Republic and the present Government are showing more concern for their own interests and for those of members of the National Bloc than they are for the independence of Syria and for the handing over of the *Troupes Spéciales*.

On the 4th March the appointments were announced of Sabri el Assali and Ahmed Sharabati as Ministers of the Interior and Education respectively. Both the new Ministers are Damascenes and strong supporters of the President; their appointment has therefore done little to allay criticisms, especially in Aleppo, that the President and the Government are self-seeking. It is possible that two further additions to the Cabinet may be made shortly; the names of Said Ghazzi as Minister of National Economy, and Michael Elian as Minister of Public Works, have been mentioned.

Decrees have been signed terminating the services of the following French Counsellors:—

- M. Grellet: Adviser to the Ministry of Interior.
- M. Martin: Adviser to the Ministry of Supply.
- M. Delbes: Adviser to the Ministry of National Economy.
- M. Wendling: Adviser to the Ministry of Public Works.
- M. Mauche: Legal Adviser.
- M. Collet: Adviser to the Ministry of Education.

A further decree terminating the services of the French veterinary advisers to the municipalities of Damascus, Aleppo and Deir ez Zor has also been published.

A protocol was signed on the 1st March, between the Syrian Government and the D.H.P. Railway Company providing for the handing back to the Government of the Syrian section of the Hejaz Railway, which has been under the management of the D.H.P. since 1924. This section consists of the line to Deraa and the extensions to the Jebel Druze, the Palestinian frontier and the Transjordanian frontier, and it will now be operated by a board composed of the directors of Finance, National Economy, Public Works, Wakfs and two non-official experts under the Minister of Public Works. The railway is at present operated at a deficit of some £S.100,000 a month and, although the Director-General has given assurances that for the time being existing arrangements with the Palestine railways will be maintained, it is possible that in view of the unsound financial state of the railway the Syrians will seek a revision of the existing tariff rates.

The Director-General and Director of the Damascus Police have submitted their resignations following the appointment of Sabri el Assali as Minister of the Interior. These officers are said to have resented the interference of the President of the Republic in the administration of their departments, and to have believed that this interference would be increased rather than diminished by the new appointment.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was asked while in Cairo to contact the Swiss and Swedish representatives there with the object of arranging for one of these Governments to accept the protection of Syrian interests in Germany and Japan.

M. Massoud Moazed presented his letters of credence to the Syrian President on the 22nd February as Persian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Aleppo.

A leading editor has been assaulted in the streets of Aleppo; a similar incident occurred last month. In each case the editors had previously criticised the administrative failings of the Government.

During the week there have been demonstrations and partial market strikes at several centres, notably Idlib, Azaz and Jerablous, to protest against the effort made by the O.C.P. to collect taxes on black market grain when it was presented for milling.

The textile industry is still in an uncertain position. The local spinning mills have been handing over some yarn, though the effectiveness of the control in the Lebanon is still doubted.

Homs and Hama.

A reliable Bedouin informant reports that a group of five French officers with seven trucks and about fifty Meharistes are at present touring the desert visiting the tribal sheikhs. They have already visited sections of the Ruwala, the Sbaa, the Beni Khaled, the Hadidiyeen and various tribal leaders and are reported to be proceeding eastwards towards Deir ez Zor and the Jezireh. The Bedouin are said to be somewhat sceptical of a story disseminated by this group that during the last disturbances in Damascus the Russian consul called on Shukri Kuwatli and threatened that if the mob's insults to the French nation were not stopped Russian parachutists would be dropped in Damascus.

The Syrian President's speech before the Chamber on the 26th February was badly received in this area, being considered too moderate, and anti-Government feeling noticeably increased. Three Homs lawyers telegraphed to the President, the Prime Minister and the Arab consuls accusing the President of being a "traitor" for declaring war without having gained possession of the army, and protesting against Mr. Eden's declaration. The Government sent instructions for the arrest of these lawyers, but their colleagues stood firm with them, and in the face of incipient disorder the Government yielded and released them.

Jebel Druze.

The commandant of gendarmerie at Soueida has informed the political officer there that there is serious disaffection amongst the personnel of the Druze squadron stationed at Salkhad. He states that when demonstrations took place in Soueida at the end of January, the Chef de Poste was asked by many members of his squadron for permission to overpower the French officer and occupy the citadel for the Syrian Government. He added that, while he discountenanced this

suggestion, he cannot guarantee that in the event of future manifestations something of the sort will not occur at both Salkhad and Soueida. The guards placed on French installations in Soueida a month ago are still being maintained.

Alaouite Territory.

There has been no further fighting in the Alaouite Territory, but French troops are still in occupation of the area of the recent disturbances, in which the Government's writ does not now run, although two of the vacated gendarmerie posts have been re-occupied. The troops, the gendarmerie, and Suleiman Murshid's partisans are stated to be all heartily tired of the present situation; the tribesmen in particular are anxious to return to their crops. The situation has been further discussed between the Syrian President and General Beynet, but no progress appears to have been made.

Tribal.

No definite arrangements have been made for the holding of a conference to settle the Shammar-Agaidat disputes. The Mutassarif of Mosul has suggested that the meeting should take place in Mosul but the Agaidat have refused to consider holding the conference in Shammar territory in view of the blood feud existing since Sheikh Sfuq was killed in 1941. The Mohafez of Deir ez-Zor has made a counter-suggestion that the meeting should take place in Ramadi, but the mutassarif is said to hold the view that this would involve too many complications for him since he would have to obtain special authority to proceed out of his liwa. All the conditions for a resumption of hostilities between the two tribes are present and the precautions taken by the authorities on both sides of the frontier must be continued until such time as a meeting can be arranged and agreement reached.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese declaration of war has been received without popular excitement or enthusiasm, and speculation has centred principally on the questions of whether the Lebanon will now be enabled to receive lease-lend material and whether the Levant States will in fact be invited to the San Francisco Conference. There has been much press comment on these points, pro-French papers suggesting that the Lebanon has been at war since 1939 (the unfortunate events of 1941 being conveniently forgotten), whilst pro-Government papers assert that the Lebanon is already giving all the assistance in her power to the Allies and should not be excluded from any conference in which her future might be discussed.

The bye-election in Mount Lebanon passed off without incident on the 4th March. Philippe Tacle secured a resounding victory, polling more than two votes for each one cast for the Phalange candidate. The latter's defeat, despite great efforts made by his party on his behalf, is ascribed largely to his incautious statement, made in a speech in Emile Eddé's place of origin, that he followed Eddé's policy. Riad Solh displayed great activity in organising Tacle's campaign, and he and his partisans are elated by the result, which they consider shows that even this traditionally pro-French district of the Lebanon is now largely won over to the cause of Lebanese independence. It is generally admitted, despite certain complaints by the Phalange, that the Government were entirely neutral.

The Government's position in the Chamber appears to be weakening. Riad Solh is now expressing the view that the Government have displayed culpable weakness on certain matters affecting the independence of the Lebanon, and cannot be entrusted with the representation of Lebanese interests if vital issues are at stake. It seems probable that he is now marshalling his followers with a view to a general assault on the Government in the Chamber when a suitable occasion arises. He is stated, however, to wish to await the return of the President, no firm date for which has yet been fixed, before taking action.

The French Déléation Générale has replied to the Government's enquiry regarding the Lebanese brigade of *Troupes Spéciales*. They admit that the brigade has been broken up, for reasons which they describe as purely military, but state that it has been arranged that each of the three battalions shall be held at the disposal of the Government for four months at a time in each year. They also admit that the Lebanese flag has been removed from the barracks formerly occupied by the Lebanese Brigade Commander, whose appointment has

been terminated with the dispersal of the brigade, but state that a Lebanese flag will continue to fly over the barracks of the battalion which is at the Government's disposal. The Lebanese Government have formally protested to the Déléation Générale, stating that this measure, which vitally affects Lebanese troops formed with Intérêts Communs money, should not have been taken without their consent, especially since the whole question of the *Troupes Spéciales* is still outstanding between the French and Lebanese.

[E 2065/5/89]

(14)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 154, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th March, 1945.—(Received 27th March.)

General.

DURING the week both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were asked by their Chambers of Deputies what steps they were taking to obtain invitations to the San Francisco Conference, and the matter has been the main topic of political discussion in both countries. The general attitude of the Chambers, the public and the press is that many other countries which have received invitations to the conference have contributed less to the war effort than Syria and the Lebanon and that the question of participation is a plain test of whether or not the independence of the two countries is a reality. It is freely stated in conversation that it is His Majesty's Government who have obstructed the issue of an invitation at the instance of the French.

Both Governments authorised the Egyptian Minister at Washington to sign the United Nations pact on their behalf; the Egyptian Minister was, however, informed by the State Department in reply to his *démarche* that no reply could be given until the United States Government had consulted their "principal associates." The Governments have also made representations to Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., China and the Arab States to support their applications to sign the United Nations declaration and to participate in the San Francisco Conference.

All this created in the local mind a state of alarm and despondency which made it easy for anti-British elements to represent the British White Paper in Syria as containing some new and adverse statement of British policy towards the Arab world. In order to put an end to this idea, which was very widespread and doing us a lot of harm, His Majesty's Legation issued a communiqué to the press stating that in view of the misapprehensions existing in regard to the White Paper it seemed advisable to state that its contents consisted solely of statements and correspondence of 1941; the headings then followed. Copies of the White Paper were also given to the local Governments.

A new draft of a Franco-Syrian Cultural Convention was presented to the Syrian Government by the French authorities on the 7th March. At first sight it appears very much more reasonable than the previous document and to contain much that could reasonably be accepted by the Syrians, who have at least not rejected it out of hand.

General Beynet left by air for Paris on the 9th March after what appears to have been an inconclusive conversation with the Syrian President, during which he indicated that he did not expect to be absent more than a fortnight. Before leaving he informed His Majesty's Minister that the texts of the establishment and consular conventions could not be produced locally but would have to be drafted in Paris.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs have made public statements on the recent Cairo Conference of the Arab States. They have, however, confined themselves to generalities, stating little more than that the statutes of the future Arab League had been drafted and would be submitted to the full conference on the 17th March, after which they would have to be ratified by the legislature in each country.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 1st-7th March, 1945, amount to 225 tons, a daily average of 32 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944-45 crop up to 175,393 tons.

The Lebanese Government on the 8th March sent gendarmes to occupy the two principal Lebanese spinning factories, and subsequently issued a decree requisitioning them. This action was necessitated by the refusal of the owners to conform to certain instructions issued by the Government in pursuance of an agreement recently reached with the Syrian Government to control the price of locally produced yarn and textiles. Under the terms of this agreement, the Lebanon was bound to hand over to Syria a certain proportion of the cotton yarn produced in the Lebanon, and the price of this yarn was fixed at a figure which, whilst giving the spinners a generous margin of profit, was still in the neighbourhood of a quarter of the excessive prices they had been charging of late. The spinners got together with the weavers (who claimed that as a result of this agreement they would not obtain sufficient supplies of yarn to keep their plants occupied) and also with certain merchants who had recently been charged by the Government with having profiteered on American textiles imported by them under the quota. Together they tried to enforce the closing of Beirut. Their efforts have not, however, so far been successful, as the public seems generally to recognise that the Government's measures, although taken somewhat clumsily and without adequate publicity, are in fact designed to benefit the population by reducing the cost of living.

Syria—Damascus.

The President of the Syrian Republic left by air on the 10th March for Bagdad, where he will stay for a few days as the guest of the Regent of Iraq. He was accompanied by Tahsin Qadri, the Iraqi Minister at Damascus, Saadullah Jabri, President of the Syrian Chamber, Lufti Haffar, ex-Prime Minister, and members of his personal staff.

Sabri el Assali, the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, made a public declaration on assuming office which contained a strongly worded passage to the effect that the Administration would not allow adverse criticism of the Government. He subsequently ordered the arrest of a certain Salah el Din Bitar for having published a signed pamphlet criticising the President's recent speech. These actions have aroused much local criticism.

Ahmed bey Lahham and Subhi Omari, director-general and director of the Damascus Police respectively, whose resignation was reported in last week's summary, have agreed to continue in office for a few days to enable the Government to find substitutes.

Aleppo.

It has been a quiet week and the celebration of Syrian independence on the 8th March produced little sign of activity.

On the 9th March there was a large meeting in a cinema organised by the friends of U.S.S.R. in honour of the Soviet Revolution. No officials are known to have been invited; the main speaker was Dr. Kamil Ayad, a Damascus teacher, who is stated to be in charge of the Aleppo branch of the society.

Homs and Hama.

Independence Day was celebrated on the 8th March in Homs by an orderly demonstration by the Boy Scouts in the morning and a meeting in a cinema in the afternoon at which violent anti-French speeches were made; all the Homs civic functionaries and representatives from Hama were present.

Two murderers, Saleh and Adnam Barazi, were released from gaol last week. Although they had for years pursued a career of murder, theft and abduction, their release was effected through the intervention of the Deputies, Hani Sebai and Farid Murhege. The Government's influence and prestige has been weakened by this apparent miscarriage of justice in which large sums of money are said to have changed hands on high levels.

Alaouite Territory.

There have been no further disturbances in this area but the situation has not yet been resolved and is still very unsatisfactory. French troops have not been withdrawn, although they have allowed the gendarmerie to reoccupy two of the gendarmerie posts. General Beynet has visited Latakia and the local French delegate has told the army commander that he hopes to obtain the agreement of the Mohafez to a settlement by tribal law of questions connected with destruction of property. The French authorities are understood to have

indicated to the Syrian Government that the withdrawal of the French troops must be arranged between the local French Délégué and the Mohafez. The latter is now in Damascus and has been granted a month's leave. But even if French troops are now withdrawn it is evident from reports received from Latakia that the prestige of the Syrian Government in the Alaouite territory has suffered a severe setback and that separatist elements have been correspondingly encouraged.

Tribal.

Discussions are still continuing for the holding of a meeting to settle the dispute between the Agaidat and the Shammar. Ramadi has been agreed upon as a suitable meeting-place by both the Iraqi and the Syrian Government, but Sheikh Aboud el Hifef, son of the paramount Sheikh of the Agaidat, has stated categorically that the Agaidat representatives will not attend a conference in Shammar territory.

Lebanon.

The Prime Minister, speaking in a debate in the Chamber of Deputies, declared that no decision taken either at San Francisco or at any other conference could bring the Lebanon to sign a treaty according a privileged position to anyone, nor could the Lebanon be bound by any decision concerning her which was taken without her consent.

The Prime Minister is to leave for Egypt for the forthcoming Arab Conference on the 15th March. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who should have accompanied him, is staying behind as the vice-president of the Council is not considered capable of being left in charge of the Government. There is still no news of the President's return, and rumours regarding his condition are increasing.

The Phalange party issued a number of their newspaper, *L'Action*, containing a violent attack on the Government for their alleged favouritism in the recent bye-election. The newspaper has in consequence been suspended *sine die*.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 7878/23/89]

No. 38.

Lord Killearn to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th December.)

(No. 2713.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, 25th December, 1944.

ARAB Union discussions are likely to acquire momentum in the near future and I am not sure whether the picture is quite clear in London.

2. We seem to me to have been pursuing two diametrically opposing policies at the same time. On the one hand we have been encouraging the Arab Union and on the other hand we have been promoting Zionism in Palestine and French predominance in Syria. It seems a safe bet that our Syrian, Palestinian and our Arab Union policies will come into conflict before long. As regards Syria and the Lebanon I understand that our policy is to press these States to conclude treaties with France which would give the latter a preferential position and presumably military bases. This policy will not be accepted except under duress by Syria or even by the Lebanon however much internal division French may be able to create. Lebanese have signed a protocol which precludes them from signing any treaty with France which would make the Lebanon a French military bridgehead against Syria and they would hardly dare to incur the open hostility of the surrounding Moslem world by breaking this agreement and siding with France.

3. In some British quarters there seems to be an idea that we can more or less run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, namely, that we may, in order to please the French, press Syrians and the Lebanese to sign preferential treaties with France, but if they refuse we may then sit back and say that we can do no more. This, I submit with all deference, is a dangerous illusion. If we support the French in the matter of a treaty, the French are bound to go ahead energetically with the business and if opposition is encountered the chances are that General de Gaulle, with his well-known inclination towards drastic methods, will use force at least against the Lebanon to impose a treaty unless we stop him from doing so. Very little force would be necessary in the Lebanon. A naval demonstration with landing parties would be sufficient. If we allow the French to impose a treaty on the Lebanon by force we shall become involved in a conflict with about 90 per cent. of the Arab world, and sooner or later we shall end by losing the Middle East unless we are prepared to keep very large forces scattered throughout the Middle East to hold the population down. It will be remembered that many troops between the two wars were required in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq to suppress the succession of revolts when these countries were far less united than they are to-day; now a revolt in one country would provoke violent reaction in others. I doubt very much whether in a future flare-up in the Middle East we could indefinitely hold these populations down with less than nine divisions. Is it likely that the British public or British Tommy is going to acquiesce in such a large permanent garrison in the Middle East for the *beaux yeux* of the French and Zionists? Moreover, can we, while involved in repressive action in liberated territories such as Greece, undertake in the near future repressive action in Egypt-Arab world? All sorts of nationalist problems are boiling up in the Middle East and even without the millstones of France and Zionists around our neck we shall have quite enough to handle in straightforward clashes between ourselves and nationalist elements in the Middle East.

4. I have thought it permissible to sound this warning note in view of ominous signs of French truculence since de Gaulle's visit to Moscow. According to a report from a usually well-informed agent in touch with the French here, the latter are speaking quite openly against us as the principal enemy and breathing [? group omitted] and thunder against Syria and the Lebanon. This visit of a French cruiser to Beirut may well be the first step in a French campaign of menace which may end in violence.

5. In any event it is important that we should be ready with our publicity to defend ourselves with arguments not too *jejune* for local digestions if our present policies in the Levant States and Palestine lead to outbreaks which will require repressive action by British troops similar to that in Greece.

[E 7876/23/89]

No. 39.

Mr. Eden to Lord Killearn (Cairo).

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 5th January, 1945.

YOUR telegram No. 2713 [of 25th December: British policy in the Middle East].

I am grateful for your appreciation of prospects in the Egyptian-Arab world and for stating your anxieties. These matters have been much in our minds, and we are alive to the fact that divergent elements in British policy will need to be reconciled. I am hopeful, however, that we shall be able to steer a line that will have regard for our strategic needs both in the Middle East (notably the Suez Canal and access secured by agreement to Abadan) and in our relations with France. We fully agree that in formulating our policy we must regard the Middle East as a whole.

2. As regards Arab unity, I think you are in agreement with our present policy, which is one of general sympathy with the desire of the Arab States to reduce the barriers between them. To put the issue in its crudest form, I feel sure that if we were to adopt any other policy, we should very quickly be condemned by the whole Arab world as responsible for the breakdown of their discussions which might or might not have had useful results. We should arouse all the latent xenophobia of the Arabs. In general, we cannot ignore the ideals and aims of the Arab Unity Movement and in view of our great strategic and other interests in the area, we must try to guide it into spheres where we can co-operate.

3. In antithesis to the question of Arab unity you refer to our attitude towards Zionism in Palestine and the French position in the Levant. As regards Palestine, I can assure you that the considerations in your telegram will be borne in mind when the time comes for decisions to be taken. Both the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine have, of course, a very strong claim to be consulted before final decisions are taken.

4. As regards Syria and Lebanon, I think you have somewhat misconstrued our policy. Having underwritten the French promise of independence we have no intention of pressing these States to sign it away. We do want them to reach agreement with the French as to the nature of their future relations. I concur in your view that if there is no agreement, de Gaulle might be tempted to use force to secure a decision. Such a situation would be even more serious than that which occurred in November 1943 in Lebanon. We intend to do our best to prevent it arising, and should it occur would have to deal firmly with it. But the possibility of it is precisely the reason why an agreement seems to us so necessary. We have not said that the Syrians and Lebanese must concede everything, or, indeed, any specific thing, which the French ask. But they are not facing the need for any agreement at all and do not even know what the French proposals are. I cannot at present see any satisfactory alternative to our policy of facilitating an agreed settlement between the French and the Levant States, though this will clearly not be easy to arrange and will take time. It will require an active line on the part of His Majesty's Minister in Beirut who is well aware that His Majesty's Government do not intend to sit back themselves nor wish him to sit back once he has acquired the confidence of the parties with whom he has to deal. This policy does not appear to me to be inconsistent with our attitude towards Arab nationalism generally, unless or until it becomes clear that the agreed settlement between the Levant States and the French would involve some real derogation from their independence. There seems to be no inherent reason why an agreement need prevent Syria and the Lebanon from co-operating with other Arab States as foreseen in the Alexandria Protocol, as they are likely to wish to do.

5. To sum up, we fully understand here that our policy towards the Egyptian-Arab world embraces many points of major importance to us and that it has to be reconciled with our obligations under the Balfour Declaration and with our policy towards the new France; also that there are undoubted difficulties and even dangers to be overcome. In the first place we require to gain or retain the confidence of the Governments and peoples concerned, and in this connexion I entirely endorse the emphasis that you have laid on the need for planned and expert publicity.

[E 402/3/65]

No. 40.

Lord Killearn to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th January.)(No. 7. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, 9th January, 1945.*

THE Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that now Ibn Saud has agreed to the Arab Conference Protocol signed at Alexandria, discussions for the establishment of Council of League of Arab States will go ahead within the next week or so. The intention is that meetings will eventually be held at intervals of three months in each Arab capital in turn, the Prime Minister of each country presiding seriatim. This should prevent the Conference being dominated by, say, Egypt. He mentioned the possibility of the eventual seat of the Organisation being at Aley in the Lebanon.

2. His Excellency explained his intention of keeping both the Turkish and Persian Governments fully *au courant*, their goodwill being most desirable seeing that their territories lay between the Arab States and Russia. Both these States had so far shown a friendly disposition.

3. Nuri Said Pasha had asked his Excellency to dinner a few nights before to meet Ali Maher Pasha. The latter had questioned him whether Great Britain interfered in the internal affairs of Iraq, asserting that such was our tendency in Egypt. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied to the contrary but added that the Iraqi Government had long realised how important it was in the interest of Iraq to invoke and rely upon "the advice" of the British Ambassador.

[E 506/15/G]

No. 41.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th January.)(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, 19th January, 1945.*

LORD GORT arrived here yesterday and has had the opportunity of meeting the Regent and other leading Iraqis.

2. In conversation with Lord Gort and myself last night, the Iraqi Prime Minister expressed the view that the situation in Palestine had reached the stage which precluded the establishment of either an Arab or a Zionist State.

3. He was very strongly opposed to partition and showed himself to be extremely apprehensive of Zionist strength and Zionist ambitions, which he described as being limitless. If partition State were set up, there would, he thought, be a large influx of immigrants and with this additional man-power the Zionists would not be content with their restricted area. They would want, and with their resources they would be able to form, a powerful army with the object of conquering first Palestine and then the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. His Excellency feared that the Arabs, with their more slender resources, would not be able to withstand such an onslaught, since war to-day was not a question so much of bravery and numbers as of wealth and science. For this reason, and for reasons of justice because Palestine was a land of Arabs, he could never agree to its being partitioned.

4. His Excellency went on to say he thought the only solution was for Great Britain to continue to rule Palestine for the next twenty-five or thirty years. If His Majesty's Government were willing to do this and at the same time to prohibit Jewish immigration, he would advocate for the same period a treaty of alliance between all Arab States represented by the Arab Confederation and Great Britain.

5. The Prime Minister urged strongly that no action which might be unwelcome to the Arabs should be taken in the near future. The Arabs needed time. Their case was imperfectly understood in Great Britain and America, but he hoped that would soon be remedied when the proposed Propaganda Bureau were established.

6. Lord Gort laid stress on the widespread sympathy which had been aroused in both countries by Jewish sufferings in Europe, and said that as soon as the immigration quota laid down by the White Paper of 1939 was exhausted in about six months' time, there would be strong pressure to permit more Jews to enter Palestine. He asked the Prime Minister whether he thought it would

be possible to arrange for say 2,000 to enter every month. His Excellency thought some such arrangement might be made provided it was purely temporary and intended only to tide over an awkward period.

7. The Prime Minister said in conclusion that a wave of feeling in favour of Great Britain had spread through all Arab countries. They all wished to strengthen their friendship with Great Britain, and he earnestly hoped no decision would be taken which might spoil their mutual relations.

8. The Prime Minister said much that I expected about partition and the desire of the Arabs to strengthen their friendship with us, but I was surprised at his openly expressed fear of the Zionists. I have not heard any other Arab voice this so frankly.

9. Lord Gort has seen and agrees to this record.

[E 1419/8]G]

No. 42.

CAIRO CONVERSATIONS, FEBRUARY 1945.

*RECORD of Conversations with King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in the Fayoum,
12.30-3.30 p.m., 17th February, 1945.*

Present:

The Prime Minister.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. S. R. Jordan, His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah.
Sir W. Smart, His Majesty's Embassy at Cairo.

Ibn Saud.
Sheikh Hafez Wahba, Saudi Arabian Minister in London.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked His Majesty for having come from his country to meet him in Egypt. HIS MAJESTY replied that he had come with the greatest pleasure.

After an exchange of compliments and mutual good wishes, THE PRIME MINISTER asked His Majesty for information regarding his conversation with President Roosevelt. HIS MAJESTY produced the attached English record of the conversation which had been compiled by Mr. Eddy, the United States Minister in Jeddah (Annex). THE PRIME MINISTER, after reading the record, remarked that President Roosevelt had expressed further views to him on the subject of Palestine. HIS MAJESTY explained that his position was very difficult. The Jews in Palestine were continuously increasing in number; they were even forming a sort of Government of their own, with a Prime Minister, a Foreign Minister and a Minister of Defence. They also had formed a military force of 30,000 men with modern arms and equipment. They had thus become a great danger to the Arabs. If it was only a question of Jews and Arabs the Arabs would fight the Jews, and, even if they were not victorious, they would not mind because they would go to Paradise. He had continually counselled moderation to the Arabs in this question, but he feared that a clash might come and then he would be in a great difficulty. He did not wish to get involved in such a conflict, which would also bring him into conflict with us.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we would not allow the Jews to attack the Arabs with armed forces. We had control of the seas and could easily deprive them of supplies. At the same time the Jews must have a place to live in—that is to say, in Palestine. He had never been in favour of Palestine being a National Home, but of a National Home in Palestine. At the same time the Prime Minister pointed out that the Jews' work in cultivating desert areas in Palestine was advantageous to the Arabs, whose population and welfare were increased thereby. The Prime Minister hoped that he might count on the assistance of His Majesty to promote a definite and lasting settlement between the Jews and the Arabs.

HIS MAJESTY enlarged on the difficulty he would have restraining his own people if conflict occurred between the Jews and the Arabs. He said that he counted on British friendship with the Arabs and on British justice. THE PRIME MINISTER assured him of our friendship with the Arabs and pointed out that we had done a lot for the Arabs since the last war in establishing Arab States in Iraq and Transjordan. The Prime Minister added that, in the event of any decision being taken regarding Palestine, we would keep Ibn Saud informed beforehand.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that he could not altogether satisfy Ibn Saud regarding Palestine and that he wished now to turn to the Lebanon and Syria. He said that we were determined to maintain the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and to prevent the French from using force to upset this independence, but he considered it necessary that the Syrians and the Lebanese should conclude a treaty with France giving the French some privileges. HIS MAJESTY replied that there would be no difficulty about giving them certain privileges regarding education, culture, railways and commerce, but the trouble was that the French would want much more. It was impossible to give them in the Levant States a position similar to ours in Egypt and Iraq, where our soldiers could be stationed without their in any way interfering in the administration of the country. If French troops were in the Levant States they would be utilised by France to interfere in the administration. HIS MAJESTY suggested that we should ask the French to say exactly what they wanted in the way of privilege. THE SECRETARY OF STATE remarked that the French had already been asked to formulate their requirements and we were waiting for their answer. The Secretary of State mentioned that His Majesty had already given good advice to the Syrians in this matter of a treaty with France.

During the conversation IBN SAUD expressed his satisfaction at the defeat of Germany, but rather cryptically expressed apprehensions of some other possible enemy. He illustrated this suggestion by the story of the serpent who was being attacked by the wolf and took refuge with a man, whom he attacked after the wolf had been driven off. Presumably this story was meant to refer to the Russians. THE PRIME MINISTER said that relations between the Allies were friendly and he hoped that world arrangements being elaborated would in future prevent either wolves or snakes from making mischief.

IBN SAUD expressed satisfaction with the conversation up to this stage, but said that there were two points which he wished to talk about, i.e., immigration into Palestine and land sales there. At this moment the meeting was interrupted by lunch, and His Majesty did not return to these particular points when the conversation was renewed for a short time after lunch.

After lunch THE PRIME MINISTER asked His Majesty whether he had any particular point he wished to discuss. HIS MAJESTY referred to the Hashemite question. He sketched briefly the relations between himself and the Hashemites. He said that he had every regard for them as descendants of the Prophet, but that, as we knew, the Amir Abdulla was a talkative person and often said undesirable things. This did not trouble him, but the important thing was the question of the tribes of Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. At present Glubb Pasha kept the tribes in order and all was well. If he were not there there would probably be considerable trouble between the tribes of the two countries (owing presumably to Hashemite intrigues). THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the hope that Transjordan would not make difficulties for Saudi Arabia.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would on his return tell Parliament of his meeting with His Majesty and of the friendly conversation he had had with him. HIS MAJESTY also expressed great satisfaction at the meeting.

Annex.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY ABDUL AZIZ AL SAUD, KING OF SAUDI ARABIA, AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 14TH FEBRUARY, 1945, ABOARD THE U.S.S. "QUINCY."

I.

The President asked His Majesty for his advice regarding the problem of Jewish refugees driven from their homes in Europe. His Majesty replied that, in his opinion, the Jews should return to live in the lands from which they were driven. The Jews whose homes were completely destroyed and who have no chance of livelihood in their homelands should be given living space in the Axis countries which oppressed them. The President remarked that Poland might be considered a case in point. The Germans appear to have killed 3 million Polish Jews, by which count there should be space in Poland for the resettlement of many homeless Jews.

His Majesty then expounded the case of the Arabs and their legitimate rights in their lands, and stated that the Arabs and the Jews could never co-operate, neither in Palestine nor in any other country. His Majesty called attention to the increasing threat to the existence of the Arabs and the crisis which has resulted from continued Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by the Jews. His Majesty further stated that the Arabs would choose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews.

His Majesty stated that the hope of the Arabs is based upon the word of honour of the Allies and upon the well-known love of justice of the United States, and upon the expectation that the United States will support them.

The President replied that he wished to assure His Majesty that he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people. He reminded His Majesty that it is impossible to prevent speeches and resolutions in Congress or in the press which may be made on any subject. His reassurance concerned his own future policy as Chief Executive of the United States Government.

His Majesty thanked the President for his statement and mentioned the proposal to send an Arab mission to America and England to expound the case of the Arabs and Palestine. The President stated that he thought this was a very good idea, because he thought many people in America and England are misinformed. His Majesty said that such a mission to inform the people was useful, but more important to him was what the President had just told him concerning his own policy toward the Arab people.

II.

His Majesty stated that the problem of Syria and the Lebanon was of deep concern to him, and he asked the President what would be the attitude of the United States Government in the event that France should continue to press intolerable demands upon Syria and the Lebanon. The President replied that the French Government had given him in writing their guarantee of the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and that he could at any time write to the French Government to insist that they honour their word. In the event that the French should thwart the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, the United States Government would give to Syria and the Lebanon all possible support short of the use of force.

III.

The President spoke of his great interest in farming, stating that he himself was a farmer. He emphasised the need for developing water resources, to increase the land under cultivation as well as to turn the wheels which do the country's work. He expressed special interest in irrigation, tree planting and water power, which he hoped would be developed after the war in many countries, including the Arab lands. Stating that he liked Arabs, he reminded His Majesty that to increase land under cultivation would decrease the desert and provide living for a larger population of Arabs. His Majesty thanked the President for promoting agriculture so vigorously, but said that he himself could not engage with any enthusiasm in the development of his country's agriculture and public works if this prosperity would be inherited by the Jews.

A SURVEY OF THE OIL RESOURCES OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

[With map and graph.]

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(For Middle Eastern Oil Production from 1933 to 1943, see the graph at the end of the Survey. A map showing the oilfields and concession areas in the Middle Eastern Countries is also annexed.)

A SURVEY OF THE OIL RESOURCES OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

Introduction.

1. There is good reason for believing that the Middle Eastern countries will, in the course of a comparatively short space of time, contribute a very much larger proportion of the world's oil supplies than they do at present. In 1939 their production amounted to nearly 16,000,000 tons, representing no more than 6 per cent. of the world total. Although much prospecting and other work yet remains to be done, enough has already been accomplished to demonstrate the great richness of the oil reserves of certain of these countries. The extent to which their oilfields could be developed will, however, depend upon a number of factors, namely: (i) the final lines that the Anglo-American oil agreement will take, (ii) the oil policy of the U.S.S.R. and whether or not she becomes a party to the above-mentioned agreement, (iii) whether or not early steps are taken to define and demarcate the frontiers of these countries, wherever this has not already been done, (iv) internal security in the countries concerned.

2. Of the above factors, the first is really beyond the scope of this survey. All that can be said under this head is that: when, as is expected, there is a serious falling off in the exportation of oil from the United States, arrangements

will doubtless be made for the Middle Eastern countries to play an important part in making up the deficiency. They would be in a favourable position to do so not only because of the richness of their fields, but also because their internal requirements are likely (except in the case of Egypt) to keep far below their output level, thus leaving large quantities of oil available for export. Of the remaining factors, the one that seems most in need of attention is the question of undefined and undemarcated frontiers.

3. Of all the regions dealt with in this survey, the most promising appear to be those situated on each side of the Persian Gulf. Persia, the largest oil-producing country in the Middle East at the present time, draws the bulk of her oil from the areas to the east and north-east of the head of the Persian Gulf. Less is known as yet of the potentialities of the western littoral of the Gulf and of the prolongation of this area to the south and south-east across eastern Arabia to the Indian Ocean in the neighbourhood of Masira island. Enough has, however, been done already for it to be said that the region from the north of Kuwait to the south of Qatar holds out much promise and that it may in time turn out to be even richer than the producing areas on the Persian side of the Gulf. The question of inter-State boundaries is most acute in Arabia, where it is likely to cause friction or even more serious trouble, and so interfere with development.⁽¹⁾

4. The effect of oil discoveries in the Middle East is already manifest, and very soon it will be profound. Western industrialisation has come with a sudden impact upon regions that have hitherto been untouched by the West, and it has had a noticeably stimulating effect upon those parts of the Middle East where contact had already been established.

5. In order to meet the requirements of the oil companies undertaking the development of the oil-bearing regions, numerous satellite companies have already been formed, while others are coming into being. Apart from this development, the economy of the various countries concerned is being radically altered by the scale of rentals and royalties paid by the oil companies to the rulers and Governments who had hitherto been, in the majority of cases, poor. In Iraq, for example, the revenue from the oil companies amounts to over a quarter of the income of the State at the present time, while in Bahrain the percentage is much higher. The Persian Government receive no less than £4,000,000 annually in royalties from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, together with an additional sum in respect of income tax. This company employs nearly 60,000 Persians, the majority of whom were, until comparatively recently, nomadic tribesmen; many of these men have now become skilled artisans.

6. In Sa'udi Arabia, where development has only just begun, there are now over 8,000 men on the pay-roll of the Arabian American Oil Company.

7. The general standards of health, living and workmanship are being raised to a marked extent by the example set by the companies for their workmen. Furthermore, the activities of the companies have necessitated the introduction of better means of communications and the development of roads, in many cases in districts where, up to ten years ago, a motor car had never been seen. In this way the relations and outlook of the peoples of these countries are being profoundly altered.

8. It is inevitable that, as long as oil is required from the Middle Eastern fields, those regions will have a vastly increased importance in world affairs, and that, instead of being the preserve of the strategist and orientalist, they will become and remain an area of great and increasing concern to statesmen, economists, exporters and business men.

I.—Egypt.

9. Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, Ltd., an associated company of the Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Iranian groups, has been operating in Egypt since 1911. During the period 1911-43 it produced 10,114,000 tons of oil. Production was first from the Gemsa field, which is now exhausted, then from Hurghada and since 1938 from that field and the newly discovered structure at Ras Gharib. In 1943 production from Ras Gharib was 1,189,348 tons and from Hurghada 71,671 tons. The Hurghada field is now almost exhausted; the structure at Ras Gharib has been very extensively developed owing to abnormal wartime requirements, and it

⁽¹⁾ For a detailed study of this question, see the Foreign Office memoranda entitled "Ibn Saud's Claims in respect of the South-Eastern Frontiers of Sa'udi Arabia" and "The South-Eastern Frontiers of Sa'udi Arabia." Both memoranda bear the reference E 2203/2203/25 and are dated the 30th June, 1940.

is now showing signs of having passed its peak. All these areas are on the west coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez.

10. After the revision in 1937 of the provisions of the Egyptian Mining Law relating to petroleum exploration and development, a large number of exploration permits were granted to British and American oil companies and their subsidiaries over areas along the east side of the Gulf of Suez, two areas (Ruweisat and Maghara) in the Sinai desert south of the Mediterranean coast, and in the western desert. Prospecting was suspended, with the consent of the Egyptian Government, during the campaign in the western desert, but activity has now been resumed and several test wells are to be drilled. Until this test-drilling has been carried out, it is obviously impossible to say anything in regard to the prospects.

11. Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields has a refinery at Suez with an annual capacity of 1,250,000 tons; there is also a small refinery there belonging to the Egyptian Government with a capacity of about 60,000 tons per year. The oil processed is royalty oil from the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Ltd.

12. Except for some asphalt, the whole of the Egyptian production is consumed in the country. It is possible, however, that a small proportion might in peace time become available for export, provided that production can be kept at its present level of some 1,250,000 tons a year.

II.—Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

13. In 1923/24 geologists of the A.I.O.C. and Royal Dutch-Shell groups carried out a joint survey of the area between the coast and the watershed of the Red Sea mountains, covering an area of some 10,000 square miles. The geologists came to the conclusion that there would be little or no chance of discovering oil, and did not recommend any test-drilling.

III.—Eritrea.

14. On the whole, Eritrea has but little attraction to offer. The only area of probable interest is that of the Dahlaq islands which lie to the east of Massawa. The Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli began drilling operations on one of these islands two years or so before the outbreak of war. Some traces of oil were found, but the war caused operations to be abandoned before conclusive results could be obtained.

IV.—British Somaliland.

15. Geologists of the A.I.O.C. in 1918-1920 and of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. in 1931 made surveys of British Somaliland. In both cases it was decided that, although there were some seepages and a small anticlinal structure at Daga Shabell, some 30 miles south of Berbera, the prospects of commercial success were too remote to warrant drilling.

16. In October, 1944, however, the Somaliland Oil Exploration Company, an associated company of the Royal Dutch-Shell group, obtained an oil exploration licence covering 27,000 square miles of the Protectorate (between one-third and one-half of the total area), including the Daga Shabell structure. The company is required to carry out a geophysical and topographical survey within two years.

V.—Turkey.

17. Indications of petroleum are fairly widespread in Turkey, there being seepages in European Turkey near the Sea of Marmara, in central and eastern Anatolia and in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country.

18. Drilling near the Sea of Marmara rendered only negative results, but the Maden Tetkik ve Arma Enstitüsü (M.T.A., the Institute of Mineral Research) has achieved a slight measure of success at Raman Dağ, 10 miles south of Beshiri in the Siirt vilayet, in south-eastern Turkey. There are some geological structures there which are superficially promising, and one of the wells sunk by the M.T.A. has produced some oil. It is possible that oil may be found in other test wells in the neighbourhood, but the prospects of finding a reasonably large field cannot be said to be very encouraging.

19. The Turkish press has expressed the view that production from the Raman Dağ field will be sufficient to meet home requirements, but this is open to doubt.

VI.—Cyprus.

20. Petroleum Development (Cyprus), Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, has been granted several prospecting licences for Cyprus, but the exploration work so far carried out has not been encouraging. Owing to the war operations have been suspended.

VII.—Palestine.

21. Petroleum Development (Palestine), Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Co. (with the same shareholding interests), has a capital of £122,100. It holds 29 licences under the Palestine Mining Law covering in all 5,268 square miles. The survey obligations under the licences were all fulfilled and arrangements to begin drilling had been made before war broke out. Owing, however, to war conditions, the company could not obtain the necessary drilling equipment, and the Palestine Government have agreed to the postponement of drilling until after the war or until materials can be obtained, whichever is the earlier.

22. Haifa is now of great importance as the Mediterranean terminal of the southern branch of the I.P.C. pipeline from Kirkuk. There is a large tank farm and there are ample loading facilities for tankers.

23. In addition, the large refinery operated by Consolidated Refineries, Ltd. (in which all the shares are held jointly by the A.I.O.C. and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., a Shell subsidiary) on the outskirts of Haifa treats crude oil from the I.P.C. field at Kirkuk; its capacity is being increased from 2,800,000 to 3,800,000 tons a year. The Shell and a number of other concerns have storage installations at Haifa. The extensions to the Haifa Refinery were completed some time ago, and the plant is now processing 4 million tons a year.

VIII.—Syria.

24. The Syria Petroleum Company, Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, has a capital of £1,250,000. It holds a concession from the Syrian Government dated the 26th February, 1938, which was ratified by the French High Commissioner on the 25th March, 1940.

25. The concession area covers the whole of the Syrian Republic north of the parallel running through Damascus (36° 18'); it is approximately 63,000 square miles in extent. The concession provides for "dead rent" payments beginning at £15,000 (gold) per annum and rising to £80,000 (gold) per annum over a period of 15 years. Should oil be produced in sufficient quantities, royalties will take the place of these "dead rent" payments. At the expiration of the 15-year period, the company must either begin to export oil or abandon the concession.

26. Drilling operations were started in 1939 and continued until 1941, when the military situation in Syria brought the work to a standstill. Most of the drilling equipment was destroyed by the British military forces in order to deny its use to the enemy. The Syrian Government have granted the company a moratorium on drilling obligations which is to last until two years after the end of the war with Germany.

27. The results of the small amount of test-drilling carried out were inconclusive, but encouraging.

IX.—Lebanon.

28. The Syria Petroleum Co. holds prospecting licences covering over 193 square miles near the Tripoli terminal of the I.P.C. pipe-line. By agreement with the local authorities, the carrying out of the obligations under the terms of the licences has been postponed until the necessary drilling and other equipment can be obtained.

29. Tripoli is the Mediterranean terminal of the northern branch of the I.P.C. pipe-line from Kirkuk. There is a large tank farm and there are adequate loading facilities for tankers. There is a small and somewhat inefficient topping plant with a capacity of under 200,000 tons a year. It is operated by the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, the French company which owns 23½ per cent. of the shares of the Iraq Petroleum Company (see under "Iraq"). It is reported that the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey have each obtained concessions from the Lebanese Government to erect and operate refineries at Tripoli. No details in regard to these refineries are yet available.

X.—Transjordan.

30. Petroleum Development (Transjordan), Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, applied for 37 prospecting licences covering 7,000 square miles under the Transjordan Mining Law of 1940. This application was properly lodged and duly acknowledged, but the issue of licences has been postponed until after the war because no British company could carry out the exploration obligations under war conditions; there is also a possibility that the Transjordan Government may wish to amend the royalty provisions under the Law. The application of Petroleum Development (Transjordan) has priority over other applications for licences covering the same area, if any are received.

31. Such geological work as has been carried out has failed to give promising results.

XI.—Iraq.

32. Oil is a mineral of very great importance in Iraq. Besides giving employment to many thousands of Iraqis, the oil industry furnishes the Iraq Government with a very substantial part of their revenue. In 1938/39, the last normal year before the outbreak of war, the total sum received in oil royalties amounted to I.D. 1,977,458, representing 34 per cent. of the revenue for that year.

33. The Turkish Government have, for 25 years from the 18th July, 1926, a 10 per cent. interest in all royalties paid to the Iraq Government on oil produced in the former vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul.

34. Iraq oil may be said to be of decided international consequence. The large amount of capital invested in the Iraq oil industry by the British, American, French and Dutch interests concerned and the value to them of the oil produced make the preservation of the rights and property of the I.P.C. and its associated concerns a matter of international importance.

(i) *The Iraq Petroleum Company.*

35. The original concession, which was granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company (as the I.P.C. was known until 1929) in 1925, covered the whole of the vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul, but by a new agreement concluded in March 1931, the company gave up all its rights to the west of the River Tigris, thus reducing its area to 35,600 square miles. The concession is valid until the 14th March, 2000. The company, which is registered in Great Britain, has a capital of £14,500,000 in £1 shares; these shares are held by (1) Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (through D'Arcy Exploration Co.) 23·75 per cent., Royal Dutch-Shell (through Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co.) 23·75 per cent., Compagnie Française des Pétroles 23·75 per cent., Near East Development Corporation (representing a group of United States oil companies) 23·75 per cent., Participations and Investments Ltd. (representing Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian) 5 per cent.

36. The main oilfield, which is in the Kirkuk area, is some 60 miles long; its potential capacity is very great, but production is limited by the capacity of its pipe-line to some 4,000,000 tons a year. The crude oil is piped from Kirkuk by a double pipe-line to Haditha, on the Euphrates. There the line bifurcates, one branch going to Haifa in Palestine (618 miles in all) and the other to Tripoli in Syria (531 miles in all). The capacity of each branch is 2,000,000 tons per annum.

37. Plans are now under consideration for increasing the capacity of the pipe-line system from 4,000,000 to 7,000,000 tons a year, which would thereby enable the output of the fields to be raised to a corresponding extent. The Iraq Petroleum Company will shortly increase the capacity of the southern (Haifa) branch of its pipeline by slightly over 4 million tons per annum. When that work has been completed, the capacity of the northern (Tripoli) branch will be increased by a similar amount. The total capacity of the pipe-line will then be over 12 million tons a year.

38. Except for topping plants for meeting its own requirements, the I.P.C. does no refining itself, all its oil being handed over in the crude state to the big shareholding interests mentioned above for treatment and ultimate disposal.

39. Royalties are at the rate of 4s. (gold) per ton, with a guaranteed minimum annual payment of £400,000 (gold).

(ii) *Mosul Petroleum Company, operating Concessions granted to British Oil Development Company, Ltd.*

40. The British Oil Development Company, Ltd., obtained a concession from the Iraq Government in May 1932, for the areas west of the Tigris which the I.P.C. had relinquished in the previous year; this area covers some 43,500 square

miles. The B.O.D. company represented a combine of certain British, French, Italian and German interests. Mosul Oilfields, Ltd., was formed in November 1932 to acquire the shares of the B.O.D. Company.

41. The Germans did some shallow drilling near Qayyara, during the last war, obtaining some heavy, viscous oil. The B.O.D. Company prospected and drilled in a number of areas, but although oil was struck at Qayyara, it was viscous and had a high sulphur content. The terms of the concession, which included royalty at 4s. (gold) per ton, with a minimum annual payment of £200,000 (gold) (payable as "dead rent" until production started) and the obligation to construct and operate a pipe-line with a capacity of 1,000,000 tons a year or the provision of alternative means of transport, proved so onerous that the B.O.D. Company in 1937 disposed of its concession to the I.P.C. A new company, the Mosul Petroleum Company, was formed to operate this concession. Until the outbreak of war, the company had not succeeded in producing sufficient quantities of oil to justify the construction of a pipe-line, although oil of better quality than the Qayyara crude had been struck at Ain Zala, 42 miles north-west of Mosul. Up to 1941 about 100 wells had been drilled, all of which, except one, were plugged as part of the denial measures undertaken by the British Military Authorities in 1941.

42. In 1943, an agreement was signed by the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Iraq Government, under which a moratorium was granted from May 1941, to a date two years after the end of the war between Great Britain and Germany and Japan, whichever is the later, on all drilling and production obligations.

(iii) *Basrah Petroleum Company, Ltd.*

43. This company, which was formed and is controlled by the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., has a capital of £1,000,000. On the 22nd July, 1938, it obtained from the Iraq Government a concession for 75 years giving it the exclusive right to prospect for and exploit petroleum in all parts of Iraq over which similar rights had not already been granted to the I.P.C., B.O.D. Co., and the A.I.O.C.

44. The company was to start drilling operations within 3 years and exporting of oil within 7½ years from the date on which the concession was granted. Royalty is at the rate of 4s. (gold) per ton, with a guaranteed minimum annual payment of £200,000 (to be paid as "dead rent" until production starts).

45. The moratorium agreement of 1943 also waived the drilling and production obligations of this company.

(iv) *Khanaqin Oil Company, Ltd.*

46. The Khanaqin Oil Co. was formed in 1925 in order to acquire from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (as it was then called)^(*) the oil-bearing area known as Naft Khaneh. The area in which this field is situated formerly belonged to Persia and formed part of the D'Arcy concession, but it was allocated to Turkey, together with a larger area north-east of Khanaqin, by the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission in 1913-14. The concessionary rights of the A.P.O.C. in these two areas were recognised first by the Turkish Government and later by the Government of Iraq.

47. The capital of the Khanaqin Oil Co. is £1,000,000; all the shares so far issued are held by the A.I.O.C.

48. Production is from 3 high-pressure wells, and is at the rate of 200,000 tons per annum. The potential output is much higher. The crude oil is pumped from the field through a 25-mile pipe-line to a refinery at Alwand, 3 miles S.E. of Khanaqin. The products are marketed throughout Iraq by the Rafidain Oil Co., another A.I.O.C. subsidiary.

49. Oil has also been found at Chiah Surkh, in the northern area that was transferred to Turkey, but the Khanaqin Oil Co., is not exploiting it at present.

XII.—Sa'udi Arabia.

(i) *Al-Hasa and North-Eastern Najd.*

50. The Arabian American Oil Company (formerly known as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company), of Delaware, U.S.A., was granted by Ibn Sa'ud a concession valid for 60 years on the 27th May, 1933, over an area of some

(*) The name was changed to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935.

249,000 square miles in the eastern portion of his realm. The Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Corporation jointly own all the shares in this company in equal proportions.

51. On signing the concession, the company paid £30,000 (gold) to Ibn Sa'ud, together with £5,000 (gold) annual rent, payable until oil in commercial quantities was found. In 1934 another "lump sum" payment of £20,000 (gold) was made. When oil was struck in large quantities in 1938, the company paid the Government £50,000 on account of royalties, and made another payment of £50,000 a year later. Royalty is at the rate of 4/- (gold) per ton of oil produced.

52. It is possible that, in due course, rising oil production will, by increasing the royalties, put the finances of the country on a sound footing.

53. On the 29th May, 1939, the company and Ibn Sa'ud signed a supplemental agreement whereby the company, in return for additional payments, secured the extension of its concession area over parts of Sa'udi Arabia to the west of its original zone, together with "all right, title and interest of the Government now or hereafter" in the two neutral zones between Sa'udi Arabia on the one hand and Iraq and Kuwait on the other.

54. After carrying out prospecting work over a wide area, the company sank successful test-wells at Damman, on the coast of the Persian Gulf south-east of Qatif, and proved the existence of a very rich field; production is now (1945) at the rate of 600,000 tons a year, but the potential production is believed to be at least ten times as large. Oil has also been struck at Abu Hadriya, 90 miles north-west of Qatif and 12 miles west of the inlet of Musallamiya, and at Abqaiq, 35 miles south-west of Damman. There are understood to be other promising structures in the concession area.

55. A pipe-line has been constructed from the Damman field to Ras at-Tanura, on the coast, where there are facilities for loading tankers. Some of the crude oil produced is treated at a local topping plant with a capacity of 120,000 tons a year, while the rest is taken to Bahrain for processing in the refinery of the Bahrain Petroleum Company. A refinery with a capacity of 2,500,000 tons a year is under construction 5 miles from Ras at-Tanura.

56. What is likely to prove not only a cause of friction between Sa'udi Arabia and her neighbours, but also a serious handicap to the smooth and rapid development of the oil resources in those countries, is the almost total lack of demarcated frontiers between them. In fact, a difference of opinion as to where the true frontier lies between Sa'udi Arabia and Qatar has already given rise to a dispute regarding a possible oil-producing area in the south of the Qatar peninsula.

(ii) *The Hijaz.*

57. In 1926 the Idrisi, the then ruler of Asir, granted a concession to a Mr. Cooper covering the Farasan islands. Cooper sold this concession later to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch-Shell group, which formed the Red Sea Petroleum Company to work it. Some drilling was done on Zifaf island, but the company encountered such difficulties with the Idrisi that it abandoned the enterprise in 1928.

58. In 1938 Petroleum Development (Western Arabia), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C., obtained a concession from Ibn Sa'ud covering the western part of the Hijaz to a depth of 100 kilometres from the coast, together with the Farasan and some other islands in the Red Sea. The company drilled a number of wells on Zifaf and on some of the other Farasan islands, but failed to find any oil. The concession was abandoned in 1943.

59. According to a recent press report (as yet unconfirmed), American interests are now negotiating for a concession covering the Hijaz.

(iii) *Asir.*

60. In 1931 geologists of the A.I.O.C. examined Asir. They considered that the prospects of finding petroleum, though not entirely non-existent, were remote. Drilling would be very speculative.

(iv) *The Neutral Zone between Sa'udi Arabia and Iraq.*

61. The treaty of Mohammerah which Iraq and Najd (now Sa'udi Arabia) concluded in 1922 provided *inter alia* for the rhomboid known as at-Tawwal, which is situated between the two states, to be neutral ground. This area, which covers approximately 2,750 square miles, was defined (but not delimited) by

straight lines joining the Shaib Auja and the wells of Amghar, Uqubba and Ansab.

62. Anyone wishing to obtain exploration and exploitation rights within this area has to get the said rights from the Governments of both Sa'udi Arabia and Iraq. The Arabian American Oil Co. has already, as stated above, obtained the grant of Ibn Sa'ud's rights in that area, but it is not known whether the company has also approached the Iraq Government.

63. Any company obtaining a concession over this area would encounter difficulties because its boundaries have never been demarcated.

64. In view of recent discoveries of oil in the province of al-Hasa, it is thought that oil may also be found in the neutral zone.

N.B.—For the neutral zone between Sa'udi Arabia and Kuwait, see paragraphs 70-72 below.

(v) *Trans-Arabian Pipe-line.*

65. The United States Government, the Arabian American Oil Company and the Gulf Exploration Company had under consideration the ambitious scheme of constructing a 1,200-mile pipe-line from Jabal Dhahran right across Arabia to the Eastern Mediterranean to either Haifa or Alexandria, with a feeder line from Kuwait and a possible branch to the Red Sea. If this project had been carried out, the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, a concern formed and controlled by the United States Government, would, by agreement with the two companies concerned, have constructed, owned and maintained the main pipe-line; the companies themselves would have constructed the gathering lines. The United States Government, however, are no longer likely to participate in this scheme, but it is nevertheless possible that the companies concerned may themselves put it into operation at a later date.

66. Although the construction and maintenance of such a pipe-line would be feasible from the engineering point of view, it is clear that, unless a very large quantity of oil (minimum 6,000,000 tons per annum) could be guaranteed, the pipe-line would be unable to compete with the alternative means of transport provided by tankers.

67. From the strategic aspect, the construction of the pipe-line would have the following advantages:—

- (i) It would provide an alternative to the already existing I.P.C. pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean.
- (ii) In time of war it would save sea transport and reduce escort duties.
- (iii) It would probably render the United States more inclined to participate in the defence of the Mediterranean sea route.

XIII.—*Kuwait.*

68. Attempts to obtain an oil concession covering Kuwait date back as far as 1911, but none proved successful until 1934. On the 23rd December of the latter year the Shaikh of Kuwait granted a concession valid for 75 years for the whole of his territory (6,000 square miles), but excluding the neutral zone (see paragraphs 70-72 below), to the Kuwait Oil Company, Ltd. This company, which is registered in Great Britain, has a capital of £200,000; the shares are held in equal proportions by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and the Gulf Exploration Company, a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. The British Government have, by agreement with the concessionaire, a pre-emption right over any oil produced during an emergency.

69. After an abortive attempt to find oil at Bahra, on the northern shore of Kuwait bay, two successful wells were drilled in 1938 at Burghan, 26 miles south of the town of Kuwait. Other productive wells were subsequently drilled, but operations were curtailed at the beginning of the war and were discontinued in 1942, when the British military authorities plugged the wells in order to deny their use to the enemy. It is now proposed to rehabilitate the wells and later to resume drilling operations. The reserves are known to be very large. Two oil jetties have been constructed at Shuwaikh, 2½ miles west of Kuwait, and a refinery may be built.*

* It is now planned to export crude oil through a sea terminal 1 mile in length at Fahabil (a village on the coast 21 miles S.S.E. of Kuwait town), at the initial rate of 30,000 barrels (about 4,300 tons) a day, as from April 1946.

70. To the south of Kuwait is a neutral zone covering 1,800 square miles over which both Ibn Sa'ud and the Shaikh of Kuwait enjoy equal rights in virtue of the treaty of Mohammerah of 1922. As oil has been found in large quantities immediately to the north, in Kuwait, and to the south in even larger quantities, in the province of al-Hasa in Sa'udi Arabia, it seems very probable that it may also be struck in the neutral zone.

71. As stated in the section of this report dealing with Sa'udi Arabia, the supplemental agreement of the 29th May, 1939, between the Arabian American Oil Company and the Sa'udi Arabian Government gave the former all the latter's rights, titles and interest in the Kuwait neutral zone. It is known that, besides the Arabian American Oil Company, Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the Eastern Gulf Oil Company are desirous of obtaining a concession in this zone. The Shaikh of Kuwait, however, has refused to discuss with anyone the question of his rights in that region. In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that Kuwait is a British-protected state which has special treaty relations with the British Government in virtue of which the ruler undertakes not to cede, sell, lease or give for occupation any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government.

72. An obstacle to the working of a concession for the neutral zone would be the difficulty of administration occasioned by the fact that, whereas there are no capitulations in Sa'udi Arabia, they, together with reservations in regard to mixed courts, still exist in Kuwait.

XIV.—Bahrain.

73. The Bahrain Petroleum Company, Ltd., though nominally a British concern (it was incorporated in Canada in 1929), is owned jointly by two United States companies, the Standard Oil Co. of California and the Texas Corporation.

74. The company purchased from the Eastern and General Syndicate in 1930 a concession which the latter had acquired in 1925 covering 100,000 acres. This concession is valid until the 29th December, 1989. By agreements between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the company, the area covered by this concession was extended in 1934 and again in 1940, and it now covers all the Shaikh's territory, together with the reefs and territorial waters surrounding the islands. Conflicting claims to certain of the outlying islands by the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Government of Sa'udi Arabia are likely to delay, if not prevent, attempts by the company to examine and exploit these islands. It is perhaps worth noting that the Persian Government protested to the United States Government in 1934 when the company's concession was first extended, on the grounds that Bahrain was Persian territory (this claim, which has no valid basis, has often been made to, and refuted by, the British Government).

75. Oil was first struck in 1934 on the structure at Jabal Dukhan, on Bahrain Island. Since that time, the field has been greatly developed. Production in 1939 was 1,034,000 tons; it was reduced in subsequent years for reasons connected with the war. There is reason to believe that the field has reached its peak, but further producing wells may be discovered by drilling on the outlying islands and in the territorial waters.

76. In the year 1357 A.H. (March 1938–February 1939) the state revenue amounted to Rs. 22,10,000; of this 65 per cent. (Rs. 14,50,000) consisted of royalties from the Bahrain Petroleum Company.

77. The refinery, which is on the east coast of Bahrain Island 9 miles south of Manama, has a capacity of 2,750,000 tons per annum; the excess refinery capacity over local production is utilised for the treatment of crude oil from the neighbouring oilfields in al-Hasa (Sa'udi Arabia). An aviation spirit plant is a recent addition to the refinery.

XV.—Qatar.

78. Petroleum Development (Qatar), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C. with the same shareholders, has a capital of £760,000. It holds a concession from the Shaikh of Qatar which is valid for 75 years from the 17th May, 1935. A sum of Rs. 4,00,000 was paid to the ruler on signature, and annual rentals of Rs. 1,50,000 were fixed for the first 6 years and of Rs. 30,000 thereafter. Royalty is at the rate of Rs. 3/- per ton; royalty payments will in time take the place of the rentals. This concession was originally granted to the A.I.O.C., but it was transferred to Petroleum Development (Qatar) on the 16th July, 1937.

79. This concession gave the holder the sole right to develop oil in the Qatar peninsula and throughout the Shaikh's territory (4,000 square miles).

80. In 1935 His Majesty's Government and the concessionaire signed an agreement whereby the former obtained pre-emption rights over oil produced in Qatar in war time.

81. Drilling began in 1939 and continued until August, 1942, by which time 3 test wells had been completed in the Dukhan area near the west coast of the peninsula; promising shows of oil were obtained in two of these wells. Further operations were prevented by the measures taken by the British military authorities to deny oil to the enemy.

82. A scheme to resume drilling with two rigs and to produce oil at the rate of 1,000,000 tons a year is now under consideration, but it seems doubtful whether anything beyond the rehabilitation of the existing wells will be possible until after the war.

83. There are promising indications of petroleum in the southern part of the Qatar peninsula adjoining the Sa'udi Arabian border, but difficulty in the development of this region has already arisen, because of conflicting claims as to the precise frontier between the two states. This frontier has never been delimited.

XVI.—Trucial Coast.

84. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C. with a capital of £224,000, has obtained concessionary rights in the shajhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dibai, Sharja, Ajman, Ras al-Khaima and Kalba and has hopes of acquiring similar rights in Umm al-Qaiwain. These small states, which are all British-protected, have special treaty relations with the British Government.

(i) Abu Dhabi.

85. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. obtained from the Shaikh in 1936 a 2-year option over the whole of his territory (23,460 square miles). This option was later transferred to Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd., which on the 11th January, 1939, obtained a concession valid for 75 years over the whole area. Rs. 3,00,000 were paid on signature. Annual payments are Rs. 1,00,000 until oil is discovered in commercial quantities. Royalty is to be at Rs. 3/- per ton with a minimum payment of Rs. 2,50,000 per annum for 2 years and Rs. 5,00,000 annually thereafter.

86. No work has yet been carried out.

(ii) Dibai.

87. The Shaikh granted the company a concession for 75 years on the 22nd May, 1937, covering 1,250 square miles. Rs. 60,000 were paid on signature. Annual payments are: Rs. 30,000 until oil in commercial quantities is found, thereupon Rs. 2,00,000 down and royalty at the rate of Rs. 3/- per ton with a minimum annual payment of Rs. 90,000.

88. No exploratory work has yet been undertaken.

(iii) Sharja.

89. The Shaikh granted the company a concession for 75 years on the 17th September, 1937, over an area of 164 square miles. Rs. 60,000 were paid on signature. Annual payments are to be Rs. 30,000 until oil is discovered in commercial quantities, whereupon Rs. 2,00,000 will be paid down and a royalty of Rs. 3/- per ton with a minimum annual sum of Rs. 90,000.

90. Drilling is to begin before 17th September, 1946, failing which the Concession will become null and void.

(iv) Ajman.

91. The company obtained a prospecting licence over 230 square miles for 5 years on the 23rd March, 1939, on payment of Rs. 15,000. This licence was extended later to the 23rd March, 1949, and such period thereafter as to assure the company 5 complete years for prospecting after the conclusion of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany; the rental was fixed at Rs. 12,000 per annum.

(v) Ras al-Khaima.

92. The company obtained a prospecting licence over an area of 300 square miles for five years from the 7th December, 1938, which was later extended for a further period ending one year after the cessation of hostilities between Great

Britain and Germany. Rs. 40,000 were paid on signature, and Rs. 30,000 annually for five years; thereafter the annual payments rise to Rs. 45,000. This licence applies to prospecting only; a further agreement giving the right to drill would have to be concluded.

(vi) *Kalba*.

93. The company has a concession for 75 years from the 20th December, 1938, over an area of 600 square miles. Rs. 60,000 were paid on signature, with annual payments of Rs. 24,000 until oil in commercial quantities is found; then a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 has to be paid. Royalty is to be at Rs. 3/- per ton, with a minimum annual payment of Rs. 90,000.

(vii) *Umm al-Qaiwain*.

94. In 1939 the company approached the Shaikh with a view to obtaining a concession, but he was then unable to negotiate on account of tribal troubles and disputes with neighbouring rulers. These troubles and disputes are now over, so it is proposed to approach him again in the near future.^(*) The area covers some 300 square miles. The Shaikh of Umm al-Qaiwain granted Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. a 75-year concession at the beginning of April 1945. The concession covers the whole of the Shaikh's territory (some 300 square miles). The company made an initial payment of Rs. 60,000 and is to pay an annual rental of Rs. 24,000 until oil in commercial quantities is found. In the event of oil in such quantities being discovered, the company will make a lump sum payment of Rs. 200,000 and will pay royalty at the rate of Rs. 3s. per ton, with a minimum annual sum of Rs. 50,000.

There are no drilling or other operational obligations.

95. Prospects are said to be reasonably good in all these Trucial shajhdoms, but difficulties are likely to arise unless and until the frontiers of these States are properly defined and demarcated.

XVII.—*Oman and Dhofar*.

96. On the 24th June, 1937, the Sultan of Muscat granted Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C., two separate concessions, one covering Oman and the other Dhofar; the total area is 52,000 square miles. Each concession contained an option period of seven years during which the company could either take up the concession or forfeit all rights. Fixed payments of Rs. 3,00,000 in the case of Oman and of Rs. 1,80,000 in the case of Dhofar were guaranteed. The company took up both the concessions in 1944 and duly paid the above-mentioned sums. In article XII of both agreements the company recognised "that certain parts of the Sultan's territory are not at present safe for its operations. The Sultan undertakes on his part to use his good offices with a view to making it possible for the representatives of the company to enter such parts, and will inform the company as soon as such parts become safe." His Majesty's Government and the company entered into a pre-emption agreement in 1938.

97. Annual rental increased from the time of the taking up of the options in 1944 to Rs. 84,000 in respect of Oman and Rs. 48,000 in the case of Dhofar. Royalty is Rs. 3/- per ton, with a minimum in each case equivalent to the annual rentals.

98. Geological surveys were carried out in Oman and Dhofar in 1937-38 and aerial surveys were made of the whole Trucial coast and the strip of Oman to the west of the Jabal Akhdar and the mountains running northwards to Ras Musandam in 1938-39. Arrangements for further surveys had to be cancelled because of the war. Results are said to be encouraging. Geophysical survey work is now contemplated, but progress will depend upon: (i) ability to engage competent staff, (ii) ability to buy or hire the necessary equipment, (iii) whether or not the rulers concerned can arrange for the safety of the parties in the remoter areas, (iv) proper demarcation of the frontier with Sa'udi Arabia.

XVIII.—*Aden Protectorate*.

99. Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C., holds an exploration licence from the Governor of Aden, dated the 12th January, 1938. The area covered the Western Aden Protectorate and the Hadramaut, a total of some 110,000 square miles.

(*) Since the paper was written, information has been received that the Shaikh granted the concession at the beginning of April 1945. No details are available.

100. The main provisions of the permit provide for geological surveys, the submission of geological reports to the Government, the right to drill shallow wells for geological data and the right to a prospecting licence.

101. In 1937-38 the company carried out an aerial survey of the Hadramaut and also made a ground survey. The results were not very promising, but the company is desirous of making a further examination, particularly of the Shabwa salt domes, when conditions permit this to be done.

102. On the outbreak of war the company informed the Governor of Aden that it was unable to continue surveys, as such work was not likely to further the war effort, and it therefore applied for a renewal of the licence (which was valid only for two years). The Governor accepted this plea, and has since granted further renewals of the licence.

XIX.—*The Yemen*.

103. So far as is known, no oil concessions covering any part of the Yemen have ever been granted by the Imam Yahya. He is extremely averse to any foreign penetration into his country, and is therefore unlikely to grant any concession; he is, however, an old and sick man, and his successor may prove less obdurate. Prospects of finding oil are regarded as extremely poor (it will be recalled that a geological survey of Asir yielded disappointing results).

104. If any company succeeded in securing a concession in the Yemen, it would find it difficult to carry out prospecting or exploitation work in the eastern and north-eastern parts because of the absence of a demarcated frontier between the Yemen and Sa'udi Arabia.

XX.—*Persia*.

105. At the present time Persia is producing far more oil than all the other Middle Eastern countries combined, and her reserves of petroleum are known to be extremely large; they may, however, be rivalled in time by the reserves in the oil-bearing regions of Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia and Qatar bordering the western side of the Persian Gulf. So far, only the western and south-western regions of Persia have been extensively prospected and developed, and all the present production is from them. It is possible that the northern areas may also be found to contain important oilfields.

(i) *Western and South-Western Persia*.

106. The Persian Government granted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company its present concession, which is valid until 1993, on the 29th April, 1933; this concession was subsequently approved by the Majlis and the Shah; it replaced the D'Arcy concession which the Persian Government had cancelled in 1932.

107. The A.I.O.C. was bound by the terms of the new concession to select by the end of 1938 one or more areas aggregating not more than 100,000 square miles situated to the south of a line drawn from the Perso-Iraqi frontier near Sulaimaniya to the Perso-Baluch frontier near Irafshan. The company selected its exploitation areas within the prescribed period. The main area, which is some 870 miles long and has an average width of 100 miles, extends from the Iraq frontier north of Qasr-i-Shirin to the entrance to the Persian Gulf; it includes all the company's existing oilfields, namely, the older fields of Masjid-i-Sulaiman and Haft Kel, the important new field at Gach Saran, the new producing areas at Agha Jari and Pazanun, and the small oilfield of Naft-i-Shah (the last-mentioned forms the eastern part of the structure which the Khanaqin Oil Company, another A.I.O.C. subsidiary, is exploiting at Naft Khaneh in Iraq).

108. Production in 1938 amounted to 10,359,000 tons. Owing to war conditions, this level was not attained in subsequent years, but there is no reason, so far as the fields are concerned, why it should not be very greatly exceeded; in fact, plans are under consideration for substantially increasing production in the future.

109. The oil is conveyed by pipe-line from the main producing fields to the refinery at Abadan, which is one of the largest and most up to date in the world; the present capacity is over 11,000,000 tons a year. There is a large plant at Abadan for the production of aviation spirit. Most of the oil processed at Abadan is exported, but some is distributed in Persia. Most of the oil requirements of the west, north-west and north of the country are, however, met by the small Kermanshah refinery, which treats crude oil piped from the Naft-i-Shah

field. The company is bound by the terms of its concession to sell products for internal consumption at a special basic rate. The present capacity of Abadan Refinery is over 15 million tons per annum.

110. Royalty is at the rate of 4/- per ton of petroleum sold for consumption in Persia or exported from that country. The company is also bound to pay the Persian Government a sum equal to 20 per cent of the distribution to its ordinary stockholders in excess of £671,250. The minimum payment under both these heads is to be £750,000 a year. The company's royalty payments to the Persian Government (averaging £4,000,000 a year from 1939 to 1943) are a most important source of revenue and are likely to become still more important in the future.

111. The A.I.O.C. provides employment for 58,000 Persians, many of whom have become skilled artisans.

112. As soon as the A.I.O.C. had selected its areas for exploitation, it relinquished the remainder of the territory lying to the south of the line forming the northern limit of the exploration area. It then became possible for other interests to apply for oil concessions covering the territory in question. In 1944 representatives of the Royal Dutch-Shell group and of certain United States companies were negotiating in Tehran for the grant of concessionary rights in the south-east of the country, but these negotiations were broken off when the Persian Government decided early in September 1944 to grant no oil concessions during the war.

(ii) *Northern Persia.*

113. There are many indications of petroleum in northern Persia, but, until more prospecting and, in particular, test-drilling have been carried out, all that can be said is that the prospects of finding oil in commercial quantities, though reasonably good, are speculative.

114. Numerous attempts have been made to secure concessions and exploit oil in the northern provinces, but they have all, so far, proved unsuccessful. The main, but not the only, cause for this failure has been the attitude of Russia. In 1901 it was Russian influence which prevented Mr. D'Arcy from securing the inclusion of the five northern provinces in his concession and which, in fact, all but brought about the failure of his negotiations for the concession covering the rest of Persia.

(a) *The Khostharia Concession and the A.I.O.C. and S.O.C. Negotiations.*

115. In 1916 a Georgian adventurer named Khostharia acquired a small concession in the province of Mazandaran based upon a *farman* (royal decree) granted in 1896. In the same year Khostharia obtained from the Persian Government a much more extensive concession covering the rest of Mazandaran and the whole of the neighbouring provinces of Gilan and Astarabad. In 1917 this concession was extended to cover the district of Ardabil, in Azarbaijan. The A.I.O.C. acquired this concession in 1920 and formed a company named North Persian Oils, Ltd., to operate it. The A.I.O.C. thereupon notified the Persian Government of the completion of the transfer. On the 20th June, 1920, the Persian Government informed the company that the Khostharia concession was for several reasons regarded as null and void. The situation took on a new aspect when the Persian and Soviet Governments signed a Treaty of Friendship at Tehran on the 26th February, 1921. By article XII of this treaty Soviet Russia declared that all concessions (with certain exceptions specified in the treaty) obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects were null and void, and that the said concessions were therefore restored "to the Persian Government as representing the Persian people." By article XIII the Persian Government, for their part, promised "not to cede to a third Power or to its subjects the concessions and property thus restored to Persia, and to maintain these rights for the Persian nation."

116. In June 1921 the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey applied to the Persian Government for a concession covering the Khostharia areas. The British Legation immediately lodged a protest with the Persian Government on behalf of the A.I.O.C., but was informed in reply that the Khostharia concession was no longer valid. Meanwhile, the Standard Oil Co. continued to press for its concession, and in November the Majlis approved the grant of the oil rights in the northern provinces to that concern. Immediately this action became known, both the British and Soviet Governments protested strongly, the former because of the alleged infringement of the A.I.O.C.'s rights and the latter because of the terms of the 1921 treaty. In order to surmount the difficulty occasioned by this

treaty, the Persian Government addressed a note on the 12th December, 1921, to the Soviet Diplomatic Representative at Tehran to the effect that the Majlis desired the retrocession of Russian concessions to be without reserve or condition, and therefore asked for the treaty to be revised accordingly. On the same date the Soviet Diplomatic Representative sent a purposely vague reply. After stating that his Government had "never sought to place any restriction upon the progress and prosperity of Persia," he went on to say: "I would be prepared . . . should friendly relations be maintained between the two nations, to promote negotiations with a view to a total or partial revision of these articles on the lines desired by the Persian Government, as far as the interests of Russia permit."

117. As matters had reached a deadlock, the A.I.O.C. and the Standard Oil Company agreed to act together on a footing of equality, with the result that the latter acquired a 50 per cent. interest in North Persian Oils, Ltd. The two companies then sought jointly to secure the grant of a new concession, but the Persian Government refused, partly because of the difficulty with Soviet Russia and partly because a new competitor, the Sinclair Oil Corporation, had appeared on the scene (see paragraph 119 below).

118. Although North Persian Oils, Ltd. has never renounced its claims in northern Persia, it is now many years since it last attempted to press them. In 1935 the name of the company was changed to North Iranian Oils, Ltd.

(b) *The Sinclair Concession.*

119. While the A.I.O.C. and the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey were making their joint endeavours to obtain a new concession, the Sinclair Oil Corporation opened negotiations with the Persian Government and succeeded in 1924 in securing a concession. This company failed to proceed with the matter because (i) it was unable to raise the necessary money for a loan to the Persian Government, (ii) charges of bribing certain Persian officials were brought against it, and (iii) the company's prestige had been very adversely affected by its implication in the Teapot Dome scandal in the United States.

(c) *Société Franco-Persane de Recherches.*

120. A Franco-Belgian group began negotiating for a concession in northern Persia in 1927 and formed the Syndicat des Etudes Franco-Persanes. This concern carried out some prospecting work, the results of which were sufficiently encouraging to lead to the formation, in 1930, of the Société Franco-Persane de Recherches. The new company sent out a party of geologists and engineers and sank a shallow well at Naft Chal, in Mazandaran, a few miles from the Caspian coast. Late in the same year, however, all operations were abandoned because of difficulties encountered with the Persian and Soviet Governments.

(d) *The Amiranian Concession.*

121. In 1936 the Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware, U.S.A., with a view to possible operations in Persia, formed a subsidiary, the Amiranian Oil Company, in which it took up 50 per cent. of the shares, the remaining 50 per cent. being allocated to the Texas Corporation.

122. On the 3rd January, 1937, the Persian Government granted the Amiranian Oil Company an oil concession valid for 60 years in north-eastern and eastern Persia. This concession was subsequently approved by the Majlis. Its terms, which followed very closely those of the A.I.O.C. concession of 1933, bound the company to select within 3 years exploitation areas not exceeding 100,000 square miles in the aggregate from an exploration area covering 200,000 square miles. Although the greater part of this exploration area was in Khurasan, 4,500 square miles of it were in the adjacent province of Astarabad (now known as Gorgan), and so to this extent overlapped the Khostharia concession.

123. When the Soviet Government heard of the grant of this concession, they lodged a protest, but instead of basing this protest, as might have been expected, on the infringement of article XIII of the 1921 treaty, they objected on the grounds that the existing good neighbourly relations between the two countries, and the benefits conferred on Persia by the Soviet Government, had entitled them at least to be informed in advance of the granting of the concession, which, if granted to the nationals of certain other countries, might have been a matter of serious concern to them.

124. The company's geologists examined some very promising indications of petroleum in the province of Astarabad and some less encouraging seepages

in the neighbourhood of Zahidan. As a result, the company intended for a time to drill in Astarabad, but it subsequently decided to abandon the concession because of the difficulty and expense of developing such a relatively remote area and because the high cost of marketing any oil that might be found would probably have rendered the enterprise uneconomic.

125. In the course of its operations the company spent \$2,000,000.

(e) *The Pipe-line Concession.*

126. At the same time as the Amiranian Oil Company obtained its concession, the Iranian Pipe-Line Company, which was formed by the same interests, secured a 60-year concession from the Persian Government giving it the non-exclusive right to construct a main pipe-line to any part of Persia, together with tributary lines to connect it with other lines in Persia or in neighbouring countries (i.e., Afghanistan). The existing rights of other companies (that is the A.I.O.C.) were to be respected. The company's lines were authorised to carry oil from wells in Persia and/or Afghanistan produced by the Amiranian or other companies. This concession was surrendered in June, 1938, when the Amiranian and Inland Exploration companies abandoned their concessions in, respectively, Persia and Afghanistan.

(f) *The Kavir Khurian Company.*

127. Khostharia, having acquired certain of the rights conferred by a *farman* which had been granted many years previously to a Persian known as the Amin al-Ma'adin, registered the Kavir Khurian Company in Tehran in 1925 in order to exploit the oil deposits in the desert region (*kavir*) to the south of Semnan, some 110 miles to the east of the capital. The fact that the company was registered does not necessarily imply that it has any valid claim to concessionary rights.

128. As soon as the A.I.O.C. heard of the registration of this company, it protested to the Persian Government on the grounds that Semnan lay within the area of the D'Arcy concession. The Government, however, maintained that Semnan was in the province of Khurasan and that it was therefore not within the A.I.O.C.'s concessionary area.

129. Although the company was established on a somewhat flimsy basis, Khostharia, who was on its board, showed great activity on its behalf. He persuaded the Russian Bank to furnish the bulk of the capital, and distributed a number of shares in a judicious manner to certain influential Persians. At a later date Khostharia offered a holding in the company to French and Italian interests, with the result that the former sent a party of geologists to examine the company's area. It is believed that their report was unfavourable; on the other hand, a leading Soviet geologist named Golubniatnikov is said to have formed a different opinion.

130. Up to the present only two wells have been drilled, and commercial production has not been obtained.

131. Shortly after the Allied entry into Persia in the autumn of 1941, the question of this company was, it is believed, discussed by the Persian Government and the Soviet Embassy; the former is said to have maintained that the company's title was not valid and that a new agreement would have to be negotiated before the area could be exploited. When M. Kavtaradze, the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Tehran at the beginning of September, 1944, the ostensible object for his visit was the study of the position of the Kavir Khurian Company.

(g) *The N.V. Algemeene Exploratie Maatschappij.*

132. On the 11th August, 1939, the Persian Government granted the N.V. Algemeene Exploratie Maatschappij, a Dutch concern connected with the Royal Dutch-Shell group, an exploration concession, valid for two years, for minerals (including petroleum) in western and north-western Persia. This area, which covered some 32,000 square miles, was an elongated quadrilateral of irregular shape running from near Tabriz in the north-west to a point south of Kashan in the south-east. The length was 420 miles, and the average width was 80 miles. An extension of this concession up to April 1944 was later granted; when this extension was on the point of expiring, the company started negotiations for a further extension. No extension or renewal of this concession has yet been granted, doubtless because of the decision of the Persian Government to shelve such matters until after the war.

(h) *The Soviet Government's Request for an Oil Concession.*

133. It soon became apparent after the arrival of M. Kavtaradze in Tehran that the real object of his visit was to negotiate for the granting of an oil concession in northern Persia. When M. Kavtaradze made his official request for this concession, the Persian Prime Minister informed him that the Government had already decided to postpone until after the war the question of granting oil concessions covering any part of Persia. M. Kavtaradze and the Soviet Embassy thereupon put such pressure on the Persian Government that it was forced to resign, despite the fact that it had the backing of public opinion. The new Cabinet followed the same policy as its predecessor in regard to the oil question, and on the 2nd December, 1944, the Majlis passed a Bill tabled by one of the Deputies to prevent the Prime Minister or any other member of the Government from entering into negotiations with any foreign Government or company or from signing any concession or agreement relating to oil.

134. Foiled in his attempt to secure the concession, M. Kavtaradze left Tehran for Moscow on the 9th December. It now remains to be seen whether the Soviet Government will return to the charge.

135. From a survey of the long and extremely complicated history of north Persian oil, certain points clearly emerge:—

- (i) If any non-Russian firm or group applied for an oil concession in the north, it seems extremely probable that the Soviet Government would put such pressure on the Persian Government as to render it most difficult, if not impossible, for its application to be granted.
- (ii) Even if Soviet approval or abstention from opposition could be secured, any firm attempting to exploit the concession would, if it discovered large quantities of oil, be confronted with the difficulty of finding a satisfactory way of transporting this oil. The only natural outlet for north Persian oil is via the Caucasus, and it seems in the highest degree unlikely that the Soviet Government would agree to such oil being transported to western markets via Baku and Batum, since it would thereby be competing with products from those centres. The only alternative would be a long and very costly pipe-line over the Elburz and Zagros mountains to the Persian Gulf.
- (iii) The petroleum requirements of northern Persia would not, in themselves, be sufficient to justify the heavy expenditure on drilling and on the erection of a refinery that would be required; moreover, it must be borne in mind that most of the marketing for this region is already being done by the A.I.O.C. with products from its Naft-i-Shah field which are refined at Kermanshah. Furthermore, Soviet-Russian competition in this market might at any time be revived.
- (iv) It would thus seem that north Persian oil could be exploited only by the Soviet Government or by some Persian or other concern in which they had a large interest.

XXI.—*Afghanistan.*

136. In 1927 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (as it was then called) was unofficially offered a concession covering Afghanistan, but it declined the offer on the grounds that the Tirpul area near Herat, where there were oil indications, was in the Russian economic sphere and that the inaccessibility of the area made it commercially unattractive. The Burmah Oil Company and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company likewise considered the possibility of taking up a concession in Afghanistan, but they also gave up the idea, because the remoteness of the area from seaboard would have rendered development work extremely costly, while, if oil were found, the cost of a pipe-line to some point on the coast of Makran or the Persian Gulf would be very high.

137. Undeterred by these objections, two United States companies, the Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware and the Texas Corporation, formed a joint concern called the Inland Exploration Company of America with a capital of \$5,050,333 for the purpose of negotiating for and exploiting a concession in Afghanistan. A concession agreement was signed by representatives of the Afghan Government and the company in Berlin on the 19th November, 1936. This agreement was modified in Kabul on the 18th January, 1938, in order to embody certain of the provisions of the Amiranian Oil Company's concession in Persia, which were more favourable to the Government.

138. The exploration area covered the whole of Afghanistan, but the company was bound by the terms of its concession to select within 3 years five provinces for exploitation, the rest of the area being abandoned.

139. The company's geologists carried out surveys in the north and found a promising area near Khanabad, 40 miles south of the river Oxus, and another near Sar-i-Pul, 65 miles south-west of Balkh and about the same distance north-east of Maimana. Both these areas were not far from producing fields in the Shirabad region in Soviet Central Asia, on the further (north) side of the Oxus. The Afghan Government refused to allow the company to put down test wells in this northern territory. The company also examined the Tirpul area, which was found to be disappointing, and it started to survey some districts further to the south, but the Afghan officials prevented it from carrying out a thorough examination.

140. Owing to this obstructiveness and to the remoteness of the more promising regions examined, the Inland Exploration Company abandoned its concession in June 1938.

XXII.—U.S.S.R.

141. In order to complete this survey of the oil resources of the Middle East, it is necessary to describe briefly the very rich Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus and the less important fields on the eastern side of the Caspian sea, although most of these fields are not, strictly speaking, within the area covered by this survey.

(i) Baku.

142. The Baku oilfields are by far the richest in the whole of the Soviet Union. Before the war they produced 24,000,000 tons of crude oil a year, and production in 1944 is estimated at some 26,000,000 tons or 70 per cent. of the total output (37,000,000 tons) of the Union. Baku oil is dealt with as follows:—

- (a) *Crude Oil*.—The bulk of the crude oil produced is refined in Baku; of the remainder, some is piped to Batum for treatment there, while the rest is taken by sea to Makhach-Kala whence it is sent partly by pipe-line and partly by rail to Grozny for refining.
- (b) *Finished Products*.—Part of the kerosene refined at Baku is conveyed to Batum by pipe-line. The rest of the kerosene and the other finished products are disposed of in the following manner: (i) Rail to Batum. (ii) Rail to Grozny, Rostov and beyond, (iii) Tanker to Makhach-Kala and thence by pipe-line and rail to Grozny and beyond, (iv) Tanker to Astrakhan and thence by river tanker and barge up the Volga. The Baku crude oil refined at Grozny is similarly dealt with, some being piped or sent by rail to Rostov and beyond and some being piped to Makhach-Kala, whence it is shipped to Astrakhan for onward transport by Volga tanker (there is a short pipe-line from the Volga roadstead, near the mouth of the river, to a point just to the north of Astrakhan).

(ii) Grozny.

143. The Grozny fields seemed at the outset to offer great possibilities, and refineries of very large capacity were therefore erected to treat the oil produced. Production, however, fell very far short of the estimates, and the surplus refining capacity at Grozny has since been used to deal with Baku oil.

144. Before the war Grozny production amounted to 2,700,000 tons a year or 8.5 per cent. of the total for the Soviet Union; production in 1944 is estimated at 2,800,000 tons.

145. In pre-war days there was a pipe-line from Grozny to Rostov and Trudovaya. It is not known whether this pipe-line is again in operation along its entire length (667 miles).

(iii) Maikop.

146. The Maikop fields produced some 2,500,000 tons of good quality oil before the war. This oil was refined partly at Krasnodar and partly at Tuapse. The Maikop fields suffered very severely as a result of military operations in that area; in consequence, production in 1944 is estimated at only 100,000 tons.

(iv) Emba-Dossor.

147. Production in these fields rose from 650,000 tons in 1938 to an estimated total of 1,000,000 tons in 1944. The crude oil is conveyed by pipe-line to the refineries at Orsk and Guriev.

(v) Trans-Caspia.

148. The field at Neftedag to the south-east of Krasnovodsk produced 436,000 tons in 1938; production in 1944 is estimated at 1,600,000 tons. The oil is conveyed by rail to Krasnovodsk and thence by tanker across the Caspian to Baku and Makhach-Kala for treatment.

149. The Baku oilfields have now been exploited for over 60 years and fears of their approaching exhaustion have often been entertained. However, new wells drilled in the shallow waters of the Caspian near Baku have proved successful and further drilling elsewhere in that region has revealed more extensive reserves than were for long supposed to exist. Nevertheless, the possibility of the exhaustion of the Baku fields within a measurable period of time and the not unnatural desire to avoid having "too many eggs in one basket" have caused the Soviet Government to make strenuous efforts to discover "a second Baku." The Grozny fields have proved very disappointing, and the extensive deposits in the Emba-Dossor-Ufa regions, though promising, have not yet come fully up to expectations. In addition, there is the Soviet desire to discover and exploit oil in regions to the east of Baku, in view of the general development of Soviet industry in the east.

150. For all these reasons, the Soviet oil experts have for long had their eyes on a number of hitherto unexploited regions in the Soviet Union and also in northern Persia, where there are, as already stated, extensive indications of petroleum.

*Research Department, Foreign Office,
28th February, 1945.*

[E 2091/3/65]

No. 44.

Lord Killearn to Mr. Eden—(Received 28th March.)

(No. 80. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, 23rd March, 1945.

OLD rivalries between Arab States have become accentuated during discussions leading up to the constitution of the Arab League, and in these rivalries Egypt has entered as a new element. The rivalry between Egypt and Iraq for the leading rôle in the Arab Union became evident from the beginning of the discussions. The Hashemites and Nuri, so intimately associated with the Arab Movement from its early stages, were not unnaturally piqued at being ousted by a newcomer from the major rôle. By a natural process Ibn Saud aligned himself with Egypt against his old enemies, the Hashemites and Nuri. The Lebanon, which was fearful of domination by a still uneuropeised Moslem hinterland, naturally followed suit, regarding Egypt as more modernised and less fanatical than Syria and Iraq. Memories of Ibrahim Pasha were even evoked to promote closer relations between the Lebanon and Egypt. Syria, which at the beginning was not enthusiastically pro-Egyptian, has gradually evolved towards Egypt owing to the desire of the present governing elements in Syria to preserve the republican régime and their apprehensions of Hashemite designs on Syria. King Farouk has always treated the Emir Abdullah very superciliously and there is no love lost between them. Moreover, inevitably a Hashemite Emir, with his dreams of a Syrian throne, would find himself in the opposite camp to that of the present Syrian rulers. It was equally inevitable that, in spite of rivalries between Abdullah and the Iraqi Royal family over Syria, the two Hashemite Powers should find themselves standing together against the Egyptian bloc.

2. The latest phase of these developments has been the movement towards the conclusion of treaties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with the suggested adherence of Syria, and between Egypt and the Lebanon. The Hashemites are thus tending to be isolated in the Arab League.

3. The movement towards Arab Union, encouraged by our declaration of sympathy towards any attempt of the Arabs to get together, started with the

genuine desire to attenuate the balkanisation of Arab lands brought about mainly by the necessities of Anglo-French politics and with the equally genuine desire to protect Arab lands from outside encroachment.

4. Egypt took the lead, actuated at the beginning largely by reasons of internal politics. Nahas Pasha wished to strengthen his internal prestige by posing as a leader of the Arab world, and King Farouk wished to strengthen his throne by assuming a similar rôle. King Ibn Saud was, from the beginning, opposed to the idea of Arab Union because he feared it would mean a Hashemite domination of the Fertile Crescent with the consequent danger to his own position in the Hejaz. Hence his determination to *saboter* any northern combination. The Lebanon was determined to preserve its complete independence in order to avoid absorption in a Moslem *bloc*. The attitudes of the Lebanon and Ibn Saud led to the emasculation of the corporate idea of the League and that of the Lebanon to the attenuation of any executive function of the League, such as that involved in compulsory arbitration. Ibn Saud and the Lebanon were kept within the League largely by the influence of Egypt, whose support in the Council they regarded as a guarantee against the dangers which they saw in it to their respective countries. Syria, after aiming at the creation of a Greater Syria under the rule of Damascus, acquiesced in the maintenance of the present divisions of the western part of the Fertile Crescent. This acquiescence was due to the fear that prosecution of the idea of a Greater Syria would drive the Lebanon back into French arms. Syrian acquiescence was no doubt also partly due to the influence of Egypt, whose assistance it needed for its emancipation from France and for support against Hashemite designs.

5. It is clear from all this that the influence of Egypt is a determining factor in the present evolution of Arab States. It is also clear that the Hashemites are being relegated to the background, largely owing to Egyptian manipulation of their rivals. This is not a happy state of affairs. We are under obligations to the Hashemites for the rôle they played in the last war and for their stabilising influence in Transjordan and Iraq. As things are at present in the Arab world, it is not in our interest that Hashemite prestige should be weakened in those two countries. I submit, therefore, that our efforts should be directed against the isolation of the Hashemites within the Arab League. If we make representations to Ibn Saud against exclusive treaty making, we should make similar representations to King Farouk and the Egyptian Government. We can justify these representations by our desire to promote union among our Egypto-Arab friends and to remove the danger that the present discords may wreck the League.

6. Arab Union has now been realised on paper by the formation of an Egypto-Arab *bloc* of independent units preserving their often conflicting policies of the pre-League period. There will no doubt be much friction between the members of the League and without our good offices these frictions are likely to end in a relaxation, if not disintegration, of the League. It may no doubt be argued by some, on the principle of divide and rule, that such disintegration would not be contrary to our interests. While on a short-term view this is an arguable proposition, I feel that you will agree that on a long-term view it is to our advantage that the Egypto-Arab world should not be distracted by internecine conflicts which will expose it not only to British but also to Russian penetration. Moreover, the balkanisation of the Arab world leads to material retrogression which militates to provoke discontent in a large area lying across our lines of communications and containing our vital oil supplies. I suggest, therefore, that we have a long-term interest in promoting through Arab co-operation the material welfare and the satisfaction of the sentimental aspirations of these countries as far as our Imperial interests permit. These aspirations, though often obscured by rivalries such as I have described, nevertheless constitute a permanent factor in the relations of these countries with Great Britain and, moreover, in the stability of the whole Middle East.

7. At present it may be said that the only aims on which all these States are united are those of getting rid of the French from Syria and of preventing the Zionist domination of Palestine. Whatever discords may weaken the Arab League in the immediate future, we must count on its being united on these two issues.

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T**TREATY.****Further Correspondence**

respecting

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 61.—APRIL TO JUNE 1945.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 2105/67/97]

No. 1.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 30th March.)

(No. 24.)
Sir,

Kabul, 16th March, 1945.

IN my despatch No. 12 of the 10th February last, I promised a fuller report on the visit of the recent Afghan Military Mission and I have now the honour to forward herewith the military attaché's letter and enclosures on the subject.⁽¹⁾ The report has been prepared in great detail largely for purposes of record, and for general purposes it will be sufficient to read only the main report of the tour along with Appendices C and D which deal with the supply of war material from India, though the whole report contains much that is also of great interest. The tour lasted from the 4th December, 1944, to the 30th January, 1945, and took the mission from Peshawar to Delhi, Dehra Dun, Ramgarh, Calcutta and the Burma Front and back via Calcutta, Ahmednagar, Saugor, Agra, Delhi and Lahore. The only serious contretemps was the unfortunate illness of Brigadier Md. Arif Khan, the second in command of the mission, who was incapacitated by tonsillitis at Dehra Dun and had to remain there in hospital from the 16th December and was only able to rejoin the mission at Calcutta on its return from the Burma Front on the 5th January.

2. The mission was an unqualified success, chiefly owing to the meticulous care with which the arrangements for the whole programme had been made and to the friendliness and hospitality shown to the mission throughout the tour. The Afghans, who suffer from the inferiority complex so usual in small countries, were afraid that they would not receive the attention which they considered to be the due of representatives of an independent country, and any suspicion of lack of courtesy would have had most unfavourable repercussions in Afghanistan. But the attention paid to them everywhere and more especially the hospitality shown to them by their excellencies the Viceroy and the commander-in-chief far exceeded their expectations and made a very deep impression both on the mission itself and on the Afghan Government. Since their return I have received expressions of gratitude from many quarters. In my previous despatch I reported that the head of the mission had called on the American Minister and myself in person to express his gratitude and that the Minister of Defence had given a dinner party for the same purpose. The Afghan Foreign Minister similarly expressed the gratitude of himself and his Government and, after making informal enquiries whether an official letter from himself or from the Minister of Defence would be more appropriate, has now written officially on behalf of his Government requesting me to convey their sincere thanks to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India for the kindness and hospitality shown to the mission.

3. From a military point of view the results may be classified under two heads, psychological and material. The friendliness shown to the mission

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

throughout their journey, the readiness to show them all sorts of modern weapons and training and, finally, the generous offer of weapons and facilities for training in their use made a great impression on the officers comprising the mission, and may be counted on to have an even more important effect on the outlook of the Afghan army as a whole. They have been brought up to look on the British as their hereditary enemies and to regard the Indian army with the gravest suspicion. The treatment they have received will go a long way to remove these suspicions. Of the material results of the mission it is as yet too early to speak. As mentioned at the end of paragraph 6 of the general report the Afghan Government are considering the offer of arms and equipment that has been made and I expect to be consulted about the whole matter very shortly.

4. The success of the mission should have an even wider effect on opinion in the country as a whole. The Afghan Foreign Minister has spoken to me about this on more than one occasion. He regards the actual agreement regarding any arms and equipment that may eventually be supplied as of minor importance in comparison with the fact that now for the first time in history His Majesty's Government have given clear proof of their readiness to trust the Afghan Government and to give them the substantial help they require in establishing their authority throughout the country. He recalled a conversation with you, Sir, while he was Minister in London some years ago, during which, in reply to the sympathy which you had expressed on behalf of His Majesty's Government with Afghan aspirations, he had asked where his country could look for the material help she needed, and had received no encouragement! The effect of our new attitude would, he said, be of inestimable value, and already the tendency to blame the British for all the difficulties that the country was experiencing, and had experienced during the last 100 years, was less in evidence, not only among older people but also, and far more important, among the younger generation. He looked for a rapid extension of this new feeling of friendship and confidence. Such an opinion may be exaggerated but I do not think that it is devoid of foundation. That the Afghan Government are genuinely doing their best to foster such friendly sentiments is shown by the appreciative references in the Afghan press detailed in Appendix E.

5. In the last paragraph of his general report Colonel Lancaster has touched on the question of Russian reactions. When it had been finally decided to welcome the mission I had, as instructed in your telegram No. 104, dated the 13th August, 1944, informed the Soviet Ambassador in general terms and the subject had also been mentioned both by the British and American military attachés to Major Raitcev. No particular interest was shown at the time but as soon as the mission had returned, both the Soviet Ambassador and his military attaché evinced the liveliest curiosity and some suspicion. They seemed to think that the mission had actually brought back with them a large quantity of arms and ammunition. They were surprised, but at first by no means convinced, when they heard that the only arms brought back with them consisted of two rifles, presents to the head of the mission from the British and American military authorities. These suspicions we endeavoured to counter by explaining frankly the position and emphasising that the problem which was of main interest to both our Governments was the control of the tribes on the Indian border. At my suggestion M. Najibullah Khan spoke himself to the Soviet Ambassador explaining that Afghanistan, in her backwater, had been anxious to obtain first-hand information about the trends of modern warfare and also to acquire modern weapons such as would enable her to exercise more effective control over her tribes. He added, that they had no need of such weapons as anti-aircraft guns, as they had no fear of attacks from without, (1) but that they did need more efficient weapons suitable for mountain warfare. Colonel Lancaster and I have also explained to our Russian opposite numbers that we have offered to supply Afghanistan with a certain amount of modern equipment as soon as the war is over and that these offers are now being considered by the Afghan Government. It seems that the ambassador's suspicions have been to a large extent allayed, and when I last saw him he told me that M. Najibullah Khan had given him an account of the mission's activities in India. He added that he had also been much interested to read in a recent number of the *Indian Chronicle* (a paper published in Russian in Delhi) an article on the North-West Frontier and that he felt that he now had a much better understanding of the difference between the administrative frontier and the Durand Line and of our problems in this area.

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6. In paragraph 5 of his general report Colonel Lancaster has paid a tribute to American co-operation. It is a fact that the good relations existing between our two legations in Kabul have enabled us throughout to present a united front to the Afghan Government, and the co-operation afforded by the American military attaché, Major Fox, throughout the tour has contributed in no small measure to its success.

7. Finally, I cannot close this despatch without paying a tribute to the work of Colonel Lancaster on whom has fallen the principal burden of shepherding the mission throughout the Indian tour. His intimate knowledge of the Afghan character and understanding of the Afghans' point of view has enabled him to be guide, philosopher and friend to the chief of the mission and to have steered him past the many pitfalls into which he might easily have fallen. That the difficulties which he encountered were by no means small is shown by his comments on the detailed tour in Appendix B and are well instanced by his account of the trouble which he had at Imphal on the 2nd January. That the pitfalls were all successfully avoided is in itself the highest tribute to Colonel Lancaster's invariable good temper, patience and tact.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 2177/195/93]

No. 2.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd April.)

(No. 117.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 19th March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 15th January last, the following summary of principal events in Iraq since that date.

2. The rumours of change in the Cabinet mentioned in the second paragraph of my despatch under reference proved completely baseless and the Government of Hamdi al Pachachi remains in office with, however, the possibility of changes before the Regent leaves in April on his official visit to the United States. The storms which arose during the long debate on the reply to the speech from the Throne have died away as suddenly as they came. Speeches in Parliament have recently been less concerned with personalities, have kept to the point under discussion, and have been less unconstructively critical than heretofore. There is also a salutary tendency for members to ask questions on matters affecting their constituencies. One reason for the improvement of the general standard of Parliament is the publication of their proceedings in the press, which now has far more freedom to comment than formerly. At the instance of a group of Bagdad place-holders, the important new Liwa Administration Bill, which has been under consideration for so long, was referred by the Chamber back to a Committee, but the Government were determined not to allow it to remain on the shelf, and it has now been passed and will shortly become law; though it will be a year before the complicated regulations necessary to give it effect can be drafted. Its general effect will be to decentralise the administration and, I hope, to revitalise the neglected provinces.

3. One event of minor political note occurred on the 3rd February when Jamil Beg al Madfai resigned his seat in the Senate. No reason was given for this publicly, but it is generally assumed to have been due to his bitterness at being removed from the presidency of the Senate, as the result of a plot sponsored by the Regent and Nuri Pasha. However this may be, Jamil Beg is no longer in Parliament and no serious effects have so far been observable.

4. Some weeks ago I was visited by a Shaikhly Deputy from Diwaniya liwa who sought my opinion on a scheme which he and others of his kind were hatching. This was the formation of a tribal party in the Chamber of Deputies, membership of which would be forbidden to Effendis and to those who wear the "sidara." I said that I saw no particular harm in the idea and the "Parliamentary bloc," as it is called, was (with the Regent's approval) duly announced to a wondering world on the 16th February. After all the recent discussion about political parties in the press and in Parliament, one cannot but be amused that it should have been the Shaikhs, even though led by the armchair Shaikh Hassan al Suhail, who should have shown the Effendis the way. Abdul Aziz Beg al Sa'adoun, an ineffective Deputy from Basra, is the President, and Shaikh Hassan al Suhail the secretary of the bloc. Its guiding principles are stated to be loyalty to the throne, friendship with Britain and preservation of the faith of Islam. I scarcely expect that the new party will have very much influence on affairs, or indeed, that it will hold together very long. Its formation, however, as the first political party to come into existence since 1931, is worth recording.

5. There has been continued interest in Arab Unity. Nuri Pasha has come and gone from point to point with tireless zeal. His public statements have not always been happy and in private it has almost seemed as though he did not know his own mind. For all that, Iraqis in general have approved the Government's decision to leave the handling of Arab Unity affairs very largely to Nuri Pasha, though not without some measure of protest from the Senate, which was rather hurt that it had not first been consulted on this matter. Interest in Arab unity has been sustained in the press, which has combined the usual attacks on "imperialism" with dissertations on Palestine and Syria; but it has, at the same time, remained clear that the Arabs, like the peoples of the west, find it hard to be united except when they are all in opposition to some outside power or policy which they conceive menaces the Arab States individually or collectively.

6. The meeting of King Ibn Saud and Farouk at Yenbo revealed an immediate divergence of opinion, and emphasised the continued existence of rival

ambitions within the Arab world. Messages about this meeting were for the most part published without comment in the Iraqi press. On the other hand, the meeting of the Regent of Iraq with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan was hailed as an important event in Arab affairs. The Regent and the Amir Abdullah were clearly disturbed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt should show such solidarity and were apprehensive of the effects of the discussions between the two kings on Hashimite claims to Arab leadership, and perhaps also on Hashimite claims to more material things, like the throne of Syria. The press, voicing what is now, I think, the feeling of most of this country, clearly expressed its support of the House of Hashim and refrained from attaching any significance to the Farouk-Ibn Saud Conference which might appear to conflict with the interests of Iraq's ruling dynasty.

7. The fear that Hashimite claims might be overlooked, or passed by, was unfortunately strengthened in the minds of the Regent and his Ministers when they heard that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt had met King Ibn Saud in Egypt and had conveniently found in the same country the President of Syria. The Regent was deeply hurt at not having also received an invitation, but as I have dealt fully with the resulting local complexities by telegraph, it is hardly necessary to do more than just mention the matter in this despatch.

8. Kurdish affairs have, on the whole, been quiet during the period under report. Mulla Mustafa after some further touring seems inclined for the moment to take no initiative in attacking the Government. The rôle of *revendicateur* has been temporarily assumed by his elder brother Shaikh Ahmad and Beg Mahmud Agha Zibari, while Mulla Mustafa sits back and disclaims any responsibility for what these two may do. Mulla Mustafa was persuaded to meet the Mutasarrif of Erbil, to whose charge Barzan has now been transferred, at Walsh on the 17th January, and the results of the meeting are said to have been satisfactory. An amnesty for Mulla Mustafa and his followers for the events of 1943-44 will shortly be laid before Parliament, and is expected to be passed without much opposition. Apprehension in the Rowanduz-Barzan area is stated to be growing as a result of rumours of approaching Iraqi army manoeuvres in the north in which British troops are to participate and highly-coloured rumours are circulating of when and where the army will attack and of "counter-measures" being taken by the Kurds. Much of this agitation can be discounted, but there is no denying that tension exists and the situation will require careful handling. I propose prior to my departure to address a farewell letter to Mulla Mustafa in which I shall not only explain clearly that the coming military exercises will neither threaten nor impinge on his territory, but will also tender him some good advice as to conduct and his relations with the Arab authorities. This problem is largely a conflict of wrong. In the past, the Bagdad Government has been neglectful and vindictive in dealing with its Kurdish areas. On the other hand, the Kurdish Aghas are ignorant, rapacious and reactionary. Their time is up, and they know it. They are now fighting a delaying action with all the weapons at their command, of which bluff and blackmail are two. In the end, Bagdad will win, but it is our duty to see that, if possible, the victory shall be bloodless.

9. Tribal affairs have been more turbulent than in previous months. In particular, there has been renewed trouble between the Shammar Khurassa tribe of Iraq and the Agaidat from Syria. On the 11th January a force of Agaidat numbering, it is said, some 1,000 men, with a similar number of followers, attacked an encampment of the Shammar at Bir al Bugharis north-east of Abu Kemal. In the ensuing fight about 120 of the Agaidat were reported killed and eleven of the Shammar also fell. The Agaidat, however, carried off considerable booty which the Iraqi police, who claim to have intervened and stopped the fighting, were unable to recover before the raiders had recrossed the border. Police patrols are now out on both sides and the Shammar have been ordered well away from the border. A meeting between the Muhafiz of Deir ez Zor and the Mutasarrif of Mosul has been arranged; but until they agree on a settlement and carry out its terms there will continue to be a danger that similar large-scale raids will recur.

10. The newly-formed trades unions are showing a certain fairly discreet activity. Notices appear in the Arabic press from time to time stating that this or that union has sent a petition to some Government department or other asking that the workmen of the trade concerned should be granted a stated favour or concession such as an issue of Government cloth or new sugar ration cards. "Get-together" parties have even been arranged between the workers of one part of Bagdad and another.

11. I have not noticed that the unions have displayed much leaning towards "communism," but as a subject of conversation this is still much to the fore. The arrival of M. Krikori Titovitch Zaitzev, the new Russian Minister, has inevitably led to much propaganda and many rumours. Not the least of the latter was to the effect that you and I, Sir, had opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the Soviet and that the Russians had refused to appoint a Minister until I had been removed: the news of my resignation, coming as it did with M. Zaitzev, appeared to some to confirm this ridiculous theory. It is perhaps, at the same time, a small pointer to the power with which the Russians are credited by some of the uninformed in this country: *Omne ignotum pro magifico*.

12. The Russian Minister himself is a pleasant young man, but not apparently a very outstanding personality. He has a capable Counsellor (formerly the Russian Consul at Kermanshah) named Klimov who has established friendly contact with my staff and it is thought in Iraqi circles that Klimov is the real brain in the Russian Legation. So far, there is little to report on their activities and such information as I have received shows that only the known "communists" have gone out of their way to flaunt their dutiful belief in the Soviet system.

13. On the 7th February Awad al Bahrawi Beg returned to Bagdad as Egyptian Minister. I knew him when he was here before in 1941 and find him an agreeable and friendly colleague.

14. A Syrian by the name of Baha ud Din Bakri, married to a daughter of Yasin Pasha al Hashimi, arrived here on the 8th February in the capacity of Syrian Chargé d'Affaires. Though he has secured a house for the legation, he has not yet begun to function as official Syrian representative, and Syrian visas are still being granted by His Majesty's Consulates and Embassy here.

15. M. Bakri has nonetheless had a busy time for the President of Syria, Shukri Beg Quwatli, has just been here on an official visit, accompanied by Sa'adullah Jabiri and others. The President and his party travelled in aircraft put at their disposal by the air officer commanding and were very grateful for this courtesy. As I have reported by telegram, the visit cannot be regarded as an outstanding success. In the first place, as you are aware, the relations between the Syrian Republic and the Hashimites, never easy, since the latter regard Damascus as by rights a Hashimite capital, have been strained ever since the Amir Abdullah was refused permission to visit Syria last August. More recently, the fact that President Quwatli flew to Jedda without informing the Iraqi Government of the object of this visit, caused a good deal of resentment here because it is felt locally that this country did far more for Syrian independence than any other in the Arab world. The Regent was by no means pleased to see President Quwatli, and had even talked of being out of Bagdad when he arrived. The general atmosphere therefore lacked cordiality and the receptions were formal and languid.

Shukri Quwatli himself and his colleagues were cast down by the failure of the United Nations to invite Syria to attend the San Francisco Conference. It cannot be said that this visit has done anything to advance the prospects of Arab unity. Indeed, it has served to underline once again the strength of the personal, sectional and dynastic rivalries which obstruct the path to federation, of which mention has already been made in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

16. The Minister Resident in Cairo accompanied by Lady Grigg and his private secretary honoured me with a visit from the 5th to 8th March. During his stay Sir Edward Grigg met the Regent, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and other leading Iraqi politicians. He also paid a flying visit to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery at Abadan. His visit was most opportune and successful.

17. While he was here the invitations to the San Francisco Conference were issued and Sir Edward and I had to receive the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and two ex-Prime Ministers to record their protests that Syria and the Lebanon had not been invited. Comment in the press on this omission has been blunt and even bitter. There has even been criticism that Transjordan was not invited, though I do not think this has been meant very seriously.

18. On the 31st January Ramzi Nafi' Agha, the Iraqi member of a German parachute expedition which landed in Iraq in 1943, and who was captured by the Iraqi police, was tried by an Iraqi court martial and sentenced to twenty years' penal servitude under chapter 12 of the Bagdad Penal Code. The two parachutists mentioned as being at large in paragraph 20 of my despatch under reference have yet to be detained.

19. On the 3rd March a new list of twenty-two persons released from internment at Amara was published. They are all men of no account, largely persons interned on criminal charges who should normally have been sent to the common jail.

20. Some of the members of the Iraqi delegation to the recent Conference of Chambers of Commerce at New York have returned. They visited other cities of the United States, and report that they were very courteously received by the Commercial Secretariat of His Majesty's Embassy at Washington. One of them, Abdul Hadi Chelabi, has spoken a little to a member of my staff of his impressions of America, and did not seem to be unduly impressed with the advantages of trading with that country. He reported that in many cases, such as that of irrigation pumps and engines, the American product was more expensive than the British, and no better. In luxury articles such as radios, refrigerators and cars the Iraqis could not do better than turn to the United States, but for other things he felt that the United Kingdom was still the best source of supply. He was surprised to find that the highest class of poplin and woollen cloth to be bought in America comes from Great Britain. He said that the Americans appeared to want to buy Iraqi dates, and he had actually been approached by the Ford Company for a deal involving a thousand tons of dates. The Americans, so he said, somewhat resented the way in which we had monopolised the date trade during the war. It is to be regretted that Abdul Hadi Chelabi's public comments have been far less constructive. In the vernacular press and elsewhere he has, indeed, given expression to some surprising nonsense on the possibilities of trade expansion between this country and America, and has aroused expectations of dollar credits on an impressive scale.

21. Dates have, I am afraid, been a sore point for the last two months, so far as growers on the Tigris and Euphrates are concerned. These growers have bitterly complained of the treatment they have received at the hands of the concessionary company, Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co., Ltd., who have perhaps been rather inclined to stand very strictly to the letter of the concession. The Date Board also appear to have helped in creating misunderstandings. In short, the growers of Zehdi dates outside the Basra area find themselves with large quantities of dates on their hands which Andrew Weirs refuse to take, for technical reasons, and which they are unable to sell elsewhere by reason of the concession and of the lack of transport. I hope, however, that the problem will be satisfactorily solved shortly, for it is one which is of concern to many Shaikhs and notables.

22. Discussions with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance looking to an agreement for the supply of United States dollars and other scarce foreign exchange for the essential needs of this country during the current year are still in progress, and at last show signs of being successfully concluded. After some blunt speaking on the part of this embassy, Saleh Jabr has finally agreed to the surrender of such exchange to the sterling pool and to our other main desiderata. At the time of writing, the main question still outstanding is that of "invisibles," i.e., the provision of dollars for the Regent's visit to the United States, for Iraq's part in Arab propaganda, for students and so on. If, as now seems likely, the present Minister of Finance is dropped from the Cabinet in the near future and replaced by the more knowledgeable and conciliatory Abdullilah Hafidh, the last stages of these difficult negotiations should proceed smoothly and with relative speed.

23. There is little change to report in the economic situation in general. The country continues to suffer from an inordinately high price level and a striking shortage in consumer goods. Cotton textiles have, however, been arriving in reasonable quantities and distribution has now taken place in most areas. United Kingdom Commercial Corporation purchases of barley under last year's contract have been going well, and look like being completed before the end of May. Thanks to abundant rain during the winter, crop prospects are excellent and a barley surplus of 350 to 400,000 tons is confidently predicted. This has led me to recommend to you, Sir, the desirability of an early decision on the part of His Majesty's Government on their policy towards this crop surplus this year. I have represented that while we control all shipping and other transport serving this country, we cannot divest ourselves of interest in the disposal of surplus grain, which in turn foreshadows a continuation of "political buying" if serious political complications are to be avoided. While comparisons between local and world prices are unreal owing to the continued existence of special conditions in this and other Middle Eastern markets, prices this season should show a marked reduction on those paid last year, which in turn were very considerably lower than those paid in 1943.

24. Throughout the period under review the press has been more free and therefore more interesting than formerly. On the whole, its growing freedom has not so far been greatly abused. It is only occasionally, as for instance over Syria or the release of internees, that I have found it necessary to suggest moderation. So far as political detainees are concerned, the murder in Egypt of Ahmed Maher by a pro-Fascist fanatic he himself had caused to be released from internment, did not escape notice here. Compared with the vernacular press of Syria, Egypt and Palestine, the Bagdad papers are temperate and although from time to time articles do appear which can be construed as criticism of Britain, it must not be overlooked that day after day newspapers print articles which are very much in our favour. An interesting development is that the Bagdad Radio has taken of its own initiative to broadcasting a daily translation of "the Watchtower," the leading article in the *Iraq Times*.

25. The British Council has continued to function satisfactorily, and has made a preliminary selection of six research students who are to be sent to England at the Council's expense for the next academic year.

26. At the beginning of this month Shakespeare was performed in English in Bagdad for the first time. Egyptian companies have given Arabic versions of some of Shakespeare's plays, and he has been seen and heard in English at the cinema; but the production of "Romeo and Juliet" recently at the King Faisal Hall was the first English presentation on the stage. It was performed by the "Hassan Players," a group of military amateurs under the direction of a medical missionary who is at present a staff surgeon here. Their first production was Flecker's "Hassan," some eighteen months ago. They have also performed a translation of Sophocles "Antigone" and T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral." It was very noticeable that on the first night of the Shakespeare performances the majority of the audience were young Iraqis.

27. The "Brotherhood of Freedom" recently arranged an exhibition called "Iraq Know Thyself," the purpose of which was to bring home to the people of Iraq by means of cartoons and diagrams the principal hygienic deficiencies of the country. It has been remarkably successful and called forth official commendation from the Minister of Education. The exhibition is now touring the provinces. On its return to Bagdad, it is to be shown at the Iraq Army Officers' Club, at the request of the Minister of Defence.

28. An important series of changes has taken place or is taking place among the British Advisers to the Iraqi Government. Mr. C. J. Edmonds, Adviser to Interior, is leaving shortly after some thirty years in Iraq. Mr. A. I. Ditchburn, formerly in Land Settlement here, has arrived to take Mr. Edmonds' place and will take over shortly. Mr. K. J. Ritchie, Adviser to Education, has left after only a few months' work on doctors' orders, and he will shortly be succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel C. H. O. Scaife, formerly associate professor of English at Fuad al Awwal University in Cairo. Mr. E. T. Caparn has become Technical Adviser to the Ministry of Communications and Works, in which he has long been Chief Engineer. Mr. Forwood has taken up his post as Inspector-General of the Public Works Department and Mr. Sainsbury has settled down happily to his complex duties in the sphere of income tax.

29. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Minister Resident in the Middle East at Cairo, the Government of India, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Kuwait, the Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 2431/195/93]

No. 3.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th April.)

(No. 134.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 30th March, 1945.

ON the eve of my departure from Bagdad, it may be of interest if I briefly review the situation as it stands to-day at the end of the four years during which I have had the honour to be head of this mission.

2. When I arrived in April 1941 Rashid Ali al Gailani had established a stranglehold on administration throughout the country. His chief supporters were a clique of ambitious politicians and army officers who had been brought up under the old Turkish régime. Rashid Ali was not a popular leader, but by

methods which by now have unfortunately become only too familiar, he established an armed dictatorship, and the people, cowed into acquiescence, could offer no resistance. Few Iraqis dared to visit me during that month.

3. The fundamental reasons for this state of affairs were four. First must be put the gradual weakening of the administration and of the authority of the Government over a period of eight years which was punctuated by *coups d'Etat*. Next was the fact that, with the death of King Faisal in 1933, the country lost its chief unifying force. His son, King Ghazi, was wild and unbalanced, and when he met his death in 1938 the Crown passed to a child of 4. The latter's uncle, the Amir Abdul Illah, who became Regent, was completely inexperienced, a stranger to the country, and hampered by shyness and hesitancy. Nor had he any sensible or capable supporters to help him in establishing his position. He thus fell an easy prey to an unscrupulous gang. Thirdly, there were the Germans. Their old plans for eastern expansion were being revived; and they sent here as their minister a most industrious, experienced and energetic propagandist in Dr. Grobba. In contrast to the task of his British diplomatic colleagues, who sought to guide the footsteps of a mercurial people on to constructive paths, his rôle was easy: he had to undermine and destroy. In this he was powerfully assisted by the growing might of Germany and by the dynamism that emanated from Berlin and Rome. Britain, on the other hand, seemed to be sunk in apathy. Fourthly, to crown all, came the Arab rebellion in Palestine, and the harsh, but ineffective, measures which we were taking to suppress it. Day after day the German and Italian radio would denounce our actions, and day after day we made no attempt to justify them. Our foreign policy in general was weak and vacillating and our prestige sank steadily.

4. At the same time the contrast between Iraq and other parts of the Arab world was striking. In Saudi Arabia a strong man was in control of a kingdom which he himself had made, a kingdom which had never been the object of German ambitions. In Egypt and in Palestine we had maintained appreciable military forces for strategic reasons. In Syria the people were under control of the French army. In Iraq, however, despite its paramount importance, there were a few British aircraft but no British troops and no effective organisation to fight enemy activities. Over a period of seven or eight years we had sat back and watched our influence decline. It was small wonder that, comparing our apparent weakness and ineffectiveness with the dominating position we had held only ten years before, the people of Iraq considered that, much as some might regret it, our time was done.

5. It was obvious in April 1941 that Rashid Ali hoped, by feigning loyalty to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, to keep His Majesty's Government in play until such time as the Germans were able to send forces to Iraq. The prompt decision of His Majesty's Government to send troops to Basra saved the situation and placed Rashid Ali in a quandary. If he allowed British troops to come to Bagdad he would perish; if he opposed them before the Germans were ready, he could not rely on the help of his secret ally. The arrival at Basra from India of a second brigade forced his hand and he decided to attack while our forces were still weak. The tribes which had waited and watched during April continued inactive during May, deaf to all his exhortations.

6. When Bagdad was freed at the end of May 1941 by a small column that could scarcely have reached here had the desert tribes thrown in their lot with Rashid Ali, it became clear that the country in the main was with us, and was much relieved to see the last of that traitor and his gang. But many pro-German pockets still existed, especially in the towns, and there was still the danger of German invasion—invasion from two sides, for at the end of 1941 the enemy stood both upon the frontiers of Egypt and in the foothills of the Caucasus. In these circumstances my aim was—

- (a) To secure full facilities for our war requirements and unimpeded opportunities for training and defensive measures by our navy, army and Royal Air Force.
- (b) To root out pro-Nazis and bring about a change in public feeling, both to facilitate (a) and, looking further ahead, to consolidate our future position by making people realise the advantage of alliance with us.
- (c) Unofficially and in the hope of helping to create greater stability, to influence the administration as far as possible, but not to the extent of causing a crisis and so jeopardising (a) and (b). Owing to my personal knowledge of the working of the governmental machine and my old friendship with Ministers, shaikhs and others, I happened to be favourably placed for this.

7. To attain (a) and (b) it was necessary to get in touch with all classes of society, who had been neglected for years, and to proceed by a co-ordinated plan. Accordingly, I formed a political advisory staff, whose duty was to act as liaison officers between our army and Iraqi officials, especially in the provinces, to fight enemy propaganda, to make friends with leaders and, generally, to restore British influence. I was extremely fortunate in securing the services of several officers who had long experience of Iraq and were liked and respected by its inhabitants. They, with their young assistants, have produced remarkable results. They quickly helped to stabilise the country, and they are now frequently invited to assist in administrative problems. They have worked closely with the Public Relations staff, which, in addition to ordinary propaganda work of press and radio, has done much to increase knowledge of Britain and the British by the establishment of reading rooms, the operation of travelling cinemas, and above all by establishing personal contact with people in all walks of life. The Ikhwan al Hurriyah, or Brotherhood of Freedom, is a third organisation which has helped to establish touch with the people, not only in Bagdad but in provincial towns also. Fourthly, in Bagdad, Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk the British Council has made a valuable contribution in bringing about a better understanding of our country and its aims. Finally, tribute must be paid to the work of the British military mission, of British advisers and many other of the Iraqi Government officials, and of the area liaison officers under the orders of Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq. Nor must mention be omitted of the British army, which, by its traditional straight dealing and good behaviour, has done a great deal to heal old wounds. It is, indeed, a source of gratification to me, and a real tribute to the personnel concerned, that all these different bodies have worked closely and amicably together and with general headquarters and this embassy.

8. In short, it has been my endeavour to establish, through every possible means, closer relations between Iraqis of all classes and individual Britons, and I now have the satisfaction of recording that to-day Britons and Iraqis mix far more than they ever did before. My task has been made easier by the fact that Iraqis as a whole were not with Rashid Ali, and that his revolt came as a profound shock to them. They were ashamed, and wanted to make amends. Consequently we received full co-operation, both from the Government and from the people as a whole, even in the most difficult days of 1941 and 1942. As a proof of this, it is to be noted that suspects of all kinds were energetically rounded up and interned, that the Iraqi authorities themselves, of their own motion, tried and hanged three of the four members of the Golden Square who fell into their hands, and that all Rashid Ali's Ministers who are not in exile are in prison. Not a murmur has been heard from anyone against the execution of these drastic sentences.

9. As regards the question of influencing the Administration, it is not perhaps always realised how difficult Iraq is to govern. Unlike Egypt and the Levant, before the British occupation Iraq had been subject to almost no Western influences. The country consisted in fact of three of the most neglected provinces of a moribund empire. In addition, it was and is divided by secular feuds and differences—the Shia still nurtures his 1,000-year-old resentment against the Sunni, the Kurd is antagonistic to the Arab, the Christian and Jewish communities (two of the most ancient of their kind in existence anywhere) are apprehensive of the Moslem majority. Townsfolk have little in common with tribesmen, who are heavily armed and accustomed from time immemorial to resist by force any encroachment on their privileges. This complex society calls for the highest standard of administration. Moreover, Iraq has many hundred miles of wild land frontiers, with potentially troublesome neighbours, Turkey, Persia and Saudi Arabia. Even in peace-time it is a difficult country to govern, but with the dislocation, mostly economic, which the war has inevitably brought with it, it is small wonder that the people have felt discontented with their Government. To deal with this situation the Iraqi Government had at their disposal a corps of officials, few of whom had received a Western education, and most of whom had been corrupted by ten years of misrule. Working with them was a very small group of British officials. Fortunately, the Iraqi Government realised their own shortcomings and applied increasingly to us for help, with the result that there are now more British officials in the Government than for many years past. Indeed, we cannot supply all the officers that are wanted. Of their own volition the Iraqi Government have, since 1941, placed Britons in executive charge of Imports and Exports, Irrigation, the Veterinary Service and the Transport Service, and we have also Britons as heads of the Port and of the Railways administrations. In all the

Ministries where they are employed British advisers are now effectively consulted. This has applied particularly to education, which before was a focus of anti-British agitation. On the whole, therefore, in spite of much corruption and inefficiency, it is only fair to record that the Iraqis have risen well to the occasion. Everywhere public security is good and taxes are collected. There is naturally grumbling about the high cost of living, the shortage of textiles and other commodities, but it is not serious. Only in Kurdistan to-day is there a potentially dangerous tension.

10. While the position is therefore comparatively satisfactory, it would be most misleading to pretend that it will automatically remain so. The problem of government without experienced assistance is too difficult for these people in their present state of development. This is clear now. It will become even clearer when British troops, which have done so much to steady the situation during the last four years, are withdrawn after the war. Besides the inherent stresses which I have described in paragraph 9, there are too many personal hates and rivalries, too little mutual confidence and public spirit, and too much intrigue to ensure stability and continuity, without some external influence. The Regent, although he showed considerable personal courage in 1941, and although his affection for Britain is beyond question, is none the less no leader. He has many of the qualities and defects of his father. With his private friends (most of whom are British) he has an easy, natural manner, and he likes and is liked by the Iraqi army, whose exercises he constantly attends, and which he is determined shall not again, if he can help it, be used against him. But he finds his public duties a very heavy burden, largely because there is no Iraqi in whom he feels he can place implicit confidence. He therefore needs propping up all the time. There is no present alternative to him, and in any case another change in the head of the State would be most unfortunate. It must always be borne in mind that the Regent is far from being a mere figure-head. In fact, though not in theory, almost every appointment, every measure of administration, is subject to his personal wish. The chief politicians with whom, for some few years more, must rest the leadership of the Cabinet are individualists. When they get into office their chief preoccupation is to score off their opponents, and to undermine hostile combinations in the Senate. No Cabinet can endure long enough to produce continuity or stability. It is we who should provide the latter, and I fear that we must do it for some time to come; because the rising generation, while it has produced many ardent critics, has hitherto furnished no men of courage or action. So far as the educated class is concerned, it is a generation of Hamlets. The malcontents of the so-called *intelligentsia* have pretended in this country, as in others, to be attracted to Russian political ideas. There are probably less than a score of people in Iraq who have even the most superficial knowledge of the Russian political system, but "communism" has become a cloak for any critical opinion, whether honestly or dishonestly held. Some old Nazi wolves, wearing Communist clothing, have already established themselves in the "progressive" fold. This problem will increase and will, indeed, become one of the most difficult which we have to face. We have in the past, here as elsewhere, been accused of backing "the old gang." To some extent we have done so, but, as I have explained above, it has been a question of *force majeure*, for no new gang has so far emerged; and until it does, if the Government is to be maintained at all, it must be through those who have held sway hitherto. The real trouble lies not with us, but with the rulers themselves, who obstinately refuse to give up any of their privileges or prerogatives to others. There are now signs that they are becoming apprehensive for their future, and I and my staff continually do the best we can to stimulate their apprehension; for unless they do make some concessions, a violent clash between the "haves" and the "have-nots" is inevitable in time.

11. If Iraq were not important to us, it might pay us to get out, but it is, in fact, extremely important. In addition to its strategic position, its oil and its communications, we have a third reason. We cannot afford to neglect Iraq in view of the interest which Russia and the United States are now taking in the Middle East. We no longer hold the field alone. But how are we to maintain our position? What means can we use? The whole tendency of all Middle East countries is, as you are aware, to eliminate foreign influence as soon as possible. Already in Egypt there is clamour for a modification of the treaty. In Iraq extremists are beginning to raise the same cry, though without treaty. In Iraq extremists are beginning to raise the same cry, though without treaty, so far signifying any single particular in which they consider revision desirable. In such an atmosphere it is obvious that any idea of tightening control by force,

or of keeping permanently larger forces than those defined in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, is completely out of date. Nevertheless, it is possible for us to maintain our place here, and indeed, to enhance it; because there is no doubt whatever that Iraq is fundamentally far more friendly to us than to any other Power, now or at any other time, and it is worth while to keep it so. In his speech of farewell to me last week the Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly declared that the policy of the Iraqi Government was to continue to employ "British scientists and experts in various branches and to train Iraqis in Great Britain to be scientists and experts." In the same speech his Excellency stated that Iraq's friendship with Britain is the cornerstone of her policy. This statement, which would have been branded as "treachery" four years ago, has been widely acclaimed, both in public and in private. This feeling rests on a sound basis: for more and more people in Iraq are coming to see that the treaty, which at the time when it was signed was by many regarded as a bond of servitude, is, in fact, a guarantee of freedom. They realise that by granting us concessions as regards oil and communications (from both of which Iraq materially benefits) they have engaged us to maintain their frontiers; and they acknowledge that in a war in which so many frontiers have been obliterated we have held these inviolate without ever, even after 1941, encroaching on Iraq's internal independence.

12. The desiderata I consider for the maintenance of our present relations are:—

(a) Sympathetic and understanding treatment of Iraq's problems by His Majesty's Government, especially of economic problems and those connected with the change over from war to peace in the next few years. Such treatment will make these people feel that, apart from other considerations, their close associations with us redound to their material benefit. I have been told that some departments in London are antagonistic to Iraq because they think Iraqis are grasping. They are, and so are all Orientals—and perhaps some Westerners too. As Bismarck said of the Balkans: "Liberated nations are not grateful—they are exacting." But it is of British interests that we should think, and we should realise that by downing Iraq we injure ourselves. We should not be weak, but we should be fair and just, and we should avoid like the plague adopting a "tough line" just to be tough. Above all, we should avoid any action which might injure the *amour-propre* of the country and its citizens. They are a small people, at the beginning of their independent existence, and it is natural that they should have an adolescent sensitiveness. Almost overnight public opinion can change. An inconsiderate act or speech produces an exaggerated despondency, and a kind word an equally disproportionate buoyancy.

(b) The officials we send here should be of sound character and knowledge. An ambassador's influence must always be limited by the nature of his office. Our real influence should be inside the Government, through British officials. If we provide good men, there is no reason why Iraq should not ask for more, but there is nothing to gain in forcing officials on the Iraqi Government, and we must always remember that Iraqis are very critical of foreigners, whom they pay so very much higher than their own Ministers, and are quick to spot a second-rater. I have long held that the provision of the most suitable men will be best assured by the creation of a Middle East personnel pool, embracing the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and India Office, from which trained and competent men could be seconded. I trust that some such plan may soon materialise.

(c) It is most important that we should maintain the personal contacts which we have created. We should therefore keep on the organisations of Political Advisers and Public Relations for as long as possible. When the time comes to give them up, we must hope that there will be some administrative inspectors or land settlement officers in the districts. Failing this, we should consider the establishment of more consulates whose duties would be mainly politico-social. The British Institutes must be encouraged and the more British officials we can get into the Education Department, both in the towns and in the districts, the better. The Oriental Secretariat of this embassy will become more important as the other organisations change or disappear, and it must place high value on personal contacts.

13. A relationship between Iraq and Britain has developed which places us in a strong and enviable position. It will, I consider, be our own fault if we allow that position to deteriorate. We must be continually on our guard and on the alert, for naturally we have many enemies and critics, not all of them Iraqi. Finally, we must take into account in all our actions the new feeling of

solidarity and unity which animates the whole Arab world. The Arabs themselves have publicly acknowledged that it is we who have sponsored it and that it is we who have made its realisation possible. It is all the more important, therefore, to consider the Arab world as one, and not as various units on the map, to be handled individually or in sections by different Government departments. Our policy towards the Middle East as a whole, it seems to me, requires greater co-ordination. It may, for example, seem a small thing in London to present the King of Egypt with an aircraft and to make the Regent of Iraq pay for his. But such an incident can have serious consequences as implying favouritism. And, as Lord Killearn has stated, we must be on our guard against the painful gibe that the only way to get anything out of the British is to kick them.

14. Any action which we take in regard to Syria or Palestine, for instance, will, as I have often emphasised, have a direct and immediate bearing on our position, influence and prospects in Iraq; and it is to the maintenance of British interests and British influence that our efforts should be primarily and consistently devoted. It is creditable to any man that he should feel moved to pity and sympathy by the sufferings of the Jews, or the Assyrians, or the Kurds or the Arabs; but you cannot govern by sentiment. Political lines of force do not change, and the laws of geography and history cannot be revoked. Our interests in this part of the world have been identical for more than 200 years. Originally those interests were selfish. They are no longer so, for, whether we will it or not, the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Middle East are as directly bound up with the maintenance of our position as were those of their ancestors with the existence of the Roman Empire. Were we to be driven from our paramount position here, the Middle East would dissolve in a chaos such as that which enveloped it when the Roman Empire decayed. In time, it may well be, other nations will be willing to share our responsibilities, as they are already eager to share our privileges. But that day has yet to come. Until it dawns, it is for us to maintain our own, and by so doing to preserve and enhance the tranquillity and prosperity of this ancient and historic land.

15. I cannot close this last despatch without recording how much I owe to my own staff. I have endeavoured to show that such success as has been achieved during the last four years has been due to the united efforts of a good many departments and people working in harmony to a definite end. In this concerted plan, the embassy staff had a vital and essential part to play, and I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which, one and all, they have acquitted themselves. I owe them a deep debt of gratitude.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 2542/1719/93]

No. 4.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st April.)

(No. 149).
Sir,

Bagdad, 10th April, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 9th April I was received in audience by His Royal Highness the Regent of Iraq and presented to him my Letter of Credence and the Letter of Recall of my predecessor.

2. The ceremony followed the usual lines. The Chief of Protocol of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and his assistant called at the embassy with a mounted escort of the Royal Bodyguard at 11.15 and at 11.25 I and my staff left for the Palace. The passage of the cortège through the streets attracted considerable crowds of Iraqis of all classes who appeared thoroughly to enjoy the spectacle and applauded intermittently in a manner which was clearly unrehearsed. There were also cries of "God give you victory!" I am informed by members of my staff that this show of enthusiasm, ingenuous and ragged as it was, is most unusual among these normally undemonstrative people and that it affords a remarkable illustration of the rise of British popularity that has taken place in the past four years.

3. A Guard of Honour was awaiting me at the Palace and after it had been formally inspected I was ushered into the Ambassadors' reception room

where I was met by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Shortly afterwards I was received by His Royal Highness. The Regent's reception of me was most friendly. There were no set speeches, but I told His Royal Highness how proud and honoured I felt to have been chosen to succeed Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. I realised how difficult this succession would be, but I felt sure I could count on the help of His Royal Highness and of a friendly Iraqi Government and people. I was later able to tell the Regent that, when The King had received me in audience on my appointment, he had spoken in warm terms of His Highness and had said that he was looking forward to seeing him on his return from the United States. His Highness spoke in terms of the warmest affection and admiration for The King and Queen and is obviously much looking forward to his visit to England. The Regent assured me, in conclusion, that I could count, at all times, on his friendship and collaboration.

4. At the close of our conversation I presented the members of my staff to His Royal Highness. The Oriental Counsellor, who knew him well, said that he was obviously in a good mood and had been pleased by what I had told him. We talked and laughed together for a little longer, and then withdrew and returned to the embassy. The ceremonies were well organised and passed off without a hitch. I was particularly impressed by the friendliness of the officials with whom I had conversation, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on whom I paid formal calls during the course of the same day.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Cairo.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

[E 3664/182/93]

No. 5.

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.

(No. 211. Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 21st May, 1945.

AS I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 360 of the 15th May, the Regent expressed to General Renton his very grave concern at the delay in the supply of equipment for the Iraqi army. His Highness had said that not only was this delay a source of great disappointment and disillusionment to the young officers, who were keener and more efficient than ever before, but it was exposing both him and His Majesty's Government to dangerous criticism. It was being said that His Majesty's Government were deliberately withholding the equipment as they did not wish to see a well-equipped and efficient Iraqi army. As regards himself, there were two forms of criticism: in spite of his loyalty and friendship towards the British he had not even enough influence with them to obtain a few tanks and armoured vehicles, or, alternatively, he too preferred a weak and ill-equipped army as presenting less danger to himself. His inability to obtain this equipment for his army made him appear, and indeed feel, completely ineffectual, and perhaps the best solution was resignation.

2. The General Officer Commanding Paiforce, who accompanied General Renton when the latter called to report the conversation, suggested that, if I saw no objection, he should see the Regent before I saw him and explain fully the reasons for the delay. I readily agreed to this proposal as the Regent has, I know, a great esteem and liking for Sir Arthur Smith. The latter warned me that he was afraid it would be impossible to keep the conversations on a purely military level, but he would, as far as possible, steer the Regent off the discussion of matters within my preserve. An account of the interview, which took place yesterday, is contained in the accompanying copy⁽¹⁾ of a personal letter addressed to me by General Smith.

3. I saw the Regent myself just after General Smith had left him. After a short talk about His Royal Highness's coming visit to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, I approached the question of equipment. The Regent repeated the reasons why, as he had explained to General Renton, he

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

regarded the matter as one of grave political concern both to himself and to His Majesty's Government. I replied that I had reported to you by telegram on this aspect of the problem. His Highness must not think for a minute that the Foreign Office or the War Office were unsympathetic or had been dilatory, but His Majesty's Government did not, as General Smith had doubtless explained, stand alone in this matter. His Highness said that he himself now understood the position, but the difficulty was to get it across to his people, and even to his Ministers. I replied that it might perhaps help if I gave him simply and briefly my own understanding of the British position in the matter. There was, I said, a period when we had spent in the prosecution of the war practically the last dollar, not only which the Government, but which each individual Briton, had possessed. Not only had we done this but, by concentrating almost exclusively on the production of war material at the expense of our industries, which had been reduced to something like 20 per cent. of pre-war level, we had temporarily undermined our power to earn more dollars. Fortunately for us a solution of our difficulties was found by the United States Government—lease lend. But this arrangement, most generous as it was, yet placed upon us certain natural obligations, one of which was that we could not re-export lend-lease war material or war material of a similar nature produced by ourselves, except in pursuance of the war effort. His Highness would agree that it was not possible to argue that the supply of equipment to the Iraqi army was an urgent war-time military need. The position might, of course, have been modified by the cessation of hostilities in Europe, and I had made a further appeal to you in the hope that this was the case. The Regent thanked me and said that he had never before so fully appreciated our difficulties. He would, he hoped, be able to make his Ministers understand His Majesty's Government's position, but the general public might remain ignorant. I said that my counsellor and I had decided that, when the recently drawn up exchange agreement was published it would be well to call in representatives of the Press and give them some background material, thus forestalling uninformed criticism. His Highness thought this an excellent idea.

4. I then asked the Regent if he would, as this was my last opportunity of seeing him before his departure, give me a brief exposé of the situation in Iraq as he saw it, with special reference to Anglo-Iraqi relations. I had not been here long, but I had been struck by a rather curious phenomenon. Most of the leading Iraqis with whom I had spoken, or whose conversations with members of my staff had been reported to me, expressed the desire to see His Majesty's Government play a much greater rôle in Iraq. On the other hand there was a great deal of talk, so I was told, about Iraq achieving complete independence, about freedom to choose her own markets, about release from the stranglehold of British directorates (port and railways), and about the British political advisers.

5. The Regent said that Iraq needed and wanted British assistance. Those who objected to British direction of the port and the railways were merely stupid; they must realise that there were no Iraqis capable of doing the jobs efficiently. What Iraq wanted from us was good advice and good guidance. The country wanted British advisers but they must be of the highest standard, able not only to advise on current affairs, but men of vision who could plan for the future. He instanced Mr. Swan, British adviser to the Ministry of Finance, who, he said, could carry out his daily duties satisfactorily but was not a man who could usefully evolve a long-term financial policy for the country. The best way to stamp out communism, of the spread of which he thought there was some fear, was to find employment for the working classes. This could be done by the promotion of large agricultural and other ventures and for this the country must employ really high-grade specialists and was willing to pay high salaries. As regards the political advisers, His Highness said that they were doing valuable work which could not be done as well by Iraqis, whose judgment in a dispute would invariably be tainted by racial or religious prejudice. There was no criticism of the officers themselves, "especially the younger ones" (this, Mr. Thompson tells me, was an indirect hit at Colonel Lyon and Mr. Edmonds who were believed to be unduly pro-Kurdish). There was criticism of their carrying on their duties in British pay as advisers to the embassy in military uniform, and I asked whether His Highness meant that he would welcome their services after the war as civilian district inspectors, or with some other such title, in Iraqi Government pay. If so, His Majesty's Government would certainly like to know in good time as the future of these younger men had to be considered. It was manifestly impossible to ask a young man to accept employment with a foreign Government unless he had security of tenure for a very considerable number of years or unless he were a member of the British foreign or colonial service.

seconded for special duty. My predecessor had, I know, been very much concerned on this point, and the matter was, I hoped and believed, receiving earnest consideration at home. His Highness said that I could quote him as saying that the Iraqi Government would want to employ young district inspectors. When Nuri came back with him from England and formed a new Cabinet he would take the matter up with me officially.

6. His Highness asked me always to be quite frank with him, and not to hesitate to criticise him or his Ministers if I felt they were on the wrong lines. He wanted to feel that he had the full confidence and backing of His Majesty's Government and to avoid that feeling of isolation from which he had suffered in 1939 and 1940. I promised to do my best, but pointed out that I had much to learn before I could personally be of much help, but as His Highness had given me this opening there were points on which I could perhaps usefully speak. I had heard with real consternation that His Highness had once again spoken of resignation. This was unthinkable for the reasons which Sir Kinahan Cornwallis had given him in March. I could obviously not speak with my predecessor's weight of the full effect which such a step would have locally, but I had seen proof with my own eyes of the charmingly affectionate relations which existed between him and the young King, and his resignation could not fail to jeopardise the King's position. He had told me that he wished His Majesty's Government to take an ever more sympathetic interest in Iraq and its development; his resignation would be a profound shock to my Sovereign, who had told me how highly he valued him, and to His Majesty's Government, who had confidence in him. All the British here, army and civilian, from General Smith downwards, liked him. I was sure that his mention of resignation had been made at a passing moment of depression. He admitted that this was the case. He had a sense of duty to the King and his country, and would remain at his post, but at times he wondered whether he was doing all he could for the country. He was inexperienced and, though he realised what the country needed, he did not know how to set about providing it: that was why it was so vital for him to have the best possible advisers in all spheres. I asked His Highness at this point whether he was soon going to fill the post of Chamberlain. It was surely most important that he should have a first-class Iraqi adviser. He replied that the question had been exercising his and Nuri's mind. The difficulty was that a Court Chamberlain, if a sufficiently big man for the job, wished, sooner or later, to become a Cabinet Minister. I ventured to suggest that the best answer was to give the Chamberlain Cabinet rank. The Regent said he thought this would be done.

7. Another criticism which I had heard was that there was never any new young blood in the Cabinet (Tahsin Kadri, when asked by the young King to explain musical chairs, replied, "it is the game of the Cabinet of which your Majesty will learn later"). The Regent agreed, but said that new blood could not be introduced for as long as there were no political parties and for as long as the electoral law was applied as at present. There was little chance for an outstanding young man to emerge under present arrangements and he had been discussing with Nuri the question of the reintroduction of political parties which they both agreed was advisable and also possible changes in the electoral law.

8. His Highness, at the close of the interview, said that he was much looking forward to his visit to England. There alone he felt he could have the rest he so badly needed. He hoped to stay in all about six weeks in England, most of the time, he thought, in the Iraqi legation house in the country.

9. I have reported my interview in such detail in the hope that it may give a picture, in advance of the Regent's visit to England, of his frame of mind, and of the line of policy he hopes His Majesty's Government will follow. It is perhaps early for me to express my views, but I have had the advantage of talks with all present, and most past, Cabinet Ministers, and with a good selection of Senators, Deputies and shaikhs, and I would sum up my impressions as follows:—

10. Iraqis fully realise that they are not yet fit either to administer or develop their country without a large measure of outside assistance; they want this help if possible from Britain alone. The Regent, though not all his Ministers agree, wants a strong and efficient army, loyal to the throne, and uninterested in politics. There must be the minimum interference with the apparent sovereign independence of the country: all technical and administrative help should be given by officials in the pay of the Iraq Government: we should not oppose the appointment of an ambassador in London. We must, at all times, avoid the appearance of greater generosity towards other countries in our sphere, especially towards Egypt.

11. In conclusion, I venture to stress once again most strongly that the best, and, indeed, the only, means of maintaining our influence and prestige in this country is by the supply of advisers of the highest quality.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and the Air Officer Commanding.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

[E 4269/195/93]

No. 6.

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th June.)

(No. 233.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 2nd June, 1945.

IN my despatch No. 211 of the 21st May I reported my farewell audience with the Regent before his departure for America, and also, in the latter paragraphs, summed up my first impressions of this country, its people and our relations with them. Since writing that despatch I have had the opportunity of paying a visit to parts of Iraq outside the capital, and it may be of interest if I report to you my impressions. To be precise, it was not my first journey outside Bagdad; I had planned to spend three days in Basra during the second week of May, but the very day on which I arrived brought the announcement of Victory and I had to return to Bagdad. Nevertheless, during even the few hours I spent in Basra, I could not help feeling that the reception accorded me was indicative of a real desire to see His Majesty's representative in this country take an active interest in its affairs, and of pleasure that I should wish to establish personal relations with its citizens.

2. I selected for my next journey the liwas of Kut and Amara, because I was advised that these were tribal areas of considerable importance which could conveniently be visited before the great heat of the summer made journeys in the south out of the question. I was particularly anxious to visit tribal areas, because almost as soon as I arrived here a succession of tribal leaders from the north and from the south, Arabs and Kurds alike, came to call on me, and all expressed the hope that the close ties which exist between the embassy and the tribes would be maintained. These were not mere words of courtesy, but obviously indicated anxiety lest, with the departure of my predecessor and the approaching end of the war in the west, British policy towards Iraq were going to change, or rather, to be frank, relapse into its former apathy and disinterestedness. I was informed by members of my staff that this anxiety was very widely felt. I have therefore made it my business to assure one and all whom I have met that His Majesty's Government will continue to interest themselves actively in the welfare of this country and its inhabitants, and I have good reason to believe that these assurances have given satisfaction.

3. My journey in the Kut and Amara liwas lasted five days, from the 23rd to the 28th May. I had intended to prolong it for another day, but the acuteness of the Syrian crisis necessitated my return to Bagdad. I was able to see much in that time, both of town and tribal life. I was accompanied by the oriental counsellor throughout the journey, in Kut liwa also by Colonel Aston, the political adviser of Central and Southern Area, and in Amara liwa by Major Dowson, his assistant. It gave me much pleasure to observe in what respect and affection these two officers are held. For the first two nights I was the guest, together with my wife and daughter, of Senator Muhammed Habib, Amir Rabia, at his magnificent and comfortable country house near Kut. Thence I was able to make trips to the little frontier town of Bedra, and on the following day to Hai, on the Gharraf. On the 26th I embarked in a survey ship, kindly placed at my disposal by the Basra Port Directorate, and proceeded down the Tigris to Amara, which I entered just before dusk on the 27th. The following day, owing to the necessary rearrangement of programme, was exceptionally crowded, but it was possible to fit in official calls, the inspection of the Amara Secondary School, a luncheon, accompanied by a regatta, with Sheikh Mohammed al Ureibi, a municipal reception, and a moonlight dinner-party with swimming regatta as the guest of Sheikh Majid al Khalifa. I then motored by night to Basra, returning to Bagdad by air on Friday morning, the Air Officer Commanding having very kindly placed a machine at my disposal.

[31729]

4. I need not weary you with the details of the programme which I have outlined above, but there were certain recurring aspects of my reception which I feel it is worth while to record. In the first place, the officials of the Iraqi Government, mutessarifs, kaimakams, commandants of police, mayors and directors of education, all made it quite clear that they wished to give me as cordial a reception as their resources permitted. Not only in the provincial capitals, but in the villages the same spirit prevailed. By day, I was greeted with triumphal arches, flags, mottoes, palm fronds, flowers, cheers, addresses and poems; by night, with elaborate illuminations and sumptuous banquets. At every reception and in every speech I was informed both privately and publicly that it is the wish of the people of this country to be associated as closely as possible with Great Britain. If these manifestations of official cordiality are genuine, as I believe they are, then clearly they represent a spirit which must be regarded as a sterling asset. But even were the enthusiasm simulated, it would, nevertheless, indicate that the Iraqi Government thought it worth while to conciliate a powerful ally. As I say, I believe that by far the greatest proportion of the friendship displayed does represent genuine majority feeling, and I shall proceed on that assumption in doing my best to maintain and increase it.

5. My second impression is that of the tumultuous and overwhelming reception accorded me by the two sections of the Abu Mohammed tribe, of whose sheikhs I was the guest. The entertainments were on the most lavish scale. The beasts roasted in my honour could be counted by the score, the guests invited to meet me by the hundred and, on at least one occasion, by the thousand. These "guests," wore not only smiles, but rifles as well, and the object of their assembly was no doubt to impress both me and the representatives of the Iraqi Government, with their friendliness, certainly, but also with their power and potential nuisance value. We are sometimes accused of undue preference for the romantic and the antique, and there is often force in this accusation. It is useless to conceal that the life which is lived by these tribesmen does not belong to this century any more than their beautiful river craft or their strange and fantastic tribal dances. They are survivals, we must admit, but we must also admit that a survival which is armed to the teeth with magazine rifles is one with which it is better to be friends than enemies.

6. My third impression is that not only goodwill, but hard economic facts, have created among these tribal leaders, enormously enriched by the war, a very profitable market if only we can exploit it. Undoubtedly, they will prefer to "buy British," and it is much to be hoped that it will prove possible to place British agricultural and domestic goods on sale here soon, before we lose the trade to our competitors.

7. My final impression is a reinforcement of the feeling which I referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 1 above. My experience of Arab countries goes back nearly a quarter of a century and, whether in Morocco or Saudi Arabia, I have found that paper and protocol mean little to the Arab. Personal influence and confidence mean everything. I am informed that the fact that I undertook this trip, and the fact that I made it clear that I intended my policy to be one of personal acquaintance with all classes of citizens, have been very favourably received.

8. The full rigours of the summer will soon be upon us—noonday shade temperature has already reached 110 degrees—and it will not be practicable to make further tours into Southern Iraq until the autumn. I feel, however, that it is important that I should have some acquaintance with Kurdistan as soon as possible, and I hope with your approval to spend a week in the north at the end of this month.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the Air Officer Commanding.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 2445/239/34]

No. 7.

Mr. Wall to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).—(Received in Foreign Office, 16th April.)

(No 4.)

Sir,

Tabriz, 16th March, 1945.

IN accordance with your circular despatch No. 38 of the 10th June, 1944, I have the honour to submit an appreciation of conditions in this consular district during the six months ended on the 28th February, 1945.

2. *Relations between Soviet and Persian Authorities.*—Relations between the local representatives of the Soviet and Persian Governments emerged from the crisis of the oil question fundamentally unchanged; on the side of the Russians a jealous control of administrative authority, so close as not only to prevent any repression of the Left-wing elements to whom the Russians look to provide them with the appearance of popular support, but also frequently to prevent action by the Persian authorities against trouble makers of no particular political allegiance whose activities are as damaging to Russian interests as to Persian; and on the Persian side, general acquiescence, combined in some cases with a suppressed indignation and a patient keeping of scores to be settled at the end of the war, not with the Russians, but with the local people who have grown great in their shadow. Russian intervention in the administration of the province has been both direct and indirect: the former, usually practised by the Soviet military authorities, operates through their control of all movements of military and gendarmeries, their virtual control of the police and the application of security measures which can put a prompt end to any action the Soviet authorities disapprove of by simply expelling the official who takes it. There are almost daily instances of such intervention, which was seen at its directest in the expulsion of the Commandant of the Third Division, Sartip Khosrovani, last November, and which appears from time to time in an almost absent-mindedly open way as in the orders for the cleaning of Tabriz streets published by the Russian town-commandant last December. Indirect intervention through "popular pressure," whether it originates there or not, is closely watched and guided by the Soviet consulate-general, mainly through the intermediary of the two Caucasian vice-consuls, MM. Guliev and Cassanov. All Left-wing pressure is believed by Persian officials to be an expression of the will of the Soviet authorities; they resent it the more as being an affront not only to their national pride but to their personal dignity, as a man resents the yapping of a cur which he dare not kick for fear of its master. The Soviet authorities, finally, by withholding their approval of the appointment of any Persian official of independence and courage have succeeded in obtaining an administration completely subservient to their wishes: the only senior official of any energy and moral fibre in the whole of Azerbaijan is Sarhang Durakhshani, who, though he has lost his post of Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan, continues to command the Third (Tabriz) Division of Persian troops. That he has done so, so far, without loss of credit, is a tribute to his diplomacy. But the result of this supervision of appointments is a spineless administration which, while it does nothing against Russian interests, does nothing at all in the interests of the country.

3. *Objects of Soviet Policy in Azerbaijan.*—Nothing has occurred in the last six months to modify the view expressed in the last appreciation (dated 22nd August, 1944) that Soviet practice aims at maintaining a fluid situation in Azerbaijan which can be turned to advantage at the end of the war in whatever way then seems best to the Soviet Government. It is certainly difficult to escape the conclusion that the weakness of the Persian administration here is largely due to Soviet policy, for with a very little encouragement from the Russians it could be made much stronger. On the other hand, there is little evidence to support the wide-spread belief that the Soviet Government aim at detaching Azerbaijan from Persia and sponsoring its union with the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Indeed, on all public occasions—and they are many—when the highest Soviet officials here speak they are careful to emphasise that it is to Persia, not to Azerbaijan, that they speak. Moreover, there has been, in the latter half

of the period under review particularly, a noticeable absence of separatist propaganda from the public speeches of leaders of the Freedom Front. Some have displayed their Persian patriotism in the most theatrical way. At the same time the materials for a separatist movement exist in plenty in the communal and racial aspirations of the Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian minorities, as well as in the language barrier between this province and the rest of Persia and its corollary of greater sympathy with the republic across the northern frontier. Nor can it be denied that below the surface Soviet officials and soldiers of Caucasian race carry on a good deal of propaganda for a Greater Azerbaijan. If these people are not encouraged by higher Soviet authorities, they do not seem to be very actively discouraged. It can scarcely be doubted that, in whatever form Soviet policy may be expressed, its underlying object is to ensure that Soviet political and economic influence remain dominant in this province. Not unnaturally, the Soviet authorities seek to achieve this object by the methods with which they feel most at home.

4. *Soviet Propaganda*.—The past six months have been marked by a steady strengthening of all overt forms of Soviet propaganda. The chief propaganda vehicle—leaving aside the Freedom Front, which is something more—is the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society. This organisation, which has spacious premises equipped with a cinema projector, holds meetings on an average twice a week. It is served with indefatigable zeal by a number of local people who are either genuine admirers of everything Russian or have a strong interest in appearing so. Its meetings, which are usually packed, run often to inordinate length, beginning with speeches translated *in extenso* into two languages, and ending either with a film or with a concert of Azerbaijani and Russian music. Its joint chairmen are the Governor-General and the Soviet Consul-General, and there is a ladies branch under the presidency of the Governor-General's wife. The society is undoubtedly a success, for while everyone recognises that its motives are purely propagandist and that it may not survive the occupation, it does meanwhile both provide entertainment of a better sort than anything else in Tabriz and it offers a welcome outlet for a good deal of local organising, oratorical and literary talent.

5. A well-stocked Russian bookshop was opened in the town last October. Besides this, there is a recently enlarged reading room from which the news is broadcast and where news photographs are displayed and the progress of the Russian armies marked on a large map. The Russian school, which was opened last November, flourishes. There are evening classes in the Russian language for adult students and much talk of scholarships to Russian universities for local boys and girls. The Soviet hospital, also opened last year, is another institution of obvious propaganda value. Performances by Red army concert parties, visits of artistes from Soviet Azerbaijan, soirées organised by the Armenian community and other enthusiasts, ensure that no occasion for celebration goes unexploited. Naturally, the Red army itself plays an impressive part in Soviet propaganda: its spiritual force of intense patriotism, Stalin-worship and consciousness of its own worker-peasant origin overflows abundantly from its own ranks and stirs the crowds of Azerbaijanis who gather to watch its displays. A vein of commercial enterprise runs through some of this propaganda: the charges of the Soviet hospital, for instance, are high, and there seems to be little or no free treatment (the indigent are sometimes referred to the American or Seventh-Day Adventist medical missionaries), while the frequency with which merchants of the town are laid under contribution by the forced purchase of expensive tickets for concerts in aid of this or the other Russian cause is leading to diminishing returns in cash but an increasing yield of exasperation. On the whole it may be said of propaganda in Azerbaijan that where it is accompanied by some material attraction such as a free show or feast it is eagerly lapped up, for the rest, it is tolerated as one of the necessary nuisances of war, and at least provides material for the old oriental pastime of finding the hidden motive.

6. *Persian Administration*.—A constant theme in local speculation during the last six months has been the coming removal of the Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan, Mehdi Dadvar (Vussuq us Saltaneh). But he still keeps his position—apparently through a policy of offering no resistance to anyone in any circumstances. His compliant attitude towards the Russians would, it might be thought, have earned him at least the tolerance of the Left wing, but they are as bitter in their criticisms of his supineness as are the soldier citizens. He has, however, escaped any accusation of gross corruption. If weak, he would seem to be reasonably honest, and perhaps his one object is to hold his job down with a

minimum of trouble until he can comfortably retire. The Governor (Farmandar), Mubassir Roshani, after a prolonged absence in Tehran, was replaced in February by Muhammad Hussein Muhtashami. Roshani, a man with long experience in the Persian Foreign Service and enjoying a reputation for honesty, competence and punctiliousness, was looked upon by most people in Tabriz as the last hope for any kind of order or efficiency in municipal affairs. His successor is believed not to have the confidence either of the Governor-General or the Russian authorities, and the general opinion, which he himself shares, is that he is not destined to stay long in Tabriz. With the removal of Sarhang Durakhshani from the Governor-Generalship of Western Azerbaijan, the administration of the province has been still further weakened. His successor, Sa'eed Sam'i, though appointed in January, has not yet arrived to take up his duties, and the administration of the Fourth Ustan is in the hands of Sarhang Zangineh, a soldier of good reputation but of quite unknown capacity as an administrator. Sarhang Durakhshani succeeded as Commandant of Persian troops in Azerbaijan Sartip Khosrovani, who was unceremoniously bundled out of the province by the Soviet authorities for his presumed responsibility for the firing which occurred during a demonstration in favour of the oil concession on the 30th October, 1944. Durakhshani has not yet had to face a similar test and it cannot be said whether he would survive it, but he appears to get on very well with the Russians while stoutly maintaining that he will not truckle to the rabble-rousers. He has it to his credit that Western Azerbaijan was perfectly peaceful during his tenure of office there. He inspires confidence in the nervous *bourgeoisie* and has recently earned applause by organising a demonstration march of Persian troops through Tabriz—the more effective for its being the sole reminder for many months past that the Government of this country is after all Persian.

7. Tabriz Municipality remains only a name. Its head, Ghulam Reza Ilhami, who himself appeared to treat it as a joke, and devoted his serious attention to currying favour with the Russians, incurred the displeasure of the Minister of the Interior by signing a demand for reforms presented by the Freedom Front on the 1st December, 1944, and was summoned to Tehran, as it was thought, to be relieved of his office. The chief of Tabriz police, Mehdi Guli Ziai, equally inefficient and corrupt, was also summoned to Tehran early in the year. But though the replacement of both these officials is imperative if there is to be any improvement in municipal affairs, it is expected that they will have been able to enlist sufficient Russian support to retain their offices. A new Commandant of Gendarmerie in Azerbaijan was appointed early in January. Like his predecessors, and like most other Persian officials, he complains of the impossibility of carrying out his duty when every move is subject to Russian approval which as often as not, is not forthcoming. His chief task has been the regrouping of the force throughout the province, withdrawing small isolated posts and concentrating his men in a few larger centres from which patrols will operate: a reform which has not the wholehearted approval of Sarhang Kamal, the Commandant of Gendarmerie in Rezaieh. Meanwhile nothing has occurred to sweeten the relations between the gendarmerie on the one hand and the villagers and Kurds on the other. It would probably take much effort to clear the gendarmes of all the charges of oppression, extortion and corruption that are daily made against them, and it is not surprising that many peasants are beginning to see in the Tudeh party an ally against them. The Kurds still prefer to shoot their own.

8. Mr. Thomas Allen, American head of the Supply Department, and of the Finance Department, too, for a time, under the Millsbaugh régime, failed to make much impression on the muddle and malpractices attending the distribution of monopoly goods. The task was more than one man could hope to accomplish and, in spite of his ferocious zeal, which shocked and alienated all his Persian subordinates, some of the worst scoundrels continued to wax fat under his very nose. Since his departure yet one more effort is being made in Tabriz to issue ration cards in numbers corresponding roughly with the population, while in the country districts distribution appears to be haphazard and accompanied by such complicated frauds as probably lay at the bottom of the recent riot in Mahabad. A Persian head of the Supply Department has now been appointed, but it is too early yet to judge his ability.

9. *The Freedom Front and Tudeh Persia*.—The Left-wing movement has made steady progress during the six months and has become, after the Soviet authorities, the most active force in the affairs of Azerbaijan. It underwent a test at the crisis of the oil concession agitation and emerged from it stronger than before. The series of demonstrations organised to protest against Sa'id's policy showed the leaders how many men they could put on the street, and the

clash with the police on the 30th October and the subsequent disarming of the police by the Soviet authorities convinced them that, in a "good cause" at least, they could have matters pretty much their own way. In the later stages of this agitation there began to be seen the rudiments of a party discipline which were later to be developed. When the oil question was dropped there followed a month of comparative inactivity, but during this time a new theme was being built up—the demand for provincial councils (*Anjuman Iyalati*), for which provision was made in the Constitution of 1906, but which have never been formed, although it would appear that some such council did function for a short time in Tabriz about 1906. At the same time party propagandists were trying to interest the peasants in their programme, and agrarian reform was given prominence in all speeches. On the 1st December a "monster" meeting was held which was supposed to be attended by large numbers of peasants. In the event few country people turned up and the crowd of 5,000 was chiefly composed of urban workers on whom the Tudeh party and trade union could bring pressure. On the 11th January the "First Regional Conference of the Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh Party" was held at Tabriz. It gave rise to alarming rumours among the more nervous of the propertied citizens, but the resolutions it published contained nothing but what the party spokesmen had been urging for months past. The most interesting feature was a bid to attract Kurdish support. The party claimed that they were promised support by certain chiefs of the Shakkak tribe, but the precise nature of these promises is unknown. It can only be said that whatever those particular chiefs may have promised, they can be relied on to carry out their promises only if it suits their own personal interests. Since the conference there has been an intensified recruiting drive and an effort to tighten up party organisation and discipline.

10. It is difficult to see any clear distinction between the Freedom Front (*Jibhei Azadi*) and Tudeh Persia. There can scarcely be any member of the former who is not also a member of the latter and there would appear to be no good reason for the formation of a second organisation, unless, indeed, the object be to absorb Tudeh Persia in the Freedom Front, thus getting rid of some of the opprobrium that attaches to the old name and making a wider appeal. The last six months have seen a great many meetings and discussions about the organisation of these bodies, with the publication of rules and regulations and orders for the election of a bewildering number of sub-committees. But through the fog of resolutions and proclamations may be dimly discerned the lineaments of some scheme in which the Freedom Front stands as the supreme programme-drafting body and co-ordinator of all progressive opinion in the province, and from it stem two executive bodies: the Tudeh party, charged with securing the election of Freedom Front candidates and with putting forward the Freedom Front's programme in the Majlis; and the Workers' Union (*Shurai Muttahidei Iyalati Ittihadieh* Kargaran va Zahmatkashan Azerbaijan—sometimes known by the shorter name of *Shurai Muttahidei Iyalati Azerbaijan*) which endeavours to put into practice the Freedom Front's economic and industrial programme. But in practice the functions of the three bodies constantly overlap, and the same group of leaders appears to dominate them all.

11. The programme-drafters have laboured to such purpose in recent months that their latest published effort at generalisation comes to nothing more precise than saying that the aim of the party is to improve things in general. But from the speeches of the leaders more particular points can be picked out: The preservation of the integrity and independence of Persia; the establishment of a truly democratic and liberal Government; the formation of provincial councils to safeguard local interests; agrarian reform; economic development; punishment of "traitors"; firm friendship with the Soviet Union. On the face of it there is nothing in such a programme to alarm anyone, but it is customary for the more conservative part of the population to see the published programme as a cloak for more sinister goings-on inspired by the Soviet Consulate-General. According to this view, the Freedom Front aims, at worst, at an independent, bolshevised Azerbaijan; at best, a prolongation of the Russian occupation. It is true that both the language and the actions of the Freedom Front belie the seeming mildness of their programme. "Reactionaries" in the Central Government, such as Seyyid Zia ud Din Tabatabai, and the local representatives of the Persian Government are attacked in the most violent terms, and in the recruiting drive in both Eastern and Western Azerbaijan the methods of intimidation used have included assault and threats of murder.

12. It has been said in a previous appreciation that the Tudeh party's appeal had no ideological content. As regards its usual propaganda among the workers

and peasants, this remains true, but it would be wrong to think of all the party leaders in Azerbaijan merely as Russian-paid tools without any principles of their own. While immediate self-interest may be, as in any other Eastern political party, the chief motive, some of the leaders, like Shabistary and Isfahani, have a grasp of Communist theory, and the party has attracted a number of young men who are probably genuinely intent on social reform. Among them there is Mohamed Mohamedluyi Abbasi, who has already translated some of the shorter works of Marx and Lenin into Persian. It is not in any case to be expected that any attempt would be made to preach theoretical communism to such an ignorant and backward proletariat as this. The party seems to have chosen in practice the shrewder way of trying to make the economic and social life of the province conform to a pattern derived, however remotely, from Socialist theory: the organisation of the various trades within the Workers' Union, the consequent raising of wages and imposing of conditions of work, the control and correction of employers, the adoption by party officials to some extent of police and judicial functions, and the project of operating bankrupt factories by and for the workers (as yet only a project) may all be seen as part of this pattern.

13. The Freedom Front-cum-Tudeh party with Russian encouragement and protection (as being the most useful auxiliary of Soviet policy in the province) has been able to cast its net very wide. It has members from every stratum of the population: loafers and braves of Tabriz, porters, factory-workers, peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers, students, journalists, even merchants and landlords as well as political adventurers of all kinds. Its organisation is muddled and its policies ill-defined, yet there are increasing signs that it is becoming self-conscious and is trying to bring some order and discipline into its ranks, perhaps, as recent proclamations would indicate, by the expulsion of the gangster element. It has, moreover, adopted recently a more patriotic attitude, and even its worst enemies admit that it talks sound sense on a number of local problems. Set against the corruption and incompetence of the local government and the profiteering of the wealthy its influence is not wholly evil.

14. *Trade Union Movement*.—Most of what has been said of the Freedom Front applies to the Trade Union Movement. But the union faces a problem of its own. It has been largely successful in its legitimate struggle for better rates of pay and working conditions, only to find that the beginning of the industrial slump in Azerbaijan is threatening unemployment on a large scale. The weapons which the union developed to wrest advantages from the factory owners when things were going well—strikes and intimidation of individual owners—are useless against intangible economic forces. A factory owner may still be imprisoned by union officials, but that does not solve the problem of where to find the money to pay the workers. There is some talk of the workers taking over the factories themselves, but the same factors that make it impossible for the owners to run them will, of course, continue to operate, and there is every sign that the workers' exasperation will find the obvious outlet of violence. Meanwhile the last six months have seen a steady extension of the influence and membership of the Workers' Union: trades previously unorganised, such as the porters, have been drawn into the fold, rates of wages have been fixed at higher levels, and the union's authority made pretty well absolute. There have been one or two feeble attempts to set up rival unions, but these have been crushed as soon as announced. Such Government machinery as did in theory exist for the settlement of trade disputes—the Chamber of Industry and the industrial powers of the Farmander—seems to have fallen out of use entirely. Only in the matter of the Union of Civil Servants has the Government reacted: orders have apparently been received from Tehran that any Government servant joining this union will be dismissed. But it is most improbable that these orders will be carried out here.

15. *Kurdish Affairs*.—Little has been heard during the period under review of the Kurdish autonomy movement. Gazi Mohamed, who is generally thought to be its champion in Azerbaijan, has been absent most of the time in Tehran. There have nevertheless been a few rumours of increasing membership of the "J.K." (Young Kurd) Society, and of Russian interest in it. The operations conducted by Sartip Hushmand Afshar against Hama Rashid at Baneh in September-October had few repercussions in this Consular District, though the subsequent tour of Khalil Fahimi, Minister with Portfolio, provided an opportunity for both the "J.K." Society and individual chiefs to put their point of view before the Persian Government and to declare their loyalty to the Shah. These professions of loyalty were probably genuine; there is nothing to show that the Kurds of Azerbaijan are prepared to co-operate even with each other, let alone with those of Iraq, and though there have been one or two reports of the coming and going of Kurdish

agents across the Iraq frontier these visits would seem to have produced no tangible results. While the Kurds are no more consistent in their outlook and no more uniform in character than any other of the races that make up the population of Azerbaijan, it may be said that, in general, what they want is not political independence so much as a square deal from the Persian Government. The chiefs, being big landowners, have everything to gain from a state of security which will enable them to obtain the maximum profits from the cultivation of wheat, tobacco and fruit. But old tradition and bitter experience make them resent any attempt to impose this security by Persian bayonets. A policy of extending medical and educational facilities to the Kurdish districts, of ensuring just distribution of monopoly goods and granting assistance for town and village improvement, carried out by sympathetic and honest officials, while leaving responsibility for public security largely to the Kurds themselves—in brief, fewer gendarmes and more sugar—would probably remove most of the grievances the Kurds at present nourish.

16. For most of the period, being winter, the peace of the Kurdish districts has been broken only by minor incidents of robbery or assault. But in February a chance encounter between a small body of Persian troops and a few Kurds of the Herki tribe in Rauze Chai near Rezaieh led to the death of a Persian officer and a punitive expedition against the Kurds of the district in which about five Kurds were killed. As the Kurds were followers of Rashid Beg Herki, who is said to have joined the Tudeh party, this incident seemed at first as if it might be the curtain-raiser to more serious attacks on Persian authority in Western Azerbaijan, but it now seems probable that it arose out of nothing more than the traditional hostility between Kurd and Persian soldier. At about the same time there was an attack by Kurds in Mahabad against the police station there. Five policemen were killed and the station sacked. There is even less political significance in this incident. The most likely explanation is that it was caused by dissatisfaction with the way monopoly goods were being distributed. It seems, however, both to have spurred the Persian Government to make a show of authority in that district and to have convinced the Soviet authorities that such a show is necessary. Preparations are now afoot to establish a Persian garrison in Mahabad and it is reliably reported that the Russians have given their assent.

17. Fifteen Shakkak and Herki chieftains, among them the young son of the late Ismail Agha (Simqo), came to Tabriz for the Tudeh party conference and the party claimed that they had offered their support. Only one of them, however, Rashid Beg Herki of Targivar, seems in fact to have joined the party. Both Persian officials with experience of Azerbaijan and Kurdish informants alike are emphatic that the Kurds would never make common cause with the Tudeh party, but at the same time there are well authenticated reports from Western Azerbaijan of Kurdish chieftains using the threat of raids to force Persian villagers to join the party. The explanation is probably that one or two chiefs see in the activities of the Tudeh party a promise of unrest and a weakening of Persian authority which they may exploit to their own advantage. It is certainly most unlikely that any part of the Tudeh social and economic programme would appeal to these feudal highlanders. The visit of these chieftains to Tabriz, the Tudeh party's flirtation with them and the marked increase in Tudeh party activity in Western Azerbaijan led some Persian officials, as well as the more easily alarmed merchant classes, to believe that some kind of *coup d'Etat* was being plotted by the Tudeh party in conjunction with the Kurds and that the spring would see a serious attack on Persian authority in Western Azerbaijan. Nothing has occurred to confirm these fears and they seem now to a great extent to have been allayed.

18. *Economic Situation.*—The near approach of Allied victory in Europe is having precisely the effect on Tabriz trade and industry that was long ago predicted. It is doubtful whether anything could keep the costly local industries going, but the paralysis of commerce is perhaps largely psychological, it being the deeply rooted conviction of the dealers that the defeat of Germany will immediately open the flood-gates of plenty, and that Persia will be at once deluged with cheap imported commodities with which the high-priced stocks of the local merchants cannot compete. Over the last six months there has been an increasing willingness to sell and an increasing reluctance to buy. Wholesale prices have reflected this tendency, but with a certain hesitation. Retail prices, except for the month of October, when there was a fall in nearly all food-stuffs, have remained substantially unchanged. The Russian Trade Agency has continued to import goods for the local and Tehran market, the chief commodities being

cotton piece-goods, sugar, crockery and glass-ware, cod-liver oil and small quantities of chemicals for the soap and match factories. The textile and sugar imports have done nothing to lower prices and force the release of hoarded stocks which is so desirable, as the Russians have shown as much determination to get the highest prices as the local merchants. Their purchases both of grain and dried fruits have declined. The Irano-Soviet Oil Company has made a bid—not always by means of legitimate persuasion—to capture the retail trade in paraffin to the disadvantage of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Business in dried fruits, the principal export of the province, has not been brisk; after the ceasing of the autumnal demand from India in December there was practically no export except a consignment of about 50 tons bought by the Russians. The carpet trade has fluctuated; direct export to Syria, Iraq and Egypt has dwindled to a trickle, but there have from time to time been purchases on some scale for the Tehran market, destined, no doubt, for ultimate export. Prices have fallen, but costs in the industry have risen, and failures of small factories, noticed in the last appreciation, have continued. Stocks of Tabriz carpets are said to be getting very low.

19. As observed in paragraph 14 above, the inevitable slump in Tabriz industries has begun. Of the four biggest factories—two textile and two leather—one textile factory is virtually bankrupt and the others are nearing the verge. It is difficult to see how they can survive. The disproportionate cost and poor quality of their products closes the export market to them and the same costs prevent them from satisfying the local market. With two well-equipped cotton and woollen mills and two modern tanneries in the city half the population is in rags and unshod. The factories could only carry on by cutting down the number of their operatives to less than half and by reducing wages. The existing labour agreement (the Sheikh award) prevents them from dismissing employees, and the strong trade union, arguing incontrovertibly from the high cost of living, rigidly opposes any wage cuts. In this dilemma an increasing number of factory owners and shareholders are seeking to rid themselves of their liabilities and migrate to Tehran. The shares of the two tanneries and one of the textile mills are quoted at present at 10, 5-9 and 5-4 rials. There has for long been a flight of capital from Tabriz; the price of real property is low and there are no buyers.

20. *Local Attitude to Great Britain.*—The agitation over the oil question was singularly free from references to Great Britain. But this was probably due to directives which later fell into disregard, for in the later months of 1944 Left-wing journalists began to assume a tone of righteous indignation over British policy in Greece, and events there were quickly made the excuse for open attacks on British policy in Persia, where, it was represented, we were intent on "colonisation," using as our tool "Mister Zia ud Din the Englishman." Since January, no doubt as a result of the joint action of His Majesty's Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador, this campaign has died down and there have been few references to Great Britain in the local press. While the Left-wing pictures Great Britain as the big bad wolf of imperialism, the attitude of the merchants, landlords and officials towards us is one of disappointment and reproach. Unreasonable as it may seem, there is a belief among this class that if the Russians and the Tudeh party behave badly it is because the British let them. Great Britain, they argue, brought the Russians into Azerbaijan; she ought both to keep them in order and see to it that they depart at the proper time. But they rather fear she won't.

21. The principal vehicle of British propaganda in this province is the printed word. Publications in Persian, supplied by the Public Relations Bureau at Tehran, sell steadily, and over the past six months there has been an appreciable increase in the demand for the more attractive magazines, such as *Shaiapur*, and others produced by United Publications, India. Distribution in the various towns of the province is in the hands of local newsagents, who find the trade profitable. Publications in English have only a restricted sale, as the knowledge of the language is not widespread, but there is evidence of a desire to learn and text-books have sold comparatively well. A good teacher of English would be a most useful adjunct to our propaganda here. The travelling cinema van, though its activities were somewhat restricted by the delays in obtaining passes from the Soviet authorities, put in some good work up to the end of October when the weather became too bad for outdoor shows. The Soviet authorities have in general shown themselves well disposed towards our propaganda. Red army officers and men frequent the Public Relations Bureau shop, and cordial relations exist with the manager of the Russian propaganda shop, who takes from us a certain number of Russian publications. Broadcasts of the B.B.C. news in

Persian over the P.R.B. shop wireless continue to attract a regular band of listeners.

22. *Conclusion.*—As the European war draws towards its end the question that is uppermost in the minds of the official and propertied class of muslims in Azerbaijan is whether the Soviet Government will in fact terminate the occupation on the date that has been laid down. That there should be, in spite of consistent Soviet declarations, any doubt about this is a measure of the suspicions of Soviet intentions entertained by this class—suspicions which, deeply rooted in religious and racial prejudice, have unfortunately been reinforced by the dubious conduct of Soviet officials at various times during the occupation. While the constant complaint of the local Persian Government is that the Russian occupation makes a strong administration impossible, whatever preparations the Persian Government may be making to set up such an administration when this obstacle is removed are not discernible in this province. On the other hand, the efforts being made by the Left to increase membership of their organisations and strengthen their authority should undoubtedly be interpreted in part as a preparation for the day when Russian protection is withdrawn. There will almost certainly be trouble on that day, for if the natural reaction of the muslim ruling class will be to revenge themselves on the pro-Russian element for all the humiliation, repression and injury—real or fancied—which they have suffered during the occupation, the reaction of some at least of the Left-wing leaders will be to make a struggle for the retention of the hopes of social betterment they have glimpsed during the Russian connexion. If the Persian Government can find a few competent and liberal-minded civil officials, and if the Tudeh and trade union movement can organise itself for disciplined and co-operative work within the framework of a Persian Administration, there is a hope that Azerbaijan's readjustment may be brief and not too painful, indeed, a hope that the lessons learned during the occupation may be turned to the permanent benefit of this province.

23. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Office; the Minister Resident, Cairo; His Majesty's Ambassador, Angora; His Majesty's Ambassador, Moscow; His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah; the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India; General Headquarters, New Delhi; and C.I.C.I. Sub-Centre, Tehran.

I have, &c.
J. W. WALL

[E 2832/464/34]

No. 8.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th May.)

(No. 129.)

Sir,

Tehran, 26th April, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 28 of the 30th January, 1945, and to enclose herewith copy of a further report prepared by the financial counsellor to this embassy on the financial situation in Persia.

2. Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 8.

PERSIA.

Financial Situation.

ON leaving Persia, after a year's stay, I report as follows on the country's present and prospective financial position. My previous (and more detailed) reports are dated the 3rd July and the 23rd October, 1944, and the 30th January, 1945.

I.

2. In recent years the deficit on the Persian budget has been:—

	Hundred Million Rials.
1940-41	1.2
1941-42	7.1
1942-43	7.5
1943-44	10.5 ⁽¹⁾

3. The figures for 1944-45 are not yet available. For the first eleven months they are as follows. Figures for the first eleven months of 1943-44 and for the whole of that year are given for comparison:—

	1943-44. (Millions of Rials.)	1944-45. First Eleven Months.
Ordinary budget—		
Revenue	3,945	3,488
Expenditure	3,360	3,414
	+ 585	+ 74
Commercial budget—		
Revenue	1,890	3,105
Expenditure	3,549	3,603
	- 1,659	- 498
Net deficit	1,074	424

4. The ordinary budget covers normal administration. The commercial budget covers in the main two entirely different types of activity, viz. (a) administration of the Government factories and (b) the purchase, transport, distribution and sale of food-stuffs and certain other goods. Although the provisional position for 1944-45 is better than that for the preceding year, it will be seen that the small surplus on the ordinary budget is not sufficient to compensate for the deficit on the commercial budget. This deficit is caused chiefly by (a) food subsidies and (b) wasteful and corrupt management of the State factories.

5. The ordinary budget for the year 1945-46 balances at 4,412 million rials, but only by the optimistic transfer of a surplus of 500 million rials from the commercial budget, which has not yet been prepared. It will be noted that the commercial budget has shown a considerable deficit over the last two years.

6. The figures of note circulation and bank deposits over recent years are:—

	Notes. (Million Rials.)	Deposits. (Million Rials.)
August 1939	1,000	500 ⁽²⁾
June 1941	1,312	671
June 1942	1,913	1,222
June 1943	4,070	4,553
June 1944	6,262	8,753
September 1944	6,215	8,388
December 1944	6,640	9,003
January 1945	6,604	9,504
February 1945	6,709	8,801
March 1945	6,714	8,771

⁽¹⁾ (a) The Persian financial year, like the calendar year, begins on the 21st March.

(b) Under the Anglo-Persian financial agreement the value of the rial is fixed at 128 to the pound sterling. This deficit is thus equivalent to rather over £8 million.

⁽²⁾ Estimated.

7. The indices of wholesale prices and cost of living are as follows:—

	Wholesale Prices.	Cost of Living.
	1939 = 100.	
June 1941	141	145
June 1942	239	254
June 1943	422	629
June 1944	513	850
September 1944	506	798
December 1944	497	684
January 1945	513	699
February 1945	486	693
March 1945	461	696

8. The internal debt of the Government (to the National Bank) is 4,800 million rials. There is only one item in external debt, viz., a loan from Great Britain, of which about £750,000 is outstanding.

II.

9. Since the autumn of 1941 the position of the Persian Government has been rendered more difficult by Allied military expenditure in the country. Nevertheless, before the Allied occupation Persia had already become accustomed to the inflationary process, and given a reasonably able Government much could be done by the Persian authorities to avoid heavy budgetary deficits and the increase in inflation. It was not until the beginning of 1943 that, after continued Allied pressure for administrative assistance from abroad, Dr. Millspaugh, an American, was appointed as Administrator-General of Finance with extensive executive powers covering both the ordinary budget and the Government's commercial activities. The next two years are a record of expectation on the part of the Persian Government and people that Dr. Millspaugh would work miracles in spite of the continued and calculated obstruction to him in his task by the Government and business community generally. He finally resigned in disgust and left the country last February.

10. Those of Dr. Millspaugh's American staff who have remained are not of high efficiency; and of some of them it must be said, with regret, that they appear likely to acquiesce in measures of which they do not approve in order to retain their own positions. In spite of the slight improvement shown in the figures for 1944-45, compared with 1943-44, the country's finances are in a serious condition. The largely increased rates of income tax imposed by Dr. Millspaugh have failed in their object. This is partly because he himself underestimated the difficulty of accustoming the community to the payment of high direct taxation at short notice. In the event, the reluctance of the taxpayer to contribute and the extreme willingness of the underpaid and corrupt officials to accept bribes instead of taxes have resulted in the receipts for 1944-45 being considerably less than under the lower rates current in the previous year. It is probable that the rates will be reduced from the beginning of 1945-46. It is uncertain whether collections will improve, but it is clear enough that arrears will be forgotten. Some effort is being made to bridge the gap by the retrograde measure of increasing indirect taxation on essential goods such as tea, sugar, petroleum, &c.

11. The Government has reached its statutory limit of borrowing from the National Bank and is living from hand to mouth. Thus, the salaries of Government servants (amounting to 200 million rials monthly) are normally a month in arrears. Some weeks ago the Government found it necessary to request payment of the periodical instalment of royalties from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company ten days before it was due because it could not carry on for even this short period. It is also endeavouring to obtain parliamentary sanction to borrow another 200 million rials on short term from the National Bank. The organisation of the commercial activities of the Government is virtually in chaos now that Dr. Millspaugh has retired. Post-war plans are of the vaguest.

12. It is probable, therefore, that, although owing to the favourable war news, there are some small signs of a downward turn in the circulation and price figures, a financial crisis is to be expected in Persia within, say, the next six or twelve months. This will be accentuated by the deflation following the end of the war with Germany, involving among other things even greater

difficulty in collecting taxation; by the expectation of increased imports from abroad, which will result in an over-sudden fall in prices within the country; and by the handicap to exports of the still high internal level of production costs. Unemployment will be increased by the withdrawal, in due time, of the Allied military forces; and there may well be civil disturbances, possibly on a serious scale.

III.

13. If Persia were competently governed she could be financially self-supporting, and could provide a considerably higher standard of living for the undernourished and ragged millions of her population. Under the ordinary budget at the present time some 25 per cent. of expenditure (both in 1944-45 and 1945-46) is allocated to the army, the almost useless plaything of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the present monarch, instead of to irrigation and agricultural development. Another 15 per cent. is spent on the gendarmerie and police. About 20 per cent. goes on the management of the monopolies and the, at present, abortive administration for the collection of taxes. Education and public health account for no more than 6 per cent. and 4 per cent. of total expenditure. On the side of receipts, 16 per cent. is estimated (but it is an over-estimate) to come from direct taxation, while indirect taxation produces 50 per cent. The propertied classes are without conscience in their evasion of taxation; and the officials are so rooted in corruption that it would persist to a large extent even if they were adequately paid. Successive Cabinets do not expect to remain long in office and have no incentive towards reform; in the last year there have been four Ministers of Finance.

14. If a new dictator, endowed with a keener financial sense than Reza Shah, should come into power, and exercise the ruthlessness that is required—selling or giving away the State factories, cutting down the Government officials by 50 or 60 per cent., reducing corruption and collecting taxes from the rich as well as the poor—the situation might perhaps be retrieved. There are, however, strong political obstacles to the rise of a dictator so long as foreign troops are in the country, and the remedy must be sought for elsewhere. The only alternative, in my view, is the engagement of another and a better Dr. Millspaugh, presumably from the United States, to take charge of Persian financial administration. This is a particularly unfavourable moment for such a suggestion, since the one good deed with which the late Cabinet is credited by the majority of the vocal part of the Persian population, is the liquidation of Dr. Millspaugh. Unless, however, something drastic is done, Persia will fall into a state of chaos and thereby play into the hands of her northern neighbour.

E. N. R. TRENTHAM.

Tehran, 28th April, 1945.

[E 3278/31/34]

No. 9.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd May.)

(No. 128.)

Sir,

Tehran, 25th April, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 23rd January, 1945, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on Persian affairs during January, February and March 1945.

Internal Politics and Relations with the Soviet Union.

1. At the beginning of the year the Government, under the pressure of a Soviet-inspired propaganda campaign demanding that steps be taken to increase employment, issued a circular to all the provinces promising extensive administrative and social reforms, including the passing of measures leading up to the creation of provincial councils, the improvement of the condition of rural and industrial workers, radical reform of Government departments, enforcement of the free compulsory education law, and plans for the development of agriculture and industry and for the exploitation of underground resources.

2. At the same time the Prime Minister, in an effort to placate the Russians in connexion with the oil concession dispute, informed the Soviet Ambassador that the Persian Government intended to form a Persian company for oil

exploration, employing if possible Persian experts for the work. If these were not available, then "neutrals" were to be engaged; and failing them, the Persian Government would apply for experts to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Ambassador was reported to have shown little enthusiasm over these proposals, but to have promised reluctantly to inform his Government.

3. Under the new oil law the Prime Minister should have informed the Majlis of these proposals, but he did not do so for fear lest the ensuing controversy might wreck any chance of an agreement. It was not long, however, before rumours that he had been in negotiation with the Soviets began to arouse the suspicions of those Deputies who considered Bayat capable of going too far in his promises to the Russians. Many Deputies, indeed, believed that Bayat, on assuming office, had made two definite promises to the Russians: (1) that he would get rid of Dr. Millspaugh, and (2) that he would induce the Majlis to reconsider the law passed in December making it illegal for any Persian Government to give an oil concession to any foreign Government or company. On the whole, Bayat had the House with him over the Millspaugh question, although there were some Deputies who subsequently considered that by depriving Millspaugh of his economic powers he had caused the situation to deteriorate. (For a report of the Millspaugh question see below). But those Deputies who opposed concessions to the Soviets were now determined to get rid of Bayat. They were joined by others who, having used Bayat to get rid of Millspaugh, were ready to turn Bayat himself out. As a result there was a realignment of "fractions" in the Majlis. The largest fraction, the *Ittehad-i Milli*, to which the Prime Minister had himself belonged, split into two groups, one in support of and the other opposed to him. The "*Mihan*" fraction, which, together with the "*Ittehad-i Milli*," had been responsible for bringing Bayat to power, now openly opposed him. Of the other fractions, the "*Democrats*" also opposed Bayat, whereas the "*Mustaqill*" and many of the independents and even the Tudeh were inclined to support him. Bayat had in fact lost the support of the more conservative elements of the Majlis who had chosen him as Prime Minister and seemed increasingly dependent on his erstwhile opponents of the Left to keep him in office. But his position had become very shaky in the process, and there was much talk of his imminent departure. Among those mentioned as possible successors were Qawam es Saltaneh, who is always a candidate; Soheily, who, however, has not yet been exonerated from charges of corruption, undue influence, &c.; and Mehdi Quli Hayat, who is eighty. But the Deputies failed to agree about the choice of a new Prime Minister and Bayat firmly refused to resign.

4. Various incidents which occurred during this period were cited by Bayat's opponents as evidence that he had gone over to the Soviet side. He was, for instance, severely criticised for allowing the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society to broadcast from Radio Tehran a translation of an article in the *Pravda* attacking Seyyid Zia-ud-Din Tabataba'i (the former Persian Prime Minister who came back two years ago after 20 years' exile in Palestine), and containing the scarcely veiled calumny that he was the tool of the British. Much unfavourable comment was also aroused when the Prime Minister held an official reception to celebrate the 27th anniversary of the Red army and invited the diplomatic corps to attend. A story that two of his Ministers attended a memorial ceremony at the grave of the Communist, Dr. Irani, though subsequently denied by one of them, gave ground for adverse criticism. In the matter of the press, too, Bayat was considered, with some reason, to lean to the Soviet side. Nevertheless, though he was inclined to truckle to the Russians in small matters there was no definite evidence that he had given way on the oil or any other essential question. His supporters in the Majlis in fact claimed that he had, by giving way on non-essentials, succeeded in improving Perso-Soviet relations; and according to some reports the Shah was inclined to agree with Bayat and to encourage him to remain in office in spite of increasing opposition in the Majlis. In this His Majesty was possibly influenced by the fact that in reply to a protest made some weeks earlier about Soviet behaviour in the north, the Soviet Embassy sent the Persian Government a conciliatory note disclaiming any intention to interfere in Persia's internal affairs.

5. Little serious business was transacted by the Majlis during this period. In January a quarrel between two Deputies, one of whom accused the other of using his position to gain commercial advantages for himself, led to the adoption by the chamber of a Bill authorising the appointment of a committee of five members to examine all accusations made in the press or Parliament against individual Deputies. Two Bills tabled by the Minister of Health were passed; one empowered the Ministry of Health to enforce health regulations previously

enforced by the Ministry of Interior, and the other concerned the reorganisation of the Ministry of Health. New legislation tabled but not yet passed by the end of March included a Bill for the restoration to their rightful owners of properties confiscated from tribes and other landowners; two Bills for the development of agriculture and the formation of agricultural councils; a new labour law; and a Bill for the prohibition of the use or cultivation of opium.

6. There was a good deal of party activity and labour agitation during the period under review. The Tudeh intensified their propaganda particularly in the south. Their leaders indeed openly said that as their activities in the north were attributed to Soviet instigation they intended in future to improve their organisations in those parts of Persia not occupied by Soviet troops. They therefore established a centre in Shiraz where they published two papers and began an active campaign against those whom they believed, or professed to believe, to be British agents, notably Qawam ul Mulk and Nasir Qashqai. In Ahwaz, too, the arrival of a new Soviet consul was followed by a strike in the local factory. But it was in Isfahan and Yezd that the Tudeh made their most determined efforts. Tudeh Deputies from Tehran visited Isfahan in January and February to try to strengthen their domination over the local trades unions. In this, however, in spite of the energetic support of the Soviet Consul, they were remarkably unsuccessful. Anti-Tudeh interests, mostly mill-owners, succeeded in setting up a rival trades union. After a period of unrest, with demonstrations and clashes between supporters of the rival parties, the local Persian authorities, who handled the situation very well, succeeded in re-establishing order, and the upshot of it all was that the bulk of the workers declared themselves, at least for the time being, definitely anti-Tudeh. At the end of March there was further trouble and during an anti-Tudeh demonstration the crowd wrecked the Tudeh offices. At Yezd, too, the Tudeh suffered a reverse when their agents were attacked and driven out of the town by the crowd, who also set fire to the Tudeh headquarters. The Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh held their first congress at Tabriz in January. This was followed by a Tudeh recruiting drive among the townfolk of Tabriz, the peasants and the Kurdish tribes. In Hamadan and Kermanshah, too, there was an attempt to gain adherents to the Tudeh, but without great success.

7. In Tehran the general opinion was that the Tudeh had lost ground ever since the demonstration of October last had revealed that the Tudeh was not altogether a genuine Persian Left-wing movement but a political organisation largely under Soviet control. When the Tudeh advertised a demonstration in Tehran for the 2nd March, the Military Governor showed a bold front, and the demonstration was called off. In Azerbaijan, too, there were signs towards the end of March that the local Tudeh leaders were drawing in their horns and trying to restrain the activities of their more unruly followers. But in Meshed towards the end of March there was renewed Tudeh activity when their leaders harangued the crowds in the streets after scores of Soviet Tommy-guns had been patrolling the streets.

8. In February Seyyid Zia published the programme of his party, called the "*National Will*" party, which he now declared open. In spite of violent attacks in all the Soviet-inspired press, and in many other newspapers, Seyyid Zia and his cause appeared to be making good progress, at least in Tehran, where it was claimed that by the end of March the party had between nine and ten thousand adherents.

9. On the 4th March Dr. Musaddiq, one of Bayat's principal supporters, accused the Majlis of condoning corruption and left the Assembly declaring he would not take his seat again. Two days later, however, he allowed himself to be escorted to the Majlis by a crowd of students who tried to force their way in. In the ensuing disturbance one student was killed and a few people were hurt. Bayat himself and other members of the Government were widely accused of complicity in this demonstration against the "*reactionary*" Majlis. But the incident did Bayat no good and greatly increased the criticism against his Government. Finally, on the 18th March, representatives of the "*Mihan*," "*Mustaqill*," "*Democrat*," and part of the "*Ittehad-i Milli*" fractions called on the Shah to inform His Majesty that the majority of the Deputies no longer supported Bayat and to request His Majesty to advise him to resign. The Shah was, however, reluctant to dismiss Bayat, and expressed the opinion that his Government should continue in office at least until after the No Ruz holidays.

10. Bayat and his Government in fact were still in office at the end of March, owing largely to the lack of cohesion and determination of his opponents; and the Majlis, having adjourned for the No Ruz holidays, did not meet again before the end of the period under review owing to the lack of a quorum.

Soviet Oil Claim and the Yalta Conference.

11. Towards the end of March the embassy were authorised to make to the Persian Government, in reply to their numerous enquiries as to the extent to which Persian affairs had been discussed at Yalta, an unofficial and oral communication in the following terms:—

"Persian affairs, though not on the agenda of the conference, were discussed briefly; and while there was no sign that the Russians had abandoned their desire for an oil concession, there was such complete agreement as to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia that it would have been superfluous to repeat the declarations already made on this subject."

12. In point of fact the Russians at Yalta had adopted a very unforthcoming and aggrieved attitude where Persia was concerned, repeating many of their earlier mis-statements regarding the circumstances of the oil concession crisis and flatly rejecting all suggestions for an agreed official statement on Persia. Nevertheless the brief discussions on this subject probably served to convince the Soviet Government that any overt pressure with a view to securing a reversal of the oil decision would adversely affect their relations with Great Britain and the United States; and, while of course they hotly denied that any such pressure was being exercised, it was noticeable that a short while after the close of the conference the Persian newspapers controlled by the Soviet Embassy gradually ceased their agitation for the cancellation of Dr. Musaddiq's oil law.

Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.

13. The Anglo-Soviet censorship "war," waged throughout the greater part of the period under review with increasing intensity, resulted in a complete victory for the British side.

14. Late in the summer of 1944 a proposal had been made in general terms to the Soviet Ambassador that a truce should be called to "ideological censorship." British retaliatory measures had at that time hardly begun to inconvenience the Russians, and although M. Maximov undertook to transmit the proposal to Moscow for consideration it is doubtful whether he did so.

15. On the 26th January the proposal was reiterated in a more detailed and concrete form. It was suggested that both sides should cease to censor all incoming printed matter published in English or Russian and posted, through the intermediary of officially-approved agencies, by publishing firms in the United Kingdom and British Dominions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States.

16. Meanwhile retaliatory pressure was maintained on the British side. This was never comparable to the Russian censorship activity in extent, and was indeed confined largely to the protection of the Polish Government in London from the more outrageous of Soviet slanders. It involved, however, the holding up of several issues of the *Pravda* and one of the *Izvestiya*—actions which the Soviet Ambassador evidently regarded as unspeakably shocking and difficult to explain to his colony without loss of face. Although the Soviet section of the censorship and the Soviet Embassy had met all protests on our side with a consistent refusal to justify or explain their actions, M. Maximov protested strongly against these British counter-measures and demanded explanations. He was merely informed that his protests had been referred to London.

17. On the 6th March the Soviet censor agreed orally to the proposals described above, and large quantities of British, American and Russian printed matter, previously held up, were thereupon released. He announced moreover his intention of interpreting his responsibilities liberally in respect of publications in languages other than English and Russian, with the possible exception of Polish. So far he has been as good as his word, and we have followed suit. Relations between the British and Soviet censors were immediately restored to the highest level of cordiality, the Russians, true to their national psychology, having accepted defeat without the slightest trace of resentment.

18. Unsuccessful attempts were made to extract from the Soviet Ambassador a written acceptance of the British proposal. It is always very difficult to get anything in writing from the Soviet authorities, but M. Maximov was probably embarrassed by the fact that he had stipulated in conversation for the continued suppression of attacks on Heads of States (a stipulation to which there is of course no objection so long as it is reasonably interpreted), and did not wish to put this point in writing because—presumably—it was not contained in his instructions.

19. It proved impossible, during the period under review, to obtain a square deal for the Polish legation in the matter of broadcasting over the Tehran radio: the Russians continued to reject the legation's material submitted for censorship, and to evade censorship of the so-called Polish Patriots' radio propaganda by sponsoring it themselves. Until the closing down of British broadcasting from the Tehran station it might have been possible to redress the balance by copying the Soviet Embassy's methods; but the increasingly difficult attitude adopted by the Polish Government after the Yalta Conference made it inadvisable to adopt a form of drastic retaliation which would in any case have been effective for a short period only. The Poles, however, discovered a solution of their own when the British broadcasts from Tehran ceased. They found that the Persian radio authorities were willing to allow the Poles to broadcast official Polish bulletins that had not been censored by the Russians (or by the British) and two or three such bulletins have in fact been broadcast without the Russians raising any objection. The Poles have promised not to be provocative, so we are turning a blind eye to the broadcasts.

Aid to Russia.

20. The total "Aid to Russia" cargo carried during the period under review was:—

	Long tons.
January—	
Rail	102,009
Trucks	36,603
	138,612
February—	
Rail	83,779
Trucks	50,728
	134,507
March—	
Rail	60,766
Trucks	20,927
	81,693

The tonnages shown for trucks are the weight of the assembled trucks plus their cargo.

21. Overseas cargo for Russia via Persia has diminished very rapidly, so much so that it is now being carried as part cargo on occasional ships from the United Kingdom, United States, India and Ceylon. Aviation spirit and alkylate (material to convert ordinary into aviation spirit) from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refineries at Abadan now form an important part of the traffic. Thus, of the 60,000 tons carried by rail in March, 47,000 were Anglo-Iranian Oil Company products.

22. 3,000 tons per month of fuel oil has continued to be supplied from Abadan to the northern (Soviet operated) section of the Persian railways to make up the quantities not supplied from Baku.

23. During March the general truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr was dismantled and despatched through Persia to a Black Sea port. The one remaining assembly line at Khorramshahr closed down in mid-April.

24. The American Persian Gulf Command is shipping to another war theatre fifteen out of the total of fifty-seven diesel locomotives imported to assist in moving "Aid to Russia" traffic.

25. The total number of Soviet prisoners of war returned to the Soviet Union via Persia between the 27th October, 1943, and the 25th February, 1945, was 13,063. No more will pass by this route.

The Question of Withdrawal of Allied Troops.

26. This question continued to form the subject of correspondence between His Majesty's Embassy and the Foreign Office. As stated in paragraph 19 of the last quarterly report, the embassy's original suggestion was that British troops should be evacuated at least from Tehran as soon as the opening up of

supply routes other than the Persian should render this practicable. It was hoped here that such action would lead before long to a corresponding Russian withdrawal from Tehran, since the Russians could hardly afford to face the odious comparisons which their continued presence in the capital would invite. Their propaganda in Persia depends negatively for its effect on the lip-service which they pay to the joint Allied guarantees of Persian sovereignty, and positively on the belief which they surreptitiously foster that this sovereignty is menaced only by "the capitalist Powers."

27. His Majesty's Government were not, however, in favour of even a partial British evacuation as a gesture, and considered that British troops could only be withdrawn on a *pari passu* basis.

28. While remaining of the opinion that even the evacuation of Tehran alone by Allied troops would be better than nothing, the embassy became more and more convinced as time went on that a far more radical withdrawal was required, and required soon, if Persia were to be saved from administrative paralysis and progressive disintegration. The Russians had steadily increased their hold over the rich northern provinces within their "zone." The longer this process was allowed to continue, the smaller the chances would become of ever dislodging them; and unless they were dislodged no Persian Government could be expected to function as a Government should. The possibility was therefore mooted of negotiating a British withdrawal to the oilfields area in the extreme south-west with a corresponding and simultaneous Russian withdrawal of equal importance in the north.

29. At this stage, however, a complication arose. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Paiforce, considered it essential for the health of any troops retained for the protection of the oilfields that the Indian rest camp at Karind should be maintained, and that there should be a summer training camp (on which work had already been started) at Bisitun, with southward lines of communication through Khurramabad. But Karind, Kermanshah (which is 20 miles west of Bisitun) and Khurramabad lie along the northern and eastern perimeters of the British "zone" as defined in the letters exchanged with the Persian Government after the occupation in August 1941. The arrangements proposed by the general officer commanding-in-chief would no doubt have meant a genuine reduction in the quality or intensity of the British "occupation" within a large part of this zone; British troops would be much less in evidence than before. Nevertheless nothing short of a total withdrawal from a given area would have stood the least chance of acceptance by the Russians as a change requiring a corresponding change on their side. They would undoubtedly have claimed—and not without some show of logic—that the most they were called upon to do in these circumstances was to withdraw to "their" zone as defined at the same period. And this zone was only smaller than their present zone by an unimportant area of mountain and forest covering the central part of the Elburz range and the coastal fringe to the north of it. (The area is contained approximately within a line drawn north-east from Qazvin to another at Khurramabad, thence eastward along the Caspian coast through Aliabad to Babul, and thence south-south-east to Semnan). On this basis they would have remained in full control of Azerbaijan, Gilan and the north-eastern corner of Persia, with garrisons on the Tabriz and Meshed roads within 100 miles of Tehran on both sides of the capital. Meshed, it is true, was not included within the "Soviet zone" as defined in the Soviet-Persian exchange of letters after the occupation of the country; but on the strength of an oral declaration made by the Soviet Ambassador at that time troops were stationed on the Meshed airfield, and a moral influence was thereby established over the town which became in the course of time the practical equivalent of inclusion within the Soviet zone. The Russians would therefore in all probability have claimed to treat Meshed as part of their original zone for the purposes of any new arrangement based on the sacred principles of "equilibrium."

30. Confronted with this dilemma, the embassy put forward the only proposal which seemed at all likely to solve it, viz., the negotiation of a total withdrawal on both sides, with special arrangements for the protection of the oilfields area, in the absence of British troops, by a police force on the lines of the Palestine police and theoretically under Persian control. It was realised that this proposal might well appear too drastic to the military authorities responsible for the security of the oilfields. But it was pointed out that the risks of sabotage by the Japanese would be very much less than the risks of sabotage by the Germans had been in the difficult days before the occupation of South Persia; and that in the last analysis a continued Soviet occupation of the north until six months

after the peace with Japan was likely, by bringing about the complete disintegration of Persia, to deprive us of the use of the oilfields for good and all—among other and still more serious consequences.

31. This proposal was telegraphed to London on the 31st January; and there had of course been no time to consider it when the Yalta Conference took place a week later. At this conference Persian affairs, though not on the official agenda, were touched upon, and more than one attempt was made to persuade the Russians to agree to discuss the question of the withdrawal of Allied troops. The Soviet reaction was, however, completely negative and discouraging; both Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov took the line that the exact terms of the Tripartite Treaty should be adhered to and that there was consequently no advantage in discussing the question of withdrawal.

32. Commenting on this unsatisfactory result, the embassy pointed out at the beginning of March that the Russians had shown their hand. It was clear that they wished to keep their troops in Persia as long as possible in order to secure the strongest possible hold over the country before they went. The only weapon left was wide publicity, or at least the threat of it, if the Russians maintained their obstructive attitude.

33. Such publicity was not sanctioned during the period under review, nor was the threat of it used; but towards the end of March the embassy were authorised to inform the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government, so far as they were concerned, "were not opposed to Allied examination" to see whether some withdrawal could not be made before the treaty date for total withdrawal, i.e., the six months' period following armistice with Japan. This communication undoubtedly did something to hearten the Persian Government, and was bound in time to confirm in the mind of the Persian public the general impression which it had already derived from the attitude of the Tudeh press, namely, that it was the Russians alone who were opposed to the early withdrawal of foreign troops. Obviously, however, the full benefit of publicity could only be obtained by revealing that His Majesty's Government had actually proposed a withdrawal to the Soviet Government and had met with an uncompromising refusal. Such a revelation—but nothing short of it—would completely deflate the intensive and disloyal propaganda of the Soviet authorities in this country, who, through the agency of the newspapers which they control, seek to deflect attention from their own real misdeeds in the north by painting a lurid and entirely fanciful picture of the attempts of "foreign capitalists" to detach and swallow the south.

Security.

34. The most important recent development has been an outcry in the Persian press and agitation in the Majlis against the continued internment of prominent Persians, for which the British authorities have been almost exclusively blamed. The clamour has taken the line that the internees should be brought to trial under Persian law and that in any case the security danger is over and it is time for release.

35. The agitation took its rise from an incident which occurred at the Tehran Internment Camp when the internees were inspected by a British subaltern. This officer was assailed with abuse by an overwrought colonel, and the episode was interpreted in the press as a further example of British brutality.

36. In the Majlis, on the 1st February, Dr. Musaddiq questioned the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the legal justification of the arrest and confinement of the internees and, in spite of Anglo-Russian efforts to prime the Minister with suitable powder for a reply, received a deplorably weak and inconclusive answer, which did little or nothing to damp down the agitation.

37. To counter these developments, His Majesty's Embassy published an official statement of the facts of the incident at the camp and released to the world press, Reuter, A.P. and U.P., the complete story of the German spies, Gametha and Mayr, and of the Mellun Society. This in turn provoked further protestation in the press, ranging from denunciation of this alleged endeavour to discredit Persia in the eyes of the United Nations and so to deny her the rewards she anticipates from San Francisco, to a flat refusal to believe the story.

38. The general disloyalty of the Persian authorities was again made clear by the indulgent treatment vouchsafed to the internees in the Tehran Camp, the transfer of one of them, without authority, on grounds of sickness, from the camp to his private house, and the failure of the Government to implement a

promise to reduce to the rank of major an internee who had been promoted to lieutenant-colonel.

39. As the Russians had been largely exempt from the odium incurred by the British in virtue of the continued internment of Persians, and as, although the Russian Ambassador concurred in protesting against the futility of the Foreign Minister's reply to the agitation against it, he seemed to be disposed to disclaim the Russian share of responsibility, a notice was inserted in the press by His Majesty's Embassy, emphasising the joint responsibility of both British and Russians. His Majesty's Embassy tried to get the Soviet Embassy to agree to this action, but as they refused, were compelled to act alone.

40. On the 12th February all the Persian internees remaining in the Sultanabad Camp, except the dangerous, and very anti-British mullah, Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, were transferred to the Persian Internment Camp in Tehran. Kashani was later removed to Kermanshah.

41. The progressive release of the Persian internees in Tehran, except for a few who may have to be detained until the war with Japan is over, is now proposed by the British security authorities, and the Soviet Embassy have been asked to approve the release of the first eight.

42. On the 10th March, thirteen German, Czech and other internees were removed from Sultanabad to a camp in Iraq and the Sultanabad camp was closed.

43. On the 18th March, Sheikh Abdul Majid Shirazi, whose name has been on the Anglo-Soviet list of enemy partisans in connexion with the Mayr conspiracy, was arrested by the Persian police. And on the 2nd April, Constantine Kassakowski, the last undesirable German to be at large in Persia, was arrested at Shah Reza by the gendarmerie at the request of the British authorities and handed over to the latter.

British Army Interests.

44. In the course of the last twelve months the British combatant troops in Persia (which were about 11,000) were reduced by 800 men.

45. Thefts of signal wire still continue in spite of strong protests by His Majesty's Embassy against what amounts in effect to sabotage of Allied military communications. The Persian army has taken over the protection of wire over an additional stretch west of Tehran and south of Tehran and are now responsible for some 150 miles.

The Press and Public Opinion.

46. During the early part of the period under review the press and public opinion were chiefly occupied with the crisis over the demand by the Soviet Union for an oil concession in Northern Persia. The press, over this question, was divided into two main groups, namely the Freedom Front (i.e., the papers influenced and controlled by the Tudeh party) which in effect supported the Soviet demand, and the Independence Front papers which opposed the demand and considered the pressure being exercised by the Soviet Union as an unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of the country. Certain papers, chiefly those supporting Seyyid Zia, made vigorous and telling attacks on Soviet policy, which the Tudeh press were unable to answer effectively. Impelled, perhaps by this, the Soviet Ambassador suggested to His Majesty's Ambassador that they should request the Persian Government to oblige the press to moderate its tone. On the 27th January the two ambassadors therefore presented a joint memorandum to the Persian Government protesting against press attacks on the Allies and requesting the suppression of the worst offenders and the prosecution of their editors. At the same time the Military Governor of Tehran published a notice reminding the press of his powers and threatening to prosecute those responsible for attacks on the Government, or on Government officials, or for upsetting relations with the Allies, or endangering security. The Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Ambassador that he had sent instructions to all Governors to take similar action in their districts. Subsequently, a number of papers were suppressed for brief periods, but with little effect, as each suppressed newspaper immediately reappeared under another name.

47. As the oil crisis developed there was a marked deterioration in the attitude of the Freedom Front papers towards Great Britain. The disinterestedness of the Soviet Union was asserted in contra-distinction to the machiavellian policy of British Imperialism. The columns in this section of the press were

full of virulent attacks on "Imperialism" and "international reaction" and the agents of these forces, in particular Seyyid Zia, and anti-British innuendoes. The opportunity to attack British policy offered by events in Greece was, moreover, not missed by the Freedom Front papers. The Freedom Front press continued its attack on Dr. Millsaugh. Criticism of the Government persisted in all sections of the press. The Tudeh organ, *Rahbar*, began to advocate during the period under review the formation of a Government based on a coalition of all progressive parties. The Independence Front papers emphasised the need for reform. The Yalta Conference was fully reported; surprise was expressed in the press and public that there was no mention of Persia in the communiqué issued after the conference. A certain amount of pique was shown at the declaration of war by Egypt and Turkey and fear lest, by their last-minute declaration, these countries should obtain a position at the peace conference equal to Persia. The approach of the San Francisco Conference has been the occasion for a spate of articles on Persia's alleged sacrifices to further an Allied victory and the importance of her rôle in the war. In some minor papers there has been a tendency to recommence attacks on the Shah for alleged unconstitutional interference in political affairs. Other topics discussed by the press include Arab federation, the progress towards the formation of which is regarded as a British diplomatic success. There have been demands by Independence Front papers for the evacuation of the country by Allied troops, on the grounds that the Dardanelles are now open to Allied shipping. The Freedom Front papers carefully refrained from such demands, which were clearly not in the Soviet interest.

48. There has been a relative improvement in Anglo-Persian relations during the period under review. This was largely due to the acceptance by the British Government of the Persian Government's decision to defer the grant of concessions until after the war, and the fact that this attitude contrasted favourably with the Soviet attitude.

American Affairs.

49. On the 19th February the United States Senate confirmed the appointment of Mr. Wallace Murray as ambassador to Persia, in replacement of Mr. Leland Morris, who has been here only since last August.

50. Mr. Morris has been a disappointment. Although not mischievous like his predecessor, Mr. Dreyfus, but on the contrary, frank and honest, he has been inert and has carried no influence whatever. In particular, he was unable to co-ordinate the activities of the American advisers or to curb the intransigence and obstinacy of Dr. Millsaugh.

51. As is known, Mr. Murray has hitherto been very mistrustful of British aims and activities in the Middle East. If, however, the change of heart operated in him by Soviet machinations in this area is serious (see paragraph 34 of my despatch under reference), we may profit by having his strong personality here instead of the mediocrity of his two predecessors.

Declaration of War on Japan.

52. On the 28th February, Persia set the seal on Japan's fate by declaring war on her.

Indian Affairs.

53. By the end of March the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society succeeded in overcoming the inertia of and other obstacles presented by the Persian Ministries of Education and Agriculture and selected (1) four Persian graduates for the Government of India's scholarships for the three-year course at the Lyallpur Agricultural College in the Punjab, (2) two for the two years' Forest Rangers' course at the Imperial Forestry College at Dehra Dun, and (3) five for the Delhi Polytechnic courses in textile and ordinary engineering. The offer of six scholarships at the Aitchison College, Lahore, had to be rejected as it was found that no Persian youth had sufficient knowledge of English to join the college before reaching the age of 16 or 17 and the college course is planned to take boys from 8 to 17. The difficult problem of getting the young men to Zahidan was unexpectedly solved by the welcome offer of accommodation in an Indian army motor convoy which happened to be crossing Persia from Iraq at the beginning of April.

54. In March the Society was "At Home" and lectures on "The Philology of Persian, Sanskrit and Russian Works" and "The Effect of Persian Literature

in India" were given by Pandit Rahul Sankrityayana (Professor of Sanskrit at the Moscow University) and M. Bahar (the Persian Poet-Laureate) respectively. At this gathering some excellent films produced by "Information Films of India" were shown and much appreciated.

55. The English classes at Meshed, Kerman and Yezd had teething-troubles caused partly by the Indian teachers' lack of knowledge of colloquial Persian and partly by incompatibility of temperament, but also by the exceptionally cold winter which kept students away from these classes. An Indian teacher is now on his way to Ahwaz.

56. The Indian Trade Commissioner elect (Major M. Hassan) was detained in India by ill-health but is expected in May.

57. The Indian Troops' Welfare Association continued to entertain the Indian troops of the small garrison in Tehran. The coming spring and summer will enable the association to co-operate with the Army Welfare Services in the organisation of excursions to beauty spots in the mountains near Tehran.

British Propaganda Activities.

58. No new activities have been commenced during the three months under review. Our publications continue to circulate with varying degrees of popularity; the *Daily News* sales have declined slightly—probably because of the decrease in the numbers of British and American troops in Persia; the *Children's Newspaper* is as popular as ever; the *Women's Magazine* is not doing as well as we should like; while *Tafsir*, the highbrow weekly, is being distributed as in the past to Persian notabilities and newspapers.

59. With the possible cessation of the German war, British propaganda activities are being directed firstly towards emphasising the Japanese war and secondly towards stressing the importance of British trade.

60. On the 21st March a large party was held at Victory House to mark the closing down of the "Voice of Britain" on the Tehran Radio.

British Council.

61. The number of pupils taught by the British Council went up during the quarter from 4,000 to 4,500, the increases being registered in all three Anglo-Persian institutes operating in Persia (Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz). The usual cultural activities continued during the period under review, the high lights being the first performances in Persia of plays by Shaw ("Candida") and Priestley ("The Long Mirror"). The concerts of the Tehran Symphony Orchestra (which are sponsored by the Council) continued to be packed to capacity.

62. A notable visitor was the actress, Miss Marie Ney, who gave a successful presentation of Shakespeare's *Women before a large and distinguished audience* and was honoured by a command performance before the Persian Court.

Tribal Affairs.

63. During the first quarter of 1945 the tribes have, on the whole, remained quiet and have given no trouble. The Persian Government, while doing nothing to improve the condition of the tribes, has also refrained from annoying them by ill-timed military ventures.

64. *Fars*.—The continued presence of the Qavam ul Mulk in Shiraz and his opposition to the Tudeh party has kept alive the attacks in the Soviet-inspired press against the tribal bloc and the danger to the Central Government which is implied therein, and also against the sinister designs of British imperialism in the south. Nasir Khan Qashgai made some efforts to increase his influence in Kuh-i-galu but met with little success. There is some prospect of his coming to Tehran to see the Shah and thus put an end to his equivocal position.

65. *Kuh-i-galu*.—The long-drawn-out quarrel between Abdullah Khan Zarghampur and his half-brother, as also the lawless activities of Abdullah himself, seem, temporarily, at least, to have been settled by his making his formal submission to government. The Persian Government has not given him a formal pardon, but some sort of assurance that his past sins would be overlooked.

66. *Khuzistan*.—General Humayuni has completed his disarmament operations against the Arabs. A high estimate puts the number of rifles collected at 5,000. Most of the rifles handed in were obsolete patterns and some of great antiquity. Complaints have been made by the tribes that they have been placed in a dangerous situation *vis-à-vis* their Iraqi neighbours and other Persian tribes who have retained their arms. Such complaints will persist until the Persian

Government can, as in Raza Shah's days, guarantee them from attack by their neighbours. The Persian Government is also placed in a difficult position in that it has not the requisite force at its command to tackle the problem in the right sequence, by disarming the more powerful tribes first, but must start on the weaker tribes.

67. *Bakhtiari*.—Murteza Quli Khan continues to preserve order though naturally incurring the odium of the other branch of his tribe who see the plums of office going to his relatives and their influence waning. The proposed operations against the Bahmai and Tayyebi tribes were postponed. Murteza Quli Khan had asked, in return for the provision of tribal infantry and cavalry, more than the Government were prepared to give or could afford to give. General Humayuni also advised against the operations on account of the lateness of the season and the impending upward migration of the tribes to areas inaccessible to his troops.

68. The murderers of Mr. Vice-Consul Harris and Dr. Griffiths (who were killed in the Bakhtiari country in 1942) still remain at large, and the Persian Government has taken no steps to effect their capture.

69. *Kurdistan*.—The tribes of Southern Kurdistan have remained quiet. The fifteen Rogzadeh Jaf tribesmen have been set free at last and have returned to Iraq. No acts of brigandage have occurred to constitute a serious menace to the lines of communication of His Majesty's forces. In Northern Kurdistan the situation is not so satisfactory. The extent to which Soviet influence has dominated the Kurds, the degree of adherence of the Kurds to Tudeh politics and the distance to which Kurds would be prepared to go in active support of separatist movement in Azerbaijan are not accurately known, and are probably exaggerated by the wealthy burgesses of Tabriz who fear for their skins when the Russians depart. A skirmish took place at Rezaieh, in which a Persian major was killed, and in an affray at Mahabad five policemen were killed. The General Staff promptly assembled a mixed column from Saqqiz to proceed to Mahabad, but the Soviet commander stopped them at Bukan and turned them back. The question has since been taken up on a diplomatic level but, up to the time of writing, the Russians persist in their refusal to admit this column and maintain that any garrison required at Mahabad should come from Tabriz, be limited to a battalion of infantry and not replaced in Tabriz.

Persian Forces.

70.—(a) *The Army (including the United States Military Mission)*.—During the first quarter of 1945 there have been no changes in the posts of Minister for War or Chief of the General Staff, though Ibrahim Zand has been prevented by ill-health from attendance at the ministry since mid-March. There have been many changes in the senior appointments. A new head of the Military Tribunal and a new Public Prosecutor have been appointed. It is to be hoped that their reputed honesty and energy will enable some of the more flagrant cases of corruption to be dealt with. A new deputy Chief of the General Staff, a new Departmental Director and a new Director of Transport have been appointed. A divisional commander has been deprived of his command and summoned to Tehran to answer charges of corruption. A brigade commander has also been changed for the same alleged reason. While General Arfa's reforming zeal merits all praise, the purity of his motives is tinged with doubt when it is realised that all the outgoing officers were friends of his predecessor, General Razmara, and that all their replacements are his own cronies. The High Military Council which General Razmara allowed to lapse into abeyance is again functioning. Though not a body of great weight or authority, it has this use in that it defends the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff from some of the charges of favouritism. The Majlis has again been debating the Conscription Law criticising the system of drawing lots to choose the required number of conscripts from the annual call up, and also demanding that the period of compulsory service should be reduced from two years to one. This latter amendment was rejected. In the budget proposed for 1324 (21st March, 1945 to 20th March, 1946), the army has been allotted 1,000,000,000 rials; conscription has been shown as 1,400,000 rials and 96,000,000 rials has been allotted for purchases of military equipment in the United States. These three items amount to approximately 25 per cent. of the total budgeted expenditure. When 398,246,100 rials are added for the gendarmerie vote and 237,000,000 rials for the police vote, there is some justification for the statements by Majlis Deputies that Persia is spending more than she can afford on her security and defence forces. The Persian army has

undertaken no operations of any importance during the past three months. Brief references to military activity are given in the section dealing with tribal affairs. The United States Government informed the Persian Government some time ago that General Ridley's mission would be withdrawn on the 1st March when the period of their contracts expired. The Persian Government then requested the United States Government that the mission should remain for some time longer. The United States Government have cancelled their orders for the recall of the mission, but nothing has been settled as to the period for which they will remain.

71.—(b) *The Gendarmerie (including the United States Gendarmerie Mission).*—There is little to report and such progress in efficiency and turnout as has been noticed in the capital is offset by the frequent reports of inefficiency, corruption and even connivance at highway robberies which have been received from consular sources in the provinces. Colonel Schwarzkopf still keeps his mission too centralised, and seems to busy himself more with future plans for organisation than with those frequent tours of inspection which alone can have any effect on checking corruption and combatting inactivity in a force split up into so many small packets over so wide an area. Two reforms recently introduced by him are sound. The first is to have no gendarmerie post of less than one platoon in strength. The second is to move his Persian gendarmerie officers round every two years—the minimum period, he estimates, in which a local commander can dig himself in and organise a system of graft on a large scale.

72.—(c) *The Police.*—Brigadier Saif remained as Chief of Police during the first three months of 1945. No further steps have been taken to obtain a foreign police adviser. No progress in organisation, administration or efficiency have been noted. Shortage of personnel and shortage of money are advanced as excuses for every failure and the whole force is rapidly sinking into decay.

Persian Air Force.

73. Early in the year the Shah outlined to the Air Attaché his idea for a grandiose expansion of the Air Force on very modern lines. His Majesty had little conception of either the cost involved or the long and rigorous training which would be necessary before his goal could even be seen over the horizon. No more has been heard of this project and the Air Force has on the contrary done less in this quarter than the last, owing partly to natural inertia, partly to internal dissension and partly to inept interference by the General Staff of the Army.

74. General Nakhchevan has returned from his mission to the United States bringing, it appears, no sheaves with him. He discharges in a desultory fashion the duties of Inspector of the Air Force, an appointment which he does not seem ever formally to have accepted.

Civil Air Lines in Persia.

75. The Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones has taken delivery of the third and last Dominie aircraft bought from His Majesty's Government. The commercial company which is trying to establish air lines claims that this Ministry has agreed to its proposals, which are stated to be under consideration by other departments, but there are no visible results so far.

The End of Dr. Millspaugh.

76. It was stated in the last report that there was a renewed agitation to deprive Dr. Millspaugh of his economic powers, i.e., his functions of purchase, distribution, price control and sale of certain food-stuffs and other goods as distinguished from his financial powers proper. On the 8th January the Majlis passed a Bill depriving him of them, the voting being 69 votes to 6 with 20 abstentions. Although efforts were made in some quarters to persuade him to remain with limited powers, he resigned and left Persia on the 28th February, justifiably disgusted at his treatment by the Persian Government and its ingratitude for the very considerable services which he had rendered. (For an appreciation of his qualities and defects please see paragraph 64 of the Annual Political Review conveyed in my despatch No. 73 of the 9th March, 1945.) Some of his American staff have also resigned, but most of them are remaining, with their powers reduced to that of advisers. (The principal ones are Mr. Pixley and Dr. Black.) They are not, however, of very high calibre or of sufficiently strong personality to influence the Persian Government towards setting its house in order; and unless an adequate successor to Dr. Millspaugh is appointed (which at the present stage appears improbable) the financial situation is likely to become even more serious.

Finance.

77. The budgetary out-turn for the first ten months of the current financial year, i.e., up to the 20th January, 1945, has been as follows. (Figures for the same period in the year 1943-44 are given for comparison):—

	1943-44.	1944-45.
	(Million rials.)	
Ordinary revenue	3,649	3,183
Ordinary expenditure	3,124	3,200
	+ 525	- 17
Commercial revenue	1,745	2,857
Commercial expenditure	3,193	3,396
	- 1,448	- 539
Net deficit	923	556

The payment of salaries to Government servants is, however, a month in arrear, and about 200 million rials should therefore be added to the deficit on the ordinary budget on this account.

78. It is most improbable that Dr. Millspaugh's hope of balancing the governmental accounts for 1944-45 will be realised, mainly owing to the passive resistance on the part of the taxpayer to the payment of income tax, the inadequate system of collection and the corruption of the underpaid revenue officials. Receipts from income tax for the first ten months of the year have been less than for the corresponding period in the previous year, when the rates were considerably lower. In Dr. Millspaugh's view it was by no means impossible that, after his departure, the Government would abolish the income tax. It is expected that a Bill will shortly be tabled in the Majlis at any rate reducing the rates of tax for the future; and it is hardly likely that any sufficient steps will be taken to collect arrears. In the meantime, the Government has reached its statutory limit of borrowing from the National Bank, and its internal debt stands at 4,800 million rials.

79. The ordinary budget for the year 1945-46 (beginning on the 21st March, 1945) was recently presented to the Majlis, which has not even yet approved the budget for 1944-45. This new budget balances at 4,412 million rials, but only with the help of the transfer of a surplus of 500 million rials from the commercial budget, which has not yet been prepared. This can hardly be more than wishful thinking, as the deficit on the commercial budget was 1,741 million in 1943-44 and has been 539 million in the first ten months of the current financial year. The estimated receipts from income tax for the year 1945-46 are 644 million, compared with the estimate of 885 million for 1944-45, but are still almost certainly too high.

80. Note circulation and bank deposits are still increasing. The former, which was just under 1,000 million in 1939, was 6,640 million in December 1944 and 6,709 million in February 1945. Bank deposits, about 500 million in 1939, were 9,003 million in December 1944, and 9,800 in February 1945. The wholesale price index, which was 497 in December, decreased slightly to 486 in February, while the cost of living index rose from 684 in December to 693 in February.

81. As anticipated in the last report, sales of gold for the account of His Majesty's Government have been discontinued. For the period from the 1st to 15th January, when they ceased sales, amounted to the equivalent of £235,880; and for the whole period during which sales were carried out, viz., from the 26th June, 1943, to the 15th January, 1945, to £6.8 million.

Economic Situation.

82. The economic powers previously held by Dr. Millspaugh were ceded to an "Economic Organisation" of Persians prominent in the economic field. Since its constitution this body has shown few signs of being able to stem the chaos into which the economic administration of the country has been sliding since American control ceased. The Bayat Government tabled numerous Bills designed to improve agricultural and economic conditions, but most of them are still in the committee stage. They included a new Labour Bill. The practical value of this mass of legislation is doubtful, as the means and the will to enforce them are lacking.

83. Another factor responsible for an important change, at any rate superficially, in the economic outlook is the removal of Middle East Supply Centre control over a large number of imported commodities. This resulted in great activity by merchants, who are trying to import goods by all means within their power, both honest and dishonest. The goods (Group "C" commodities), which are no longer under Middle East Supply Centre control, still officially require a Persian Government import licence. Merchants are, however, endeavouring to get goods shipped without licences in the hope that they will be able to clear them through the customs on arrival. This attempted evasion of the import licensing regulations is the result of the increased difficulties encountered in obtaining licences, for which larger sums have now to be paid in bribes to the various officials concerned. Nevertheless, the relaxation of Middle East Supply Centre control has been very welcome both to importers and to exporters as a first step towards freer trade after the war.

84. With the approaching end of hostilities a number of public works schemes are being planned by private companies and administrative bodies. In addition to the Lar irrigation and hydro-electric project previously reported, negotiations are taking place for similar works in Isfahan and Shiraz. Power station equipment is required for an extension to the Tehran power station and for a new generating station in Isfahan. A piped water supply and drainage are planned for Tehran and a new water system for Shiraz, and there are proposals to equip Tehran with trolley-buses, a modern street-lighting system and an electric railway to the summer resort of Shemran.

85. Soviet commercial activities steadily increased during the period under review and are being extended also to other Middle East countries, the goods passing in transit through Persia. The principal commodities concerned are silver, silk, cotton yarn and skins.

Economic Warfare.

86. Merchants are still anxiously awaiting the conclusion of hostilities in which they see the end of all controls and economic regulations and envisage a free-for-all trade without the restrictions to which they have become accustomed, but which they nevertheless would wish to see removed. In the majority they are not hostile to these restrictions as they realise that they are an essential part of the war effort and would not continue to be enforced unnecessarily.

87. The easing of facilities for the passage of carpets to Switzerland and of lambskins and other commodities to Turkey should bring a certain measure of relief, and already the fact that liberated territories are coming once more into the sphere of economic activity is producing a spate of enquiries as to the *modus operandi* of correspondence and trade questions. With this liberation are also coming an increasing number of queries about the remittance of monetary aid to persons of nationality other than Persian residing in those countries. Facilities already exist for Persians and monetary grants are made regularly.

88. During the quarter it was decided by agreement between the countries concerned and London to dispense with the taking of Ultimate Destination declarations as between Syria-Lebanon, Iraq and Persia.

89. No removals from the Statutory List have been made although one recommendation for deletion has gone forward to the responsible authorities in London.

Cereals and Agricultural Development.

90. The departure of Dr. Millspaugh might have upset the cereals collection system, but it was arranged that the British officers of the cereals collection team should remain at their posts and work as long as it was seen that the newly appointed Persian officials refrained from interfering with or upsetting their carefully prepared plans for the fixing of prices and the collection of the wheat and barley due for harvesting in the summer of 1945.

91. At the end of March the stock of food-grains in the Tehran elevator amounted to 36,000 tons of wheat and 22,000 tons of barley, enough for 221 days for Tehran City, at the current rate of adulteration, which has been increased from 7 per cent. to 10 per cent. of barley, while the total stock held by the Persian Government was 251,241 tons of bread-grains, well distributed throughout the country.

92. It is forecasted that the excellent snow and rain this winter will give a surplus of 30,000 tons of grain (20,000 tons of wheat and 10,000 tons of barley) from the existing stocks and another 50,000 tons after the harvest. Enquiries are being made of the Soviet Embassy as to whether they need any of it for Russia

before it is offered to the Middle East Supply Centre for other areas in which food-grains are deficient. If, however, the threatened locust invasion (see below) takes serious proportions, all this may have to be reconsidered.

93. At long last the Khuzistan Agricultural Society is to be wound up and a commission is at Hamidiah Farm for this purpose. As might have been expected, the Persian Ministry of Finance seemingly went out of its way to do the wrong thing by hoodwinking their American "advisers" and by allowing subordinate officials to make this liquidation as awkward as possible. The incorrectness had to be pointed out to the Persian Minister of Finance and a promise extracted that another emissary would be sent to complete the taking-over from Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. C. Noel, C.I.E., D.S.O., who has been technical manager for the past two years and more.

Transport.

94. Following the removal of Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers and the reversion of executive control to Persians, Mr. Shields, Director of the Road Transport Administration, also resigned. The Persians then tended to leave most of the work in the hands of the British officers lent to the administration to such an extent that the tendency had to be checked. So despite the change this department has, on the whole, continued to work with less confusion than was anticipated, largely because of the strenuous efforts of the British advisers. Tyre stocks are low, but every endeavour is being made to ensure that the few available are being distributed only to essential consumers. It has been decided to convert three-quarters of the lorry chassis imported under the 1944 procurement programme into buses, so that communications between the capital and provincial towns may be improved.

95. The transport of oil, coal and cereals by road and the transport of goods by rail proceeded satisfactorily.

Locust Control.

96. It appeared at the beginning of the quarter that the campaign of the Locust Officer for Persia, as far as the desert or migratory locust was concerned, was destined to be superfluous. However, in the early days of March Cairo reported that flights could be expected to invade the Persian coast in the Gulf. Indeed, by the middle of March several swarms in the ovipositing stage made their appearance on the coast, and by the end of the quarter the locusts had infested considerable areas of the coastal belt.

97. The success of the campaigns against the invasion is not yet substantiated, and the position is viewed with considerable concern by the British, Soviet and Persian authorities. The Bandar Abbas area, where a joint Anglo-Persian effort is being made, is heavily infested with ovipositors and widespread areas are reported to be covered with eggs and there is likelihood that these will increase in magnitude. Khorramshahr area is also reported to have received an attack, but the seriousness of the infestation has not been confirmed.

98. The Moroccan or non-migratory locust did not emulate the tardiness of his travelling cousin. By February in the province of Shiraz, in the Fasa Jahrum and Darab districts, 4,000 hectares were covered with eggs. Unfortunately, the Persian authorities in the area were poorly equipped with transport, so the British Locust Officer lent two of his trucks to assist in this campaign, which appeared to be reasonably successful.

U.N.R.R.A. and the Polish Evacuees.

99. On the 3rd January Mr. Galusinski arrived in Tehran as representative of the Displaced Persons Division of U.N.R.R.A. Since his arrival all Poles in Persia have been registered. The result was as follows:—

Ahwaz	1,366
Isfahan	950
Tehran—	
Camp No. 3	585
Camp No. 2	81
Camp No. 5	46
Hospital	162
Old People's Home	26
Town	866
Total for Tehran	1,766
Total	4,072

100. Since the 1st January, 408 Poles have left for Syria; 12 for the United Kingdom and 4 for Palestine.

101. Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Persia and Iraq Command, the Minister Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3890/464/34]

No. 10.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th June.)

(No. 169 E.)

Sir,

Tehran, 26th May, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 129 of the 26th April, 1945, I have the honour to transmit the following figures obtained from Mr. Johnson, the American Treasurer-General to the Persian Government, relating to the Persian budget for the year 1323 (21st March, 1944—20th March, 1945). The budget is divided into two parts: the Ordinary budget, which covers ordinary revenue and expenditure; and the Commercial budget, which relates to the operations of Government commercial enterprises, factories, &c.

2. The results for the Ordinary budget were as follows:—

	Rials.
Ordinary Revenue	3,924,678,000
Ordinary Expenditure	3,844,532,000
Surplus	80,146,000

The results of the Commercial budget were as follows:—

	Rials.
Commercial Revenue	3,459,572,000
Commercial Expenditure	4,001,853,000
Deficit	542,281,000

The total deficit on the two budgets was therefore Rials 462,135,000.

3. For the sake of comparison I append the corresponding figures for the previous year 1322 (21st March, 1943—20th March, 1944):—

	Million Rials.
Ordinary Revenue	4,386
Ordinary Expenditure	3,697
Surplus	689
Commercial Revenue	2,132
Commercial Expenditure	3,873
Deficit	1,741
Total deficit	1,052

4. The results in 1323 therefore show some improvement over those for the previous year, for which a great deal of credit must go to Dr. Millspaugh and to the efforts of his mission to restore order to Persia's finances. The deficit in 1323 was due to the uneconomical operation of the Government commercial enterprises and monopolies and there is little doubt that if this millstone did not hang around the neck of the Persian Government the public finances of this country would be in a much healthier condition. Stocks of goods in the possession of the Government are thought, however, to amount in value to at least as much as the deficit on the 1323 budget, though with the fall in prices to be expected now that the war in Europe is over the value of these goods will in the future become progressively less.

5. The Government's budgetary difficulties, reflected in the delay in the payment of the salaries of civil servants and in the inability of the Government

to settle its current debts to the Allies (particularly to the British) and its other claims, are due mainly to the shortage of liquid cash. Government expenditure is being met on a hand-to-mouth basis, and there is no reserve available from which to meet any unexpected outgoings in addition to the outstanding liabilities referred to above, if the need should arise suddenly. For example, it is hard to see where the Persian Government would find the money with which to buy expensive surplus military installations—such sales would almost certainly have to be on a credit basis if the Persian Government is to be the buyer.

6. There would seem to be only one obvious solution to these difficulties and that is the more efficient and determined collection of taxes. There is plenty of money in the possession of private persons and with normally efficient taxation the Government should be able to meet its current obligations easily. The foreign exchange position is strong, so there is no justification for a foreign loan. For the last two years the Persian Government has come to rely increasingly on the A.I.O.C. royalties to help it out of difficult situations, and there are indications that this year also the Persian Government will expect to keep itself going by receiving royalty payments before the due dates, if possible, free of interest. This, of course, is no satisfactory substitute for obtaining sufficient revenue from taxation as the royalty payments are made in sterling and the subsequent conversion into rials increases the quantity of notes in circulation and merely adds to the already unsatisfactory position in that respect.

7. The prospects for the future are not particularly bright. It is reported in the press that owing to the clamour against the present rates of income tax, the Government has promised to introduce a new income tax Bill. No mention has yet been made of the nature of this Bill but there seems to be little doubt that the rates will be lower and the conditions easier. Nor has there yet been any proposal to counter-balance this probable loss of revenue by the imposition of extra taxes in other directions, though it seems possible that the Government will look rather to import and monopoly dues to provide revenue than to any form of direct taxation.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the Government of India, New Delhi, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 2254/70/34]

No. 11.

(1)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12, Secret, for the Period the 19th–25th March, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 92 of 26th March; Received in Foreign Office 6th April.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. Owing to the Nauruz holidays there has been little political activity in the capital. Just before the holidays, representatives of the Majlis groups Mihan, Mustagil, Democrat, and Ittihad-i-Milli had an audience of the Shah and informed him of their discontent with the present Cabinet and their desire for a change. They claimed to have the support of the majority of the Deputies. It is still, however, uncertain whether the Prime Minister will resign. It is understood that the Russians oppose a change at present, since the next Prime Minister, who is unlikely to be the Russian favourite, Qavam es Sultaneh, might be less amenable and more energetic—he could hardly be less—in the interests of Persia than Bayat. It is rumoured that the Shah at Russian instigation has instructed the Prime Minister not to resign.

2. The account of the activities of the German organised Fifth Column in Persia published in the local British paper, the *Daily News* (see Summary No. 11/45, paragraph 6), has aroused a storm of criticism in the Persian press, which angrily demands proof of the association of any important Persians with German agents, denies the existence of any plot, maintains the innocence of the

majority of the Persians arrested and attributes the publicity given at this juncture to alleged activities some two years old to a malevolent British design to prejudice Persia's standing at the San Francisco Conference and later at the Peace Conference.

3. The following have been definitely selected to represent Persia at the San Francisco Conference:—

Nasrullah Intezam: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mustafa Adl: Minister of Justice.

Dr. Siassi: Minister without Portfolio.

Hassan Taqizadeh: Ambassador to London.

Majid Ahi: Ambassador in Moscow.

It is understood that it is doubtful whether Taqizadeh will consent to go. The delegation will be joined in Washington by the Persian Ambassador in Washington, Muhammad Shayesteh, and the Persian Trade Representative in the United States, Dr. Nasr.

Economic.

4. In more responsible Persian circles anxiety is being created by the chaos that is commonly said to have followed on the departure of Dr. Millsbaugh and the withdrawal of American control in the whole financial and economic administration of the Government. The Treasury is nearly empty; revenue is not coming in; salaries are in arrears; corruption is again rampant in the distribution of rationed monopoly goods; and no plans have yet been made for the collection of the coming harvest or to ensure a very necessary and justifiable (having regard to the bumper harvest expected) reduction in the price of bread.

5. A recent survey of motor transport, owned privately or by the Government, available for civilian purposes in Persia, has resulted in the following figures:—

Trucks of approximately 2½ tons capacity	3,757
Above 2½ tons	1,941
Total	5,698

These figures include approximately 681 buses but no touring cars. They are considered to be accurate within 10 per cent.

6. A Bill has been tabled by the Government to sanction the imposition of a 3 per cent. increase on the price at which the Government retails monopoly goods, the proceeds to be credited to provincial municipalities. Municipalities are now in most cases bankrupt and in debt.

Medical.

7. Some half a dozen mobile dispensaries have been equipped by the Persian Government and are now touring the provinces. It is intended to increase the number when funds are available. This measure was probably inspired by the success of the mobile dispensary provided by Paiforce which for the past two years has been touring extensively among the Kurdish, Lur, Bakhtiari, Qashgai, Khamseh and Arab tribes.

Appointments—Civil.

8.—(i) Rukneddin Ashtiani to be First Secretary to the Persian Legation in Switzerland;

(ii) Bihjat Nuri to be Secretary to the Persian Consulate-General in Jerusalem;

(iii) Muzafferi to be Farmandar of the newly-created Shahrestan of Sirjan (Kerman Province).

Persian Forces.

Army.

9. General Ridley states that the United States Government some time ago informed the Persian Government that his mission would be withdrawn on 1st March, when the period of their contracts expired, and that the Persian Government then requested that the mission should remain for some time longer. The United States Government have cancelled their orders for the recall of the mission but nothing has been settled as to the period for which they will remain. Owing to lack of funds to make the necessary bulk purchases the supply administration organised by the American Mission is functioning irregularly and with

difficulty, and, due to inefficiency and to labour troubles in the textile mills, it seems likely that the cloth required for summer uniforms will not be available in time.

Air Force.

10. It is learnt from secret sources that Colonel Khosrevani, of the Persian Air Force, who was sent to America in October to attend the International Air Conference (see Summary No. 40/44, paragraph 4), has requested the Westinghouse Electrical International Company of New York to make a project for the equipment of the Qaleh Murgheh airfield at Tehran with all devices necessary for air services, and subsequently to make a survey of the whole of Persia with a view to assessing requirements for radio communications and radio navigation for internal air services.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

11. As reported in Summary No. 9/45, paragraph 10, and Summary No. 8/45, paragraph 10, the Persian Government, after the disturbance at Mahabad, ordered the despatch to that town of a column from the Saqqiz Brigade. On reaching Bukan the column was met by the Farmandar of Mahabad and Qazi Muhammad, the most prominent Kurdish notability of the town, who informed the commander that the Kurds could not be restrained from opposing the occupation of the town by the Persian troops. When the Persian commander decided to ignore this warning a Russian officer intervened and forbade the further advance of the column. This order was obeyed. Negotiations are now in progress with the Russians through diplomatic channels. It is understood that the Russians are insisting that any troops required for the garrisoning of Mahabad must be taken from those already in Azarbaijan.

Fars.

12. There has been a further case of shooting at travellers on the Shiraz-Bushire road resulting in one death and two persons wounded. But security generally remains good.

Russian Affairs.

13. The *Dost-i-Iran*, the Persian paper published by the Publicity Department of the Soviet Embassy, has printed an article, alleged to be based on American sources, which is offensively critical of British policy in Greece. It will not tend to convince the public of the reality of Anglo-Russian unity.

Tehran, 25th March, 1945.

[E 2468/70/34]

(2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13, Secret, for the period 26th March to 1st April, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 102 of 4th April; Received 17th April.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

There has been no meeting of the Majlis since the Nauruz holidays, so the Prime Minister remains in office. The election of a new President of the Majlis and office-bearers is shortly due, and the Prime Minister hopes that the disagreements that are likely to arise over those elections may disrupt the unity of the Majlis groups now combined in opposition to him. Moreover, there is as yet no agreement among a majority of the Deputies as to his successor. Pakravan and Bader are the most talked-of candidates.

2. For some time past Seyyid Zia has absented himself from sessions of the Majlis. He has been occupied with the organisation of this party under the name of Iradeh-i-Milli (the National Will). The party has published an admirable programme of reform and has gained some adherents in Tehran, who do not, however, include any persons of present or likely future political importance. Because of its opposition to the Tudeh party it is supported financially by some merchants and millowners. Little progress, if any, has as yet been made with the organisation of branches in the provinces.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nasrullah Intezam, has resigned. This may be due in part to the opposition that has been expressed to his being appointed to lead the Persian delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Taqizadeh's refusal to go is said to be due to his objection to being second fiddle to Intezam. The composition of the delegation may now be changed.

4. Active opposition to the Tudeh party is increasing. In Isfahan the Deputies Saifpur Fatimi and Doulatbadi, aided by the impolitic actions of the Soviet Vice-Consul and the firm action of the Governor-General against Tudeh disturbers of the peace, have for the time being welded the elements opposed to the Tudeh party into some unity, with the result that the Tudeh party has lost ground. On the 27th March the offices of the party were wrecked by members of the anti-Tudeh Union after an exchange of stone-throwing which took place during a demonstration organised by the latter. In Azarbaijan, in the districts of Ardebil and Maragheh, agents of the Tudeh party have been meeting with rough treatment. In Shiraz, too, active opposition is being organised. The Tudeh press has been fulminating with hysterical anger against the Fascists, reactionaries and agents of imperialism whom it blames for these manifestations of dislike of the Russian fifth column.

5. The killing of five Persians, apparently intending to steal Allied telegraph wire, by Indian troops protecting the line has been very strongly and unfavourably criticised—it may be assumed, not without Russian approval—by the Tudeh party paper *Rahbar*. After asserting the illegality of the action of the Indian troops, the article goes on to express sympathy with the "poor, dirty, illiterate" Indians, who were not the persons really to blame.

Appointments—Military.

6. The following Sarhangs have been promoted to Sartip:—

- (i) Hussein Atapur, C.B.E.: Inspectorate Department.
- (ii) Nasrullah Bayendor: head of Army Engineer Department.
- (iii) Muhammad Mazheri: Director of 4th Bureau, General Staff.
- (iv) Ali Akbar Darakshani: G.O.C., 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division.
- (v) Mehdi Quli Alavi Muqaddam: Army Veterinary Services.
- (vi) Seifullah Parsa: head of No. 1 Military Hospital, Tehran.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

7. In spite of the assurance of the Soviet Embassy that a reduced Persian column from the garrison at Saqqiz, reinforced by a battalion from Tabriz which might be relieved at Tabriz by a battalion from Tehran, would be allowed to move to Mahabad, the local Russian military authorities still refuse to permit the column to advance. See Summary No. 12/45, paragraph 11.

Kuhigalu.

8. Abdullah Zarghampur has made his submission to the Government and it has been accepted. He has been given some assurance that his sins of the past would be overlooked if he behaved well in future, but not a formal pardon. He has undertaken not to interfere in the affairs of the other chiefs of Kuhigalu or of other tribes. The chiefs previously in opposition to him are to be assured that they are not being abandoned by Government and that they can count on the support of Government against any attempt by Abdullah Khan to interfere with their rights or to impose himself as overlord of Kuhigalu. The question is whether the Boir Ahmadi, having agreed now not to loot each other, will be able to refrain from looting their neighbours.

Russian Affairs.

9. It is reported that the Soviet military authorities are taking up land near Rezaieh, Tabriz and Mianeh, ostensibly for the purpose of growing their own vegetables, and that villages are being rented in the vicinity of Tehran apparently by members of the Tudeh party but really by the Russians. To the Persians this can mean only an attempt to get hold of the peasants who in these villages will be given cause to appreciate Soviet methods. Both reports require confirmation.

10. On the 23rd March Soviet troops in Meshed turned out in considerable numbers to prevent interference by the Persian police with crowds which were being harangued by Tudeh orators.

11. It is reported, but requires confirmation, that the Russians are making a new airfield at Khoi in north-west Azerbaijan.

12. The new Archimandrite of the Armenian Church in Julfa (Isfahan) is reported to be telling Armenians that the time has come for them to return to their native land and that arrangements for this are being made by the Soviet Government.

13. A Society of Armenian-Soviet Cultural Relations has been formed in Isfahan.

American Affairs.

14. An American military survey party is now making preliminary arrangements for the making of an aeronautical chart which is to cover Persia south of a line somewhere between the 28th and 29th parallels of latitude and west of the Shiraz-Isfahan-Tehran road. It seems that the country affected is to be covered fairly thoroughly by survey parties, since points are to be fixed by ground survey every 50 miles.

Czechoslovak Affairs.

15. M. Masaryk, Foreign Minister in the Czechoslovak Government, has arrived in Tehran on his way to London and San Francisco.

Tehran, 1st April, 1945.

[E 2470/70/34]

(3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14, Secret, for the period 2nd April to 8th April, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 106 of 9th April; Received in Foreign Office 17th April.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. Owing to the continued absence on holiday of many Deputies there was no public session of the Majlis until the 3rd April, when it proceeded to elect a new president. The running was close between Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai (the out-going president) and Mehdi Farrukh (F.O. 61; M.A. 85). No less than three separate ballots were taken at that session as there was some doubt as to whether some of the papers marked "Tabatabai" referred to the outgoing president or to Seyyid Muhammad Tabatabai, also a candidate for the presidency. Objections were also raised on the score that some of Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq's papers had been brought into the Majlis from outside. It was finally announced that Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai had been elected by 49 votes to 48 cast for Mehdi Farrukh. On the 5th April Dr. Malek Madani⁽¹⁾ was elected as first vice-president, receiving 74 votes out of 94. Dr. Moazemi⁽¹⁾ was then elected second vice-president with 71 votes out of 101. Some minor members of the Majlis presidential body, such as recorders, tellers, &c., were elected at the next session.

2. It is reported, but not confirmed, that at the next public session Bayat intends to ask for a vote of confidence after describing what his Government has achieved since it came into office. This recital should not take long.

3. Taqizadeh, Ahi, Ala and Mustashar-ud-Dowleh are all reported to have refused to head the Persian delegation to the San Francisco conference. The first two have pleaded ill health. M. Ala makes no secret of his dread of the perils of a sea or air voyage, and Mustashar-ul-Dowleh is said to have alleged advancing age as his excuse.

The Court.

4. The Agence Pars has, "on good authority," contradicted the news broadcast by the B.B.C. in their Arabic transmission from London at 2115 hours on the 3rd April to the effect that His Imperial Majesty The Shah and Queen Fauzieh were to visit Egypt towards the end of April in order to be present at the wedding of Queen Fauzieh's sister Princess Faiza, to Prince Muhammad Ali Raouf.

⁽¹⁾ Short personality notes on these two are given in an Appendix to this Summary.

Appointments—civil.

5. Amir Khosru Afshar to be second secretary at the Persian Legation in Paris.

Appointments—military.

- 6.—(i) Sartip Atapur, C.B.E., Inspector at the Ministry of War, to be head of the Persian Army Transport *vice* Sarhang Mir Jalali relieved;
 (ii) Sartip Zarrabi^(*) to be Chief of Police, Tehran, *vice* Sartip Saif;
 (iii) Sartip Darrakhshani, General Officer Commanding 3rd Azerbaijan Division, to be officiating Governor-General of Ustan 3 (Eastern Azerbaijan) *vice* Mehdi Dadvar (Vossuq-es-Saltaneh) recalled.

Persian Army.

7. His Excellency Ibrahim Zand, Minister for War, has gone to Palestine for medical treatment. He had been ailing for several months.

Persian Air Force.

8. The Persian Air Attaché in London has requested the loan of two n.c.o. instructors to train the Persian Air Force in the wireless and navigation equipment supplied with the Anson aircraft recently delivered.

Internal Security.

9. Constantine Jacob, alias Kassakowski, the last German remaining at large in Persia, has been captured at a village near Shahreza (Qumishah). It will be recalled that he made his escape into Boir Ahmadi territory when his companions were handed over to the British Security authorities by Nasir Khan Qashgai in March 1944. The arrest was effected at the request of the British Security authorities by the Officer Commanding gendarmerie at Isfahan, previous knowledge having been obtained that Kassakowski was in hiding near Shahreza with the connivance of the local gendarmes.

Baluchistan.

10. The troubles reported in Intelligence Summary No. 4, paragraph 12, seem to have left some suspicion of the Baluchis among Persian Government officials in Mekran. Eighty Reki and Ismailzai volunteers have been dismissed from the 11th Khosravi Camel Regiment and government grants to several prominent Reki, Gamshadzai and Yarahmedzai chieftains have been discontinued.

Fars.

11. The Qashgai upward tribal migration has started and the tribes are reported as being abreast of Shiraz. The grazing is said to be the best for many years. No acts of brigandage have as yet been reported.

Khorassan.

12. In this province, as in Azerbaijan, local enthusiasm for politics and rivalry between the Tudeh and anti-Tudeh factions seems to be on the decline and the attention of the populace, or at least the mercantile community, turns to the war news and the approaching slump of which signs can be detected. A wool factory, a cotton oil seed factory and a carpet factory have closed down as the owners can no longer pay the employees' wages.

13. The Russian garrison at Meshed is now estimated to be no more than 4,000 of all arms including administrative services. There are only small detachments at Sabzawar, Nishapur, Turbat-i-Haidari and Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam.

Azarbaijan.

14. The Pashmineh wool factory and the Khosrovi leather factory are reported to be in financial difficulties and may soon close down or go bankrupt. The Governor-General, Mehdi Dadvar, for some days refused to obey the order from Tehran for his recall but is now reported to be leaving in a few days.

15. Russian opposition to the entry into Mahabad of the small column referred to in Intelligence Summary No. 9, paragraph 10, continues. The Kurds, as may be supposed, are also opposed to the establishment of this garrison. The

(*) A short personality note on the former will be found in the Appendix to this summary.

situation described in Intelligence Summary, No 8, paragraph 10, has not been cleared up. A number of Rashid Beg's men of both Herki and Shakkak tribes are in the neighbourhood of Ushnava awaiting, doubtless, the outcome of the discussions between the Persians and Russians as to the establishment of a garrison at Mahabad.

British Interests.

16. His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., left Tehran on the 31st March to attend the Mid East Economic Conference and returned on the 6th April.

17. Professor S. J. Davies, Professor of Engineering at London University and adviser on engineering subjects to the British Council, has arrived in Persia on a short visit.

18. Some deserters of the Arab Gulf R.A.F. Levies who mutinied at Jask in January 1945 (see Intelligence Summary No. 4, paragraph 13) have arrived in the Lar district and have disposed of their arms to a local chieftain of Bastak. Two others with six rifles have been caught in Shiraz and are now in custody there.

Egyptian Interests.

19. His Excellency Mahmud Sabit Bey, the new Egyptian Ambassador to Persia, presented his credentials to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 4th April.

American Interests.

20. Four editors of Tehran newspapers have been invited by the United States Government to visit America. They are as follows:—

Abul Qasim Amini of the weekly *Umid*,
 Majid Muwaqqar of the daily *Mihr Iran*,
 Dr. Mesbahzadeh of the daily *Kaihan*,
 Abbas Masudi of the daily *Ittelaat*.

Tehran, 8th April, 1945.

*Appendix.**Short Personality Notes.**(a) Reference paragraph 1 of Summary.*

(i) *Dr. Malek Madani*.—Born about 1890. A landowner who married into an influential family of Malayir which constituency he represents. Has been a Deputy since 1927. Belongs to the Mihan faction and is closely allied with Sipahbod Ahmedi.

(ii) *Dr. Moazemi*.—Born about 1900. Educated in France. Deputy head of the faculty of law. Was first elected to the 13th Majlis. Owns some land in Gulpaigan which constituency he represents. Is generally regarded as the Shah's nominee. He carries some weight among the younger intellectuals.

(b) Reference paragraph 6 (ii) of Summary.

Sartip Ibrahim Zarrabi.—Born about 1903. Trained in Gendarmerie under Swedes. A brother-in-law of the landowner and ex-Deputy for Ahwaz, Naseri.

Officer Commanding 6th (Khuzistan) District of Gendarmerie—1942.

Promoted to Sartip—June 1942.

Officer Commanding 14th Brigade (Ahwaz) Persian army—July 1942.

General Officer Commanding 5th (Kermanshah and Luristan) Division—December 1942.

Was relieved and recalled to Tehran—August 1943.

Appointed Chief of Police, Tehran—April 1945.

[E 2581/70/34]

(4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15, Secret, for the Period 9th April to 15th April, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 117 of 16th April; Received 23rd April.)

Persian Affairs.

1. The Cabinet has approved the statutes of the Supreme Economic Council. They are published as Appendix "A" to this summary.
2. The Cabinet has drawn up regulations governing the sale of "foreign" goods with special reference to the sale of surplus stores by the Allies and the collection of customs dues thereon. They are published as Appendix "B" to this summary.
3. The Minister of Finance has tabled a Bill in the Majlis to govern the sale of public domains and ceded properties. The text has not yet been published.
4. The four secretaries of the Majlis have been elected. They are Sadiqi, Hashimi, Jawad Masudi and Tusi. Thus there has been no change in either the presidential body or the secretaries of the Majlis. The various Majlis Commissions for Finance, Interior, Education, Agriculture, Industry and Mines, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Health, Military Affairs and Posts and Telegraphs were also elected.
5. As considerable time may elapse before the budget for 1324 (March 1945–March 1946) is passed, the Majlis has prepared a "two-twelfths" Bill to cover the period the 21st March–20th May.
6. Almost every day new names have been announced in the press for the Persian Government's selection of representatives for the San Francisco Conference. Whether Taqizadeh and Ahi have maintained their refusal to go is not yet confirmed. The latest list of starters from Persia comprises the following:—

Nasrullah Intezam, Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Saltaneh), Dr. Siyasi, Salih, Dr. Qasim Ghani, Seyyid Baqir Kazemi; Dr. Qasim Zadeh (legal adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) and Faziullah Nabil (head of the 3rd Political Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) will also accompany the delegation. Sartip Ali Riazi and Colonel Muarraf have gone as military representatives. The Majlis representatives are Dr. Abduh, Dr. Shafaq and Dr. Itebar. Dr. Ali Akbar Daftari (legal adviser), Ahmad Ardeshir (counsellor and interpreter), Dr. Suratgar (counsellor and interpreter), Muazzami and Gaudarzi (secretaries) are also said to have been selected.

7. Muhammad Hussein Jehanbani has resigned from the directorship of the Road Transport Department. With his previous record (in the Ministry of Interior and, for a brief spell, as Chief of Police) of garrulous ineptitude and bribe taking on a scale sufficient to make even a Persian gasp, he will be no loss to that body.

Persian Gendarmerie.

8. Colonel Schwarzkopf, American chief adviser to the gendarmerie, left for the United States on the 5th April to arrange for further purchases of equipment. He will be absent from Persia for about two months.

Persian Army.

9. The Chief of the General Staff told the British Military Attaché that 380 Persian military trucks out of a total of 700 were off the road awaiting repair or totally unserviceable. Many of these trucks have only been in use for less than a year and have run negligible mileages. Sartip Atapur's report discloses hopeless chaos and widespread peculation. While the repair services are inefficient, the chief cause, in the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, of the present poor state of the mechanical transport is the total lack of any system of regular periodical inspection.

Appointments—Civil.

10. Hassan Karimi to be an inspector of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Internal Security.

Isfahan.

11. M. Krutchkov, the titular Soviet Consul at Isfahan, has returned to his post. It remains to be seen whether he interferes in local affairs with the same precipitancy and stupidity as the egregious Marchenko. Tudeh and anti-Tudeh activity has, for the moment, died down. The new Armenian Archimandrite at Julfa is reported as having told his flock that they should consider the wisdom of migrating from Persia and returning to their coreligionists in Soviet Armenia.

Makran.

12. Further acts of highway robbery are reported. Two trucks were recently held up 8 miles north of Zahidan and the passengers were robbed of their cash. Baluchis are suspected.

Azerbaijan.

13. The Persian column which tried to reach Mahabad and which was turned back by the local Russian commander is still at Saya. It has been told to stand fast there in the hopes that the Russians will subsequently permit its entry into Mahabad, and that the Kurds will realise what is coming to them when the Russians depart. Meanwhile negotiations between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Embassy are at a standstill. The Russians still insist that any garrison required for Mahabad should come from Tabriz; be limited to one battalion of infantry and should not be replaced in Tabriz.

British Interests.

14. His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., left Tehran on the 9th April for Andimeshk, Khorramshahr and Bushire. He is due to return on the 16th April.

French Interests.

15. The Persian Military Mission which has been visiting the Western Front at the invitation of the French Government left France on the 10th April on their return voyage.

Polish Interests.

16. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 6th April, 1945, was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
Tehran	368	1,181	300	1,849
Isfahan	71	442	417	930
Ahwaz	172	758	317	1,247

Grand Total 4,026

Tehran, 16th April, 1945.

Appendix "A."

Statutes of the Supreme Economic Council approved by the Cabinet (Bayat)—April 1945.

1. The Supreme Economic Council shall be composed of twenty-five persons to be elected by the Cabinet on the proposal of the Prime Minister from among intelligent persons with a knowledge of economics, financial, agricultural and technical affairs, their election to be ratified for a period of three years. The Ministers of Finance and Agriculture, the heads of the Government Economic Organisation, the National Bank, the Mortgage Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the Iran Insurance Company, the President of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, and the head of the Tehran Municipality shall be members as long as they retain their posts.

Note.—Should the number of members fall to less than the twenty-five mentioned in this article through resignation or other causes other persons shall be elected on the proposal of the council, that proposal to be ratified by the Cabinet.

2. The honorary president shall be the Prime Minister in person.
3. The president and vice-president of the council shall be elected by absolute majority of the members of the council.
4. Cabinet Ministers shall be allowed to attend the sittings and take part in the discussions. Should circumstances demand, the council shall have the right to call on any Minister for consultation and an exchange of views.
5. The members of the council shall be divided up into the necessary commissions according to their special qualifications. These commissions shall study the questions involved and shall report results to the council. These commissions shall also have the right to call upon intelligent and informed persons who are not members of the council or commissions to study special matters, or to form special commissions from those persons.
6. Internal statutes and regulations connected with the running of the council shall be put into effect after ratification by the council.
7. Ministries and Government concerns shall be bound to put at the disposal of the council any information which the council may require for its investigations.
8. The Cabinet or individual Ministers shall have the right to ask for the opinion of the council on matters affecting the national economy, before taking a decision; in that case the council shall be bound to investigate the matter and submit a comprehensive report for their information.
9. The fundamental duties of the council shall be to draw up an economic programme on the following lines and to submit it to the Government:—
 - (a) To stabilise prices.
 - (b) To investigate matters of money and prices.
 - (c) To encourage and increase agricultural and industrial products, and to make full use of their products.
 - (d) To conduct a full and technical investigation into the country's agricultural and irrigation, and to draw up profitable and practical plans through technical experts.
 - (e) Matters connected with Government factories and lands.
 - (f) To encourage an increase of the population; to increase people's capacity for work and to educate the people in economic matters.
 - (g) To create order and equilibrium in the economic and financial affairs of the country; to ensure a minimum standard of living; to make hygiene universal and to create public works.
 - (h) To preserve good relations between workers and employers, landlords and peasants, and to look after the rights of both parties with a view to agricultural and industrial progress.
 - (i) To attract the necessary capital in order to make the maximum use of the mines and water in Persia.
 - (j) To reform the general system of the country's external and internal trade, and to define the principles according to which foreign trade should be conducted.
 - (k) To complete the internal and external means of communications policy;
 - (l) To co-ordinate the economic actions of the Ministries, banks and other Government concerns;
 - (m) To put into practice the principles of social insurance.
 - (n) To make provision for the return to normal immediately after the war of the economic and financial situation.

Appendix "B."

Regulations Governing the Sale of "Foreign" Goods, proposed by the Ministry of Finance and Approved by the Cabinet (Bayat)—10th April, 1945.

Article 1.—When foreign military authorities desire to sell worn out goods and equipment or articles which they no longer require they must inform the local customs or the nearest customs department, to enable that department to take steps to collect import dues and charges payable by the purchaser.

Note.—Should it be desired the seller may first carry out the customs formalities in respect of the goods to be disposed of, and hand over to the purchaser a special certificate bearing the number and the date of the customs clearance document.

Art. 2.—Before the payment of import dues and charges has been guaranteed by the purchaser or seller, the purchaser will not take possession of the purchased goods. Contravention of this article will render the offender liable to punishment according to the law laying down penalties for smuggling.

Art. 3.—Regardless of the type of goods the customs department may place such articles, provided that they are used (second hand) in the category covered by article 2204 of the Customs Tariff (goods other than classified in the Tariff).

Art. 4.—The goods in question will not be subject to import quota or Foreign Trade Control Regulations, but 6 per cent. of the stamp fees payable on the import licence, and in certain cases monopoly dues, will be payable.

Art. 5.—The price of such goods will be reckoned at the net selling price inside the country instead of at the former price at the Persian frontier.

Art. 6.—Goods of which the import is legally forbidden, i.e., arms, war equipment, sporting guns, and explosive material will not come under this type of transaction except with the special permission of the Government.

[E 2753/70/34]

(5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the Period 16th April to 22nd April, 1945, communicated in Tehran despatch No. 125 of 23rd April —(Received 1st May, 1945.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. Bayat's Cabinet has fallen. The dismissal of Millspaugh gained him a respite by pandering to the capitalists and crooks who stood to lose by economic and financial stability. Some flirtations with the Tudeh earned him another breathing space by placating the Left. The Nau Ruz holidays, the election of the Majlis President, Presidential body and sub-committees, and a sitting suspended out of respect to the late President of the United States served to postpone the day of reckoning a little longer. A notice of interpellation of the Government by Seyyid Zia-ud-din Tabatabai was only withdrawn on the understanding that on the 17th April Bayat would address the Majlis on the subject of his Government's achievements and would ask for a vote of confidence. In the course of a very long speech, which received a very mixed reception and during which he was interrupted several times by shouts from the public gallery, the Prime Minister gave an account of the Government's position and its activities during its tenure of office. This, he said, had been forced upon him by the spreading of false rumours about the Government by certain people, rumours which had found their way into the press. Instead of taxing the Government in open debate in the Majlis those persons had spread unfavourable propaganda which had only resulted in a weakening of the Central Government's position. He had been ready to answer his critics for some time past, but a necessary delay had been imposed by the Nau Ruz holidays and the election of Majlis officials. He spoke of the conditions under which his Government came into power and of the difficulties which had arisen, especially over plans for internal reorganisation. The speed with which the Millspaugh problem was settled came in for special mention, and he stressed the fact that Millspaugh's departure had done nothing to impair relations between Persia and the United States. Persia's relations with the United States, one of her great Allies, were to-day, as always, based on established principles and there had been no change in their friendship and mutual understanding. In spite of rumours published by certain sections of the press, rumours which were spread in the hope of creating disunity between Persia and the Great Powers, the firm and full understanding with those Powers had not only been safeguarded but confirmed and strengthened. He repeated statements made in previous sessions of the Majlis about the rumoured arming of the tribes and the formation of a Tribal Union, and denied that there was any truth in the rumour that the Americans leaving Persia were destroying all the installations they had built or that they were dismantling such installations and shipping them out; no installation had ever been destroyed or removed, and negotiations for the transfer of such material had already been opened. He was happy to say that Persia's foreign policy was clear and that a perfect understanding with her Allies was enjoyed; any statement to the contrary

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could only be attributed to those ill-intentioned persons who wished to stir up troubled waters. It was the duty of all legislative powers in Persia and of the Government to work in the closest collaboration to ensure Persia's future in a manner worthy of her ancient civilisation and historical prestige, and conforming to the part played by Persia in the Allies' victory and the sacrifices she had borne. Bayat concluded his speech by requesting the House to judge between his Government and their opponents. A proposal made by Deputy Dashti that the vote of confidence in the Government should be taken was approved. Of the ninety-two members present only forty-five cast their votes in favour of Bayat, with three against and forty-three abstentions. The Prime Minister thanked the House and wished them success in the choice of a better Government. His Imperial Majesty the Shah has sent a message to the Majlis urging them to lose no time in choosing a successor and putting an end to the crisis.

2. The names of Ali Mansur (Mansur-ul-Mulk), C.B.E. (F.O. 126-M.A. 164), at present Governor-General of Khorassan, Mahmud Bader (F.O. 40-M.A. 51) and Fathullah Pakravan (F.O. 169-M.A. 208) have been mentioned as possible successors to Bayat. There are some grounds for belief, however, that the various Majlis factions have not been able to come to an agreement over the choice of one of these and may choose a nonentity incapable, either by past reputation or future activity, of incurring the displeasure of anyone.

3. The following names were announced in connexion with the Supreme Economic Council (see paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 15/45): The Prime Minister—honorary President; Dr. Moazzami—President; Imami—vice-President; Nasir Quli Ardelan—Secretary.

4. Fahimi, Minister without portfolio, has been charged with the preparation of a bill to amend Dr. Millspaugh's income tax law.

5. According to the Minister of Court, the Soviet Ambassador has complained about an attack by Persians on a Russian officer in Tabriz which resulted in his death, an assault by Persians on a party of Russian school children in Tabriz and the posting up of anti-Communist slogans on the walls at Isfahan.

Appointments.

6. Abdul Ahad Dara to be Persian Consul in Istanbul.
Jamshid Khabir to be Deputy Director of Department General of Supply.
Mustafa Quli Ram to be Director of the Road Transport Board, *vice* Muhammad Hussein Jehanbani resigned.

Resignations, Retirements.

7. Sartip Gulshayan, the late Military Governor of Tehran, suspended from his duties on account of the fracas outside the Majlis on the 6th March, has been placed *en disponibilité*.

Colonel Shahrasis, acting Military Governor of Tehran since the suspension of Sartip Gulshayan, has submitted his resignation to the Ministry of War.

Persian Army.

8. A battalion of approximately 300 strong has been moved from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr. They will take over the guarding of the port installations and stores at Fahliyah creek. This has been done at the request of His Majesty's Embassy, whose desire it is to see the Persian Government and Persian Army's authority re-established in areas where the British forces have been in occupation and also to bring home to the Persian Government a sense of their joint responsibilities, as Allies, for the safeguarding of our communications in Persia.

9. The Chief of the General Staff, General Arfa, is uneasy about the situation which will arise in the North when the Soviet troops are withdrawn. (He added parenthetically and gloomily, "if ever they do withdraw.") He envisages their stealing silently away overnight and then returning to "restore the situation," *i.e.*, to suppress the disorders which will have broken out at their instigation. To forestall this he is busy assembling and training a brigade to occupy Gurgan (where the Yamut Turcomans have come heavily under the influence of the Soviets) and a mechanised brigade which, plus the column ordered to stand fast near Bukan, will be required to occupy Azerbaijan.

Tehran, 22nd April, 1945.

[E 3370/70/34]

(6)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17, Secret, for the Period 23rd to 29th April, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 138 of 30th April; Received in Foreign Office, 25th May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

No successor to Bayat has been found and Persia still lacks a Government. H.I.M. the Shah has sent a further message urging the Deputies to come to a decision and deploring the lack of a Government at this critical period, when the war in Europe might end at any moment and Persia would be faced with the readjustment of her internal life.

2. A further batch of seven Persian internees has been liberated. Two military officers are included.

Economic.

3. The various sub-committees of the Supreme Economic Council (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary) have been selected. They are as follows:—

Finance: Bader, Muqbil, Sadiqi, Ardelan and Dr. Zanganeh.
Commerce: Wakili, Khosroshahi, Imami, Kooros and Namazi.
Industry: Amin, Farivar, Pannahi, Dr. Ittebar and Buzurgniya.
Agriculture: Adl, Dr. Shafaq, Mustaufi, Bayat and Bushehri.
Works: Dr. Moazzemi, Dr. Aghayan, Dr. Bahrami, Fateh and Dr. Namdar.

Appointments—Civil.

4. Muhammad Hajib Davallu, Persian Consul at Mosul, to be counsellor at the Persian Legation at Stockholm. He is a pleasant-mannered and honest man of about 45 years of age. He married, and was recently divorced from, the younger daughter of the late Baqir Azimi, under whom he served when the former was Persian Consul-General in Delhi. Davallu has since held posts in Rome and Istanbul.

Internal Security.

Fars.

5. A consular report states that Nasir Khan Qashgai will probably stay in Shiraz for the summer on account of ill-health and that his brothers Malik Mansur and Khosro will accompany the tribe to its summer grazing-grounds.

Khorassan.

6. Further acts of highway robbery are reported on the roads between Meshed and Fariman and near Tabas.

Mekran.

7. Six out of the seven brigands who were guilty of a highway robbery in November last and who were subsequently captured have been convicted by a military court and shot in Zahidan.

Isfahan.

8. No further demonstrations have been held. A Mill Council has been formed, consisting of owners, managers and foremen. If this body takes its duties seriously and looks after the welfare of the workers it should make for tranquillity in the labour situation and also undermine the influence of the Tudeh, which hitherto has treated labour disputes as a field for political manoeuvre more than a field in which they should work for reforms.

Financial.

9. The National Bank has been authorised to mint 200 million silver coins of various denominations.

British Military Interests.

10. An interesting summary of "Aid to Russia" cargoes carried across Persian roads is published as an appendix to this Summary. It was prepared in London.

Turkish Interests.

11. According to a press report, not yet confirmed from consular sources, the Turkish Consulate at Rezaieh has been raised to a consulate-general.

Russian Interests.

12. According to a press report, the Soviet military authorities have asked the Persian Government to appoint representatives to take over the port installations at Nau Shahr, which, owing to the decrease in Aid to Russia supplies, are no longer required by the Soviet military authorities. The terms of the transfer are not mentioned but, in any case, during the time of their occupation the Soviet military authorities have not made any considerable alterations or improvements to the port or its installations.

The Russian papers *Trud* and *Red Fleet* have published articles on Persia recently, based on information supplied by Tass Agency. The articles have violently attacked Seyyid Zia and accuse him of bringing about the fall of Bayat. The articles also warn Persia against "reactionary" tendencies.

Appendix.

Summary of the "Aid to Russia" Cargoes Transported by Road through Persia, in Metric Tons, October 1941 to September 1944, inclusive.

Names of Transport Agencies and Routes Operated.

British Army. (G.P.T. Coy.) Andimeshk/ Khanagah. Hamadan-Tabriz.	American Army. (M.T.S. of P.G.C.) Khorramshahr. Andimeshk-Kazvin.	U.K.C.C. Bushire/Andimeshk. Khanagah-Tabriz. Pahlevi-Nowshahr. Zahidan-Meshed. Quehan-Bajguiran.	Soviet Transportation. Bushire/Andimeshk. Khorramshahr/Raffadiah. Tehran-Nowshahr. Tabriz-Pahlevi.	Total.
40,964	393,740	628,024	319,438	1,382,166
3%	28.49%	45.4%	23.11%	100%

Notes.

1. The above figures are in respect of the forward (south to north) carrying only, i.e., "Aid to Russia" goods, and do not include stores transported by the various transport agencies for the maintenance of their "Aid to Russia" services or Persian Government supplies or petrol oil lubricants carried in East Persia.

2. The figures shown under Soviet Transportation represent the cargoes loaded and transported on the newly-assembled trucks, the driving and conveying of which were undertaken by the Soviet Transportation directorate. Where loads were carried on trucks assembled at the U.K.C.C. plant at Bushire and driven by U.K.C.C. drivers the tonnage has been included under U.K.C.C.

3. The low percentage, i.e., 3 per cent., of the G.P.T. Companies is due, amongst other things, to the fact that they operated for fifteen months only as against American army, twenty months; U.K.C.C., thirty-four months; and Soviet Transportation, twenty-four months.

[E 3171/70/34]

(7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18, Secret, for the Period 30th April to 6th May, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 145 of 7th May; Received in Foreign Office, 18th May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Deputies, having been unable to agree on any man of character, have elected a nonentity as Prime Minister in the person of Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim ul Mulk), an old deaf man who has played no important part in Persian politics for many years. In past history he was physician to Muzaffer ed Din Shah and was subsequently a Cabinet Minister in several Governments before Reza Shah's

reign. He is said to be honest and is known to be ineffective. He obtained sixty-four votes from the Deputies, Sadiq Sadiqi (Mustashar ed Douleh) (F.O. 193; M.A. 248), who was preferred by the Russians, finding twenty-four supporters. Rumours that Hakimi intends in the choice of the members of his Cabinet to give paramount consideration to the propitiation of the Soviet Embassy have already raised doubts in the minds of those who voted for him whether their choice was wise, and hopes of his having a stable majority are not high.

2. On the advice of His Majesty's Ambassador the Persian authorities decided to suspend for the 1st May the order forbidding public gatherings and demonstrations in Tehran since the professed object of the Tudeh party was to show their admiration for the Red army. The party was consequently allowed to hold a May Day procession on condition that orders given by the Military Governor to party leaders regarding the route to be followed and the avoidance of offensive slogans were obeyed. A crowd of 4,000-6,000 men and women was collected for the occasion, mostly Armenians, Assyrians, refugees of some years ago from Russia and Turks from Azerbaijan. The proceedings were entirely orderly.

Economic.

3. The personnel of the commissions which according to the Statutes of the Supreme Economic Council—see appendix to Summary No. 15/1945—are to be charged with responsibility for studying and reporting to the Supreme Council on questions connected with finance, agriculture, labour and commerce have now been appointed. The presidents of the commissions in the above order are Mahmud Bader (F.O. 40; M.A. 51); Ahmad Hussein Adl; Dr. Aghayan and Mohammad Mehdi Nimazi.

Appointments—Military.

4.—(i) Sarhang Ahmed Vusuq to command the 8th (Khorassan) Division *vice* Sarhang Khodadad, relieved.

(ii) Sarhang Seyyid Hussein Hashimi Ha'iri to command the Independent Mechanised Brigade (Tehran).

(iii) Sarhang Keihan to be head of the Army Transport Department *vice* Sartip Atapur, resigned.

Internal Security.

Western Azerbaijan.

5. Disturbing reports are reaching the Persian authorities regarding the situation in Mahabad. It has already been reported in Summaries No. 12/1945, paragraph 11, and No. 14/1945, paragraph 15, that a column of Persian troops, which the Government had despatched with a view to establishing their authority in Mahabad, had been stopped by the Soviet military authorities. Recent reports say that there is intensified propaganda for Kurdish independence; that the local Kurdish leader, Qazi Muhammad, is enlisting Kurds for the Independent Kurdish army; that funds are being collected; that a pageant had been staged showing Kurdistan delivered from bondage by the Russians; and that a Kurd named Samadoff had recently arrived from the Caucasus to encourage the movement. These reports are possibly exaggerated, but there is little doubt that there is some truth in them—unfortunately, because they serve to embitter the attitude of the Persian authorities towards the Kurds in general. According to a circumstantial report received by the Persian Government, the Soviet Consul from Rezaieh recently visited Mahabad and promised full Russian support to the movement for Kurdish independence. The truth of this requires confirmation. Some reports say that the movement is spreading to the Herki, the Shakkah, the Mangur, the Dehbukri and the Mamish, and that the only chief of Northern Kurdistan on whose loyalty the Persian Government can rely is Quraini Agha of the Mamish. The tribes of Southern Kurdistan have as yet shown no sign of being seriously affected.

Eastern Azerbaijan.

6. A few days ago the Soviet Ambassador informed the Persian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that, unless the Persian authorities began within five days the disarmament of the Shahsavan tribes of the Ardebil district and of the "brigands" of Mianeh, the Soviet military authorities would undertake the operation themselves. The Shahsavan tribes are anti-Russian, and their

principal chief in the Ardebil area, Sardar Nusrat, has recently been taking vigorous action against agents of the Tudeh party who have ventured into the tribal territory. By the "brigands" of the Mianeh district the Soviet Ambassador means the followers of Salar Muzaffer, a prominent landowner who has also recently been hunting Tudeh agents from his district. The reply given to the ambassador is said to have been that the Persian troops would be instructed to begin disarmament operations in the towns of Mianeh and Ardebil (where, according to the Chief of the General Staff, Tudeh sympathisers have been issued with arms by the Russians), and that further operations would be carried out in accordance with the Government's general programme in which the disarmament of the Kurds of Mahabad had priority.

Kuhigalu.

7. Abdullah Khan Zarghampur appears to have made good use of the re-establishment of correct relations with the Persian authorities that followed on his submission, reported in Summary No. 13, paragraph 8, to convert the responsible Persian Army commander, General Humayuni, to a belief in his (Abdullah's) virtues and in the unreliability of all the Kuhigalu chiefs lately opposed to him—Hussein Quli Rustami, Khosrow Zarghampur, Muhammad Hussein Taheri and Malik Mansur Bashti, who were, until the submission of Abdullah, strongly supported by General Humayuni. The latter is now accusing them of preparing to create trouble at the instigation of agents of the Tudeh party, who have, it is true, recently visited Behbahan and Hussein Quli Rustami of the Mamassani. He has suggested that Abdullah Khan should be used to arrest Khosrow and disarm his followers. The Chief of the General Staff has expressed to General Humayuni his surprise at this sudden change of attitude and has asked for more precise information to justify it. It is unlikely that this will be forthcoming.

Russian Affairs.

8. About a dozen persons of the landowning class of Mianeh in Azerbaijan were recently deported to Tabriz by the Soviet military authorities, their crime apparently being opposition to the Tudeh party. Some have since been allowed to return to Mianeh.

9. The incidents at Tabriz of which the Soviet Ambassador, as reported in Summary No. 16/1945, paragraph 5, had complained—with good cause—turned out to be an assault by Persian policemen on a Russian in civilian clothes, who, however, was not killed, and a much more serious incident where it is alleged an assault was made by seven Persian civilians on two Russian youths and a Russian girl of 15 was raped. The suspected assailants in the latter case were arrested by the Persian authorities, but the Russians insisted on their being handed over to them and they are still in Russian custody.

10. In the course of an obviously inspired article in one of the Persian papers subsidised by the Russians commenting on a suggestion made in an article in the *Washington Post* to the effect that Russia did not really need Persian oil the statement is made that Russia certainly requires more oil since she wishes to conserve her own oil supplies for the needs of national defence and "military economy," for the supply of the European market, particularly in the Balkans and possibly of the French and Italian fleets. Her home consumption was increasing; Russia was relying in increasing degree on mechanised agriculture. The oil of North Persia would be transported via the Volga to Central Russia for internal consumption.

Chinese Affairs.

11. The Chinese Minister, Mr. Li Tieh-tseng, has returned to Persia after an absence of two months and will shortly present new letters of credence on his elevation to the rank of ambassador.

[E 3434/70/34]

(S)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19, Secret, for the period 7th to 13th May, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 149 of the 14th May, 1945; Received in Foreign Office, 28th May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The following Cabinet has been presented to the Majlis:—

Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior: Ibrahim Hakimi.

Foreign Affairs: Anushirwan Sepahbudi (F.O. 205—M.A. 282).

War: Ibrahim Zand.

Health: Dr. Ismail Marzban (Amin-ul-Mulk) (F.O. 128).

Agriculture: Nasrullah Khalatbari (Ittela-ul-Mulk).

Finance: Abdul Hussein Hajir (F.O. 79—M.A. 104).

Roads and Communications: Nadir Arasteh.

Commerce and Industry: Abul-Qasim Najm (F.O. 156—M.A. 192).

Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnama.

Ministers without portfolio:—

Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet (Nasr-ul-Mulk) (F.O. 107—M.A. 140).

Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Sultaneh) (F.O. 1—M.A. 1).

Justice: Dr. Khushbin (Acting).

Posts and Telegraphs: Not yet appointed.

The selection appears to have been mainly on a desire to appoint Ministers with no political bias or convictions. It is, consequently, not remarkable that with a few exceptions they are colourless. Hajir is able, but will be obstructed by the Russians and the Tudeh. Sepahbudi was recently ambassador in Turkey. Khalatbari has for years suffered from senile decay and has been long in retirement. Najm, who is now ambassador at Kabul, is expected to refuse his appointment. Rahnama is a new-comer to political life. He is a professor of mathematics and vice-chancellor of the university. The Minister for Justice is likely to be offered to Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 198—M.A. 253), who is now at the San Francisco Conference.

2. The Cabinet has already come in for much criticism, and prophecies about the length of its life are gloomy. It meets with the approval of no group in the Majlis, and it is unlikely that it will command a sufficiently stable majority to enable it to undertake any effective measures of government. The parliamentary groups that combined against Bayat and later to elect Hakimi have fallen apart again, and dissensions have appeared even within individual groups. There is some talk of forming a group in the Majlis to be openly associated with and called by the name of the party that Seyyid Zia has recently formed outside the Majlis—the Iradeh-i-Milli. The small Tudeh group still remains unique in having some party discipline and in following a consistent programme, and in opposition to alleged sympathisers with Seyyid Zia or with the British it can, in certain circumstances, count on the support of an increasing number of Deputies who for reasons of private interests find it advisable to court Russian favour.

3. Persia celebrated the victory of herself and her Allies over Germany with restrained elation. A salute of 101 guns was fired; Government buildings were ordered to display the flags of the United Nations; bands played martial music in the public squares; but on the whole the population of Tehran was apathetic. In the Shah's broadcast to the Persian people, in the speeches made in the Majlis by the Prime Minister and the Speaker the great part played by Persia in the victory was given due prominence. When the hour was darkest for the Allies Persia, it was claimed, threw her weight on their side by declaring war on the Axis. Even before that she had, at great sacrifices to the Persian people, placed her roads, railways and communications at their disposal. How greatly then should she be rewarded by her grateful Allies. The Shah has already called attention to the great services rendered by the Iranian State Railways by conferring on the Railway Administration the Order of Merit.

Economic.

4. The policy for the collection of this year's harvest has now been approved by the Economic Council. Substantial reductions are to be made in the price at which grain will be purchased by the Government; the number of buying centres is to be greatly reduced; and Government will not buy grain

in deficit areas (of which the Tehran district is the most important). Purchases of barley will be limited to those made by the Ministry of War and the gendarmerie for forage. All indications are that, provided serious damage by locusts can be prevented, the harvest should produce a considerable surplus over the requirements for internal consumption.

5. Locusts have appeared along the Persian Gulf littoral, notably at Bushire and Bandar Abbas, and at Birjand, Kerman and in the Farrashband and Lar districts of Fars. In the north they have appeared at Gorgan and on the Moghan steppe. In all these areas control measures of varying degrees of efficiency are being taken, in the south with the assistance of British, and in the north of Russian experts.

6. There is now a weekly air service, once each way, between Tehran and Bushire calling at Isfahan and Shiraz, operated by de Havilland Rapide or Dominie machines, the property of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

Appointments—military.

7. (i) Sarhang Sarimi to command the 11th (Saqqiz) Brigade;
(ii) Sarhang Kamal to be Officer Commanding Gendarmerie in Kermanshah.

Internal Security.

Kuhigalu.

8. It is reported that the rival Boir Ahmadi chiefs, Abdullah Zarghampur and his half-brother Khrosrow, have signed an agreement which may for a time eliminate one of the possible causes of trouble in that turbulent area.

Russian Interests.

9. The Tudeh press has been voicing Russian displeasure with the Persian delegates at San Francisco who dared to vote in opposition to Russia in favour of the Argentine being invited to the conference. They, it says, are obviously merely tools in the hands of certain Great Powers. The campaign against Seyyid Zia and his "masters" continues without pause. Shameless attempts are being made to intimidate by threats the Court of Justice which is to try an action for defamation brought by Seyyid Zia against one of the Tudeh papers.

10. The May Day celebrations of the Tudeh party in Meshed went on for two days. Mounted Russian officers and about sixty soldiers with Tommy-guns were on duty in the streets for the protection of party members.

11. Recent manoeuvres by British troops in the area Behbahan—Gach Saran, during which a number of the chiefs of Kuh-i-Galu and Mamassani were entertained by General Lochner, have, as was to be expected, aroused the suspicious curiosity of the Russians. The Russian vice-consul and two members of the Ahwaz Consulate recently visited Behbahan and Gach Saran where, since Persians will usually tell the kind of tale that they think will be welcome to their visitor, they have doubtless collected much information to confirm their suspicions of British encouragement of tribal chiefs in their desire to return to an autonomous and feudal tribal system and of British support for the establishment of unity among the tribes of the south, to be used one day against the Tudeh party and Russian interests, and perhaps even the distribution of arms to the tribes.

French Interests.

12. M. Herriot has arrived in Tehran from Moscow and imprisonment in Germany. The Persians were at some pains to do him honour and to express to him their attachment to France in terms of fulsome flattery. M. Herriot's replies were highly pleasing to Persian vanity.

Turkish Interests.

13. A Turkish commercial mission has arrived in Tehran to investigate the prospects of trade between Persia and Turkey and more particularly the purchase of Persian tobacco.

Vatican Interests.

14. Mgr. Marina has relinquished the appointment of Papal representative in Persia.

Tehran, 13th May, 1945.

[E 3796/70/34]

(9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20, Secret, for the Period 14-27th May, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 172 of 28th May; Received 5th June.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. More than a fortnight has passed since the Cabinet was presented to the Majlis and it is not yet known whether it will stay or fall. On the 14th May the Prime Minister announced his programme—the consolidation of friendly relations with Persia's allies, based on the Tripartite Treaty, the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of Tehran; revision of taxes; attention to economic problems and to agricultural reforms; reform of the security forces; improvement of conditions for workers and peasants. Since then the Deputies have resorted to various tricks to postpone the taking of a vote on the programme. The Tudeh party declared its opposition to the Government as a matter of principle, since it did not stand for that radical reorganisation of society which the party desired to see. All its representatives in the Majlis and some ten to twelve other members notified their intention to speak against the Government's programme; and these speeches, alternating with those of supporters of the Government, have filled up the last ten days. In addition to the Tudeh representatives there are many Deputies who are not content with the Government. They are chiefly interested in having in the Ministries of War and Interior Ministers who can be induced to secure their re-election, and they do not see in the present Cabinet those with the necessary qualities. They are therefore attempting to reconcile their divergent views as to a suitable alternative to Hakimi as Prime Minister and to make up a coalition of groups that will form a majority in the Majlis. It seems that at best Hakimi can hope for only a small majority and it is doubtful whether in the circumstances he will be willing to continue in office.

2. There is a very prevalent demand that, now that the war with Germany is over and Persian communications are no longer required for the transport of munitions to Russia, Allied troops should evacuate Persian territory. In his speech introducing the Government's programme the Prime Minister expressed the hope that the Allies would substitute more normal relations for those based on the Tripartite Treaty, and other speakers defined this more precisely as a hope that Allied troops would leave the country. The same hope is expressed over and over again in the press, combined very frequently with a demand for the release of the remaining internees.

3. One of the numerous political parties in Persia—the Adalat, a party with a programme of reform by persuasion, opposed to the Tudeh because of its Russian connexion, staged a demonstration on the 18th May to celebrate the Allied victory and also to demand the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops and the release of the *détenus*. The meeting was broken up by an attack staged—there is little doubt—by the Tudeh party. One of the Adalat party was killed and several injured by bricks thrown by the attackers, with whom the police made no attempt to interfere. For their inactivity the Government is largely to blame since, at Russian insistence, they suspended the Chief of the Isfahan police for taking action against Tudeh rioters. Subsequently, some eight arrests were made. It is reported that the Soviet Ambassador made a strong verbal protest against the matter of the withdrawal of Allied troops being allowed to be made the subject of a popular demonstration.

4. In the speeches of the Tudeh members in opposition to the Government attacks were made on the whole of the present social system, on the present direction of the army (although the Tudeh supports a strong national army, politically educated), on the servants of the imperialists and on the alleged support by the reactionaries of the feudal tribal system. The usual accusation was made that the tribes were being supplied with arms in the interests of imperialism. Better relations and a new treaty with Russia were advocated. Seyyid Zia came in for much abuse, and on several successive days his supporters organised demonstrations in his favour at the entrance of the Majlis.

5. Seyyid Zia's party—the Iradeh i Milli—is increasing in numbers, activity and, perhaps, prestige. It is preparing to open up branches in the towns of the South, wherever the Tudeh has branches. Attempts are being made to bring about a reconciliation between Seyyid Zia and the Shah, whose relations have been embittered by the incessant criticism of the Shah and the Court in

the newspaper *Rad i Imruz*, whose editor, Muzaffar Firuz, a Qajar prince very hostile to the Shah on account of the murder of his father, Prince Nusrat ed Douleh, by Reza Shah, was one of Seyyid Zia's earliest and most ardent supporters. Seyyid Zia is now reported to have broken with Muzaffar Firuz since he considers that the forces of resistance to Russian penetration should not be dissipated by attacks on the Crown.

6. Dr. Musaddiq has again been in trouble with his fellow members of the Majlis. Not content with calling them a pack of thieves he accused them of doing nothing for the country and hinted that the country would be better without them. This provoked some reaction since it is known that Dr. Musaddiq is in close contact with the Shah and that the Shah would gladly be relieved of this troublesome Parliament.

7. A personality note on the Prime Minister, Hakimi, is attached as an appendix to this summary.

Economic.

8. The fall in prices that followed on the news of victory in Europe has not been maintained. Reports of world-shortages of commodities and of discord between Great Britain and Russia have caused prices to rise again.

9. Although the Persian financial year begins on the 22nd March the budget for the current year has not even been prepared, much less considered, by the Majlis. Consequently, all departments of the administration are living from hand to mouth with a complete absence of foresight, planning or provision.

10. The present population of Persia according to the estimate of the Persian Government is 16,549,837, but according to estimates made by British consular officers for their various districts the total is 12,975,600. The latter figure may be assumed to be nearer the correct number.

Appointments—Civil.

11.—(i) Hurmuz Qarib to be First Secretary at the Persian Embassy in Turkey.

(ii) Ali Akbar Furuhandi to be Second Secretary at the Persian Legation in Syria.

(iii) Ismail Usanlu (Mudir ud Dauleh) to be Farmandar of Meshed.

Retirements—Military.

12.—(i) Sartip Ghulam Ali Qadar—dismissed from the service for corruption.

(ii) Sartip Hussein Quli Setvate.

(iii) Sarhang Ali Yazdanfar—dismissed from the service.

(iv) Sarhang Majid Ghaffari.

(v) Sarhang Ahmad Tahir Niya.

Internal Security.

Isfahan.

13. The leader of the anti-Tudeh Labour Union of Isfahan was murdered by thugs of the Tudeh party on the 25th May. This followed on the return from Tehran to Isfahan of the Tudeh leader, Bahrampur. He brought a large sum of money, and his intention presumably was to endeavour to regain the ground recently lost by the Tudeh. He used the money to stir up Tudeh sympathisers and ruffians of the town. There had already been a fight between the Tudeh and their opponents on the 22nd May. The town is now being patrolled by Persian troops, and the Governor-General has recommended that a Military Governor should be appointed so that military law can be applied. The Chief of Police, a relatively efficient man, had been recalled to Tehran some time previously at the insistence of the Russians, who objected to action he had taken against Tudeh agitators. The acting Chief of Police is believed to be in Russian pay.

Fars.

14. Nasir Qashgai has sent to the Prime Minister and the Majlis an excited telegram protesting against the movement of Persian troops into Qashgai territory, apparently to garrison places that to some extent control the lines of migration. Nasir pretends to regard these moves as provocative, likely to alarm the tribes as to the intentions of Government and unjustified in view of the good order maintained by the tribes during their upward migration. It is true

that both the Qashgai and Khamseh tribes have moved from their winter to their summer quarters with unusually little disturbance to roads and villages. A minor incident has occurred between a section of the Qashgai tribe and the gendarmerie at Abadeh, which will not improve relations, when the gendarmerie attempted to force the Qashgai to drive to Shiraz sheep which they were taking for sale to Yazd. In the ensuing fracas the gendarmerie opened fire and killed some sheep.

Kurdistan.

15. It is reported from Kermanshah that early in April several important Kurdish chieftains from Iraq met representatives from the Persian Kurdish tribes of Kalkhani, Waladbegi and Qubadi to discuss plans for Kurdish independence. This meeting was followed by an anonymous petition to His Majesty's Consul complaining of the oppression of the Iraqi and Kurdish Governments, and urging the establishment of an independent Kurdistan to include the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, Persia and Turkey.

Russian Interests.

16. In commenting on rumours to the effect that present disagreements between Russia and Great Britain might lead to another war, one of the Russian-inspired Persian papers says that these rumours are being put about by persons interested in maintaining and increasing high prices. There was no possibility of Great Britain fighting Russia. In one stroke the Red army could sever the vital arteries leading from Great Britain's oil supplies in Persia and Iraq.

17. A Society for the Promotion of Cultural Relations between the Armenians of Julfa (Isfahan) and Soviet Armenia has been organised in Julfa. An extract from a message to Stalin from the people of Soviet Armenia published in the Russian press of the 17th May is not without interest in this connexion. It reads, "This is why our blood brothers abroad, whose lot continues to be bitter and heavy, look with so much admiration on our great advancements, meet with such love from Soviet Azarbaijan and accept with such gratitude the many-sided help afforded them by the Soviet Union." The new Archimandrite of the Julfa see has returned to Armenia for a short visit. His Majesty's Consul reports that although outwardly he abstains from expressing political views, in secret he encourages the Tudeh party.

18. An eminent Moslem priest from Soviet Russia, styled by the Persian press the Sheikh ul Islam of the Caucasus, has arrived in Tabriz and is to visit Qum and Meshed. The object of his visit may be to convince the Persian priesthood that Soviet principles are not injurious to Islam.

19. India has been given some attention lately not only in Russian papers such as *The War and the Working Class*, but also on similar lines in the Russian-inspired Persian press. The theme generally is: How can it be said that victory has brought freedom while the people of India and Africa are captive and enslaved?

Polish Interests.

20. The number of civilian Polish refugees still remaining in Persia on the 6th May was—

	<i>Men, Women and Children.</i>
In Tehran	1,793
In Isfahan	938
In Ahwaz	1,131
	<hr/> 3,862

Iraqi Interests.

21. Abbas Mehdi Beg, Iraqi Minister in Persia, has left Tehran on relinquishment of his appointment.

Swiss Interests.

22. M. Eduard Bavier has arrived in Tehran as Swiss Chargé d'Affaires in relief of M. Daeniker who is returning to Switzerland.

Turkish Interests.

23. The Turkish Economic Mission has now left Persia. As far as is known it achieved little definite result.

24. Kamal Kupurlu, the newly-appointed Turkish Ambassador to Persia, has arrived in Tehran.

American Interests.

25. According to the Persian press Brigadier-General Besson of the Persian Gulf Command was presented with a decoration by the Shah in appreciation of his collaboration with the Persian authorities in the operation of the Persian railways. Brigadier-General Besson has now left Persia.

26. Mr. Leyland Morris, American Ambassador to Persia, has left Tehran on relinquishing his appointment.

Tehran, 27th May, 1945.

Appendix to Enclosure.

Dr. Ibrahim Hakimi, Hakim al Mulk.

Short biographical note.

An Azarbaijani, with long official experience, aged about 72. Deaf. Highly respectable but of very weak character. Was Court Physician in Qajar times as was his father before him. Claims to have been bearer of the hubble bubble to the last of the Qajars. Associated before the invasion of Persia with Qavam, Yazdanpanah, Mustasharu'd-Daula and Vusuqu'd-Daula in pro-German intrigues but apparently less deeply implicated. Speaks French.

Lived in retirement throughout Reza Shah's reign. Member of former Democrat party, and now belongs to Taraqqi, a small party or group which has existed for some years past.

Deputy in first Majlis 1908. Minister of Finance 1910 and 1911. Minister of Education in seven different Cabinets between 1914 and 1920. Minister for Foreign Affairs January 1922. Assistant Prime Minister to Qavam August 1942 and Minister without portfolio February 1943. On National Bank Advisory Council in March 1943.

Appointed Prime Minister 2nd May, 1945, chiefly because all other candidates were opposed by one faction or another in the Majlis.

[E 4117/76/34]

(10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 21, Secret, for the Period 28th May to 3rd June, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 185 of 4th June. Received in Foreign Office, 13th June.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

SPEECHES in the Majlis during the week have been concerned very little with the programme or qualities of the Government but almost entirely with propaganda for and against the Tudeh party. The speakers against the Government, and indeed some of those nominally for the Government, were the Tudeh members and their sympathisers, and they made good use of their opportunity to attack the many prevailing abuses, the present ruling classes and their alleged one-sided policy in foreign affairs. Some spirited rejoinders were made by their opponents. The debate, however, did not materially affect the views of the Deputies about the Government. The opposition of the Tudeh party and of those who from consideration of their personal interests feel bound to vote in accordance with the party dictates was certain. The fate of the Government depended on whether a sufficient number of the other Deputies would agree that a different Government would give them a better chance of re-election. That, it seems, was their conclusion, for when the vote was taken on the 3rd June only a small number supported the Government. It could not be contended that it was a good Government, but it fell not on its demerits but because the majority of the Deputies, who had themselves chosen Hakimi as Prime Minister, failed to

induce him to appoint Ministers to their liking to the Cabinet posts that can exert great influence on the elections. Their obvious lack of concern for anything but their personal interests has further discredited the Majlis and strengthened the hands of those, notably the Shah and the Russians, who would like to see it dissolved.

2. The Persian Government has addressed notes to the British, Russian and American Embassies requesting the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia, since with the end of the war in Europe the reasons for which those troops entered Persia no longer exist. The announcement that His Majesty's Government were giving sympathetic consideration to this request has given pleasure and raised hopes. The question of withdrawal has figured large in the press and Majlis debates. Claims are made that even if the treaty does allow British troops to remain in Persia until six months after the end of the war with Japan Russian troops have no justification for remaining, since Russia is not at war with Japan, and that Allied troops have no longer legal claim to the rights as regards censorship and the use and control of aerodromes, means of communication, &c., which they have enjoyed by virtue of article 3 of the Tripartite Treaty, since that article refers only to the Allies' undertaking to defend Persia against aggression and Persia is in no fear of aggression from Japan.

3. The Soviet Ambassador recently informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the Soviet Government was opposed to the continued detention of the internees and he asked for the views of His Majesty's Government. But unable to resist making political capital at the expense of His Majesty's Government, Soviet officials did not delay to let it be known that the internees were now being detained solely to please the British. It had, in fact, already been decided that a number might be released, and that only those previously associated with the Japanese or known to be fundamentally hostile to the British need be detained.

Economic.

4. The financial year March 1944–March 1945 ended up with a deficit in the Government's finances of 462 million rials. Ordinary revenue was 3,924 million rials and commercial revenue 3,459 million rials. Ordinary expenditure totalled 3,844 million rials and commercial expenditure 4,001 million rials. The deficit for the previous year (1943–44) was 1,052 million rials.

Army.

5. General Razmara, the previous chief of the General Staff, is being put on trial, on a charge of accepting a bribe from a tribal leader, much to the delight of his successor, General Arfa, to whom he is a dangerous rival.

*Internal Security.**General.*

6. Remarkably few incidents of tribal lawlessness have been reported in recent weeks from the tribal areas of South and West Persia. This is probably due to a variety of causes: improved economic conditions, less provocation by Persian officials, in a few areas better security measures, and the conversion of some tribal leaders to the belief that at the present time good behaviour is the best policy for the tribes.

Isfahan.

7. A large number of arrests—some reports say as much as a hundred—have been made in connexion with the murder of the anti-Tudeh Labour leader reported in Summary No. 20/45, paragraph 13. No further disturbances have occurred although the instigators of the murder are still at large.

Western Azerbaijan.

8. The situation at Mahabad is still very obscure. Even the Persian authorities have little information that is reliable. There is undoubtedly a movement for Kurdish independence, known as the J.K. Society, which according to Kurdish sources receives its inspiration from Iraq. There is little doubt, too, that the Russians are giving some encouragement to this movement. There is some competition for members, however, between the J.K. Society and the Tudeh party which the Russians may find it difficult to reconcile. The Kurds are generally hostile to the Tudeh whose principles are contrary to their religious ideas and to their tribal system.

[31729]

F 2

Russian Interests.

9. The Russian-inspired Persian press has, now that Russia is no longer being supplied with petrol from Abadan, begun the expected campaign against the A.I.O.C. with the object of fostering discontent among Persian workers. The strike at Kermanshah, reported in paragraph 14, is its first success. The justice of the Persian claim to Bahrein and the iniquity of the continued detention of the internees are also being pressed in some of these papers.

10. The Soviet Government recently invited a party of Persians to Baku to attend a celebration of the 25th anniversary of the "independence" of the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, and on their return to Tehran the House of Culture (V.O.K.S.) held a reception to give other Persians the opportunity of being impressed by their sycophantic descriptions of their experiences.

11. The Soviet Ambassador is pressing the Persian Government to send a battalion of Persian troops to Mahabad. This battalion must, however, come from Tabriz; it must not be replaced, so leaving Tabriz with no troops other than one battalion of 400 semi-trained recruits. To the protest that it would be unwise to despatch to Mahabad, occupied and surrounded by armed Kurds, so small a force as 400 infantry soldiers, the ambassador replied that the Soviet authorities would guarantee their safety. It looks as if the Russians wished to reduce the Persian garrison in Tabriz and have a Persian battalion interned by the Kurds at Mahabad as the small Persian garrison is practically interned at Rezaieh. The refusal of the Russians to allow the Persian Government to send an adequate force to Mahabad has been referred to in Summary No. 18/45 and previous Summaries.

American Interests.

12. The Persian Gulf Command will cease to operate the Persian Railway at the end of June. The Persian authorities are taking over by stages and by the end of the month they will be in full control of the railway from Tehran to Ahwaz and Bandar Shahpur.

13. Mr. Wallace Murray has arrived in Tehran as American Ambassador.

British Interests.

14. There has been a general strike of Persian employees of the Kermanshah Petroleum Company, instigated by agents of the Tudeh party. Some of the strikers have already gone back to work.

Tehran, 3rd June, 1945.

[E 4314/70/34]

(11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period 4th June to 10th June, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 193 of 11th June. Received 20th June.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. A majority of the Deputies has chosen Seyyid Muhsin Sadr (Sadr-ul-Ashraf) (F.O. 194-M.A. 249) for appointment as Prime Minister, and he has been charged by the Shah with the formation of a Government. He is already in difficulties with the Deputies over the selection of his Ministers. In the session of the Majlis held to elect a Prime Minister he was supported by 60 of the 67 members present, but his supporters are already at loggerheads with each other regarding the choice of Ministers for the Ministries of the Interior and of War, the Ministries that have most influence on the elections. Consequently he has not yet been able to present the Cabinet to Parliament. It is understood that he has decided to retain Anushirwan Sepabbudi as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nadir Arasteh as Minister of Roads and Communications, and to include Mahmud Bader (F.O. 40-M.A. 51), Abdul Hussein Hajhir (F.O. 79-M.A. 104), Dr. Said Malek (Lughman-ul-Mulk).

The Tudeh party has already declared itself to be in opposition, and another thirty Deputies are unlikely to support the Government whatever its

composition. While the Deputies are concerned almost entirely with attempting to secure their re-election the business of administration is falling into serious arrears. The budget for the current year has not yet been discussed; the control of economic affairs is in abeyance and there are many important questions for decision, notably the arrangements to be made for the financing of the railway when it passes to the control of the Persian administration, and British contributions to make up the difference between revenue and expenditure cease on the 1st July.

2. The desire for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Persia continues to be widely expressed. Even the Tudeh press supports what it must realise to be the genuine wish of all politically-minded classes. But it stresses the necessity for a complete withdrawal. It is perhaps affected by the arguments put forward in some quarters that even if the British have some justification for staying the Russians have none. The Russians probably feel safe in advocating complete withdrawal, having good cause to expect that the British intend to remain in Khuzistan at least.

3. All internees have now been released with the exception of fourteen. For this the Minister for Foreign Affairs has gained some much-needed credit.

Economic.

4. Discussions to settle the details of the transfer of the railway south of Tehran to the Persian administration and the amount of rolling stock to be handed over by the British and Americans have been held and the decisions reached await confirmation by the Governments concerned. The Persian administration begins to take over on the 18th June. The Americans have agreed to allow a number of their technical staff to remain to help the Persians in the transition period. The present financial arrangement whereby the British Government makes good the difference between revenue and expenditure ceases to be effective on the 30th June. Some economy can be effected by a reduction of staff, now considerably in excess of the requirements of normal Persian traffic, but even then a considerable increase in freight rates will be necessary if revenue is to balance costs. And the discharge of a large number of employees will swell the ranks of the unemployed and the Tudeh party.

British Interests.

5. The employees of the Kermanshah Petroleum Company have returned to work with the exception of some 350 who, having been absent for a week, were dismissed in accordance with the ordinary rules of the company. The Tudeh press, which had been inciting the employees, made a sudden *volte-face*, perhaps realising that the strike was doomed to failure, and the official organ of the Tudeh labour organisation published a statement to the effect that the strike had not had its prior approval and that in view of the necessity for not hindering the prosecution of the war against Japan it should be ended as soon as possible.

Russian Interests.

6. It seems that the Persian authorities made some pretence of complying with the Russian demand, reported in Summary No. 18/45, paragraph 6, that the Shabsavan tribes of the Ardebil district and the "brigands" (i.e. the landlords) of Mianeh (both areas where Tudeh agitators had been meeting with rough treatment) should be disarmed. The gendarmerie collected five rifles from Mianeh, and a military detachment was sent to the Shabsavan camps to search for rifles. It found none. But the Russians trumped up a charge of harbouring deserters against the Shabsavan chief, Amir Arslan, and insisted on his removal to Tabriz.

7. The two Persian policemen accused of assault on a Russian civilian—see Summary No. 18/45, paragraph 9—have been sentenced by Persian military court to imprisonment for several months. The Persians accused of assault and rape against Russian students are still in Russian custody.

Tehran, 10th June, 1945.

[E 4636/70/34]

(12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period 11th June to 17th June, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 204 of the 18th June; Received in Foreign Office, 29th June.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE new Cabinet, composed as under, was presented to the Shah on the 12th June:—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior: Seyyid Muhsin Sadr (Sadr-ul-Ashraf).

Ministers without portfolio: Mustafa Adl⁽¹⁾ (Mansur-es-Sultaneh); Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet⁽¹⁾ (Nasr-ul-Mulk).

Finance: Mahmud Bader (F.O.40—M.A.51).

Justice: Amanullah Ardalan (F.O.27—M.A.33).

Industry and Mines: Abbas Quli Gulshayan.

Public Health: Dr. Sa'ed Malek (Lughman-ul-Mulk).

Posts and Telegraphs: Ahmad Etebar.

War: Ibrahim Zand⁽¹⁾.

Foreign Affairs: Anushirwan Sipahbudi⁽¹⁾.

Agriculture: Dr. Nakhai.

Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema⁽¹⁾.

All the above have at one time or another in the past been Cabinet Ministers, Gulshayan not since Feroughi's Cabinet. He was Mayor of Tehran in 1944.

2. The Cabinet has not yet been presented to the Majlis. The Opposition, which consists of the eight Tudeh representatives and some thirty other Deputies led by Dr. Musaddiq, by absenting themselves from the Majlis have ensured that the necessary quorum was not present, some of the Deputies of the majority coalition being absent from Tehran. The Shah also, although he authorised Sadr to form a Cabinet, is known to be intriguing against him, and it is probably due to his influence that Etebar and Ardalan have already resigned. The Shah's opposition is mainly due to pique and a desire to get even with the majority of the Deputies for having rejected Hakimi's Cabinet which included some Ministers of his own choice. The Deputies of the Opposition, but not including the Tudeh representatives, have issued a manifesto announcing their intention to obstruct the Government by all means in their power, since they believed that Sadr had not the qualities necessary for the solution of the problems facing the Government nor did he command the confidence of the people. The Tudeh party had previously announced their opposition. The Prime Minister is being vigorously abused by all the press under Russian influence, history of nearly forty years ago being raked up to provide charges against him. Representatives of the majority and minority groups have met and are to meet again to attempt to solve the deadlock. It is understood that the minority, less the Tudeh Deputies, have stated that they will support a Cabinet formed by any of the following, but by no other: Sadiq (Mustashar-ed-Douleh), Bayat, Hakimi or Sepahbudi. The Tudeh Deputies object to Hakimi and wish to include Qavam es-Sultaneh.

3. The increase of Russian influence in the Majlis is causing some alarm to those Deputies who have hitherto for various reasons opposed Russian transgressions and the Tudeh party because of its Russian direction. In addition to the eight Tudeh representatives there are now some twenty Deputies who will often vote in accordance with Russian instructions. The fear that this coalition inspires in the remaining hundred Deputies arises from their belief that it is supported, guided, inspired and disciplined to united action by the formidable Soviet and from a recognition of their own lack of unity, of leadership and of common purpose. The British, some of them think, should play a more active part—support their friends, threaten the wavering, bribe the needy, inspire and subsidise the press and give clear directives of policy. The British, they say, treat their friends no better than their enemies. The Russians reward their friends and murder their enemies—in Persian eyes a sensible and effective manner of acting.

⁽¹⁾ In previous Cabinet.

4. The Persian Government has issued invitations to the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, the United States, France, China, India, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey and Afghanistan to send representatives to attend a medical congress in Tehran. The date for the opening session was originally notified as the 23rd June, but it has been postponed until the 1st July. The Persians themselves have no great enthusiasm for this congress having enough sense to realise that nations still at war are not likely to send highly qualified representatives. The suggestion came from the Russians, and the Persians gave way to Russian pressure and insistence on an early date, the Russian object being apparently to ensure that they, being more conveniently situated, will make a better show than any other Power.

Economic.

5. The Road Transport Department, which was set up during Dr. Millsaugh's tenure of office to control the operation of motor transport imported for the Persian Government by the Allies or hired by the former, has now been dissolved. Control over the issue and use of tyres will be exercised by the newly-formed Tyre Control and Distribution Department.

Appointments—Military.

6. Sarhang Ahmad Baharmast to be Military Governor of Tehran.

Internal Security.

Isfahan.

7. For the time being the situation in Isfahan town is quiet. The murder of the anti-Tudeh leader Sarafian shocked public opinion and rallied it against the Tudeh. But if the Government shows weakness in proceeding against those implicated in the murder or in supporting the officials in Isfahan who have taken measures to preserve order it is likely that the Tudeh party will take heart. The public is disturbed by fears that they are already making plans to continue their campaign of intimidation and assassination.

Azərbayjan.

8. On the 6th June the unemployed of Tabriz paraded the streets carrying banners bearing slogans such as "We want bread and work," "What is the Government doing for us?" There was, however, no disturbance.

British Interests.

9. The statement recently made in the House of Commons by the Government spokesman to the effect that British interests in South Persia and the Persian Gulf would be safeguarded in all circumstances has given a great opportunity to the Russian-inspired Persian press and to other enemies of Great Britain to give colour to the accusations they have been making for some time of the sinister designs of British policy in South Persia, which are to be achieved through the arming and support of the tribes and the creation of autonomous provinces to be converted, as opportunity offers, into a British colony, however disguised. Moreover, the defence of British interests, these papers say, requires the suppression of all aspirations to freedom lest the British colony of India should be infected by the ideas of the liberty lovers of Persia.

Russian Interests.

10. A party of some twenty Russian soldiers has arrived in Isfahan for the ostensible purpose of erecting a monument to the Soviet airmen who were killed last year in a crash in Chahar Mahal. Persians, however, are unable to avoid connecting their presence with the desire of the Tudeh party to re-establish itself in Isfahan—see paragraph 7.

11. From several sources reports have been received that the Russians have increased the number of their troops in Azarbaijan, particularly along the Turkish border. These reports have not as yet been confirmed by any reliable source.

12. The Russians continue to prevent the despatch of recruits for the Persian army from Azarbaijan.

Iraqi Interests.

13. The press announces the appointment of Tahsin Qadri as Iraqi Minister in Persia.

Swedish Interests.

14. M. Sven Herald Poussette has vacated his post as Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Persia on his return to Sweden. Dr. Gunnar Jarring has assumed charge of the Swedish Legation.

Polish Interests.

15. M. Bader has vacated his post as Polish Minister in Persia on recall to London. M. Okonski has assumed charge of the Polish Legation.

Tehran, 17th June, 1945.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 4519/17/25]

No. 12.

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th June.)

(No. 104.)

Sir,

Jedda, 9th June, 1945.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 274 of the 1st June and relative correspondence relating to the Viceroy's visit to Ibn Saud, I have the honour to inform you that his Excellency, accompanied by Sir Evan Jenkins, private secretary, and Captain Henderson, aide-de-camp, arrived in Jedda by air from Cairo on the 3rd June. Conflicting reports from Egypt had left us in some doubt as to the expected time of arrival of the Royal Air Force Lodestar in which the Viceroy travelled. In the event, the party arrived rather in advance of the earlier of the times indicated; but, fortunately, the Emir Mansour was already at the airport to welcome his father's guest.

2. It is conventional to wear Arab clothes when travelling in the interior of Saudi Arabia, especially when visiting the King. I had suggested to Lord Wavell before he left Cairo that he should conform with this practice, and his willingness to do so gave great pleasure in this country. In the King's private apartments at the Khuzan Palace, where the visitors rested briefly before continuing their journey, a carnivalesque atmosphere of private theatricals reigned while *sirwals* and *thoba* were distributed and assumed, Arab cloaks draped, and white head-dresses fastened with a gold fillet. Breakfast, when it came, was more of a masquerade than a meal.

3. The King had made it clear that he expected me to accompany the Viceroy to Riyadh and, with your permission, I gladly did so, having ascertained that this would not inconvenience his Excellency. Lord Wavell invited the Emir Mansour to join his party in the Royal Air Force machine. I travelled in Ibn Saud's private aeroplane, which had been sent to Jedda to escort Lord Wavell on his flight across the desert. Before leaving, I was happy to present my staff, including the Indian Vice-Consul and the Indian medical officer in charge of the legation dispensary, to the Viceroy. Of the flight, which was remarkably bumpy, the less said the better.

4. We arrived at Buwaib, a landing ground some 50 kilom. from Riyadh, three and a half hours after leaving Jedda. There the Emir Khaled, various Court dignitaries, and a spare set of Arab robes sent by the King, awaited the Viceroy. Another hour and a half's drive brought us to Riyadh, where the Badia Palace had been organised for our stay. The Crown Prince, the Emir Saud, bade us welcome, and all hopes of a wash had to be postponed until after luncheon. It was by that time 4 o'clock in the afternoon. It was shortly before luncheon that I recorded my twentieth coffee of the day.

5. Audience with His Majesty had been arranged for 5 o'clock, and for this we proceeded to the huge Qasr al Murabba, some miles from our palatial guest-house. Ibn Saud's delight in welcoming the Viceroy was manifest, and though conversational exchanges on this first occasion were—except for an urgent enquiry whether Mr. Churchill would win the elections—limited to the formalities of courtesy, the happiest atmosphere of mutual regard and goodwill was instantly established. Your own greetings to the King, which Lord Wavell delivered, were much appreciated.

6. Dinner was served on the palace roof, an hour or so after the sunset prayer. It was a simple meal, as Royal banquets go, and blessedly short for those unexercised in oriental sedentary attitudes. For music we had the reed-like voices of five blind devotees, chanting the Koran on a near-by roof, and the drone of a distant water-wheel. For background, Ibn Saud's fantastic bodyguard, in their bravery of silks and gold. After dinner, rose-water and frankincense and perfumed oil were ceremoniously applied, and the King made the unusual gesture of conducting us to a point from which we could look down into his private wing of the palace. Then, having introduced a batch of about twenty of his sons, he settled down for a talk with the Viceroy.

7. His Majesty had asked me whether it would be incorrect to speak of official matters to Lord Wavell during his visit, and I had assured him to the contrary. What he, in fact, asked was that India should help to relieve the great shortage of consumer goods in this country, and that various purchases made by

two of his sons in a raid on India in 1943 should be licensed for export. Neither request is likely to commend itself to the Government of India, but Lord Wavell was good enough to say that he would see whether anything could be done.

8. The Viceroy then persuaded Ibn Saud to tell the story of his capture of Riyadh from the garrison of Ibn Rashid forty-odd years ago. His comments reminded the King that he had a field-marshal for an audience. "Soldiers always understand each other," His Majesty said; and he instructed the Emir Nasser, Governor of Riyadh, to show us, on our way home, the famous spear-point in the citadel door, and blood-stains, still startling on the wall, which remain from the night when young Abdel Aziz ibn Saud won the first of many desert victories.

9. The King's gifts were sent to the Viceroy and his party, including the Royal Air Force officers of his aeroplane, after they had returned to the Badia Palace. Lord Wavell's presents to Ibn Saud, which I took to him next day, included a beautifully illuminated manuscript of the Koran. "He could not have given me a gift more precious," the King remarked.

10. The Viceroy made an early start on the 4th June, as he had to join the Sunderland flying-boat at Bahrain at 9 a.m. I remained in Riyadh at the King's request. The Emir Khaled and Nasser accompanied Lord Wavell to Buwaib, to wish him Godspeed on their father's behalf.

11. The Viceroy's visit was, I think, a complete success. I fear that the circumstances of Arabian hospitality in June were occasionally arduous, but Lord Wavell took all discomforts in his stride and, if I may say so, matched the King's simplicity and natural dignity with his own. The establishment of immediately friendly relations was, perhaps, natural; but it was none the less pleasant to observe.

12. Some credit for removing the barriers of race and language must certainly go to Shaikh Izzedin Shawa, Director of Mines, Public Works and Transport in Jedda, who, at my suggestion, accompanied the party as interpreter when Mr. Mon, on doctor's orders, was unable to travel. Shaikh Izzedin Shawa, a Palestinian political exile and Cambridge graduate, reserves his anti-British mood for the Zionist problem. His interpreting was supple and impeccable.

13. I am reporting in a separate despatch such developments as occurred after the Viceroy's departure from Riyadh.

14. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 1737/1737/88]

No. 13.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th March.)

(35.)

Sir,

Beirut, 3rd March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in the Lebanon.

2. Owing to the political evolution of the Lebanon since the crisis of November 1943, many new personalities have come into prominence and it has therefore been found necessary virtually to rewrite the report furnished in June 1943.

3. In view of the large number of religious communities in the country, the report has been drawn up in two sections, the second dealing with the leading religious personalities of the different communities.

4. Riad-es-Solh's Government fell and the present Government was formed while these notes were being typed. It has, however, been found possible to bring up to date the notes on the members of the new Government who already appeared in the Personalities List. Separate notes on Wadi bey Naim and Dr. Nicholas Ghosn were enclosed in my despatch No. 7 of the 11th January. Alterations to the notes on members of the former Government will be found in an annex to the report. (1)

5. For the compilation of these notes I am indebted to the Political Officer, Beirut.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

(1) Alterations incorporated in main report in Foreign Office.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Index of Leading Personalities in the Lebanon.

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Khaled Abdel Khader. | 30. Omar Daouk. |
| 2. Aboud Bey Abdel Rezzek. | 31. Badr Dimishkieh. |
| 3. Mohammed Abdel Rezzek. | 32. Me. Emile Eddé. |
| 4. Me. Habib Abi Chahla. | 33. Mohamed el Fadel. |
| 5. Me. Joseph Abou Khater. | 34. Nassouh el Fadel. |
| 6. Me. Roukou Abou-Nader. | 35. Dr. Samih Fakhoury. |
| 7. Ashraf Abdab. | 36. Me. Hamid Frangieh. |
| 8. Ibrahim Ahdab. | 37. Pierre Gemayel. |
| 9. Amir Majid Arslan. | 38. Nicola Ghosn. |
| 10. Amir Rafik Arslan. | 39. Narsi Haddad. |
| 11. Ahmed el Assad. | 40. Ibrahim Haidar. |
| 12. Me. Taufiq (Toto) Awad. | 41. Subhi Haidar. |
| 13. Me. Ibrahim Azar. | 42. George Haimari. |
| 14. Amir Khalil Bellama. | 43. Sabri Hamadi. |
| 15. Dr. Raif Bellama. | 44. Sayed Ahmed el Hussein. |
| 16. Abdullah Beyhum. | 45. Aref Bey Ibrahim. |
| 17. Amin Beyhum. | 46. Sheikh Sayed Istephane. |
| 18. Mohammed Ali Beyhum. | 47. Sheikh Yusuf Istephane. |
| 19. Omar Beyhum. | 48. Joseph Karam. |
| 20. Salah Beyhum. | 49. Abdul Hamid Kerami. |
| 21. Me. Jawad Boulos. | 50. Rafaat Kazaoun. |
| 22. Me. Philippe Negib Boulos. | 51. Sheikh Farid el Khazen. |
| 23. Me. Camille Chamoun. | 52. Michel Khattar. |
| 24. Joseph Chamoun. | 53. Sheikh Béchara el Khoury. |
| 25. Yusuf Charbel. | 54. Kaban Issa Khoury. |
| 26. Amir Jemil Chehab. | 55. Sami el Khoury. |
| 27. Amir Khaled Chehab. | 56. Jamil Mikawi. |
| 28. Michel Chihha. | 57. Moussa Moubarek. |
| 29. Ahmed Daouk. | 58. Gabriel Murr. |

59. Alfred Naccache.
60. Adib Nahas.
61. Gibran Nahas.
62. Wadib Naim.
63. Me. Moussa Nammour.
64. Alfred Nasser.
65. Sulaiman Naufal, Colonel.
66. Muhieddin Nsouli.
67. Izzedin Omari.
68. Henri Pharaon.
69. Dr. Moustafa Rifai.
70. Amin Saad.
71. Me. George Sabbagha.
72. Ali Salam.
73. Saib Salam.
74. Joseph Salem.
75. Ramez Sarkis.

76. Alfred Skaf.
77. Riad es Solh.
78. Sami es Solh.
79. Dr. Ayoub Tabet.
80. Emile Tabet.
81. Georges Tabet.
82. Jacques Tabet.
83. Dr. Jamil Talhouk.
84. Salim Tayara.
85. Fozil Trabulsi, Lieut.-Colonel.
86. Habib Trad.
87. Me. Pierre (Petro) Trad.
88. Gibran Tuéni.
89. Me. Adel Usseyran.
90. Me. Abdullah Yafi.
91. Yusuf ez-Zain.

1. *Khaled Abdel Khader*.—A Sunni Moslem landowner and one of the leading Beys of the Akkar (North Lebanon); born 1896. Ex-Deputy and a supporter of Emile Eddé. Is actively engaged in smuggling. Unsuccessfully contested the 1943 elections.

2. *Aboud Bey Abdel Rezzek*.—A Sunni Moslem, born 1891. The principal Bey of the Akkar (North Lebanon) and the largest landowner in the Lebanon. A former Deputy and a supporter of Béchara el Khoury. A sly and crafty individual, whose sole interest is personal gain.

3. *Mohammed Abdul Rezzek*.—Son of No. 2. A Sunni Moslem, born 1904. Elected a Deputy for the second time in 1943 on Abdul Hamid Kerami's list, but has since turned against him. Secondary education and mediocre intelligence; would do anything to become Premier.

4. *Me. Habib Abi-Chahla*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer of Beirut, born 1903. Holds the Paris degree of Doctor of Law. Several times a Minister. Was formerly a supporter of Emile Eddé but broke with him before the 1943 election, in which he was successful. Vice-President and Minister of Justice and Education from 1943 to January 1945. Remained staunch to the Government in the crisis of November 1943. Able, energetic and superficially likable, but untruthful and venal; consequently not much respected; known as a sincere Nationalist.

5. *Me. Joseph Abou Khater*.—A Greek Catholic lawyer of Zahlé, born about 1905. Studied law in France. A leader of the anti-Skaf faction in Zahlé. Is extremely intelligent and ambitious and may have a political future if he becomes less mean and more accessible.

6. *Me. Roukos Abou-Nader*.—A Maronite lawyer of Beskinta, born 1883. Several times a Deputy and twice a Minister; supports Emile Eddé. Influential in the Metn district, but somewhat discredited on account of his exceptionally low morality.

7. *Ashraf Ahdab*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut. Born 1894. Has for some time been an official of the Lebanese Administration of the Finance Department. In November 1943 was made Director in succession to Nasri Haddad; Director-General in 1944. Honest and quiet, not particularly intelligent, does not mix in politics.

8. *Ibrahim Ahdab*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born in 1902. Was a contractor and engineer until appointed in February 1944, as Lebanese representative of the Council of the *Intérêts Communs*; failed in the elections of 1943. Honest and intelligent but indecisive.

9. *Amir Majid Arslan*.—A Druze from Shwaifat, born about 1908. Ex-Minister; a member of Béchara el Khoury's Constitutional party. The most influential of the Lebanese Druzes on account of his family name. Unlike most Arslans, has never been pro-Axis. Minister of Health, National Defence and Agriculture, September 1943-January 1945. During the crisis of November 1943 headed a resistance group in the mountains. A cheerful, uneducated and highly-venal feudal chieftain.

10. *Amir Rafik Arslan* (cousin of No. 9).—A Druze, born about 1898. A Director in the Lebanese Administration and many times a Deputy. Appointed Muhafez (Governor) of Beirut in October 1943. Not unintelligent but weak and ineffective.

11. *Ahmed el Assad*.—A Shia Moslem from Taibé (South Lebanon), born 1905. A feudal chieftain whose influence is paramount in the Jebel Amil. Dishonest, unreliable and quite unprincipled; suspected of promoting smuggling over the Palestine frontier. Was a Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government in 1941-42, but was displaced when it fell in July 1942 owing to British objections. Has since been wooed by the French, but would still prefer to play with the British if given any encouragement. Re-elected a Deputy in 1943. Appointed Minister of Public Works and Minister of Health and Public Assistance in January 1945.

12. *Me. Taufiq (Toto) Awad*.—A Maronite lawyer of Hasroun, born 1908. Belongs to an influential family of North Lebanon and is a relation of the Maronite Patriarch, to whom he acts as legal adviser and land broker. Contrived by doubtful methods to become a Deputy in the 1937 Chamber. By constant intrigue succeeded in 1942 in securing a reconciliation between the Maronite Patriarch and both General Catroux and President Naccache. Was appointed Assistant Secretary of State in the interim Lebanese Government in July 1943, but failed in the elections. A professional go-between, who is universally disliked and despised for his dishonesty and mendacity.

13. *Me. Ibrahim Azar*.—A Maronite lawyer of Sidon, born 1906. A member of the Constitutional party and a former Deputy. Not over-intelligent and very cautious, but sound and reliable.

14. *Amir Khalil Bellama*.—A Maronite from Bikfaya, born about 1888; belongs to a well-known family. For many years practised as a lawyer in Cairo. Twice a Minister. Exceptionally stupid and rather a laughing-stock.

15. *Dr. Raif Bellama*.—A Maronite bacteriologist of Beirut, born 1897. Is a professor at the American University of Beirut. Has so far taken no part in political life but has political ambitions. Has strong pan-Arab leanings. Honest, intelligent, and a good orator, but not an outstanding personality.

16. *Abdullah Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem from Beirut, born about 1873. Was Secretary of State in 1934, in 1939-41, and in the interim Lebanese Government appointed in July 1943. Honest but colourless and past his prime.

17. *Amin Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem landowner of Beirut, born 1907. Has not so far held office, but is considered one of the most prominent younger Moslems, and is likely to emerge as a political figure. Is nationalist and anti-French in his views.

18. *Mohammed Ali Beyhum* (brother of No. 19).—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1889. Prominent in Moslem political circles, but has never been a Deputy. Well-meaning and pleasant but ineffective.

19. *Omar Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1881. A former Deputy. Has great influence in Beirut Moslem circles, particularly over the Najjade party, in whose formation he played a large part, and by whom he is constantly consulted. Brusque and uneducated, but honest and consistent in his Nationalist views.

20. *Salah Beyhum*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1895. Has so far held no office, but is prominent in Moslem circles. Professes pan-Arab ideas and is anti-French. Honest and principled but not very bright.

21. *Me. Jawad Boulos*.—A Maronite solicitor of Tripoli, born 1900. Ex-Deputy; was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the provisional Lebanese Government of March 1943, but was eliminated with it in July. A servile tool of the French, to whose support he owes his position. Unsuccessfully contested the 1943 elections.

22. *Me. Philippe Negib Boulos*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer from Koura (N. Lebanon), born 1902. Has held various magisterial offices. In 1941 was appointed by the Vichy authorities a member of President Naccache's administration, and held office in the first two "independent" Lebanese Governments, in the

second of which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Weak and ineffective, but honest and likeable. Failed in the 1943 elections, and resumed his post of judge of the Court of Appeal.

23. *Me. Camille Chamoun*.—A Maronite lawyer from Deir el Kamar, born 1901. Once a Minister; a prominent member of the Constitutional party. Strongly pro-British and for this reason viewed with suspicion by the French. Very influential in the Chouf district. Honest, able and extremely likable. Appointed Minister of the Interior and Posts and Telegraphs in September 1943; one of the Ministers arrested by the French in November 1943. In July 1944 appointed first Lebanese Minister in London.

24. *Joseph Chamoun*.—A Maronite from Deir-el-Kamar, born 1896. Was chief clerk of Beirut Governorate up to 1929 when Emile Eddé, then Prime Minister, made him Acting Director of Public Health. Became Director of Public Works in 1933 and was transferred in 1935 to be Director of Economic Services; in 1942 became Director of Public Education, a post which he held until November, 1943, when he was appointed Director of Public Works; became Director-General in 1944. Honest, clever and hard-working; does not mix in politics.

25. *Yusef Charbel*.—A Maronite of Hosh-el-Newar of the Bekka. Born 1896. Made his career as a magistrate specialising in the examining branch; Attorney-General in 1943. Honest and well educated, but brusque and may well be an opportunist. Often consulted by Ministers on political matters.

26. *Amir Jemil Chehab*.—A Maronite from Beirut, born 1898. Belongs to the Christian branch of a leading Lebanese family. Director of Finance from 1941-42, and from September 1943 senior Lebanese member on the Conseil Supérieur des Interêts Communs. Was delegated by Riad Solh in 1944 to run the Ministry of Supply, but resigned at the end of the year and now holds no public post, though still technically Secretary-General to the Presidency. A hard-working and conscientious but exceedingly obstinate and narrow-minded official, who periodically quarrels with his superiors.

27. *Amir Khaled Chehab*.—A Sunni Moslem from Hasbaya, born 1891. Belongs to the Moslem branch of the Chehab family and is very prominent in South Lebanon. Has been Prime Minister and President of the Chamber; was a member of Dr. Ayoub Tabet's interim Government appointed in March 1943, but has since retired from politics. Honest and respected, but weak and easily led.

28. *Michel Chiha*.—A Roman Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1893. A member of the Board of Administration of the Banque de Syrie. Was Deputy in 1926, at which time he assisted in the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution. A supporter and adviser of the Constitutional party. Advocates a Christian Lebanon protected against Moslem and Jewish domination. A shrewd and cautious financier, who is highly respected. Is brother-in-law to the President.

29. *Ahmed Daouk* (brother of No. 30).—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1889. After many years in the Beirut Municipality was appointed Secretary of State in the Administration appointed by the Vichy authorities in 1941. Became Prime Minister of the first "independent" Lebanese Government in December 1941, but resigned in July 1942. While in office proved himself incompetent and servile and has lost much of his influence in Moslem circles. In July 1944 was appointed first Lebanese Minister to France.

30. *Omar Daouk*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1865. President of the Chamber of Commerce and a highly respected proprietor who is prominent in Moslem charitable activities. Ex-Senator; nowadays takes no active part in politics but is often consulted, and has much influence. Honest and shrewd.

31. *Badr Dimishkieh*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1878. Has been president of Beirut municipality. Has relations with Palestine Jews through his son-in-law, who is a merchant of Jaffa. Venal and a hypocrite.

32. *Me. Emile Eddé*.—A Maronite lawyer of Beirut, born 1888. President of the Republic from 1936 to 1941; has also had much ministerial experience. A fanatical exponent of the concept of an independent Lebanon separate from the Arab world. Was a member of the Lebanese deputation to Paris in 1919 to ask for a French mandate, and has always had close relations with the French authorities, who regard him as their chief Lebanese supporter, but would support

any Power whose policy furthered his designs. Elected a Deputy in 1943, but failed to obtain sufficient support to run for the Presidency. Accepted office as temporary Head of the State during the French *coup d'Etat* in November 1943, in the planning of which he participated. Was consequently expelled from the Chamber in March 1944. Very intelligent and persuasive, but is impulsive, lacks judgment, and is none too scrupulous in his methods of enlisting support.

33. *Mohamed el Fadel*.—Born 1912; landowner from Nabatieh. Minister from July 1944, to January 1945, with portfolios of Commerce and Industry, and Posts and Telegraphs. Received a primary education only. Has little character and is thought to be completely under the influence of Ahmed el Assad.

34. *Nassouh el Fadel*.—A Sunni Moslem, born 1883. A landowner of the Danieh district (N. Lebanon), where his influence is predominant. A former Deputy.

35. *Dr. Samih Fakhoury*.—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1881. Ex-Deputy. Inconsistent in his political allegiances. A relative of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, who stayed with him on his flight from Palestine, but is not unfavourable to the Allied cause.

36. *Me. Hamid Frangieh*.—A Maronite lawyer from Zghorta, born 1905. Was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the first "independent" Lebanese Government of 1941-42 and had previously held ministerial posts. His attempts to promote Lebanese independence and his close collaboration with the British rendered him *persona non grata* to the French. The most prominent Christian politician in North Lebanon; in general agreement with the Constitutional party. Intelligent, honest and able, though not always sound in judgment; well qualified to become a political force in the future. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943. Minister of Finance July 1944-January 1945.

37. *Pierre Gemayel*.—A Maronite from Bikfaya, born about 1909. Leader of the Phalange party and affects extreme Lebanese Nationalist and pro-Christian views. Although subject to Jesuit influence, is nowadays strongly critical of the French, and wholeheartedly supported the Government during the crisis of November 1943. A hot-headed and rather unbalanced demagogue, whose influence outside his followers is limited.

38. *Nicola Ghosn*.—A Greek Orthodox landowner of Kosba, N. Lebanon, born in 1882. Has three times been a Deputy, but has not, so far, held ministerial office. Until 1943 was a follower of Emile Eddé and considered wholly under French influence, but rallied to Abdul Hamid Kerami for the 1943 elections. Uneducated and speaks no foreign language. His honesty is questionable and he has little influence even in his district.

39. *Nasri Haddad*.—A Roman Catholic of Beirut, born 1898. Served for many years in the Finance Department of the French High Commission. In 1941 was appointed Director of Finance; became Director of Supply, which post he still holds. Honest and capable, but wholly under French influence.

40. *Ibrahim Haidar*.—A Shia Moslem from Labwé (Bekaa), born 1888. Several times minister; his last such post, in 1937, terminated owing to his alleged connexion with a hashish racket. A leading member of one of the two principal Shia families of the Bekaa. Shrewd, but shifty and dishonest. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943.

41. *Subhi Haidar* (cousin of No. 40).—A Shia Moslem from Labwé (Bekaa), born 1893. A director in the present Lebanese Administration. Unintelligent and not over-honest.

42. *George Haimari*.—A Maronite from Beirut, born 1898. Was Chief of the President's Secretariat from 1920 to 1943 and served successive masters faithfully. Inclined to favour Emile Eddé and was consequently transferred to become a Director of Education when Bechara el Khoury became President in September 1943.

43. *Sabri Hamadi*.—A Shia Moslem proprietor of Hermel (Bekaa), born about 1903. Is head of the most prominent Bekaa family and claims 60,000 adherents, but has strong rivals in the family. Brother-in-law of Ahmad el Assad, No. 11. Was elected Deputy at an early age and was a minister in 1938. Has little education and is wholly unprincipled, but has always been pandered to by French and Lebanese authorities on account of his nuisance value in the remote

North Bekaa region, and is consequently arrogant. Elected speaker of the Chamber of Deputies in October 1943, and re-elected to the same office in October 1944.

44. *Sayed Ahmed el Hussein*.—A Shia Moslem from Akoura (Bekaa), born 1888. Has several times been minister but has usually resigned on personal grounds after a short time in office. An honest, old-school official, influential in Shia circles and generally respected, but uneducated and muddle-headed. Re-elected Deputy in September 1943.

45. *Aref Bey Ibrahim*.—A Moslem Circassian from Smyrna. Born 1887. Chief of Police since 1943. Was in the Turkish police at the end of 1914-18 war. Appointed Head of Judicial Police in Beirut on first Allied occupation; was dismissed in 1932 and spent one and a half years in prison under accusation of bribery; acquitted when tried. A clever police officer, comparatively honest and fairly loyal.

46. *Sheikh Sayed Istefhan* (brother of No. 47).—Maronite, born 1892. Owes his position to his brother's influence, and is on good terms with Abdul Hamid Kerami (No. 49). Influential in Maronite circles in North Lebanon.

47. *Sheikh Yusef Istefhan*.—A Maronite of Kafar Saghab (N. Lebanon), born 1886. Was once a minister and a supporter of Emile Eddé, but is nowadays associated with Hamid Frangieh (No. 36). Very influential in his district; once successfully toured Australia, where many of his family are settled. Elected a Deputy in September 1943 and is a very critical supporter of the Government.

48. *Joseph Karam*.—A Maronite of Zgorta (N. Lebanon), born 1891. A rather weak character who is overshadowed by Hamid Frangieh and Jawad Boulos, both of the same district. Pro-French and a supporter of Emile Eddé. Entered the Chamber on a bye-election in April 1944.

49. *Abdul Hamid Kerami*.—A Sunni Moslem of Tripoli, born 1891. At one time Mufti of Tripoli, but was dismissed by the French in 1920 on account of his hostile attitude towards the French Mandate. Was a close friend of Haj Amin Hussaini but, unlike some members of his family, is not pro-Axis; dislikes the French, but is nowadays by way of becoming pro-British. Well educated and intelligent. Has a large following and can count on the support of the vast majority of Moslems in Tripoli on any major issue, such as pan-Arabism or the demand for union with Syria. Is wealthy and possesses much property. Formerly a strong partisan of the incorporation of the Lebanon in Syria. Refused to co-operate with any Lebanese Government but in 1943 modified his views to the extent of entering the Chamber. Strongly supported the Government of Riad Solh, and was arrested by the French during the crisis of November 1943. Was appointed Prime Minister in January 1945, also taking portfolios of Finance and National Defence.

50. *Rafaat Kazaoun*.—A Sunni Moslem of Qabb Elias (Bekaa), born about 1908. Suspected of Axis sentiments, but probably merely ambitious and fanatical. Elected a Deputy in September 1943.

51. *Sheikh Farid el Khazen*.—A Maronite landowner of Jounieh, born 1895. A smuggler in his younger days and nowadays a gambler. Ex-Deputy. A member of the Constitutional party and influential in the Kesrouan district. Shrewd and amusing but uneducated and unscrupulous. Re-entered the Chamber on a bye-election in April 1944.

52. *Michel Khattar*.—A Greek Catholic manufacturer from Deir el Kamar, born 1889. President of the Silk-Growers' and Industrialists' Associations. Has held no office but has much political sense, which causes him often to be consulted by Ministers in office. Strongly pro-British and has co-operated well with us. Very likable, with an unusually strong and independent character.

53. *Sheikh Béchara el Khoury*.—A Maronite lawyer from Beirut, born 1891. For many years a bitter political rival of Emile Eddé, by whom he was beaten for the Presidency in 1935. Leader of the "Constitutional party" and several times Prime Minister. Achieved his consuming ambition by becoming President in 1943. Behaved with firmness and dignity when arrested by the French in November of that year, but has since relapsed into his old failings of weakness and hesitancy and has comparatively little influence on public opinion.

54. *Kabalan Issa Khoury*.—A Maronite proprietor of Ainata (Bekaa), born 1915. Is a nephew of the Maronite Patriarch, whose influence he uses freely. Resides in Beirut. Used to grow much hashish on his properties. An active and ambitious young man, but wholly unprincipled.

55. *Sami el Khoury*.—A Maronite of Beirut. Born 1895. Chief Clerk in the Lebanese Directorate of Justice until 1926, when he was appointed Director of Justice; in 1937 appointed by Emile Eddé as President of the "Conseil d'Etat"; became Director-General of Foreign Affairs in 1944. Honest and disciplined but of medium intelligence.

56. *Jamil Mikkawi*.—A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, born 1911. Was leader of the Najjadé party, in which capacity he had a certain nuisance value, until July 1943, when his failure to conform to the attitude of the Moslem leaders on the electoral issue lost him most of his popularity and the majority of the party seceded to a rival leader. A pretentious young coxcomb, who is not unintelligent but lacks stability. Married to a Frenchwoman. Appointed Counsellor to the Lebanese Legation in London in July 1944.

57. *Moussa Moubarek*.—A Maronite of Antura. Born 1903. Member of the staff of the French Delegate to the Lebanon from 1923-1941, during which time he played an important part in Franco-Lebanese politics as principal French go-between. Director of Public Instruction 1941; became "chef de Cabinet" to Béchara-el-Khoury in 1943, and the Lebanese member of the "Interêts Communs" in 1944. Of doubtful honesty, clever and intelligent, pro-French. A personal friend of the President.

58. *Gabriel Murr*.—A Greek Orthodox Deputy for Mount Lebanon; born 1895. Originally of Btigrin and now of Beirut. Lived in the United States for ten years and served during the first world war in United States army. Returned to Lebanon in 1922 and started a cinema business which is still flourishing. Entered political life for first time in September 1943, when he was elected Deputy for Mount Lebanon on Emil Eddé's list. On good terms with United States Legation; patriotic, not very intelligent, honest and well meaning; is in opposition only as far as internal policy is concerned.

59. *Alfred Naccache*.—A Maronite of Beirut, born 1889. An unsuccessful lawyer, who has held magisterial posts since 1925 and was President of the Court of Appeal. Was unexpectedly nominated head of the Lebanese Administration by the Vichy authorities in 1941, having held no previous administrative post. Continued in office after the Allied occupation and was nominated President of the Republic by General Catroux in November 1941. Much under Jesuit influence, and widely unpopular. Very honest, but impulsive, volatile, and incapable. Accepted dismissal by General Catroux in March 1943. Elected a Deputy in September 1943, and has since been a silent member of the small pro-French opposition group.

60. *Adib Nahas*.—A Greek Orthodox of Tripoli. Born 1903. Comes of a leading Christian family in North Lebanon. A senior government official who has filled many posts, including that of Director of the Interior in 1940; Muhafez of South Lebanon during the 1941 campaign and rendered great assistance to the British; reappointed Director of the Interior in November 1943. Probably the best of the Lebanese civil servants, honest, intelligent and capable.

61. *Gibran Nahas*.—A Greek Orthodox of Tripoli, born 1891. Was formerly Muhafez of North Lebanon and is a prominent figure in that district. Ex-Deputy. Under French influence and of mediocre intelligence.

62. *Wadih Naim*.—A Maronite lawyer of Chiah near Beirut, born 1886. A former leader of the Beirut Bar, took no part in politics before the 1943 elections in which he became a Deputy for Mount Lebanon on the Constitutional list. Bears a good reputation, but is considered of mediocre intelligence.

63. *Me. Moussa Nammour*.—A Maronite lawyer from Muallaka (Bekaa), born 1883. Minister of the Interior in the second "independent" Lebanese Government; has held many previous Ministerial posts. He has always tried to keep a foot in all camps without owing allegiance to any party, and as a result the Government will have no confidence in him. Was unsuccessful in the 1943 elections and, being in financial straits, is now a leading anti-Government intriguer.

64. *Alfred Nasser*.—A Greek Catholic merchant and insurance agent of Beirut, born 1878. President of the Merchants' Association. So far has taken no part in political life, but has political ambitions. A typical shrewd, grasping, short-sighted Beirut merchant.

65. *Sulaiman Naufal, Col.*—A Greek Catholic of Merjayun. Born 1900. Spent two years at the French Ecole de Guerre, was an officer in the Chasseurs Libanais until 1941, when he became head of the Lebanese gendarmerie. During the Lebanese crisis of November 1943, worked with the French and was consequently removed from his post. A capable officer, strongly pro-French in sympathy in upbringing and temperament.

66. *Muhieddin Nsouli*.—A Sunni Moslem journalist and merchant of Beirut, born 1900. Proprietor of the newspaper *Beirut*. Ex-Deputy. During the 1928 Palestine troubles wrote violent anti-British articles and in 1941 was interned as an Axis sympathiser, but while interned wrote strongly pro-Allied articles and since his release has continued to collaborate effectively.

67. *Izzedin Omari*.—A Sunni Moslem of Iraqi origin, born about 1887. Was for several years a judge and has been governor of various districts. Was Chief of Police from 1935 to 1937, when he was retired as a result of a scandal; was reinstated in the same position in 1942, but again dismissed in October 1943. Active and a disciplinarian, but venal and subservient; consequently not respected.

68. *Henri Pharaon*.—A Greek Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1902. Socially prominent and a leading racehorse owner. Popular amongst the middle and lower classes, especially Moslems, and is a promoter of the Najjadé party; also believed to finance the Constitutional party. Ostentatiously generous and hospitable. Bought himself into the Chamber in September 1943 and now has considerable influence. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1945.

69. *Dr. Moustafa Rifai*.—A Sunni Moslem of Baalbeck, born about 1895. A well-educated and strict Moslem of an old Syrian family, descendants of the Prophet. Kind, simple-hearted, and much respected. Formerly reputed to be pro-German, but his views have changed and in 1942 he gave two talks on the Jaffa radio comparing the democracies to Islam. His political tendency is towards Damascus and the National Bloc.

70. *Amin Saad*.—A Maronite of Ain Traz, born 1898. Nephew of a former President, by virtue of which relationship he became a Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government, but proved a complete failure and is unlikely to hold further office. A foolish and negligible character. Re-elected a Deputy in 1943 and has not spoken since.

71. *Mr. George Sabbagha*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer and journalist of Beirut, born 1893. Proprietor of the Arabic newspaper *Saut ul Ahrar*. A mediocre journalist. Has close relations with the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut.

72. *Ali Salam*.—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1897. The eldest of the eight sons of the late Salim Salam, a follower of King Feisal; professes pan-Arab and pro-British ideas and has some influence. A bumptious and rather tiresome person, who has, however, never wavered in his support for the British cause.

73. *Saib Salam*.—A younger brother of No. 72, less forceful but more reasonable. Elected a Deputy in September 1943, and is now regarded as the most prominent of the younger Moslems.

74. *Joseph Salem*.—A Greek Catholic of Tyre, born 1895. Manager of the Beirut Water Company. Ex-Deputy. Has considerable political influence in South Lebanon. Has Nationalist leanings and keeps on good terms with the Moslems, but belongs to no party. Honest and intelligent, with an unusually well-balanced and far-sighted outlook, but not over-courageous. Re-elected a Deputy in 1943; was an unsuccessful candidate for the Speakership in October 1944, and accepted the appointment of first Lebanese Minister in Cairo in November of that year.

75. *Ramez Sarkis*.—A Protestant journalist of Beirut, born 1891. Owner of the Beirut newspaper *Lisan ul Hal*. Was Minister of Education in the first "independent" Lebanese Government, but proved exceptionally incompetent

and is unlikely to hold further office. Professes pro-British sentiments, having had an Anglo-Saxon education, but is a colourless personality who carries no weight.

76. *Alfred Skaf*.—A Greek Catholic of Zahlé, born 1907. Member of a prominent Bekaa family. His appointment as Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government was his first introduction to public life; as Minister of Supply he tried hard, but found the problems involved too great for his mediocre intelligence and did not retain his office when the Government fell. Not over-scrupulous. Was unsuccessful in the 1943 election, and has temporarily abandoned politics for agriculture.

77. *Riad es Solh*.—A Sunni Moslem of Sidon, born 1898. Early became known as a fanatical adherent of the Arab cause, but escaped internment by the Turks in 1914-18 because his father had been a Turkish official. Governor of South Lebanon for a few months in 1919. Refused all collaboration with the Mandatory authorities and was exiled by them for two months in 1935. Constantly advocated the cause of Arab independence and unity; acquired much influence amongst Moslems in the Lebanon and elsewhere, but was feared and distrusted by many Christians. Until 1943 held no Government office and generally effaced himself, to emerge periodically as a Moslem leader in a crisis. Entered the Lebanese Chamber in September 1943 and was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. At once adopted a bold Nationalist programme which, unhesitatingly pursued, brought his Government into violent conflict with the French, the November crisis resulting. Since then has proved himself an adroit negotiator and forceful debater, but with no aptitude for, or interest in, administration. A strong personality, unscrupulous, supple and shrewd. Fundamentally xenophobe, anti-French in particular; flirted with the Germans between 1938-40 and has since courted the British, but has no loyalty except to his own not wholly disinterested aspirations. Resigned the Premiership in January 1945.

78. *Sami es Solh*.—A Sunni Moslem of Sidon, born 1891. Educated in Istanbul. In 1920 was an official of the Hejaz Railway. Cousin of No. 75. Subsequently entered the Lebanese magistrature and held several posts, including that of president of the Court of Cassation. His appointment as Prime Minister of the second "independent" Lebanese Government in July 1942 was his first introduction to political life. A well-meaning, impulsive but fundamentally foolish man whose extreme vanity makes him unreliable and a bad judge of character. On first appointment plunged into a variety of undigested schemes and defied the French, but was soon brought to heel. After his dismissal in March 1943 returned to his magisterial post. Elected a Deputy in September 1943 and dreams of supplanting his cousin.

79. *Dr. Ayoub Tabet*.—A Protestant of Beirut, born 1883. A doctor of medicine of the American University of Beirut, but does not practise. Lived in the United States before and during the First World War, during which he was an active French propagandist. Was a Minister in 1928 and Secretary of State in 1936. Was appointed provisional Head of State in March 1943 in order to arrange elections, but had to be dismissed in July for having exceeded his powers in initiating a series of ill-considered measures. A strong and excitable protagonist of the concept of an independent Christian Lebanon; obstinate, opinionated and full of muddle-headed good intentions. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943, but his health is now failing.

80. *Emile Tabet*.—A Maronite proprietor of Beirut, born 1879. Brother of No. 82, but was long estranged from him. Has strong pro-British views, which he has expressed to any British official who would listen during the last twenty-five years. Ex-Deputy. Not nowadays taken seriously. Rich and avaricious, but good-hearted.

81. *Georges Tabet*.—A Maronite landowner of Beirut, born 1891. Several times a Minister and a candidate for the Presidency. President of the recently-formed Maronite Council and of the Maronite Charitable Association. Influential amongst middle and lower class Christians but notoriously untruthful and not trusted.

82. *Jacques Tabet*.—A Maronite landowner of Beirut, born 1887. Very rich, and socially prominent; holds views on economic problems but plays no part in political life. Unpopular on account of his meanness but not ill-intentioned.

83. *Dr. Jamil Talhouk*.—A Druze landowner of Aley, born 1887. Ex-Deputy. Comes of a leading Druze family which has a traditional friendship with the British. Of mediocre intelligence, shrewd and obstinate. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943. Appointed Minister of Supplies and Minister of Agriculture in January 1945.

84. *Salim Tayara*.—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1887. Ex-Mayor of Beirut and has held several Municipal posts. Has much influence amongst the Moslem middle classes. Honest but mediocre.

85. *Fozi Trabulsi, Lieutenant-Colonel*.—A Maronite of Dair-el-Kamar; born 1901. Lebanese gendarmerie officer until 1939, when, having quarrelled with his French chief, he left the service. Re-instated on the 10th November, 1943, as Inspector-General of Lebanese gendarmerie and police. Later became Officer Commanding Public Security Forces of the Lebanese Republic. Honest and loyal, but tactless, excitable and of mediocre intelligence.

86. *Habib Trad*.—A Greek Orthodox banker and landowner of Beirut, born 1885. Has held no office but is a prominent social figure who wields some influence in political and commercial circles. Not over-intelligent.

87. *Me. Pierre (Petro) Trad*.—A Greek Orthodox lawyer of Beirut, born 1873. Was for many years Speaker of the Lebanon Chamber. Appointed provisional Head of State in July 1943. Vain and of limited intelligence, but prides himself on keeping on good terms with all parties and communities and has the reputation of being skilful in settling disputes.

88. *Gibran Tuéni*.—A Greek Orthodox journalist of Beirut, born 1891. Owns *An-Nahar*, the leading Arabic daily, and is the best Lebanese journalist. Once a Minister. Formerly belonged to the Constitutional Party but now independent. An intelligent and outspoken critic with strong Nationalist ideas.

89. *Me. Adel Usseyran*.—A Shia Moslem proprietor and lawyer of Sidon, born 1903. One of the two strongest personalities of South Lebanon. Has relations with the Constitutional Party but does not belong to it. Elected a Deputy in September 1943, and was appointed Minister of Supply, Commerce and Industry, but was eliminated from the Ministry in July 1944, and has since been very critical of Riad el Solh. A strong Nationalist and very anti-French, but at present well-disposed to the British, with whom he co-operated well when in office. A blunt and uncompromising lawyer who revels in political argument.

90. *Me. Abdullah Yafi*.—A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, born 1899. Was Prime Minister in 1936, re-elected a Deputy in September 1943. Formerly the only prominent Moslem follower of Emile Eddé, but has broken with him and supports the present Government. A somewhat colourless, though well-intentioned person.

91. *Yusuf ez-Zain*.—A Shia Moslem from Nabatiyeh, born about 1873. Ex-Deputy; has some following in South Lebanon. Shifty and venal.

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1. Mgr. Antoine Abed.		12. Mgr. Youssef Kallas.	
2. Mgr. Boulos Akl.		13. Mgr. Youssef Malouf.	
3. His Beatitude Antoine Pierre Arida.		14. Mgr. Nicolaos Nabha.	
4. Mgr. Boulos Awad.		15. Mgr. Aghabius Naoum.	
5. Mgr. Francis Ayoub.		16. Mgr. Maximos Sayegh.	
6. Mgr. Augustin Bustani.		17. Mgr. Aftimus Youakim.	
7. Mgr. Boutros Feghali.			
8. Mgr. Abdallah Khoury.		<i>Greek Orthodox.</i>	
9. Boulos Meoushi.		18. Mgr. Elia Karam.	
10. Mgr. Ignace Moubarak.		19. Mgr. Theodosius Abu-Rjaili.	
11. Mgr. Elias Risha.		20. Mgr. Nippon Saba.	
		21. Mgr. Elie Salaby.	

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22. Mgr. Ephrem Hikary.		29. Mufid Abdul Karim.	
23. Mgr. Ignatios Nouri.		<i>Jew.</i>	
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		34. Sheikh Milhim Hamdan.	
		35. Sheikh Husain Talih.	

Religious Personalities.

Maronites.

1. *Mgr. Antoine Abed*.—Maronite Archbishop of Tripoli, including the Lattakia district. Born 1901. Became archbishop in 1931. Moderately cultured; interested with his brothers in commercial enterprises, very pro-French.

2. *Mgr. Boulos Akl*.—Maronite Archbishop of Laodicee (Lattakia)—at one time second vicar to the Patriarch, born 1884; resides at Shammat in the Jebel district. Quarrelled with the Patriarch in 1936. Intelligent, low mentality and rarely tells the truth; an intriguer with a reputation for dishonesty.

3. *His Beatitude Antoine Pierre Arida*.—Maronite Patriarch; born 1863; from Becharré (North Lebanon), the largest landowner in the Lebanon; a former Deputy and supporter of Béchara el Khoury; sly and crafty, sole interest is his own personal gain.

4. *Mgr. Boulos Awad*.—Maronite Archbishop, at one time Archbishop of Cyprus, but at present holding no title. Born in 1860 from Hasrun, resides at Kornet-Shahwan, near Bikfaya. In his younger days had a bad moral reputation.

5. *Mgr. Francis Ayoub*.—Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus, residing at Kornet-Shahwan, near Bikfaya. Born about 1894, well educated and wealthy.

6. *Mgr. Augustin Bustani*.—Maronite Archbishop of South Lebanon residing at Beit-Iddin. Born in 1872 of a leading Maronite family of Deir-il-Kamar. An intelligent and well educated intriguer with a pro-French reputation; has always been a close friend of Nazira Jomlat; has shown on more than one occasion unfriendly feelings towards the British.

7. *Mgr. Boutros Feghali*.—Maronite Archbishop covering no special diocese. Resides at Bkerke. Born about 1874, well off but venal. Pro-French tendencies—not intelligent.

8. *Mgr. Abdallah Khoury*.—Maronite Archbishop. First vicar to Patriarch residing at Bkerke. Born about 1872, from Haifa. Is an uncle of President Béchara-el-Khoury. Very intelligent and highly educated, an opportunist and a clever diplomat. Is the only prelate who has some influence on the Patriarch and is considered to be a likely successor.

9. *Boulos Meoushi*.—Maronite Archbishop of Haifa residing at Tyre. Born 1892, from Jezzin; has been in the United States and speaks English; sensible, devout and respected; takes no part in politics.

10. *Mgr. Ignace Moubarak*.—Maronite Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1876, from Rachmaya (Mount Lebanon). Studied in Rome; appointed to his present See in 1919. Impulsive, courageous and somewhat quarrelsome when thwarted; critical of his Patriarch, with whom he is on indifferent terms, and has not hesitated on occasions publicly to attack the French authorities, usually for not accepting his suggestions in political matters. While determined to further his community's interests, is more practical and realist than most local prelates in his political outlook. Has made approaches to the British, but will support any authorities who will favour his community.

11. *Mgr. Elias Risha*.—Maronite Archbishop of Baalbeck but resides in Bkorki. Born 1874. Uneducated, wealthy, venal and stupid.

Greek Catholic.

12. *Mgr. Youssef Kallas*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of North Lebanon residing in Tripoli. Born about 1878; well educated—has a reputation for honesty, with no particular political leanings.

13. *Mgr. Youssef Malouf*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Baalbeck and Haifa, born about 1898. Was appointed by Rome. Intelligent and ambitious—aims at becoming the next Greek Catholic Patriarch.

14. *Mgr. Nicolaos Nabha*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Saïda and Deir-el-Kamar. Born 1892. Hypocritical and venal. On good terms with French authorities. Publicly supported the French during the crisis of November 1943, and is now trying to rehabilitate himself.

15. *Mgr. Aghabius Naoum*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Sour. Born 1882. No particular tendencies.

16. *Mgr. Marimos Sayegh*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1878, from Aleppo. Was appointed Archbishop of Tyre in 1919 and of Beirut in 1933. Well liked by his community, to whom he devotes himself. Has a tendency to mix in politics in which he has not always shown sound judgment. On the whole pro-French, but advocates an Anglo-French-American guarantee of an independent Lebanon.

17. *Mgr. Aftimus Youakim*.—Greek Catholic Archbishop of the Bekka, residing at Zahlé. Born about 1884, well educated, on good terms with the French.

Greek Orthodox.

18. *Mgr. Elia Karam*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Mount Lebanon, residing at Hadad, near Beirut. Born in 1896 from Bhamdun. Speaks no foreign language other than Russian, intelligent but venal and hypocritical. Is said to have bribed his colleagues to elect him as archbishop. Studied in Russia before 1914-18 war. On good terms with all foreign authorities.

19. *Mgr. Theodosius Abu-Rjaili*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of South Lebanon, residing at Jdaïdit-Marjeyun. Born about 1887 from Marjeyun, well educated and intelligent but a bit of a twister; if anything, is pro-British.

20. *Mgr. Niphon Saba*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of the Bekka, residing at Zahlé. Born about 1884 from Hasbaya, cultivated, has nationalist sentiments, but on the whole an opportunist.

21. *Mgr. Elie Salaby*.—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1876 from Souk-el-Gharb. Appointed archbishop in 1935 on the death of his predecessor to whom he had been assistant. Opportunist and is considered dishonest in his handling of the large Wakf of his community, by a large section of which he is distrusted and criticised. Professes staunch friendship for Great Britain.

Syrian Catholic.

22. *Mgr. Ephram Hikary*.—Syrian Catholic Archbishop attached to Cardinal Tapouni. Born about 1884 in Mosul. Reputed venal.

23. *Mgr. Ignatios Nouri*.—Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Bagdad, attached to Cardinal Tapouni. Born in 1859.

Syrian Catholic.

24. *Cardinal Ignace Gabriel 1st Tappouni*.—Syrian Catholic Cardinal and Patriarch. Born 1879; from Mosul. Appointed Bishop of Srouj and Patriarchal Vicar-General at Mardine in 1913; Archbishop of Aleppo in 1921; elected Patriarch in 1929. Made Cardinal in 1933 at the instance of the French High Commissioner, who desired a counterpoise to the dictatorial pretensions of the Maronite Patriarch. Very pro-French and devoted to the Jesuits; detested by all Moslems, especially those of Syria, for his protection of the Christians in the Jezireh. Considered fanatical and venal.

Syrian Orthodox.

25. *Mgr. Ohanes Kandour*.—Syrian Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut and the Lebanon. Born about 1884 from Mardin. No political tendencies.

Armenian Orthodox.

26. *Mgr. Arzawat Surmeyan*.—Armenian Orthodox Archbishop of Lebanon and Syria residing in Beirut. Born 1889; good education, intelligent; friend of Cardinal Tapouni; pro-French.

Armenian Catholic.

27. *Grégoire Pierre XV Aghajanian*.—Armenian Catholic Patriarch of Cilicia and acknowledged as Patriarch by Armenian Catholics throughout the world. Originally from Tiflis, but now resident in Beirut. Born 1895. Became a priest in 1917, bishop in 1935 and patriarch in 1937. Studied and taught at Rome. Highly cultivated, speaks several languages; a clever diplomat and very pro-French. Elevated to rank of Cardinal December 1945.

28. *Louis Batanian*.—Armenian Catholic Patriarchal Vicar-General of Beirut. Born 1899. Became a priest in 1921 and bishop in 1933. Worked successively in Egypt, Iraq and the Lebanon. Highly cultivated, speaks several languages, pro-French.

Protestant.

29. *Mufid Abdul Karim*.—Calls himself Chief of Superior Council of Protestant Community in Syria and the Lebanon. Born 1877 in Beirut and was for several years a teacher in American schools; has been a Protestant pastor for the past twenty-five years. Not very well educated (Anglo-Saxon education), respected by his community and does not mix in politics.

Jew.

30. *Shabelai Bhabut*.—Grand Rabbi of Lebanese Republic. Born in Beirut 1876. Has very little education, and possesses little prestige and influence amongst his community.

Sunni.

31. *Sheikh Muhammed Taufiq Khalid*.—Sunni Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. Born about 1878; from Beirut. Became anti-British over the Zionist question in Palestine and earlier in the war was strongly pro-Axis; had numerous contacts with the German and Italian Armistice Commissions. Nowadays, like many Moslems, has much modified his views with an Allied victory in sight. Formerly considered not sufficiently energetic in defence of Moslem interests and consequently not highly thought of by his community, but enhanced his prestige in the summer of 1943 by his advocacy of the Moslem case on an electoral issue.

Shia.

32. *Seyyid Abdul Hussin Sharafeddin*.—Chief of the Shia Ulema (Mujahiddin). Born about 1867; resides near Tyre, of which his son is Mufti. Was a student at Najaf. Strongly anti-Christian and Xenophobe; during the 1936-38 Palestine troubles preached the Jihad against the British, but likewise refused to support the Vichy authorities against the British in 1941 because no Moslem interest was involved. Tried to play off the British authorities against the French after the Allied occupation. Enjoys considerable prestige in Moslem religious circles.

Druzes.

33. *Sheikh Husain Hamadi*.—Grand Druze Sheikh-ul-Akl. Born about 1868; from Baakline (Mount Lebanon). Was given this title after the first World War by the French authorities, who used him to demonstrate Druze attachment to France. Very venal and not respected by his community. His two sons were both dismissed from judicial posts for accepting bribes; the elder then went to Italy and was for some time employed by the Bari Broadcasting Station. The father was in close touch with the Italian Armistice Commission, but nowadays professes pro-Allied sentiments.

34. *Sheikh Milhim Hamdan*.—Qadi of the Mazhab for the Lebanese Republic. Born about 1867 from Batar. Inspector of Justice in the Lebanese Government from 1929 to 1932 when he was made Druze Qadi. Has little education; an opportunist who professes pro-British sympathies.

35. *Sheikh Husain Talih*.—Druze Sheikh-ul-Akl. Born 1855; from Jdeideh-ech-Chouf (Mount Lebanon). Intelligent, honest, and has pro-British tendencies. Takes no part in politics.

[E 2336/8/89]

No. 14.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th April.)

(No. 51.)

Sir,

Beirut, 26th March, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 5th March, 1945, I have the honour to report that the Central Committees of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist parties held a meeting at Beirut on the 5th March "to discuss political matters interesting both countries and to adopt towards them a uniform line of conduct." After the meeting the two parties issued a long statement which is not of sufficient interest to reproduce in full, but of which the following are the salient points:—

2. After paying tribute to the efforts of the Red Army, the statement deals first with Arab affairs. The Arab question, it states, is primarily one of "collaboration among all Arab States in their fight against fascism and the principles of despotic colonisation." It goes on to condemn in the strongest terms the Greater Syria project, the collapse of which it welcomes.

3. Turning to the subject of relations between the Levant States and the French, the statement declares that the Syrian and Lebanese desire that their right to national sovereignty and freedom shall be respected, "that they will never yield that right to anyone, and they refuse to serve the aims of colonisers whatever they are, and they have no desire to free themselves from a certain foreign influence in order to get under another foreign influence." The statement expresses satisfaction at the progress of relations between the Levant States and the French, and hopes that the discussions now proceeding will lead to the settlement of all outstanding affairs and to the establishment of friendship between the Levant States and the French on a solid basis. It warns against "all irresponsible elements, and against all introduced elements, internal and external, which try to disrupt the negotiations because they would like to preserve an atmosphere of tension and unrest to enhance certain influences foreign to the national interest." The two parties declare their belief that an alliance and a state of friendship between the Levant States and the French would be in the interest of both parties—"provided such friendship be true, and one concluded between two independent sides enjoying equal rights, and not a veil for a new form of colonial exploitation." All Fascist and colonial-minded French who refuse to recognise the right of the States to independence, who try to create disturbances in certain localities, and engender feelings of hatred and suspicion, thus injuring the reputation of France, should be removed.

4. The statement then deals with relations with Russia, and declares that the U.S.S.R. "by virtue of their principles and for their own security are the natural friends of all small nations. Lebanese and Syrian national interests dictate that the States should do all they can to establish a firm friendship with the great U.S.S.R."

5. As regards internal affairs the statement attacks the "shameful policy of leniency adopted towards those Fascist elements which are trying to unite under new names in the Lebanon." Persons of Fascist mentality, it continues, should be swept away from power and the constitutional rights of citizens should be respected.

6. It is noteworthy that this statement is given considerable publicity in the French-controlled *L'Orient*, which affirms that the sentiments expressed in the manifesto represent the wishes, not only of the local Communists, but of every good Lebanese.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow and Paris.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2337/8/89]

No. 15.

Record of Conversation between His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and the Syrian President. Communicated in Beirut Despatch No. 53 of 29th March, 1945.—(Received 11th April.)

I HAD an hour's conversation with the Syrian President this morning. He told me that Count Ostrorog had been to see him recently and from a general conversation about Franco-Syrian relations, he had had the impression that

Count Ostrorog's attitude was reasonable. I mentioned Monsieur Bidault's and Monsieur Gorse's recent statements in the French Consultative Assembly and also France's attitude as regards the invitation of the Levant States to San Francisco; the President agreed that these were hopeful signs. But all would of course depend on what General Beynet brought back from Paris. The President had gathered from a talk he had just had with General Humblot (who had come to see him for the first time in 18 months or more) that General Beynet would not be back until the second week in April.

I said the new draft University Convention was a very different document from the old one. The President agreed and said that he had not yet studied it carefully (the more so as the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs had been away in Cairo); there were certain things in it which the Syrians could not accept, amongst which was article I; but it ought to provide a basis for negotiation.

As regards the Alaouite situation, the President said he had told Count Ostrorog that it would not be enough if the French troops and the gendarmerie were withdrawn; Colonel Bonnot and the other French authorities ought to make it clear to their Alaouite adherents that if they had cause for complaint, it was to the Syrian authorities that they should have recourse. The President said Count Ostrorog had promised to give instructions accordingly; but would he do so, and if he did, would the instructions be obeyed?

I said it was at any rate all to the good that the French authorities here were now in personal contact again with the President and the Syrian Government; it gave opportunities for discussing matters at issue in what was surely a better spirit than had existed lately. The President agreed; but he went on to complain, as usual, of the intrigues of French officials and officers in various parts of the country, who tried to make the people believe that the French were "coming back" and disparaged the Syrian Government and authorities. He hoped this was not part of French policy but rather the work of irresponsible elements, not under the proper control of the Délégation Générale. He remarked that the Syrians, too, had their irresponsible elements, e.g., amongst the younger deputies, students, &c., whom it was no easy matter to restrain. The Syrians had got so accustomed, during the régime of the last twenty-five years, to protest by demonstrations, strikes, &c., that this could not be put a stop to at once. If the Syrians could only have their own army and the gendarmerie properly armed, they could keep order all right. But unless the French intrigues were stopped, there could be no improvement in Franco-Syrian relations.

The President said the French were still putting forward the argument that they could not forego their position here, lest the British should step into it. They still alluded to the maintenance of "large British Forces" in the Levant States, to the construction of "permanent barracks," the "competition" of British officers for the friendship of the local population and so forth. The President said Count Ostrorog had again raised the question of a French military mission when they had touched on the army question. The President had refused to commit himself; Count Ostrorog had argued that if the French did not have a military mission, the British might try to replace them in this respect. The President said he always tried to disabuse the French of such ideas of evil intent on our part, but they seemed to persist despite the many statements we had ourselves made about not wanting to replace the French.

We then turned to internal affairs and I tackled the President again, as Colonel Furlonge had recently done at my request, about giving some satisfaction to the Alaouites, in order to ease the situation there, in the way of participation in the Government machinery. I urged him again to seek some way of settling Suleiman Murshid's case. I said it was no part of my business to interfere in Syria's internal affairs, but I believed I could speak to him as a friend about the feeling which I had sensed, especially during my recent tour of part of Syria, that the Government was too much in the hands of Damascenes. The French clearly felt that they still had some obligation to the Alaouites in view of their promises of "home rule" in the past. Might it not be wise if the Syrians could make some gesture to the Alaouites, e.g., by choosing an Alaouite as Mouhafez somewhere, if not as a Cabinet Minister? I asked, too, whether it was true that Dr. Khayali, the only member of the present Cabinet who was not a Damascene and the only representative of Aleppo in the Cabinet, had resigned? And I said I had also heard recently that the Druses felt they were being left out in the cold. (This was based on information given to me last week by the Political Officer at Soueida, to the effect that the Druse leaders

were disgruntled with the Government and that monarchist feeling was strong amongst them).

The President, who took all my remarks in good part, seemed disposed to do something for the Alaouites, though not until some satisfactory arrangement had been come to as regards the withdrawal of the French troops. With regard to Dr. Khayali, he said he had not actually resigned, though he was not attending the chamber. As for the Druses, the President maintained stoutly that they were not disgruntled; only a day or so ago he had had a message from Sultan Atrash that they were satisfied and asking him not to pay any attention to demands for representation in the Cabinet. Anyway, the President went on, the number of ministers in any Cabinet must be limited and the best men must be chosen wherever they could be found. If an Alaouite or a Druse were chosen (and he evidently seemed doubtful as to their capabilities for Cabinet rank) there would inevitably be hard feeling amongst other Alaouites and Druses.

Neither the President nor his Chef du Cabinet seemed much perturbed by the Chamber's critical attitude to the Government, which they ascribed mostly to hot-heads. (Nor, indeed, were the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday).

Nevertheless, the feeling is prevalent in Damascus that Fares el Khoury will resign before long—perhaps after the Government have reported to the Chamber on the results of the Cairo Conference, if not before, as a result of a vote of non-confidence. And I have the impression that the position of the President, as well as that of the Government, has been considerably weakened of late—partly because of his recent speech to the Chamber (my despatch No. 38) and largely because of the feeling that he and the Government may adopt too forthcoming a line with the French.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2358/8/89]

No. 16.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th April.)

(No. 239.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 11th April, 1945.

I WENT to Damascus yesterday to see Syrian Prime Minister before his departure for San Francisco and to introduce Sir A. Overton to some of Syrian Ministers. I spoke to Prime Minister on the lines of your circular telegram No. 9.

2. Prime Minister said he was greatly looking forward to meeting you at San Francisco and he hoped I would recommend him favourably to you. I said I would. He is well disposed to us and if obstinate and legalistic has, I think, good sense and is, I believe, receptive to our advice. He is a good parliamentarian and although a Christian was, I understand, generally regarded as the best man to carry on Government. He paid a special tribute to your support of Arab unity at His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo after the recent Cairo Conference. Being well over (group undecypherable) his enterprise in going to San Francisco is widely commended.

3. I asked the Prime Minister how things were going with the French. He referred to what Count Ostrorog had told me yesterday, that the Syrians and French have agreed to set up a joint committee to examine the new draft convention. He said that there were several points which Syrian Government could not accept as they stood but if they could agree with the French on a text, it would be initialled and put aside to form part of general settlement of all outstanding matters. The Prime Minister clearly appreciated the importance of such a convention from the French point of view and said it would also have advantages for Syria.

4. Prime Minister appeared to think that French were now generally inclined to be more reasonable. I reminded him of the efforts we have been making in Paris to this end. He said that these were greatly appreciated. He emphasised the importance which Syrian Government attached to the handing over of "Troupes Spéciales" and he believed the French might agree to this if they could secure a French military mission. I said that this did not seem unreasonable, provided that French officers of the right type were made available; Syrians would surely want assistance in training their armed forces, if they really had need of more than gendarmeries and "gardes mobiles." (group undecypherable) Prime Minister said that Syrian Government might prefer British or American officers but he added that provided French proposals and attitude in general were

reasonable and the Syrians could be sure that their independence was to be a reality and that there would be no continued interference in their affairs, a French military mission might be a small price to pay for the handing over of the "Troupes Spéciales."

5. Prime Minister repeated that Syria could not conclude a treaty giving France a privileged position. He said in confidence that he would like to conclude with Great Britain and also with United States agreements similar to those concluded with France. They need not be identical: the three countries had different interests here; but he hoped it would be possible for Syria to stabilise her relations with all three on a similar basis. I replied that I could not answer him on this point now, but I would report his remarks to you. He said he hoped to speak to you and also to the United States Secretary of State on these lines at San Francisco. I asked the Prime Minister whether he also envisaged agreements with Soviet Union. He replied not at present; Syria was too uncertain as regards Russian policy.

6. I suggested that it would also be very useful to have the opportunity of talking to the French Foreign Minister. I presumed the Prime Minister would be in touch with his Government while negotiations with the French authorities here were in progress; he and M. Bidault might be able to find ways and means of solving any difficulties that might arise. The Prime Minister agreed.

7. Finally the Prime Minister mentioned report (see my immediately following telegram) that the French Ambassador in London had approached His Majesty's Government with the suggestion that French troops in the Levant States should be removed from the British command and that British troops should be withdrawn. This, he said, might be good or bad; but he feels that it could only be good if Syria secured the "Troupes Spéciales" and if Franco-Syrian relations were established on a basis of real confidence and of full recognition of Syrian independence and sovereignty. I would know, he said, from my experience here, how antagonistic the Syrian people were towards the French and how difficult it would be to convince them that they could trust the French. The proposals which General Beynet would make on his return should provide a test of French intentions. Any agreements with France would naturally have to be approved by the Syrian Chamber of Deputies.

[E 2426/8/89]

No. 17.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th April.)

(No. 47.)

Sir,

Beirut, 22nd March, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 8th March, I have the honour to report that Sabri el Assali, the new Syrian Minister of the Interior, has since his appointment been taking a strong line with the critics of the Government and the President.

2. His first notable action was to arrest a certain Salah eddin Bittar, the author of one of the pamphlets referred to in my despatch under reference, and to send him to a distant village for detention. The pamphlets in question had accused what is described as the "Government clique" of having an isolationist policy which was placing obstacles in the way of union between Greater Syria and Iraq; Arab collaboration was no substitute for Arab unity. The pamphlet also accused the President of pursuing a pro-French policy and warned the nation that a treaty with France would inevitably mean a pre-eminent position for her, whereas Syria was determined to be rid of any foreign influence and would not be swayed from this course by British interference. The President was also accused of attempting to set himself up as a "leader," in contravention of the rights of the Chamber.

3. The Minister of the Interior then issued a communiqué, a French version of which is attached⁽¹⁾; this has been checked with the original Arabic. It will be observed that this communiqué refers to the "President Zaim"; the word "Zaim" ("leader") is the same as that to which Bittar's pamphlet objected. The communiqué, coming as it does from a Cabinet Minister in a democratic State, is remarkable in tone, and smacks more of the pronouncement of a Head of State—and a totalitarian at that. The reference to the tribes as the corner-stone of Syrian independence seems also ill-advised, as it is likely to encourage these turbulent elements to exaggerate their own importance.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

4. After the publication of this communiqué a deputation of university students called on Sabri el Assali to protest against its tone and against the arrest of Bittar. They reminded the Minister that he held his present position under a democratic régime which entailed freedom of speech and suggested that, as a young man, he should appreciate their point of view. The Minister replied that Bittar's "impertinence" had rendered necessary the action against him. One of the students, Jamal Atassi, objected to the word "impertinence" and asked for its withdrawal. The Minister thereupon called upon the police to eject the deputation from his office. Jamal Atassi then circulated a pamphlet giving his version of the interview. He was promptly arrested.

5. Another pamphlet, this time by the League of National Action, has also been published. It follows much the same lines as previous pamphlets, but stresses the interdependence of Syria and the Lebanon. Its author, Fehmi Mahayri, Secretary-General of the League, has also been arrested.

6. Sabri el Assali's appointment has also caused trouble in the Syrian security services. The Director-General of Security, Ahmed Bey Lahham, and the Director of the Damascus Police, have both tendered their resignations on the grounds that political appointments in their services have already started and will undoubtedly take place on a wider scale with Sabri el Assali in charge. They have been persuaded to continue in office for the time being, but not indefinitely. The loss of Ahmed Lahham will be felt by the British military authorities, with whom he has been outstandingly co-operative and who consider that he has done his best to ensure efficiency in the forces under his command.

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2706/8/89] No. 18.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th April.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, 25th April, 1945.

AT a picnic which the Syrian President gave yesterday for me and the entire staff of His Majesty's Legation, he and the Acting Syrian Prime Minister spoke to me very earnestly about the relations with France. They said I would remember well how bad the situation had been early in the year and how it had been no easy matter to calm down public opinion and bring about the present rumours of a *détente*. It was essential to make use of this opportunity to settle things with the French but General Beynet had not yet returned with the French proposals although he had now been absent since the 9th March. Jamil Mardam Bey said he intended to speak frankly to Count Ostrorog this morning and it was agreed that I should call on him afterwards to receive his account of the conversation.

2. When I did so Jamil Mardam Bey began by reading me a translation of a letter dated the 17th April which he had to-day received from the Syrian Minister in Paris, Atassi. This letter described a dinner given by M. Bidault on the 12th April, for the Syrian and Lebanese Minister in Paris at which General Beynet and other French officials had been present. After the dinner M. Bidault had opened up by saying that he was looking forward to meeting the Syrian delegation in San Francisco and discussing current problems with them. He remarked that Syria was now for the first time entering into the international life which presented grave problems. Atassi had said that local problems gave just as much trouble and that the local problem which was preoccupying the Syrian Government above all else was that of the army. He was sure that the Syrian delegation would be glad to take to M. Bidault provided that the army question was satisfactorily settled first. General Beynet had intervened to say that he had done everything in his power to get this question settled. Atassi had retorted that General Beynet had done exactly the opposite: agreement had been all but reached in June 1944 but General Beynet had then procrastinated and had finally refused to hand over the "Troupes Spéciales" on the pretext that the British had forces in Syria. General Beynet replied that he knew that a secret agreement existed between Jamil Mardam and the British authorities which did not bind the Syrian Government. Atassi had said he was surprised to hear it: did the General mean a verbal agreement? General Beynet replied: "no, a written agreement of which we have the text." Atassi had remarked that even if this were so, it did not prevent the French from handing over the "Troupes Spéciales."

3. Jamil Mardam, after reading this letter and promising me a copy, stated that he had read a translation to Count Ostrorog and had expressed his astonishment that General Beynet should, after eight months, have reverted to the suggestion, which had already been denied, that there was a secret agreement between Mardam himself and the British. He could only repeat his denial in the most formal terms and request Count Ostrorog to telegraph it to Paris. He remarked that since the Syrians had certainly not made up this story either the French or the British must have done so: and he could see no reason why the British should have spread so manifest a falsehood. Count Ostrorog had promised to telegraph to Paris in the sense desired.

4. Jamil Mardam had gone on to discuss Franco-Syrian relations with Count Ostrorog. He had first raised the question of the presence of French troops in the Alaouites which had still not been withdrawn. (See my immediately following telegram.) He had made it clear to Ostrorog that whilst there was no objection to the Syrian delegation to San Francisco discussing the matter with M. Bidault, they were not and would not be empowered to conduct negotiations which must be done here as arranged. He had gone on to tell Ostrorog that he had just received the Chinese Minister in Iraq who had come to tell him that the Chinese Government not only did not recognise a pre-eminent position for any one in Syria but fully supported the Syrian claims for complete independence. How then, he asked, could the French expect the Syrians to concede to them a privileged position when no other State (except Great Britain) recognised their right to any such position? The Syrians were perfectly ready to discuss outstanding questions in a reasonable spirit provided that it was clearly understood that they were free to accord to any other Power any privileges they might give to the French. If the French were to call in the British to support their point of view, the Syrians would call in the Americans or some other Power to support theirs. Things could not drag on indefinitely; Beynet had now been absent several weeks and there was no news of his return. The Syrian Government were being pressed by their Chamber and the people to make some progress particularly as regards the "Troupes Spéciales" and they could not go on indefinitely awaiting General Beynet's return. Moreover were the French sure that time was on their side? He thought the reverse. Ostrorog had said that General Beynet might conceivably be appointed to the French Commission of occupation in Germany, as he knew Germany. He agreed to telegraph to Paris stating the Syrian point of view and asking when General Beynet's return might be expected.

5. Jamil Mardam had lastly discussed the "Troupes Spéciales" question in greater detail. He said that the French had argued that the Syrians did not require all these troops: this might be so, but it was for the Syrians to decide how many they wanted of those they had transferred, and to disband the rest. The French had also suggested that they could not transfer these troops while the British occupied the country. Jamil Mardam had pointed out that it was not the Syrians who were maintaining British troops in Syria: in due course they would expect both them and the French troops to quit. If the French handed over the "Troupes Spéciales" and withdrew their own troops, the Syrians would certainly ask the British troops to leave also. But the French must understand that the Syrians required to have control of the "Troupes Spéciales." The French were claiming that they would uphold the rights of the small nations at San Francisco: they had better set the example by giving Syrians their rights, otherwise the Syrians would call on the Americans, the Russians, and so on (he would not say the British since he knew the British were "suspect" in French eyes) to support their point of view.

6. Jamil Mardam said that the purpose of this frank talk with Ostrorog was to try and induce the French to make the most of the present *détente* and that he and the Syrian Government were anxious to avoid any provocation of the French.

[E 2706/8/89] No. 19.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th April.)

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, 27th April, 1945.

MY telegram No. 77.

On the assumption that General Beynet does return with the French proposals for general settlement, we are now approaching the crucial stage in

relations between the Levant States and France, and I feel that the time has come to put the following considerations before you.

2. We must be under no illusion as to the nature of the present *détente*. If a good deal has been achieved in the way of promoting a better atmosphere for discussions between the two parties, their fundamental positions have not been radically changed. The French *desiderata*, in so far as they have been divulged, and French activities here, go to show that they are determined to preserve as much of their present position as they can. Both States Governments are, if anything, more determined than ever to concede no preference or privilege to France. If the Syrians are taking the lead in this respect, the Lebanese are following suit, and the hardening of the attitude of the Lebanese Government is, if anything, more marked because they are weaker and more susceptible to attack by Nationalist elements which will make capital out of anything which can be represented as a surrender of independence and sovereignty.

3. In Syria, where the potential troubles are greater and where determination to get rid of any form of French control is more wholehearted than in Lebanon, the Government have only been able to keep the Chamber at bay by reiterating the conviction that the forthcoming negotiations with the French will result in satisfaction for the Syrians over the "Troupes Spéciales" without the surrender of any of the attributes of sovereignty. (By this they mean that they will not give France more than they would give to the other Great Powers, as they mistrust France too deeply to give her even such privileges as we possess in Iraq. Even so, the President's and Government's position has been weakened by the announcement of their readiness to negotiate at all. If the negotiations result in disappointment of Syrian hopes, it is only to be expected that the more extreme elements will come into power and that the President will be forced to conform to them. In the Lebanon matters are not so far advanced, since the French have not yet made any proposals, but in the present state of feelings events there would be likely to follow similar course.

4. At present there is confidence in both States that we would not allow the French to reinforce their troops here or to attempt repetition of the 1943 *coup* in the Lebanon, though the local French are generally believed to be quite capable of the latter if circumstances permitted. If, however, we were at any time unable to prevent reinforcement, such as has recently been suggested, disillusionment would be so severe that it might well excite the Nationalist elements in both countries to violence.

5. While we are still looked upon as the most important factor in the situation, largely because of the continued presence here of the 9th Army, the formation of the Arab League, the successive recognitions of the States' independence by the other Powers and their enrolment in the United Nations and acceptance at San Francisco are inevitably leading the Government and the population to feel that we are not their only friends and supporters and that in any clash with the French they can find powerful allies elsewhere.

6. [group undecypherable] opinion here is alive to the fact that so far we are the only Power to have admitted and even advocated a pre-eminent position for France; that we have played the leading rôle in bringing Syria to the point of resuming negotiations with France; that we have been unable to move the French to give satisfaction to the States over the transfer of the "Troupes Spéciales" or the rearmament of the gendarmerie, and that we are not in a position to prevent activities by the local French directed against the States Governments such as those in Alaouites. On the other hand, there is a general belief—and that not without reason—that the States Governments can count on Arab and United States representatives here and possibly also the Soviet representative to advocate the support of their Governments against French claim for pre-eminence. While the two Governments still have confidence in us and the populations still consider us as sympathetic to their cause and powerful enough to aid them, the sands are running out. They have looked to us more than anyone else to induce the French to be reasonable; and if they are now confronted with demands which they have told us so often that they will never willingly accept, *e.g.*, for a military base for the French alone, they are likely to feel that we have led them up the garden path. If the attitude of the other Powers in regard to a privileged position for France is, in fact, what it appears to be we may soon get perilously near to the position which your general instructions to me state that we must avoid, *viz.*, being left with the French on one side of the fence, while the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the other Powers are on the other.

7. In the light of the above I submit that it now behoves us to consider very carefully our attitude towards the situation here, particularly in relationship to

the forthcoming negotiations. In these the crux will undoubtedly be military questions, "Troupes Spéciales" on one side, bases for France on the other. In the prevailing state of feelings I do not see how the French can hope, except by sheer force, to maintain the right to station forces here (unless it is imposed on the States by all the Great Powers or by whatever World Security Organisation is set up). If the French refuse to transfer the "Troupes Spéciales" except as the price for bases, the States will certainly appeal to us and also to all the Powers which have declined to recognise a pre-eminent position for France. They will as certainly be supported in their appeal at least by the Arab States if not also by the United States and the U.S.S.R. Agitation much more formidable than that over the invitation of the States to San Francisco would probably follow. In such circumstances (which on present evidence are too likely to be dismissed as mere hypotheses) can we afford to appear, by ourselves, to be backing France in taking any other line with the States? If not, is it not desirable that we should warn the French in advance that we have done much to bring the States to discuss matters with them again, and that while we will continue to do all we can to make things as easy as possible we cannot alone support them in demands which are unacceptable to the States, and others? In all this I have in mind your telegram No. 153 to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and the Prime Minister's words in the House of Commons that too much must not be placed upon the shoulders of Great Britain.

[E 1319/8/G]

No. 20.

(1)

Mr. Eden to Mr. Shone (Damascus).

(No. 37. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 22nd February, 1945.

IT would be helpful for us to receive in due course an official despatch giving your considered views on the question to what extent we have been justified in regarding Syria and the Lebanon as viable States, reasonably mature and capable of maintaining a healthy national existence of their own. We recognise that ability of the Central Government in each State to maintain its authority will inevitably depend to some extent on the efficiency and equipment of the national forces at its disposal for keeping order, collecting taxes, protecting minorities, and so forth, and that this is still an uncertain factor. But the question has obvious importance in connexion with the eventual withdrawal of British troops and the future of Franco-Levant relations.

Matter is not urgent. We are telegraphing so that you can discuss it with Hankey.

[E 2780/8/89]

(2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd May.)

(No. 63. Secret.)

Sir,

Beirut, 19th April, 1945.

IN your telegram No. 37 of the 22nd February to Damascus you requested me to give in an official despatch my considered views on "the question to what extent we have been justified in regarding Syria and the Lebanon as viable States, reasonably mature and capable of maintaining a healthy national existence on their own."

2. This question is not easy to answer, for more than one reason. Firstly, although we and other Powers have recognised the independence of the two countries, it is only for a bare fifteen months that their Governments have in fact been in a position to exercise anything like real control over their affairs. Secondly, war conditions have given rise to problems here, not least that of inflation, which would have taxed the powers even of a highly efficient administration. While, during the war period, Allied organisations, such as the Middle

East Supply Centre and the Office des Céréales Panifiables, have been of great value in meeting a number of such problems they—not to mention French and British military headquarters, with their attendant services—have also limited the free exercise of power by the local administrations. Thirdly, I fear it is undeniable that, since the French authorities, during the first half of 1944, made a real advance towards giving the States self-government by surrendering control of the *intérêts communs*, they have not merely failed to help the Governments further on the path to independence, but have sought to maintain in various ways what remains of their former position here and even to instil the belief amongst the local populations that their position will be strengthened. Indeed, it may broadly be said that, while the other Great Powers represented here have been encouraging the States towards self-government, the French have been directing their efforts in a contrary sense. This, in addition to creating difficulties for the local Governments, has—as more than one Minister has said to me—served to distract their attention from the task of improving internal administration. The conditions on which an estimate of the States' capacity up to now to maintain a healthy national existence must be based are therefore far from normal. And the future—if we are to look to that, as I think we should—is complicated by many imponderables.

3. Apart from this, there are two questions which are germane to the problem, namely, what are the minimum requirements for "viability," and by what standard should the Levant States be judged? I have no personal experience of Central or South America, but unless many States in that part of the world are to be regarded as "non-viable," South and Central American print AS/15/15/51 of the 26th January, 1945, suggests that revolution, rebellions and *coups d'Etat* are no ban. From a remark which my United States colleague once made to me I have no doubt that he considers the Levant States to be as "viable" as many South and Central American countries. In so far as other Middle Eastern countries are concerned—and it is presumably by their standards that we should seek to judge the Levant States—experience shows that States can continue to exist even though their Administrations are riddled with corruption and nepotism and are inefficient to a point which we ourselves would regard as intolerable. It seems, in fact, essential to avoid setting the standard of "viability" too high and, above all, not to be influenced unduly by preconceived notions of what constitutes good government.

4. The last despatch which my predecessor addressed to you from this post (No. 135 of the 8th December, 1944, particularly paragraphs 17 to 19) contains a succinct expression of his views on the subject of your enquiry. My own relatively brief experience of these countries and reports from a number of experienced officials which I called for on receipt of your enquiry (and of which I am sending copies under separate cover, as they are all of interest) tend, in general, to bear out Sir E. Spears's appreciation. I will return to it at the end of this despatch, after attempting to develop the picture in greater detail, assuming, with the above considerations in mind, that the Levant States, to be considered "viable," should be able to maintain, over a period of years, at least—

- (a) a sufficient stability of régime to allow the essential functions of government to be carried on, and
- (b) a sufficiently even balance of payments to prevent insolvency and depreciation of their currency.

5. There is one major defect in the administrative systems of both States, namely, the lack of a competent civil service. A number of French advisers and officials were employed in various Ministries and departments during the mandatory régime; some still remain and are to be retained until the end of the war, but, in Syria, others, after being cold-shouldered for the past year, have recently been dismissed. The French, however, did nothing to train up a civil service, as we did in Egypt before that country became independent. While both local Governments say they appreciate the need of an efficient civil service—a point I often make to them—they are all too prone to appoint officials for political expediency or family reasons rather than for administrative competence. In any case, the establishment of a proper civil service will take time, and it is clear that, if administration is to be efficient, both Governments will have need of foreign advisers and technicians for many years to come. The Governments maintain that they will not give preference to France in this respect, but must be free to choose the best men where they can find them.

6. For the rest, conditions in the two States differ so considerably that it will be well to consider them separately from the political angle. I will take

Syria first. Although comparatively homogeneous in race, religion and language, Syria has still far to go before becoming a nation. The President rarely leaves Damascus, the Damascenes form too large a proportion of the Government and administration. Except in opposition to the French, there is little community of interests between the out-districts and the capital, and the tribal and provincial leaders complain of systematic governmental neglect. The French have successfully played on this feeling in the past, and some French officials are still doing so. Unless the President and the Government can rid themselves sufficiently of their present tendency to "Damascus-mindedness" to give the provinces a fair share of governmental care, and their notables a fair chance of office, they will have to face recurring troubles in the provinces of the type that have recently taken place in the Alaouites.

7. I have myself but little experience of Iraq or Persia, but of those whom I have consulted, several know both countries well, in addition to Syria, and they consider that the Syrians are more intelligent and potentially more capable than the Iraqis or the Persians. There is a residue of Turkish-trained senior officials, who have some notion of administration but also the usual Turkish faults. The country lacks competent junior officials, there is no tradition of public life amongst her leading families, the scions of which, if they work at all, generally enter one of the liberal professions. But if foreign advisers and technicians are made available and properly used, and a better sense of public duty is developed amongst the younger generation, there is hope for the future.

8. Persecution of minorities appears improbable, for the Syrians, though their religious sheikhs are amongst the most reactionary and bigoted of Islam, are not themselves fanatical, and will have too great a need of foreign Powers to risk thus alienating them. The minorities themselves, however, would have to play their part; the French have in the past spoiled them by extending to them a degree of protection which amounted to favouritism, thus breeding in them a feeling of superiority which often causes them to exaggerate their rights or grievances. Provided that they could divest themselves of this feeling and consider themselves first and foremost as Syrians, they should have little or nothing to fear.

9. The police and gendarmerie, given adequate equipment (including a mobile striking force) should suffice to keep order amongst the sedentary and semi-sedentary population in normal circumstances, as the populations, although they contain unruly elements in both the urban and rural districts, are usually amenable to a show of force. They should also be able to enforce the processes of law, the collection of taxes, &c. Only in a severe political or economic crisis, such as might in any country lead to the employment of troops, would there be a likelihood of a complete loss of control. Such occasions would probably be rare.

10. Democracy in Syria works no better than in other Arab States; democracy combined with republicanism is still more unsuited to the fickle, self-seeking, hypocritical Syrians. The feudal organisation of the country and the ignorance and illiteracy of the masses are at present effective bars to any real popular representation; the Chamber of Deputies is ranged according to personalities, not policies, and the manifest lack of civic spirit amongst even the more enlightened leaders will always form a serious obstacle to the promulgation of legislation calling for sacrifices from the population. A benevolent autocracy would probably suit the country far better, but in present circumstances the establishment of such a ruler seems remote. If the present régime continued, it could probably rub along much as at present in normal times, with Governments succeeding each other at short intervals and the administrative machinery creaking but turning; but the impact of an economic blizzard or other severe crisis might well prove too great a strain.

11. In the Lebanon the problem is different, and more complicated. The population structure is split by confessional fissures. Christian-Moslem hostility, resulting partly from history and partly from the clash between their respective Occidental and Oriental cultures, is not always outwardly apparent, but smoulders beneath the surface and breaks out on occasion. The more enlightened Christian families intermarry to some extent; Christians with Moslems seldom or never. The Maronite Patriarch and other Christian prelates jealously guard their communities' real or fancied interests, and still wield more power than any Government have up to the present felt able to defy. The provision in the Constitution that all communities must be equitably represented in the administration has by tradition been carried to such lengths that nowadays not only Ministers but judges and even gendarmes must be so chosen as to preserve the proportional distribution of such posts amongst the communities. A more

formidable obstacle to the emergence of a true national consciousness or an efficient administration can hardly be imagined.

12. Republican democracy is even less successful in the Lebanon than in Syria: the country is too small, the ruling classes too level in calibre and too much inter-related. Chamber debates, and politics in general, are squabbles between cliques. Centuries of domination or protection, and a common consciousness of minority status, have deprived all but a few Lebanese of any civic spirit or true nationalist feeling. The Lebanon, even more than Syria, requires to be ruled, but it is difficult to conceive what type of ruler could impose his authority on these conflicting elements.

13. The Lebanese are widely regarded as the most intelligent of all Middle-Eastern peoples, and have some officials and politicians of a relatively high standard. In general, the competence of the administration is lower than in Syria, but it manages to keep going somehow in present conditions. Serious disturbances are rare and short-lived, and a small display of force quells them; there can hardly be a minority problem in a State where no community has a clear majority; and so far the security services have sufficed for the normal functions of government. But it is even more likely than in Syria that a serious crisis would produce a complete breakdown in an unaided administration.

14. To turn now to the economic and financial aspect. Between 1930 and 1940 the Levant States, as a unit, had an unfavourable balance of trade of some £S.323,000,000. Their combined payments were balanced by the following main types of invisible export: (i) French military and civil expenditure, (ii) remittances from emigrants, (iii) the expenditure of foreign tourists, and (iv) the proceeds of hashish grown and smuggled out. Of these (i), like so much else, depends on future relations between the States and France; (ii) and (iii) apply rather to the Lebanon, and (iv) is an unknown quantity, the continuance or disappearance of which would depend on many extraneous factors.

15. Syria has no major source of wealth, such as the oil of Iraq or the cotton of Egypt. Since the excision of the Hatay, she has no satisfactory port. She has normally an exportable surplus of cereals and other agricultural products, wool, &c., if markets can be found for them in the face of world competition, and her textile industry, which has developed under sheltered conditions during the war years, may aid her towards self-sufficiency. The Lebanon has one good port, Beirut, and one secondary port, Tripoli; no major visible export (except silk, if it can survive post-war Far-Eastern competition); and the somewhat doubtful invisible exports referred to in the preceding paragraph.

16. Both States built up large budget reserves during the war; at the end of December 1943 these were: Syria, £S.25,900,000; Lebanon, £S.19,600,000. The Lebanon, at least, is, however, believed to be dissipating her reserves by losses on her supply services and on a five-year plan of development. Since some 70 per cent. of the revenue of both States comes from indirect taxation, the end of the war and the withdrawal of British troops is likely to cause revenue to shrink more rapidly than expenditure; and the process will be accentuated if in addition the *Troupes Spéciales* are transferred to the States and if French military forces no longer garrison the States. Budget deficits are therefore to be foreseen after the war.

17. Furthermore, there is little local confidence in the currency, in view of the several devaluations it has suffered during the last twenty-five years. If the French guarantee of it were withdrawn and were not replaced by some other, a rush on foreign currency, with consequent deflation of the countries' reserves of foreign exchange and ultimate depreciation of the currency, would almost inevitably result.

18. On present showing, there are few signs that the legislatures of either State would show the necessary sense of responsibility to initiate unaided any drastic measure which such a situation might call for, or that the ignorant electorate would support them if they did.

19. On the other hand, the situation described in paragraph 17 above is unlikely to occur for some time after the war. At present the two States together have large holdings of foreign exchange (£41,650,000 in francs and sterling on the 31st December, 1944). This, plus the proceeds of exports, should enable them to pay their way for a considerable period. Neither State has contracted foreign loans; neither has any internal debt. Much would depend on the manner in which the post-war situation, complicated as it would be by internal politics and factors arising out of the struggle for liberation from French control, was tackled by the Governments. Much, also, would depend on imponderables, such as the world economic situation, the international arrangements made for dealing with

it, and the extent to which the two States could succeed in marketing their relatively uninteresting products. During this period, disinterested foreign advisers would be of the greatest service.

20. The observations in paragraphs 13-18 above are founded on the assumption that Syria and the Lebanon will continue to function as a unit for customs purposes and will be able to maintain harmony in their mutual economic relations. This, however, is not necessarily true; there is bitter mutual rivalry between Syrian and Lebanese commercial interests, which is at present generally being subordinated to the desire of the two Governments to form a common front against the French but which in normal times might easily result in serious differences on such issues as tariffs. In 1937 the two States not only failed to reach agreement on the division between them of the *intérêts communs* revenues (which include customs dues), but as a result levied *octroi* dues on each other's products. The consequences of such eventual disagreements might be far reaching.

21. In the preceding paragraphs every endeavour has been made to give an objective picture of conditions in the Levant States, as I and my advisers see them. If it seems not too rosy, from the point of view of "viability," I would again suggest that the standard by which the States are to be judged should not be set too high. As regards their ability to stand on their own legs, I agree with Sir E. Spears that if Syria can overcome the main obstacles with which she is confronted, namely, French political interference amongst her minorities, the absence of cohesion in her outlying provinces and the lack of capable administrators (in which I would include efficient civil servants), she ought, with reasonable luck, to make a good enough showing, in comparison with other Middle Eastern countries, provided she will accept and properly use the foreign advice and technical assistance which she will clearly need for some time to come and provided that advice and assistance is given in a truly co-operative spirit and without ulterior motives. It is to be expected that in the difficult post-war period help of this kind will be particularly necessary; and it seems clear, from what has been written above, that either a French or some other guarantee of Syrian and Lebanese currency will be essential. Like Sir E. Spears, I doubt whether the above degree of assistance would suffice in the case of the Lebanon, which is so much less a nation even than Syria and where conditions seem such as to call, in greater measure, for support and guidance from outside sources.

22. It remains to consider, in relation to the foregoing, the question whether the Arab League is likely to be of help to the States and, above all, the future position of France as regards the States. It is too early to forecast with any confidence the results which may flow from the Arab League, but if it were to bring about intelligent measures in the economic sphere, such as the lowering or abolition of customs barriers and other economic impedimenta, the "viability" of the Levant States would be enhanced. Unfortunately, it seems more likely that the chief preoccupations of the League will be political rather than economic; and its utility, from the point of view of the problem now under consideration, will depend on the extent of its readiness to co-operate with and be guided by such international organisations as may be set up after the war. If it were to serve merely as a political umbrella, under which the nationalistic tendencies of the Arab States would be encouraged, the Levant States would no doubt seek to use it not only as cover for stiffer resistance against any French attempts on their political or economic position but also, perhaps, against the acceptance of the advice and assistance from foreign sources, whether French or other, which they so plainly need.

23. As regards France's position and attitude, which must to so great an extent be the determining factor in this and any other problem affecting the Levant States, there appear to be three main possibilities:—

- (1) that the French will withdraw, or be forced to withdraw, any measure of control from the States, leaving only diplomatic representation and normal cultural and commercial interests;
- (2) that the French will retain some control, but will achieve relations with the States Governments broadly similar to those which characterise our own relations with Iraq;
- (3) that the French, while retaining some control, will remain on the same terms of mutual suspicion and dislike with the States as at present.

It is clear that a continuance of (3) would not only not enhance the "viability" of the States but would sooner or later lead to an explosion which would have grave effects throughout the Middle East; (2) appears to be what the French

Government are aiming at, and (1) what the States are hoping to secure from the forthcoming negotiations with France. Whether or not (2) would work would depend on the establishment of relations of real confidence between the States and France and on French behaviour in the future. Such relations do not exist; and many competent observers consider that they never can. Until General Beynet has returned from Paris and we know what proposals he makes to the States' Governments and how far the latter are likely to accept them, there is little more that can be said. There is for the time being a *détente* in the relations between France and the States, and there may perhaps be some ground for hope that a settlement of outstanding questions between them, together with a change in French mentality towards the States, may lead to better relations. If this should come about, it may be that the fact that the system of administration in the States is in many respects based on the French model, coupled with the realisation of the hold which the French have over finance, may eventually convince the local Governments that they can ill afford to dispense with French advice and assistance altogether.

24. But for the moment it seems clear from statements by Syrian political leaders—notably by the Prime Minister, as reported in my telegram No. 239 of the 11th April—that they regard the present *détente* as a prelude to the recognition by France of their full independence and sovereignty, which would mean the abandonment of any French claim to predominance. They continue to state that they will not accord her a position analogous to ours in Iraq; and if any attempt were made to compel them to accept such a position against their will, they would certainly resist it tooth and nail and would invoke the aid of the Arab League and of the Great Powers, especially those which have given unqualified recognition to their independence. It is only to be expected that any Government representative of the present Greater Lebanon would take a similar line; but it is impossible to exclude the possibility that the French, if they failed to secure their desiderata in Syria or the present Lebanon, might try, by hook or by crook, to ensure for themselves a predominant position in a small, mainly Christian, Lebanon. The wider effects of such a venture lie beyond the scope of this despatch; it will suffice to say here that, in so far as can be seen, such a State would only be "viable" as a mere appanage of France.

25. I cannot conclude this despatch without an apology for its length. My excuse must be the complexity of the subject. In so far as it is possible to sum the matter up, having regard to the position of France as well as conditions in the States themselves, I would say—

- (1) that both States will need help from outside sources—and the Lebanon help in large measure—for some time to come;
- (2) that although France may seem, at least in her own eyes, to be the Power indicated to give such help, her past record still inspires such mistrust in the States that they will not willingly accept it from her alone;
- (3) that the States themselves, and especially the Lebanon, probably do not now appreciate fully how much help they will need and that nationalist fervour may well incline them rather to muddle along in their own way;
- (4) that if they do come to realise their need, they will, on present indications, seek help from other sources than France, though it is possible that the establishment of better relations with her may make them more ready than they now are to accept something from her;
- (5) that of the Great Powers, they would prefer to look to us or to the United States of America; but that Syria at least would hotly resent any attempt to force help upon her or to impose any form of "trusteeship."

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 2781/14/89]

No. 21.

Record of Conversation with Syrian President on 19th April, 1945.—(Communicated in Beirut Despatch No. 64 of 20th April; Received in Foreign Office, 2nd May.)

I CALLED on the Syrian President this afternoon. He complained of the long delay in General Beynet's return. The general had spoken of a week or ten days when he left; it was now over a month. I told the President that these

things inevitably took time in European capitals where there were so many pressing problems to deal with. The President, however, continued to maintain that the French were deliberately spinning things out. They were now putting it about that they would not hand over the *Troupes Spéciales* as long as the British troops remained here. The President said he believed it was the intention that British troops should come here for rest and training as long as the war with Japan went on. The Syrians for their part wanted to make any contribution they could in the way of facilities for us. The above was the latest French argument for putting things off.

2. M. Bidault, the President went on, had also now suggested that the Syrian Prime Minister should discuss outstanding questions with him at San Francisco. This, the President believed, was only another device of a similar kind. Why could not General Beynet come back and discuss matters here, as arranged? The French, he said, were not taking the independence of these countries seriously. They clearly did not want a settlement until after the San Francisco Conference and the end of the war. They thought time would be on their side; but he was not so sure.

3. The President then spoke at some length about the French desire for a military mission, if and when the Syrians obtained their national army. If the *Troupes Spéciales* were passed to the States as they were, with the existing French officers, &c., what need was there of a military mission? Moreover, the Syrians did not wish to be bound to France in a military sense; they were members of the Arab League; Syria formed with the other Arab countries, which had treaties with us, a common area of defence. He did not think it wise that Syria's armaments, training, &c., should be different from those of the other Arab States. He would far prefer a British military mission, if one was necessary at all. And what of the expense? Syria had no real need of an army; gendarmeries, properly armed, *gardes mobiles*, and special formations for Bedouin control were all that were necessary. (This, of course, bears out what we have always said, that the Syrians do not really want the *Troupes Spéciales* as a national army but want to get them away from French control.)

4. The President went on to say that military missions like we had in Iraq or Egypt were all right, but the French would never behave as we did if they had one here. They would always seek to control things as far as they could and to maintain their old position as long as there were any of them left in the Levant States. He did not believe they were capable of changing their mentality or their methods. An Englishman was always an Englishman, wherever he was, and could be trusted to carry out his undertakings; the French were quite different when they were abroad. Their *Sûreté aux Armées* here was mainly concerned with espionage and putting spokes in the wheels of the Government. A military mission would, he believed, be no better.

5. I told the President again of the constant efforts we had made to urge on the French Government the need for speed and moderation in every respect, but he clearly remained unconvinced. He also argued that a French military mission would mean a privilege for France. What would the Americans and the Russians say to that?

6. Lastly, the President referred to the long delay—particularly over the *Troupes Spéciales*—as embarrassing to the Government. "We shall inevitably be attacked," he said, "and our people will be right to attack us if we fail to secure the *Troupes Spéciales*."

7. Altogether rather a gloomy conversation, especially as we have reason to believe that the French will not merely want a military mission but a military base here.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 3122/8/89]

No. 22.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th May.)

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Beirut, 30th April, 1945.

IT is now some four months since I took up my appointment in the Levant States and a certain *détente* has been achieved in the relations between France and the States, with which I have been particularly occupied since my arrival. A stage has thus been reached at which it seems opportune to review the events of the period in a despatch with special regard to those relations.

[31729]

2. When I reached the Levant States just before Christmas, their Governments were in a state of depression and anxiety owing to the departure of Major-General Sir Edward Spears. His remarkable personality, his great talents—not least his aptitude for public speaking in French as well as English—his tireless energy, his gift of personal appeal to people in these countries in all walks of life and, above all, his championship of the cause which is closest to their hearts—their independence—had won him a position here which was altogether exceptional for a foreigner. The Governments turned to him for advice in a multitude of matters, great and small. The people often acclaimed him in the streets. The tributes paid to him and Lady Spears, who had also gained the esteem and affection of the States to a remarkable degree, when it was known that they were about to leave, were quite unusual. Streets in capital cities have no doubt often been named after distinguished soldiers or servants of the Crown; but it must be rare for one of His Majesty's representatives to be made an honorary citizen of the countries in which he served. Sir E. Spears had indeed set the prestige of Great Britain high in the Levant States where the French alone showed no regret at his departure. His place here was not easy to take.

3. Anxiety lest a change in British representation might betoken a change in British policy was widespread in the States. In the autumn of 1944 Sir E. Spears had impressed on both Governments the need for settling outstanding questions with France; but the subsequent negotiations had ended, almost at once, in a deadlock. The French had firmly refused to concede the principal demand of the States, namely, the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, except as part of a general settlement of outstanding questions, and they had proposed to the local Governments the heads of a number of conventions of which the Governments fought shy. In this attitude they were influenced by the text of a "convention universitaire," which the French had put forward earlier on and which contained demands so extravagant in the whole field of local education that the Governments would not even consider it as a basis for negotiation. Thereafter relations between the Governments and the French had steadily deteriorated. With Sir E. Spears's departure the States inevitably felt that they were losing a great strength and stay; the Governments were apprehensive lest His Majesty's Government might be about to exert stronger pressure on them to make concessions to France which they would regard as derogatory to their independence, so recently recognised by the United States and the Soviet Union without the qualification we had made concerning a privileged position for France; and the fear that we might be about to leave the States in the lurch evoked, not infrequently, memories of 1919 and 1920.

4. My arrival at Beirut coincided with that of a French cruiser, the *Emil Bertin*, flying the flag of Admiral Auboyneau, whose demeanour on a previous visit had aroused considerable feeling in the States. This time, thanks to prior warnings given to the French, the visit passed off without incident. But nerves were highly strung and relations between the States and the French were daily becoming more strained. Personal contacts between the local French authorities and members of the Syrian Government had virtually ceased; they merely exchanged curt notes. One of these, from the French side, was accompanied by the despatch of a number of French tanks to Damascus—about the same time as the arrival of the French cruiser at Beirut. If relations between the French *Délégation Générale* and the Lebanese Government seemed outwardly somewhat better—the Lebanese notes were at least couched in more diplomatic language than the Syrian and there were still personal contacts between members of the Government and French officials—the difference existed only on the surface. A change of Government in the Lebanon, entailing the replacement of Riad Solh as Prime Minister by Abdul Hamid Kerami, a Moslem of Tripoli, who made no secret of his antipathy for the French, seemed unlikely to result in any improvement in this respect. The sudden death of the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Selim Takla, who had retained his office in the new Cabinet, deprived the Administration of a man who had some experience of affairs and who was notable for having no private fortune. Another serious development in the Lebanon was the grave illness of the President, who was to all intents and purposes to remain incapable of transacting public business for the next three months.

5. The procedure for selecting a successor to Salim Takla provided, for a newcomer to the Lebanon, a striking example of the curious system under which adequate representation must be assured to the various religious communities, not only in the Cabinet but also in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Administration generally. I have alluded to this in my despatch No. 63 of the 19th April about the "viability" of the Levant States. Under this system, the choice of Selim

Takla's successor in the Cabinet (though not necessarily as Minister for Foreign Affairs) was limited to the Greek Catholic community. The only two candidates considered suitable were M. Henri Pharaon, a millionaire banker whose main interest was the turf, and the Lebanese Minister in Cairo. The former was chosen and, in fact, became Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. In view of your instructions to me concerning the importance to His Majesty's Government of the friendship of the Arab peoples in the Middle East and that the Levant States should be conscious of the value of our support, my efforts were primarily directed in these circumstances to restoring, in so far as I could, the confidence of the local Governments. In establishing relations with them their knowledge that I had just served for nearly five years in Egypt and was not a stranger to the Middle East was undoubtedly a help. As you had also instructed me that one of my principal duties would be to assist in the final settlement of the questions outstanding between the States and the French, I made it clear that I would endeavour also to be on good terms with the French *Délégation Générale*. "By all means start your mission here, if you like, by being Francophile," said the Syrian President; "How pleasant your mission here would be if it were not for the French," said the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In my early interviews with them—and also with the Lebanese political leaders—I avoided contentious questions though I did at intervals put in a few words about settling matters with the French. These, I am bound to say, were not too well received. The Syrians and Lebanese treated me to long discourses about the misdeeds, past and present, of the French. They not infrequently displayed the anxiety to which I have referred above; and the main theme, throughout their talks with me, was that, come what might, they would never again consent to French predominance or privilege in any form. Sir Edward Grigg, who visited these countries shortly after my arrival, was deeply impressed by their determination in this respect, as indeed I was myself.

7. Circumstances led me to devote my attention at the outset mainly to Syria, where the situation was more disturbing than in the Lebanon. There the burning question of the *Troupes Spéciales* was leading to a rapid deterioration in relations with the French. There was little doubt that the Syrian Government, who were under severe criticism in the Chamber of Deputies and in the country generally, were not averse to playing up this issue in order to distract attention from their administrative shortcomings. Demonstrations, mainly of students and school-children, calling for a national army and giving vent to anti-French slogans, took place up and down the country and eventually got so much out of hand that the Government had the greatest difficulty in restraining them. The French, on their side, made some show of military defence measures for their installations in the principal towns, particularly in Damascus. The Syrian Government complained to us of these as likely to inflame public opinion still further. A somewhat serious incident took place at Soueida in the Druse country, where the windows of the French Officers' Club were broken by demonstrators. Even if the situation was at no time grave, there was always the danger that in such an explosive atmosphere a spark, like that of Soueida, might start a fire. In these circumstances the Army commander and I did all in our power to urge the Syrian President and Government to suppress the demonstrations and keep their people quiet. We also impressed on the French authorities the need for avoiding any provocative action. M. Georges Delcoigne, the Belgian *Chargé d'Affaires*, was of great assistance in urging moderation on the Syrians, as were also the representatives of the Arab States, not least, I believe, Hakki Bey, the newly arrived Egyptian Minister.

8. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris had been instructed to make strong representations to the French Government about the situation in the Levant States. He was to inform them of your grave concern at the complete lack of progress over the questions of the *Troupes Spéciales* and the further armament of the gendarmeries and to point out how essential it was that the French should adopt a more realistic attitude towards the States if serious trouble was to be avoided. In your telegram No. 153 of the 26th January to Mr. Duff Cooper, you said that, provided France followed the policy to which she was committed and gave the States full independence, French and British interests there ran parallel and did not conflict in any major respect. It did not, however, follow from this that we could allow the French to do as they wished in the States or that we could make a bargain with them at the expense of the States' independence. Great Britain's whole position in the Middle East would be gravely threatened if the French followed in the States a policy which was

inconsistent with ours and with what the whole Egypto-Arab world had come to regard as essential and right. We should meet with very great criticism both at home and in the Commonwealth and empire if, by failing to keep the French up to their promises, we found our whole position threatened in the Middle East where we had fought so hard to maintain it. We were entitled to expect the French not to put us in this position; and were they to do so, not the Arab world alone but also the United States and probably the Soviet Union would take the side of the Syrians and Lebanese against them and they would not be able to maintain their position. If the French were not prepared to come to terms with the States on conditions which the Arab world and the Great Powers could regard as acceptable, they would be faced with a general attack on their position which must prove highly embarrassing to them in the coming year. There must be no misunderstanding as regards the assistance which His Majesty's Government could give to the French to secure a predominant position in the States. While we were willing that the two sides should reach a freely negotiated settlement and to use our influence as mediator to bring them together, there could be no question of our joining the French in an attempt to coerce the States if they maintained their refusal to agree to a French predominant position. The French must see that there were limits to the extent to which we were prepared to incur mistrust and hostility, or, still more, endanger our position in the Middle East on their behalf. Any attempt to interfere with the internal affairs of the Levant States or to produce artificially the complacency of their Governments or to overawe them with troops or tanks would have the worst possible effect. You also spoke of the importance of eradicating the "mandatory mentality."

9. In this latter connexion, it was of interest that the French *délégué*-general, in an early conversation with me, had spontaneously said that he had too many officers here, many of them of the wrong mentality for present times, and that he would be glad to be able to send them home and keep only a few picked men. Although General Beynet himself had been known on occasion to speak unguardedly and menacingly about local affairs and the French *Délégation-Générale* gave constant offence to the local Governments and the Diplomatic Corps by maintaining as far as possible the trappings of the mandatory régime, the general's attitude appeared on the whole to be more reasonable than that of many of his subordinates, over whom, however, he seemed to exercise all too little control. There was certainly ample justification for the frequent complaints of the local authorities about French pretensions and intrigues; and one of the demands which they made of the *Délégation Générale* was for its reduction to the status of the normal diplomatic mission.

10. Early in February I received your instructions to press the States' Governments at least to find out what the French wanted in the way of a final settlement and not merely to remain entrenched in their attitude of refusing to discuss anything with them. There seemed to be indications both in Syria and the Lebanon that certain Ministers were beginning to feel that this attitude would get them nowhere and that they would be better advised to take some initiative themselves, such as preparing a draft treaty for submission to all the four Great Powers. They realised that this would in no way satisfy the French claim for a "special" position, which General de Gaulle had recently reaffirmed—with the inevitable result that public opinion became further inflamed against France—but they felt that if there were any chance of the other three Powers accepting their proposals, this would bring into relief the unjust nature of the French demands on them and would therefore strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* world opinion. The Lebanon, as regards foreign policy, was tagging along behind Syria without taking any initiative of its own. The Lebanese Government were weak and were being hampered by the artificial agitation, created largely by French propaganda and the manoeuvres of Opposition Deputies, to the effect that the promulgation of the Alexandria Protocol on Arab unity would have the effect of selling the Christians down the river. Both Syrian and Lebanese Governments seemed determined, however, to walk hand in hand, at least outwardly.

11. Neither Count Ostrorog, General Beynet's second in command, who took the opportunity on his return from Europe to pay some courtesy visits to Syrian personalities and had been treated to some plain speaking by the Syrian President, nor my United States colleague, who was expecting instructions from the State Department to support our efforts to bring the local Governments and the French together again for discussion, considered that there was any prospect of success if negotiations were resumed at the moment. And so indeed it seemed to me. But you pointed out the danger of allowing the present state of tension to continue; and early in February I pressed the Syrian President and the Minister

for Foreign Affairs strongly to resume discussion of outstanding questions with the French. In brief, I pointed out that there were many things which the French badly wanted and which the Syrians could perfectly well concede without infringing their independence; and that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the best way to start negotiations would be to tackle the easier questions first, in the hope that when these had been cleared out of the way it would prove possible to go on to the more difficult ones.

12. The Syrians, as usual, expressed complete scepticism as to French good faith, whilst maintaining that they themselves were perfectly prepared to consider anything that would not infringe their sovereignty. After a long argument, they declined to put forward proposals on their side, but said they would ask the French for theirs. This they did; Count Ostrorog came over two days later and had an unusually cordial interview with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a result of which he agreed to suggest to General Beynet that the French Government should be asked to state their proposals. Jamil Mardam Bey emphasised that the Syrians had only one demand, the immediate transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, and only one condition, that they would not give France a pre-eminent or privileged position. The French were undoubtedly appreciative of what had been done to bring the Syrians to a more reasonable frame of mind and of our repeated efforts to prevent the spread of disorder. The Syrian Government for their part did their best throughout this time to calm down the students and to keep the Chamber of Deputies quiet. The Syrians and Lebanese were at this point contemplating sending a statement of their case to the "Big Three" in anticipation of their forthcoming meeting, but as discussions with the French had now started I headed them off and they did not pursue the idea.

13. In February the Syrian President received an invitation from King Ibn Saud to visit him in the Hedjaz, and a Royal Air Force aircraft was provided for the journey, as it was clear that their meeting might be useful. The French authorities were informed; in Paris they appeared to think that the President ought to have travelled in a French aircraft, which only showed how little they knew of the strong feelings of the Syrian President. The King and the President had long discussions during which Shukri Quwatli stated the Syrian case and Ibn Saud, as usual, urged him to follow British advice and to be reasonable in negotiating with the French. Shukri Quwatli's attitude does not seem to have been much influenced by this meeting.

14. Meanwhile it had been learned that King Ibn Saud was going to Egypt to meet the Prime Minister and yourself, and as the Syrian President was paying an official visit to the King of Egypt about the same time, it was arranged for Mr. Churchill and you, Sir, to meet him. This meeting, which I attended, took place on the 17th February. The Syrian President had the satisfaction of stating his case to the British Ministers who, in return, explained British policy to him. Shukri Quwatli said he hoped that the situation in Syria would improve and that the Syrian Government would enjoy the help and support of Great Britain in overcoming the present difficulties. The Syrians' ambition was to have peace and tranquillity in their country but they had suffered much provocation; and although every effort had been and would be made to preserve tranquillity he was afraid that if the present state of affairs continued, the situation might get out of hand. He pressed for the transfer to Syrian control of the *Troupes Spéciales*, who were composed of Syrians; the fact that they might be used against the Syrian Government was a standing provocation. And there had lately been a number of others. The French Government had issued a statement that France was responsible for the maintenance of order in Syria; General de Gaulle had repeated that France required a special position; and there had just been an incident in the Alaouite territory, where the French had been encouraging the followers of Suleiman Murshid, a local chieftain, against the Syrian authorities. The Syrian Government had sent gendarmes to liquidate the incident and the French had then sent troops and had prevented the gendarmes from carrying out the task assigned to them (see below). The President emphasised that the Syrians would not grant France a privileged position. They wished to co-ordinate their policy with that of the other Arab States and they were not prepared to link their fate with that of France.

15. You, Sir, explained that the French had been urged to communicate their proposals to the Syrian Government. If some points were unacceptable, the Syrians should put forward counter-proposals and give the French all they could. Great Britain and the United States would be in a position to support them if the counter-proposals were reasonable. An agreement would not

necessarily mean that Syrian foreign policy would be subordinate to French foreign policy. You were not asking for anything contrary to Syrian independence. Everything ought to be arranged before the British troops left the Levant; we had made repeated representations in Paris concerning French relations with the Levant States; you were sure that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs wanted an agreement, that he did not believe we were trying to replace the French in the States and that he did not wish to provoke the Syrians. But he would make no concession about the *Troupes Spéciales* without something in return.

16. The Prime Minister said he was anxious to convince the French that we did not aim at replacing them in the Levant States. We wanted nothing for ourselves. France must recognise the independence of the States but if she made arrangements with Syria by which she got a somewhat better position there than His Majesty's Government, we should not object. It was, of course, understood that this should not affect the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. The Syrians, for their part, must give something reasonable to the French, who must have a position of some sort. They should handle the question tactfully and settle it without quarrels, which were very annoying to His Majesty's Government. They should not trample on French *amour-propre*, which had been greatly shaken by the war; they should be confident in their friends and in the world organisation which would be set up. They could afford to be generous to France. His Majesty's Government were friends both of the French and the Arabs; they would be pleased with any arrangement which could be made and an arrangement which gave France a somewhat better or different position from ourselves need not affect Syrian independence. He had said publicly that the situation of the French in the Levant States might be similar to ourselves in Iraq; as he understood the position the Syrians were not prepared to go so far. (The President confirmed this.) Nevertheless, they should go as far as possible. If they remained intransigent there would certainly be trouble. British troops would not stay in the Levant States indefinitely. Negotiations should begin soon; but the Syrians should not try to force the issue prematurely. Their long-term position was no bad one.

17. The President thanked the Prime Minister for the sympathy which he had shown to Syria and for his advice. He was himself sure that it was not the British aim to replace the French. It was essential in the Syrian Government's view that the question of the *Troupes Spéciales* should be settled before the British troops left. The Prime Minister could count on him to handle the situation carefully. But he earnestly hoped that there would be no undue provocation.

18. This interview was particularly useful in view of a statement by the Minister of State in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had "endorsed" but not "guaranteed" the independence of the States, to which altogether disproportionate publicity was given in the States. The position of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Levant States and France was restated by Mr. Churchill during his speech in the House of Commons on the 27th February, in the following terms:—

"I must make clear, once and for all, the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French allies. The position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavours to preserve a special position for France in view of the many cultural and historic connexions, which France has so long established with Syria. We hope that it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organisation, and that French privilege will also be recognised.

"However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian or Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both, and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not be placed, therefore, upon the shoulders of Great Britain alone. We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States have recognised and favour Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favour any special position for any other foreign country."

19. Meanwhile an unpleasant situation had developed in the Alaouite territory. I have reported on this at length in my despatch No. 45 of the 19th March; but as the matter was of importance because it raised in a somewhat acute form the question of French rights under the territorial command recognised in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, and of interest as throwing light on French behaviour in an area where the Syrian Government were under difficulties, some account of it cannot well be omitted from this review of events. The fundamental cause of trouble in the area was the acquisition of other people's property by a local chieftain, Suleiman Murshid, who had a considerable following amongst the Alaouites and was, according to their doctrine, regarded as semi-divine. Murshid had for years enjoyed at least the tacit support of the French. In the Spring of 1944 the Syrian Government felt it was time to put a stop to Murshid's depredations which had given rise to many complaints and constant disturbances in the area. They appointed a Court of Arbitration to consider the various claims against him. Murshid, fearing that this would result in the loss of all his property, retracted his consent to arbitration and refused to give evidence before the Court. The Syrian Government thereupon placed him in forced residence in Damascus, although he was a Deputy, and no further progress was made in settling his claims. In January 1945 the Syrian Government received information that French officers, particularly one Captain Boussiquet, were stirring up trouble in the area by encouraging and even arming the Murshidites; and it is significant that early in February Colonel Gaussot, the French delegate at Lattakia, resigned and made no secret of the fact that he had done so because he resented the encouragement given by the French *Délégation Générale* to the political activities of Captain Boussiquet. Fighting broke out in the area early in February between the Murshidites and the followers of a rival chieftain, and the Syrian Government determined to reinforce the Gendarmerie in order to suppress disorder. Before the Gendarmerie could deal with the situation, French forces, sent up against the wishes of the Syrian authorities, arrived on the scene and formed a screen between the Murshidites and the Gendarmerie. The Syrian Government appealed to the Army Commander and me against this action on the part of the local French authorities which they regarded as an infringement of their prerogative to maintain law and order.

20. Public opinion in the Levant States had recently been inflamed by a statement by General de Gaulle to the effect that France was responsible for maintaining order in the States. It had been agreed in 1944 between the British and French military authorities that, the maintenance of law and order being the responsibility of the States, these should, when reinforcements were required for the purpose, make application to the French Territorial Commander, who would meet these requests so far as his operational commitments permitted; and that the decision as to how many troops were maintained for the purpose of maintaining law and order was one for the Governments of the States in conjunction with the French military authorities. In the present case the Government maintained that the Gendarmerie, if left to themselves, could have dealt with the insurgents; and how, they asked, could they be expected to invoke the help of the French, who, on all the evidence available, were encouraging the forces of disorder? General Holmes and I discussed the matter with General Beynet, who agreed to the establishment of a Syrian-Anglo-French Commission to enquire into the causes and circumstances. This the Syrians would not accept, mainly because they did not wish to admit French participation. You, Sir, pressed the Syrian President in Cairo to agree to the proposed Commission; but on my return here, it proved impossible to draft terms of reference acceptable to the parties concerned. Moreover, General Holmes and I had to explain to the Syrian President that as the territorial command was in the hands of the French, military intervention on our part was impossible in such cases, unless a major conflagration occurred. This resulted in a change of attitude on the President's part and he agreed in a subsequent interview with General Beynet that the French troops and *Troupes Spéciales* as well as the Gendarmerie should be withdrawn from the area. Negotiations between the Syrian and French authorities have so far failed to result in effect being given to this decision; nor has any action yet been taken by the Syrian authorities to settle the claims against Murshid, despite constant pressure on our part to find some means of doing this. The position in the Alaouite territory thus remains thoroughly unsatisfactory. The writ of the Syrian Government does not run in the area of the disturbances, which is to all intents and purposes under French control. The rising prestige of the Syrian Government in the area has again been reduced almost to vanishing point and other chieftains

are showing signs of setting themselves up against the Government and of admitting only the control of the local French officials in future. If Syria is ever to be established as a fully sovereign State, these developments are retrograde; the French have clearly demonstrated both their intention and their power to exploit their holding of the territorial command as an argument for intervening directly, without consultation with the Government, in an area of disturbance; the possibility that such disturbances may be fomented by French political intrigue as a pretext for subsequent armed intervention and the ultimate creation of French controlled areas, particularly along the Littoral, has not been lost on the Syrian Government; and relations between the Syrian Government and the French authorities have been exacerbated at an unfortunate moment.

21. On the 18th February the United States Government instructed their Minister in Paris to represent to the French Government their view that the matters at issue between France and the States should admit of an amicable solution, that both sides should show moderation, and the French, if sincere in their professed intention of granting independence to the States, should agree to the conversion of their representation into the status of diplomatic missions, to the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, and to the modest scale of rearmament for the Gendarmerie recommended by General Holmes. He was to explain that the State Department appreciated the French desire to obtain assurances for the future protection of their rights, and that their Minister in Beirut was being instructed to urge the States Governments to enter into negotiations with the French; but to point out that the State Department had seen the first French draft of a University Convention, which in their opinion would injure American cultural interests. If necessary he was also to state that United States policy towards the independence of the Levant States was entirely distinct from their policy towards France and the French Empire. The United States Minister at Beirut was simultaneously instructed to inform the States of these representations in Paris and to urge them to adopt a more realistic attitude and to consent to undertake negotiations for a treaty with France which would not discriminate in favour of any third Power but would guarantee legitimate French interests. Mr. Wadsworth was also authorised to suggest informally that the two Governments might consider submitting treaty proposals simultaneously to France and to the major Allied Powers. He was to explain that these views did not indicate any retraction of United States recognition of the States' independence, but that, in the view of the State Department, the explosive potentialities of the situation were the relations of the Levant Governments with France, which constituted the fundamental problem to be solved in the last analysis. Mr. Wadsworth carried out his instructions in Damascus on the 20th February, in an interview with the Syrian President.

22. On the following day, after I had again seen the Syrian President and had urged him to get down to details, Shukri, Quwatli saw General Beynet. They appear to have reviewed the whole situation and General Beynet decided to go to Paris in order to discuss matters with the French Government and prepare proposals for submission to the States' Governments. He undertook to redraft locally the "Convention Universitaire" which had given so much offence to the States' Governments last year.

23. Throughout these weeks His Majesty's Government continued to press the French Government strongly to meet the Syrian request for proposals by forwarding them promptly and in as moderate a form as possible. Similar representations were made to the French authorities here. General Beynet left for Paris on the 9th March, and at the time of writing has not yet returned. The Syrian Government have constantly complained of the long delay and maintain that the French are trying to spin things out. Meanwhile the "Convention Universitaire" has been redrafted in a much more reasonable form; there are still points in it which the Syrians will not accept; but arrangements have been made for the draft to be discussed by a Franco-Syrian committee. General Beynet is expected to bring back with him particulars for Consular and Establishment Conventions; but there is as yet no detailed information as to French proposals with regard to the really important and difficult questions, namely, the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* and the future military position of France in the Levant States. The French Government appear not only to attach great importance to a satisfactory convention on cultural matters, but also to desire precedence for their representative here over all other diplomatic representatives and a military and air base.

24. The declarations of war by Egypt and Turkey and the Turkish Prime Minister's announcement of the decisions of the Yalta Conference caused both

Syria and the Lebanon to decide to declare war at all costs before the 1st March. Both Governments were warned on instructions from you that their names were not on the list of States agreed at Yalta, and that their entry into the war did not mean that they would be invited to the San Francisco Conference. Nevertheless, both decided to go ahead. Having declared war they put forward through the Egyptian Minister at Washington applications to join the United Nations and also asked to be invited to the Conference. Their case was strongly taken up by the other Arab States and by a group of British Members of Parliament. The French indicated to His Majesty's Government that they saw "danger" in their being invited, presumably because they thought the States would raise at San Francisco the question of their relations with France. The United States Government, however, felt that they should come, and China and the Soviet Union, on being approached, agreed. It was not, however, desired to invite them without French concurrence in view of the delicacy of their relations with France, and the fact that attempts were still being made to induce France to become an inviting Power. We, therefore, in agreement with the Americans, suggested to the French that they might improve their relations with the States if they took the initiative in asking for an invitation for them. Meanwhile the French authorities here, having been approached by the States' Governments, supported their candidature in Paris. On the 22nd March, M. Bidault announced publicly that France would welcome their presence, and the decision was taken to invite them after they had been accepted as United Nations. For a time, we had appeared to be the main obstacle; and a member of the French *Délégation Générale* was heard to say that the French had had a golden opportunity to exploit the position in favour of France. It is doubtful how far French sponsorship affected the feelings of the States towards France, but the States certainly seized upon it as further evidence of French acceptance of their full inclemence.

25. During March inter-Arab relations were much to the forefront in consequence of the pan-Arab Conferences in Cairo, which resulted in the signature of the statute of an Arab pact on the 22nd March. His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo has reported so fully on the Conference that I need only mention it briefly here. From the beginning, the old rivalry between Egypt and Iraq for leadership of the Arab League became evident. The Hashemites and Nuri Pasha, as initiators of the Arab movement, were piqued at being ousted by Egypt, a newcomer; Ibn Saud naturally aligned himself with Egypt; the Lebanon, fearful of domination by the Moslem States and regarding Egypt as less fanatical, followed suit; and Syria gradually evolved in the same direction because of her rulers' desire to preserve the Republican régime, and of their fears of Hashemite designs on their country. As for the statutes, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, who although inexperienced played a considerable rôle, succeeded in securing the deletion of a clause providing for compulsory arbitration by the other States of disputes between any two, and the insertion of a clause allowing any State to secede from the League on a year's notice. The clause in the Alexandria Protocol providing that no State could make a treaty with an outside Power against the interests of the other signatories was also deleted. The resulting League was therefore more loose in form than enthusiasts desired, and has disappointed the Moslems in both Syria and the Lebanon, although the extreme Christians are appeased. In his telegram No. 80 Saving of the 23rd March, Lord Killearn stated: "At present it may be said that the only aims on which all these States are united are those of getting rid of the French from Syria, and of preventing the Zionist domination of Palestine. Whatever discords may weaken the Arab League in the immediate future, we must count on its being united on these two issues."

26. After the Conference, a tri-partite treaty between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria was suggested, but we discouraged it as tending to disrupt the League at its inception. The Syrian President went to Bagdad on the 10th March for five days, but the visit was not a success; the Iraqis were angry, after what they considered they had done for Syria in the past, that he should have been to King Ibn Saud first, and treated him with marked coldness.

27. Meanwhile the internal situation in Syria had worsened since the easing of tension with the French. The Syrian President had taken the unprecedented step of addressing the Chamber of Deputies in person on the occasion of Syria's declaration of war. In his speech he also referred to the project for a Greater Syria, to the need for obedience to the Head of State, and to relations with the French. His statement that if there were to be a Greater Syria, it must be a republic with its capital at Damascus—made, no doubt, because of the widespread feeling in Syria in favour of a monarchy which there was every

evidence that the Hashemites were seeking to exploit—gave much offence and was seized upon by the Government's opponents, who pointed out that it was for the people, and not for the President, to choose the type of régime they preferred, and that Arab confederation was no substitute for Arab union. His statement about obedience was criticised as undemocratic; but his conciliatory references to the French were of all his remarks the most unpopular. A shower of anti-Government pamphlets was distributed on the principal Syrian towns, and various demonstrations, ostensibly anti-Zionist but actually anti-Government, took place; and it became increasingly obvious that the resumption by the President and the Government of a policy of resistance to France was the best method of regarding popularity.

28. In April it became clear that the Syrian Government were on their last legs, and on the 7th April a new Cabinet was formed. The Prime Minister, Fares el Khoury, retained his position as did the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamil Mardam Bey, and the new Cabinet received an almost unanimous vote of confidence in the Chamber, largely because it was considered advisable to make a show of solidarity on the eve of the departure of the Syrian delegation to San Francisco.

29. In the Lebanon the President returned to Beirut early in April from Palestine, where he had been receiving treatment during his long illness. He appeared to be in reasonably good health, but the Prime Minister complained to me that he had difficulty in inducing him to take decisions. The Government have gained more popularity by energetic action in the economic field, notably by implementing, as their predecessors had failed to do, the plans for controlling the textile industry and have shown energy in controlling prices. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Henri Pharaon, is, on the other hand, achieving considerable unpopularity by ill-advised interventions in matters outside his province and by flirtations with opposition elements, and he has also incurred lasting Moslem hostility on account of the part attributed to him in watering down the Arab pact. The Government's opponents, with Riad es Solh in the lead, are making him their chief target in their attacks on the Government. While the Riad es Solh group are obviously animated solely by the desire to return to power, the effect of their campaign will undoubtedly be to force the present Government to adopt a nationalistic line; and Riad es Solh's aim is probably to seize any weakness of theirs in this respect to return to power on a wave of nationalist and anti-French feeling. A hardening of public opinion in this sense has been perceptible of late, and this process is likely to be accentuated if General Beynet, on his return from Paris, makes proposals for an eventual settlement which the Lebanese regard as incompatible with their national sovereignty.

30. Long as it is, this despatch is by no means a complete record of the period under review. For instance, I have not touched upon the States' relations with Turkey or with the Soviet Union. As regards the latter, I have at present little or nothing to add to my despatch No. 37 of the 5th March. Nor have I considered here financial and economic matters; these, however, are to some extent covered in my despatch No. 63 of the 19th April, concerning the "viability" of the States. The present despatch is primarily intended as a review of events affecting the relations between the Levant States and France and as a background against which to set the conclusions drawn in my telegram from Damascus No. 83 of the 27th April.

31. In conclusion, I wish to pay my tribute to the General Officer Commanding Ninth Army. I had the privilege of knowing Lieutenant-General Sir George Holmes when he was General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt, and when I was appointed to this post I was indeed glad that it was with him that I should be working again. His great knowledge of these countries, the universal esteem in which he is held here, and his personal influence with the Governments of both States have enabled him to render signal service to His Majesty's Government, while from my personal point of view the wise counsel which he has given to me in many problems, has been invaluable.

32. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Resident Minister, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, and His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 3187/8/89]

No. 23.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Paris).

(No. 810.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 18th May, 1945.

M. MASSIGLI asked to see me this morning, when he showed considerable anxiety about Russian behaviour and its consequences for the future of Europe. He said that he had gathered from telegrams that he had seen that M. Bidault had shown anxiety for still closer relations with us. Was this correct?

2. I was not enthusiastic, but I contented myself with saying that in certain respects Anglo-French co-operation had certainly improved at San Francisco. On the other hand, I continued, there were directions in which French policy was causing me deep anxiety. This applied in particular to the Levant States. I had only just returned and was not completely in touch with the most recent telegrams. None the less, it was already clear that the French Government was pursuing a most dangerous policy. We had done our utmost in recent months to reduce the temperature in the Levant. M. Massigli acknowledged this. Yet the French were now deliberately raising that temperature again. The first cruiser which had been sent in with reinforcements had brought a like number of troops away, but now I understood that a fresh ship had arrived with more reinforcements. It was difficult to judge the local situation, but it seemed quite possible that this French action would provoke an explosion. If so, the effect would be felt not only by the French but by ourselves, and we felt it a very poor return for all our efforts that the French Government should be pursuing such methods. I asked M. Massigli, when he went to Paris, to do all he could to restrain French policy, which, if pursued, might have most serious consequences for both our nations in the Middle East.

3. M. Massigli, who was clearly uneasy at the situation, said that he would certainly do what he could in Paris. He mentioned that he thought that the Russian attitude in the Syrian States was not helpful.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 3204/8/89]

No. 24.

(1)

Mr. Grafftey Smith to Mr. Eden.--(Received 19th May.)

(No. 238. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, 19th May, 1945.

IBN SAUD has sent me text of telegram which he proposes to send to General de Gaulle about the situation in the Levant States.

2. The King refers to his own advice to the Levant States to strive for good relations with France, and appeals to de Gaulle to accept the fact and implications of Arab States' aspirations for complete independence. This war has been fought by France and her Allies for unshaken ideals which the Levant States now yearn to see realised, and France in particular, having tasted the bitterness of a foreign occupation, will appreciate the States' longing for freedom.

3. Message is dignified and not provocative. I have not considered it advisable to attempt to prevent its despatch, but I have suggested additional opening reference to message of friendship recently sent by de Gaulle [group undecipherable: ? to] the King. This may check the otherwise inevitable lasting repercussion that we have prompted the King's *démarche*. The text will be sent you by bag.

4. The King will certainly [group omitted: ? not] announce Emir Faisal's impending official visit to Paris unless events take a favourable turn.

(Repeated to Beirut.)

[E 3596/979/89]

(2)

Mr. Jordan to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st June.)

(No. 89.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Jedda telegram No. 238 of the 18th May to the Foreign Office, has the honour to transmit to him the text of the proposed telegram from King Ibn Saud to General de Gaulle regarding the situation in the Levant States.

*British Legation,
Jedda, 18th May, 1945.*

Enclosure in (2).

(Translation.)

To his Excellency General de Gaulle, President of the French Government, Paris.

In view of the incidents which have occurred in the last few days the traditional firm friendship between the Arabs and France prompts me to reveal to your Excellency how great my anxiety and concern is to maintain this precious friendship, which I have no doubt your Excellency shares with me, so that we may both manifest it clearly to all the world and thereby dispel doubts and anxieties from men's hearts.

I have latterly sent messages to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments asking them to strive to reach a satisfactory understanding with France and to maintain friendly relations with her as we did during the dark days of the war.

In the meantime I am sending your Excellency this letter trusting that you will view with sympathy and in a spirit of equity the situation of Syria and the Lebanon who demand nought save their freedom and independence, which is the natural right of all nations and for which France and the Allies have fought and striven regardless of the cost.

France, which has tasted the bitterness of occupation and its tragedies during these years, can best understand the feelings of our Syrian and Lebanese brothers.

All Arab peoples, who consider Syria and the Lebanon as part of themselves, watch closely and with anxious hearts what developments the fates will bring about. As a friend, I wish the friendship between the Arabs and France to continue as I have already said above, and, your Excellency, I wish all Arab nations to have confidence in the adherence of the Arabs to this friendship by France's sympathy for Syria and the Lebanon, by her avoiding any action prejudicial to their independence and by a friendly settlement of the problem existing between you and these States which leaves no loop-hole for dissension. Thereby we may be grateful to you for the hopes which we have placed in France and thank your Excellency for your far-sightedness and understanding of the new spirit which prevails among the Arabs. Thus our minds may be at rest.

I have pleasure in conveying to your Excellency on this occasion my best greetings and sincere good wishes.

ABDUL AZIZ.

[E 3197/68/88]

No. 25.

(1)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th May.)

(No. 367.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 18th May, 1945.

LEBANESE Minister for Foreign Affairs, who visited Damascus yesterday and returned to-day, has given member of my staff the following account of what happened there during his visit:—

2. He was [? group omitted: ? informed] by Syrians on arrival that General Beynet had asked for an interview with him to-day to present his proposals. Minister for Foreign Affairs had understood that Syrians felt as

he did that, in view of the arrival of the cruiser and reinforcements, the two Governments should refuse to receive proposals. He found, however, that Syrians now favoured hearing them and he therefore agreed in order to keep the common front. He attended meeting between General Beynet and Syrians this morning.

3. At this meeting Minister for Foreign Affairs described to General Beynet moderation which his Government had shown in face of repeated French provocation culminating in the arrival of troops in Montcalm. They had fully demonstrated their willingness to be reasonable and to negotiate settlement. Now, however, despite their note regarding the right of foreign troops to enter Lebanese territory, more troops had arrived in *Jeanne d'Arc*. General Beynet repeated the story of another British division having entered Lebanon. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that no such move had been reported to him since he had issued note in question and that British authorities whom he had specifically asked about it had categorically denied it. General Beynet attempted to argue the point, but Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he regarded it as settled.

4. General Beynet then presented two [group undecipherable] identical notes containing French proposals. Main points of text are as follows:—

(a) After recalling how France was responsible for independence of the States by her 1941 declaration, note states French Government, without [group undecipherable] to this independence, wished to safeguard legitimate French interests in the Levant States.

(b) These interests are cultural, economic and strategical.

(c) French Government propose that cultural interests shall be safeguarded by a university convention; economic interests by agreements on the lines [group undecipherable: ? of] the international procedure, e.g., establishments and consular conventions and commercial agreement; strategical interests by basis which will guarantee lines of communication between France and her Far Eastern possessions.

(d) When agreement has been reached on these three points, French Government are prepared to hand over Troupes Spéciales to the States with reserve that they shall remain under French Military Command "so long as circumstances do not allow full exercise of national commands."

5. Notes contained no reference to immediate transfer of a brigade of Troupes Spéciales, which General Beynet has not so far mentioned.

6. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated no discussion took place on these notes, but it would appear that he and Mardam may have indicated to General Beynet that, in view of arrival of reinforcements, they would not negotiate. Mardam is, I understand, seeing General Beynet again.

7. Questioned as to what the two Governments now intend to do, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that they were in process of drafting notes to the French. These will apparently be to the effect that the Lebanese cannot accept to negotiate under threat and that, in any case, French proposals are unacceptable. Copies of these notes will be sent to the Allied Powers. A meeting between the two Presidents, which will be attended by the Lebanese Prime Minister and the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs, will take place to-morrow. The Presidents will probably address telegrams of protest to the heads of all Allied States. The two Governments are asking that Arab League Council shall be summoned in June to discuss Lebanese and Syrian questions. Statements will be made in both Chambers in the next three or four days. Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested three-day strikes of protest in towns of both States, but Syrians had declined on the grounds that they would not guarantee to control them. He agreed a complete deadlock would now ensue, but said it was quite impossible for the States even to consider these proposals under menace of the French reinforcements. Had it not been for these, he himself might have been prepared to present counter-proposals.

8. Ninth Army have just been officially informed by French military authorities that a further ship with reinforcements is expected in the next few days. Two senior French officers have said they appreciate efforts made by myself and my staff to keep things calm, but that the position here is ugly and that despatch of troops now is most inopportune.

[31729]

[E 3643/8/89]

(2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 81.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 367 of the 18th May, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of an aide-mémoire from the French delegate dated the 18th May concerning the protection of French interests in the Levant States.

*British Legation, Beirut,
21st May, 1945.*

Enclosure in (2).

Aide-mémoire.

LE premier geste des autorités de la France Libre lorsqu'elles arrivèrent au Levant en 1941 fut de proclamer l'indépendance de la Syrie et du Liban. C'est par suite de ce geste que cette indépendance est maintenant acquise. La France se félicite que l'initiative prise par elle est heureusement aboutie. Elle souhaite que les Gouvernements syrien et libanais exercent leur pleine autorité sans entrave ni obstacle d'aucune sorte.

C'est dans cet esprit et sans qu'aucune réserve soit apportée à l'indépendance de la Syrie et du Liban que le Gouvernement français désire assurer, en ce qui le concerne, la défense des intérêts essentiels que la France conserve en Syrie et au Liban. Ces intérêts sont de trois ordres : culturel, économique et stratégique.

Les positions culturelles intéressant la Syrie et la France seraient définies et garanties par une convention universitaire.

Les positions économiques respectives seraient définies et garanties par les accords divers que prévoit en pareille matière la procédure internationale habituelle (convention d'établissement, convention consulaire, accord commercial, etc.).

Quant aux positions stratégiques, elles consisteraient en bases permettant de garantir les voies de communication de la France et de ses possessions d'outre-mer.

Une fois l'entente réalisée sur ces trois points, le Gouvernement français serait d'accord pour effectuer le transfert des Troupes Spéciales aux États, sous la réserve du maintien de ces troupes sous le Haut Commandement Français aussi longtemps que les circonstances ne permettent pas le plein exercice d'un commandement national.

Le 18 mai 1945.

[E 3205/8/89]

No. 26.

(1)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th May.)

(No. 369.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 367.

I called on my United States colleague to discuss the situation. While I was with him the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs called and gave us copies of Lebanese reply to the French proposals and of covering notes, which will be sent to Mr. Wadsworth and me (copies by bag).

2. Lebanese reply, after referring to the efforts made during the past month to preserve suitable atmosphere for negotiations and deploring recent provocations by the French especially during the victory celebrations, when the Lebanese Government had never taken action beyond what was strictly necessary for the maintenance of order, states that the Lebanese Government were nevertheless disposed to enter into negotiations. The Lebanese Government, having made it clear to the French on the 3rd May that they could no longer allow foreign forces to enter or pass through their territory without previous

Beirut, 19th May, 1945.

consent, must protest against the disembarkation of French troops on the 17th May without such consent. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the name of the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, had notified General Beynet that, in the event of the arrival of fresh French troops without consent, the two Governments must take such measures as the circumstances demanded. General Beynet has promised to inform his Government and communicate their reply. No reply has come and fresh troops had arrived. Hostilities in Europe having ended, there was no justification for the arrival of these troops, which in the circumstances constituted not only an infringement of Lebanese independence and sovereignty, but, even more, an inadmissible pressure at the moment when negotiations were envisaged. Before this protest had been received by the French, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was given by General Beynet an aide-mémoire indicating the basis of future negotiations and expressing the hope that both Governments should exercise their authority without reserve of any sort. The arrival of French troops against the wish of the Lebanese Government was contrary to this indispensable condition and evidently constituted a threat.

In these circumstances the Lebanese Government could not negotiate under threat of armed force, and, while deploring what might occur, could only disclaim responsibility. The French memorandum showed a spirit incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon. The Lebanese Government renewed its solemn protests and reserved its attitude completely.

See my immediately following telegram.

[E 3205/8/89]

(2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th May.)

(No. 370.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 19th May, 1945.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Lebanese covering note to me emphasises restraint shown by the Lebanese authorities, especially during victory celebrations, on which I myself had commended the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and contrasts this with French acts of provocation. It reaffirms that entry or transit of foreign troops should only take place with Lebanese consent, and states that the present arrival of French troops constitutes a grave menace to [group undecipherable] negotiations which the Lebanese Government has envisaged. Only after the arrival of further French troops on the 17th May had General Beynet given any indication of French *desiderata*, which [group undecipherable: ? took] no account of Lebanese independence, or of engagements concerning it or of the international position of the Lebanese; but which subordinated Lebanese independence to gratify French *desiderata*. The Lebanese Government is sure that its point of view will be shared by His Majesty's Government, and that "it can expect, if necessary, the most effective aid from His Majesty's Government."

[E 3206/8/89]

(3)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th May.)

(No. 377.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 19th May, 1945.

AFTER returning from meeting the two Presidents yesterday, Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned me and handed me copy of his note of protest to the French and covering letter to me. Aforesaid as reported in my telegrams Nos. 369 and 370. Minister for Foreign Affairs is making similar, though not identical, communication to my United States colleague this morning most probably, as reported in my telegram No. 371. I understand that he has already made communication to my Soviet colleague. Syrian Government are taking similar action, but I have not yet received their communication.

2. Syrian President, after returning from the meeting, was taken seriously ill, apparently with recrudescence of the trouble from which he nearly died last year. British military doctor, at the request of the Syrian Government, has been sent urgently to Damascus with the necessary apparatus for blood transfusion.

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3. It may well be that news of the presentation of the notes of protest and of President's illness may have at least temporary calming effect on Syrians. Lebanese Government are confident that they for their part can prevent disorders in Lebanon. To-day Beirut and Damascus are still closed. Demonstrations are continuing in the latter, but are so far orderly.

[E 3644/12/89]

(4)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 82.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegrams to the Foreign Office Nos. 369 and 370 of the 19th May and No. 377 of the 20th May, has the honour to transmit to him (1) a copy of a note, No. 436, from the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister dated the 19th May, 1945, and (2) a copy of a note, No. 433, from the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to French dated the 19th May, 1945, concerning the protest against the arrival of French reinforcements in the Levant States.

*British Legation, Beirut,
21st May, 1945.*

Enclosure 1 in (4).

M. Henri Pharaon to Mr. Shone.

(No. 436.)

M. le Ministre,

Beyrouth, le 19 mai 1945.

J'AI l'honneur de me référer à la note de ce Ministère en date du 5 mai dernier qui a été transmise à votre Excellence sous le No. 385 et de vous prier de vouloir bien trouver sous ce pli le texte d'une note que j'ai remise à la Délégation Générale à la date du 19 mai 1945.

Ainsi que votre Excellence voudra bien s'en rendre compte, le Gouvernement Libanais y définit sa position sur le plan des rapports libano-français à la suite de l'introduction répétée sur le territoire libanais de forces armées françaises et notamment du débarquement à Beyrouth de nouvelles troupes françaises arrivées sur un navire de guerre le 17 mai 1945.

Le Gouvernement, pleinement conscient de ses responsabilités, a déployé les plus grands efforts en vue de maintenir le calme au cours des déplorables événements de ces derniers jours et, d'une manière plus générale, au cours des mois écoulés pour créer un climat favorable à des conversations avec les autorités françaises.

Il se plaît, d'ailleurs, à invoquer le témoignage que dans un de nos récents entretiens votre Excellence elle-même a bien voulu porter sur l'action pondérée et sage des autorités libanaises.

Le Gouvernement regrette de constater qu'à la bonne volonté constamment manifestée de sa part, aucune disposition correspondante n'a répondu du côté français, et que bien plus on a pu observer récemment une recrudescence d'incidents à caractère provocatoire dont les conséquences sur l'état d'esprit de la population auraient pu être extrêmement fâcheuses, si le Gouvernement, soucieux de ses devoirs et de sa dignité, n'y avait remédié par des mesures appropriées d'apaisement à l'opinion publique.

Le Gouvernement réitère qu'il ne saurait admettre l'entrée ou le passage sur son territoire de troupes étrangères sans son consentement préalable et exprès. Il considère plus particulièrement que l'arrivée de troupes françaises dans les circonstances actuelles constitue une grave menace pour la liberté des négociations amicales qu'il envisageait d'ouvrir avec les autorités françaises en vue d'une solution des litiges en souffrance entre le Liban et la France.

Cette inquiétante considération trouve, au demeurant, dans la succession des faits tels qu'ils se sont produits depuis le retour du Général Beynet au Liban, le plus solide des fondements.

En effet, rentrant de France, où il avait pris contact avec son Gouvernement, le Général Beynet m'avait rendu à l'occasion de son retour une visite, au cours de laquelle il ne m'avait fourni aucune indication sur les grandes lignes éventuelles d'un règlement des problèmes pendants.

Ce n'est qu'après le nouveau débarquement des troupes françaises intervenu le 17 mai que le Général Beynet a fait connaître par un aide-mémoire au Gouvernement Libanais les conceptions françaises à cet égard, conceptions, je m'empresse de le dire, qui ne tiennent aucun compte de l'indépendance du Liban, des reconnaissances dont cette indépendance a été l'objet, et de la position internationale du Liban, mais qui subordonnent au contraire l'indépendance du Liban à la satisfaction des désirs français.

Le Gouvernement Libanais en conclut logiquement que, loin d'être nécessité par des besoins militaires quels qu'ils soient, l'afflux de troupes françaises au Liban est manifestement destiné à exercer sur lui une pression.

Il ne doute pas que son point de vue soit parfaitement admis par les autorités britanniques et qu'il puisse attendre en l'occurrence l'aide la plus efficace du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

HENRI PHARAON.

Enclosure 2 in (4).

Note remise à la Délégation Générale le 19 mai 1945.

(No. 433.)

LE Gouvernement Libanais, qui, au cours de ces derniers mois, s'est appliqué à créer une atmosphère de calme favorable à une entrée en négociations avec les autorités françaises pour un règlement des problèmes pendants entre le Liban et la France, avait déjà été conduit à déplorer que les incidents provoqués par le personnel civil et par certains éléments militaires des forces françaises eussent singulièrement réduit la portée de ses efforts.

Il fait observer à ce propos que, pendant les troubles signalés, et notamment pendant les manifestations où des cris provocants pour la population ont été poussés par les employés de l'armée française portés en camions militaires à travers la ville, son action n'a pris à aucun moment un caractère répressif et qu'il s'est strictement limité à maintenir l'ordre.

Bien plus, sans tenir compte de l'effet regrettable produit par les incidents ainsi visés, le Gouvernement Libanais était encore disposé à entrer en négociations avec les autorités françaises.

Il doit réaffirmer aujourd'hui la position qu'il a déjà prise en ce qui concerne l'introduction de troupes étrangères sur son territoire et préciser, une fois de plus, qu'il tient pour hautement inopportune l'arrivée de nouveaux effectifs militaires au Liban.

Le Gouvernement Libanais a clairement fait connaître le 3 mai qu'il ne pourrait pas admettre à l'avenir que des forces étrangères entrent ou passent sur son territoire sans son consentement préalable et exprès. Il élève en conséquence une vive protestation contre le débarquement à Beyrouth de troupes françaises arrivées, le 17 mai 1945, sur un navire de guerre sans qu'il y ait préalablement consenti, alors que cependant, en remettant à son Excellence le Comte Ostrorog la note du 5 mai 1945, et ultérieurement au cours de l'entretien qu'il a eu avec son Excellence le Général Beynet le 14 mai suivant, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères avait bien précisé à nouveau de vive voix aux représentants de la France le point de vue du Gouvernement Libanais en la matière.

Parlant au nom du Gouvernement Libanais et au nom du Gouvernement Syrien, son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon avait ajouté que, dans le cas où de nouvelles troupes françaises seraient amenées au Liban et en Syrie sans le consentement des Gouvernements intéressés, le Gouvernement Libanais et le Gouvernement Syrien prendraient telles mesures que dicteraient les circonstances.

Son Excellence le Général Beynet avait promis de saisir son Gouvernement de ce point de vue et de faire connaître sa réponse.

Aucune réponse n'a été fournie et de nouvelles troupes sont arrivées.

Le Gouvernement Libanais souligne que, la guerre en Europe ayant pris fin, aucune considération ne justifie l'arrivée de nouvelles troupes françaises au Liban. Il estime au contraire que l'arrivée de ces troupes, dans les circonstances où elle a lieu, constitue non seulement une atteinte à son indépendance et à sa souveraineté, mais encore une pression inadmissible à l'heure où sont envisagées des négociations entre le Liban et la France.

Avant que cette protestation n'ait été remise au représentant de la France, son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon, de passage à Damas pour y conférer avec le Gouvernement Syrien, a été saisi au cours d'une réunion au Ministère des Affaires

étrangères de Syrie le 18 mai 1945, réunion à laquelle il prenait part avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Syrie et le représentant de la France, par son Excellence le Général Beynet d'un aide-mémoire du Gouvernement Français indiquant les grandes lignes des négociations éventuelles. Ce document comporte le souhait que les Gouvernements Libanais et Syrien exercent leur pleine autorité sans entrave ni obstacle d'aucune sorte.

Il est manifeste que cette condition indispensable ne saurait s'accorder avec les circonstances précédemment exposées. L'arrivée des troupes françaises sans l'accord du Gouvernement Libanais et contre sa volonté a très évidemment le caractère d'une contrainte et d'une menace.

Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement Libanais déclare qu'il n'est pas en mesure de négocier sous la menace de la force armée et, en déplorant ce qui arrive, ne peut que dégager entièrement sa responsabilité.

Il doit ajouter que l'aide-mémoire tel qu'il se présente révèle un état d'esprit et des propositions incompatibles avec l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban.

Le Gouvernement Libanais fait à ce sujet, en renouvelant sa protestation solennelle, les plus expresses réserves.

Beyrouth, le 19 mai 1945.

[E 3645/12/89]

(5)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 84.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 377 of the 20th May, 1945, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a letter from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the arrival of French troops in the Levant.

British Legation, Beirut, 22nd May, 1945.

Enclosure in (5).

Jamil Mardam Bey to Mr. Shone.

M. le Ministre,

Damas, le 20 mai 1945.

J'AI l'honneur de faire parvenir sous ce pli à votre Excellence copie d'une note que j'ai adressée au Général Beynet à la suite du dernier débarquement de troupes françaises arrivées à Beyrouth le 17 mai 1945, sur un navire de guerre, et en réponse à un aide-mémoire remis par lui au Gouvernement Syrien.

Le Gouvernement Syrien croit devoir à cette occasion réaffirmer la position qu'il a prise en ce qui concerne les troupes étrangères dont il ne saurait admettre l'entrée ou le passage sur son territoire sans son consentement préalable et exprès. En ce qui concerne les troupes françaises en particulier, il estime que leur arrivée au Liban et en Syrie constitue une grave menace pour la liberté des négociations envisagées pour le règlement des problèmes en suspens entre la Syrie et la France.

Le Gouvernement Syrien voudrait signaler que pleinement conscient de ses responsabilités il a déployé les plus grands efforts en vue de maintenir le calme au cours des déplorable événements de ces derniers jours et, d'une manière générale, au cours des mois écoulés pour créer un climat favorable à des conversations avec les autorités françaises.

Il regrette de constater qu'à la bonne volonté constamment manifestée de sa part, aucune disposition correspondante n'a répondu du côté français et que bien plus on a pu observer récemment une recrudescence d'incidents à caractère provocatoire dont les conséquences sur l'état d'esprit de la population auraient pu être extrêmement fâcheuses, si le Gouvernement, soucieux de ses devoirs et de sa dignité, n'y avait remédié par des mesures appropriées d'apaisement à l'opinion publique.

L'inquiétude suscitée par le débarquement des troupes françaises trouve, au demeurant, dans la succession des faits, tels qu'ils se sont produits depuis le retour du Général Beynet, les plus solides des fondements.

Le 17 mai 1945, le Général Beynet, au cours d'un entretien qu'il a eu à 17 heures 30, au Palais de Mouhajrine, avec son Excellence le Président de la République Syrienne, en présence de son Excellence M. Jamil Mardam Bey,

Président du Conseil p.i., Ministre des Affaires étrangères, avait déclaré qu'il était chargé par son Excellence le Général de Gaulle d'informer le Gouvernement Syrien que la France était disposée à céder à la Syrie et au Liban les troupes dites spéciales tout en se réservant d'étudier les modalités de leur transfert. Il a déclaré en outre que la France demanderait la concession de bases navales au Liban et aériennes en Syrie ainsi que la garantie de ses intérêts matériels et ses intérêts moraux, auxquels se rattacherait la conclusion d'une convention universitaire.

Son Excellence le Président de la République et son Excellence le Président du Conseil p.i., tout en faisant remarquer que c'était pour la première fois que la France formulait de telles demandes, en ont souligné le caractère inacceptable.

Le lendemain, vendredi 18 mai, à onze heures, le Général Beynet devait remettre à leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Syrie et du Liban une note relative au sujet ayant été l'objet de l'entretien.

Il leur a remis, en effet, un aide-mémoire énonçant les demandes françaises formulées la veille.

Or, non seulement cet aide-mémoire subordonne le transfert des troupes spéciales à l'acceptation par la Syrie et le Liban de l'octroi des bases demandées et à la conclusion d'accords universitaires et économiques, mais il les maintient sous le haut commandement français pour une période indéterminée, dépendant des circonstances à venir.

Le Gouvernement Syrien en conclut logiquement que, loin d'être nécessité par des besoins militaires quels qu'ils soient, l'afflux de troupes françaises au Liban et en Syrie est manifestement destiné à exercer une pression sur les deux Gouvernements.

Il s'empresse de déclarer, en outre, que les conceptions françaises exposées dans cet aide-mémoire ne tiennent aucun compte de l'indépendance de la Syrie, des reconnaissances dont cette indépendance a été l'objet et de la position internationale de la Syrie, mais elles subordonnent, au contraire, l'indépendance de la Syrie à la satisfaction des désirs français.

Le Gouvernement Syrien ne doute pas que son point de vue soit parfaitement admis par les autorités britanniques et qu'il puisse attendre en l'occurrence l'aide la plus efficace du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Note remise au Général Beynet le 20 mai 1945.

LE Gouvernement Syrien, qui s'était appliqué à créer une atmosphère de calme favorable pour régler définitivement les problèmes en suspens entre la Syrie et la France, avait été conduit à déplorer que les incidents provoqués par certains éléments militaires des forces françaises eussent singulièrement réduit la portée de ses efforts.

Il croit de son devoir aujourd'hui de maintenir la position qu'il a déjà prise en ce qui concerne l'entrée des troupes étrangères sur son territoire et préciser, une fois de plus, qu'il tient pour hautement inopportune l'arrivée de nouveaux effectifs militaires en Syrie et au Liban.

Le Gouvernement Syrien a clairement fait connaître le 4 mai qu'il ne pourrait admettre à l'avenir que des forces étrangères entrent ou passent sur son territoire sans son consentement préalable et exprès. Il élève en conséquence une vive protestation contre le débarquement à Beyrouth de troupes françaises arrivées le 17 mai 1945, sur un navire de guerre, sans qu'il y ait préalablement consenti, alors que cependant, en remettant à son Excellence le Comte Ostrorog la note du 6 mai 1945, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères lui avait bien précisé le point de vue du Gouvernement Syrien en la matière.

Ultérieurement, parlant au nom du Gouvernement Libanais et au nom du Gouvernement Syrien, son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Liban, avait bien mis en relief, dans le cas où de nouvelles troupes françaises seraient amenées au Liban et en Syrie sans le consentement préalable des Gouvernements intéressés, le Gouvernement Libanais et le Gouvernement Syrien prendraient telles mesures que dicteraient les circonstances.

Son Excellence le Général Beynet avait promis de saisir son Gouvernement de ce point de vue et de faire connaître sa réponse. Or, aucune réponse n'a été fournie et de nouvelles troupes sont arrivées.

[31729]

Le 17 mai 1945 le Général Beynet, au cours de l'entretien qu'il a eu à 17 heures 30 au Palais de Mouhajrine, avec son Excellence le Président de la République Syrienne, en présence de son Excellence M. Jamil Mardam Bey, Président du Conseil p.i., Ministre des Affaires étrangères, avait déclaré qu'il était chargé par son Excellence le Général de Gaulle d'informer le Gouvernement Syrien que la France était disposée à céder à la Syrie et au Liban les troupes dites spéciales tout en se réservant d'étudier les modalités adéquates de leur transfert.

Il a déclaré qu'en outre, la France demanderait la concession de bases navales au Liban et aériennes en Syrie ainsi que la garantie de ses intérêts matériels et moraux auxquels se rattacherait la conclusion d'une convention universitaire.

Son Excellence le Président de la République et son Excellence le Président du Conseil p.i., tout en faisant remarquer que c'était pour la première fois que la France formulait de telles demandes, en ont souligné le caractère inacceptable.

Il fut convenu qu'à l'issue de l'entretien son Excellence le Général Beynet, muni d'une note écrite sur le sujet ayant été l'objet de l'entretien, se rendrait le lendemain, vendredi 18, à 11 heures au Ministère, où son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères le recevrait en présence de son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Liban.

Le lendemain, son Excellence le Général Beynet, au cours de sa visite suscitée, a remis à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères un aide-mémoire énonçant les demandes françaises formulées la veille.

Or, non seulement cet aide-mémoire subordonne le transfert des troupes spéciales à l'acceptation par la Syrie et le Liban de l'octroi des bases demandées et à la conclusion d'accords universitaires et économiques, mais il les maintient sous le haut commandement français pour une période indéterminée, dépendant des circonstances à venir.

Devant ces faits, le Gouvernement Syrien, qui pourtant avait apporté à plusieurs reprises la preuve tangible de son esprit de conciliation et de son désir réel de résoudre les problèmes en suspens entre la France et la Syrie, déclare que l'aide-mémoire révèle un état d'esprit et formule des demandes incompatibles avec l'indépendance et la souveraineté syrienne, et il ne peut donc engager sur ces bases des négociations avec la France.

Il affirme, en outre, qu'il considère l'afflux des troupes françaises en Syrie et au Liban, sans le consentement préalable des deux Gouvernements, comme constituant une atteinte flagrante à la souveraineté et à l'indépendance du pays et revêt le caractère d'une pression inadmissible.

Aussi le Gouvernement Syrien demande-t-il avec insistance que toutes les troupes étrangères soient retirées de son territoire et que ses propres forces lui soient transférées dans le plus bref délai.

No. 27.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th May.)

(No. 783.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, 28th May, 1945.

WASHINGTON telegram No. 3699 to Foreign Office.

The representative of the United States Embassy to-day showed Minister the text of the telegram dated 26th May from the State Department instructing the United States Ambassador here to make a communication to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs unless he saw strong reasons to the contrary. The following is the substance of the telegram: The United States Government are deeply concerned at the recent developments in Syria and Lebanon. The impression created in the United States is that the French are using the threat of force to obtain Levant States concessions of political, cultural and military nature. When French Delegate-General was presenting proposals to the States, which if accepted would give France a special position there, a French warship was landing armed forces in Beirut. The Levant States had been recognised as independent countries by France and the United States. In San Francisco they and other nations are now discussing means for guaranteeing world security and combating aggression. It is most important now, when international security organisation is being set up, that all nations refrain from giving the idea that a member may be pursuing a policy not in conformity with the spirit and principles of that organisation. The United States Government urges in a friendly spirit the French Government to review their policy in the Levant and to seek a way to make

it clear that France in her dealings with the Levant States intends to treat them as fully sovereign and independent members of comity of nations.

Note was communicated by United States Embassy to Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning without any prior consultation with this embassy. Reason given for this was that instructions contained nothing to that effect.

[E 3624/8/89]

No. 28.

Extract from House of Commons Debates, 31st May 1945.

Syria and Lebanon (British Intervention).

Mr. Eden: I had to inform the House last night of a very serious situation which has developed in Syria, where there is fighting between Syrians and French troops, and I promised to keep the House fully informed as early as I could of any decision His Majesty's Government might take. The situation has deteriorated still further since last night. Our Minister in Damascus reports that there was heavy firing and shelling during the night, and that two great fires were burning in the centre of the city, about 1 mile apart but spreading. All telephone communication has been cut between Damascus and the sea coast and we are only in touch with His Majesty's Minister by wireless. An armistice was arranged with the French military authorities yesterday afternoon and British and United States civilian colonies were evacuated from Damascus. After that the centre of the city was subjected to the heaviest and most concentrated shell fire yet directed upon it. It was also bombed from the air. [Hon Members: "Shame."] The Governor of Hama has appealed to the Ninth Army to arrange an armistice in order that the many dead and wounded may be evacuated.

The fighting has spread to other parts of Syria, notably Jebel Druse, where French officers have been taken prisoner. The President and the Government of Syria have sent an urgent appeal to His Majesty's Government reminding us that we have endorsed the promise of independence and that we have also said that the treaty negotiations with France should be conducted freely and not under duress. The greatest concern has been caused throughout the Middle East and serious fears are entertained for the state of tranquillity which is so necessary in that area if a vital line of communication to the Far East is not to be disturbed. Every possible effort has been made to enjoin calm on both sides and I do not think that a further appeal in this sense would have any effect. In all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that they cannot any longer stand aside, and the Prime Minister has accordingly to-day sent the following message to General de Gaulle:—

"In view of the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant State, and the severe fighting which has broken out, we have, with profound regret, ordered the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in the interests of the security of the whole Middle East which involves communications for the war against Japan.

"In order to avoid a collision between British and French forces, we request you immediately to order the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks. Once firing has ceased and order has been restored, we shall be prepared to begin tripartite discussions here in London."

I feel sure that the House will agree with me in deploring these events, and will share my hope that once order has been restored we shall be able to resume the diplomatic initiative which I mentioned last night, and to arrange a peaceful settlement which will be satisfactory to the parties concerned. We also have in mind, of course, arrangements by which the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will be associated with these discussions. We are in closest touch with all the Governments concerned, including the United States Government, but I would not wish to say more about the diplomatic arrangements which we contemplate at this stage. I feel sure the House will also share my hope that nothing shall be said at this stage which would make that diplomatic initiative more difficult.

Mr. Attlee: I am sure everybody will agree in deploring these events and the bloodshed between our Allies, and, under those circumstances, we have no option, with our responsibilities but to endeavour to restore order. We all hope that negotiations may be resumed, and I would ask the Foreign Secretary—I am sure he will agree—that if we can get this settled, the sooner we can get both the French troops and our own out of Syria the better.

Mr. Eden: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for what he has said, and I am in entire agreement with everything that he has said. Our desire throughout has been to get a settlement of this troublesome business, and I think it is abundantly clear to all—and I am glad he has underlined it—that we desire to withdraw our troops the moment a settlement can be reached.

Mr. Gallacher: I would like, if I have any influence, to use it to get the French Government—the strong Government in this situation—to ease off. It is a terrible thing that there should have been such a situation, and I hope the effort to get the French Government to ease off and to allow negotiations to take place will succeed, but I would like above everything else to impress on the Leader of the House, arising out of the letter sent by the Prime Minister—which I hope will have a good effect—that we must, at all costs, avoid a further extension of the conflict in the form of the British forces coming into conflict with the French forces. That would be very terrible.

Mr. Eden: I think the House, which has watched the events for some weeks, and especially in the last few days, will understand how immensely anxious we have been to avoid this very situation. We have not acted until our over-all responsibility was so serious that we simply had to act, or stand by and see a situation develop which would have shamed us all. I need not tell the hon. Gentleman that there is no one more anxious than I am to see that this matter does not result in any serious injury to Anglo-French relations, and, if our French friends will do as we have asked and asked them repeatedly to do, to resolve these difficult issues, they will be welcomed in London and we shall do our utmost to make those conversations a success.

[E 3862/8/89]

No. 29.

Record of Conversation between the French Ambassador and Mr. Eden.

THE French Ambassador called at his request on the Secretary of State this evening. His first remark was to ask why Mr. Eden had published the text of the message from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle who, he said, had not received it at the time Mr. Eden made his statement in the House of Commons.

The Secretary of State said that he had felt that the situation in Syria according to reports received this morning had become so bad that nothing should be left undone which might stop the fighting. He had felt that the announcement that British troops would intervene might possibly cause the French troops and the Syrian population to cease the strife. General Paget would not receive his instructions before this evening and in the meantime worse things might have happened. The Secretary of State emphasised that the great thing for the French Government to do now was to say at once that they would take part in the proposed conversations in London, and it was open to them in saying this to state that they disapproved of the action taken, but that they were ready to discuss matters with His Majesty's Government and the Americans in the interests of a solution of the problem.

The Secretary of State gave to the Ambassador the text of Mr. Attlee's remarks in the House of Commons and of his reply to these and to Mr. Gallacher's intervention, calling attention to the tone of his remarks and the emphasis laid on the desire of His Majesty's Government to engage in conversations and make them a success.

In reply to a remark of the Secretary of State, M. Massigli referred to British officers (not always British by blood or nationality) who he considered were really making trouble and acting as "agents of General Spears." The Secretary of State said that if there was really anything in these allegations he would be glad to know the names of the officers and the activities laid to their charge. In any case, if conversations with the French Government took place all cards should be laid on the table and all parties should state anything they had to complain of.

The Ambassador left saying that he would at once telephone the texts the Secretary of State had given him to his Government, and asked to be told as soon as any reply was received by the Prime Minister to his message to General de Gaulle.

The Secretary of State called the Ambassador's attention to his remarks in the House of Commons about the association of the Governments of Syria and the Lebanon with the Anglo-Franco-United States discussions in London. He explained that it had been essential to say this and that he contemplated that the Levant States Governments should be kept in close touch with what took place in the conversations.

R. I. CAMPBELL.

Foreign Office, 31st May, 1945.

[E 3648/420/89]

No. 30.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 573. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Paris telegram to the Foreign Office, No. 783, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of Note No. 518, dated 28th May, from the United States Ambassador, Paris, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning Syria and Lebanon.

Paris, 30th May, 1945.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Mr. Caffery to M. Bidault.

(No. 518. Secret.)

Excellency,

Paris, 28th May, 1945.

I HAVE been instructed by my Government to convey to the Government of France the deep concern which my Government feels with regard to recent developments in Syria and Lebanon.

An impression has been created in the United States and elsewhere that French representatives have been using the threat of force to obtain from Syria and Lebanon concessions of a political, cultural and military nature. It is understood that, at a time when the French Delegate-General to the Levant States was presenting to the Governments of Syria and Lebanon proposals which, if accepted, would give France special position in those countries, a French warship was landing fresh armed forces in Beirut.

Syria and Lebanon are recognised by France and the United States as independent countries. They are also members of the United Nations whose representatives, including representatives of France and of the United States, are now discussing in San Francisco means for guaranteeing world security and for combating aggression.

It is important, at the very time when the International Security Organisation is in process of being created at San Francisco, that in order to inspire confidence in its future effectiveness, all nations, both great and small, refrain from any act which might give rise to a suspicion—however unjustified—that a member of the future organisation may be pursuing a policy not in uniformity with the spirit and principles which that organisation is being established to defend.

The United States places a great value upon the historic friendship which, since its founding, has bound it to France. It considers that France and the United States, which share the inheritance of common democratic past, have a particular responsibility for the vitality and influence of the democratic tradition, and that the extent to which that tradition will continue to influence the course of history depends upon the manner in which the great nations which are its exponents make use of their position and their power and upon their willingness to co-operate with one another.

The Government of the United States, therefore, in a most friendly spirit, earnestly urges the Government of France carefully to review its policy towards Syria and Lebanon with the purpose of finding a way to make it clear to those countries and to all the world that, in its dealings with the Levant States, France intends to treat them as fully sovereign and independent members of the family of nations.

I avail, &c.
JEFFERSON CAFFERY.

[E 3681/8/89]

No. 31.

The Soviet Ambassador to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

M. le Ministre, 1st June, 1945.
On the instructions of the Soviet Government I have the honour to convey to you the following:—

According to information received, fighting is at present taking place on the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and the French troops have come into conflict with the Syrians and Lebanese, firing with artillery and mortars on Damascus, the capital of Syria. Damascus is being bombed from the air. Armed conflicts are also taking place in several other towns of Syria and the Lebanon, and the number of killed and wounded is increasing daily. The position is aggravated by the fact that the three States in question—France, Syria and the Lebanon—are members of the United Nations, and are participating in the conference now in session at San Francisco.

The Soviet Government considers that the events in Syria and the Lebanon are not in accordance with the spirit of the decisions taken at Dumbarton Oaks or with the aims of the Conference of the United Nations now in session at San Francisco for the purpose of founding an organisation for guaranteeing peace and the security of the peoples. The Soviet Government therefore considers that urgent measures should be taken to bring the fighting in Syria and the Lebanon to a conclusion and to settle by peaceful means the conflict which has arisen.

The Soviet Government has approached the Provisional Government of the French Republic with this proposal, and also approaches the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and China which have taken the initiative in founding the post-war organisation of peace and international security.

I am, &c.
F. T. GOUSEV.

[E 3688/8/89]

No. 32.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 814.)
(Telegraphic.) Paris, 2nd June, 1945.

MORNING papers the 2nd June publish following communiqué issued by Presidency of Council:—

[Begins.]

Since the 8th May French troops of certain Syrian garrisons, in particular Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, as well as several French military and civilian establishments, have been sporadically attacked by armed bands, at head of which were often elements of local gendarmerie and police subordinate to Syrian Government.

2. These disorders began the day after General Beynet, delegate-general and plenipotentiary of France, had invited Syrian and Lebanese Governments to begin negotiations on basis of instructions which he had received from French Government. Our troops had to react and mastered situation everywhere, except in Jebel Druse territory which was only held by few locally-recruited squadrons. Our losses amounted in all to about twelve killed. At Damascus it was necessary to use artillery.

3. In the desire for *détente*, and to comply with request of British Government alleging its apprehension that Syrian incidents would produce repercussions in other areas in the Near East, French Government at 11 p.m. on the 30th May

(some newspapers give earlier official version, namely, the 31st May) ordered French forces of Levant to cease fire. This order was executed the 31st May.

4. Aim of French Government was to create, if possible, atmosphere more favourable for conversations with American and British Governments and, eventually, with Governments of various Arab States, covering whole of situation in Near East, and of which, moreover, Soviet Government should at least be informed.

5. On the 31st May at 4.30 p.m. Mr. Holman, counsellor of British Embassy, brought to Presidency of Government text of message addressed by Mr. Churchill to General de Gaulle, which had been read at 3.45 by Mr. Eden in House of Commons.

6. As this telegram, drafted in tone and form that it was, had been thus published, it could only involve public reply, which President of Provisional Government of Republic has judged it preferable not to address to British Prime Minister.

7. Orders given to French troops by French Government are to cease fire and hold their position. [Ends.]

8. Press states that Council of Ministers yesterday heard report from Bidault about international situation and Syrian incidents. Government approved instructions given to Beynet with view to avoiding any pretext for new agitation, while holding positions occupied by French troops. Minister of War was requested to express to troops of Levant entire confidence of Government. Inspired comment adds that official circles state that to judge by most recent reports incidents of last few days have been seriously exaggerated. Further, according to latest reports of delegate-general, situation in Levant is evolving towards return to calm. Government took note of artificial character of agitation.

9. Press states that de Gaulle will give press conference at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon, at which he will define position of French Government as regards Syria and Lebanon. This evening, at hour not yet fixed, he will broadcast.

10. Press adds that Foreign Affairs Committee of Consultative Assembly discussed Levant situation yesterday.

There was evidently considerable criticism of Government. Committee have asked to be received by de Gaulle before his press conference.

No. 33.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd June.)

(No. 823.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, 3rd June, 1945.

My telegram No. 814.

Following is summary of General de Gaulle's press conference on Levant situation on 2nd June:—

After referring to the long history of the Syrian problem, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the settlement after the last war, he said that difficulties had arisen since France and Britain were established side by side in the Near East. France's aim had never changed, namely, to lead Syria and Lebanon to independence and the greatest possible economic development. The task was complicated both by the political and geographical structure of the Levant States and by the British attitude. The British had often said, and perhaps believed, that they wished to leave France to act in the Levant as she thought best, but unfortunately they had not always done so. He would not describe all the incidents resulting from this attitude, but only those which had arisen and grown more serious since the temporary misfortunes of France immeasurably increased opportunities for British encroachments. In 1941 Free France took the initiative to enter Syria, leading Britain with her. To avoid difficulties which he foresaw he signed the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. He then summarised agreement, adding that France at the same time proclaimed the independence of Syria and Lebanon and declared herself ready to negotiate with them the practical conditions of enjoyment of this independence.

2. In spite of difficulties, all the attributes of independence had been given successfully to the Levant States. France now retained only one power given by mandate. Namely, military command over volunteers in *Troupes Spéciales* employed precisely for the maintenance of order. Since nearly all French troops in Syria had been withdrawn to fight from Bir Hakim to France, and only 4,000 to 5,000 remained, British had retained in whole of Near and Middle East

(Orient) considerable land, sea and air forces amounting at present to 600,000 men.

3. The general continued: "I will not hide from you the mass of complications which arose from the attitude taken either at the highest level by the British Government or at a low level by a mass of agents who, assumed on the spot a hostile or critical attitude. France has done what she could to minimise and even sometimes to hide them. Desiring to end an unfortunate situation, we sought to negotiate with the Levant States treaties settling definitely all outstanding questions, and safeguarding firstly, cultural interests of France, secondly her economic interests and finally French possession of certain bases such as British and also for the moment United States possessions in this area, with a view to preparing international strategic co-operation in this traditional area.

4. During first days of May, Beynet, who had given French proposals to Levant Governments, found himself informed that these proposals were not acceptable and that it consequently appeared useless to negotiate. At same time incidents began to break out everywhere from 8th May and spread to several Syrian towns, particularly Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus. Armed bands, often helped by Syrian police and gendarmerie, which forces unfortunately carry arms supplied to them by British authorities, in spite of all our long-standing warnings on this subject, attacked various French military and even civilian establishments. There were some killed and French troops had to react and re-establish order which except in Jebel Druse, they did everywhere, often with some difficulty as in Damascus, where certain French establishments were surrounded by crowds and gendarmes, and artillery and one aircraft had to be used to disengage them.

5. On evening of 30th May, British Government asked French Government in a pressing manner to give the order to cease fire and to allow the British Command to assume authority in Syria and Lebanon and to act there as it thought best. At 23 hours on same evening French Government, while not of course ordering French troops to place themselves under British Command and thus to renounce French rights and even application of Agreement signed with Britain, instructed them to cease fire, to hold their ground pending clarification of situation and not to oppose movement of British troops. The order was carried out on 31st May."

6. General then referred to the receipt of Prime Minister's message at 1630 hours on 31st May after your statement in the House underlining reference to possible collisions between French and British troops. He said that this message had changed and would change nothing in orders to French troops. He had thought it better not to reply to this public message. Situation was most unsatisfactory and indeed dangerous. It would be monstrous absurdity if, after ending war against Germany, bloody incidents between two Allies now occurred. It was principally to prevent such collisions that the French Government stopped action of the troops in the Levant and is keeping them on their positions pending clarification of the situation.

7. General continued: "To get out of this situation which is evidently very bitter for France and for international co-operation, various solutions appear to be proposed. France has made it known that she is ready to negotiate but only over the whole matter and not only about the Levant States, which are only part of the whole of Arab States. As between Britain and France and as regards the Levant, the question is already settled by Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement which it only remains to apply. Matter must be treated as a whole, i.e., on the basis of whole Near and Middle East. Further, the British have always justified their action in the Levant by their interest in repercussions on other Arab States. Conversely, events in Arab States such as Palestine, Iraq or even Egypt evidently interest France and not only France. United States have made known their position by advising restoration of order and Soviet Government have just issued a communiqué indicating their interest in this region. The solution, through none of our doing, can no longer be a Franco-British one and now passes to sphere of international co-operation. France sees no disadvantage in this. There would then be many interested parties, great Powers, Arab States and others. Near Eastern question could then be handled in a normal and, I hope, pacific manner on the basis of international co-operation where it would have been placed by regrettable encroachments due to rivalry. I do not know what will be the solution finally adopted but France is ready to negotiate with all those concerned and, if possible, in common, on the basis of international co-operation. Perhaps this will be the first sphere in which true international co-operation such as we are now trying to establish at San Francisco can at last come about."

8. After stating that neither he nor the French people felt any bitterness towards the British nation, for whom they had the highest regard, the General continued: "There are, however, interests which are opposed to ours in a way which we cannot accept. The interests of both sides must be reconciled and their positions defined. We must put an end to 'dictate' and crises. Such is the desire of France, who is doing all she can to achieve it and will continue to do so but only to the limit of her endurance."

9. The General concluded by saying that the whole French people were united behind its Government on this issue. They were equally united in the desire to see such matters settled by sincere international co-operation. Finally, he said that the system of trying to settle matters without participation of those concerned could not have good results.

10. The General then replied to questions. Asked whether he proposed to refuse the invitation to negotiate in London he said that unforgettable as had been their reception there in 1940 they preferred to be invited otherwise than they had been. The invitation would then be more likely to be accepted.

11. He welcomed the Soviet Union's interest in pacific settlement of the present difficulties in the Near and Middle East.

12. Asked whether Spears' departure had meant a change in policy, he replied that he could not suppose that for three years Spears had followed a policy other than that of his Government.

Asked whether French had requested the recall of other senior British officials as well as Spears, he said that any list of those whose recall was desirable would have been endless. Much friction would have been avoided if in accordance with Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement no attempt had been made to replace French by foreign personnel.

13. Asked whether His Majesty's Government had advised against the despatch of reinforcements, he said that ever since His Majesty's Government established themselves in the Levant they had opposed increase of French forces. Certain most painful incidents had resulted. As soon as the German war ended, France no longer allowed these encroachments and sent troops to area where she is responsible for order and rightly foresaw outbreak of troubles.

14. Questioned about the delay in publishing the cease fire order and about Prime Minister's message he said that correspondents in Syria telegraphed the order immediately and it was certainly known to British Command. He repeated that the Prime Minister's message changed nothing which made its publication all the more regrettable.

15. He did not think the damage at Damascus was very great, but a number of shots had been fired and he regretted there were several hundred killed and wounded. One battery and one aircraft had been used.

16. He denied that any Fascist French had contributed to the disorders. But there were certainly strong German influences in the area and on 8th May first incidents in Lebanon had consisted of a march of Palestinian troops with swastikas through the streets of Beirut.

17. The French troops in the Levant had no American lend-lease material.

18. Asked whether Levant Governments had given reason to think that their refusal to negotiate had been concerted or suggested by other Powers, the General repeated "the Levant Governments have a horror of solitude."

19. Questioned about British suggestions that French had used excessive force, he said that like the British in Greece, the French had defended themselves and as economically as possible.

20. In conclusion he said: "I do not wish to end without saying that, however painful, bitter and unjust the present situation is for us, I would like to hope that it will not have too far-reaching consequences. There are such vast common interests between all those concerned that everything which could lead to collisions should be excluded completely from relations between great States. There is peace to be made in the interests of the whole world and of our civilisation and I do not think there is on earth one man or woman who can fail to recognise that if this peace is not made well and quickly, by reciprocal concessions and in a real spirit of international solidarity, the future of the world would be disquieting. We must have peace. A new war would be the end of the world and the world wishes to live. We must have peace and you will see that we will make it."

Conversation between Sir R. I. Campbell and the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers.

THE Syrian and Lebanese Ministers called this morning at their request and handed me the attached *note verbale*. When asked whether they were acting upon instructions from their Government, I got a rather vague reply in the form "Yes, we are in agreement with our Government." Asked whether they purported to speak for the Arab League and whether this was part of any instructions they had, they replied that they were only setting out what were the known decisions of the League in the matter of the controversy between France and the Levant States (I made a point of putting this question as I would have shown unwillingness to receive a communication from them on behalf of the League in a corporate capacity. But I think they took the point).

The ministers began their remarks by saying that there seemed to be in the last fortnight or so a campaign in the British press which they much deprecated. The object of this campaign seemed to be to convey the idea that the Arab countries were the enemies of all European countries, that the European countries should stand together to protect their position, and that, if it was the turn of France to be ejected now, it would be the turn of Great Britain to-morrow. The ministers argued that it was not the moment to talk of Arab hostility for Great Britain when, in contrast to the situation which had developed in the Middle East between 1918 and 1940, British prestige was particularly high. They urged then that mistrust should not now be sown between the Arabs and the British when the latter's recent acts had produced confidence. The press articles to which they had referred, coupled with the remarks of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 14th June, would be reproduced in the Middle East and sent from country to country. There would be repercussions there which, in turn, would be telegraphed back to Europe, and misunderstanding and mistrust would result. The Middle East would not understand the purport of this alleged press campaign when the whole tendency of the policy of Arab countries now united in their League was towards co-operation with Great Britain and a policy consonant with British policy. The articles particularly mentioned by the ministers were in last week's *Observer* and *Economist*, and in the *Whitehall Letter* of the 16th June. The ministers stated that they had noticed in the *Monde* also reiterations of the argument that France and Great Britain should stand together and protect their interests *vis-à-vis* of the Arab countries. The whole line of argument and the suggestions favouring any maintenance of the French influence in the Levant States gave the impression of being based on the idea of separate treatment for the Levant States and other Arab States, and the preservation of French domination in the one and British domination in the other. They were confident that this was not the policy of His Majesty's Government, but people less well informed in the Middle East would receive that impression.

The Lebanese Minister referred to the Prime Minister's remark that His Majesty's Government would support French influence in Syria, and I explained to him the significance of the words "but only in counsel." Both ministers went on to say that any chance of maintenance of any special French influence was excluded, but, on being pressed, expressed a readiness to have due regard for French interests.

I called attention to what might appear at first sight an inconsistency in the *note verbale*, viz., that while it was stated in the first paragraph that the Levant States were unwilling to conclude any treaty with France, in the second paragraph they spoke of establishing their relations with France on such bases of international law as ordinarily govern the relations between States. It did not seem to me that the second question excluded the conclusion of a treaty, and I regretted that the method of establishing relations with France on these bases and of regularising the position left over from the past should not be effected by a treaty which would have been not unnatural, and perhaps the simplest way. The ministers said that a treaty with France alone was quite impossible after all that had happened, and that no treaty was needed for the establishment of relations on the ordinary basis of good neighbourliness such as was customary between countries without treaty relations. The Syrian Minister remarked that he had noted from the press that M. Bidault was unwilling to enter a conference of the kind that had been talked of, but wished to refer the whole matter "to San Francisco." That was all right by him (the Syrian Minister).

On the subject of the French demand for a base, they said this would not have as its object the protection of French possessions in the Far East. It could only be designed to make possible the domination of the Levant States.

After some rather dramatic remarks from the Lebanese Minister to the effect that the Levant States were not prepared to barter away their liberty in any treaty but were, on the contrary, prepared quite calmly to die for it, and after further deprecating the alleged campaign in the British press, the ministers left.

Apart from the assertion of the firm position of their Governments, the ministers' *démarche* may perhaps show a certain nervousness that the Levant States cannot count on the blind and indiscriminate support of this country for any position they may take up. If this is so, I think it is quite healthy as far as it goes. At the same time, it shows that we must not suppose that because of our intervention in Syria we shall be immune from the possibility of Arab opinion turning against us if we appear to that opinion to be giving to France support which it thinks derogatory to the full independence and sovereignty of the Levant States.

I undertook to report the ministers' remarks to higher authority and to look into the question of the press campaign which they alleged to exist.

A copy of the *Economist* article referred to by the minister is attached.⁽¹⁾

R. I. CAMPBELL.

Foreign Office, 16th June, 1945.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Note Verbale.

THE Syrian and Lebanese Ministers, while expressing their high appreciation of the action of His Majesty's Government in the recent violent crisis in Syria, find it necessary, to avoid any misunderstanding, to affirm to His Majesty's Government that the Syrian and Lebanese Government and the League of the Arab States as a whole are not willing to concede any influence to France or to conclude any treaty with her. Twenty-five years of struggle, ending in the latest crisis, have proved that a policy based upon the concession to France of any influence or the conclusion of a treaty is doomed to failure and leads only to bloodshed and disturbance of the peace.

Syria and the Lebanon are therefore determined to put an end to this tragedy and to establish their relations with France only on such bases of international law as ordinarily govern the relations between States.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Forester to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th June.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Damascus presents his compliments to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him: (1) a copy of note on interview between B.G.S., Ninth Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, American Legation, Colonel Coghill and General Humblot, on the 30th May, 1945; (2) a copy of note on interview between B.G.S., Ninth Army, Mr. Young of British Legation and Lebanese Prime Minister on the 30th May, 1945, regarding internal security in Levant States.

Damascus, 6th June, 1945.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

AT 1350 hours on the 30th May, 1945, B.G.S., Ninth Army, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson of the American Legation and Colonel Coghill of the B.S.M., interviewed General Humblot, G.O.C., F.T.L.

B.G.S. said that owing to the indiscriminate shooting by the French in Damascus it had become necessary to evacuate the British and American colonies to a place of safety. The sub area commander asked General Oliva Roget for an armistice from midday to 1400 hours for this purpose. At 1200 hours the firing died down. At 1215 hours French lorries filled with troops overran all the main

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streets firing wildly and indiscriminately at everybody and everything they saw. The evacuation could not be carried out. The army commander must insist that an armistice to effect this evacuation be arranged and he called upon General Humblot to issue the necessary orders to General Oliva Roget and to see that they were obeyed.

General Humblot said that he knew nothing of this but promised to issue the necessary instructions and to give Ninth Army two hours' notice of the arranged time.

B.G.S. said further that the G.O.C., Ninth Army, wished to appeal to General Humblot as a soldier to stop the inhuman and unjustified slaughter which was going on in Damascus. French troops had been shelling and mortaring the town since daylight apart from rifle and machine-gun fire. There could be no possible justification for this shooting, which was absolutely indiscriminate. The Orient Palace Hotel had been badly damaged and two British officers inside it had been wounded, one of whom had since died. This was intolerable, and it was necessary that some restraint should be put upon those who were directing it.

General Humblot said that the outbreak had been provoked by attacks by the gendarmerie on French barracks and installations and they must take the consequences of it. He complained that Ninth Army situation report had said that the outbreak was due to the French firing on some deserters. This was quite untrue and had been broadcast to many addressees.

B.G.S. said that it was Ninth Army's business to report the facts as they could see them from the different sources available. He thought that General Humblot might be comforted to know that his own statement on the situation issued at 2145 hours on the 29th May had been communicated *ad verbatim* to general headquarters. It was not for us but for the world to judge whether the massacre which was going on in Damascus could be justified by the events which preceded it. The world would know the facts as they would also know that General Humblot had been personally appealed to to stop this inhuman slaughter.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson said that he had instructions from the American Minister to associate himself entirely with everything that Brigadier Frere had said. The Americans were interested in the safe evacuation of their nationals and must support the demand for a proper armistice. He was also instructed to appeal to General Humblot as a soldier to give orders in the interests of humanity for some restraint on the shooting which was being carried on.

General Humblot said he would do what he could to modify the shooting, but if the Syrians attacked the French they must take the consequences.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

AT 1215 hours, 30th May, 1945, B.G.S., Ninth Army, accompanied by Mr. Young, of British Legation, interviewed the Lebanese Prime Minister.

Mr. Young gave a message from His Majesty's Minister asking the Prime Minister to prevent his country breaking out into violence. He said that there was a military as well as a political aspect and so the B.G.S. had come to explain to him.

B.G.S. said he had come on behalf of the army commander to ask the Prime Minister from a military point of view to restrain any violent action for at least a few days. He gave the Prime Minister a statement of the events of the last 24 hours in Damascus without committing himself to any view as to who was responsible for starting it. He went on to say that he had absolutely no authority for giving any expectation that the Allied Powers would intervene, nevertheless, it seemed common sense that events such as those which had occurred at Damascus would have a great influence on world opinion. It would take time for world opinion to be transformed into action and he suggested that it would be in the best interests of both Syria and Lebanon that the Lebanese should not indulge in any violence which might form a pretext for the same sort of action as the French were taking in Damascus and elsewhere.

The Prime Minister said that all his life he had been a fighter and a leader of revolutions. It was only his national duty and the advice which he believed had been tendered by the British in a friendly spirit which had kept him behind his desk for so long. He would much rather be using a rifle in the cause of Syria, the blood of whose people was being shed on behalf of Lebanon as well.

B.G.S. said it was a question of time and again emphasised that neither he nor anyone else here could possibly say whether the Great Powers were going

to act or not; it would be far better for the Lebanese to hold their hand for the time being and so save unnecessary bloodshed. Moreover, should the Powers decide to intervene, which, of course, he did not promise, it would be easier for them to have one problem for them to deal with instead of two. If the French took the same action in Beirut as they had in Damascus on account of violence offered by the Lebanese there would inevitably be great bloodshed and disaster. Surely it was worth waiting two or three days to see if this could be avoided.

The Prime Minister said that, although it went against the grain and he felt a sense of shame that the Lebanese were not already fighting at the side of the Syrians, he would take notice of the army commander's views. He gave his word of honour that as far as he could prevent it there would be no immediate violence, although he did not guarantee it. There were bound to be large and peaceful demonstrations throughout the country during the next few days and it was always possible that some untoward incident might spread to a general disturbance.

B.G.S. thanked him and said that if the Prime Minister at any time wished to know the facts of what was going on Ninth Army were keeping the legation fully informed and he was sure that the legation would always pass the information on if required.

Mr. Young agreed to this and also offered to send any message to the Syrian Government which the Prime Minister might like.

The Prime Minister replied that he would be grateful if the Syrian Government could be informed of his extreme sympathy in their hour of disaster and that he was only holding his hand for the time being because he had been pressed to do so by the British.

(B) Weekly Political Summaries.

[E 2278/5/89] No. 36.

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 155, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 20th March, 1945—(Received 9th April).

General.

The question of invitations for Syria and the Lebanon to the San Francisco Conference has continued to be the main topic of public interest. The general belief that invitations will be forthcoming has been increased by French intimations that there was no objection from their side. As the United States, U.S.S.R. and China are believed to favour the issue of invitations, public suspicion tends to centre on His Majesty's Government as the obstructing Power.

The Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs left for Cairo by air on the 17th March to attend the Arab League meeting, accompanied by a number of Government officials and Deputies. The Lebanese Delegation, headed by the Prime Minister and four Deputies, left Beirut for Cairo on the 15th March.

The President of the Syrian Republic and his party returned from Bagdad on the 14th March.

Pending the return of General Beynet, there have been no further developments in the negotiations with the French.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 8th-15th March, 1945, amount to 160 tons, a daily average of 23 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 175,556 tons.

Last season's crops in the Jezireh and Euphrates area fell much below expectations and there is a genuine shortage of cereals in the area, the O.C.P. stocks amounting to little over 1,000 tons. There are already signs of unrest.

The Government have issued a communiqué explaining their motives for imposing control on the Lebanese spinning factories, and the attempts of the owners to raise opposition to the measure have come to nothing. Asseili, one of the two owners in question, has now accepted the Government's conditions, and the requisition of his mill has accordingly been lifted. Arida Brothers, the other

mill concerned, have not yet accepted and they endeavoured to stage a lock-out, which was, however, prevented. They have also enlisted the help of the Maronite Patriarch and various other Opposition elements, but the Government have stood firm. It is probable that the owners will eventually give way.

Syria—Damascus.

The position of the President and Government has undoubtedly deteriorated. The President's stock, which had been lowered by his speech on his return from Cairo (see *Weekly Summary* No. 152) fell still further when it became known that he had met with a cool, if not chilly, reception at Bagdad. Nor was he helped by his Minister of Interior's reference to him, in a declaration on the 11th March (see *Weekly Summary* No. 154, paragraph 3), as "President Zaim" (President Leader). The Minister himself seems determined to proceed on his authoritarian course. Not only did he give no satisfaction to a deputation of students who protested on the 12th March against his declaration and against the arrest of Bitar, but he arrested one of their number, Jamal Atassi who published a pamphlet giving an account of the interview. (Atassi was later released.) Another factor which has weakened the Government's position is their manifest failure to deal with the Alaouite situation. All this, of course, has made it more unlikely that the nationalist elements would be prepared to tolerate any action on the part of the President or Government which appeared to them to savour of truckling to the French. The prospects of future Franco-Syrian negotiations have consequently been impaired.

Khaled Bey el Azm, Minister of Finance and Minister of Supply, has announced the suppression of the latter Ministry. He explained that it had not given the desired results and in view of the approach of the end of the war it had been decided to attach its various departments to other Ministries.

Ahmed Lahham and Sabhi Omari continue to exercise their functions as Director-General of Police and Director of the Damascus Police respectively, though it is believed that the Government have agreed to nominate the former as Director-General of Defence as soon as the Army Law is passed and to appoint the latter for the time being to the vacant post of Assistant Director-General of Police.

Aleppo.

The declaration by the Minister of the Interior referred to above has roused general comment in the local press.

The suppression of the Ministry of Supply has been much welcomed.

Dr. Kayali, Minister of Justice, has again been speaking in Aleppo of his imminent resignation. One of his main anxieties is probably the severing of his lucrative connexion with the cotton mills.

Homs and Hama.

The arrest of Salh Eddin Bitar and the temporary arrest of Jamal Atassi (see above) have had a considerable reaction in Homs. The latter is reported to have been released only on the personal request of his uncle, Hashim bey Atassi.

A number of pamphlets were issued in Homs during the week including a secret plan for a bigger Syria which, it is alleged, arrived by post from an anonymous source at the house of Fikri Atassi. The pamphlets contained a plan for Syrian unity—Syria to include Transjordan, Palestine and the Lebanon. There are indications that the document was printed in Transjordan.

Alaouite Territory.

There is no progress in the Alaouite situation. His Majesty's Minister discussed the matter with the Syrian Prime Minister on the 14th March; the latter confirmed that it had been left to the Acting Mohafez to make such arrangements as he could with the local French delegate for the gradual withdrawal of French troops: there is no evidence that this has yet begun.

The Prime Minister maintains his previous refusal to accept the Tripartite Commission of Enquiry on the recent disturbances. He said that in his view the only important point was whether the French had been within their rights in sending troops into the area of disturbance when the Syrian Government had said they did not want them. Since His Majesty's Government apparently upheld the French view that they were within their rights, his Government could say no more than that they felt keenly that this was not in accordance with independent status.

His Majesty's Minister pressed the Prime Minister to find some solution for the land cases between Suleiman Murshid and the surrounding peasantry which are one of the basic causes of the trouble. He replied that he could see no solution as Murshid's position in law over the disputed lands was unassailable even though he might have obtained them by intimidation. Murshid himself now refused to accept arbitration.

The Nationalists have been disturbed by the manifest weakness of the Government as shown by recent events in the Alaouite territory, and they have therefore been all the more easily upset and discouraged by garbled versions in Arabic papers of recent statements by British statesmen regarding Arab affairs.

A manifesto was issued in Damascus by Suleiman Murshid to all the Deputies giving his account of his dealings with the Syrian Government concerning various land disputes. It shows up the weakness of the Government in not having previously settled the land cases as they have been continually urged to do.

An all-Alaouite company of the *Troupes Spéciales* is being formed in the Mohafazat under Capitaine Quwass. It is understood that it will be stationed at Lattakia.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

French representatives continue to work hard to gain the sympathies of the inhabitants and their influence is growing. They have recently circulated privately to some fifty notables of Deir-ez-Zor extracts in Arabic of speeches by Mr. Churchill and other purporting to show that Britain is committed wholeheartedly to a policy of supporting French authority in Syria.

Tribal.

There has been no development in the settlement of the Shammar-Agaidat dispute. The mutessarif of Mosul is understood to be still insisting that the meeting should take place at Mosul while the Agaidat refuse to enter Shammar territory.

Frontier.

The question of frontier passes is still causing friction between the Syrians and the French. Although an Allied military check has been retained on the frontier of Turkey the Mohafez has again instructed some of the kaïmakams to issue frontier passes.

Some fifty Turkish deserters crossed the frontier into Syria during February, most of them being Armenians and pioneer units.

Lebanon.

The decision to leave the Minister for Foreign Affairs out of the Arab Conference Delegation was probably due partly to reluctance to leave the country in the incompetent hands of M. Nicolas Ghosn, and partly to the Prime Minister's annoyance at what he felt to be the excessively pro-Christian line M. Pharaon had taken during the previous discussions. In coming to this decision the Prime Minister presumably took into account the risk of leaving such a notorious intriguer free to make trouble while his master's back was turned. Whether he was wise to take such a risk remains to be seen; but it is perhaps significant that on the 20th March Henri Pharaon entertained to dinner Riad Solh, Sami Solh and Habib Abu Chahla, who are generally believed to be plotting the overthrow of the Kerameh Government at the first convenient opportunity.

In spite of the pro-Christian sympathies ascribed to M. Pharaon, the extreme Christian opponents of the Government are still endeavouring to raise the bogey of Islam as an inducement to the Christians to oppose the Government policy of participating in the new Arab League. On the 17th March a deputation composed of the three ex-Presidents, Emil Eddé, Alfred Naccache and Dr. Ayoub Tabet, accompanied by Moussa Nammour, proceeded to Bekerké in the hopes of inducing the Maronite Patriarch to send a telegram to Cairo expressing disapproval of the Arab League and disavowing the Prime Minister's signature of the protocol. Their mission was, however, unsuccessful; the Patriarch said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had shown him the modifications made in the original Alexandria Protocol, which in his view constituted sufficient protection for the Maronites. Messrs. Naccache and Tabet, after discussion, agreed with him and the deputation withdrew.

Fauzi Hoss, one of the Lebanese delegates at the Chicago Air Conference, has now returned and reported on the results of his mission to the United States and Great Britain. The Governments are expected to charge him with missions

to investigate the possibility of air lines between the Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries.

Controversy between the Phalange and the Government over the recent bye-election in Mount Lebanon continues. Great play was made in anti-Government newspapers of a statement attributed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that some of the Government officials in Mount Lebanon might have exceeded their instructions during the election. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has now officially denied having made this statement.

The Lebanese Government have asked for the *agrément* of Charles Malik, the well-known American University of Beirut professor, as their first Minister to Washington.

The Finance Committee of the Chamber have at last started the examination of the budget, which is even more overdue than usual.

Mazhar Omari left for Beirut during the week to surrender to the authorities, in accordance with the promise made to the Chief of the Gendamerie. The Minister of Justice, M. Henry Pharaon, was duly notified, but it was subsequently decided that it would be preferable to postpone this case until after the Prime Minister's return from Egypt, and as it was not intended to detain Mazhar for long he was instructed to wait. It has been agreed that Mazhar is to be pardoned if found guilty, in order that he may assist in bringing about the arrest of Karameh's assailants.

M. Pharaon has come in for considerable adverse comment as a result of his dismissal of the head of the Lebanese gendamerie for refusing to carry out an order given to him by M. Pharaon in his capacity as Minister of Justice. Colonel Traboulsi maintained that only the Minister of the Interior could give him orders. The matter was ventilated in the press, and the Cabinet ultimately decided in favour of M. Pharaon. The whole affair, which was clearly the result of a conflict of personalities, is generally regarded as unfortunate and reflecting little credit on M. Pharaon.

[E 2381/5/89]

(2)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 156, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 27th March, 1945.—(Received 13th April.)

General.

The American Minister, acting on telegraphic instructions from the State Department, addressed notes to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the 24th March stating that their adherence to the United Nations' declaration would be accepted and that when they had adhered they would be invited to San Francisco. The State Department have also informed His Majesty's Government that on receipt of the declarations of adherence they will make a public statement announcing that the States have joined the United Nations and have been invited to San Francisco; the communiqué will add that France took the initiative in proposing that the Levant States should be invited. The United States Minister was also instructed to inform the Governments that these developments must be kept absolutely confidential until a public statement had been made. Public opinion is, however, tending to take it for granted that an invitation will in fact be extended, in view of the declaration by the French Foreign Minister and the intervention of the Arab nations on behalf of the Levant States. The French are undoubtedly making capital out of the situation, and in a French-inspired article in *Le Matin* of Damascus on the 26th March it was stated that Transjordan ought to be invited to San Francisco before the discussion of such questions as that of mandates "in which not only Syria and the Lebanon but also Transjordan and Palestine are most particularly interested."

The formation of the Arab League has been on the whole favourably commented upon in Syria, although a few mildly disparaging articles have appeared in the Arab press; it is possible, however, that questions will be raised in the Chamber of Deputies after the return from Cairo of the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the Lebanon in general the more extreme Christians are relieved that the Lebanon should, in their view, have kept clear of any entanglements with the Moslem Arab States, and attribute this to the efforts of their Minister for Foreign Affairs; whilst the Moslems as well as the more moderate Christians are disappointed that the League should have been constituted in so loose a form and consider that it cannot thus be effective. There is a tendency to consider the result as a set-back to British policy on the grounds that Great

Britain, in view of her special relations with most of the Arab States, could have dominated a closely-knit League.

Count Ostrorog had an interview on the 21st March with the Acting Syrian Prime Minister, Khaled el Azm, but no progress in the negotiations has been made, the draft University Convention still being under examination by the Syrian Government.

According to reports from Cairo relations between the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are none too cordial and it is suggested that when they return Fares Khoury will insist on resigning. Dr. Kayali, the Minister of Justice, though present in the capital, did not attend any of the sittings of the Chamber of Deputies held during the week and rumours of his resignation persist. It is strongly rumoured that a new Government will be formed before long.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 16th–22nd March, 1945, amount to 90 tons, a daily average of 13 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944–45 crop up to 175,646 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

In the absence of the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at the meeting of the Arab League in Cairo, Khaled el Azm has been acting as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ahmed Charabati has been in charge of the Ministry of National Economy and Acting President on the Higher Cereals Commission.

At the fifth and last sitting at the extraordinary session of Parliament on the 19th March, a written question was submitted regarding the non-invitation of Syria to the San Francisco Conference; Deputies from Homs and Hama complained that no decision has been reached in connexion with the army, although the extraordinary session had been called in this connexion; another Hama Deputy said that, in addition to the question of the army, matters of internal policy such as censorship, deportations (reference to Salah Eddin Bitar—see Section 3, Weekly Political Summary No. 154) and the Alaouite question called for discussion. The Acting Prime Minister accepted in principle that the questions mentioned should form the subject of a debate, but it was agreed to await the return of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At a sitting of the Chamber on the next day another Hama Deputy enquired what were the Government's views in connexion with President Roosevelt's declaration regarding Palestine. The Speaker suggested that the matter should be left over for discussion until the Minister for Foreign Affairs had returned.

An anti-Government demonstration for which the Arab Resurrection party was largely responsible took place on the 24th March. Students of the Tajhiz school cried: "Down with the Syrian dictator"—a reference to Sabri el Assali, Minister of the Interior—"Down with the unjust policy of the Government," "Down with France and the traitor de Gaulle," "There will be no army without revolution," "Long live Greater Syria," and "Long live Feisal II." Speeches were made by students at the Sérail accusing the Government of trampling on the Constitution and calling for the transfer of the army, the return of the Hatay, and the formation of Greater Syria.

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires called at the Syrian Foreign Office on the 19th March to make an unofficial protest against an article in the Damascus newspaper *El Inshaa* quoting statements by the German general Guderian that the Red Army were responsible for the atrocities in occupied territory. He also protested against the anti-Soviet tone of certain other articles in the Syrian press though he did not give details. As a result of his protest the *Inshaa* was suspended for five days on the direct orders of the President.

Two Damascus lawyers have left for Egypt to attend the Arab lawyers' conference.

Cotton-spinning mills are to hand over all their yarn to the Government and their private arrangements for the selling of cheap cloth are to cease. There is however a general lack of confidence in the proposed distribution by the Government of locally produced yarn or of imported piece-goods.

Aleppo.

The signing of the Arab League agreement was well received in the local press and welcomed by the Nationalists.

The Soviet denunciation of their treaty with Turkey created considerable interest, particularly amongst the Armenians, who envisage the possibility of an enlargement of Soviet Armenia at the expense of Turkey.

Homs and Hama.

The week has seen an increased feeling of exasperation against the Government amongst the Opposition elements in the area. The return of Shukri Quwatli from Iraq and the absence of any clear or definite statement by the Government on the results of his visit had given rise to a shower of pamphlets emanating mainly from Damascus and Beirut.

A Communist leaflet has been distributed in Homs and Hama complaining against the efforts made to disturb Franco-Syrian relations and drawing attention to the necessity of strengthening Syrian relations with Russia.

Jebel Druze.

The Atrash clan have strongly expressed to the Political Officer their disappointment at having been passed over in the selection of new Syrian Ministers. The Emir Hassan recently delivered himself of a violent diatribe against the Government and openly avowed his intention of working henceforth against Shukri Quwatli—and for the Emir Abdullah. They reject the argument that if a Ministry were given to the Jebel Druze the Alaouites and the Jezireh would expect similar recognition, since they maintain that the Jebel Druze's contribution to the struggle for independence has been greater than that of any other province.

Alaouites.

The return of the Mohafez from Damascus on the 20th March enabled discussions to be resumed between him and the Délégué Adjoint regarding the gradual withdrawal of the troops and gendarmerie from the Jobit area. By noon on the 23rd March, however, little change had occurred, the French still having 490 and the gendarmerie 380 men in the "rebel" area. The establishment by Ninth Army of British liaison officers in a camp, one at Jobit and one at Qerdaha, with a third mobile observer, is helping to keep the situation in hand. Recruiting for the all-Alaouite company of the Troupes Spéciales continues.

Lieutenant Berge of the French Political Office is continuing to pay visits to notables in the neighbourhood and to treat the gendarmerie officers with scant courtesy. The opinion has been expressed to the Political Officer by a reliable source that but for the interest the British have shown in the Alaouite question a general rising of the Alaouites would have been engineered by the French.

Lebanon.

Conflicting reports regarding the health of the Lebanese President continue to circulate. It is stated that he will return to the Lebanon after Easter, but there are indications that he will continue to live in retirement and attend only to the most pressing business.

The Lebanese Government's control of the spinning industry appears to have achieved success, as the Arida factories have now accepted the Government's conditions and are co-operating with them.

The Lebanese Communist party, profiting by the weakness of the Minister of the Interior, have now held meetings in a Beirut cinema on three successive Sundays, the speeches being broadcast in the adjoining square through loud speakers. The party have also revived their long-standing feud with the Parti Populaire Syrien and are understood to have addressed a manifesto to the Government calling for the suppression of this "Fascist organisation." Much criticism is being directed against the Government for what is considered to be the unnecessary licence given to the Communists.

[E 2462/5/89]

(3)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 157, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 3rd April, 1945.—(Received 17th April.)

General.

THE Lebanese and Syrian Governments were informed on the 29th March by the United States Minister of their invitation to attend the San Francisco Conference. Both Governments have subsequently published a communiqué announcing their adherence to the United Nations Pact.

On the 31st March the Syrian Chamber of Deputies unanimously ratified the signature of the Arab League Pact, though one Deputy stated that his vote was subject to the reservations that acceptance of the pact was not contrary to the unification of Syria, and that it did not recognise the mandate of Palestine.

The Lebanese Cabinet approved the pact on the same date and it will be submitted to the Chamber for ratification on the 7th April.

The Lebanese President returned to Beirut incognito on the 31st March and has now started to receive visitors. His state of health appears to be much improved, though he is still a tired man.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 23rd-31st March, 1945, amount to 472 tons, a daily average of 52 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 176,118 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to Damascus from Cairo on the 27th March. There have been strong rumours of the Prime Minister's resignation and a consequent Cabinet reshuffle; but it seems that the Prime Minister is anxious to attend the San Francisco Conference and has decided against resignation for the moment.

It has been reported that the United States will offer five scholarships to Syrian students for courses in American universities; in this connexion it will be recalled that the British Council are offering two scholarships to be taken up at British universities.

Homs and Hama.

Count Ostrorog visited Palmyra on the 24th March and addressed a number of sheikhs on the subject of France's love for Syria, which had recently manifested itself in her demand that the Levant States should be included in the San Francisco Conference. His visit appears to have had little reaction.

Jebel Druze.

Two gendarmes were wounded and one soldier killed in a disturbance which took place on the 31st March in Soueida. The Mouhafez and his supporters accused the French of engineering the incident, but there is little evidence to support this opinion. It does, however, indicate an unfortunate state of indiscipline amongst the Druze squadrons.

Alaouites.

It is reported that two companies of Troupes Spéciales, which had been sent to the area from Hama, are being withdrawn and replaced by two Druze squadrons from Jebel Druze. The délégué of Soueida has informed the Political Officer there that they will not be replaced by non-Druze troops from elsewhere.

Lebanon.

The mention in the United States communiqué that the invitation to the Levant States was due to French initiative was badly received by the Lebanese Government, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently issued a communiqué denying that he had endorsed it in a public declaration. There has been little local comment on the invitation, which had been generally expected.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has recently forwarded to the United States Minister a memorandum setting forth the Arab objections to Zionism and asking for his support to the Arab cause. The Prime Minister pointed out that the Lebanon as a limitrophe country with Palestine was particularly concerned at a possible development of Zionism, which might overflow the borders of Palestine.

Dr. Charles Malik has now been appointed first Lebanese Minister in Washington and is being hurried off there with his staff in order to be ready for San Francisco.

There is little internal political activity. What there is seems to be confined to rivalry for a place on the delegation to San Francisco. The Government have continued to show energy in the economic field and their efforts have won them increased popularity. Reductions in wholesale prices, though not in general reflected in the retail market and probably caused more by the war situation than the Government's efforts, have nevertheless enhanced the Government's prestige, and the opposition elements have not yet found the moment propitious to begin a general assault on them.

[E 2663/5/89]

(4)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 158, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th April, 1945.—(Received 26th April.)

General.

ON the 7th April the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies unanimously ratified the Arab League Pact, though one of the Deputies wrote a letter to the President of the Chamber saying that he was in favour of bilateral treaties between the Lebanese and Arab nations.

The Prime Minister, in a speech in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 4th April, replied to the various criticisms which had been levelled against the Government during the past few weeks, and said that the primary aim of the Nationalist leaders had been independence; this consideration had influenced them in their attitude to the Lebanon, but it was now agreed that a Greater Lebanon which was independent was preferable to a smaller Lebanon under the influence of a foreign Power. The Prime Minister went on to deny that the Government had declared that they would not conclude treaties with foreign Powers; it was, in fact, inevitable that they should do so. The Government, however, declared that they would not negotiate a treaty which would be detrimental to Syrian sovereignty or which would give a pre-eminent position to any foreign Power. He then announced the decision of the Cabinet to resign, on the grounds that the period of Syria's isolation had come to an end through the signature of the Arab League Pact and the participation in the San Francisco Conference, and that a new stage in the life of the nation had been reached; it was therefore fitting that he should return to the First President the trust which had been deposited with him.

The President, after consulting with the outgoing Ministers and with Lutfi Haffar, invited Fares Bey Khoury to form the new Cabinet, the constitution of which is as follows:—

President of the Council of Ministers: Fares el Khoury.
Foreign Affairs and National Defence: Jamil Mardam Bey.
Justice, Wakfs and Acting Minister of Supply: Said Ghazzi.
Finance: Naim Antaki.
Interior: Sabri Assali.
Public Instruction and Acting Minister of National Economy: Ahmad Sharabati.
Public Works: Hikmat el Hakim.

Opposition elements will find a certain satisfaction in the absence of Khaled el Azm, but Deputies from the north are not likely to be satisfied by the inclusion of only one of their number, Hikmat el Hakim. It is reported that the Prime Minister was anxious to include Khaled el Azm in his new Ministry, but that Khaled el Azm himself declined to accept the portfolio. It is interesting that throughout the negotiations for the formation of the Cabinet all sections were apparently agreed that Fares el Khoury should remain Prime Minister.

At a sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 9th April, at which the Prime Minister outlined the policy of his new Government, he said that it was essential for relations between France and Syria to be settled without delay. The Syrians must consider that their problems with France had been solved. Both Syria and France now cherished towards the other friendly feelings based on the recognition of rights and sovereignty. The matters in suspense could be summarised as follows: (a) the army, which must be taken over, and the Government hoped from the information they had received that the transfer would take place soon; (b) no agreement had so far been concluded between Syria and France regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations as had been done in the case of other Allied Powers; (c) similarly, no agreement had been reached with regard to financial relations with France, with whom the Syrians had a current account of long standing. France possessed in Syria certain establishments, buildings, cultural institutions and schools; they had previously proposed a form of agreement in connexion with these which the Syrian Government had, however, not considered to merit discussion. The French had now proposed a different convention which the Government thought might serve as a basis for discussion; both parties would shortly appoint three experts each with a view to discussing the new draft. The Government would submit for approval to the Chamber of Deputies any agreement reached.

There has been much political activity in both capitals during the week in connexion with the selection of the delegations for the San Francisco Conference. The Syrian delegation consists of Fares el Khoury as president, Naim Antaki and Nazim Kudsi (Syrian Minister in Washington) as members, with Farid Zein ed Din and Nur ed Din Kabbali as advisers, and Tewfik Hunaidi as secretary. The Lebanese delegation is much weaker and consists of Wadih Naim as president, Joseph Salim, Abdullah Yafi and George Malik (Lebanese Minister in Washington) as members, with Subbi Mahmassani as legal adviser.

The Syrians and French have agreed to set up a joint committee to examine the new draft University Convention.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 1st–7th April, 1945, amount to 473 tons, a daily average of 67 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944–45 crop up to 176,591 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

Telegrams have been addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, the United States of America, China, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, expressing the appreciation and thanks of the Syrian people for the support which they received in connexion with their request for participation in the San Francisco Conference. A similar telegram but in rather more tepid phraseology was sent to M. Bidault.

Abdul Karia Aidi, Kaimakam of Douma, has been appointed Director of the Damascus Police in succession to Sobhi Omari, who has been appointed lieutenant-colonel in the gendarmerie; he has so far refused the appointment on the grounds that he is entitled to the rank of full colonel. Ahmed Lahham, the Director-General of Police, absented himself from his office for two days in order to show his solidarity with Sobhi Omari, but was persuaded by the President to return to duty.

The Futuwwa Committee will be composed of the Director-General of Education, a representative from the Gendarmerie Department, a representative from the Ministry of Defence and two representatives from the Ministry of Education; Major Abdul Razzaq Qouli has been made responsible for military training.

A draft Labour Law has been prepared by the Ministry of National Economy which, according to the press, will provide for the establishment of reconciliation machinery on which labour and employers will be represented in addition to the Government and will regulate child labour and hours of work.

Homs and Hama.

A meeting of the leaders of the Homs Monarchist party was held on the 4th April.

The security situation in Hama has continued to deteriorate, and on the 5th April a severe clash occurred between members of the Barazi clan and a large number of the Haurani family. Fighting occurred in the open fields, and it is estimated that at one time about 800 persons were involved. Police intervention was ineffective but the participants finally dispersed at nightfall, taking their casualties with them so that the actual numbers are not yet known.

The Hama civil authorities do not hesitate to connect the fresh Barazi outrages with the clandestine visits lately paid to Khalid Agha Darwish Barazi by the Délégué adjoint of Homs–Hama.

A squadron of Druze troops reached Homs on the 2nd April *en route* for the Alaouite area, but refused to continue the journey as they did not want to enter the Alaouites. They have been placed under the command of Commandant Hassan Atrash, who is trying to find them accommodation in Homs. It is clear that the French dare not use force to oblige the men to continue the journey for fear of them dispersing.

Alaouite Territory.

On the 5th April, after repeated requests from the Mohafez, Colonel Bonnot informed him of the French decisions regarding the withdrawal of troops. Commandant Rayssac's headquarters and the company of Moroccans are to remain in Jobit. The cavalry squadron of Cherkess in the Jobit area are to be

replaced by a squadron of Druze cavalry which will detach one troop to replace the cavalry squadron in the Ainab area. The latter squadron will return to Hama; the net withdrawal from the Jobit area, the seat of the original disturbances, is, therefore, one troop of cavalry, though it has been reported that the cavalry troops covering the re-established gendarmerie posts at Nzeiraa and Fakhoura have been called in to Jobit.

It is reported that 240 men already have been recruited for the new Alaouite squadrons of the *Troupes Spéciales*. The Mohafez has informed the Political Officer that certain of these men are called "avenantaires," and have signed an undertaking to serve General de Gaulle and to go wherever he sends them. The Mohafez added that two-thirds of the *Troupes Spéciales* have also signed similar documents, which there is evidence to show are in French and signed by the men without knowledge of their meaning.

Frontier.

The Syrians have again invited a rebuff from the Turks and the French over the question of frontier passes. The Kaimakam at Harim, in the temporary absence of the French frontier officer, issued a pass for a Syrian to cross to Rihanieh. After being turned back by the French *Sûreté* on the 29th March, the man was put across the frontier elsewhere by the Syrian gendarmerie, only to be sent back by the Turks at French request on the 30th March because the signature on his pass was unacceptable.

Lebanon.

There is no great enthusiasm for the delegation finally selected to represent the Lebanon at the San Francisco Conference, though its members are drawn from the Maronite, Greek Catholic, Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs intends that the delegation shall later tour the Lebanese communities in North and South America.

On the 30th March two members of the Shamass tribe were murdered at Boudaye by members of the Jaafar tribe. Both these tribes are well armed and live in the hills to the west of Baalbek and Hermel. The murders were premeditated in revenge for the killing some six months ago of a Jaafar by the Shamass in a dispute concerning a woman of the latter tribe. As a result of the murders feeling is running high since they took place while talks were in progress between the tribes to attempt a reconciliation. There was evidence to show that the Shamass intended to take immediate reprisals and the Mohafez of the Bekaa asked for gendarmerie reinforcements.

During the week the 500 *Chasseurs Libanais*, of the unit at the disposal of the Lebanese Government, arrived in the area, and a number of gendarmes estimated now at more than 400. A demand was sent to the Jaafar for the surrender of the wanted men and, when this failed, an unsuccessful attempt was made to arrest them. The gendarmerie and the *Chasseurs Libanais* are now dispersed between the two tribes, but there is little doubt that they would be unable to prevent a serious clash if either of the two parties decided to make a general attack.

The Political Officer for the Bekaa has been reliably informed that on the day prior to the murders a French officer visited Fadlalah and Sadalah Hamadi at Hermel. These two are leading members of the Hamadi family, which has considerable influence over both tribes, though they are hostile to the interests of Sabri Hamadi, the Lebanese Deputy.

The Turkish delegation to the San Francisco Conference passed through Beirut on the 8th and 9th April. Official calls were paid on the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 2843/5/89]

(5)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 159, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 17th April, 1945.—(Received 4th May.)

General.

THE death of President Roosevelt has been sincerely regretted in both countries, though in Syria, where his alleged support of Zionism has more than once caused irritation, there is some apprehension lest Mr. Truman may show himself to be even more pro-Zionist.

The Syrian Minister in Paris reported to his Government on the 11th April that he had learnt that M. Massigli had been instructed to propose to His Majesty's Government that British troops should be withdrawn from the Levant States and that the French troops in the country and the *Troupes Spéciales* should be removed from British operational command. It has been ascertained that no such proposal had been received in London up to the 12th April.

Certain members of the Turkish delegation who recently passed through Aleppo on their way to San Francisco told Syrian journalists that the recognition of Syria was held up because of the Hatay agitation, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who headed it, told His Majesty's consul that it had been "represented" to the Turks (presumably by the French Embassy at Angora) that recognition at this stage was inexpedient. His Majesty's consul reports that the Turks appear to be seriously considering making Iskenderun a free port, though probably from a wish to gain financially rather than from any fear of Syrian agitation.

At the sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 9th April, referred to in paragraph 4 of section 1, Weekly Political Summary No. 158, the new Government obtained a vote of confidence with two Deputies voting against and one abstention.

The Syrian and Lebanese delegations to the San Francisco Conference left Damascus and Beirut on the 12th and 13th April respectively.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 8th-15th April, 1945, amount to 568 tons, a daily average of 81 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 177,159 tons.

Purchases by the O.C.P. of all cereals from the 1944-45 harvest amount to 176,591 tons, and the stocks on hand are 35,163—distribution in March amounted to 16,691 tons. As a result of the unsatisfactory situation disclosed by these figures the Commission des Céréales Panifiables decided to negotiate for the purchase of U.K.C.C. stocks in Syria and a further 4,300 tons of wheat were purchased last week.

A meeting was held under the presidency of Jamil Mardam Bey at which the position was discussed; it was considered that the O.C.P. would be successful in purchasing another 5,000 tons from last year's harvest which, with the stocks in hand, ought to be sufficient to feed the two countries until the new purchases from the 1945-46 harvest can be made, although reports suggest that the new harvest will be late. A slight fall in prices is reported from Damascus, Homs and Aleppo.

Damascus.

On receipt of the news of the death of President Roosevelt the Syrian Government gave orders that the Syrian flag should be flown at half mast throughout the country for three days. Telegrams of sympathy were addressed by the Syrian President to Mr. Truman and Mrs. Roosevelt and by Jamil Bey Mardam to Mr. Stettinus. The Chamber adjourned its sitting on the 14th April as a token of sympathy after the President of the Chamber had expressed their sympathy at the loss of "Roosevelt the Great" and Jamil Bey Mardam had referred to Syria's debt of gratitude to the President for the country's independence.

In the absence of Fares el Khoury and Naim Antaki at the San Francisco Conference Jamil Bey Mardam and Said Ghazzi will act as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance respectively.

The question of censorship of the press has been raised twice during the past week. A manifesto addressed by the president of the Lawyers' Syndicate to the Chamber of Deputies has been published in all newspapers; it complains that in spite of the "decision" of the Chamber to abolish censorship no action has been taken. The same point was also raised when the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs received journalists on the eve of the former's departure for San Francisco. The Prime Minister indicated that instructions for the relaxation of censorship regulations had already been given.

Fares el Khoury and Naim Antaki will represent Syria at the conference to be held in Washington in connexion with the establishment of the Court of International Justice.

The Emir Tallal of Transjordan arrived in Damascus on the 12th April. He was met on the frontier by the "chef de protocole" and by the Transjordan and

Iraqi consuls, and on his way to Damascus was greeted by a number of notables and senior Government officials. He called on the President and on Jamil Bey Mardam, leaving for Beirut the next day.

An Egyptian Military Mission headed by El Ferik Atallah Pasha arrived in Damascus on a so-called private visit on the 13th April and was entertained by Saadullah Jabri and Jamil Bey Mardam; Atallah Pasha was received by the President.

Aleppo.

A petition about the Hatay was despatched early in the month by a certain M. Medin Stamboulie to the Syrian delegation to the San Francisco Conference and to the secretariat at the Arab League. M. Stamboulie claims that the petition was sent on behalf of 60,000 refugees from the Hatay to ask for help in returning to the Hatay, maintaining that the separation of 1938 was contrary to the wishes of the League of Nations' Commission and to the plebiscite figures.

Jebel Druze.

The Amir Talal, the principal notable of the Chehba region, has sent telegrams to the Mohafez and to the President of the Republic protesting against the activities of "foreigners" (i.e., French) in an independent country and assuring the President and the Government of the loyalty and support of the inhabitants of the Caza.

The French have completely dismantled the telephone line Soueida-Salkhad-Imtan, which they allege had been previously damaged by a storm: it is rumoured that they also intend to dismantle the Soueida-Chehba line. If this is done there will be no telephonic communication available to the Syrian authorities to any place in the Jebel Druze other than Soueida.

Alaouites.

The situation in the Alaouite territory remains thoroughly unsatisfactory. No further withdrawals of French troops have been reported and fighting broke out near Bab Abdulla between followers of Suleiman Murshid and Ali Baddour; twelve gendarmes from Slenfe were fired on as was also the British observer patrol. The gendarmes were unable to reach the village and reinforcements have been despatched to Slenfe.

Tribal.

The Mohafez of Deir ez-Zor is reported to have settled all outstanding cases between the Afadla and the Fedaan Khrossa which have been outstanding since 1939 and which have cost some 500 lives.

A quadrilateral exchange of telegrams between the Mohafez of Deir ez-Zor, the Syrian Government, the Iraqi Government and the Mutessarif of Mosul has up to the present failed to secure a definite agreement either for the place and date of the Shammar-Ageidat Conference or for the place and date of a preliminary unofficial meeting between the Mohafez and Mutessarif.

Beirut.

There are indications that Riad Solh and his group are on the point of initiating an assault on the present Lebanese Government, with the object of procuring its downfall and thus clearing the way for their own return to power. The immediate target selected is the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid himself open to attack by a series of ill-advised excursions into matters outside his province, and particularly by attempts to enlist the support of Christian elements hitherto deemed to be wholly opposed to the present régime and under French influence, such as Alfred Naccache and Tewfik Awad. A group of newspapers under the influence of Riad Solh has now begun openly criticising the Prime Minister and his Government and hinting that there is dissension within the Ministry. Riad Solh is also suspected of covertly working up the Beirut merchants to protest against the Prime Minister's anti-profiteering campaign. So far it would not seem that Riad Solh has gained the sympathy of the majority of the Deputies, but his position is growing stronger whilst that of the Government grows weaker. A point may soon be reached when Abdul Hamid Karami will be forced to choose between dropping his Foreign Minister or resigning

himself, but even the former course would not suffice to divert the attacks of his opponents. The President, who under the Constitution should be in a position to direct the course of events, is plainly still in no condition to do so, and his weakness continues to represent a serious obstacle to the establishment of a stable régime.

The Communist newspaper, *Saut Esh Shaab*, has begun a series of articles intended to stiffen the population against all types of foreign interference in Arab affairs. Treaty revision in Iraq and Egypt is spoken of, in addition to the liberation of the Levant States from French control and the termination of the mandates over Palestine and Transjordan, and it is clear that this paper, whether or not under the directives of the Soviet Legation, is embarking on a campaign of avowed xenophobia.

Lively criticism of the weakness of the Lebanese delegation to San Francisco has been expressed in all quarters, though it is recognised that the Government's political opponents, by their refusal to participate, share some of the responsibility in the choice of so unrepresentative a team.

The new Egyptian and Persian Ministers to the Lebanon have now presented their credentials to the President, the former after several months' delay caused by the President's illness. The press reports that the Brazilian Consulate-General is shortly to be transformed into a legation.

The Amir Tallal of Transjordan arrived in Beirut on a private visit on the 13th April. He called on His Majesty's Minister, who returned his call before leaving for Damascus.

The enthronement of a new Armenian Catholicos on the 8th April gave rise to yet another squabble over protocol between the Lebanese and French authorities. The latter wished to follow the precedent of previous years, under which the Lebanese and French official representatives would rank level, ahead of the other diplomatic representatives; this the Lebanese Government refused to accept and as a result the French were not represented at the ceremony.

The Shamass-Jaafar dispute referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, Section 11 of Weekly Political Summary No. 158, is still not resolved and the Chasseurs Libanais and the gendarmerie remain in the field. The latter have arrested thirty-five persons for interrogation in connexion with the further killing of one of the Shamass tribe. It is reported that the Lebanese Deputy, Sabri Hamadi, is making a new attempt to arrange a settlement by negotiation between the two tribes.

[E 3121/5/89]

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 160, Syria and the Lebanon, 24th April, 1945.—(Received 17th May.)

General.

DISSATISFACTION is being freely expressed in both countries at General Beynet's prolonged absence, and the President of the Syrian Republic and members of both Governments have expressed their conviction that the French are merely playing for time. A suggestion by the French, made through the Syrian Minister in Paris, that the Syrian delegation at San Francisco should be empowered to discuss outstanding questions with the French delegation has added to the growing impression that the French have no intention of making any immediate concessions to either of the local Governments. The Syrians, in agreement with the Lebanese, have made it clear to the French that, while there is no objection to exchanges of views at San Francisco, actual negotiations must take place, as originally arranged, in this country.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs met the Acting Syrian Prime Minister at Chtaura on the 19th April, and had what was officially described as a cordial discussion. The Syrians are understood to have stated that, in the negotiations with the French for a university convention, their representatives had instructions to agree to nothing which would give any pre-eminence or privilege to the French or the French language; the Lebanese appear to have agreed to take a similar line. The two parties also reached agreement regarding the appointment of representatives to the Arab Propaganda Bureaux.

On the economic side, however, the Syrians and Lebanese had more controversial subjects to discuss. The Syrians had recently published an order that all goods destined for Syrian merchants should be imported through Syrian

customs posts; to this the Lebanese objected, as dealing a blow to the *entrepôt* trade of Beirut. The Lebanese also protested vigorously against the manner in which the Syrian Government were carrying out the recent textile agreement; they claimed that, whilst all the Lebanese cotton-yarn due under the agreement was being delivered to Syria, the Syrian cloth delivered to the Lebanon in exchange was of such poor quality as to be useless. They appear to have threatened that, if its quality were not improved in a week, they would cancel the whole agreement.

The presence of locusts has been reported between Deir-ez-Zor and pipe-line station T.2, and also in the south-east parts of the country. The Minister of National Economy has asked Ninth Army for assistance in the shape of transport, men and locust-fighting appliances.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 15th-21st April, 1945, amount to 209 tons, a daily average of 30 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 177,368 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

A committee has been formed to consider the new French proposals for a cultural convention; the Syrian members are Faïdi Atassi, a former Minister of Education; Sami Midani, dean of the Law College; and Dr. Zaki el Jabi, Syrian representative on the Cultural Committee of the Arab League; on the French side are M. de Lagarde, Délégué Adjoint; M. Collet and M. Bounoure, former advisers to the Syrian and Lebanese Ministries of Education, respectively. Count Ostrorog has expressed the view that the Syrian members are reasonable and acceptable to the French. The committee has held one meeting, but since two of the Syrian members had been appointed only two days previously it was decided that they should be allowed some days to study the proposals in detail. The second meeting has been fixed for the 25th April. It is understood that the directive given to the Syrian delegation by their Government is to the effect that they should agree only to such concessions as could be granted to any other foreign Power, and there is strong evidence to show that the Syrians do not, in fact, propose to conclude a cultural agreement with the French, except as part of a general settlement. Hassan Jabbara, Director-General of Finance, has been appointed Minister of Supply. Faiz Khoury, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and brother of the present Syrian Prime Minister, has told a member of the legation staff that he has been offered and accepted the post of Syrian Minister in Moscow; the Russian Minister has been asked verbally to obtain the approval of his Government for the appointment, and if the answer is favourable an official request will be made by the Syrian Government.

Two detachments of Druze Troupes Spéciales reached Homs early in April en route for the Alaouite area and refused to continue their journey (see paragraph 4, Section 5 of Weekly Political Summary No. 158). One detachment was eventually persuaded to continue, but the second maintained its refusal, partly through dissatisfaction over transport and feeding arrangements on the journey, partly because they apparently feared that they might be required to fight against the Syrian gendarmerie. The French military authorities disarmed this detachment and at first stated that they had dismissed it, but later claimed that they had merely "dispersed" it. Be that as it may, most of the men then began to make their way back towards Damascus; on the way they were met by the Mohafez of the Jebel Druze, who promised that they would be enlisted in the Syrian gendarmerie. On their outward journey to Homs they had been coldly received by the villages through which they had passed, but on the return journey, though still wearing French uniforms, they were warmly welcomed. The Syrian Government appear subsequently to have arranged for them to be medically examined. The French civil authorities begged the Governments not to allow the men to enter Damascus, and the Government, being quite prepared to show themselves reasonable in this matter, agreed to keep them out. Later, the French stated that they did not wish to charge the men with desertion, for fear of repercussions in the Jebel Druze, but would be compelled to do so if the Syrian Government enlisted them in the gendarmerie. His Majesty's Minister intends to take an early opportunity of warning the Acting Syrian Prime Minister against taking any precipitate action.

Tribal.

The Iraqi and Syrian authorities have agreed to hold the Shammar-Ageidat Conference in Bagdad on the 3rd May. A report has been received from Mosul that there was a further Shammar-Ageidat clash near Baaj on the 23rd April, but this has since been denied, although there is said to be tension in the area.

Frontier.

The problem of frontier passes is again giving trouble. The Mohafez of Aleppo, on the 23rd April, according to French reports that have not yet been checked, ordered the Kaimakam of Harim to close the frontier to holders of Turkish frontier passes because of the Turks' unwillingness to recognise passes signed by the Syrian Kaimakam. This possibility had been mentioned previously to the French Délégué, who had urged delay for full consideration by the Government of a matter which affected the whole frontier, but apparently the closure was ordered without further reference.

Beirut.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are both displaying nervousness and irritation at the campaign which is being directed against them by Riad es Solh and his partisans. While the latter are obviously animated solely by the desire to return to power, the effect of their campaign is likely to be to force the present Government to adopt a more nationalistic line. Riad es Solh's aim is probably to seize any weakness of the present Government in their attitude towards the French and to return to power on a wave of nationalist and anti-French feeling; a hardening of public opinion in this sense is already perceptible.

In the field of internal policy, the Government continue to derive credit from the slightly downward trend of prices which has now become evident, and the Prime Minister's efforts to check profiteering are generally appreciated, as is his own rectitude. Public opinion is not therefore yet ready for any change of Government.

The Prime Minister, who, in his capacity of Minister of Finance, is now studying the budget, is much concerned at the continued heavy deficit in the Supply Department, which is estimated at 16 million Syrian pounds per annum. He complains, as have his predecessors, that this department is saddled with a large number of redundant and useless officials; but he finds, again as did his predecessors, that the President of the Republic remains an insuperable obstacle to any retrenchment, on the grounds that dismissals of employees would create opposition to the régime at a time when solidarity is essential. The budgetary position appears, indeed, to be somewhat disquieting; the collection of the newly instituted income tax has not yet been begun, the Beirut merchants are making difficulties in paying up the instalments of the arrears of War Profits Tax which is now due from them, and the expenses of the Five-Year Plan and other public works have turned out to be substantially greater than the estimates.

There has been no development of importance in the Shammas-Jaafar dispute referred to in Section 11, paragraph 7, of Weekly Political Summary No. 159.

[E 3177/5/89]

(7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 161, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 1st May, 1945.—(Received 18th May.)

General.

IT was learnt during the week that the French wished to move three North African battalions from North Africa and France to the Levant in two cruisers to "relieve and reinforce" the French troops in the Levant.

General Humblot, on instructions from the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Force, was informed that as the whole of the Middle East, under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, is a single operational command, the commander-in-chief alone can decide on the needs of the different armies under his command, and expects to be consulted in advance before any question of reinforcements is considered. He was not prepared to authorise any increase in French forces in the Levant States at this time unless the proposals and reasons for them were placed before him. If the battalions in question were intended as a relief for the

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present French regular troops, he did not wish that the actual relief should take place in the Levant States and suggested that the actual exchange should take place in Alexandria or some other agreed port. General Humblot replied that he did not wish to discuss the matter, as it was one for discussion between London and Paris, but that he personally did not agree with the commander-in-chief's view. He considered that the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement did not specify that the commander-in-chief had any control over the number of French troops. Since the French were responsible for security they alone should judge the number of troops necessary.

Acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris discussed the matter with General de Gaulle on the 30th April. General de Gaulle said that he did not understand why the matter should concern the commander-in-chief since he could not suppose that there was any German menace in the Middle East. Throughout the interview he showed most clearly his conviction that the policy of His Majesty's Government was to weaken the position of France in Syria and finally to take over French responsibilities; he complained of the continued presence of British troops in the Levant States, and added that if His Majesty's Government were prepared to withdraw all troops from Syria he would withdraw all French troops, though he would not consider it wise to do so. But so long as His Majesty's Government retained forces there he was not prepared to reduce the number of French troops, which he would be doing if he handed over the *Troupes Spéciales*. His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris assured him that it had never been the policy of His Majesty's Government to diminish French prestige in the Levant and insisted that His Majesty's Government must be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Minister and the commander-in-chief about the dangers to public security which would result in French reinforcements arriving at Beirut at a moment when Franco-Syrian discussions were due to be resumed.

It is now known that one of the cruisers, with 800 Senegalese troops on board, will arrive at Beirut on the 5th May and should sail about three days later, taking away a composite battalion of troops who are being relieved, but it is as yet uncertain whether the other two battalions will be sent or, if so, when.

Locusts are reported to be steadily advancing westwards in the Deir-az-Zor area and north-west from the Transjordan frontier. Ninth Army are providing the Syrian Government with assistance in the shape of transport, men and equipment, and a locust expert from the M.E.S.C. arrived during the week to estimate what additional assistance may be necessary.

Reports from Political Officers in both Syria and the Lebanon suggest that greater quantities of hashish have been sown this year than ever before.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 22nd-30th April, 1945, amount to 288 tons, a daily average of 36 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 177,656 tons.

Certain changes in the organisation of the work of the M.E.S.C. in Syria and the Lebanon have been agreed by the British and American authorities concerned.

Hitherto the work of the M.E.S.C. in Syria and the Lebanon has been carried out by the staff of the Economic Section, Spears Mission. In conformity with arrangements made in other Middle Eastern territories separate M.E.S.C. representation has now been established in Syria and the Lebanon on an Anglo-America basis.

The British and American Legations have informed the two local Governments of the establishment of the Anglo-American M.E.S.C. unit, and have requested them to agree to the attendance of M.E.S.C. representatives at meetings of the Joint Supply Council and the Joint Advisory boards. The replies of the Governments have not yet been received, but it is understood that the proposals are likely to be accepted. In that event the Joint Supply Council and each of the subsidiary boards will comprise, in addition to the Syrian, Lebanese and French members, representatives of the British and American Commercial Secretariats and of the Anglo-American M.E.S.C. unit. The M.E.S.C. representatives will, however, confine themselves to giving advice in respect of goods which still remain under M.E.S.C. control.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have now been informed that the Allied authorities wish the O.C.P. to continue for a further year. No objections were raised by the Governments, but the Syrians made it clear that they wished to take a larger share in the general administration of the office.

The French are expected to finance the O.C.P. for the coming year, as previously, but both the Syrian and the Lebanese Governments may contribute 25 per cent. of the necessary funds. This contribution would be welcomed by the French as it would be an added guarantee during what is considered to be a crucial year from the finance point of view. It is hoped that the O.C.P. will obtain the consent of the Syrian Government to a lowering of cereal prices. This, however, will certainly be opposed by the Syrians.

Syria—Damascus.

The Acting Syrian Prime Minister, at a meeting with Count Ostrorog on the 25th April, referred to the popular concern at the delay in General Beynet's return. He also made a formal demand for the withdrawal of French troops from the Alaouites area, on the grounds that the Syrian Government were responsible for the maintaining of law and order, and added that when the withdrawal had been effected he himself would head a commission for the settlement of the land disputes involving Suleiman Murshid. The French must understand, he said, that the Syrians insisted on having control of the *Troupes Spéciales*.

On the 28th April student demonstrations were held in Damascus in connexion with the formation of a national army. The students were prevented by police intervention from approaching the Serail; no incident occurred and the demonstrators dispersed before noon.

His Majesty's Minister strongly advised the Syrians not to enlist the men from the disbanded Druze squadron referred to in Weekly Political Summary No. 160, section 3, paragraph 2. It is understood that the Syrian authorities now intend to employ them as watchmen in different parts of the country, and that the French do not intend to take action against them. Their four officers, who are held responsible for the mutiny, are, however, to be the subject of judicial proceedings.

At a sitting of the Chamber on the 24th April laws were passed abolishing press censorship except as regards military matters, and authorising the Ministry of Finance to issue silver and nickel coinage to the value of L.S. 14 million. A Hama Deputy submitted a written proposal that the Syrian delegation should raise the question of the return of Alexandretta to Syria at the San Francisco Conference.

The Chinese Minister in Bagdad visited Syria during the week. According to an official of the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs it is not the intention at present of the Syrian Government to appoint a representative to Chungking, though it is possible that the Syrian Minister in Tehran, when appointed, will also be accredited to China.

The Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. has informed the Syrian Government of his Government's *agrément* of Faiz Khoury as Syrian Minister in Moscow.

Aleppo.

There have been two unimportant demonstrations during the week in Aleppo. The general political situation is unchanged, though the present period of outward calm does not reflect an improvement in Franco-Syrian relations, which remain strained.

Jebel Druze.

The Emir Hassan el Atrash and the Qaimaqam of Chahba are incensed by the cautious attitude of the Syrian Government regarding the recruitment into the gendarmerie of the men of the Druze squadron referred to in section 3, paragraph 3 above. They claim that the men had been dismissed because they had refused to accept orders which would have brought them into conflict with the Syrian gendarmerie, and that the Government, so far from having recognised this patriotic gesture, are abandoning the men. The Emir maintains that, if the Government do not take on the men, serious anti-Government and anti-French demonstrations may be expected in the Jebel Druze, together with widespread mutiny among the French-commanded troops there.

Alaouites.

The Political Officer, Lattakia, reports a deterioration in the situation in the French-protected parts of the Alaouites mountains, but that so far this has not led to further disturbances.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has been making persistent efforts either to stifle or to compound with the Opposition to his Government. He has suppressed several of the more vociferously critical newspapers, and he and his Minister for Foreign Affairs have spent many hours arguing with their critics. As a result, a "reconciliation" between the Government and the Riad Solh group was arranged, and the Prime Minister obtained a unanimous vote of confidence in the Chamber on the 1st May. It is probable, therefore, that the so-called crisis will not now come to a head, as Riad es Solh and his partisans are well aware that they do not yet command a majority in the Chamber.

Camille Chamoun, the Lebanese Minister in London, returned to Beirut by air on the 26th April. The ostensible purpose of his visit is to procure a prolongation of his leave of absence from the Chamber, of which he remains a Deputy; the real reason, as he has admitted in conversation, is to investigate the local political situation and to ascertain whether the present Government are pursuing a policy compatible with the ideal of Lebanese independence. He has also stated his view that the policy of His Majesty's Government is evolving in a manner satisfactory to the States. He was given a demonstrative welcome, staged by Riad es Solh and his party, but there is no doubt that his published declarations while in London in support of the aspersions of the Levant States have much increased his local reputation, which now stands very high.

The Lebanese Chamber on the 30th April were given a somewhat gloomy picture of the financial situation of the Lebanon by the committee on the financial accounts of the 1943 budget. The committee report pointed out that, while the year's working showed a surplus of 2 million Syrian pounds, two-thirds of the expenditure went in the form of salaries and allowances, and some 2 million Syrian pounds on various other unproductive expenses, leaving only 4 million Syrian pounds for constructive projects. The report criticised the Government's financial policy and recommended various methods of retrenching administrative expenditure. In the course of the ensuing debate the Banque de Syrie came in for sharp criticism by several Deputies, and the cancellation of its agreement in favour of a juster one was advocated. The Prime Minister admitted an annual deficit of between 8 and 9 million Syrian pounds in the supply services, and spoke also of the unhappy results of the inflationary policy of the Banque de Syrie. He said that the Government were looking into these matters and realised the necessity for drastic action if the country's finances were to be safeguarded. A committee from the Chamber was to be appointed for the purpose.

The Chinese Minister in Iraq has visited the Lebanon as the guest of the Lebanese Government. The press announced that he had come to discuss the question of the establishment of a Chinese Legation, but he himself denied that his visit had any special object.

Four bankruptcies have occurred among local firms and considerable uneasiness has begun to be manifest in local circles as the result of the marked downward trend in wholesale prices, which threaten severe losses to speculators and hoarders.

Mazhar Omari (see Weekly Political Summary No. 149, section 11, paragraph 5) has now surrendered to the authorities in Beirut and is being held in custody awaiting his trial, which has been fixed for the 5th May.

There has been no settlement in the Shammas-Jaafa dispute (see Weekly Political Summary No. 160, section 11, paragraph 4), but an agreement has been reached with the Syrian authorities that the Lebanese gendarmerie will be permitted to attempt to arrest four of the Jaafa tribesmen for whom warrants have been issued and who are known to be hiding in villages in Syrian territory near the Hermel area. The dispositions of the Chasseurs Libanais remains unchanged, but the effective strength of the gendarmerie in the area has been reduced to about 100.

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Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 162, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 8th May, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 29th May.)
General.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were informed on the 4th May and 3rd respectively by both the French and British authorities that the cruiser *Montcalm* would be arriving on the 6th May, bringing 800 Senegalese

troops, who were destined to relieve another Senegalese battalion which would be repatriated by the same ship. It was explained to them that the relief was a normal military measure which had been known to be under consideration for some months past, and that although we considered the move to be untimely and should have preferred that the French did not use a warship for the purpose, we were aware that they had no civilian shipping available. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs proceeded to Damascus to consult the Syrian Government on the situation and as a result both Governments have addressed a note to the French, with copies to Allied representatives, stating that in their opinion the time has come when the ordinary international usages in regard to the movement of foreign troops to or through the territory of a sovereign State should be applied to their countries. The Syrian note is worded in rather stronger terms than the Lebanese. Telegrams have also been sent to the delegations at San Francisco instructing them to bring the incident to the notice of the Allied representatives there. It is believed that the Lebanese will be instructed to take a more moderate line than that which the Syrian Delegation will be asked to follow.

The *Montcalm* arrived on the morning of the 6th May, bringing 800 Senegalese troops and 100 French sailors. The troops, who disembarked without their arms, were immediately sent to Tripoli, whence the battalion to be relieved is also being brought. No incidents attended the arrival, and the normal courtesies were exchanged between the captain and the Lebanese Government. Both Governments are, however, extremely uneasy that this move may presage further arrivals of troops and rumours are already widespread amongst the population that anything up to 50,000 troops may be expected in the near future. These rumours, some of which are undoubtedly of French origin, will be exploited by the Lebanese opponents of the present régime. The situation at present is very tense.

Syria—Damascus.

At a sitting of the Chamber on the 1st May, the draft law for the establishment of the Ministry of National Defence met with considerable criticism on the lines that the Deputies were unwilling to approve the proposals before receiving assurances regarding negotiations with the French. Some of the Deputies also expressed their opposition to the conclusion of a cultural agreement with France before the question of the army had been solved.

The Acting Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Consul that the French had agreed to the Syrian Government employing the other ranks of the recently-liquidated Druze squadron provided they were not enlisted in the gendarmerie and not put into uniform (see Weekly Political Summary No. 161, Section 3, paragraph 3). On the 4th May the Acting Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Consul that, as a result of the situation created by the arrival of the French cruiser and after discussion with the Lebanese, the Government had decided to enlist the Druze squadron in the gendarmerie and that he intended to make a plain statement of the situation in the Chamber. He added that he thought there would certainly be demonstrations in the town when the facts became known. As a result of further representations from His Majesty's Consul in the form of a personal message from His Majesty's Minister, the Acting Prime Minister agreed to go back on the decision to enlist the Druze squadron though it is understood that they are being taken on to the Government pay roll and paid from police funds but are not being armed or given uniforms and are being sent to their home villages.

Many well-wishers visited the Russian Legation on May Day to congratulate the chargé d'affaires. A meeting was held by the Communist party at which about 1,200 persons were present; Zionism and Greater Syria were attacked and the transfer of the army demanded.

Aleppo.

The French as well as the Syrians in the Aleppo area appear to be uneasy at the delay in General Beynet's return. The French officer commanding in Aleppo echoed the views which Count Ostrorog had expressed to His Majesty's Consul the previous week that there were common Franco-British interests in the Near East and that close Franco-British collaboration was essential. He went as far as to say that unless Britain intervened on behalf of France, the French would be unable to obtain satisfactory terms from the Syrians.

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Homs-Hama.

The Mohafez of Homs reports that he has received instructions from Damascus to stop all personal communication with the French délégué at Homs until his exact status, political or military, is defined by the French. Relations between the Serail and the Maison de Commandant will therefore continue to be almost non-existent.

Alaouites.

On the 3rd May a fight occurred between gendarmes and inhabitants of Nqouro, the former on their way to relieve the posts at Fakhouira and Mzeiraa. The gendarmes fought until their ammunition was exhausted and then surrendered, three of them being wounded. A passing Druze officer and five men made the villagers return the captured arms and equipment. The French informed the Syrian Government on the 7th May that French troops in the Jobit area would be withdrawn within three days.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The main topic of interest is the threat presented by the presence of locusts which have appeared east of Deir-az-Zor and both north and south of the river. "Hoppers" of the Moroccan species are widespread east of the line Dez-Hassetché and Qaimichlie and in the Khabour valley upstream from Hassetché. Nejd flying locusts also present in the latter area. Ten British army lorries are helping the local authorities in counter-measures.

Tribal.

The Mohafez of the Euphrates left for Bagdad on the 1st May accompanied by the kaimakam of Abu Kemal and the commandant of the gendarmerie in the Euphrates. The Director of Syrian Tribal Affairs is also expected to be present. At the last moment Shaikh Jedaan al Hiffel of the Agaidat refused to go to Bagdad. However, his son, Abboud, was persuaded to go in his place, though he professed considerable fear for his personal safety while in Bagdad.

Lebanon.

At a private meeting on the 29th April between Abdul Hamid Karami and Henri Pharaon on the one hand and Riad Solh and some of his supporters on the other, a "reconciliation" was arranged under which the Prime Minister agreed, when asking for a vote of confidence in the Chamber, to make a strong speech reaffirming the intention of the Government to safeguard Lebanese rights and sovereignty, whilst Riad Solh promised that his group would not vote against the Government. When the vote of confidence was debated in the Chamber on the 1st May, the Prime Minister's speech was less categorical than had been expected, whilst Riad Solh did not refrain from certain criticisms of the Government. Nevertheless, the vote of confidence was carried unanimously. For the moment, therefore, the Government's position is somewhat stronger, as it is now manifest that Riad Solh does not command sufficient support to overthrow it. Relations between him and the Government are still strained, as the Government consider his speech on the vote of confidence to have been unfriendly in tone. The Maronite Patriarch on the 2nd May expounded his ideas on education and personal status to most of the Maronite Deputies. He is understood to have expressed the view that the Ministry of Public Instruction should be abolished and that all schools in the Lebanon should be run by the various religious communities to each of which the Government should make grants; and the case involving the personal status of Maronites should be tried not only in the Lebanon but throughout the world according to Maronite religious law. The Deputies were unable to follow him in this extravagance and the Government is understood to have no intention of accepting his major proposals.

Mr. Stettinius has sent a reply to a letter addressed to him by the Lebanese Prime Minister on the subject of Palestine. The Prime Minister had pointed out the Lebanese interest in this question, stressing that it was racial and not religious (since the Christian Arabs of the Lebanon felt as strongly as did the Moslems) and that the Lebanon was directly concerned since Zionism was a dynamic force which might well overflow the frontiers of Palestine into the

Lebanon itself. Mr. Stettinius's reply states that the United States Government will bear in mind the views of the Lebanese and of the other Arabs when considering the problem of Palestine, and recalls the United States Government's expressed view that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 163, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for week ending 15th May, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 4th June.)

General.

The end of the war in Europe was officially celebrated during the week throughout both States. Receptions were given by the Presidents of both republics at which members of the diplomatic corps and representatives of the Allied fighting services were present. In the principal towns receptions were given by the local representatives of the Government and by the British political officers and the French délégués. On the whole the celebrations passed off without any major incident, though the general effect has undoubtedly been to resurrect much of the bad feeling between the French and the local authorities which has been lying dormant for the last few months.

In Damascus incidents occurred in which French soldiers and civilians acted in a provocative manner. Shots were fired and a small number of people were injured. Police intervention, however, prevented any of the incidents from assuming serious proportions. The Syrian Government protested to the French authorities against the behaviour of French nationals and also against the action of the French Prevote in arresting a Syrian for an alleged insult to the French flag. A hand grenade was also thrown in the early hours of the morning at the Chamber of Deputies. The Syrian Government alleged that this was done by three members of the French forces and shots were exchanged or fired into the air.

V-day celebrations in Beirut, as might have been expected in the present political atmosphere, led to a number of regrettable incidents and much bad feeling all round. For these incidents the behaviour of certain French elements must be held largely responsible. On the 8th May and several days afterwards, all French establishments were lavishly bedecked with French flags, usually to the exclusion of the flags of any of the Allies; French lorries filled with the employees of French services paraded the town plastered with flags, the occupants shouting such slogans as: "We are your children and the country is yours, Oh de Gaulle"; tricolours and Russian flags were distributed to the townspeople, who were bribed to carry them, and tricolours were parachuted over the town by rocket; there seems no doubt that instances occurred of French personnel endeavouring to intimidate shopkeepers into displaying portraits of General de Gaulle.

While these extravagances were generally regarded with contempt and irritation, and were severely commented on in the press, some of the more extreme Christians participated in them. The Moslems reacted and staged Arab Nationalist demonstrations on the 9th and 10th May, in which a number of soldiers from the Palestine Regiment were unfortunately persuaded to join. The demonstrators carried a portrait of the ex-Mufti and shouted anti-Zionist slogans; they did some damage in the Jewish quarter, apparently because a young Jew had shouted an insult against the Prophet; and when, near a French convent, a stone was thrown at the Mufti's portrait, the demonstrators assumed the convent to be responsible, pulled down its French flags and broke its windows, and thereafter went through the town pulling down every tricolour they saw. Two French officers who intervened were assaulted. Some French-commanded Lebanese troops reacted in their turn, pulling down at least one Union Jack and engaging in a free fight with the Palestinians which was stopped by military police after the gendarmerie had failed. The British military authorities withdrew the Palestinians and placed the town out of bounds. The French authorities protested vigorously, but after discussion with IXth Army the matter is understood to have been settled.

[31729]

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On the 11th May the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, hearing that French troops were tearing down portraits of the Lebanese President, curtly told the French territorial commander to remove his troops from the streets, failing which he would order the gendarmerie to fire on anyone insulting the Lebanon. General Humblot, with surprising meekness, did so and there were no more incidents. The question of these disturbances was raised in the Chamber of Deputies on the 14th May, when the Prime Minister stated that attempts to divide the population had failed in the face of general condemnation of the perpetrators and that the Lebanon, backed by 40 million Arabs, would pursue the path of full independence.

General Beynet returned quietly by air on the 12th May and saw the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 14th May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs complained of the conduct of the French during the recent disturbances, and said that the Palestinian troops, though they had taken part, had at least respected the dignity of the Lebanon. Neither the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales nor the French proposals for a settlement were discussed, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs learnt from General Beynet that a French ship with reinforcements for the Levant garrison was already at Tunis, and thereupon informed him that if she arrived the Lebanese, in agreement with the Syrians, would break off all negotiations and would not resume them unless an equivalent number of troops were withdrawn. General Beynet promised to telegraph to Paris to try to have the troops stopped, but held out little hope that he would succeed. M. Pharaon also read General Beynet a telegram from the Lebanese delegation at San Francisco reporting a conversation with M. Bidault, who was alleged to have said that the French Government were ready to transfer the Troupes Spéciales and to withdraw their forces from the Levant States if all the Allies did the same. General Beynet undertook to telegraph to Paris about this also.

On the 12th May the chief of the Yugoslav military mission in Egypt visited Beirut and delivered a note from his Government recognising the independence of the Lebanon and adding that it was proposed to establish diplomatic relations when circumstances permit. It is understood that a similar approach was made to the Syrian Government.

Syria—Damascus.

On the 14th May the Syrian Chamber unanimously voted a law "for the protection of independence." It provides for severe penalties for any person who appeals to religious, communal, racial or regional sentiments with the object of destroying national unity, and for those who cause bloodshed by stirring up feelings; anyone creating or taking part in provocations or disturbances at the instigation of a foreign Power shall be liable to the death sentence; any Syrian spying for a foreign Power shall be liable to a life sentence. Syrians in the service of a foreign Power, either in or outside Syria, who do not conform to a request by the Government to leave this service within a definite time shall be deprived of their nationality and their property shall be seized. This latter provision gives the Syrian Government a means of bringing direct pressure on the Troupes Spéciales under French command.

A demonstration occurred in Damascus on the 14th May in which a large number of students participated and for the first time this year a certain number of "hooligans." The demonstrators protested against the landing of Senegalese troops by the French and the bomb outrage at the Chamber of Deputies, which they attributed to French action. Three British observers independently noticed that the demonstrators appeared to be in an uglier mood than they had shown earlier in the year. The town was closed and remained partially closed the next day but the demonstrators were dispersed by police action before midday.

Martyrs' Day was celebrated on the 6th May by a Government-sponsored festival held at the Syrian University. The Acting Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, the Egyptian Minister and the Transjordan Consul were amongst those who attended. A rival meeting was held by opposition elements at which some 1,500 people were present; the tone of the speeches was violently anti-Government.

General Oliva-Roget (he has just been promoted) was not invited to the Victory reception given by the President on the 9th May, as a result of the incident which occurred on the 9th December, 1944 (see Weekly Political Summary No. 141, section 3, paragraph 2), at which he was considered by the Syrians to have insulted the President.

It is reported by the British Overseas Airways representative in Damascus that on the 5th May the American Minister approached the local French Air Force authorities in order to obtain permission for the use of the Mezze airport and its facilities. The British Overseas Airways representative believes that the proposal is to run a twice-weekly service for the purpose of carrying military loads via Lisbon, Istanbul, Damascus, Tehran, to India.

Aleppo.

In Aleppo the French flag was noticeably omitted by Nationalists from their decoration schemes. On the night of the 10th May local boy scouts and school-boys of all religious denominations, over 1,800 in number, with police and fire brigade bands, after serenading the Mohafez, made a friendly demonstration outside the British Consulate. Neither the French Delegation nor other consulates were similarly favoured.

The Rev. Atakios Coussa arrived at Aleppo on the 27th April, having been charged by the Vatican to investigate the affairs of the Maronite community and to enquire into the recommendation put forward by the Apostolic delegate at Beirut that Mgr. Akras, the Maronite Archbishop of North Syria, should be asked to resign and be replaced. On the 4th May Mgr. Akras duly handed in his resignation.

Homs and Hama.

Locusts have now reached an area only six miles from Homs. Locusts for eating are now on sale at £S.7 per sackful at Palmyra and £S.4 per sackful at Qariatein.

Alaouites.

There have been further minor incidents in the Alaouite area. On the 13th May the French délégué at Lattakia stated that he had received no orders to withdraw French troops from the Jobit area.

Tribal.

It is reported that the Shammar-Agaidat Conference in Bagdad has settled outstanding differences between the two tribes, with a balance of payments of some 90 odd camels by the Agaidat to the Shammar and some 300 sheep by the Shammar to the Agaidat.

Frontier.

A report from French sources describes a clash on the Turco-Syrian frontier near Yassirim on the 25th April, between Turkish soldiers and Syrian inhabitants of Kamishlie who had attempted to cross the frontier to make purchases in Turkish territory. Two Turkish soldiers are stated to have been killed and a few soldiers wounded; as a reprisal the Turkish military authorities are said to have arrested a few villagers from Yassirim.

Lebanon.

See "General" above.

On the 14th May the Chamber began the examination of the 1945 budget. Several Deputies criticised the past and present financial policy of the Government, which the Prime Minister defended.

At a press conference on the 12th May the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that no negotiations had begun between the Lebanese Government and the French for a University Convention. He also declared that the Government had taken no decisions about civil aviation or about the American application for concessions to erect oil refineries at Tripoli.

A delegation from the Arab Union Society of Cairo, headed by Fuad Abaza Pasha, arrived in Beirut on the 12th May and will be the guests of the Government. Their object is apparently to open an Arab Union Centre.

In general the week has shown a marked increase in tension, as a result of the V-day disturbances, the arrival of the French cruiser *Montcalm*, with troops, and the spread of rumours (some probably French-inspired) that anything up to 50,000 more French troops may be expected to arrive in the near future.

[E 7605/5/89]

(10)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 164, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 22nd May, 1945.—(Received 10th October.)

General.

THERE has been a rapid deterioration in the general situation in the Levant States during the week. Following the increase in tension arising out of V-day incidents, reported in Weekly Political Summary No. 163, General, the arrival of the French cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc* on the 17th May, bringing about 600 French reinforcements, has aroused intense public indignation in both States, and, in Syria at least, had led to a high state of tension. The belief is widespread that the return of General Beynet (on the 12th May) was deliberately delayed so that he might be able to present the French demands to the Levant States Governments simultaneously with the arrival of these reinforcements.

On the 18th May General Beynet, at a meeting in Damascus with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both Syria and the Lebanon, presented them with a note, in which were set out the French proposals for a settlement. The note stated that French interests in the States are cultural, economic and strategic, and proposed that the cultural interests should be safeguarded by a University Convention; the commercial interests by agreements on the lines of "usual international procedure," e.g., Establishment and Consular Convention and a commercial agreement; and the strategic interests by the establishment of military bases which would guarantee the lines of communication between France and her overseas possessions. Once agreement had been reached on these three points, the French Government would be prepared to hand over the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States, with the reserve that they should remain under French command "as long as circumstances do not permit the full exercise of national commands."

On the 19th May the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents met at Chtaura; Jamil Bey Mardam, Abdul Hamid Kerami, and Henri Pharaon were present. A communiqué issued jointly by the two Governments on the 21st May on the results of this conference stated that the two parties had considered the situation which arose from (a) the arrival of French troops subsequent to the presentation to the Allied Powers by the two Governments of notes requesting that foreign troops should not enter their territory without their previous consent, and (b) the French proposals for a general settlement which had been handed to the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs by General Beynet on the 17th May. The two Governments had reached the conclusion that the disembarkation of these troops was an infringement of their sovereignty, and that General Beynet's note contained proposals incompatible with Syrian and Lebanese independence. They had consequently agreed to refuse to enter into negotiations and to throw on the French Government all responsibility which might result from this situation and also to unite their action for the defence of the independence of the two countries. Notes closely following the lines of the communiqué, which was subsequently published, had previously been communicated by both Governments to General Beynet and to the British, United States and Soviet representatives.

The principal towns in both countries were closed on the 19th May and demonstrations took place. In Damascus and Aleppo serious incidents occurred on the 19th and 20th in which a number of Syrians were killed and wounded. (For details see Syria-Damascus and Aleppo respectively of this Summary.)

In Syria hostility to the French is more active than at any time since the Allied occupation. There are indications that many leaders, especially of the National bloc, are anxious to force the issue before more troops arrive, and it is probable that these elements are behind the disorders which have already occurred, as the students and population will in general take orders from them. The Government seem uncertain how to act. They are reported to be sounding such elements as tribal chiefs and Druzes in order to ascertain how far they can count on them for armed assistance against the French if need arises, and they are doubtless also in touch with the other Arab Governments for the same purpose. Their future course of action will to some extent at least be conditioned by the replies they receive. In the Lebanon, although extreme Christians are still obsessed with the advantages of French protection, hostility to the French is more widespread than at any time since November 1943.

But, whatever policy the Governments desire to pursue, there is a limit to their influence over their undisciplined populations, and there is at least considerable danger that disorders will increase rather than decrease.

The Syrian President had a recurrence of internal hæmorrhage on the night of the 19th May. At his request Colonel Bodley Scott of the Forty Third General Hospital, Beirut, visited him on the 20th and gave him a blood transfusion. Two British doctors, in addition to a number of local doctors, are looking after him and he has British night and day nurses. He is reported to be making good progress.

Syria—Damascus.

The town has been closed since the 19th May and demonstrations have taken place daily. On the 19th, as a result of missiles thrown from the French hospital at the demonstrators, the crowd overturned and set fire to two French lorries. Several grenades were thrown by Frenchmen and some exchange of shots took place. One Algerian Frenchman was arrested by the Syrian gendarmerie, after having thrown one grenade, with a second in his hand. Twenty-three Syrian casualties were detained in hospital. The gendarmerie restored order shortly after midday, and French and British troops were withdrawn from the streets. On the 20th there was a number of clashes between the demonstrators and the gendarmerie, the latter doing their utmost to protect French buildings and installations; firing continued for a large part of the morning, but only three people were wounded. Demonstrations have continued and isolated incidents have occurred, but up to the present the gendarmerie have taken action solely against Syrians in order to protect French interests. The French have mounted additional guards on a number of their installations and more than once have sent lorry loads of armed troops through the streets. The Syrians have protested to the French against low flying aircraft, the throwing of bombs by Frenchmen, the placing of road control posts on the outskirts of the town and the mounting of guards and tanks in and around the town. The French have protested at the arming by the Government of the inhabitants of Damascus, and at various incidents in which French men or French institutions have been attacked.

The Syrian Government are complaining bitterly that their gendarmerie are inadequately armed, and on the 21st May specifically requested the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to supply them with transport and 2,500 rifles. Meanwhile, they have enlisted into the gendarmerie between 400 and 500 university students and propose to give them three days' training, after which they will be armed with old rifles retained by the Government when the gendarmerie was rearmed, and will assist in maintaining order in the town.

Aleppo.

Minor demonstrations occurred in Aleppo on the 16th and the 19th May. On the 20th a crowd of nearly 1,000 young men, many of whom were armed, stoned the *Prévôté* Headquarters and attacked a French motor car, the occupants of which fired in the air. One demonstrator was killed and a few injured. The crowd then returned to the *Prévôté* and again stoned it; a French gendarme was killed and further attacks followed on French cars and tramways and on isolated French soldiers. About midday the French sent four tanks and four armoured cars into the town to clear the streets and restore order.

The Mohafez informed His Majesty's consul that after the first incident reported above, the Mohafez had asked the French officer commanding troops to put the town out of bounds to his men and had repeated this request later in the day, but the officer commanding did not agree, and French officers and men continued to circulate in Aleppo. The total casualties reported are: killed: French 3, Syrians 8, and wounded: French 12, Syrians 22.

Homs and Hama.

In Hama, Alaouite members of the Battalion *Désert Léger* were reported to have planned to pay off old scores in the city on the occasion of the public restoration of the French flag to the *Sûreté* building, which had been torn down the previous week. After strong representations to the *Délégué* the ceremony was called off, and, although a considerable number of arms, including tommy guns, had been brought into the town and the shops were shut, no incident occurred.

Jebel Druze.

Sixty-three of the other ranks of the Druze Squadron recently "dispersed" by the French at Homs have been taken on the strength of the Druze gendarmerie

and have been issued with arms and uniforms, preparatory to being used as watchmen.

The Emir Hassan-el-Atrash has informed the Political Officer that he has had an interview with the Syrian President at which he offered to call over the loyal officers of the Groupement Druze and to take prisoner all French officers in the Jebel whenever the Government wishes. The Government are understood to have asked him to hold his hand.

Lebanon.

The *Jeanne d'Arc* sailed on the 21st May taking 13 French civilian and 220 military and naval personnel.

On the 17th May the Chamber met again to discuss the situation resulting from the arrival of the *Jeanne d'Arc*. Khalil Abu Jaoudé, a Maronite deputy, made a violent speech of protest against this infringement of Lebanese independence, and the Prime Minister, in reply, stated that the Lebanon was prepared to fight for her sovereignty and called upon the other Arab nations to shed their blood, if need be, in this cause. He stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had proceeded to Damascus to concert action with the Syrian Government.

Beirut and Tripoli were completely closed from the 19th May to the 21st May. The Government had apparently ordered this closure as a symbol of protest against the arrival of troops and French proposals. There were no serious incidents. A large section of the press has published outspoken articles condemning the despatch of French troops and reaffirming Lebanese determination to achieve complete independence. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who claims with some truth to have the situation completely in hand, is clearly opposed to any disorders, and is said to be preparing a draft treaty for simultaneous presentation to France, Great Britain and the United States, so as to avoid the impression that the Lebanese Government are adopting a merely negative attitude in the face of French proposals. Serious disorders are, therefore, not to be feared unless and until the situation in Syria deteriorates more markedly.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 15th and 16th May to continue the study of the budget. Several deputies objected strongly to the Government's action in prolonging the contract for the French financial adviser, but after the Government had explained that he was a useful man and that his title had been changed to that of "expert" the necessary credit was voted.

[E 7606/5/89]

(11)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 165, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 29th May, 1945.—(Received 10th October.)

General.

During the week tension increased throughout Syria and ugly incidents became more frequent and more serious. Reports continued to be received of a steady increase in the number of deserters from the *Troupes Spéciales*, although there is no evidence that the Syrian Government encouraged these desertions. All towns remained closed. His Majesty's Minister and G.O.C. 9th Army continued to urge patience and restraint on both sides, but it was increasingly evident that such counsels could not continue indefinitely to be effective. Moreover, the texts of the two alleged draft proclamations by General Oliva Roget, couched in language which could only betoken an intention to force the issue, came into the possession of the Syrian Government. The French Sous-Délégué admitted that one of the texts was authentic but asserted that he had burnt it, and declared the other to be a forgery; the Syrians were convinced that both were genuine. Subsequent events suggest that they are right.

Minor incidents occurred in many towns on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. On the 26th, in an interview with His Majesty's Minister, General Beynet talked about the "battle atmosphere" in Damascus and expressed the view that if the Syrians wanted it they could have it. On the 27th May the French military authorities requisitioned O.C.P. lorries in Aleppo and Damascus and on the

same day the D.H.P. railways was sabotaged near Hama, trains in both directions being turned back. During this period telephone and telegraphic communication between the various Syrian towns began to break down and by the 28th no communication was possible except by wireless from Damascus in any direction other than to Beirut. On the night of the 27th-28th a northbound train was derailed at Kaoukab, some 15 miles north of Hama and three French armoured cars were ambushed at Hama, one being burnt out and destroyed. During the night of the 27th and on the morning of the 28th and 29th there was indiscriminate mortaring and shelling by the French of both Homs and Hama with numerous casualties. The situation in both towns rapidly deteriorated with the French isolated and firing at any moving object, and the roads barricaded. On the morning of the 29th it was reported that the Transjordan Consul had been shot and seriously wounded by fire from the French barracks whilst entering Deraa in a car flying the Transjordan flag, and that fighting had broken out there between the French and the local population. It was also reported by the French that tribal horsemen had attacked the main Euphrates bridge at Deir ez-Zor.

The Syrian Government until the 28th succeeded in maintaining a large measure of control and in Damascus in particular the behaviour of the gendarmerie was most praiseworthy. As was to be expected, however, as communications broke down and incident followed incident, the local authorities, without the means of support from the central Government, found it increasingly difficult to control the actions of the people in the face of French provocation.

The French continued to display their guns, their armour and their armed forces in a way which convinced the Syrians that force was the argument which the French intended to use. General Beynet himself in a conversation with the Army Commander twice used the word "intimidation" when referring to the reasons for low flying by French aircraft and other displays of French forces.

At 7 o'clock on the evening of the 29th May, when the Syrian Chamber had failed to meet through lack of a quorum, a shot was fired near the Serrail in Damascus, apparently at a deserter; fire was immediately opened on the crowd from the Cherkass Barracks and a general fusillade followed from the French all over the town. Civilians and gendarmerie in the streets eventually replied, and soon afterwards the French opened indiscriminate mortar and artillery fire on the centre of the town. At 8 o'clock just before dark an aeroplane flew in and dropped at least two bombs, one of which hit the Citadel.

Syria—Damascus.

At a sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on the 24th May laws were passed for the creation of a force of 5,000 gendarmes and for the recruitment in the case of necessity of a National Guard of all Syrians between 18 and 60. At a sitting of the Chamber on the 26th, violent anti-French speeches were made and the Acting Prime Minister stated that it had been decided to request a meeting of the Arab League Council to consider the position of the Levant States.

Considerable excitement was caused in the town on the 26th May when the Syrian authorities obtained the text of a secret French communiqué addressed by General Oliva-Roget to all French subjects, in which it was stated that the French should be patient for a few days or only for a few hours, that every man should hold himself in readiness for "la grande bagarre," when accounts would be settled at one blow. The French at first denied the authenticity of the document, but finally admitted that it had been prepared as a draft.

Aleppo.

On the night of the 23rd-24th the one remaining French unit in the Citadel was withdrawn to barracks outside the town without incident, after the intervention of His Majesty's Consul at the request of both the Mohafez and the French authorities to obtain a guarantee from the Syrians that the convoy would be unmolested. Two batteries of French 75's have remained trained on the town; intermittent indiscriminate firing has taken place and there have been some casualties. The French control the western quarter of Aleppo where they patrol the streets under the muzzles of their field guns and their machine guns; the remainder of the town is under Syrian control.

Jebel Druze.

The situation in the Jebel Druze remained tense all the week and the Mohafez of Soueida informed the Political Officer that if the signal for revolt is given to the Druze troops they will immediately declare for the Government, overpower the French officers and hold the Citadels in the principal towns.

See also General Section.

Alaouites.

Events in the rest of Syria have been followed with close interest. The general feeling is probably one of relief that nothing has taken place in Lattakia.

Following the statement which he made by proxy in the Syrian Chamber that he was now prepared to support the National Government, Suleiman Murshid returned to his home in Jobit from Damascus on the afternoon of the 20th May.

Lebanon.

Events in Syria have overshadowed everything else during the past week. The Lebanese Government has maintained close contact with the Syrian Government and a meeting was held at Chtaura on the 26th May at which it was decided to request a meeting of the Arab League Council. His Majesty's Minister saw both Ministers of Foreign Affairs after the meeting and the possibility of the preparation of treaties for simultaneous discussion with the British, American and French Governments was discussed.

The town of Beirut was closed on 24th May as a sign of sympathy with the Syrians and a number of anti-French articles and cartoons have appeared in the Press. A joint Syrian and Lebanese Press announcement was made in San Francisco on the 23rd May in which it was stated that neither Government could accept the French demands.

The French have been encouraging the Christian fears of Moslem domination, and on the 29th May at the instigation of Mgr. Tapouni, the Maronite Patriarch convoked a meeting of all the heads of Christian communities at Bkerke to discuss "the present situation." The announcement of this meeting caused some uneasiness amongst the Moslems and the possibility of holding a Moslem conference was mooted; it was decided, however, that the danger of provoking inter-communal feeling would outweigh any advantage, and the idea has now been dropped. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch sent a letter to the Maronite Patriarch informing him that he could not attend nor could he delegate anyone to do so since such discussions should not be confined to Christians only. At the Conference a number of resolutions were put forward declaring that the delegates fully supported the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon and that they looked to France and the country's other Allies to protect them, and expressing a desire to live on friendly terms with neighbouring countries and with the allies of the Lebanon. A further resolution recommended that a treaty should be made with France in which the independence of both countries should be safeguarded. In the pro-French Press accounts of the meeting suggested that agreement to these resolutions had been unanimous, but in fact the Maronite Archbishop, Moubarek, of Beirut, and the Maronite Bishops Haj and Abdullah Khouri and the Greek Catholic Archbishop Sayigh, did not agree with the last resolution, the Orthodox Armenian delegates said they had no power to sign on behalf of their Patriarch.

No instances have been reported from the provincial towns of Franco-Lebanese clashes.

[E 4669/5/89]

(12)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 166, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th June, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 29th June.)

General.

Syria, where the situation had been deteriorating steadily since early in May, finally exploded everywhere during the past week. Homs and Hama had already gone up; on the 29th May the French garrisons in the Jebel Druze and Hauran were bloodlessly liquidated by the Syrians; on the night of the 28-29th May trouble started in Deir ez-Zor; and on the evening of the 29th May heavy firing

broke out in Damascus and Deir ez-Zor, continuing until the 1st June. Lattakia alone of the principal towns remained quiet.

During the past month His Majesty's Government, in concert with the American Government, had repeatedly warned General de Gaulle of the dangers inherent in the situation in the Levant States and particularly in the event of the arrival of further French reinforcements, however small in number, as a prelude to the presentation of the French proposals for a treaty. As soon as reports of the outbreak of open hostilities in Damascus and other parts of Syria were received in London the Cabinet met to consider what steps could be taken to restore order in the States and to eliminate the serious threat to Allied lines of communication with the Far East. On the afternoon of the 31st May Mr. Eden informed the House of Commons that a message from the Prime Minister was being handed to General de Gaulle in Paris stating that, in view of the grave situation which had arisen between French troops and the Levant States, and the severe fighting which had broken out, His Majesty's Government had with profound regret ordered the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, to intervene in order to prevent further bloodshed and to restore order; once firing had ceased His Majesty's Government would be prepared to begin tripartite discussions in London. President Truman telegraphed to Mr. Churchill his approval of the order to the Commander-in-chief, Middle East.

In the late afternoon of the 31st May General Pilleau, who had taken command of the Ninth Army in place of General Holmes, absent on sick leave, informed General Humblot of the commander-in-chief's instructions to intervene to restore order; General Humblot said that he had received instructions from Paris that French troops were not to resist such intervention. The Syrian President was informed at 6.15 the same day of the action which His Majesty's Government were taking. Later in the evening the British commander in Damascus informed General Oliva Roget, who said that he had received no instructions and would not accept orders from a British officer. He finally admitted that he had received orders, and ordered the cease fire in Damascus at 10.15 on the following morning. He was subsequently removed from Damascus by order of the commander-in-chief and flew to Paris, whence, however, he has now returned after making a statement to the press which contained a number of untruths.

The Commander-in-chief, Middle East, arrived by air in Beirut escorted by two squadrons of Spitfires early on the morning of the 1st June; a British cruiser and two destroyers also arrived during the morning. After calling on General Beynet and being received by the Lebanese President and Cabinet, in company with His Majesty's Minister, at the Serail, where large and enthusiastic crowds had gathered, General Paget proceeded to Damascus with Mr. Shone and saw the President of the Syrian Republic, who promised the fullest co-operation with British forces. In Damascus, too, there was great popular enthusiasm and soon after the entry of the British forces at 4 p.m. some shops were opened and the streets were crowded with people. For the next few days, however, the town remained partially closed and a curfew was imposed to ensure that French military personnel and civilians were evacuated without incident.

From the 1st June onwards French military personnel and civilians have been withdrawn under British protection from most of the principal Syrian towns, with the notable exceptions of Aleppo, where the French remain in a part of the town, and the Alaouite area, where no withdrawal has taken place. As a result there are two large concentrations of French forces, one at Mezzé, near Damascus, where there are some 2,000 French troops, and the other at Rayak in the Bekaa. Many individual French officers and most of the civilians have found their way to Beirut.

General de Gaulle has refused to accept His Majesty's Government's suggestion of a tripartite conference in London on the Levant States, and has made a counter-proposal of a five-Power conference, including Russia and China, to discuss the whole Middle East. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government at present both seemed disinclined to accept this. The States Governments seemed at first to favour a five-Power conference, but later indicated their preference for three-Power discussions; their main concern was, however, to secure representation for themselves from the outset at any such conference. The Arab League has also staked a claim to participate.

The Syrian authorities have shown every wish to co-operate with the commander-in-chief, but have stated clearly that they cannot accept any proposal which entails French officers or troops remaining in the country. Certainly at present, and possibly for a long time to come, the lives of French officers in Syria will be in danger.

Many problems remain to be dealt with. The most urgent are the future of the *Troupes Spéciales*—many of whom have already deserted (see section 6 of this report) the Mixed Courts, the Customs Department of the *Intérêts Communs*, the *Sûreté aux Armées*, the French military courts, censorship and various frontier and passport control services in which the French have participated in the past.

In a press interview on the 4th June General de Gaulle accused the British of bad faith in the Levant States for a number of years. He referred to "complications which arose from the attitude taken either at highest level by British Government or at low level by a mass of agents who assumed on the spot a hostile or critical attitude." He went on to say that armed bands helped by the Syrian police and gendarmerie, which forces carried arms supplied to them by British authorities, had been attacking the various French military and civilian establishments since the 8th May. There had been some killed, and French troops had had to react and re-establish order, which, except in Jebel Druze, they had done everywhere, though often with some difficulty, as in Damascus, where certain French establishments were surrounded by crowds of gendarmes and artillery. Sir E. Grigg, in a press interview in Beirut on the 11th June, refuted a number of the allegations made by General Oliva Roget in his press conference at Paris.

The acting Syrian Prime Minister convened a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps on the 4th June and asked, in view of General de Gaulle's statement that the Syrians had attacked French installations, that the Corps should prepare a report on the condition of the principal French and Syrian buildings.

Economic.

The most urgent problem raised by the refusal of the Syrians to have any further dealings with the French was the future of the O.C.P. Damascus itself had only sufficient grain for six days, the Lebanon was little better off, and the first of the new harvest was ready for purchase and collection. It was obvious that the Syrians would not sell grain to the O.C.P., which was closely connected in their minds with the French, the more so since O.C.P. lorries had been used for military purposes by French troops in Aleppo and Damascus. The commander-in-chief therefore decided that it was necessary for the Ninth Army to take over responsibility for feeding the two countries and set up a temporary organisation known as M.I.R.A., by which the Ninth Army will carry out the task of the purchase and distribution of grain in co-operation with the local Governments. M.I.R.A. will take over the transport and property of the O.C.P. and will be financed by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; it is already in action.

Syria—Damascus.

In Damascus, firing became general in the centre of the town between 7 and 8 on the evening of the 29th May (Weekly Political Summary, No. 165). The French continued shelling, mortar fire and small-arms fire for the next sixty hours, against little resistance except from snipers; the gendarmerie, after suffering many casualties, were mostly evacuated by the Government to avoid further losses. The French largely destroyed the Syrian Parliament building by shell-fire, and occupied it in the early hours of the 30th May. The Citadel, headquarters of the Syrian gendarmerie, was shelled on the nights of both the 29th and 30th and was hit by at least one bomb from a French aircraft. The Syrian Foreign Office and the Serail were both entered on the 31st May, and books, files, headed note-paper and the official seals taken away by a party from the French delegation; some of the seals were returned the next day after protest by the Syrian Government, but the censorship seals have not yet been returned.

Armistices were arranged for the evacuation of the British and American communities and for the collection of dead and wounded on the 30th and 31st May. Their observance by the French was by no means complete.

Sporadic light-arms and mortar fire continued in the town during the night of the 31st May and on the 1st June and for some hours after General Oliva Roget had ordered all French troops to withdraw to barracks on the morning of the 1st June. Both on the 31st May and the 1st June there was considerable looting by Senegalese soldiers and *Troupes Spéciales* in the Merje Square and the areas near by despite a denial by General Oliva Roget that any looting was taking place.

A British armoured column entered the town in the late afternoon and ensured the return to barracks of all French troops which had not already obeyed General Oliva Roget's order. By 7 o'clock in the evening the Syrian flag was again flying over the Syrian Parliament building. The British forces received

an enthusiastic welcome from the people of Damascus, and a certain number of shops were open the same evening. By the 5th June the life of the town had almost returned to normal, the majority of the shops were opened and the curfew lifted.

Considerable damage was done by high-explosives and fire near the centre of the town, and Syrian hospitals and ambulances were fired on by French troops, one Syrian doctor being killed whilst travelling in an ambulance. The official Syrian figures of casualties for Damascus were: killed, gendarmes 80, civilians 400; wounded, seriously 500, minor injuries 1,000; and 500 gendarmes missing. One British officer, Major Scott-Nicholson, of O.C.P., was killed in the Orient Palace Hotel, and Mrs. Gray of the Church Army, was also killed in the Church Army building. One British officer and one British O.R. were injured by mortar fire, and a British Indian subject was amongst a number of prisoners in the Citadel who lost their lives when bombs and shells fell on the prison there.

Aleppo.

The town remained closed and uneasy during the week and there was sporadic shooting but no actual fighting. The French ordered the cease fire at 11.15 on the night of the 31st May, and a British armoured column arrived at 12.30 p.m. on the 2nd June.

Homs and Hama.

Hama, where some fighting had taken place on the 28th May, was the scene of bombing, artillery and mortar fire and general fighting during the 30th and 31st. Much destruction was done in the town and casualties are estimated at more than eighty killed and fifty wounded. One French aeroplane was shot down by small-arms fire and one driven off on fire. An armistice was arranged to collect dead and wounded on the evening of the 31st.

In Homs, after heavy firing on the 28th and 29th May, shooting continued. British troops arrived in the town on the evening of the 1st June and passed through Hama an hour later.

The French claimed that they shelled and mortared Homs on the nights of the 27th and 28th May in order to defend themselves against a massed and carefully prepared attack on the delegation. In fact, the attack was made by some dozen men and this only in reprisal for the wounding by the *délégué's* guards of two babies playing in the porch of a nearby house. This incident, the French claimed, occurred the following day, but there is positive proof to the contrary, so that in Homs at least it was the French who initiated violent action.

Jebel Druze.

On the 29th May the Mohafez of the Jebel Druze, the Emir Hassan el Atrash, occupied the Citadel at Soueida. There was no resistance from the French-commanded troops of the Druze, who deserted *en bloc* as did all other French troops in the Jebel. French officers and civilians were moved to the Emir's house, where they remained throughout the troubles under the Emir's protection. No blood was shed. In the Hauran the French barracks at Deraa were attacked and occupied by the townspeople after some forty-eight hours' fighting; the French barracks at Ezraa were occupied without resistance. Both garrisons were captured.

Alaouites.

The situation remained uneasy throughout the week in the Lattakia area, but no incidents took place.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

In Deir ez-Zor the situation was tense, but relatively calm until the night of the 28th–29th May, when a bomb was thrown into the French Political Offices. Next morning barricades were erected in the streets and the French fired on the crowd, causing several casualties. At 9 a.m. a meeting between the Mohafez and tribal leaders took place, at the latter's house, at which a protest was lodged against the French action. During the course of the meeting firing broke out and a bullet entered the Mohafez's house, killing a sheikh. Later in the day an agreement was reached between the French and Syrian authorities by which the French guards on the two bridges in the town over the Euphrates were replaced by Syrian gendarmes, but the French announced they would call in air support if the tribes attacked.

On the 30th May French troops withdrew from the town to positions outside and the tribesmen were thus able to pour into the town. French armoured cars caused damage and casualties by bombarding the town.

Early on the 31st May several French planes dropped bombs on the town, one of which hit British Military Headquarters. At 10.30 a second air raid took place, heavier bombs being used. These bombardments caused considerable damage, loss of life and great terror among the townspeople. By 4 p.m. firing had ceased, so conference was held between the Syrian and French authorities, the people meanwhile streaming out of the town into the desert. Late that night news was received of the commander-in-chief's intervention. Deir ez-Zor since then has been returning to normal, but the tribal situation is causing some anxiety.

Lebanon.

During the early part of the week there was some criticism that the British were taking no action with regard to affairs in Syria. The Lebanese Government were in close touch with the President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, who left Damascus by car with the Russian Minister on the morning of the 30th May. Apart, however, from expressions of solidarity with the Syrian Government, no direct action was taken against the French by the Lebanese. The Government were repeatedly informed by His Majesty's Legation that it was essential to refrain from any provocative action which might give the French an excuse for retaliation. Apart from the closing of Beirut and Tripoli on the 31st May and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd June, the Government followed this advice.

In the last few days, however, tension has been increasing as it becomes apparent that the French are being removed from Syria to the Lebanon. A big concentration of French forces is at Rayak, and on the 4th June anti-French feeling has become so marked in Baalbek nearby that the French Political Officer and the Sûreté aux Armées were conveyed by the French to Zahlé. In Beirut itself the French are nervous and are making some show of force, moving armed troops about in motor vehicles and allowing armed military personnel to walk about the town. Michel Pharaon has been elected as the head of all youth movements, irrespective of their religious connexions, and there is widespread anxiety that the French will remain in the Lebanon stronger than ever: although French agents are active in encouraging Christian fears of Moslem domination should French protection be removed.

[E 4665/5/89]

(13)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary, No. 167, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 12th June, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 29th June.)

General.

In Syria, during the week, progress has been made in the evacuation of French military personnel and civilians from some of the principal towns. In addition, the new cereal collection organisation, M.I.R.A., has started to operate, though there still remain many problems of detail to settle (see section 2 of this report). Other problems arising out of the removal of French military and civilian personnel from Franco-Syrian organisations have been dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis. There have been a number of Franco-Syrian incidents varying in gravity from the mutiny of a company of Méharistes at Dmeir to isolated attacks on individual Frenchmen who have disobeyed instructions from the Anglo-French Joint Staff and appeared in the streets of Syrian towns.

In the Lebanon there has been a growing anxiety at the influx of French troops and French civilians, and regrets are freely expressed that British advice was so scrupulously followed by the Government that no disorders occurred, and that in consequence no British military intervention has been necessary. Certain Christian elements are being actively encouraged by the French to feel that they will be victimised should the French ever leave the country; and the French are taking every opportunity by means of public statements, the press, Radio Levant, the distribution of literature, and rumours to explain that the British actions in Syria were unnecessary and committed for purely selfish ends, and that France has the backing of Russia, who will ensure the return of French influence. French troops are in evidence in the streets of Beirut and Tripoli.

With the dispersal of the British forces and the necessity for guarding not only the major concentrations of French troops, but also French installations and the few French officials remaining in the various towns, there is a possibility that disorders may occur in such places as Tripoli and Lattakia, where there is no concentration of British forces. The present situation is one which cannot last, and unless a settlement is reached before long deterioration seems inevitable.

Saadullah Bey Jabri and the Lebanese delegation to the Arab League Conference returned to Beirut on the 12th June. The decisions taken by the League at the final meetings remain secret.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 16th-31st May, 1945, amount to 270 tons, a daily average of 17 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 178,250 tons.

As a result of French action in Syria between the 27th May and the 4th June, the O.C.P. ceased to function in many parts of the country and the cereal situation became serious, Damascus itself being reduced to eight days' supply only. In order to ensure that the population of the two countries should be fed, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, set up a temporary organisation called M.I.R.A. to co-operate with the local Governments in the purchase and distribution of grain. Although the final details of this organisation have not yet been finally approved, the States' Governments have expressed their willingness to advance money immediately to finance the necessary purchases, and M.I.R.A. is already operating in some areas. General Beynet has protested against the formation of M.I.R.A.; but it is hoped that discussions with the French about O.C.P. assets and personnel, coupled with the numerous assurances that M.I.R.A. is only a temporary organisation, whose establishment is not intended in any way to prejudice the future of O.C.P., will clear the air.

Syria—Damascus.

In order to disprove French allegations that the Syrians had commenced hostilities by attacking French installations in Syria, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd June invited the heads of foreign diplomatic missions to visit these installations when it was demonstrated to them that they bore scarcely a trace of having been fired upon. The diplomatic representatives are now engaged on drawing up a joint report on what they saw.

Damascus town has now returned to normal, and great efforts have been made by the Government to reorganise the security services. It is to be hoped that the gendarmerie, who were considerably demoralised as a result of French action, will before long be able to take over the protection of French property in the town. They have already been issued by the British military authorities with 25 armoured scout cars, 90 Bren guns (with 45,000 rounds of ammunition), 45 Sten guns (with 18,000 rounds of ammunition) and 500 rifles. Izzat Sati, formerly director of the Damascus police, has been appointed head of the new mechanised force.

Direct contact between the Syrian authorities and the French Delegation has ceased to exist, and His Majesty's Legation and Consulate have as a result been used as a channel of communication.

Almost every Damascene feels that in view of recent events he can have no further dealings with the French. The import of French books and magazines has been prohibited and no French papers have been published in Damascus; cinema proprietors have been informed that the police cannot be responsible for their safety if they show French films or films with French sub-titles. The Banque de Syrie has been informed that financial transactions with French nationals are likely to expose the bank to danger of attack, and even the use of the French language in public is frowned on. The Lawyers' Syndicate have appointed a committee of five to study the question of the Mixed Courts. The Damascus Municipal Council are studying proposals that the 29th May each year should be observed as Martyrs' Day, that French memorials should be removed from the streets, and that the Parliament building should be left in its present condition as evidence of French savagery, bearing a plaque on which will be inscribed the names of those killed in the building.

The British military commission, which was responsible for the collection of prisoners and loot from French establishments, quickly completed its task, and a considerable quantity of Syrian Government property was returned to the Departments concerned. On the 9th June the safe belonging to the Syrian

Chamber of Deputies was discovered in the residence of General Oliva Roget, together with boxes of Parliamentary archives. The French authorities suggested to the Syrian officials who, accompanied by the British military commander, visited the residence, that the safe had been taken there for safe keeping, and regretted that it had been damaged in transport. The safe door bore the marks of having received considerable attention, and the locks had been so damaged that it was not possible for the Syrian officials to open it at the time.

On the 8th June the Méharistes Company at Dmeir revolted and killed six of their officers and four non-commissioned officers. A party arrived in armoured cars shortly afterwards at the Citadel, and by arrangement with the Syrian authorities were disarmed but not put under arrest, on condition that they should be at the disposal of the British military authorities when required. The remainder of the company at Dmeir were similarly disarmed and were evacuated on the following day. Pending a final decision the Méharistes have been put at the disposal of the Syrian Bedouin Control, to which the French Commandant Lacroix has been attached as adviser. A British force known as Bedou Force, under the command of Colonel King, has been formed to assist the Syrian authorities when necessary in maintaining security in the desert.

A numerous medical mission under the auspices of the Egyptian Red Crescent arrived in Damascus on the 6th June. The precursors of the mission who arrived by plane on the previous day received a very chilly reception from the French authorities at Mezzé airport.

Faiz Khouri, Minister designate to Moscow, has been temporarily put in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Aleppo.

The situation in Aleppo during the week has given rise to considerable anxiety. The French have not wholly withdrawn to barracks west of the town and still occupy a number of buildings in the western and most European quarter, in which automatic guns can be clearly seen by the passers-by, and groups of French troops are also to be seen in the streets. It is reported that there has been some victimisation by the Syrian authorities of Syrians previously employed by the French; these for the most part are Christians or Jews, and this has given rise to uneasiness amongst the minorities that they may be attacked by the Moslems.

On the nights of the 9th and 10th June, fighting broke out at Jisr el Chorghour to which a company of the B.D.L. have been sent from Lattakia to evacuate French personnel. It is not yet clear how the fighting started, but there were casualties on both sides and Syrian buildings were machine-gunned and mortared. The situation is also reported to be tense in Idlib. These events have still further increased the tension in Aleppo, where ugly incidents, which may well spread to general disorder, are possible at any time unless French troops and civilians are withdrawn. The British authorities have made every attempt to urge on the Syrian authorities the absolute necessity of maintaining order and preventing incidents by irresponsibles.

Homs and Hama.

All the French have been evacuated from Hom and Hama. The students of the military school at Hom were sent to their homes on leave.

The French Méhariste Company at Palmyra was disarmed by a British column on the 11th June, and its French officers taken into protective custody, as it had mutinied.

Jebel Druze.

The 1,400 members of the Groupement Druze who placed themselves under the orders of the Emir Hassan el Atrash on the 29th May, have been causing some concern, and a large quantity of French arms and ammunition had disappeared from the Citadel at Soueida. Arrangements were made with the Syrian Government to arrange for payment of the troops from Syrian Gendarmerie funds, and the Emir Hassan has proceeded to Soueida accompanied by an official of the Ministry of Finance to undertake this task. A British officer has also been appointed as "Military Adviser" to the Emir, and it is hoped that with this assistance the Emir will be able to set about collecting the missing arms before they have time to go underground or cross the frontier. A small British force is being despatched to assist him in this task.

Alaouite Territory.

The situation of the French in the Alaouite Territory remains unchanged though there has been considerable tension in the town, and Nationalist representatives have made repeated requests to Syrian and British authorities that the French should go as in other parts of Syria. The French, on the other hand, are showing no signs of going, and in fact have occupied the Citadel and exposed field guns and machine guns to the view of passers-by. As in Aleppo, as long as the French are still in evidence, there must always remain the possibility of incidents spreading to general disorder.

Mazhar Pasha Raslan has been appointed Mohafez of Lattakia.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

An uneasy calm returned to Deir-ez-Zor at the beginning of the month, after the news of British intervention had been received, although the first detachment of British troops under the command of Colonel King, officer commanding Bedou Force, did not arrive in the town until the 8th June. Their presence had an immediate calming effect on the population, who gave them an enthusiastic welcome. Shortly afterwards part of the force moved to Raqqa, where there had been some fighting between the French and the local inhabitants during which the town was shelled by mortars. The guard on the bridge has now been taken over by British troops.

French troops are mainly confined to their barracks in Deir-ez-Zor, and on the 10th and 11th June women and children of French military families were evacuated by air to the Lebanon.

There has been no open hostility to the French in the Jezireh area though the Mohafez has complained to officer commanding Bedou Force of alleged French efforts to stir up trouble in the area.

Lebanon. (See also General.)

The events of the past fortnight have given an opportunity for criticism of the Government. Riad Solh has made it clear that he feels he has been given no opportunity to take part in the deliberations and consultations in which he considers his previous record and experience give him the right to share. It is therefore not improbable that he will shortly organise an attack on the existing Government, with the intention of returning to power or at least regaining a place in the Cabinet.

The Lebanese Government have kept in close touch with their Syrian colleagues, and adopt the attitude that in any settlement both countries should receive similar treatment. Some anxiety is shown that the discussions will drag on until after the British General Election, and that a Labour Government, if returned, may be less inclined to support the Levant States in their demand for the elimination of all French privilege.

Local Communist leaders are taking the line that France and Britain intend to divide up the Levant States, and that the former will never leave the Lebanon nor the latter Syria; disorders in the Lebanon should at all costs be avoided as they would be certain to lead to civil war; the only course now left is diplomatic action, and the support of the U.S.S.R. and the United States must be obtained.

Radio Levant continues under French control. The tone of many of these broadcasts is anti-British, and much of the output is strongly resented by the Lebanese.

On the 13th June the Lebanese Foreign Minister published a communique replying to General Beynet's Press Conference. He gave an accurate factual account of the principal events between the 3rd May and 19th May, including the arrival of two French cruisers with troops, the presentation of Lebanese and Syrian Notes requesting that troops should not be brought into their territories without their previous consent, the States' warning to French against the consequences of bringing in troops, and the issue of the States' communiqué refusing to negotiate with the French under pressure. He went on to express the complete solidarity of his Government with the Syrians and their indignation at the bombardment of Damascus and other Syrian towns; and concluded that the Lebanese Government considered that French actions call for the intervention of international justice, and that the French Government must accept all responsibility for a situation created by their actions in the Levant States.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 2594/3/65]

No. 37.

Lord Killearn to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd April.)

(No. 539.)

Sir,

Cairo, 12th April, 1945.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 563 of the 31st March, in which you requested a translation from the full Arabic text of the Covenant of the Arab League, I have the honour to transmit the enclosed English translation which has been prepared in the Oriental Secretariat of this embassy from the Arabic text supplied by Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. It will be seen that the enclosed translation incorporates the passage which, as reported in my telegram No. 730 of the 27th March, was omitted from Annex II of the Covenant in the French version. Attention is also invited to the wording of the first sentence of article 5 where the French version referred to disputes between two States of the League, whereas the enclosed translation from the Arabic text refers to disputes between two or more States of the League.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad, Beirut and Jedda, the High Commissioner for Palestine, the four Service Chiefs, and Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

KILLEARN.

Enclosure in No. 37.

(Translation.)

Covenant of the League of Arab States.

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic;
His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordan;
His Majesty the King of Iraq;
His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia;
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic;
His Majesty the King of Egypt;
His Majesty the King of the Yemen;

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States, and anxious to cement and reinforce these ties on the basis of respect of the independence and sovereignty of these States, to direct their efforts for the welfare and prosperity of all the Arab countries, to assure their future, to achieve their aspirations and hopes, and in response to public opinion in all the Arab countries,

Have decided to conclude a pact with these objects in view and have delegated the following plenipotentiaries:

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic has delegated for Syria:

His Excellency Fares el Khoury, Prime Minister;
His Excellency El Sayed Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordan has delegated for Transjordan:

His Excellency Samir el Rifai Pasha, Prime Minister;
His Excellency Said el Mufti Pasha, Minister of Interior;
Soliman el Nabulsi Bey, Secretary of the Council of Ministers.

His Majesty the King of Iraq has delegated for Iraq:

His Excellency Sayed Asshad el Omary, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
His Excellency El Sayed Jawdat el Ayoubi, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington;
His Excellency El Sayed Tahsin el Askari, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo.

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia has delegated for Saudi Arabia:

His Excellency El Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for Saudi Arabia;
His Excellency El Sayed Khair el Din el Zereky, Counsellor of Saudi Arabian Legation in Cairo.

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic has delegated for the Lebanon:

His Excellency El Sayed Abdel Hamid Karamy, Prime Minister;
His Excellency El Sayed Yusuf Salem, Lebanese Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo.

His Majesty the King of Egypt has delegated for Egypt:

His Excellency Mahmoud Fahmy el Nokrashi Pasha, Prime Minister;
His Excellency Mohammed Hussein Heikal Pasha, President of the Senate;
His Excellency Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
His Excellency Makram Ebeid Pasha, Minister of Finance;
His Excellency Mohammed Hafez Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice;
His Excellency Abdel Razzak Ahmed El Sanhoury Bey, Minister of Public Instruction;
Abdel Rahman Azzam Bey, Minister Plenipotentiary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the King of the Yemen⁽¹⁾ has delegated for the Yemen:

Who, after having exchanged their credentials according to their full powers, recognised valid and in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.—The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States who sign the present Covenant.

Every independent Arab State has the right to join the League. If desirous of joining, it will present an application to that effect and deposit it at the Permanent Secretariat-General for submission to the Council at the first meeting to be held after presentation of the application.

Article 2.—The object of the League is to strengthen relations between member States, to co-ordinate their political action with a view to ensuring collaboration between them and protection of their independence and sovereignty, and generally to consider all questions concerning the Arab countries and their interests.

Likewise its aim is to ensure close co-operation between the member States consistent with the régime of each State and the conditions prevailing therein, in the following matters:

- (a) Economic and financial matters, including commercial relations, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.
- (b) Matters of communications, including railways, roads, aviation, shipping, posts and telegraphs.
- (c) Cultural matters.
- (d) Matters relating to nationality, passports, visas, execution of legal judgments and extradition of criminals.
- (e) Social matters.
- (f) Health matters.

Article 3.—The League shall have a council composed of the representatives of the member States of the League, each State having only one vote irrespective of the number of its representatives.

Its task will be to realise the aims of the League and to attend to the execution of agreements made between the member States on matters referred to in the preceding article and others.

The duties of the Council will also include those of determining the means of collaborating with international organisations which may be created in the future to maintain order and peace, and of organising economic and social relations.

Article 4.—For each of the questions enumerated in Article 2, a special commission will be formed on which the member States of the League will be represented. These commissions will be entrusted with the task of laying down

⁽¹⁾ NOTE.—The King of the Yemen being unable to send delegates to Cairo, the text of the Covenant is being sent to him at Sana'a to be signed by his plenipotentiaries.

the basis and extent of collaboration and of putting them into the form of draft agreements to be examined by the Council before being submitted to the States concerned.

The commissions may include representatives of other Arab countries. The Council will define the circumstances in which such representatives can be admitted and the bases of their representation.

Article 5.—It is not permissible to resort to force in order to settle disputes between two or more States of the League. In case of a dispute which does not affect the independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of the State and if the litigant parties apply to the Council for the settlement of the dispute, the decisions of the Council shall be considered as effective and binding.

In such a case the States involved in the dispute will take no part in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council will also mediate in any dispute which it is feared might lead to war between one of the States of the League and any other State of the League or third State in order to effect a conciliation.

Decisions on arbitration and in cases of mediation will be taken by a majority vote.

Article 6.—In case of an aggression by a State against a member State of the League or in case of threat of such an aggression, the State attacked or threatened with attack may apply for an immediate meeting of the Council.

The Council will decide on the necessary measures to prevent the aggression. Its decision will be unanimous. In case of aggression by a member State of the League the vote of that State will not be taken into account when reckoning unanimity. Should the aggression take place in a manner which renders the Government of the State against which the aggression is committed unable to communicate with the Council, the representative of the said State may apply for a meeting for the purpose set out in the preceding paragraph. Should the representatives also be unable to communicate with the Council, then any member State may apply for its convocation.

Article 7.—Decisions taken unanimously by the Council are binding on all member States of the League while decisions taken by a majority are only binding on those that accept them.

In both cases the decisions of the Council will be executed by each State in accordance with its organic régime.

Article 8.—Each member State will respect the régimes established in the other States of the League and will consider those régimes as a right of each State. It undertakes to abstain from any action tending to change that régime.

Article 9.—The Arab States of the League who may wish to establish between them closer and stronger ties than those laid down in this Covenant may conclude between themselves such agreements as they may desire to realise these objectives.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or which may be concluded in future by a Government or Governments of the League with any other Government whatsoever do not (and will not) bind and do not (and will not) commit the other members.

Article 10.—The permanent seat of the League of Arab States will be in Cairo, but the Council may meet at any other place as may be appointed.

Article 11.—The Council of the League will meet in ordinary session twice a year during the months of March and October. It will meet in extraordinary session whenever the necessity arises at the request of two States of the League.

Article 12.—The League will have a permanent Secretariat-General comprising a Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries and an adequate number of officials. The Secretary-General will be appointed by the Council of the League by a two-thirds majority of the States of the League. The Secretary-General will appoint, with the approval of the Council, the Assistant Secretaries and senior officials of the League.

The Council of the League will lay down internal regulations covering the duties of the Secretariat-General and staff matters.

The Secretary-General will hold the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General will be designated in an annex to the present Covenant.

Article 13.—The Secretary-General will prepare the League's budget and will submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each financial year.

The Council will determine the share of each State of the League in the expenses, which may be reconsidered when necessary.

Article 14.—The members of the Council of the League as well as members of its commissions and its officials as laid down in the internal regulations will enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The premises occupied by the organisations of the League will be inviolate.

Article 15.—The Council will meet for the first time when summoned by the Egyptian Prime Minister and thereafter when summoned by the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the States of the League will assume the presidency of the League in turn at each ordinary session.

Article 16.—Except in the cases mentioned in the Covenant, a majority vote will suffice to constitute a binding decision by the Council in the following matters:

- (a) Questions concerning the staff;
- (b) Adoption of the budget of the League;
- (c) Adoption of regulations governing the Council, Committees and Secretariat-General;
- (d) The closing of sessions.

Article 17.—The member States of the League will provide the Secretariat-General with copies of all treaties and agreements concluded or to be concluded with any member State or third State.

Article 18.—If one of the States of the League desires to withdraw from it, the Council is to be informed of its intention one year in advance.

The Council of the League may consider any State that does not comply with the obligations of the Covenant as excluded from the League by a decision given unanimously, excluding the vote of the State in question.

Article 19.—This Covenant may be amended by a two-thirds majority vote of the States of the League, especially with a view to strengthening their ties, to creating an Arab Court of Justice or regulating the relations of the League with international organisations that may be formed in the future to guarantee order and peace.

No amendment will finally be adopted until the session following that in which it was first raised.

Any State not accepting the amendment may withdraw at the time of its entry into force without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20.—This Covenant and its annexes will be ratified according to the constitutional provisions of the various high contracting States.

The instruments of ratification will be deposited at the Secretariat-General and the Covenant will become binding on those States that have ratified it, after the expiration of fifteen days from the date of receipt by the Secretary-General of the instruments of ratification from four States.

This Covenant has been drawn up in Arabic in Cairo on 8 Rabia el Tani, 1364 (22nd March, 1945), in single copy to be deposited at the Secretariat-General.

A true copy will be delivered to each State of the League.

Annexes.

I.—*Special Annex on Palestine.*

At the termination of the last Great War, the Arab countries were detached from the Ottoman Empire. These included Palestine, a vilayet of that Empire, which became autonomous, depending on no other Power. The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that the question of Palestine was the concern of the interested parties and, although she was not in a position to direct her own affairs, the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 settled her régime on the basis of the acknowledgment of her independence. Her international existence and independence are therefore a matter of no doubt from the legal point of view, just as there is no doubt about the independence of the other Arab countries. Although the external aspects of that independence are not apparent owing to force of circumstances, this should not stand in the way of her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States that have signed the Covenant of the Arab League consider therefore that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of Palestine and until that country enjoys effective independence, the Council of the League should undertake the selection of an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work.

II.—*Special Annex relating to Co-operation with Arab Countries not participating in the Council of the League.*

Considering that the States participating in the League will have to deal, both in the Council and in the commissions, with questions benefiting and affecting the whole Arab world, and in view of the aspirations of the Arab countries that are not members of the Council, it being for the Council to take them into account and work for their achievement, the States that have signed the Covenant of the Arab League invite the Council of the League, when considering the participation of those countries in the commissions referred to in this Covenant, to act in co-operation with those countries to the greatest possible extent, also to spare no effort to be acquainted with their requirements, to understand their aspirations and hopes and in addition to work for their welfare and for the assuring of their future by all means which political methods provide.

III.—*Special Annex on the Appointment of the Secretary-General of the League.*

The signatory States of this Covenant have agreed on the appointment of Abdel Rahman Azzam Bey as Secretary-General to the League of Arab States.

His appointment will be for two years and the Council of the League will define subsequently the future organisation of the Secretariat-General.

File Number:

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TREATY.

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Further Correspondence

respecting

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EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 62.—JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1945.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 4787/2313/97]

No. 1.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th July.)

(No. 56.)

Sir

Kabul, 19th June, 1945.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your circular despatch No. L. 3603/405 dated the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the records of leading personalities in Afghanistan duly corrected up to June 1945. In the present revision an attempt has been made to substitute the leading personalities references in place of "Who's Who in Afghanistan" references.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan.

(References where preceded by W.W. relate to "Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1936" issued by the General Staff in India and where preceded by L.P. relate to List of Leading Personalities.)

1. Abdul Ahad (W.W. 4).

Born about 1890. Son of Qazi Ghulam. Brother of W.W. 63. "Sardar-i-Ali," Ismail Khel Ghilzai; owing to long residence in Wardak, is known as "Wardaki." From 1909 to 1916 was Chief Usher (Arzbegi) to the Amir. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Kataghan. Was arrested with his brother for complicity in the murder of Amir Habibullah Khan (1919) and banished, but was later acquitted. In 1922 was appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Sent to Wardak valley during the Mangal rebellion in 1924-25 to maintain loyalty amongst the Wardakis. During Amanullah's absence in Europe was for four months Governor of the Eastern Province, but was relieved and sent to Moscow to meet King Amanullah, it being realised that he was incapable of administering the province. Returned to Kabul July 1928. Officiating Minister of Interior November 1928. Supported Amanullah in his efforts, from Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929 and went to Persia. Returned to Afghanistan December 1929. Elected President of the National Council (Rais-i-Shura) 1930. In

November 1931 proceeded to Farah as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Farah and Chakhansur. Returned to Kabul in spring of 1932 and re-elected President, National Council. Is reported to belong to the "Charkhi" family party. Re-elected President of the National Council 1933. Visited Wardak country March 1933 to check pro-Amanullah propaganda. Served on a commission on the Helmand water dispute June 1933. In October 1933 visited North Afghanistan with Prime Minister and others. Re-elected President of National Council 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. In 1937 visited Europe for medical treatment. Is suffering from diabetes. Still President of National Council. He is now a very sick man, but continues to carry out his duties. A friend of the Prime Minister (L.P. 50). Owing to ill-health he is unlikely to be given any more active appointment, but should retain his position in the Government. His son is the Wali of Kabul.

Is apparently friendly to members of the British Legation, but does not convey an impression of sincerity.

13518 [30918]

B

2. Abdul Ahad (W.W. 5).

Son of Abdul Ahad Khan of Ghazni and brother of L.P. 36. Born 1902 in Kabul. Tajik. He owns property in Kabul and Ghazni. An infantry officer. Was sent to Turkey about 1925 for military training and studied in Military Academy, Istanbul. Returned to Afghanistan via Herat early in 1929; reached Kandahar just after Amanullah fled to India. Returned to Herat. Later joined late King Nadir Khan in Southern Province and took part in fighting there. Appointed Officer Commanding, Arq. after Nadir's succession. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1930. Has more than once been congratulated by the King on his good work as General Officer Commanding, Kandahar. Attended manoeuvres in Delhi, January 1935. After his return held frequent field parades of Kandahar garrison and started seriously to learn English, of which he spoke little. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, in June 1935. Came to Kabul, was received by the King and returned to Kandahar and left to take up his new appointment. An intelligent little man, with a great sense of humour, he is a keen student of his profession and from all accounts a capable commander. Popular and loyal. Speaks Turkish well. Was very friendly to British Military Attaché on his visit to India and was much impressed by the friendliness and hospitality of British officers he met. In 1936 he visited Musabab on the Persian frontier to select a site for a post in area given to Afghanistan by the Boundary Commission. Trained men in ambulance work. Takes an interest in medical work and rewards doctors who have done good work. His brother joined Abdul Majid (L.P. 9) in Herat for his tour in Europe. Popular in Herat. Appointed commander in Farah Province during Helmand water dispute. Sister married to W.W. 553 in 1936. Royal appreciation presumably in connexion with services in Helmand water dispute. A very hospitable man, polite and enlightened, prepared to discuss any subject but not very communicative on military matters. Appears keen on his profession and anxious to improve training and equipment of the army. Professes loyalty for Central Afghan Government and Government of Herat. Said he was impressed by his visit to Indian manoeuvres in 1935 and with British methods. Reported that he exercised more influence than the Governor of Herat. In absence of the Governor of Herat, he and Mohammad Ali Khan officiated as Governors jointly. He opened a school in Robat-i-Ghurian where officers learn English. Formed a local intelligence corps in Ghurian. Transferred from command of Herat forces, appointed Governor of Ghazni 1937. Inhabitants of Katawaz are said to have confidence in him; has some influence with the various tribal leaders. Accused Indian Government of intrigue with the Ghilzais. Detailed men in Katawaz for pro-Government propaganda. Bribed Suleiman Khel visitors to keep away from rebels. Warned Suleiman Khel against Fakir of Ipi, whom he called a "British agent" working against Afghan interests. Visited Turkey in 1942 for medical treatment and returned in 1943. His visit to Turkey is thought to have had some political motive. Commandant of an infantry division in the Kabul army corps. He is a possible choice for Governorship of a Province or command of troops sent to suppress tribal disturbances or to head a military mission abroad or to represent Afghanistan at any International Conference. Visited Bombay in 1945 for medical treatment. His illness is more mental than physical and he shows a tendency to become a permanent invalid. His brothers are Governors of Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

3. Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13).

Son of the late Ghulam Haider Charki. Born 1891. Brother of Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309). Was a lieutenant-colonel (Kandak Mishar) of artillery. Was on the Asmar front in 1919. Commanding

Arandu October 1919. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) and proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif June 1920. General Officer Commanding, Kunar Valley, 1922. Hakim (Governor) of Laghman 1923-24. Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior 1926. Officiated as Home Minister 1927. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Wounded and imprisoned in Mazar-i-Sharif by Saqavis February 1929. Sent to Kabul March 1929 but escaped. Arrived Quetta and left for Meshed July 1929. Returned to Kabul, via India, April 1930. Left Kabul by air on the 20th July, 1930, to visit his brother Ghulam Nabi (deceased) in Angora. Accompanied ex-King Amanullah to Mecca in 1931. One of the Amanullah party in Europe. Lived some time in Constantinople at No. 110, Grande Rue de Sisti, but left for Berlin when Amanullah was in Mecca in 1935. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In September 1935 was at Constantinople, but was expelled from Turkey that month and left for Germany.

4. Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38).

Daw Kakar of Kandahar. Son of Abdul Ahad, a Hakim (Governor) of Kandahar. Member of the Afghan Peace Delegation June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Aman-i-Afghan*. Assistant to the Foreign Minister as Mustashar (counsellor) in charge of Indian Affairs. Member of the Afghan delegation, Mussoorie Conference 1920. Arrived Kushk November 1920 with a mission to enquire into the position of the Afghan Consul. Appointed Afghan representative at Bokhara. Returned to Kabul July 1921 and resumed his duties in the Foreign Office. Appointed Minister in London January 1922. Relieved August 1924. On return was appointed Minister of Commerce. Was suspected of "Republican" intrigues during Amanullah's absence in Europe 1928. Went to Russia for three months in 1928 in connexion with Russ-Afghan trade. Retired from Ministry of Commerce in October 1928 to become a candidate for the National Assembly. Joined Amanullah in Kandahar and fled with him to India May 1929. Resided in Karachi and returned to Kabul in November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Berlin December 1929. Resigned in March 1931, as he considered the attitude of the Afghan Government was too friendly to His Majesty's Government. Went to Mecca in 1931. Reported to have met ex-King Amanullah in Venice March 1932. In May 1932 returned to Kabul after performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Was closely watched by Afghan Government, who doubted his loyalty. In 1933 (December) was arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of pro-Amanullah activities. Still (1943) in jail in Kabul. Has the reputation of being an ardent Nationalist and particularly anti-British, but financially honest. Has also been reported to be pro-Russian.

In June 1935 reported to be sending letters from jail to the Republican party in Kabul, advising them to look to Britain rather than Russia for help.

King Zahir Shah is said to have announced grant of money to his relatives who interviewed him in August 1935.

5. Abdul Hakim Khan (W.W. 43).

Was a junior Under-Secretary at the Afghan Foreign Office; transferred as a junior Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Education in 1923. Appointed Secretary to Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1927. Appointed Second Secretary, Afghan Legation, Berlin, May 1931. Assistant Secretary in western branch of Afghan Foreign Office in 1934 and 1935. Was Rais of the Afghan representatives at Joint Commission at Chaman in April/July 1936. Governor of Eastern Province in September 1939.

1948. Appointed officiating Director of Agriculture 1944. Believed to be anti-British in his sympathies due to lack of courtesy shown to him in India. Does not belong to any important family.

6. Abdul Hamid Khan (W.W. 45).

Muhammazai. Born about 1898. Son of the late Abdul Aziz Khan. Brother of Abdul Hussain Khan (Mirza). Educated in France. In Tehran in 1929 with his father, with whom he returned to Kabul in December 1929. Secretary to the Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1931-34. First Secretary, Afghan Embassy, Moscow, 1934. In the Protocol Branch of the Foreign Ministry in 1936. Chief du Protocol in 1937. Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1937. Appointed Afghan Representative in Geneva 1939. Returned to Kabul in November 1939 and re-appointed Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1940. Until recently was distrusted by the Royal Family but now appears to have been restored to favour. A possible choice as an Afghan Minister abroad in one of the less important centres.

7. Abdul Husain Khan (W.W. 47).

Mirza. Son of the late Abdul Aziz. Born about 1896 and educated in Persia. Accompanied his father to Tehran in 1920. Was Under-Secretary in Charge of Reception and Visa Branch of Afghan Foreign Office January 1924. Dismissed in August 1925, partly for taking heavy commission on goods purchased in India for Afghan Government. Director of Afghan Transport Company, Kabul, 1926. Appointed Consul-General, Delhi. In business in Karachi 1929. Returned to Kabul November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome and presented credentials the 17th May, 1930. Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva 1931-32. Attended Disarmament Conference, Geneva, during 1933, and seemed very friendly with Litvinov.

Transferred as Ambassador to Moscow during 1933. Brought the body of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan to Kabul in June 1933 and returned to Moscow in December.

Speaks quite good English and has many friends in India, where he spent some time during the Great War.

Visited Kabul September 1935, then returned to Moscow.

Reported to have pro-Amanullah leanings. Returned to Kabul July 1938. Appointed Minister of Public Works, October 1938. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1940. Suspected of intrigues with enemy 1942-43. Left for Washington in April 1943 to take up newly created post of Afghan Minister there. It is believed that he was selected for the appointment in order to get him out of Kabul. Not trusted by the Yayah Khel dynasty, and believed to be anti-British in his political sympathies.

8. Abdulla Khan.

Tajik. Son of Ahmad Khan of Ghazni and brother of Gul Ahmad Khan Tajik (L.P. 36) and Abdul Ahad (L.P. 2). He was formerly an official in the Government Purchasing Department, and afterwards their agent in Berlin in 1938-39. Appointed as Third Secretary (Mun) in the Ministry of National Economy in 1940. Stated to be pro-German in his views. Appointed officiating Governor of Herat in 1941. Is regarded as one of the more energetic junior officials in a senior post. Said to be a favourite of the Prime Minister, and to have lately made a fortune by smuggling goods to Russia and Iran. Became unpopular in Herat owing to food shortage and subsequent riot resulting in the murder of two Afghan officials.

9. Abdul Majid, alias Abdul Majidoff or Hakimoff (W.W. 73).

Tarak of Herat. Born about 1902. Son of Abdul Hakim. A man of no important family. Was at one time an official in the customs office in Herat, from where in 1920 he went to Moscow and was at one time attached to the Afghan Embassy there.

Started business in Moscow, and made a considerable amount of money by exporting and importing contraband goods with the connivance of the customs officials. In about 1930 he settled in Berlin. Was recalled to Kabul in 1933 by the Afghan Government to organise and manage the Ashami Company. Prior to proceeding to Berlin he is believed to have had a considerable amount of his property confiscated by the Soviet Government. Believed by some to have Soviet tendencies, but this has been officially denied by the Afghan Government. Has tact and is a capable business man.

In spring 1935 carried out an extensive business tour in Northern Afghanistan. Speaks Russian and German.

Has a wife and four children in Berlin.

In January 1936 managing director of the Afghan National Bank and Ashami Company. In 1936 went to Europe to arrange for trade credits and contacts. Is an ardent Nationalist in his trade negotiations and the most important business man in Afghanistan. Largely responsible for the introduction of the monopoly system and formation of various trading companies. Was also responsible for the propaganda part of the issue of the new currency notes (1935-36). Still in Europe (December 1937) negotiating loans and trade credits and purchasing machinery and armaments. Attended Nazi Congress meeting in Nuremberg in 1937.

Returned to Kabul, March 1938. Appointed Minister of Trade, September 1938. Proceeded to Delhi December 1938 for trade discussions with the Government of India. Appointment changed to Minister for National Economy, April 1939. Left Kabul January 1941 for United States but changed plans at Karachi and went to Germany for medical treatment. Ill and in Switzerland 1943. Shows reluctance to return to Afghanistan but still advises Afghan Government on economic matters. In 1943 sent 210,000 Afghans for distribution as charity amongst bank employees. His financial affairs in Afghanistan are believed to be controlled by Government.

10. Abdul Tawab Khan (W.W. 124).

Muhammazai. Son of late Mahmud Tarzi. Born 1902. Went to Europe for education October 1921. Admitted Saint-Cyr early in 1924 and completed a course of nearly three years' duration there. Spent one year with a French cavalry regiment. Head of Cavalry School, Kabul, 1928. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1928. Escaped from Kabul to Peshawar with Inayatullah (W.W. 366) by British aeroplane January 1929 and went to Europe. Married (1931) in Istanbul Zakiri Khanum, daughter of a retired Turkish naval captain. Still (1943) in Europe and a member of Amanullah's party. Speaks French fluently and is a smart-mannered man, of whom more may be heard in the future. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

11. Abdul Wahab (W.W. 126).

Muhammazai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Mussoorie Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul was appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went to Kandahar at the time of Amanullah's abdication and acted as Foreign Minister there. Accompanied Amanullah on his flight to India and left India with him. Has since lived in Europe. In Rome September 1934 and in close attendance on the ex-King. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In October 1935 was living in Istanbul. In Rome December 1936.

12. Abdur Rahim Khan (W.W. 89).

Nal's Salar (general). Son of Reza, Kohistan. Son of Abdul Qadir Khan. Born about 1883 in Kohistan. Brother-in-law of Muhammad Hussain, accountant

under Ameer Habibullah Khan, who was executed by King Amanullah Khan.

Appointed to Sar-i-Os (commander of the Royal bodyguard) by Ameer Habibullah at age of 16. Served for five years in Kabul. Afterwards was for ten years supervisor of bridge construction in the Eastern Province. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) (1921) and posted to the Cavalry Kandak of the Herat army. Recalled to Kabul about 1927. Later transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif as Ghund Mishar of the Cavalry Ghund. On outbreak of the 1928 revolution returned to Kabul and joined Bacha-i-Saqao in Charikar during the latter's second attempt to capture Kabul January 1929. Sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Mazar-i-Sharif to organise a revolution. He deposed the Governor and left for Maimana, and thence for Herat, which he reached on the 4th May, 1929, after defeating some Herati forces under Muhammad Ghaus (W.W. 262). In May appointed Civil and Military Governor by Bacha-i-Saqao and reappointed later by Nadir Shah October 1929. Said to be very popular with the Heratis and to be governing his province well. His loyalty to the Central Government was at one time uncertain, while the form of administration he set up in Herat was reported (1930) to show signs of Soviet influence. After the success of Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in the spring of 1931 in Kataghan and Badakhshan, he seems to have decided to submit to Nadir Shah, and sent his son, Abdul Halim Khan (W.W. 48a), to Kabul in August. He returned in September, accompanied by Firqa Mishar (major-general) Muhammad Shuaib Khan (W.W. 611a), who had been appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, and a Mustaufi (revenue official). In August 1932 visited Kabul, and in September was confirmed in appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Herat.

Dealt firmly with an attempt to incite the Herat garrison to mutiny in 1933. Met the Prime Minister at Maimana at time of Nadir Shah's assassination and gave his allegiance to King Zahir Shah. Appointed head of Perso-Afghan Boundary Commission September 1934.

In 1935 reported to be anti-Russian. Owns a large estate in Kushk.

Arrived in Kabul in June 1935 and appointed Minister of Public Works. A man of great personality who governed his province well. While he was in Herat rumour was always rife about him: that he was pro-Russian; that he intended to set up an independent kingdom; that he was pro-Republican; that the Afghan Government intended to remove him, &c. His loyalty is doubtful and he is a man who may play an important rôle should the present régime collapse. In July 1935 awarded 150 acres of land near Kabul. Was being closely watched by the Government (1936), as he was suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies or disloyalty to the Afghan Government.

Reported as being connected with the Republican party. Appointed Assistant to the Prime Minister with status of a Cabinet Minister (1938), which post he still holds. Suspected of intrigues with enemy legations 1943 and still being carefully watched by Afghan Government. Does not take much part in public life.

13. Abdur Rahman Khan.

Appointed Afghan Minister at Bagdad early in January 1941, and was on his way to Bagdad when he was recalled from Karachi owing to outspoken criticism of commercial policy of Abdul Majid Khan, Minister of National Economy, in which he had indulged just before his departure. Later reported to Bagdad and presented his credentials to the Regent of Iraq on the 21st October, 1941. Escorted the remains of Sayed Jamaluddin to Kabul in December 1944.

14. Abdus Samud Khan (W.W. 118).

Tajik.

Secretary of Afghan Legation in London; returned to Kabul May 1925, visiting Mecca en route, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economies of budget of April 1926, and he was thrown out of employment. Appointed a member of Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926. Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926, and left in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary, November 1928; transferred to the Protocol Branch, Foreign Office, Kabul, February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome, and left to take up appointment in February 1936. Represented King Zahir Shah at coronation in London, 1937. Still in Rome.

An intelligent man possessing good manners. Speaks English, and believed to be well disposed to us.

15. Ahmad Ali Jan (or Khan) (W.W. 140).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1899. Son of Suleiman Khan and cousin of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of Ali Shah Khan. Appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1923, but incurred his displeasure by marrying, without his approval, a daughter of Prince Musa Khan (W.W. 461a). Governor of Jalalabad in 1923-24. Imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in April 1929, but was released in October. Appointed Minister in Paris, November 1929, and transferred to London, June 1931. Represented Afghanistan at the Economic Conference, London, 1933. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Minister of Education. Returned to Kabul in October 1933. In 1936 Minister of Education. Left Kabul in November 1937 on appointment as Ambassador at Tehran.

Is a pleasant man, a keen sportsman, but not very capable. Appears to be lazy. Is said to be pro-British and is always very friendly to members of the British Legation, Kabul. His wife was educated in England and speaks and writes English perfectly. He himself speaks English, French and Urdu. Has a son born about 1926. Appointed Minister in London (1939). Still Minister in London.

16. Ahmad Shah Khan (W.W. 149).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Asaf Khan. Born at Dehra Dun 1889. Returned to Afghanistan 1901. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah Khan to India in 1907. On the night of the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) was in command of the guard. The sepoya of the Ghundi-Ardalan (an infantry unit), whose colonel, Ali Shah Reza, was executed as the actual murderer, believed that Ahmad Shah Khan was the real murderer and that their colonel had been made a scapegoat. It is stated, however, on excellent authority that the actual murderer was not Ahmad Shah Khan. Married a sister of the late Shaghassai Ali Ahmad Khan, one time Wali of Kabul. Was an A.D.C. of ex-King Amanullah. Went to Europe via India in 1929 with a message from Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Khan. Returned to Kabul early 1930. Appointed Wazir-i-Darbar (Minister of Court) April 1930. In March 1932 went on pilgrimage to Mecca as representative of the King and negotiated a "Treaty of Friendship" with Saudi Arabia. Visited India in the spring of 1933 for medical treatment, where he married a second wife. His eldest daughter was married to King Zahir Shah in November 1931. Speaks English and Urdu and is a pleasant, well-mannered and easy-going man. In 1934 was reported to be on bad terms with the Premier. Visited India in November 1936.

His four sisters were married to—

- (a) Late King Nadir Shah.
- (b) Late Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of (a).
- (c) N. S. Abdul Ghani Khan (W.W. 34).
- (d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (L.P. 43).

Went to Tehran for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran (1939). Still Wazir-i-Darbar. Fond of shooting, fishing and gardening, but suffers from a heart complaint and not therefore very active. Does not take any active interest in politics.

17. Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza (W.W. 179).

Born about 1894. A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Travelled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1925 promoted Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1927. Was with Amanullah in London March 1928. Minister of Commerce November 1928. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" February 1929. Appointed Minister of Education November 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1935, but was still in London in June 1935. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fourth International Hospital Conference in Rome in May 1935. Summoned to Kabul July 1935, and arrived there the same month via Moscow and Termez. Returned to London via India in October. Speaks English and is intelligent and capable.

Represented King Zahir Shah at funeral of King George V in London January 1936.

Returned to Kabul (1938) and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Visited Tehran (1939) for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran and to attend the meeting of the Council of the Suadabad Pact. Is still Minister for Foreign Affairs. Speaks English well but no French; is a keen student of English literature and interested particularly in education. Enlightened, capable and genuinely friendly to Britain, but not a strong character and lacks energy. Not being related to the ruling family, he has no great influence with the Government.

18. Ali Shah Khan (W.W. 180).

Mohammadzai. Born about 1900. Naib Salar and Sardar-i-Ali, son of Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, first cousin of late King Nadir Shah. Son-in-law of S. Musa Khan (W.W. 461a) and brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (L.P. 15). Was commandant of military schools and the military college from 1932 to 1939. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1939. In August 1941 he was transferred to the Southern Province as Governor (Rais-i-Tenzim) and General Officer Commanding Southern Province army corps and promoted to the rank of Naib Salar (general). He is a pleasant, rather easy-going individual, but has not been very successful as an administrator in the Southern Province, of which post he was relieved in April 1944. At present unemployed in Kabul, but may be given an appointment shortly (June 1945).

19. Allah Nawaz (W.W. 182).

Indian of Multan. Son of Khan Bahadur Rab Nawaz Khan, honorary magistrate, Multan. As a student in Lahore ran away to Afghanistan. In Jalalabad (1920) was an assistant editor of the *Itihad-i-Mashriqi*. A superintendent of schools, Jalalabad Circle. Was agent of the Indian Revolutionary party in Afghanistan and Tashkent and channel of communication between them and the Hindustani Fanatics. In 1927 was employed by the

Deutsch-Afghanische Company as an interpreter. Helped Nadir Shah in his advance on Kabul 1929. Appointed Minister of Court October 1929, and equerry November 1929. Was appointed to supervise the work on Dar-ul-Aman May 1930. In July 1930 accompanied the Minister of Justice (W.W. 256) to Ghazni for negotiations with the Suleiman Khel, in which he is reputed to have done well. Left Kabul for Europe via India in April 1931, ostensibly for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in November 1931. In March 1932 again went to Europe for the same reason, and returned in January 1933. In June 1933 was appointed Minister of Public Works, but spent most of the year in the Southern Province in connexion with the disturbances there. Left Kabul on visit to Europe, ostensibly for medical treatment December 1933, but in reality, it is believed, to enquire about the trial of Said Kemal, the murderer of Sardar Muhammad Aziz, and to discuss affairs of State with Sardar Shah Wali Khan (L.P. 73). Popular rumour in Kabul said he had been sent to assassinate ex-King Amanullah. In spite of rumours that he was returning to Kabul, was still (1935) in Europe. Appointed Minister, Berlin, 1935, but was not at first accepted by the German Government owing to his being the representative at the trial of Said Kemal. Was devotedly attached to the late King Nadir Shah. His life has been threatened by the Amanullah party. Trusted by the Prime Minister (L.P. 50), who considers him very capable. Travelled to Kabul by German monoplane (August 1937). Returned to Germany with his family (October 1937).

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany. Played an important part in the Government's efforts to quell the Suleiman Khel rising of 1938. Visited Kabul in 1940 via Russia. Said to be anti-British. Is still Minister in Berlin. Now said to be returning to Kabul via Russia.

20. Amanullah Khan (W.W. 183).

Ex-King of Afghanistan, third son of the Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 346). Born the 1st June, 1892. In 1914 married Souriya, daughter of the later Sardar Mahmud Tarzi. In 1916 was reported to be friendly with the German mission in Kabul and in favour of intervention in the war against Britain. When the Court moved to Jalalabad in the winter of 1918-19 he remained behind as Governor of Kabul, and was in a very strong position, with control of the arsenal, treasury and stores, when the Ameer was murdered in February 1919. He proclaimed himself Ameer, declared his uncle Nasrullah a usurper, and accused him of complicity in the murder. The troops in Jalalabad and Kabul sided with him and Nasrullah was compelled to submit. On the 27th February was formally crowned by the Tagao Mullah, and in a speech stated that Inayatullah (W.W. 366) had by his recognition of Nasrullah's usurpation forfeited his claim to the throne. On the 13th April held a special durbar in Kabul for the trial of those accused of the Ameer's murder, and at its conclusion a colonel, named Ali Shah Reza, generally regarded as a mere scapegoat, was sentenced to death and was executed. Sardar Nasrullah and others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. Amanullah soon found his position threatened by intrigue on behalf of Inayatullah and the restiveness of the army, who were not satisfied with the enquiry made into the murder of Habibullah. The army was therefore despatched to the Indian frontier, in order to divert its attention and to take advantage of the disturbances in India should these develop into open rebellion. The commander-in-chief apparently exceeded his instructions and precipitated hostilities, which resulted in the Third Afghan War. A variety of considerations led to the grant of lenient terms to Afghanistan, including the recognition of her complete independence. As a result Amanullah Khan was able to claim that he had won the freedom of

his country by the sword, and, by the conclusion of treaties with a number of European countries, that he had brought about the recognition of Afghanistan on a basis of equality by the Great Powers. These tactics gains him considerable prestige, both in his country and throughout the East. This prestige tended to increase his natural vanity and render him impatient of advice. Through his wife he had been brought under "Young Turk" influence, and he proceeded to carry out a fantastically rapid programme of reform without regard for the backwardness and prejudice of his people, particularly the mullahs. He failed to profit by the warning sounded by several rebellions, the most serious of which was the Khost rising of 1924, and continued to spend his revenues on schemes for social or educational progress, whilst neglecting his army. These tendencies were exaggerated as a result of his European tour of 1927-28, and particularly, it is believed, as a result of his visit to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. In the autumn of 1928 the Shinwaris rose in revolt and were soon followed by other tribes. Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand of low birth, attacked Kabul in December 1928 and again in January 1929. Amanullah announced his abdication in favour of Inayatullah on the 14th January and fled to Kandahar a day or two later. At Kandahar attempted to rally support for Durrani dynasty and formally rescinded his abdication. In April he advanced on Kabul, but owing to the hostility of the Ghilzais was repulsed near Ghazni and defeated at Mukur. Arrived at Chaman with his family on the 23rd May, and sailed from Bombay for Italy on the 22nd June, 1929. Visited Mustafa Kemal in Angora in February 1930, returning to Italy. Revisited Turkey again for three months in June. Left Constantinople hurriedly for Italy. Returned to Turkey in September, but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jedda to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1931, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or concerting measures for the recovery of his throne. Published a letter deprecating King Nadir and his régime. Left Jedda for Suez, the 9th May, 1931. His Mecca party included Muhammad Adib (W.W. 137), brother of Souriya, Abdul Fateh Tarzi (W.W. 20a), the late Ghulam Nabi, Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612), and two officials of the Angora Embassy, Fazal Ahmad and Abdul Aziz. Returned to Italy, via Alexandria, the 21st May. Left Rome for Switzerland, the 20th June, 1931, stayed at Montreux. Visited Rome in July and returned to Switzerland. Visited Montecatini in September, and was back in Rome by the beginning of November. Left Rome on short visits to Naples in December 1931 and Venice in March 1932. At Venice reported to have met Afghan Minister from Berlin; more likely it was Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38). Said to have definite understandings with Soviet and Persia and to have many friends in Germany. Constant rumours of his whereabouts and intentions were circulated among the tribes on both sides of the border during 1932, culminating in one, which was put about during the Dare Khel revolt in November, to the effect that he was in Gardez. The ex-King was, however, in Italy or Switzerland throughout the year. He was reported to be writing his autobiography, and to be going to Russia when he had finished it to have it published by the Soviet. This has never materialised. In Europe he has constantly intrigued against the present Afghan régime with a view to regaining his throne. In July 1933 he visited Constantinople and held a meeting of his principal supporters there. Reported to have tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain Soviet support to his efforts. The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Yahya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassinations of King Nadir Shah (Kabul 1933) and his brother Muhammad Aziz (Berlin 1933) and are active in intriguing on

Amanullah's behalf. His chief supporter in Europe is Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Receives an annual allowance of about £150 a month from the Italian Government. In March 1935 again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he met a number of sympathisers, especially Indians, but appears to have effected little. Returned to Rome, where he normally lives. Since then his adherents in Europe and Asia have been active in spreading propaganda against the present Afghan régime amongst the North-West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, which he occasionally visits. Has three sons and four daughters. Different opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorates, possibly as the result of further assassinations of members of the present ruling family, or feeling on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably leaves for Switzerland during the summer months, but, in 1935, instead of going to Switzerland he rented a large house in Stresa in Northern Italy, and took with him his family and Hasan Jan Muhammad, his brother-in-law. Returned to Rome after a short visit to Montreux on the 17th August, and believed to be in Rome (1937). Visited Mecca again in 1935. Rumoured to draw an allowance from Russia. Still in Italy (1943). Reported to have visited Switzerland (1943). After staying at Gstaad and at Villars he returned to Rome. He was accompanied by an Italian mistress. Was in Rome with his family when it was liberated by the Allies.

21. Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199).

Sardar, Muhammadzai, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born 1911. Is a son of the late Ameer Habibullah by the Ulya Janab, sister of the late King Nadir Shah. Is thus a half-brother of ex-King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sar-i-Os (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officiate as second secretary (equivalent to quartermaster-general) War Office, in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. In 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Mishar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933. In 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor, Major Christenn. Is still (1937) General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and, as such, in command of the Arq and household troops, including the Hazirbaabes (personal bodyguards of the Royal family). He is also in charge of the advanced course for officers. Nervous in manner; appears to be intelligent and to take a keen interest in his command. Is important as the lineal representative of both the "Kabul" and "Peshawar" Sardars. Has a son born in 1934. Unconfirmed reports that he is not entirely loyal to the Yahya Khel have been received from time to time.

Went to Persia to attend the millenary celebrations of the poet Firdausi, October 1934, and returned to Kabul in the same month, having met Reza Shah.

Left Kabul for Europe (March 1937) and represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI. Attended Turkish manoeuvres (August 1937) and returned to Kabul (September 1937).

Appears to take his profession seriously and is popular. Has acquired more *savoir-faire* of recent years. He visited India again in 1939 for medical treatment, and is learning English (1943). He is not a strong character or likely to be a danger to the

Yahya Khel régime. He belongs to the faction of W.W. 414 and is on good terms with most of the members of the Royal Family. On the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939 he was relieved of his appointment as General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and became Inspector-General of the Afghan Army, an appointment he still holds. He occasionally officiates as Minister of Defence.

22. Ata Muhammad Khan (W.W. 207).

Haji, Tokhi. Son of the late Sardar Abdullah Khan, who was Governor of Mazar in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Order of Astor. Quarrelled with Hashim Khan in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Was in Jalalabad when Ameer Habibullah was murdered; was arrested and condemned to death, but was reprieved at the last moment. Again arrested on suspicion of complicity in unsuccessful attempt on Amanullah's life at Paghman in 1920, but released at Mahmud Tarzi's request. Appointed diplomatic representative, Bokhara, but his arrival coincided with the Bolshevik revolt (1920) and he returned to Mazar. Was one of Afghan officials ordered to render secret assistance to Enver Pasha in Central Asia (1922). Unemployed for four years. Appointed Governor of Balkh at time of Amanullah's visit to Mazar (1928) just prior to latter's visit to Europe, and awarded the Order of Astor. During the revolution fought against the Saqavi forces of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), was defeated and fled to Tashkent. Accompanied the late Ghulam Nabi in his unsuccessful effort to recapture Northern Afghanistan in April 1929, and again retired to Russian territory. Appears to have returned to Afghanistan soon after Nadir Shah's accession. Was a member of the Commission of Reconstruction sent under Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) to Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1930. Commanded a flying column during operations against Ibrahim Beg 1931. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and awarded the Order of Astor, 2nd Class, 1931. Appointed a member of the Council of Nobles December 1931. Visited Mecca in 1932. Has a reputation for courage. Is reported to be pro-Russian. Is now (1943) President of the Council of Nobles. Is reported (1943) to have pro-German sympathies.

23. Ata-ul-Haq (W.W. 209).

Born about 1885. Eldest son of the late Khwaja Jan of Serai Khwaja, Koh-i-Daman. Brother of the late Sher Jan and the late Muhammad Sadiq Khan, two of the Bacha-i-Saqao's officials. Lived in India until he was 16. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah on his tour in India 1907. In July 1920 appointed to command at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and was suspended in March 1923 for inefficient handling of the Wazirs. Took over command of Kandahar Infantry Brigade April 1923. Spent two years in Moscow in charge of Afghan students. Appointed Foreign Minister by Bacha-i-Saqao June 1929. Arrested with Bacha-i-Saqao November 1929 on capture of Kabul by Nadir Shah. Is well educated and possesses pleasant manners.

Was released from jail in 1938.

24. Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan (W.W. 317). Born about 1899. Was secretary to the late Muhammad Aslam Khan, Afghan Envoy, Tashkent. Returned to Kabul March 1920. Adviser to the late Muhammad Wali Khan, Afghan Envoy to Moscow 1920. Returned from Moscow and in charge of arrangements for the Suritz party September 1920. Arrived Tashkent the 5th January, 1921, en route to Moscow. Appointed first counsellor to Muhammad Wali's mission to Europe 1921, which visited London, America, Paris and Rome. First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office 1922. In addition acted as Minister of Education 1923. Appointed Minister of Education March

1924. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" April 1929, although at one time the Bacha had condemned him to death. Appointed Foreign Minister by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1933. Well educated and intelligent, has a good name for honesty in financial matters. Is friendly, insincere and self-indulgent, particularly as regards drugs, the use of which renders him incapable of sustained mental effort. Prefers airy discourse of abstract principles to discussion of practical details, and is tiresome when he feels obliged to live up to his reputation as a humorist. Was sent to Eastern Province in September 1935 to dissuade Afghans from joining Mohmand Lashkars. Held a jirga at Dakka, and appears to have achieved some success in his object. Returned to Kabul the 23rd September, taking Badshah Gul I (W.W. 224) with him. Left Kabul December 1935 for an extended European tour.

Visited Iraq and Turkey, where he was well received. Later went to Paris, where he saw M. Flandin, and Geneva. In London was received in audience by The King and had conversations with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India, Mr. Eden and Lord Zetland. Saw Herr Hitler in Berlin and finally reached Kabul in April 1936 via Moscow. Again visited Europe in 1936, and returned in January 1937. Relinquished post of Foreign Minister in 1938 on appointment as Ambassador to Turkey, a post which he still holds, though his recall and reappointment as Foreign Minister is anticipated. Returned to Kabul May 1945 on leave.

25. Fazl Ahmad Khan (W.W. 250).

Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat. Son of Abdul Wahab and grandson of Hazrat Muhammad Umar Jan of the family of Sirhind Pirs. Born 1892 at Bakharz in East Persia, where his father was in exile. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1902. Qualified as a judge in religious matters. Visited Nadir Shah on his accession in 1929, and was appointed Assistant Minister of Justice 1930, and officiating Minister of Justice vice Sher Agha (W.W. 256) in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassination visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in favour of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice 1934. Member of the joint Perso-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorabad (Iran) incident December 1934. His family is influential and receives an allowance from the Afghan Government, but he himself lacks influence and character. He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married in 1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (W.W. 256). Still Minister of Justice.

26. Fazal-i-Umar (Sher Agha) (W.W. 256).

A member of the family of Sirhind Pirs established in Kabul. Son of Qayum Khan, deceased. Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar on the death of his elder brother, Sher Agha in 1925, the latter having succeeded to the title on his father's death. In 1926 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to Kabul, but eventually went to Dera Ismail Khan, where in 1928 he was intriguing against Amanullah. Was expelled from the North-West Frontier Province in March 1928 under Frontier Security Regulations for preaching against the Afghan Government. In September 1928 Amanullah asked him to return to Afghanistan but he refused. After the abdication of King Amanullah he went to the Southern Province where he assisted Nadir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice November 1929. In July 1930 was sent as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Ghazni area and returned to Kabul at the end of August. In June his daughter married Fazal Ahmad Khan,

Hazrat Sahib of Chaghatai, Herat (W.W. 250). In December 1931 tendered his resignation and ceased working as Minister. He was reported at this time to be spreading anti-Nadir propaganda. His resignation, however, was not accepted until December 1932. Was granted a visa in December 1932 to proceed to India, from whence he was to have proceeded on pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of his mother he returned to Kabul. Visited Sirhind, India, in February 1935, and was instructed by the Afghan Government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. Reactionary and opposed to progressive reforms. His whole-hearted support of King Zahir Shah is therefore doubtful, and he is not trusted by the Afghan Government. On the other hand, is probably not pro-Amanullah. He appears to have been in favour of "jihad" on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and brought back to Kabul the principal religious leaders, who, after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jihad." Wields great influence amongst the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Said to favour friendship with the British as opposed to the Soviet. Is said to be on bad terms with Saïvid Hasan (W.W. 546). Prime Minister doubts his loyalty, and would have liked in 1935 to arrest him, but was afraid to do so. Visited Sirhind (Punjab) on pilgrimage in March 1940.

Given a fort and 70 acres of land in Chahardah by King Zahir Shah (March 1936). Visited Mecca, 1938. In 1942 expressed a desire for an Allied victory and according to one report asked his followers to pray for such a victory, but was also reported to be in close contact with the Italian Legation at this time. Visited India in 1944, and again in 1945.

27. Ghaus-ud-Din (W.W. 264).

Patulla, Ahmadzai, Ghilzai. Son of the late Jehandad Khan, who was implicated in the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt of 1912, and executed for insolence in 1914. In 1915 was concerned in a conspiracy against Ameer Habibullah with Akram Khan and Azam Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in Jubbulpore jail. Given permission to return to Afghanistan by ex-King Amanullah. His father's family lands and property were restored to him in November 1920. Arrested March 1924 and detained in the Arq whilst there was trouble in Khost, but later released and proceeded to Khost, where his handling of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais in the Ameer's favour gained him the title of "Mir Afghan." Awarded 1½ lakhs of rupees for his services. Made overtures to the British Government after the flight of Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Lent his support to Nadir Khan in the Southern Province and raised a lashkar of Ahmadzais. His treachery, on account of a bribe from Bacha-i-Saqao, was the cause of Nadir Khan's defeat in the Logar Valley in April 1929. Again made overtures to the British Government for support of his claim to the throne. Fled from Hariob to Parachinar at the beginning of October 1929 as a result of the discovery by Nadir Khan that he was in communication with Bacha-i-Saqao. In Delhi under surveillance January 1930, from whence he was removed to Jubbulpore. Deported to Burma in May 1930. A deceitful, treacherous and untrustworthy man, who is always intriguing for his own ends. Has since been transferred to Kodai Kanai, Madras Presidency, from Burma (1936). Requested permission for his family to return to Afghanistan in 1936, on which the Afghan Government offered to allow him to return also, but on conditions which were unacceptable to him. Offered his assistance to the Afghan Government against Germany and Russia but this was believed to be merely a cloak to cover his real intentions of establishing himself with the Ghilzais.

28. Ghulam Ahmad Khan (W.W. 292).

Son of the late Shahghassi Ali Ahmad Jan, and grandson of the late Luinab Khushdill Khan. Married to a niece of Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243) in 1927. Appointed aide-de-camp to his father when the latter was Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province in 1924. Left Kabul for Kandahar via Peshawar and Quetta, the 10th March, 1929. Returned to Quetta on his father's arrest by Bacha-i-Saqao and proceeded to Peshawar, September 1929. Returned to Kabul on the accession of Nadir Khan. Accompanied Shah Wali (W.W. 585) to Bombay, December 1929. Returned to Kabul 1930 (April). In January 1932 visited Lahore for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in March. Went into partnership with Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Company, and managed the petrol business in Kabul. Visited India five times during the period April-December 1932. Assistant manager of the Petrol Company of Afghanistan 1933. In March 1935 appointed Deputy Minister of Court. His step-mother, Suraj-ul-Benat, is a sister of ex-King Amanullah. Assistant manager of the new petrol company in 1936. Relieved of his appointment in the Petrol Company in 1938 and appointed Deputy Court Minister, of which appointment he was relieved in July 1938. Fled to Tirah in September 1939, after discovery of a pro-Amanullah plot, in which he was found to be the ringleader. In November 1939 he was surrendered by a Chamkanni jirga to the political agent, Kurram, and lodged with other leaders in Jamrud Fort. Has since (1940) been transferred to Poona and is still there.

29. Ghulam Farug Khan (W.W. 273).

Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of the late Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan. Employed in the Afghan Cypher Department 1926. Assistant manager Motorani Company. Arrested with his father at the same time as ex-King Amanullah arrested the Hazrat Sahibs of Shor Bazar, September 1928. Released October 1928. Arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by air February 1929 accompanied by one of the younger Hazrat Sahibs, Sanai Maksum. Returned to Afghanistan with Sardar Hashim Khan March 1929. Later was employed on propaganda work for Hashim Khan in Mohmand country. Arrived Peshawar via Shabkadar, September. Left for Ali Khel via Parachinar October 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior December 1929. Appointed Governor of the Eastern Province December 1930. In January 1932 married the daughter of Ghulam Muhammad (W.W. 289). His first wife, daughter of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan, died some time before. In April 1932 was in touch with Afridis and Mohmands, including Badshah Gul (W.W. 224). In July the Safis of Kunar complained of his harsh treatment. Left Jalalabad on the 1st December 1932, on relief by Muhammad Qasim Khan (L.P. 57) and took over the Governorship of Kandahar. Returned temporarily to Jalalabad in December 1932 to deal with Hassan Khan (W.W. 344), in which he was successful. Did well as Governor of Kandahar and displayed considerable energy. Was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala in January 1933. In July 1935 appointed Governor of Herat in succession to Abdur Rahim. A great favourite of the Prime Minister (L.P. 50). Is capable and hard-working, believed to be loyal to the existing régime. Keen on road and building development (1936). Appointed Governor of Kandahar (1938). Is stated to be in poor health (1939). Relieved of his post of Governor of Kandahar (1939) owing to poor health and appointed officiating Home Minister. In 1941 appointed Governor (Rais-i-Tanzimieh), Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces, and in 1942 returned to Kabul to officiate as Home Minister. Relieved of the appointment of Home Minister later in the year, but

retained his appointment as Governor of the Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces, which he still holds. Incurred the displeasure of the Prime Minister in 1942 owing to a liaison with the wife of his brother-in-law (a son of W.W. 288). He divorced his wife and much against the wish of the Royal Family, married the wife of his brother-in-law.

30. Ghulam Muhammad Khan.

Muhammadzai. A younger brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (L.P. 15) and Ali Shah Khan (L.P. 10). Born about 1907. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Employed as clerk in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs prior to his appointment as Director, Protocol Section, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1939. Friendly and pleasant to deal with, but has an exaggerated idea of his importance. Plays tennis and speaks French and some English. Visited India in January 1945.

31. Ghulam Siddiq Khan (W.W. 309).

Sardar-i-Ala. Son of the late Sipah Salar (commander-in-chief) Ghulam Haider, Charkhi. Brother of the late Ghulam Jilani Khan, late Ghulam Nabi and Abdul Aziz (W.W. 13). Born 1894. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India, October 1919, and a junior member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussorie Conference. Left Mussorie with despatches for Kabul June 1920, and was refused readmittance into India owing to his improper behaviour at Mussorie and intrigues with seditionists. Appointed assistant president to the Muhajarin Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Second Counsellor to the Afghan Mission under Wali Muhammad Khan which visited Europe in 1920. Returned from London to Kabul with despatches September 1921. Left again for Europe, via Peshawar, October 1921. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April, 1923, when he was relieved by Ahmad Ali (W.W. 141). Visited Angora whilst en route to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed first personal secretary to the King and Minister of Court January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister January 1927 during absence of the late Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. With King Amanullah in Europe in 1928. Appointed Foreign Minister November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with rebels December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Despatched to Russia by Amanullah on a special mission March 1929. Assumed the duties of Afghan Minister, Moscow, April 1929. Returned Kabul December 1929. In Mecca June 1930. In Berlin 1930 engaged in anti-Nadir activities. Set out for Afghanistan under promise of free pardon from the King. Arrived in Kabul the 7th March, 1931. Suspected distributing agent of Amanullah's letters in Kabul April 1931. Arrived Berlin the 18th July, 1931, to take up the appointment of Afghan Minister. Worked almost openly against his own Government and Britain during his tenure in Berlin, encouraging anti-British propaganda over the Dokalim Boundary question at the beginning of 1932 and granting a visa to Ishar Singh Ghadrite against the wishes of the Afghan Government. Wrote to Nadir professing his loyalty in July 1932. His brother, the late Ghulam Nabi, was staying with him in July 1932 when he was invited to return to Afghanistan by the King. As a result of the plot discovered when Ghulam Nabi was executed in November 1932, Ghulam Siddiq was dismissed from his appointment. Visited Mecca during spring 1933 and in touch with pro-Amanullah Afghan element amongst the pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative, Bovoroi, through his brother Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. Visited Rome in January 1934. In 1934 married Bibi Khurd (W.W. 230), sister of ex-Queen Souriya

(W.W. 623). Lives in Berlin (1936), and frequently visits Rome, where he is believed to be in close touch with Amanullah and working hard on his behalf. Receives an annual allowance from the Italian Government. A close personal friend of ex-King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Speaks French, German and a little English. Bitterly opposed to present Afghan régime, and now ex-King Amanullah's principal adherent in Europe. Stated to be wealthy and to have money invested with Haji Ghulam Haider (W.W. 278). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Believed willing to work for Italian interests in Asia. Believed to have been involved in spring 1940 in a plot to restore Amanullah with German and Russian assistance. Plans said to have miscarried owing to disagreement between Germany and Soviet. Was reported in April 1940 to have arrived in Stalinabad. In 1941 he arrived in Istanbul, but the Turkish Government refused him permission to stay there and he returned to Germany.

32. Ghulam Yahya Khan (W.W. 311).

Muhammadzai. Born 1898. Son of Habibullah Naib Tarzi, deceased, and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W.W. 109, and cousin of W.W. 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Received Order of Astor, 1st class, February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by Bacha-i-Saqao's men, but still in the Foreign Office, January 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister, Rome, December 1929. Assistant Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office. Promoted First Secretary, Afghan Foreign Office, 1930. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connexion with Helmand water dispute with Persia. Officiated for the Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1933. Appointed Director (Rais) of Department of Public Health February 1935. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Member of Republican party. A pleasant, well-mannered man of no outstanding ability. He has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Speaks German and Turkish. Was relieved of his post of Minister of Health in November 1939, and appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Reappointed Minister of Health 1940, a post he still holds.

33. Gul Agha (see Siddiq Agha Muhammad).

34. Gul Ahmad Khan (W.W. 315).

Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan. Brother of F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about 1897.

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards appointed Assistant Chief Judge. Some time later was placed at the head of the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar, Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1929 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reform led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 575) to Mazar-i-Sharif, June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed President of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif vice Abdul Jamil Khan (W.W. 49) in November 1934, which post he still holds. Appointed Minister of Health in 1939, but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan régime. Speaks some English.

35. *Habibullah Khan Tarzi* (W.W. 325).

Muhammadzal. Born 1896. Son of the late Muhammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Cousins W.W. 100 and W.W. 311. Was a junior Under-Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office 1922-23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Mahmud Tarzi when latter was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under-Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris, November 1928. Relieved by Ahmad Ali Jan (L.P. 15) December 1929 and returned to Kabul. Third secretary in Foreign Office, May 1931. Chief delegate to the Dokhim Boundary Commission, June 1932. Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand Water Commission, October 1932. Visited Herat and Jalal Kala, thence to Zulfikar and Chakhansur in this connexion. Completed his work on the Persian boundary survey in June 1933 and returned to Kabul. Appointed Minister at Tokyo in July 1933 and presented his credentials there in October 1933. Speaks English fluently; a pleasant, well-mannered man. Returned to Kabul June 1939, and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a post he was still holding in 1944. He is kept in this position of comparative obscurity as he is believed to be pro-Amanullah, and is therefore not trusted by the present régime. He owns property in Shahr-i-Bau, is an exacting landlord who always wishes to raise rents and make money.

36. *Hazrat of Shor Bazar* (see *Fazl-i-Umar*).

37. *Inayatullah Khan* (W.W. 366).

Sardar, Muhammadzal. Eldest son of Ameer Habibullah Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan Badr-ul-Haram. Born the 20th October, 1888. Visited India in December 1904. Held the appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah ("Helper of the State") under Ameer Habibullah Khan. Created Sardar-i-Ala in 1905. Appointed Minister for Education in 1916. Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death. Married a daughter of the late Mahmud Khan, Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Ameer Habibullah Khan's reign he received an allowance of 130,000 rupees per annum. After the murder of Habibullah Khan, Sardar Nasrullah went through the form of offering him the throne. He, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrullah's favour, and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrullah, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of Amanullah, he had to accompany the former to Kabul. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrullah's imprisonment, he was kept under strict surveillance. At the darbar at which those accused of the murder of Ameer Habibullah were tried, Amanullah decreed that Inayatullah had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrullah's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah, &c. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the Ameer, and to be practically confined to his house until 1922. There was an abortive rising by the Safi regiment in his favour in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men, March 1921. He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure

of freedom, which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction. When Bacha-i-Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December, 1928, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arg. Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged in the Arg by Bacha-i-Saqao, abdicated on the 17th January, 1929, on condition that he and his family were sent to Kandahar by air. Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 18th January, 1929, and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to Bombay, the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929. Arrived in Tehran, the 27th July, 1929. Left Tehran for Europe, May 1930, and was in Berlin believed plotting against Nadir Khan. Applied for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1931). Visited England, August 1931, and stayed three weeks in London with his wife and eldest son Khalilullah (W.W. 399). Then joined Amanullah in Rome. Visited Constantinople for his nephew's wedding, December 1931, and then went on to Tehran where his sister joined him from Kabul. In receipt of 800 toman per month from Persian Government in February 1932. In August the Persian Government were said to be intending to discontinue this allowance, his sole means. Since then has remained in Tehran, where he now resides. Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that he is living in comparative penury. His sister, who had been with Amanullah in Rome, joined him in the autumn of 1933. Is periodically the subject of rumours in Afghanistan, generally to the effect that he has arrived, or is expected to arrive, in some part of the country. Lacks initiative, intellect and energy, but combines dignity with pleasant manners, and had a reputation for being honourable and straightforward. An agent of Inayatullah was reported to have visited Afghanistan in May 1935. Stated to have been granted a monthly allowance of about 5,000 rupees (Afghani) by the Afghan Government (1935). Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran.

38. *Mahmud Jan* (W.W. 415).

Sardar-i-Ala, Shahzai, Barakzai. Born 1885. Son of Shah Muhammad Khan, and a distant cousin of Abdul Aziz Khan, and the Ulya Hazrat. Official as Minister of Public Security in 1922 and as Governor of Kabul in 1925. Was in charge of the Public Works and Secret Service. Also in charge of the Frontier Tribes Department, of which Haji Muhammad Akbar was Under-Secretary. Was in partnership with Herr Harten, German engineer in charge of Dar-ul Aman works, and made a lot of money out of public works. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927. Appointed Wali of Kabul, December 1927. Captured by rebels near Jalalabad, December 1928, where he had been sent to restore order. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao, February 1929. Released during the Independence celebrations, August 1929. Was appointed officer in charge State Workshops, November 1929, but was deprived of his appointment the following month. Imprisoned in the Arg on a charge of theft of Government funds and jewels, January 1930. Under trial for being concerned in the Koh-i-Daman revolt of 1930. Released in January 1931, but rearrested with other members of the Shahzai family in connexion with the Ghulam Nabi and Dara Khel plots in November 1932. His brother Zobain also arrested. His ears are said to have been trimmed as a punishment. Was released in November 1933 and kept under surveillance. A stout, pleasant gentleman; was friendly to foreigners. A great personal friend of ex-King Amanullah. Speaks Pushtu.

Reported to have been arrested in March 1936 for the murder of his own son. Reported to be still in Kabul jail.

39. *Mohendra Pratap Singh* (alias *Raja*) (W.W. 437).

Indian agitator, son of Raja Ghanshyam Singh, Jat, of Mursan, Aligarh, United Provinces, and brother of the Maharani of Jhind. Founder of the Prem Vidyalaya (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915 where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1917. Endeavoured to come to India, but returned owing to our precautions. In 1918 with a party of Afghans left Mazar-i-Sharif for Russian Turkestan, and proceeded to Tashkent. In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went to Petrograd, where he received a warm welcome from Trotsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople, where he delivered Ameer's reply to the Sultan. No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts, but supposed to have gone to Tashkent via Bokhara. Came to Kabul with the Suritz Mission December 1919. Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obaidullah (W.W. 491) found him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party. Left Kabul and arrived at Wakhlan, the 14th June, 1920, en route for China. Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to China by the Ameer. He soon returned, as passage to China was refused by the Chinese authorities. In September 1920 he was in the Pamira. Did a tour in China and Japan and returned to Kabul in autumn of 1923. Left Kabul the 16th September, 1924; visited California, China, attempted to enter Tibet, then went to Japan, whence he was deported. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926. His reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid and although he held a number of receptions very few people of importance attended. This was mainly due to the displeasure of the King at Mohendra having styled himself Afghan representative at a Pan-Islamic conference in Japan, photographs describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul for the north, the 31st January, 1927, and arrived Moscow, February 1927. Returned to China, but back in Moscow November 1928 preparing to hold "Pan-Asiatic" Conference in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanullah. Went to Tehran January 1929 and returned to Moscow in April 1929. Returned to Kabul from Moscow by air December 1929. Was in close touch with Allah Nawaz (W.W. 182). He was deported by air to Termez in March 1930. Visited Berlin and reached New York on the 27th May, 1930. Is believed to be of some use to the OGPU. Was in China in 1931 and 1932. (His address there was P.O. Box 20, Peking, China). Published two books: *Afghanistan, the Herat of Arghans*, and *Long Live India!* Moved to Japan at the end of 1933 or beginning of 1934, where he was in touch with the Japanese Government. Continued to spread anti-British propaganda. Left Japan secretly for Siam in June 1934, believed at Japanese instigation to further their pan-Asiatic policy. Forbidden to lecture in Siam. Turned out of Siam, arrived Tokyo, August 1934, having been deported from Canton.

Was in Manila in February 1935, back in Japan in April 1935 and left for America in July 1935. Has agitated for his own return to India through the

Indian Legislatures. Has been regarded as an Afghan subject since 1934.

In the Far East in 1937. Reported to be in Japan (1942).

40. *Muhammad Agha Sami* (W.W. 555).

Brother of Shahzai Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675). Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a Munshi to Ameer Habibullah. A Mohmand by birth, but the family have settled in Ghazni for some generations. Was Mehmandar to the British mission in Kabul, 1921. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, but was dismissed in 1923, partly due to escape of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237) from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in murder of one Abdul Ali. Appointed Political Officer during Mangal rebellion 1924, and sent to the front, where his services earned appreciation of the Ameer. Appointed Mehmandar to Wakis of Eastern Provinces during Ameer's visit of April 1926. Reappointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, August 1926. Was a trusted personal informer to the Ameer. Efficient, controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul December 1926. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul November 1928. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao February 1929, but escaped and joined Amanullah in Kandahar. Sent to Tashkent as courier by Amanullah, returning again to Kandahar via Duzdap, April 1929. Accompanied Amanullah in his flight as far as Quetta, where he remained. Left for Meshed in August 1929. Later returned to Kabul. Arrested and sentenced to banishment for implication in Koh-i-Daman revolt, July 1930, but subsequently released. Said to be doing propaganda work in favour of Amanullah. On pilgrimage to Mecca, March 1931. Arrived Tehran with W.W. 675 in December 1931. Applied for permission to visit India, but was refused. Still in Tehran, where his brother Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) has joined him; also his nephew and niece from Quetta. He and his son, Muhammad Bashir, deprived of Afghan nationality, November 1933. His property in Afghanistan is said to have been confiscated in 1934 and his family deported to Iran.

Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran.

41. *Muhammad Akbar Khan* (W.W. 161).

Muhammadzal. Brother of W.W. 113, Minister of Health 1930. Cousin of the late King Nadir Shah, to whom he was Surgeon-General. Director of Medical Services October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome 1935 and presented his credentials in May 1935.

Relieved of appointment as Minister at Rome, March 1936, and returned to Kabul. Is married to a sister of L.P. 17.

Civil A.D.C. to the King, 1942. Visited India in 1945. Lives a somewhat retired life.

42. *Muhammad Akram Khan* (W.W. 162a).

Born approximately 1909. Director of the Reception Branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937-39. Appointed Muin I in the Ministry of National Economy 1939, which post he still holds. Is also acting as private secretary to King Zahir Shah in place of No. 49. He is related to the ruling family and enjoys the affection and confidence of the King. A pleasant, well-mannered individual, apparently friendly with the British Legation, but was suspected of having been involved in pro-Axis intrigue in 1942-43.

43. *Muhammad Aminullah Jan (or Amin Khan) (W.W. 186).*

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born the 12th October, 1885. Third surviving son of Amir Abdul Rahman. His mother was a slave girl belonging to the late Bibi Halima, who was said to have adopted him before her own son was born. Was formerly in charge of the Shara (Muhammadan Law) Department at Kabul, and was also in charge of the Jabba Khana (magazine). In 1917 he held the appointment of Sardar-i-Madafis (director of military defence). Has one son born about 1963, and a daughter said to have been married to Sardar Abdul Qudus August 1919 at Kandahar. Appointed A.D.C. to the King 1926. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao in January 1929. Arrived Quetta and left for Lahore the 4th November, 1929. Residing in Tehran 1930 in straitened circumstances. Appealed for an allowance from the Government of India in 1930. Is said to be very eccentric. In Iran 1943.

44. *Muhammad Atio Khan (W.W. 209A).*

Born approximately 1894. Muhammadzai. Sardar. Son of Rafiq Khan and son-in-law of Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan, Court Minister (L.P. 17). Brother of Babo Jan alias Zulikha, widow of late Sardar Hayatullah Khan, step-brother of ex-King Amanullah. Visited Moscow in 1935. Is an economic expert trained in Germany and holds the post of director of the Industrial Section of the Afghan National Bank. Was kept under surveillance in 1939 for his alleged pro-Amanullah sympathies. Speaks Russian and German fluently and was formerly reputed to be strongly Germanophile and to be responsible for the increased German influence in the Royal Family. Shows no outward signs now (1944) of being pro-German, but is an enlightened Nationalist who works hard and with great ability for the industrial development of his country. A pleasant and intelligent man, friendly to the British Legation and appreciative of the assistance rendered to his country by the British and Indian Governments in industrial matters; particularly the textile industry, during the war. He professes to be anxious that trade connexions thus formed should be maintained and developed after the war.

His brothers are Muhammad Umar Khan (L.P. 62) and Muhammad Rahim Khan, assistant to the president of Kabul Municipality.

45. *Muhammad Daud Khan (W.W. 238).*

Elder son of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan (brother of King Nadir Shah). Born 1900 in Kabul. Educated at the Amania College, Kabul. Spent nine years in France and returned to Kabul in October 1930. 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, where he worked hard and was well reported on by the senior German instructor. November 1932 promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province. In February 1934 assumed the duties of Governor of the province in addition to his duties as General Officer Commanding. His strictness made him unpopular and he was inclined to be headstrong and hasty. Took a great interest in the training of his troops and the Eastern Province detachment at the Independence celebrations in 1934 was conspicuous for its smartness. In July 1935 was transferred as Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, and General Officer Commanding of the Farah and Chakhansur Division. A strong personality. A keen soldier and energetic. A favourite of his uncle the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). In 1934 married a sister of King Zahir Shah. Is likely to be much heard of in the future. Speaks excellent French, and is very well-mannered and friendly. Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1936 and 1937. Warned to be more tactful by the Prime Minister. Appointed

Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province (1938).

Appointed General Officer Commanding Kabul Central Army Corps and Commandant of the Military Schools in Kabul in August 1939, the appointment he still holds. Since the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939-40 his influence has increased. The Kabul Army Corps now has a separate budget and is almost independent of the Ministry of Defence. He promoted some 230 officers in August 1942 with the approval of the King, but without reference to the Minister of Defence (W.W. 414). His corps is improving in efficiency, and his subordinates, though admiring his personality and drive, are somewhat afraid of him. In 1942, when the prospects of the Allied nations appeared not too favourable, he was believed to be advocating an approach to Germany by the Afghan Government. He is stated to be a strong Afghan Nationalist, who is inclined to resent the employment of foreign advisers, but favours seeking the assistance of Great Britain and the United States in training and equipping the Afghan army, though he is a difficult person to deal with, as he always suspects ulterior motives.

46. *Muhammad Gul Khan (W.W. 315A).*

Son of Muhammad Khurshid Khan (W.W. 408). Kuchi Mohmand of village Baru (on the Hisarak Rud, about 7 miles west of Batikot). Educated in Turkey. Was a Ghund Mishar (brigadier) in Amanullah's army in 1927. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province, in 1928. In Jalalabad during the Saqavi régime until the burning of Jalalabad, when he returned to his home at Baru. He joined H.R.H. Sardar Hashim Khan (L.P. 50) in Khugiani country about March 1929. Was Minister of the Interior in Nadir Shah's first Government October 1929. Promoted Naib Salar (general) and appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Eastern Province. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1930 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in pacifying the people. Assumed duties of Minister of Interior in October 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of Kandahar in February 1931, and left for Kandahar via India. Administered the province with firmness and efficiency. Congratulated by the Government on his work January 1932. Visited Kabul for Independence celebrations August 1932; was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala, first class, and a grant of 25,000 Kabuli rupees. Was offered Governorship of Herat in September 1932, but refused owing to his friendship for Abdur Rahim (L.P. 72). Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Mazar, Kataghan and Badakhshan and Maimana, November 1932. Relieved at Kandahar by Ghulam Faruq (L.P. 31) in January 1933, and left for Mazar. In 1934 there were rumours that his loyalty to the present régime was doubtful and that he was in favour of a republic. A quiet, well-mannered man, but ruthless. Has a strong personality and is ambitious. He is regarded as one of the most capable officials in Afghanistan. Speaks Urdu, Persian, Pushtu, Russian and Turkish. He was very loyal to the late Nadir Shah. Visited Kabul September 1935. Believed to have asked the Prime Minister to help the Mohmands against the British. Refused to visit Eastern Province to explain Mohmand situation to Afghans, and believed to have quarrelled with Prime Minister (L.P. 50) on this subject. Returned to Mazar about the 1st October. Reported to be on bad terms with W.W. 315. Stated to be connected with the Republican party. Resigned Governorship of Northern Provinces 1940 and appointed Minister of

State 1941, a post he still holds though he has withdrawn to his estate at Haibak and remains there in spite of the Prime Minister's attempts to induce him to take a more active part in the Administration. His resignation of the Governorship of the Northern Province is thought to have been due to his dislike of Abdul Majid's (L.P. 9) trade development schemes.

47. *Muhammad Haider Khan (W.W. 329A).*

Born about 1904. Son of Ata Muhammad Khan (Mir, Qazi of Herat). Formerly Afghan representative at the League of Nations and subsequently private secretary to the King. Appointed Afghan Ambassador at Tehran vice Muhammad Nauroz Khan in January 1944.

48. *H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan (W.W. 337).*

Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan (junior) and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of the late King Nadir and of L.P. 72 and L.P. 73. Born 1886. Commanded the Sar-i-Os bodyguard at Kabul and accompanied Amir Habibullah to India in 1907. Appointed Naib Salar (general) of Herat and left Kabul in 1916. Keen on instituting reforms, but checked in this direction by threat of mutiny on the part of the troops. Arrested and sent to Kabul after the murder of Habibullah, but subsequently released. People of Herat refused to have him back after his release and he was relieved. Appointed Governor of Jalalabad December 1919. Governor, Eastern Province, 1920. Went on tour in July 1921 and distributed rewards to the Mohmands and some Bajauri tribesmen, at the same time doing his best to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British; the next month he warned the tribesmen to be ready for "jihad." Summoned jirgas of the Malikolai Khel and Kumbhar Khel Afridis to Jalalabad in September 1921. Rewards in the shape of money were doled out to the tribesmen, who were informed that Nadir Khan had promised to arrange permanent allowances and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Government. Reported in August 1921 to have engineered, in conjunction with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of the British mission mail bags en route from Kabul to India. Went to Kabul from Jalalabad on the 10th November, 1921. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul, January 1922, vice Nadir Khan, who proceeded on tour. Went to Europe with his father in 1923. Appointed Minister at Moscow March 1924, when he was unpopular owing to his constant suspicions of Soviet policy. Opposed the military training of Afghans in Russia, and on his views being disclosed by the Afghan Government to the Soviet authorities he resigned and left Moscow 3rd July, 1926, to join his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Offered position of Minister at Tehran, which he refused, October 1926. Nur-us-Siraj, the sister of the King, whom he wished to marry, was betrothed to Amanullah's cousin, Muhammad Hasan Jan (W.W. 342) in October 1926. This was looked upon as an insult by Hashim Khan and his brothers. At Grasse December 1928. Granted diplomatic visa for India en route to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (L.P. 73) on the 8th February, 1929. Left Peshawar for the Eastern Province 6th March, 1929, where he tried to obtain support for Nadir, but met with little success. Was defeated by Bacha-i-Saqao and arrived Parachinar 19th September, 1929. Arrived Quetta 1st October, 1929, where he remained under surveillance until 27th October, 1929, when he was permitted by the Indian Government to proceed to Kandahar. Proceeded to Kabul, 9th November, 1929; on his appointment as Premier and Minister of Interior. This appointment he has since held, insisting on a high standard of work and efficiency. High-handed

in his dealings with other Government officials he is consequently both feared and hated. Was on tour in the Northern Provinces when Nadir Shah was assassinated and returned immediately to Kabul. Swore allegiance to Zahir Shah, since whose accession he has been the real ruler of Afghanistan. A real patriot and a tremendous worker, he has laboured to improve the stability of the country. So far as can be judged, genuinely dislikes the Russians and is alarmed by the possibility of the spread of bolshevism in Afghanistan. A quiet, dignified man with charming manners and a keen sense of humour. Is quick-tempered, outspoken and, when roused, ruthless. Trusts very few of his fellow-countrymen and tries to do too much himself. He makes up his mind quickly. Is said to have been lately more tactful in his dealings with other officials, but is still unpopular. The danger of his being assassinated is great. Is very friendly to members of the British Legation in Kabul. Understands English well and speaks it fairly. Proceeded to Berlin in October 1936 to undergo an operation for tumour. Operation for tumour successful. Visited London January-February and returned to Kabul via India in March 1937. Still Prime Minister. Had a serious heart attack in November 1943, but recovered and in spring 1944 gradually resumed control of important affairs, leaving routine matters to his nephew (No. 53). Believed to be anxious to retire and take a long holiday in England.

49. *Muhammad Hassan Jan (W.W. 342).*

Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 648). A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1926. Created Sardar-i-Ala February 1926. Married to Nur-us-Siraj, Amanullah's sister, October 1927. Was well known to the British Legation at Kabul. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1927-28 as Chamberlain. Also went with Amanullah to Kandahar after his abdication January 1929 and to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy June 1929. Was in Rome from October 1931 to July 1932. Not definitely located between summer 1932 and December 1933, but said to be in Rome with Amanullah and to be verging on lunacy. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Accompanied Amanullah Khan to the Hejaz in 1935. In Rome with Amanullah during summer of 1935.

50. *Muhammad Ihsan Khan (W.W. 363).*

Tajik of Istalif, Koh-i-Daman, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born about 1895, son of Ustad Yusuf, an iron-smith. Related to the late Bacha-i-Saqao. Received three years' aeronautical training in Italy. Appointed to command Afghan Air Force 1924. Visited Western Command manoeuvres and carried out a tour in India at the invitation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief November 1926. Was helpful to the Royal Air Force officers who landed at Sherpur in December 1928. Dismissed from his post by Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929, but was reappointed by Nadir Shah on his accession to the throne. Is keen on his profession and works hard and is keen on flying. Is very fat. Speaks Italian and a little French. Is always very friendly to members of the British Legation. Proceeded on tour to India and Europe in September 1936 with a view to purchasing aircraft.

Visited India and Europe 1936-37 with view to purchasing aircraft for Afghan Government. Purchased eight aircraft in Great Britain and twenty-four in Italy. Returned to Kabul in October 1937. Was awarded decoration of "Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy." Received by Herr Hitler during his tour. Since 1937 the Afghan Air Force has achieved a modicum of efficiency mainly due to his drive, the assistance of British instructors, and the despatch of Air Force personnel to India for training, the latter being a policy he consistently

support. In 1942 he proceeded to India for medical treatment, returning in March 1943. After his return he gave out that he was in favour of retaining the British connexion with his Air Force, and asked for the supply of nine more Hind aircraft. He resents the fact that the Air Force is under War Ministry control, and wishes to have it independent under the King. Suffers from ill-health but is still the dominating personality in the Air Force. Again visited India for medical treatment during winter 1944-45.

51. Muhammad Ismail Khan (W.W. 377A). Wardaki, Totu Khel, Ghilzai. Son of Abdullah Khan (W.W. 63) and nephew of W.W. 4. At one time Director of the Eastern Branch, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Governor (Hakim-i-Kalan) of the Northern District, Kabul Province. Officiating Governor, Kataghan and Badakhshan. Wali of Kabul 1939. Has pleasant manners and is friendly in his attitude towards British Legation. Not on good terms with His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud (L.P. 72). Believed to be corrupt.

52. Muhammad Khan, Mirza (W.W. 450).

Sent to Merv on a special mission October 1919. Still in Merv June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent. Left for Moscow July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow 1921 until relieved by the late Ghulam Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1924 was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain Crown jewels. Appointed First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagai Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a broad outlook and was not noticeably pro-Soviet. Under-Secretary in Foreign Office 1928. Remained at Foreign Office under Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary Foreign Office by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1930. In May 1932 was complimented by the King for his work. Was put under secret surveillance as a result of the plot discovered in September 1933. Left Kabul in October, with the Prime Minister, to visit the north. Returned to Kabul in November and swore allegiance to Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937. A man of no great standing or marked ability. Is said to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister, but to be on bad terms with the War Minister. Since he has been in office, the customs revenue of the country has increased considerably. Was one of the prime movers in the formation of the Ashami Company. Is believed to be a heavy bribe taker. His sister, who was a widow of the late Ameer Habibullah, was given in marriage to Abdul Qadir, Bacha-i-Saqao's Governor of Kandahar. Is inclined to be anti-British, but is lately believed to be less so than formerly. His son, Abdullah Khan, was one of six students who were sent to Japan January 1935. Appointed Minister of Revenue (1938). Still Minister of Revenue.

53. Muhammad Naim Khan (W.W. 464A).

Son of the late Muhammad Aziz Khan, Muhammadzai. Born 1911. Visited India in November 1929 with Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199). Appointed Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, October 1930. Appointed Minister, Rome, December 1932; recalled in 1934 and appointed extra secretary in the Foreign Office, Kabul. Appointed First Secretary 1935. Married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1935. Officiating Foreign Minister December 1935 and

again in 1936 during the absence of Faiz Muhammad in Europe.

Also acting managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Majid (W.W. 73) in Europe 1936-37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937.

Appointed president of Kabul Literary Society June 1937.

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalalabad in January 1938. Still Minister of Education. Visited Khanabad as head of an investigation committee (1939).

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister (September 1939), in addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence of W.W. 73 in Europe in addition to his own duties. Officiated as Prime Minister in the winter of 1943 during the illness of his uncle, Muhammad Hashim Khan (No. 50), with whom he is a great favourite. Easy-going and pleasant mannered and friendly to British Legation, but somewhat reserved, perhaps as a result of a tendency to deafness. Speaks French fluently and English tolerably. It is generally believed that he is destined to succeed his uncle as Prime Minister, but it is doubtful if he has either the brains, physical fitness or strength of character for the task.

54. Muhammad Nauroz Khan (W.W. 470).

Mirza of Logar. Appointed Chief Secretary to King Nadir, November 1929. Was on bad terms with Muhammad Yakub (W.W. 675). More inclined to friendship with Germany than with England and Russia. Accompanied late S. Muhammad Azim to Europe in January 1933 for medical treatment. Returned from Germany May 1933 and resumed appointment of Chief Secretary to King. Was appointed officiating Court Minister in 1936. Appointed Ambassador, Tehran, in 1939. Relieved of appointment of Ambassador at Tehran in 1942. Appointed Minister of Interior 1943.

Has influence in the Logar valley. Loyalty to present régime doubtful. Entertains Republican tendencies. Has ability and capacity and speaks a little English. Since his appointment as Minister of the Interior has become more influential and popular, the latter said to be due to his patience when investigating complaints.

55. Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 506).

Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaka. Nephew of the late Sardar Abdul Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam Farup (L.P. 31). Born at Lahore about 1900. Served in various minor appointments in Afghan Foreign Office 1921-25. Was a secretary in the Afghan Legation, Rome, in 1926, and also served in a similar capacity in the Afghan Embassy, Tehran, during 1927 and 1928. In 1930 was mudir (assistant secretary) in the Prime Minister's office. Appointed officiating Hakim-i-Ala (Governor), Eastern Province, November 1932, where he found it difficult to get on with the General Officer Commanding, Daud Khan (L.P. 47). Appointed Minister in Rome in February 1934, and left to take up his appointment in March. Recalled in spring 1935 and in June again appointed Governor of the Eastern Province. Is said to be an efficient and capable man, but lacks presence and personality. Speaks English, Urdu, Persian and very good Pushtu.

His father died January 1936.

Appointed Governor of Herat (1938). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds. In spite of his reputation of being capable he seems to take little interest in the provincial administration which is almost non-existent. He is said to be very corrupt but to stifle complaints by entertaining lavishly.

56. Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 507A) (F.M. Muhammadzai).

Born approximately 1904. Director of Intelligence in the War Ministry 1935. Chief of Staff, Guards Division, 1936. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Kataghan and Badakhshan Division, 1936. Promoted Firka Mishar 1937. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1937. General Officer Commanding, Herat Division, 1937-40. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding of the Southern Province in May 1944 at the time of the Zadrin disturbances. A tactful, popular and efficient officer who has pleasant manners, is intelligent and speaks little English. A staunch supporter of Shah Mahmud (L.P. 72).

57. Muhammad Sadiq Khan (Mir).

Son of Mir Sikandar Khan. Born about 1893. His father was a Court official with the honorary rank of general in the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan and left Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War and lived first in Baghdad, where Muhammad Sadiq was born, and later in India, where the boy was educated. Mir Muhammad Sadiq returned to Afghanistan during the reign of ex-King Amanullah, and held minor appointments in the Educational and Agricultural Departments of the Southern Province and in Northern Afghanistan. During the reign of the late King Nadir Shah, he became First Secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, an appointment he held for three years. When he returned to Kabul, he was appointed Director-General of International Affairs in the Foreign Office. In March 1943 he was appointed Afghan Consul-General at Meshed. He is described as patient and cautious; speaks English, Urdu and a little Russian; is reasonably well disposed towards the British.

58. Muhammad Sarwar Khan (W.W. 560).

Barakzai, Naib Salar (general). Son of Muhammad Sidiq Khan. Brothers Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276), Muhammad Shuaib (W.W. 611) and Juma Khan. First secretary in the Afghan Embassy in Tehran. Formerly a Ghulam Bacha. Was highly esteemed by Ameer Habibullah Khan. Promoted brigadier in 1906, owing to his success in the manufacture of guns, and appointed superintendent, Kabul Arsenal. Promoted major-general 1913. In March 1919 appointed Naib Salar by Ameer Amanullah Khan, and later in the same month left for Mazar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of Naib-ul-Hukumat (Governor), Turkestan. Granted both civil and military powers in his province. Relieved of appointment and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922, where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1923, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior, who, originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at the beginning of 1927. Described by the Ameer, during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1923, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent." Summoned to Kabul June 1926, and well received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1926. Appointed Governor of Badakhshan and Kataghan, 1928, but did not take up appointment. In Kandahar 1929. Appointed Governor of Kabul, February 1930, but relieved in 1931 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned via Meshed and Kandahar. Appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles) December 1931. Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276) at Maruf, Kandahar Province, in February 1932, but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed

since 1931. Still believed to be pro-Amanullah. Courteous and friendly, but Amanullah's description (above) fits him. Still a member of the Council of Nobles.

59. Muhammad Shafi Khan (W.W. 569) (Sultan Muhammad Khel).

Born approximately 1900. Son of Muhammad Isa Khan. A relative of S. Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Was a Mudir in the Afghan Foreign Office 1934-35. Appointed Afghan Consul, Karachi, 1935. Believed to be loyal to present régime. Afghan Consul-General in India vice Salah-ud-Din (No. 71) 1939. Still Afghan Consul-General. A pleasant official who speaks English and is always friendly towards the British Legation.

60. Muhammad Shuaib Khan (W.W. 611).

Born approximately 1904. Younger brother of Muhammad Sarwar Khan (No. 59). Appointed Yawar to the Governor of Kandahar and Mudir of Agriculture 1934. Incapable and lazy. The Amir dismissed him during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, October 1925. Employed as third assistant to the Minister of Court in 1931. Resigned in August 1932 and became Kandahar manager for Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Oil Company in Afghanistan. Agent for the Shirkat in Kandahar for importing Japanese goods. Brother also of Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276). Appointed Afghan Consul at Karachi 1940. Still Afghan Consul at Karachi.

61. Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 652).

Firka Mishar (major-general). Yusufzai of the "Topchi" family. Born 1898. Appointed Chief of Staff 1924. Visited Delhi manœuvres December 1924 at the invitation of the commander-in-chief in India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army and study Soviet military methods October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Tirmuez en route to Moscow the 3rd November, 1926. Visited Russia and Italy 1928. Was at one time military attaché in Berlin. Appointed chief of Afghan General Staff early in 1930. In 1932 proceeded to Europe to attend the Disarmament Conference, Geneva. Visited Paris December 1933. Returned to Kabul via India in January 1934; was a spectator of the 1st January parade at Peshawar. Lunched with the officers of the Gordon Highlanders in the Khyber on his way back. Resumed his duties as Chief of Staff, but left once more for Geneva in May 1934. A keen and intelligent officer, but said to have had little experience in the field or handling troops. Has been much in Europe and speaks English, Russian and German fluently. Is also said to speak French and Italian. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. It is said that he will probably be appointed to a diplomatic post in Europe. Has pleasant manners and is friendly. Afghan representative to the League of Nations Disarmament Committee June 1935. Said to have been recalled to Kabul (1936) owing to his immoral conduct in Europe. Still Chief of Staff and a close friend of W.W. 414. He has the confidence of the Royal Family except in matters of a very secret nature. He is not a forceful character or likely to prove a leader of troops in the field. He makes out that he is a great Nationalist, and neither anti- or pro-Russian, British or German. Headed Afghan Military Mission to India in December 1944 and made a success of it. He favours close co-operation with the British and Americans in military matters.

62. Muhammad Usman Khan (W.W. 661).

Sardar. In 1915 appointed to command at Asmar, where he adopted a friendly attitude towards the British and was taking security from "badmashes"

to prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed Brigadier and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Jalalabad in August 1920, reason unknown. He, however, again returned to Asmar and went to Kabul in September 1920. Chief Staff Officer to Naib Salar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in December 1921. Served as Afghan Consul in Bombay in 1927 and as Consul-General, India, in 1928. In Kabul 1929. Counsellor to Afghan Embassy, Tehran, in 1930. Appointed Muin II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Musabad Perso-Afghan Commission 1934-35. Pensioned and unemployed 1935. Member of the Republican party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanish plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul, since 1937. Relieved of this post, July 1942, for alleged malpractice in the distribution of food supplies to the public. A capable man, with pleasant manners, who is somewhat disgruntled because he has not been given more important appointments. Believed to be addicted to drink; and to be showing signs of disloyalty to the Yahya Khel. Took up directorship of several public trading concerns in 1944.

63. Muhammad Yunus Khan (W.W. 685).

Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation, London, from 1922-30. Always showed himself helpful and well disposed and was profuse with pro-British sentiments, which were probably sincere. Chargé d'Affaires from February 1929 to January 1930. Energetically opposed Shuja-ud-Daulah's (W.W. 612) attempts to dispose of Legation property July-September 1929. Left London for United States on Shah Wali's (W.W. 585) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non-recognition of his work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint him counsellor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1933 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office to return to Afghanistan. Believed to be (1936) in United States. Founded and became Director of the Afghan National Association in the United States.

64. Muhammad Zahir Shah (W.W. 688A).

Muhammadzai. Only surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born 1914. Accompanied his father to France in 1924 and was educated in that country. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1930. In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W.W. 149). Appointed Assistant War Minister 1932. In September 1933 officiated as Education Minister in addition to his other duties. Was proclaimed King on the 8th November, 1933, immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little share in the government of the country, the real power being wielded by his uncle H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), the Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting, tennis, riding and swimming. Up to 1938 he rarely left Kabul. Since 1938 he has made a few excursions into the country for a day or two, but is usually accompanied by a large number of officials. He spends two or three months each year at Paghman, the summer capital, to which the Government does not move. His birthday is celebrated on the 15th October each year. Has had three sons, Muhammad Akbar, born 1933, died 1942; Ahmad Shah, born 1934; Muhammad Nadir, born 1941; and two daughters born in 1932 and 1936. He is taking an increased interest in affairs, including the development of the army and air force, and has been known to express a desire to take a more active part in the direction of State business.

65. Najibullah Khan (W.W. 465B).

Born approximately 1906. Director-General of the Political Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Related to the late Amir Abdul Rahman through his mother. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Speaks French fluently and is now able also to converse intelligently in English. Has considerable ability and influence. He appears to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister and is probably closer to the centre of Afghan foreign and political affairs than the present Foreign Minister himself (L.P. 18). Ambitious and somewhat conceited, but unfailingly courteous. Had the reputation of being strongly anti-British, but, largely as a result of the kindness and courtesy shown to him on his visit to India in April 1944, is now extremely well disposed towards us. He could be more fairly described as a strong Nationalist. Dabbles in cultural matters and is a keen student of literature. If the present régime remains in power is likely to become a most important personage.

66. Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492).

Son of Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat; younger brother of ex-King Amanullah. Born 1915. Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 646), who employed a German tutor for him. Sent by Amanullah to Kandahar December 1928 with his family. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin with his mother 1930. Still in Berlin, living at the Afghan Legation November 1932. With Amanullah in Rome in December 1933. In October 1935 was living with his mother (W.W. 646) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933.

67. Rakimullah Khan (W.W. 518).

Tajik. Son of Ataulah. Native of Kabul. Was head clerk in the Russian section of the Foreign Ministry. Became Foreign Agent in Mazar. Afterwards transferred to Moscow as secretary to the Afghan Legation, and later on in the same capacity to Berlin. Appointed assistant in charge Visa Section, Afghan Foreign Office, December 1930. Relieved July 1931. In July 1932 transferred to the Home Ministry as Director, Posts and Telegraphs. Appointment raised to a Ministry in June 1935.

Reported to be efficient and gets on well with Marconi's representative in Kabul. Stated to be keen on improvements and modern developments in his Department, but is slack and indifferent in carrying out his duties. His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939. Relieved of appointment of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1940, and appointed Minister of Public Works in addition to Minister of Mines, but this is probably due to the help he obtained from German engineers up to 1941, in developing communications, &c. His attitude towards the British Legation has always been friendly. Relieved of the appointment of Minister for Public Works in May 1944 owing to ill-health, but retained portfolio of the Ministry of Mines. Said to have pro-German sympathies.

68. Rahmatullah Jan (W.W. 519).

Muhammadzai. Eldest son of ex-King Amanullah and Queen Souriya. Born 1922. Proceeded to Europe with King 1928. Declared heir apparent 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and Bombay the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed for Italy with ex-King the 22nd June, 1929. Was still with Amanullah in Italy 1931, and is believed to be there now (1943).

Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

69. Saiyid Qasim (W.W. 548).

Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Saiyid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W.W. 38) and arrival of Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612). Returned to Kabul May 1925, and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah (W.W. 327) February 1926. Appointed Afghan Consul-General, Delhi, October 1926, vice Haji Muhammad Akbar (W.W. 153) and left Kabul for Delhi, the 20th November, 1926. Awarded Order of Astor, January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January, 1930. In December 1933 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly to members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W.W. 686A.

70. Salah-ud-Din Khan (W.W. 553).

Born about 1893. Son of Mufti Siraj-ud-Din of Herat; native of Herat.

Used to be the editor of *Ittihad-i-Islam*. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612) brought him to Kabul and gave him the editorship of the paper *Tijarat* (*Commerce*). Afterwards became personal diarist to Amanullah. Appointed Consul in Bombay 1930. In March 1933 acted as consul, Jeddah, in addition to his Bombay duties. Appointed Consul-General in India August 1933. Visited Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar during the autumn of 1933, spreading pro-Nadir propaganda amongst the Ghilzais. His father, Mufti Siraj-ud-Din, left Delhi for Herat in February 1934. Pays periodical visits to Kabul. Maintained one Nur Ahmad Khan in Lahore as propaganda and publicity agent. Took care to maintain his contact and popularity with editors and proprietors of Indian vernacular papers. In 1939 returned to Afghanistan. Appointed Controller of Broadcasting and Propaganda November 1939. Appointed Director of Press and Publicity in 1940, which post he still (1943) holds. Has at various times stated that, when Consul and Consul-General in India, he was neglected socially by British officials at Simla, Delhi and Bombay. Is believed to have attempted to introduce news on the Kabul Radio and in the press with an anti-British tone, but the strict censorship maintained by the Afghan Government prevented publication on most occasions.

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was once reported to be pro-Russian and pro-Republican, but appears to be trusted by Afghan Government. Has the reputation of entertaining anti-British sentiments.

71. H.R.H. Shah Mahmud (Mahmud Jan) (W.W. 414).

Sardar Muhammadzai. Born 1894. Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of L.P. 50 and brother of L.P. 73. Appointed Sar Sar-i-Os, ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front 1919. Was in great favour with the Ameer for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Simat-i-Janubi (Southern Provinces) September 1919. In Khost February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardex December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Ameer. Returned to Gardex soon after. Shah Mahmud was in touch with Muhammad Hasan, B.A., at Makin and Haji Abdur Razaq at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921, and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent

convoys of ammunition, rations and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Wana Wazirs and Mahsuds. Arrived in Kabul in October 1921, accompanied by his family. General Officer Commanding Badakhshan and Kataghan, from 1922 to 1925. Appointed Governor of Eastern Province April 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad April 1926, and promised them similar treatment to that given by his brother, Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province and interviewed Afridis at Morgha July 1926. Visited Kabul to discuss Mohmand unrest with King November 1926. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad January 1927; visited Pesh Bolak and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Transferred from Jalalabad to Kabul February 1928. Appointed second secretary in the Ministry of Interior March 1928. In Kabul February 1929. Commissioned by Bacha-i-Saqao to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Joined Nadir Khan on his arrival in Khost March 1929. Assisted Nadir Khan in his campaign against Bacha-i-Saqao. Appointed War Minister by Nadir Shah November 1929. Left Kabul for Northern Provinces and in January 1931 was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of Northern Afghanistan. Succeeded in driving Ibrahim Beg across the Russian frontier and pacified the country sufficiently for him to be able to return to Kabul in August 1931. Awarded the Almar-i-Ala September 1931 and appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles). He suffered from goitre and hoped to take a cure for it in Germany in the autumn of 1932, but his visit to Europe was postponed owing to the Dera Khel outbreak in November 1932, during which he commanded a force of about two divisions in addition to tribal levies. His success in this affair was perhaps due as much to money as to fighting. Up to December 1932 he was still engaged in settling affairs in the Southern Province and handing over control to Nasrullah (W.W. 469A), the new Governor. Spent the spring and summer of 1933 in the Southern Province, visiting Kabul on one occasion. On Nadir Shah's murder displayed great presence of mind dealing with the situation in Kabul. Proclaimed Zahir Shah King and swore allegiance to him. Appointed Commander-in-chief and Minister of War. Appears to possess considerable energy and force of character and is believed to be popular with the army. He is probably better fitted for the command of irregulars than of regular troops, having no real military education. He is vain, though at the same time shy and sensitive; is fond of sport and games and friendly to members of the British Legation. In addition to his military duties, is in charge of the Southern Province. He is said to be jealous of H.R.H. Hashim Khan (L.P. 50) his half-brother, and not always to agree with him in matters of policy.

Betrothed his two daughters to the two sons of the late Hayatullah, brother of ex-King Amanullah, December 1935. Sons were born to him in 1922, 1924, 1932, 1936 and 1939. Left for Europe March 1936 for medical treatment and has since been successfully operated upon for goitre in Berlin. Visited England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Returned to Kabul December 1936. Now (1937) said to be taking less interest in his work. Still (1943) War Minister. Developed heart trouble in 1943 and was unable to carry out his duties for some time, but his health is said to be improving. Was in Gardex from April to June 1944, where he succeeded in isolating Mazarak (W.W. 423) and obtained support for the Government of the majority of the tribal leaders.

72. H.R.H. Shah Wali Khan (W.W. 585).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1885. Son of Sardar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of the

late King Nadir Shah. Brother of L.P. 72 and half-brother of L.P. 50. Was Rikab Bashi (equerry) to Ameer Habibullah. Accompanied him to India in 1907. After the Ameer's murder in February 1919 was arrested and sent to Kabul, but was acquitted and released. Commanded troops on Kharlachi front July-October 1919. Promoted general for good services on the Tchi border. Married a sister of ex-King Amanullah in May 1920. Appointed to command 1st Division in Kabul April 1921. Was on intimate terms with ex-King Amanullah and seemed to be his greatest personal friend. Was one of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Commanded 1st Cavalry Corps December 1921. Appointed to command the Kabul Corps 1923. Appointed Yawar Hazuri (equerry to the King) December 1924. Visited India in May 1925 and again in December 1925, when he persuaded Muhammad Umar (W.W. 648) to return to Afghanistan from Hyderabad. Commanded troops Logar during the Mangal rebellion 1924-25, and for his services was created "Taj-i-Afghan." Left Kabul for Paris September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Was with his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan (L.P. 50) February 1929, and proceeded with Nadir Khan to Khost March 1929. Captured Kabul the 13th October, 1929. Appointed Regent October 1929. Appointed Minister at London November 1929. Reached England the 10th January, 1930. Transferred to Paris June 1931. Came to Kabul on leave September 1932, bringing with him, under safe conduct, the late Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Paris and resumed his appointment February 1933. Able and quick-witted. A friendly and pleasant man. Very popular in Kabul, and consequently reported to be regarded with jealousy by his brother, the Prime Minister, Hashim Khan (L.P. 50). His popularity has somewhat diminished owing to the execution of Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Kabul February 1935, and appointed Acting Minister of Defence during absence of Shah Mahmud in Europe. His wife refused to accompany him and is still in Paris. Objects to the monopoly system of the Ashumi Company. Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Hashim Khan in Europe (1936). Left Kabul in March 1937 to resume his appointment of Minister at Paris. Represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI.

Visited Kabul March 1939, and returned to Paris June 1939. Left Vichy for Switzerland in August 1944. Returned to Paris early in 1945 on reappointment as Afghan Minister to France.

73. Sher Agha (see Fazal-i-Umar).

74. Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 598).

Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan. Born 1885. Acted in the appointment of Ishaq-Agha Nizami (Military Chamberlain) 1917. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Andkhui 1920. Suspended and arrived Kabul May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy 1921, and arrived in Peshawar on the 10th October en route with a large party of Afghan students who were proceeding to be educated in Europe. Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in negotiations for the purchase of arms until the summer of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expressed distaste for his own country. Appointed President of the Shaura (National Council) 1924. Leader of the party in favour of peaceful tactics during Urta Tagai crisis January 1926. Cordially detested the late Mahmud Tarzi. With King Amanullah in Europe 1928. Appointed to still-born post of Prime Minister September 1928, and subsequently to be head of the Public Service Bureau. Held Jalalabad for Amanullah November 1928. Was given full powers to settle the Shinwari rising, but

failed and returned to Kabul December 1928. Flew with Amanullah to India May 1929. Returned to Kabul later and was appointed Privy Councillor by Nadir Shah December 1929. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran December 1930. A man of some ability, but indolent and corrupt. Said to entertain a profound contempt and dislike for the Persians, and to be very outspoken on the subject. Arrived in Kabul the 18th September, 1935, on a visit. Returned Tehran December 1935. Visited Kabul 1936, using a German aeroplane. Betrothed his nephew Muhammad Umar to Sultan, fourth sister of King Zahir Shah, October 1935.

Relieved by W.W. 140 as Ambassador at Tehran in April 1937. Appointed Minister of State October 1937. Still (1943) Minister of State.

75. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612) of Ghorband.

Comes of a Trans-Oxus family. Born 1896. Was Ghulam Bacha (page) in 1916, and was employed looking after the German mission in Herat. Appointed Farash Bashi Hazuri (Head Chamberlain to the King) to Ameer Habibullah Khan January 1917. Appointed Kotwal of Kabul and Amin-i-Asas (chief of police) by Amanullah. Commanded 2nd Division in Kabul January 1921. One of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Appointed Minister of Security, and appeared to be a man of considerable ability. In close confidence of the Ameer. Officially as Governor of Herat January 1921. Relieved and returned to Kabul at the end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in the Southern Province during the Mangal rebellion (1924). Appointed Minister at London August 1924, and arrived in London April 1925. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed to have made a considerable fortune. Gave trouble by failing to settle debts due by the Afghan Legation for rent, &c. Summoned to Kandahar by Amanullah February 1929. Arrived Herat the 28th March, 1929, and assumed duties as Governor on behalf of Amanullah. Flew to Meshed on arrival of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 83), Bacha-i-Saqao's nominee, May 1929. Returned to London via Tashkent-Moscow, and arrived the 11th July, 1929. Attempted to dispose of Afghan Government property, and on this account was asked to leave the country. In Berlin September 1929. In Moscow November 1929. Accompanied Amanullah to Mecca in 1931, returning to Europe via Beirut. Was in Germany in 1933. One of Amanullah's most active supporters. Is believed to be the actual murderer of the late Ameer Habibullah. Proved himself on all occasions ill-mannered and anti-British. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in pay of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W.W. 289. In Russia February 1936.

76. Siddiq Agha Muhammad (Gul Agha) (W.W. 613).

Son of Qaiyum Jan Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (W.W. 847), and half-brother of Fazl-i-Umar (Sher Agha (W.W. 256)). On the death of Qaiyum Jan Agha the title was assumed by the eldest son, Sher Agha. On the latter's death in June 1925 the title was assumed by Muhammad Siddiq Agha, in the absence of his half-brother, Sher Agha, then a political refugee in India. Was arrested, with Rasul Jan Agha (W.W. 522), for trying to stir up trouble in Khost, September 1928. Later released and in February 1929 was reported to have accepted Bacha-i-Saqao's rule. In June 1929 was placed under surveillance in Kabul on account of his intrigues with Sher Agha in the Southern Province. Confined in the Arq, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul, October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt, and passed through Peshawar, en route, February 1931. Proceeded to Mecca, April, 1931, to watch Amanullah.

In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received in a friendly manner by the King and the Prime Minister. Sher Agha (W.W. 256) was reported to be trying to persuade him to resign, but he returned to Egypt in September 1932. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister, Hejaz, in addition to duties as Minister, Egypt, April 1935. Visited Mecca during pilgrimage (1935), but evinced no sympathy for Amanullah. Will in future reside permanently in Hejaz, relinquishing duties of Minister, Egypt. Still (1937) Minister in Hejaz. Reappointed (1939), in addition, Minister to Egypt, and will reside at Cairo. Visited Kabul in July 1942. Returned to Cairo in 1942. Expressed anti-British views in connexion with the war situation and British attitude towards Egypt in 1942. Still Minister in Cairo (1943).

77. Sultan Ahmad Khan (W.W. 624).

Son of Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 600). Assistant to Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450). Ambassador at Moscow, August 1920. Head of the Afghan mission to Angora 1921. Arrived in Baku, March 1921. Arrived in Angora in April. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of Namazie, Angora, in August 1921. The subject of the address was the necessity for unity through the whole Moslem world, in order that the encroachments and intrigues of European Powers might be successfully resisted. Prayers were offered for the victory of the Turkish arms, and Sultan Ahmad Khan gave a donation of 2,000 liras to the Red Crescent. The Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul, Raskolnikov, instructed his Government early in September 1921, at the request of the Afghan Government, to provide Sultan Ahmad Khan with 40,000 roubles in gold, payment to be adjusted in Kabul. Returned to Kabul, April 1926, and was appointed third secretary in Foreign Office. Officially as first secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450) on Urta Tagai Boundary Commission. Appointed second secretary, Foreign Office, June 1926, and first secretary, October 1926. Granted title of "Sardar-i-Ah" February 1927. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran, October 1928. Relieved November 1929 and returned to Kabul. Appointed to be in charge of State guests Kabul, January 1930. Went to Turkey as Ambassador, *vice* the late Ghulam Nabi, in December 1930. Took with him as secretary Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies. Was on intimate terms with the late Ghulam Nabi during his visit to Constantinople in December 1931. Visited Europe in 1933, and, as Afghan representative, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Brazil through their Embassy 1933. Appointed as an Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. Still (1936) Ambassador in Turkey. Visited Kabul, August 1935. To be Minister, Egypt, in addition to his other duties. A conceited, dissolute man, but appears to possess some ability. Represented King of Afghanistan at the funeral of King George V, January 1936. Visited Afghanistan April 1937 and returned to Angora June 1937. Appointed Ambassador at Moscow (1938). Still (1943) Ambassador at Moscow. During 1941-42 stated to have shown some concern for his personal safety, and to have given depressing accounts of Russian ability to resist the Germans. Visited Kabul in 1945 and returned with great reluctance.

78. Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 646).

Siraj-ul-Khawatin (Her Majesty the Sun of the Ladies). Step-sister of Luinab Khushdil Khan, daughter of the late Luinab Sherdil Khan, and step-daughter of Ishaq Agha Nizami Muhammad Sarwar Khan. Her name is Sarwar Sultan. Chief wife of Ameer Habibullah and mother of ex-King Amanullah Khan (W.W. 183). In 1915 said to be

strongly in favour of neutrality. Very strong character and dabbled in politics. Said to have refused to help Turco-German mission in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 had numerous quarrels with Ameer Habibullah owing to her interference in political matters, and was eventually said to have been expelled from the Arq. After the murder of Habibullah, left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, Amanullah. Is believed by many to have been, with Amanullah, the organiser of the plot which resulted in the murder of Habibullah. Was said to have been of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a treaty of friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obeidullah, known as Sher Agha (W.W. 492), born 1915. Left for Kandahar with Queen Souriya, December 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise support for the Durrani Dynasty. Was not on good terms with Queen Souriya. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay, May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah, June 1929. In Berlin 1930 intriguing against Nadir Khan in favour of Obeidullah. Has remained in Europe 1929-35, mostly at Amanullah's residence at Rome, but occasionally visits Montreux in Switzerland, and Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Visited Mecca with ex-King Amanullah for 1935 pilgrimage.

In October 1935 was living with Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin.

Still (1943), so far as is known, in Europe.

79. Yakub Khan (W.W. 675).

Mohmand. Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of Agha Sami (W.W. 555). Born 1889. Was page to Ameer Habibullah. Numerous favours were conferred on him by Amanullah. Appointed a Musahib-i-Khas (Privy Councillor) in 1920, and Shahgassi Huzuri 1927. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927, and appointed Minister of Court. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar, January 1929, and to Bombay, May 1929. Left Bombay, June 1929, for Duzdap. Arrived Meshed, August 1929. Returned to Kabul 1929. Ordered to be deported for complicity in the Koh-i-Daman revolt 1930, but was detained in Jalalabad and later released. Said to be propagandising in favour of Amanullah. Went to Mecca on pilgrimage, April 1931. Arrived at Tehran with his brother W.W. 555, December 1931. Has a son, Musa Jan, born in 1916, and a daughter, who joined him in Tehran in 1933. Probably still in Persia, May 1935. His property in Afghanistan was confiscated in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Family deported from Kabul to Tehran, August 1935.

80. Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad (W.W. 697).

Muhammadzai. Of no important family. Educated at Habibia College, Kabul. Went to France with Afghan students to look after them, and became guardian to Hidayatullah Khan (W.W. 348), son of Amanullah Khan. Was recalled to Kabul by Amanullah, and for some time was unemployed. During the revolution joined Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in the Eastern Province and became his private secretary. Went to Parachinar where he joined Nadir Khan and Shah Wa (W.W. 585). Counsellor to the Afghan Legation in London 1931. Left London for Paris, with Shah Wali, in June 1931. Returned to Kabul, September 1931, and was appointed assistant to the Prime Minister. A talkative little man, speaks English fluently, and is very friendly towards members of the British Legation, Kabul. Visited Lahore in January and returned to Kabul, April 1936. Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939. Still (1943) Minister at Tokyo.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 12th July.)

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Kabul, 29th June, 1945.

THE end of the war in Europe and my own impending departure on leave is a suitable occasion for a review of the political situation in Afghanistan and of the principal events that have taken place since the beginning of the year.

2. The principal factor in the country's stability remains the health of her Prime Minister. For the first time for many years Muhammad Hashim spent the winter in Jalalabad, and though the change of air seemed generally to have benefited his health, on his return to Kabul in the spring he was again for several weeks far from well. He has now quite recovered but seems to have lost much of his former interest in the administration of the country and to be no longer attempting to exercise the detailed control over petty affairs which has been such a feature of his Government ever since he first came into power. At the same time, his general authority is unimpaired and in all matters of importance he still appears to be absolute. He himself says openly that he would like to retire altogether and take a long holiday in England, but he sees no possibility of doing this as there is no one to replace him. Eighteen months ago it was understood that he was training his nephew Naim Khan, who is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, to take his place and to have been relying on him and his brother Daud Khan eventually to take over, respectively, the premiership and command of the army. More lately he is understood to have expressed disappointment in both his nephews—with Naim Khan as ineffective and a weakling, with neither the brains nor the character to take charge of the administration, and with Daud Khan as opinionated and obstinate and likely, in spite of his energy and undoubted efficiency, to create so many enemies as would bring down the whole Yahya Khel régime in ruins. These opinions may be considerably exaggerated and there are certainly no indications that the Prime Minister is looking elsewhere for a successor to himself. On the other hand Naim Khan has recently seemed far less diffident and his brother far more reasonable than before. The rivalry between Daud Khan and his uncle, Shah Mahmud, the War Minister, is still a potential danger which may lead to trouble, but the two seem to have been able to achieve a certain degree of co-operation. The War Minister, who has great influence among the tribes, has maintained his position and keeps the army as a whole, especially the irregular elements in it, fairly contented, leaving Daud Khan to organise and administer the Kabul Army Corps almost independently. The King still takes no outward part in the administration and though he is present at the many family conferences which are called to discuss matters of importance, it does not appear that he exercises any great influence on the discussions. He still, however, chafes at being relegated to a constitutional and comparatively unimportant position by his uncle the Prime Minister.

3. The internal situation remains on the whole satisfactory, though the dynasty has not increased its popularity, especially in the provinces. So long as the ruling family remains fairly united and retains control of the army, and so long as no important rival appears, there seems little likelihood of serious trouble. The unpopularity of the present régime is probably greatest in Kandahar, where reactionary mullahs still seem to be able to call on fanatical support to block all attempts at modernisation. This has recently been instanced by a minor riot organised to protest against the visit of an amateur theatrical party from Kabul and by the opposition which the building of a cinema has aroused. Maladministration and corruption in Kandahar and Herat, the two most important towns in the country after Kabul, has also given the Government a bad name. The food situation was in fact so badly managed and so much smuggling and profiteering was allowed to go on that in March there were serious shortages in both places, which for a time caused some anxiety, and which led, in Herat, to the murder of the Director of Food Supplies and two of his assistants in a riot which took place in that town. The situation on the Baluchistan border has remained peaceful on the whole and a greater readiness on the part of the local officials in the Kandahar province to co-operate with the authorities in Baluchistan has helped to maintain tranquillity in this area. In the Southern Province there is partial, but more open, opposition and Government control is still precarious. The Zadran are discontented, with Mazrak, their rebel leader, still at large and still causing trouble, though strict vigilance on both sides of the border has prevented any recrudescence of the outbreak of last year. In the

Eastern Province the Prime Minister, during his residence in Jalalabad, made great efforts to obtain closer control over the tribes and to introduce a personal system of recruitment in place of the present tribal system, but his efforts met with determined opposition and appear to have been abandoned for the time being, though the Government have felt strong enough to arrest Malik Qais Khugiani, one of the chief opponents of the reform, and to confiscate his property, apparently on a charge of plotting a rebellion.

4. In the realm of foreign affairs the defeat of Germany, though anticipated and therefore to a large extent discounted in advance in Government circles, came as something of a shock to the people as a whole. There can be no doubt that the interest that Germany took in Afghanistan during the period between the two wars has had a profound effect on the country. Many material improvements have been due to German assistance. Afghan armaments and military equipment have come largely from Germany, and except for the Turks, who are classed as "Half Europeans," the majority of the foreigners who worked in Afghanistan prior to the evacuation of the Axis nationals in 1942 were Germans. Afghans had been so impressed with German might and German victories in the early months of the war that they found it difficult to envisage the possibility of German defeat. German influence had been very widely welcomed if only because it was a change from, and was less of an immediate danger than, British and Russian influence, of which Afghans are traditionally so suspicious. It is therefore not surprising that the collapse of Germany evoked widespread feelings of sympathy and regret which even the Government-controlled press could not entirely conceal. In Government circles, however, and especially among the more important officials, there was a clearer understanding of world affairs, and the general feeling was rather one of relief and a hope that the end of the war in Europe might allow Afghanistan to return to a more normal existence and continue the tasks of economic improvement which the war had interrupted. Latterly, too, there has been a more general realisation of how dependent Afghanistan really is on the goodwill of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, and appreciation of the economic assistance which in spite of war time difficulties has readily and consistently been granted. Although, therefore, they have thought it both more dignified and more in accordance with popular opinion to maintain their neutrality, the Government made no difficulties about complying with the Allied request that the German Legation should be closed and its personnel interned pending arrangements for their departure. No such sympathy is felt for Japan and there have been rumours that after the defeat of Germany the rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan was seriously considered at a Royal Family conclave as being possibly in the best interests of Afghanistan and giving her a greater claim to economic assistance from the British and American Governments. In the absence, however, of any pressure from the Allied Powers, no steps to this end have yet been taken though an even closer watch than before is being maintained over Japanese activities.

5. The Afghan attitude towards His Majesty's Government and the Government of India has shown steady improvement. It is true that the informal discussions on the subject of frontier policy initiated at the end of 1944 have made no progress, and the new announcement of the possibility of sweeping changes in the conduct of India's external affairs is causing much speculation and some anxiety; but it is too early as yet for any crystallisation of Afghan opinion on this subject. Meanwhile, the policy of cultivating friendly relations with us seems to be gradually extending to classes outside Government circles and is not unaffected by admiration for the part played by Great Britain throughout the war, and for the manner in which Great Britain has upheld the cause of small nations, particularly of the countries in the Middle East. I think that the Foreign Minister was genuinely reflecting the Prime Minister's policy when he assured me the other day that his Government was only prevented from relying far more openly on us by their constant fear of Russian reactions. In spite of this, the improvement in the past six months has been considerable. The welcome given to the Afghan Military Mission in India made a great impression, followed, as it was, by an offer of armaments and equipment which, though perhaps not very large in itself, was a real indication of the sincerity of our assurances of willingness to help. The greater part of the equipment offered has now been asked for, along with other material required over a period of years, in order to re-equip the Afghan army for its vital duties of maintaining control over the country. Perhaps even more symptomatic are the requests that are now being made for facilities for training Afghan officers in India. It seems that

the Afghan Government are hoping to send some 160 to 170 students to various Indian military establishments.

6. A further event of importance in Indo-Afghan relations was the despatch in March of a small mission of officials of the Afghan Press Department to Delhi to see something of publicity work in India. So far, the apparent results of this mission have been meagre. The Prime Minister has a rooted objection to propaganda in all its forms, and it is doubtful whether he really wishes his countrymen to have their minds freely opened to the influences of foreign publicity, however friendly its intentions may be. This may account for the unwillingness of Afghanistan to produce possible announcers for Delhi Radio's Afghan-Persian programme, or even to encourage that programme at all. In this matter we must exercise patience, and perhaps it is enough for the moment that the Afghan press should be willing to take its ideas freely from British sources and to accustom its readers to the idea of friendly co-operation with India. The Press Department itself has recently been permitted to discuss matters of mutual interest direct with the British Legation and to correspond direct with the Information Department of the Government of India. This is a new and hopeful line of advance. Progress in cultural relations must be gradual and must be allowed to grow naturally without too much forcing. The connexion between the Literary Academy, which is a branch of the Press Department, and the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal has been maintained and an invitation from the Indian Archaeological Department to take part in meetings of Indian Archaeologists has been gratefully accepted. The reopening of the French Archaeological Mission which is shortly expected should also lead to further contacts between India and Afghanistan in this sphere.

7. Progress in enlarging social contacts is still slow. I understand that a Government order relaxing the restrictions that have been placed during the war on contacts with foreigners is now in preparation and is almost ready for issue. Meanwhile, there are welcome signs of impending change. Rather more Afghans than usual have been able to accept our invitations to cinema parties and to the reception recently held in honour of the King's birthday, and members of my staff have been recently invited to Afghan houses which have not been open to us since the early days of the war. There is, however, as yet no free social intercourse between ourselves and the Afghans, though these restrictions do not apply to unofficial members of the British community nor to Indians, who appear to be under no restrictions in their contacts with Afghans.

8. One of the movements which is, in my opinion, most important from the point of view of Indo-Afghan relations is that for the better teaching of Afghan history in their schools, and it is most encouraging that Daud Khan, who is responsible for the military college and school and who has hitherto been accredited with pronounced German views, recently told the military attaché that he was having the teaching of history entirely revised and the anti-British bias which has always been so strongly in evidence in the presentation of the history of the last 100 years removed. The teaching of English in Afghanistan is making some progress and has been stimulated by the interest taken in Basic English regarding which I have already expressed my views at some length. Further progress must await the arrival of English teachers for the Ghazi College, two of whom are at last expected. The help that we have been able to give in this direction has been disappointing, and this applies to the provision of Indian as well as English teachers and also to the provision by India of other specialists whose services the Afghan Government have wished to borrow. We have long wanted the Afghan Government to rely on us for the selection of their specialists rather than obtain them themselves through their consul-general from direct applicants whose qualifications and political antecedents leave much to be desired. It is unfortunate, therefore, that in spite of India's best endeavours it has so far been impossible to find more than a fraction of the specialists for whom we have been asked. Similarly, we have consistently urged the Afghans to send their students to India for training rather than to foreign countries, and our inability to meet requests which they have recently made for courses of forestry, veterinary surgery, agriculture, &c., is not a little disheartening. War conditions naturally create difficulties, and India's own needs for post-war reconstruction must have prior consideration. The same applies, though in lesser degree, to the question of supplies from India. Help is given to the best of India's ability, and very material help it has been too, but war-time demands and cumbersome machinery of supply make delays inevitable with unfortunate results on Afghan opinion. The Afghans find it difficult to believe that a country of 400 million could not freely spare the modest requirements of the 10 million in Afghanistan if it had any real desire to do so.

9. However unjustifiable Afghan criticisms of this nature may be, our inability to supply Afghan requirements inevitably forces the Afghan Government to turn more and more to America. American policy is not altogether easy to understand. The American Minister asserts that Afghanistan is far too small and inaccessible a country ever really to interest America from the trade point of view, and that America's main interest in coming into the country at all was to assist in maintaining stability in this part of the world, especially in the years when Axis influence was all powerful. On the other hand, the American Legation as a whole is extremely active in doing all it can to supply Afghanistan's every want, and to endeavour to secure for the United States complete freedom from any sort of restriction in pursuing this programme. The diversion of the Karakul (Persian lambskin) trade, the country's most valuable export, from London to America has, of course, given America a very great advantage and provides the Afghans with large dollar reserves which it is only natural should be expended in the United States. This is a loss which the United Kingdom will probably be unable to recover. India, however, with the advantages of proximity should find it easy to meet and overcome trade competition in the post-war years, but it is none the less important that America should not be given too big a start.

10. Relations with Russia have undergone little change. Suspicion of Russian intentions is as deep-seated as ever. The trouble on the northern boundary is no nearer solution and, in fact, a recent Afghan-Russian Commission to examine certain obstructions built by both sides in the river Oxus has only tended to excite further Afghan suspicions. The Soviet Ambassador has endeavoured to allay anxiety and has recently left for Moscow, possibly in an attempt to secure a satisfactory settlement of this long outstanding boundary question. At the same time, Russian underground activities in Afghanistan have undoubtedly increased. The embassy staff is believed to number over 100 persons. They are doing everything they can to cultivate friendly relations with Afghans and are apparently making extensive use of Uzbeks and other agents from the northern border for the furtherance of their own particular purposes, which may be presumed to be the fostering of discontent with the present order and the preparation of the ground for organised revolution in due course. In this connexion the capture in Berlin of Ghulam Siddiq, the brains of the pro-Amanullah movement, and his removal to Moscow is ominous.

11. Relations with Turkey have remained unchanged. The Turkish Military Mission is still largely responsible for Afghan military training, and though its members are being reduced there seems to be no intention of bringing its activities to a close. With the reopening of the French Legation, French influence is again to the fore in Kabul and efforts are being made to re-establish the cultural relations which existed before the war. A Chinese Legation is shortly to be opened. The new Chinese Minister has arrived in India, and his secretary, accompanied by his wife, who speaks no language other than Chinese, is already in Kabul trying to secure a house and to make other preliminary arrangements.

12. Any great advance in the country's economic development must, of course, await the ending of the war with Japan, but Afghanistan, like other countries, is already making plans for post-war improvements. Two American engineers are now engaged in the uphill task of correcting past mistakes and trying to inaugurate new projects, especially that of the Boghra Canal on the Holmand River at Girshk. They are handicapped by the lack of skilled subordinates and there are hints that they may find the task too much for their patience. Plans for the extension of the textile industry are being considered as are also various hydro-electric schemes. Little progress is, however, being made in the country's greatest need, the improvement of communications, though certain bridging material has been asked for from India. Civil aviation has made no progress, though the Afghan Government is believed to have ratified or to be about to ratify all the conventions proposed at the Chicago Conference. The Government admit that they have only the very vaguest idea of the implications of these agreements and are not ready to take active steps to encourage any air services themselves. The most helpful line of approach may perhaps be through the Afghan Air Force, which the Government wish to re-model and extend in accordance with British advice. A few passenger-carrying planes of British make introduced into the Air Force might well form the nucleus of a local civil air service, and so not only open the door to direct air communication with India but also secure British predominance in civil as well as in military aviation.

13. It is important that we should keep a close look out for opportunities of assisting Afghanistan's economic recovery and seize every opportunity of re-establishing our pre-war trade position in the country. The proposal that has

been made, that a small Economic Mission from the United Kingdom would help towards this end, is one that well merits consideration.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration and His Majesty's Consuls in Kandahar and Jalalabad.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

[E 5316/5316/97]

No. 3.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st July.)

(No. 60. Confidential.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul.

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Egypt.

M. Abdel Karim Safwat (Minister).
Presented his credentials on the 21st May, 1945. A quiet little man, dapper and very correct and apparently without much personality, though very pleasant. Has spent many years in England, first at Cambridge from 1923-26 and subsequently in Liverpool as Vice-Consul and in the Embassy in London. Has also been in Tehran, Rome, Vienna and Budapest. He has not been here long enough to have created much of an impression.

France.

M. Jean Charles Serres (Minister).
Presented his credentials on the 21st May, 1945. Served in the war of 1914-18, first in the infantry in the fighting round Verdun and subsequently as an artillery officer. After the war he joined the diplomatic service and has spent 20 years in North Africa. Was apparently the head of the Department of Consular Affairs in the Vichy Foreign Office from 1940-42. Speaks English tolerably well and is, I think, on the whole well disposed to Great Britain, but like most Frenchmen is extremely sensitive and critical of our policy, particularly in the Levant. Is already hard at work trying to revive his country's prestige in Afghanistan. Is accompanied by rather a depressed and tired wife and a stepdaughter. Their hardships in France in the last two years seem to have left them tired and somewhat embittered.

Iraq.

General Khalid Al Zabawi (Minister).
Presented his credentials on the 4th February, 1943. Served with the Iraqi army and has received training at the Staff College at Camberley, where he enjoyed himself thoroughly and where he seems to have been very well treated. Before being posted to Kabul he was Director-General of Irrigation in his own country. (Written in 1944.)

Speaks French, Persian and Turkish. His Turkish wife, who was in Kabul from 1943-44, returned to Istanbul last year and is shortly to accompany their son, a medical student, to America.

Italy.

Signor M. Ungaro (Chargé d'Affaires).
Since the departure of the previous Minister, Signor Quaroni, for Moscow last year, the Italian Legation has remained in charge of former members of the staff. The present Chargé d'Affaires is the Commercial Attaché, Signor Ungaro, formerly in business in Bombay. Signor Ungaro was previously understood, though how far correctly, I cannot say, to have been the only member of the Italian Legation who was a real Fascist. He is now, of course, frightfully anti-Fascist and would like to be considered as a full-blown ally. In fact, he seems not a little hurt that he should still be viewed with some distrust.

Japan.

Motoharu Shichida (Minister).
Presented his credentials on the 3rd November, 1942. (Written in 1944.)

Persia.

M. Abolghassem Nadjm (Ambassador).
Presented his credentials on the 5th August, 1943. A career diplomatist, who has been successively Minister in Berlin, Paris and Tokyo. Friendly but ineffective and appears to have little influence in Kabul. The co-operation which he is on occasion asked to give to His Majesty's Legation on matters of mutual interest is adequate, but not more. As far as I am aware, he has never expressed any enthusiasm for the United Nations. Is learning English, which he understands tolerably well. (Written in 1944.)

Was made Cabinet Minister in the short-lived Hakim Government in the summer of 1945, but fortunately for himself had not left when that Government fell.

Soviet Union.

M. Ivan Nikolaevich Bakoulin (Ambassador).
Presented his credentials on the 17th February, 1944. Aged 35. The *enfant terrible* of the

Diplomatic Corps in Kabul. Was apparently appointed to the diplomatic service from China in about 1938, and, except for a period as Consul-General in Sinkiang, has served mostly in Moscow. Burly, outspoken and entirely without polish, he boasts of his peasant origin. Like so many Russians, he considers the only test of a friend is the capacity to put away an unlimited number of drinks with no heel taps. (Written in 1944.)

His English is improving, so are his manners. He has on the whole been co-operative and friendly. His wife is the Embassy surgeon and works very hard. A simple soul, but genuinely friendly; she is wonderfully good at keeping her husband in order.

Turkey.

M. Ahmet Cevat Ustun (Ambassador).
Presented his credentials on the 9th April, 1945. Was previously Turkish Minister in Bagdad, where he seems to have attracted attention chiefly by his nervousness about his own health and his defeatism in the early years of the war. He is a decided improvement on his predecessor and first impressions are of a shrewd and cultured little man who is anxious to be friendly, though of course he finds Kabul backward and unhygienic. With so many Turkish women in Kabul unable to say a word except in their own language it is a great relief to have an Ambassador's wife who speaks English excellently and has considerable charm. They have two children in Kabul and appear to spend a good deal of their time over their education.

United States.

Mr. Cornelius Van H. Engert (Minister).
Presented his credentials on the 25th July, 1942. During the war of 1914-18 he was Secretary to the United States Legation in Constantinople, where he rendered the British Government conspicuous assistance in the matter of British prisoners of war in the hands of the Turks. In the interval, he has frequently visited London, where he is well known at the Foreign Office. At Tehran and later at Beirut he gave many further proofs of his anxiety to co-operate with his British colleagues and to further Anglo-American understanding in any way that was in his power. At Beirut, in particular (1940-42), he made himself most useful as an intermediary between the British representatives and those of Vichy France. With him Anglo-American solidarity is almost a religion, and there is at all times the closest co-operation between the United States and British Legations, which is of great assistance to us in Kabul. Mr. Engert's policy of co-operation, however, which at times goes rather beyond that of his own Government, and which he therefore tries to conceal from his own staff, inevitably lands him into difficulties and is not conducive to the securing of loyal support from his subordinates. In spite of his friendliness, it must be admitted that he lacks personality and therefore fails to command the respect which he should otherwise enjoy. (Written in 1944.)

Is now retiring and expects to leave Kabul in 1945.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 4748/3229/93]

No. 4.

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd July.)

(No. 251.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 14th June, 1945.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 319 of the 7th June on the subject of British policy in Kurdistan, I have the honour to report that I saw the Iraqi Prime Minister this morning and after reminding him of his enquiries at our first meeting regarding the British attitude to Kurdistan, handed him an *aide-memoire* (copy enclosed) embodying the substance of paragraphs 7 and 8 of my despatch No. 186. Hamdi Bey expressed his agreement with and gratitude for this statement.

2. I told him that I was anxious that our position should be made perfectly clear before I paid my first visit to the north, which I hope to do during the last week of this month. I also said how glad I was that Colonel Tawfiq Wahabi, a leading Kurdish politician and *savant*, and Minister of Economics in the present Cabinet, would be in Sulaimaniyah to welcome me.

3. I hope to report on my trip to Kurdistan in due course.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East, and to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Tehran and Beirut.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Aide Memoire.**British Attitude towards Kurds of Iraq.*

IN regard to the Kurds of Iraq, the attitude of the British Government is exactly the same as that towards any other section of the community, namely, it wishes them to be good, loyal, and prosperous subjects of their country. Members of the British Consular and Political Advisory staffs in the north are, therefore, being reminded that they are always to work towards this end. They must not concern themselves with sectional politics or personal disputes. The Kurds are to be regarded only in the capacity of Iraqi subjects, not as a separate minority. Self-styled leaders are not to be listened to by British officers, and people who have grievances are to be advised to refer them through the proper constitutional channel, that is to say through the Iraq Government administrative officers and parliamentary representatives.

At the same time the British Government feel that it is in the interests of preserving unity of the Kingdom and promoting the welfare of the north that in this area, as in others, every effort should be made to encourage education, agriculture and social services, and that the Kurds should be given their fair share in Government posts and offices.

[E 5131/195/93]

No. 5.

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th July.)

(No. 283.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 5th July, 1945.

AS authorised in your telegram No. 367 of the 24th June, I have just concluded a week's visit to the four Northern Liwas. The total area of these provinces is greater than that of Scotland, and it would be clearly impossible in so short a time to do more than acquire a general impression of the territory; but in a tour of more than 800 miles (excluding the initial and final train journeys) I was perhaps able to form some useful idea of the country and its problems. I was accompanied throughout by the oriental counsellor and by Lieutenant-Colonel Mead, Political Adviser, Northern Area. I was entertained

by members of my political advisory and consular staffs, by British civilians, by the four mutasarrifs, by three mayors, and by Arab and Kurdish tribal leaders; I had an opportunity of talking with many officials, both of the Iraqi and British Governments, with officers of both armies, with representatives of the British Council and the Iraq Petroleum Company, and with scores of citizens.

2. I started my journey as the guest of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Kirkuk. In a morning's round of the installation, I was enabled to see every operation, from the drilling of a new well to the despatch of the distilled product through the pipe line to Tripoli and Haifa. It seems to me that this enterprise, from which both Britain and Iraq gain so materially, is under wise and liberal direction. Far from wishing to exclude the people of the country, the senior officers of the company at Kirkuk are most anxious to enlist more Iraqis into their service, and offer good prospects of advancement. I hope that Professor Scaife, British Adviser to the Ministry of Education, will shortly be visiting Kirkuk to discuss with the company future policy with regard to technical education, for which the need here is so pressing.

3. From the oil company—the epitome of twentieth-century outlook and practice—to Sulaimani, was a contrast indeed. As I reported in my despatch No. 251 of the 14th June, the Prime Minister expressed great satisfaction with the *aide-memoire* on Kurdistan which I presented to him on that date. His colleagues also were favourably impressed by it, so much so that the Minister of the Interior sent for the oriental counsellor shortly before I left for the North in order to explain to him that the Iraq Government had every intention of reciprocating His Majesty's Government's goodwill; and that in days gone by the North had not been "neglected" any more than the South, because the whole country had been neglected during the first years of its independent existence when Iraqis were more interested in politics than in social progress. (The only exception he made was in regard to education. Here he admitted that in the days when the Shiah were in charge of the Ministry, they had deliberately promoted welfare of their co-religionists in the South to the detriment of the Sunni North). The Government now, said his Excellency, had every intention of promoting the prosperity of the North, together with that of the South. As a symbol of this new attitude Colonel Tawfiq Wahabi, a wise and cultivated Kurd from Sulaimani and a proved friend of Britain, who is now Minister of Economics, was sent ahead to Sulaimani to welcome me. In a prearranged exchange of addresses between his Excellency and myself, reference was made to the fact that Britain's friendship with the Kurds went back not only to the last war, but to the days of Claudius Rich, who visited Sulaimani in 1820. (It was at Sulaimani that Rich received, and had at once to re-transmit to India, the news of the death of King George III—an example of the importance of Iraq then as now as a link in our communications with the East.) Both Colonel Wahabi and myself also expressed the hope that Iraq would become, like Britain, a "United Kingdom," in which its citizens of diverse races would be able to live and work in equality and amity.

4. From Sulaimani I journeyed to the little town of Halebja near the Persian frontier. The road, as throughout Kurdistan, was metalled and tarred. In this respect the North is far more favoured than the South. At Halebja I was entertained by some of the Jaf tribesmen. The village was *en fête* and I was regaled with feasting and dancing, in which the Minister himself rather ponderously joined. There must have been several hundred tribesmen present. All of them appeared to be well fed, voluminously dressed, many of them mounted on fine mares—the tribe are horse-copers by calling—and nearly all carried rifles, with a formidable secondary armament of daggers. Below the village there are neat gardens with trimly-planted fruit trees (supplied by the Government experimental farm at Sulaimani), and fields of tobacco, in which the harvesters are paid, I was informed, at the rate of 6s. a day. There may be remote areas of Kurdistan where poverty does exist, but in general it seemed to me that the country is on the upgrade, and this impression was emphatically endorsed by Colonel Wahabi.

5. Here, as elsewhere in the Middle East, we stand on the watershed between the mediæval and the modern. An example of this contrast is the once-notorious Sheikh Mahmud. This retired rebel received me in a gay pavilion which he had pitched by the roadside on the way up to Sulaimani, not far from the scene of his former misdemeanours. He was inclined to deplore the lawlessness of the younger generation who had deserted the tradition of their forefathers. One of his younger sons was also there. He was educated at Victoria College, spent five years in America, and is now interested in scientific farming. This process

of rapid, almost violent, change from ancient to modern is, for good or evil, going on throughout Kurdistan. Naturally it is resented by those who, like Mulla Mustafa, can have no part in it. It is our duty I feel, while showing sympathy with the old, to attempt to guide and conciliate the new. Our recent statement of attitude should make this task easier, if only because it will enable us, I hope, to enlist the co-operation of the Iraq Government in the achievement of this object.

6. On my return to Sulaimani in the evening I was asked to witness a kind of floral dance which was taking place in the public streets in my honour. This entertainment was made memorable by a human flame-thrower—a man who takes a swig from a bottle of kerosene then strikes a match, and holding it at arm's length blows the vapourised kerosene upon it. The resulting conflagration is extremely spectacular but apparently innocuous.

7. I was unable to stay long in the Erbil Liwa, but was very delightfully entertained by the mutasarrif at Shawlawa, a mountain village of streams and groves where the Iraq State Railways have constructed one of their summer resort hotels. The mutasarrif, Said Qazzaz, Bahai Kurd, is an energetic and capable man with very sensible ideas on how to administer his province. He realises that stormy petrels like Mulla Mustafa must be dealt with sympathetically but firmly, and not allowed to assume an importance to which they have no right. Said Qazzaz is typical of the younger Government official, all too rare, alas, who has been trained under British influence, and is honestly trying to realise British standards of administration and integrity.

8. Finally, I spent a couple of days in Mosul. It is something of a shock to breast the ramparts of Nineveh and to see before you so large a city in so comparatively remote and empty a land. The population of Mosul (150,000) now exceeds that of ancient Nineveh by some 30,000, but the Prophet Jonah's verdict on its inhabitants, "which discern not their right hand from their left" is still just. Nevertheless, here, too, the spirit of energy and progress is evident. The mutasarrif is an ex-Minister of the Interior. The mayor is a younger brother of Arshad el Umari, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, who for so long held the same office in Bagdad. Like Bagdad, Mosul is being intelligently town-planned, new streets have been opened, new gardens planted, new plans drawn up for illumination and water supply. The mayor was obviously pleased at having just succeeded in including within his municipal boundaries the whole area of ancient Nineveh, his object being to prevent squatters planting their hovels on the sites of the palaces of Assyrian kings. He also hopes in due course to remove the village of Nebi Yunis so that the excavations which have been the dream of archaeologists for a century can at last be undertaken.

9. I concluded my tour by dining with the Shammar Sheikhs at Shagat. Unfortunately the dispute between Sheikh Sfook and his brother Ahmed still continues and seems no nearer a solution than ever. This is unfortunate not only for the tribe itself but because it affects security in general. The Iraq Government and the Regent tend to favour Ahmed, who is popular with some sections of the tribe, but is an unpleasantly conceited young man. On the other hand Sfook seems unable to exercise proper control over the tribe. The Minister of the Interior is in consequence considering appointing a Bedouin Control Officer for the Western Desert, as has been done successfully in the South.

10. Both in Kirkuk and in Mosul I visited the British Institutes and consider that they are efficiently and economically administered and that they are doing very profitable work in the education of the rising generation to a comprehension of British ideas and aims.

11. I feel that this journey, short and crowded as it was, was well worth the time and trouble which it involved, not only for me but more particularly for many officers of the Iraqi Government. The impressions which I described in paragraphs 4 to 7 of my despatch No. 233 of the 2nd June were strongly reinforced. There is no doubt whatever that Great Britain continues to have a considerable and honourable rôle to support in this country, and equally that we can only play our part if we approach its people as friends, depending on influence rather than upon authority for the achievement of our legitimate and beneficent ends.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding, and the Air Officer Commanding.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

[E 7274/7274/93]

No. 6.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 29th September.)

(No. 377.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 14th September, 1945.

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the leading personalities of Iraq duly amended and brought up to date for the year 1945.

2. Opportunity has been taken to add a number of new names, chiefly representatives of the press and the younger politicians.

I have, &c.

G. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Report on Leading Personalities of Iraq for 1945.

THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *King Feisal II.*

Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Illah. He has an English nurse and also an English governess.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum (Arbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a bright, intelligent child, though somewhat delicate with a tendency to asthma. His Majesty visited Egypt in April 1943, proceeding and returning via Palestine and Transjordan. In 1944 he again spent the summer at Alexandria. In 1945 he did not leave the country.

2. *Abdul Illah, His Royal Highness the Amir.*

Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria. He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and granddaughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939. Although in Iraq he only enjoys the title of Highness, it is considered proper for foreigners to refer to him as His Royal Highness.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took

refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding, Iraq army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past two years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943. He caused a Cabinet crisis in September 1943 by injudicious interference in the choice of Government candidates for the General Election. He has, however, shown sound sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general condition of the country. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom in December 1943. For three days he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted with the hospitality shown to him and much impressed by Britain's war effort.

During 1944 the Regent toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manoeuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July. In September he again visited Transjordan and Egypt. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In the spring of 1945 he was much discouraged by Mr. Churchill's failure to invite him to join King Ibn Saud and others for talks in Cairo. This led to a threat of abdication, a thought which still preoccupies his mind.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and attended the Victory Thanksgiving Service. He also visited the occupied area of Germany. He returned via France and Italy, whence he proceeded on an official visit to the President of the Turkish Republic

before returning to Iraq in September. While in the United States he displayed irresponsible extravagance, spending over \$200,000 on jewellery. He has also invested heavily, at the cost of grave indebtedness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Baghdad. All this is generally known and has markedly decreased his prestige, and may give rise to serious political complications.

3. Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army. Made a G.B.E. for his services in the war of 1914-18.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Ankara (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first

Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1939 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. This *mésalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Baghdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Baghdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and has remained, living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942. Accompanied by his wife, he came to Baghdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdul Ilah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

He returned to Iraq in 1945 to act as Regent during the Amir Abdullah's absence in America and Europe.

OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.

Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. Abbas Mahdi.

Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality. Returned to Iraq in June 1945 and appointed first Iraqi Minister in Moscow. Has not yet proceeded.

3. Abdul Amir al Uzri.

Shia, born Kadhima in 1899. Educated Baghdad and United States, where he graduated from Michigan University as D.Sc. (S.E.). He returned to Iraq in 1929 and was appointed engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, in which he rose to the post of Assistant Director-General in 1941. He acted as Director-General on several occasions.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Puchachi's Cabinet in June 1944. Was Minister of Supply in August 1944, returning at the end of the month to his former Ministry. Speaks English well and is pleasant, intelligent and friendly.

4. Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear

his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements. As director of Iraqi Manufacturing and Trading Company was interested in the erection of a wax match factory in 1944.

5. Abdul Aziz al-Qassab.

Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.

6. Abdul Ilah Hafidh.

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhil, who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Bagdad. Again elected Deputy in 1933. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1938-39; Consul-General, Bombay, 1939-40; Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fat, genial personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis.

Appointed Minister of Education in June 1943 and was well spoken of by his British advisers. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

7. Abdul Latif Nuri.

Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *agid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *aim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir linea* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Bagdad on his pension.

8. Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid).

Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942. Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Tahsin Ali, the Minister of Education. Has been politically active and verbose in the summer of 1945, protesting against French policy in the Levant and in favour of treaty revision, but is generally regarded as a wind-bag whose days of effective agitation are done.

9. Abdul Majid Alawi.

Born 1898 of a large Shia family of Bagdad. Graduated in law at Bagdad and for some time practised as a lawyer. Elected a Deputy in 1928 but was not returned in 1930. Is a founder member of the Iraqi Bar Association. In 1932 was appointed Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs but was sent at once as vice-consul to Khorramshahr. Transferred to Tehran 1933 and to Tabriz in 1934, where he remained for four years and where he co-operated closely with His Majesty's Consul. Became Director of Oriental Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1938 and Acting Director-General and Director of Political Affairs in 1941. He was much upset when Dr. Fadhl Jamali was made Director-General in 1944, leaving him merely as Director of the Political Department of the Ministry. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi as Minister of Social Affairs. He talks English well, if rather pedantically, and has always been consistently pro-British. He has recently married a second wife who appears in public, which is surprising for a Shia.

10. Abdul Qadir al-Gilani.

Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Bagdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with his cousin Rashid Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to

Southern Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraqi internees for trial in April 1944. Tried in August 1944, he was found guilty of having, in May 1941, insulted the Queen Mother on the telephone. Although he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, the Regent intervened and he was detained in the Police School, Baghdad, and later transferred to Amara. Released in October 1944. Has been described as arrogant and selfish.

11. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid.*

Sunni of Baghdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933 and is now well received in British business circles.

12. *Abdul Razzaq Hussein.*

Born in Baghdad 1893. Sunni Moslem of a poor family. Educated in Baghdad and received his military training in Istanbul. Appointed as officer in Machine Gun Corps of Turkish army in 1912. Took no part in Arab revolt. Joined Iraq army on the 15th February, 1924.

Is very pro-British. On the 17th May, 1943, he, along with eleven other Iraqi officers, went on a tour of the battle areas of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East. As a brigadier he was Director-General of Defence Affairs, and in November 1944 he was promoted Amir Liwa, which rank he now holds as Officer Commanding 3rd Division of the reorganised Iraq army.

13. *Abdul Razzaq al Uzri.*

Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A Baghdad lawyer. Deputy 1931-32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutessarif of Kerbela and Diyala. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found.

Lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in December 1943. Appointed Mutessarif of Hillah in August 1944 as a result of Saleh Jabr's intrigues. Mutessarif of Baghdad March 1945.

14. *Abdul Wahid, Shaikh.*

Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikh on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept

under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942. He was released in 1944 and lived in *résidence forcée* in Mosul till April 1945, when he was allowed to reside in Samarra. The compulsory economy of his exile leaves him the richest tribal leader in the Euphrates. His influence is still probably greater than that of any other chief of the Fatlah tribe.

15. *Abdullah-al-Damluji.*

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Baghdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Baghdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Baghdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jeddah in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1942.

16. *Abdullah Qassab.*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Shaikh, Abbas Amin-al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qassab, *q.v.* Educated in Baghdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Katmakam of Samarra in 1936 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kerbala in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwaniyah a month later. Did well as a Mutessarif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1943. Quiet and efficient with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in March 1944.

A strong and capable administrator. He initiated and worked hard at the Conferences (Der ex Zor, June 1944, Baghdad, May 1945) to settle Shammar-Ageidat disputes, but has not to date secured a settlement.

17. *Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan.*

A chieftain of the Kurdish Barzan tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Agra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Baghdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. After the escape of Mulla Mustafa from Sulaimani in the autumn of 1943 Sheikh Ahmad was removed to Hillah and remained there until a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944. Thereafter he was permitted to return to Barzan. He is now heavily overshadowed by Mulla Mustafa in local tribal affairs. His own home-made religion, which is tolerant to Christianity and which brought him

into conflict before with Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, led him to arrange for the liquidation of various Mullahs in 1944-45. There is evidence that he is mentally unbalanced and his "dervish" influence is so strong that Mulla Mustafa dare not directly oppose him and resorts to flattery and cunning to get his way. Throughout 1945 he was opposed to the moderate course pursued by Mulla Mustafa and expressed his disapproval by announcing his intention of retiring into the background; but his feud with the Reikan tribes has never died and in July 1945 he came forward again and ordered his tribe to overthrow the local Government. Disorder has spread and the Barzanis, with Mulla Mustafa, are committed to wholesale resistance to the Government's intention to crush them, for the fourth time in 25 years.

18. *Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.*

Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabinet was re-formed in December 1943, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice. He kept the same Ministry in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of June 1944. Has held acting portfolios of Finance and Foreign Affairs in the absence of the respective Ministers. Not a brilliant man, he steers clear of political intrigue.

19. *Ahmad al Rawi.*

Born about 1896. Sunni of Baghdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Madfai and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

In 1943 Amir Abdullah of Transjordan created him a Pasha. Appointed Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in June 1941. The unprecedented number of farewell parties to Ahmad Pasha reflected the popular esteem in which he is held. A good sportsman, with a keen sense of humour, he is intelligent and though not sufficiently forceful to administer with successful results, he may have found his *métier* in this new appointment.

20. *Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Baghdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Baghdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Auqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Baghdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.
He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.
Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937. Reappointed to Senate January 1943.
His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

21. Ahmad-i-Taufiq.

A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizdar tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.
Made an administrative inspector April 1939.
Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

22. Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat.

Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places. Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937. Was instrumental in placing important telephone contract with British firm against keen foreign competition.
Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda in August 1944, in which position he has co-operated well with the British. But he is a weak creature, with little control over the press and his chief official activity is perpetual flattery of the Royal House.

23. Akram Mushtaq.

Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (q.v.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud in spring of 1940. Member of Iraqi delegation to International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in November 1944.

24. Ali Jaudat.

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sherif. He was a member of the Abd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very

active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by under-estimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karpala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

Has interested himself in conducting propaganda in the United States to make better known the Arab side of the Palestine question.

25. Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali.

Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Ittihad* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutessarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Koweit. After holding this

appointment for about a year he was transferred to Bagdad to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutessarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fled to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

26. Ali Mumtaz.

Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

27. Ali Shukur.

President of the Railway Labour Union (now illegal). An ex-engine driver of radical outlook who was dismissed from the Iraqi State Railways at the end of 1944. Became President of the Union in November 1944 and was active in promoting the Railway labour strike, which lasted from the 15th April to the 1st May, 1945, and was the biggest labour movement which has been seen in Iraq since the formation of the Trade Unions. He appeared willing to stop the strike after a few days and to discuss terms with the Minister of Social Affairs, but the majority was in favour of continuing. Was arrested during the strike when the Union was closed and made illegal.

The Union has not yet been allowed to function again, despite the strenuous efforts of Shukur, who has been sending petitions to all the Ministers concerned with great regularity.

28. Amin-al-Umari.

Born Mosul 1889 of the notable family of the Umaris. Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople, where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in Samawa, Abu Sukhair and Rumaitha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912. Fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chitaljah lines. After the war of 1914-17 he took part (with Jamil-al-Madfai) in the Arab insurrections at Deir-ex-Zor and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its

formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this successful defiance brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas. Was relieved of his command and placed on pension in February 1940 because of the influence which he endeavoured to exercise in political matters outside his proper sphere.

Appointed C.G.S. in June 1941.

Placed on pension in November 1941 because it seemed that he was endeavouring to organise a new military clique to interfere in politics.

29. Amin Zaki Sulaiman.

A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraqi army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwanayah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C., the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

In 1940 he was 53 years old and was the senior officer serving in the Iraqi army. A staunch supporter of Taha-al-Hashimi, he was considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but was generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men.

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Ahwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

30. Arshad-al-Umari.

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of

Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

In June 1944 he joined Hamdi-al-Pachachi's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Supplies. Rushing at supply problems, he soon met difficulties and had to relinquish his portfolio in August 1944. He headed the Iraqi delegation to the Arab Unity Congress in Cairo, signed the Protocol and returned to Iraq in October 1944. As leader of the Iraqi delegation to San Francisco, he failed to substitute the ideal of independence for that of trusteeship (with Palestine in mind) and refused to sign the Charter. Returning to Iraq in July 1945, after discussions in Cairo, he coolly received and resigned in August 1945.

31. Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid.

The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

32. Ata Amin.

Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, a younger brother of King Faisal I. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires. Returned to Bagdad, and was appointed Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1943. Was appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in August 1944. He speaks good English.

33. Babekr Agha.

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Suleimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime

was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

34. Daud-al-Haidari.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shab and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942, but was squeezed out of the Cabinet in June 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister Grade I in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1943. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England, where he experienced the war at first hand, the Iraqi Legation being damaged by a bomb. His two daughters are emancipated and, after a successful debut in London, are now in Bagdad. Of very doubtful financial reputation.

35. Daud-al-Sa'ati, Saiyid.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Brought back to Bagdad for trial in March 1944.

36. Fadhil Jamali Dr.

Born Kadhimain 1902. Shi'ah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University, New York, 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the Embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington in January 1943, but at the end of May he was still in Bagdad hoping to contrive somehow to return to a post in Education. A year later he was still in Bagdad as transport by air could not be found to take him and his family to the United States. He has a Canadian wife, and is on friendly terms with the United States Legation. Appointed Director-General for Foreign Affairs in 1944. Member of Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Returned to Iraq August 1945. Still desirous of returning to Education. Is outwardly zealously pro-British nowadays, and professionally always obliging and helpful.

37. Hamdi Pachachi.

Born about 1890. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Pachachi family, who are one of the richest families of the city. He himself owns valuable property in the town and also agricultural land outside in the liwa. In the early days of the creation of the Iraqi State he had the reputation of being a young hot-head and a leader of the extreme nationalists. Became Minister for Auqaf in June 1925 under Abdul Muhain al Sadun, and resigned with the Cabinet in November 1926. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942, and again in October 1943. Ceased to be President of the Chamber when he became temporarily Minister of Economics in December 1943. Was not reappointed a Minister in Nuri's ninth Cabinet formed on the 25th December, 1943. Succeeded Nuri Said as Prime Minister in June 1944. Appointed Senator, May 1945.

In order to drop the obstinate Tahnin Ali from Defence, he put in a formal resignation of the Cabinet in August 1944 and reformed the Ministry without Tahnin Ali.

Dignified and firm, he is a typical landowner with the advantages that he has no ambition to increase his holdings and gives a personal boost to any schemes for agricultural development (such as the Dujeila collective farm project).

Has taken a prominent part in the Arab Unity Conferences and signed the Protocol. Despite prophecies, he has held his Cabinet together for a record period for recent years by steadiness, moderation and good sense, which were notable in his handling of the Levant crisis of May 1945.

38. Hanna Khaiyat.

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-

General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy, October 1943. Became an invalid in April 1944.

39. Hikmat Sulaiman.

Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views. In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Bagdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now a flourishing farmer and apparently determined to give up politics altogether.

40. Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan.

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1880. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in

November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

41. Ibrahim Akif-al-Alousi.

Sunni. Born Bagdad 1894. Educated Bagdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College, Istanbul, 1916, and came to Iraq, where he served in several places under the Turks. Joined Iraqi Health Service, and served as Director of Health, Basra and Bagdad, with considerable success.

Was Director-General of Public Health in May 1939 and afterwards Inspector-General of Health Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pacha's Cabinet in June 1944.

42. Ibrahim Kamal.

Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfa'i in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military coup made against them by Nuri-al-Said.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar and acquitted.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfa'i in June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. A realist with strong views, he became dissatisfied with the Government's weakness and vacillation in dealing with the removal of pro-Nazi elements in the army and Administration and resigned from the Cabinet in September 1941.

Made a Senator in January 1943.

In the Senate he has worked industriously on committees, and has been an outspoken critic of Nuri Said's Administration. His hopes of becoming Prime Minister have not, however, been realised, mainly because he is not able to attract colleagues to work with him. Headed the Iraqi delegation to the International Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944. Suffered during summer 1945 from high blood pressure.

43. Ismail Namiq.

Sunni, originally from Mosul. Born 1892, son of an officer in the Turkish army. Educated at Military College, and gazetted an officer in the Ottoman army in Istanbul in 1912. Joined Amir Faisal in 1917 and commanded the Hashimi Cavalry. After becoming an officer in the Iraqi army in 1921 he attended various courses, including one of six months at Tidworth, where he did well. Became Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in 1931 and Commander of the Iraqi air force in 1933. Commanded the Cavalry Brigade 1936 and the Third Division 1937. Was appointed Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of Defence in 1941, becoming a lieutenant-general the same year. Became Acting Chief of the General Staff in November 1941 and as such accompanied the Regent to England in October 1943. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Defence. Became a Senator in May 1945. He is generally considered to be pro-British. He is a man of sound sense. He has not, until 1944, mixed in politics, and disapproved of Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat*. His venality has been the subject of comment, but he is quiet and temperate. Speaks good English.

44. Jafar Abu Timman.

Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Surwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al-Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwaniyah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June 1937 he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa. Made a Senator in February 1937, but lost his seat in the summer of the same year under article 31 of the Constitution. Since then he has withdrawn from political life.

Is chairman of the newly established Vegetable Oil Extraction Company in Bagdad.

45. Jafar Hamandi.

Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939, to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfa'i in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Bagdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hilla liwa. Saleh Jabr as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this. In October 1943 was elected Shia Deputy for Hilla. Visited Palestine in early 1945.

46. Jalal Baban.

Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1943, but resigned in October of the same year.

47. Jamal Baban.

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice

in Jamil-Madfa'i's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfa'i reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfa'i to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

48. Jamil-al-Rawi.

A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jeddah, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December 1942.

49. Jamil-al-Madfa'i.

Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different liwas. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia

and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Tahir al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan-Arab movement.

Elected President of the Senate in December 1943, in which position he used his influence against Nuri Pasha's Government. Superseded as president in December 1944 and resigned from Senate in February 1945.

50. Jamil al-Wadi.

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal. Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

51. Jebran Malkon.

Was at one time associated with Rafael Butti in the publishing of *Al Bilad*. In 1940 he refused German Legation offers made through and by Dr. Grobha to publish anti-Jewish articles. Malkon

is now proprietor of *Al Akhbar*, although he does not write the articles as he himself cannot write. The writing is done by Musa Habib. Malkon comes from a large and wealthy family in Mardin. He and his sister were the only two who escaped a family massacre in 1917 when the remainder of the family was wiped out by the Turks and the Germans. Malkon and his sister found refuge in Deir-az-Zor. After the British occupation he was appointed a director of Customs and Excise. His niece is married to a Mr. O'Brien who was employed by the I.P.C. at Haditha. In 1919 O'Brien was transferred to Bagdad and Malkon joined him there—an action which forced him to forfeit his properties in Turkey. He is a simple-minded man, sentimentally attached to his family. An ingenuous type, as witness his acceptance of partnership with Rafael Butti. Invited to visit Britain as one of delegation of Iraqi journalists in autumn 1945.

52. Kamil al-Chadirehi.

A Moslem (Sunni) born in Bagdad in 1901. His brother is Raul al-Chadirehi who was Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in London. Kamil was educated locally and graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He obtained a minor post in the Ministry of Finance but soon gave up this job for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha al Watani* (National Brotherhood) which paper was suppressed for its attacks on the Government of Nuri Said. In May 1934 he was convicted for publishing false news in *Sawt al Ahali*, and in September of the same year he was arrested for publishing pamphlets against King Ghazi, but was released for lack of evidence. He was at that time well known for his Left-wing views. The *coup d'Etat* of Hikmat Sulaiman in 1936 gave him his first Cabinet post as Minister of Economics and Communications in October of that year—a post which he resigned in June 1937 because of a difference of opinion on the Cabinet's policy regarding the Euphrates. He left the country for a few months, returning after the Bekr Sidqi incident, and from that time he has been an active disseminator of Leftist propaganda.

At the present time Chadirehi's dream is to head a Cabinet. Though he is now merely a Deputy he has formed a personal political party of Left-wing tendency which includes many diverse types from different sects and walks of life. Given the right conditions Chadirehi and his party might expect strong support from the middle classes. His following includes Majid Mustafa (ex-Minister for Kurdish Affairs in Nuri Pasha's last Cabinet), Hikmat Sulaiman (ex-Prime Minister), Shawkat Zahawi and other prominent personalities. Chadirehi is not over popular with the Regent, but with the present trend to the Left in Iraq might well head a Cabinet in the future in spite of this.

Chadirehi is the owner of the daily *Sawt al Ahali*, which naturally gives voice to his Socialist principles, but has of late, unfortunately, shown a tendency to anti-British bias in its columns; this mainly over the Palestine question.

53. Khalid Sulaiman.

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Tawfiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

54. Khalid Zahawi.

Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1903. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal I. Promoted to colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College, Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C. R.I.A.F. in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in February 1939. Appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutessarif of Bagdad, but was relieved of his appointment in June. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

55. Khalil Ismail.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

Director-General of Finance, August 1943.

56. Khushaba, Malik.

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village. Now resides in Mosul.

57. Mahmud Abdul Karim.

Aged about 30. Arabic editor of the *Iraq Times* and Iraqi representative of Reuters. Editor of *al-Diyar*, started in 1945. A sensible, moderate man. Has many Jewish friends. A follower of Ibrahim Kemal (q.v.) but takes no side in party politics. Invited to Britain as one of delegation of Iraqi journalists, autumn 1945.

58. Mahmud Subhi Daftari.

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet. Made a Senator in 1940.

Made Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943, a post which he obviously enjoyed enormously. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

59. Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh.

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate al Razza, near Kerbala, has been expropriated for the Abu Dibbis reservoir and Mahrut has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

60. Mahmud, Shaikh.

Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Shaikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has the chance to do so.

His properties in Sulaimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Bagdad, and in company with Abbas-i-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (q.v.) he raised a tribal force to attack Sulaimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the

chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzan. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and unreliable, and a source of anxiety to the Mutesarrif of Sulaimania.

61. Majid Mustafa.

A Kurd of Sulaimani, born about 1894. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army, and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Kut liwa. His administrative ability was soon apparent. In 1928 he became Qaimaqam of Nasiriyah, and in 1935 he was promoted to be Mutesarrif. Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained until 1941.

His attitude in the Rashid Ali disturbances of 1941 was equivocal, but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather than that of the Regent. Rashid Ali did not, however, trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Bagdad at the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in Turkey.

He returned in September and was then suspended for four years on account of his compliance with the orders of the Rashid Ali régime.

Nevertheless, in December 1943 he joined Nuri Pasha's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzan area and of redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

Majid succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and remained in the Cabinet, without Portfolio, but charged specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

Has gone into business but has not abandoned politics. Made a vigorous and impressive speech on Kurdish needs in the Chamber in January 1945. By the Kurds he is not trusted as they consider he is only interested in the fruits of power. Has been careful to advertise on the surface his dissociation from events in Barzan.

62. Mar Shimun.

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholics of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional

allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

Since 1940 he has been living in the United States.

63. Maulud Mukhlis.

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected president of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

64. Muaffaq-al-Alousi.

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at

Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as chargé d'affaires. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

65. Muhammad Ali Mahmud.

Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

66. Muhammad Amin Zaki.

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1939. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill-health. Made a Senator December 1943.

67. Muhammad Hassan Kubba.

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1923 he entered the service of the Ministry of Justice. Served as a judge in many parts of the country and also held posts in the Ministry. In December 1943 he joined the Cabinet as Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said. Retained this position in the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi which followed Nuri's resignation in June 1944, but became

President of the Chamber of Deputies on the resignation of Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi in December 1944.

68. Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Sa'iid).

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahmad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao, but was released in August 1944.

69. Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi.

Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943 and again in December 1944, but resigned almost immediately.

70. Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz.

Bagdad mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

71. Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid.

Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil-al-Madfa'i.

72. Mulla Mustafa.

Born about 1898. Brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32. He surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimani. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1943 he bolted back to Barzan and a few months later became involved in skirmishes with the police. The fighting gradually developed, and Mulla Mustafas successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with his own position, but later on he began to put forward political demands and to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism. He won a good deal of Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was promised a pardon after paying a formal visit to Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Thereafter he returned to Barzan, but he remains restless and untamed, and the Government have not yet been able to re-establish control over the Barzani tribal area. Was formally pardoned in April 1945 by the Barzan Amnesty Law, and the Government embarked on a programme of improving security and of developing agriculture in his area. However, he became impatient in the summer and took up arms against the Government again in August 1945.

73. Musa Shabandar.

Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899. Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations. Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as chargé d'affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in

April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to stand his trial with internees in March 1944. Sentence was finally passed on him, in August 1944, of five years hard labour and sequestration of all his property. Now an invalid.

74. Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1943 he appeared to be living in Rome. Later he went to Geneva and sought but was refused facilities to return to Iraq.

75. Mustafa-al-Umari.

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfa'i in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. Since then he has been a prominent speaker in the debates of the Senate, and has been a constant critic of Nuri

Said's Administration. Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi formed in June 1944.

76. Dr. Naji-al-Asil.

Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i.

Appointed Director-General of Antiquities in 1944. A pleasant man of considerable intelligence.

77. Naji Shaukat.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Mushin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsuring with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941, but was appointed Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May

1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

In 1942 he found his way to Europe and moved between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In 1943 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

78. Nadhif Shawi.

Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-18. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and fought at Maisalun, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfa'i in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

79. Najib-al-Rawi.

Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad-al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected president of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being in too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister. He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943. He represented Iraq at the Arab Lawyers' Conference at Damascus in August 1944.

80. Nasrat-al-Farisi.

Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfa'i's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in April 1943, but did not proceed.

In June 1943 he became Foreign Minister. Resigned in October 1943, as a protest against the Regent's interference in the choice of Government candidates for election to Parliament.

81. Nishat-al-Sanawi.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

82. Nureddin Mahmoud.

Born 1889. A Kurd. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1917. Intelligent, resourceful and ambitious. Director of Military Operations. Graduate of Camberley and Quetta. Good man both in administration and in the field. One of the few Iraq army officers with modern military knowledge. Has done several courses in England. Command over men is good, and influence on the army high—as witness his behaviour on the flight of Rashid Ali when he took over command of the army and initiated the Anglo-Iraqi armistice. Does not dabble unduly in politics but sympathises with the Allied cause and was heartily against—and worked against—Rashid Ali. His only strong feeling is apparently for the Kurds, and as long as there is friendship between the Kurds and the British his support can be taken for granted.

Attractive personality. Has been military attaché in London. Was Officer Commanding 2nd Division at Kirkuk and was transferred to Bagdad as Assistant C.G.S. He visited the battle-fields of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, in May 1943.

Was promoted Amir Liwa in November 1944 and later became Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, in the reorganised Iraq army.

83. Nuri-al-Said.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913 and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again

in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jeddah in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfa'i in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfa'i, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri-al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha-al-Hashimi and Husain Fauzi overthrew Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet and brought Nuri-al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfa'i at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited Egypt to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943, but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his ninth Government on the 25th December, 1943.

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an unedifying brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest. Accompanied the Regent on his travels in America and Europe during the summer of 1945.

84. Rashid Ali-al-Gilani.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937. During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military coup d'Etat on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid

Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq. It is now known that the struggle for predominance between him and the Mufti led to a split in the ranks of the Arab traitors. It was rumoured that he had been captured by the Russians, but there is to date no confirmation of his whereabouts. When in London the Regent reiterated his determination that when caught he would be executed.

85. Rashid-al-Khojah.

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-General, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General at Jeddah, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shawkat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shawkat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfa'i. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfa'i. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

86. Rauf-al-Bahrani.

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial

in March 1944 and in August 1944 condemned to three years' hard labour and sequestration of all his property.

87. *Rauf-al-Chadirchi.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the Law School August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937. Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

88. *Rauf-al-Kubaisi.*

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutassarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutassarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Auqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

89. *Razzuq Ghannam.*

Doyen of Bagdad journalists. Owner of *Al Iraq*. A Christian. Pro-British; backer of Nuri Said. He was a Deputy for Bagdad in the 1942 Assembly. At one time he employed Rafael Butti, but soon fired him when he realised his true feelings. Pan-Arabist. According to a speech he made while a Deputy, he had no time for those who supported the merchants and landowners at the expense of the people. "Parliaments were not collected for the protection of the profiteers and opportunists." Invited to visit Britain as one of the delegation of Iraq journalists, autumn 1945.

90. *Sabih Najib.*

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfa'i Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rostam Haidar, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey. Was retired from the service in August 1944.

91. *Sadiq-al-Bassam.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939. Became Minister of Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

92. *Salah-al-Din Ali-al-Sabbagh.*

Born about 1896. Educated at Istanbul and graduated as an officer from the Turkish Military College. Taken prisoner in the war 1914-18 and released to join the Amir Feisal's army. Gazetted second-lieutenant in the Iraqi army 1921. Has done courses at Belgam and Sheerness and also attached to British units. Instructor at Bagdad Military College 1924. Appointed Director of Operations in the Ministry of Defence September 1937, and became Officer Commanding 3rd Division March 1940. Is an efficient officer, but has the reputation of being a careerist with ambition.

Belongs to the group of senior officers who are particularly active in politics.

With Fahmi Said, Kamil Shabib and Mahmud Salman he formed the group of officers known as the Golden Square, which dominated Iraqi politics in

1940, and, in company with Rashid Ali, brought about the coup d'Etat of the 1st April, 1941. He fled to Tehran with Rashid Ali at the end of May 1941 and evaded arrest and disappeared when British forces entered Persia in August.

Turned up again in Turkey in February 1942 and was placed under strict police supervision by the Turkish authorities. The Iraqi Government's request for his extradition was refused. Negotiations are now, in 1945, in progress for him to be handed over.

93. *Salman-al-Barrak.*

Shiah and a tribal notable of Hillah, Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943, but returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

94. *Salman-al-Shaikh Daud.*

Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government. Arab News Agency representative. Invited to visit Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945.

95. *Salih Jabr.*

Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfa'i November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutassarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfa'i formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwaniyah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutassarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up to expectations and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

He is married to a strong-minded tribal woman of Hilla, who causes her husband much trouble by interfering in the tribal politics of Hilla Liwa.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Finance in June 1944. Took on portfolio of Defence in August 1944 when Tahir Ali refused

to dismiss senile officers as part of the scheme for reorganising the army, but in the reshuffled Cabinet he took up Supplies, only to hand them over in December 1944, and he is now back in Finance. During the absence of Hamdi Pachachi, the Premier, he has acted for him. Opinion is divided as to his sentiments towards the British and there are not lacking those who prophesy that he will head the next violent reaction against British influence.

96. *Sami Shaukat.*

Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denies these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

97. *Shakir-al-Na'ama.*

Editor and owner of *Al Thaghr*, a Basra paper. A quiet intelligent man with no liking for the Iraqi methods of administering the supply situation and its attendant corruption. He was, in 1943, involved in a little trouble with the Mutassarif of the Basra Liwa for publishing articles in his paper criticising the local supply distribution methods. He was told to cease such publications but he asked for such instructions in writing—presumably he would have taken the matter further. The instructions in writing were not forthcoming, but from that time he has been the subject of persecution by the Mutassarif. A good friend of Britain. Invited to visit Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945.

98. *Shakir-al-Wadi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi's was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on,

however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941. Transferred to London in October 1944 as first secretary in order to take charge of the Iraqi Legation during Daud-al-Haidari's absence in Iraq.

99. Sufuq-al-Ajl.

Of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yuwar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1923), is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased unduly Shammar influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammar arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ahmed about the division of their inheritance from their father Ajil. A settlement was made in May, but its terms were so ambiguous that it is not likely to endure for long. An attempt was made to murder him in June 1944 by putting locust bait in his food. His brother Ahmad was suspected of being the author of the plot and while Sufuq was convalescing in Palestine he increased his prestige with the tribe by issuing free the Shaikh's reserves of corn, ghee and sugar to grateful tribesmen. Ahmad has lost no opportunity to undermine Sheikh Sufuq's influence. Flashy, engaging and plausible, he has made himself acceptable to authority, more especially the Regent. Sufuq, who is flabby, selfish and incapable, has with his persecution complex proved a sore trial to the Mosul authorities, who have attempted to sort out his quarrel with Ahmed over the inheritance. Sufuq was detained in August 1945 with the rest of the Shammar Shaikhs in Mosul, for failing to assist the Government effectively to control his tribesmen near the Syrian frontier.

Of the younger brothers, Mish'al, though only 19, is steadier than either Sufuq or Ahmed.

100. Tahsin al Askari.

Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces under the Amir Faisal 1916-18 and later appointed Governor of Aleppo. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank of commandant. Became Kaimakam of Samawa in 1927 and Mutassarif of Kirkuk in 1930; a year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Jafar-al-Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'Etat* in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed counsellor in the Iraqi

Legation in Cairo and became minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan-Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

Transferred to the Ministry of Communications and Works in June 1943, and acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1943. He resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943, and was appointed minister at Cairo.

101. Taha-al-Hashimi.

Brother of the late Yasin-el-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed Chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of Chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed Chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *fariq* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Hussain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfa'i resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

102. Tahsin Ali.

A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussain of

the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Faisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sabunchi faction and transferred to the Dulaim area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutassarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutassarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his *coup d'Etat* in May. Was restored when the Madfa'i Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "apaisement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Transferred to the Palace as Rais of the Royal Diwan in June 1943. Became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi in June 1944, where he proved obstructive to the reorganisation of the army. Transferred to Works and Communications in August 1944 and finally dropped from the Cabinet altogether at the end of that month.

103. Tahsin Qadri.

Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the Palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

In September 1943 he was appointed chargé d'affaires at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January, 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at Beirut, where he has been active in Arab Unity affairs, at the same time maintaining close touch with His Majesty's Minister. Recalled early in 1945 and appointed Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Fadhil-el-Jamali at San Francisco. Appointed minister in Tehran, June 1945, but in September was still in the Lebanon.

104. Talib Mushtaq.

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in

November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

105. Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935 and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the legality of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister. Went to San Francisco Conference. On his return appointed Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Arab League.

106. *Taufiq Wahbi Maroof.*

Kurd, born Sulaimania 1887. Educated Sulaimania and Turkey. Graduated from Turkish Military College in 1904, and thereafter served in many military stations in European Turkey. During the war 1914-18, he held a regimental command, and later a staff appointment with the 13th Corps, commanded by General Ali Ihsan Pasha. After the war he returned to Iraq, and entered the Iraqi army. He was appointed Military Adviser and Staff Officer to Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimania in 1923, but left him when his attitude became pro-Turkish and his conduct impossible. He returned to Baghdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of colonel became Commandant of the Military College, Baghdad. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

In April 1930 he was appointed as Mutesarrif of Sulaimania, but lasted only until July, when as the result of election troubles he was removed.

For several years he remained unemployed, but ultimately obtained appointment to the post of Director-General of Surveys. After the conclusion of the operations against Rashid Ali, Taufiq Wahbi resigned from Government service, took pension and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor for the British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Hamdi Pacha's Cabinet, in which capacity he has toured the north to investigate possible relief and developments. It was largely owing to his initiative that the Director of the Sudan Forestry Service was engaged to prepare a comprehensive survey of the economic possibilities of forestry in Kurdistan. To the young Kurdish nationalists and hot-heads he pleads moderation and gradualism, but his influence on them is not effective.

Taufiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture, and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Public Relations Department in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

107. *Thabit Abdul Nur.*

Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Baghdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he

helps in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

108. *Umar Nazmi.*

Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hillah 1925; President, Civil Courts, Dials; Mutesarrif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927; Mutesarrif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutesarrif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

109. *Yahya Qassim.*

Age 30. Advocate; ex-Iraq State Railway employee. Is the editor and proprietor of *Al Sha'ab* newspaper. He is a Muslawi and is married to the daughter of Hamdi Effendi, the brother of the ex-Chief of the General Staff, Amin Zaki Suleiman. He is a prominent leader of a growing Socialist movement, the members of which erroneously self-style themselves Communists. Secretary of "Biyout al-Umma" (Houses of the Nation) Society. He was interested in the publishing of a secret Radical paper called *Al Sharara* which ceased publication some time ago. It has not been confirmed that he is connected with the present active clandestine pamphlet *Al Qaida*, although there have been reports to that effect.

As a result of his meddling in politics—including the distribution of pamphlets, for which he was arrested and released on bail—the Iraq State Railways Board dispensed with his services. Owing to his discharge from the Railway Directorate, which, while being an Iraqi Department, has a British Director and is considered by Yahya's fellow Socialists a "British Imperialist concern," he is somewhat embittered against the British. He is an active member of a group of advocates known to have advised the Railway Union to strike. There are grounds for believing that he has received minor subsidies for his paper from the Russians.

110. *Yunis Bahri.*

Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1936 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhranaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a news-

paper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

Broadcast from Berlin in connexion with the Lebanese crisis of November 1943.

111. *Yusuf Ghanimah.*

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of

the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941. In July 1944 appointed Director-General of Supplies and President of Post War Planning Committee, and he became Minister of Supplies in November 1944, since when the country has settled down to accepting supply controls and rationing has become more effective in reaching the consumer at the end of the supply line.

112. *Yusuf Iz-al-Din.*

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

Obituary since last Report.

Fahmi-al-Mudarris.
Said-bin-Ali.

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

[E 4870/4870/34]

No. 7.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th July.)
(No. 220. Confidential.)
Sir,

Tehran, 28th June, 1945.
WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of the 1st July, 1944, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on heads of missions at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Tehran.

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Afghanistan.

Ambassador: M. Mohamed Heydar Khan Hosseini. (5th January, 1944.)

*A young man for the post—born probably about 1904. Has always served in diplomatic posts or in the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Has served in Paris and Geneva.

Talks French well, and a little English. Wife in purdah. Amiable but colourless. (Written in 1944.)

Belgium.

Minister: M. Egbert Graeffe. (17th January, 1937.)

*Born about 1890 but looks older. A diplomat by profession but was in the Belgian intelligence service during the last war, and after that specialised in commercial and financial affairs, especially in Berlin. Has much energy and determination and is outspoken in his discussions with the Persian Government. Unfortunately he is vain and boastful and lays claim to omniscience, and this leads many people to underrate his abilities.

When the King of the Belgians surrendered to the Germans, M. Graeffe, though a keen Royalist, supported the Belgian Government in exile, and continued to do so, in spite of the defeat of France.

Graeffe has been in closer touch with the Shah than most of his colleagues. He and the Shah have met frequently for shooting and tennis, pastimes for which, as for dabbling in Persian intrigue, he has always had plenty of leisure. M. Graeffe is absent for long periods, on holiday in Egypt or on the Caspian or at his other post in Bagdad. For the last six months he has been very ill and it is not yet certain that he will ever recover full working capacity. Too long residence at this high altitude, and anxiety about his country and about a son in Belgium, may have contributed to the decline of his health.

M. Graeffe speaks excellent English, as does his wife, who is half American. (Written in 1944.)

Brazil.

Minister: M. Renato de la Serda Lago. (3rd July, 1944.)

Was Minister to China from 1936 to 1942, when he was repatriated upon the severance of relations between Brazil and Japan. Came from Brazil with a reputation as an agreeable colleague which he has fully sustained here. It is true that he has nothing else to do.

Talks English well, besides French.

China.

Ambassador: Mr. Li Tich-tseng. (Minister, 28th June, 1942; Ambassador, 14th May, 1945.)

*Mr. Li is the first Chinese Minister to Persia. He was born at Changsha in 1905 and started his career as a magistrate in Nanchang, but since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service. He spent four years in London, where he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference and in his spare time attended courses at the London School of Economics.

He talks English well and is learning French.

Mr. Li has always been friendly to His Majesty's Mission here, but since he gets from this very much more than he can give, too great credit should not be given to him for it. He is very touchy and protocolaire. (Written in 1944.)

Mr. Li has with him an attractive and sensible wife and four of his eight children; the others are in China.

Czechoslovakia.

Minister: M. Josef M. Kadlec. (14th April, 1943.)

*M. Kadlec served as Czechoslovak Consul-General in Jerusalem for some years. He seems anxious to ingratiate himself with everyone he meets, and is the perfect stage diplomat. He is accompanied by a henna-haired wife of Bulgarian origin and a cripple step-daughter (Italian father) who acts as his private secretary. He speaks quite good English and seems genuinely grateful to the British for the part they played when France collapsed. (Written in 1943.)

M. Kadlec does not seem altogether happy at the subservience which his country is obliged to show towards the Soviet Government.

Denmark.

Chargé d'Affaires: M. A. E. C. Fensmark. (13th April, 1939.)

*Formerly the Danish Minister in Stockholm was accredited to Tehran also, but M. Fensmark is Chargé d'Affaires en pied. Born about 1890. Formerly in Ankara, and before that was attached to the Danish Court. Speaks excellent English (has an English wife). Energetic, able, helpful and straightforward. Very strongly pro-Ally and detests the Germans and their policy towards his country. It was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation

Netherlands.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim: Jonkheer de Brauw. (11th March, 1942.)

*Came here from Simla, where he held a consular post. He and his wife, who both talk English well, are very friendly. They have an only son in the Netherlands forces in England.

M. de Brauw is not a great character, but as he has nothing to do this does not matter. (Written in 1944.)

Poland.

Minister: Vacant.

M. Witold Okonski is Chargé d'Affaires.

Soviet Union.

Ambassador: M. Mikhail Alexeevitch Maximov. (3rd July, 1944.)

*M. Maximov's appointment as Ambassador was very sudden. He was counsellor to the Soviet Embassy, but was promoted to succeed M. Constantine Alexandrovitch Mikhailov, who retired "ill" after three months.

M. Maximov was born about 1900. He served for several years in Afghanistan and was then for several years consul-general in Meshed, where His Majesty's consular officers got on well with him. He talks Persian well and is beginning to learn English.

M. Maximov has the reputation of being an exceedingly cunning man and of being mainly responsible for the election of a number of pro-Russian and pro-Communist Deputies to the Majlis in 1943. I believe that this reputation is deserved. Nevertheless, M. Maximov is business-like and is sufficiently well informed about Persia to be able to give an opinion without fear, and, as he is also amusing and can grin at a fair hit, he is as good a Soviet colleague as one could expect to have in this country. (Written in 1944.)

The above report was too optimistic. M. Maximov was better as a counsellor than he has proved to be as an Ambassador. He has even ceased to be business-like. He would make a good Public Prosecutor in Russia or a good gangster in Chicago; but as an Ambassador he has shown himself ill-bred, a petty trickster and shamelessly dishonest.

Sweden.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim: Dr. G. Jarring.

Switzerland.

Chargé d'Affaires: M. Charles-Edouard de Bavier. (21st May, 1945.)

Born about 1895. Has the rank of Minister. Was in Athens during the Axis occupation and admits having strained Swiss neutrality by hiding in his house a British officer who had been condemned to death by the Germans. Talks English well. As he has only just arrived little can be said about him except that he seems intelligent and very friendly.

Turkey.

Ambassador: M. Kemal Kröprülü. (24th May, 1945.)

Born about 1890. His last post was Kabul. Has had some experience of Persia as member of a delegation which negotiated an agreement some ten years ago. Has only just arrived. Seems friendly but not highly intelligent. Talks very fair English.

United States.

Ambassador: Mr. Wallace Murray. (4th June, 1945.)

Mr. Murray, who was born in 1887, was a secretary at the United States Legation in Tehran in the early twenties and is believed to have acquired at that time a sentimental affection for Persia and a

here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the German Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1941.)

*He maintained close relations with the Allied Legations, and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty, when it was certain that Persia was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him. (Written in 1942.)

Those to whom M. Fensmark pours out his troubles often find him lacking in a sense of proportion. His community is now split into two factions—for and against the legation, and although the dissidents are not an admirable band, it is probable that if M. Fensmark had been more sensible and less authoritarian he might have held the community together.

Egypt.

Ambassador: Mahmoud Sabit Pasha. (4th April, 1945.)

Born about 1890. Finished his education at Cambridge, of which he has the happiest memories, and was employed in the newly-established Egyptian Legation in London for some years. His last post was that of Head of the Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Cairo. He and his wife and his daughter of 26 have become immediately popular. Mme. Sabit is related to the Queen of Egypt. Her daughter has become very friendly with the Queen of Persia, who will be all the better for the companionship of a sensible, good-humoured compatriot with a *savoir-faire* beyond her years.

Sabit Pasha is not a great mind, but he is very friendly and makes a pleasing impression of frankness and honesty.

France.

Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation: M. Pierre Lafond. (29th March, 1944.)

*M. Lafond was born probably about 1895. He fought in the 1914-18 war and then entered the diplomatic service. He returned to the army in 1939, but after the defeat of France he obtained an appointment in Tunisia. His open antagonism to Vichy caused him to be arrested by the Germans and sent back to France, whence he escaped back to Tunis after the occupation of North Africa by the Allies.

From all British sources we have good reports of M. Lafond. He is rather effusive in language, but not the less sincere for that. He is an interesting and cultivated man, and a pleasant addition to the diplomatic corps. He speaks English quite well. His large family is still in Tunis. (Written in 1944.)

Greece.

Chargé d'Affaires: M. Georges Coustas. (13th September, 1943.)

*M. Coustas has the rank of first secretary, though both he and his wife think that he ought to be a Minister. Agreeable but vain and with no character. His wife, a Greek from Istanbul, is young and very silly. (Written in 1944.)

Holy See.

Apostolic Delegate: Vacant.

The Secretary, Monseigneur Pierre Pavani, is in charge.

Iraq.

Minister: M. Tahsin Qadri.

The agreement has been given for the present Iraqi Minister in the Levant States, M. Tahsin Qadri, and it is announced that he will arrive shortly to take up his post here.

M. Hachim Khalil is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

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deep suspicion of British imperialist aims in Persia. Since then he has been employed in the section of the State Department where until the last year or two he was not considered very friendly. However, after a visit to London early in 1944, when he discussed with the Foreign Office all questions relating to the Middle East, Mr. Murray seemed to be genuinely desirous of co-operating with us, and it seems possible that his fear of Russia is now greater than his suspicion of His Majesty's Government.

Yugoslavia.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim: M. Dragos Dragutinovic. (28th October, 1944.)

Born about 1910. A Serb. Colourless but agreeable. Does not seem to approve the more robust

actions of Marshal Tito but is very discreet. Besides French, knows a little English.

The British Political Representative in Belgrade reports that Asmi Ali Hodjic has been appointed Minister to Persia.

Norway.

Minister: M. Rolf Otto Andvord. (20th April, 1942.) Resides in Moscow.

*Born 1890. He was for seven years a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. He is a friendly, sociable colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visits to Tehran are short as most of his time is spent in Moscow. (Written in 1944.)

[E 4969/222/34]

No. 8.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)

(No. 223.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith three copies of a report on the Isfahan Province, prepared by His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan, Mr. C. A. Gault. I am sending copies of the same report to the Resident Minister in Cairo, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, and to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Paiforce.

2. I think you will agree that this competent and comprehensive survey reflects great credit on Mr. Gault, and that it constitutes, with his report on the Bakhtiari tribes, which I sent you with my despatch No. 197 of the 3rd May, 1944, a valuable contribution to our permanent records relating to Persia.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 8.

(Confidential.)

*A Report on the Isfahan Province by Mr. C. A. Gault,
His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan.*

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PREFACE

This report has been written to place on record much miscellaneous information about Isfahan and its surrounding district, which I have collected in the past three years and which I consider of permanent value for a consular officer here. It is not intended to be exhaustive but to give useful information as succinctly as possible.

Isfahan, April 1945.

CHARLES A. GAULT.

CHAPTER I.—GEOGRAPHY.

[NOTE.—Map references given are for the quarter-inch maps of Persia published by the Government of India and the British army. The sheets of this series which cover the Isfahan province are: I-39-N, I-39-O, I-39-P, I-39-Q, I-39-T, I-39-U, I-39-V, I-39-W, H-39-C, H-39-D and H-39-E.]

Isfahan lies in latitude 32° 38' 1" and longitude 51° 36' 33" at a mean height of 5,100 feet above sea level (this is the mean of observations by Khanikoff, St. John and Walker Floyer).

The climate of Isfahan is good. The summer is warm but the temperature rarely rises above 105°. The winter is cold and there is some snowfall and rain, but not much, for the average rainfall seldom exceeds 4 inches. A disadvantage is the hardness of the water which is drawn from shallow wells 18 to 20 feet deep, of which every house has two or three. In the spring there are often strong winds which bring a good deal of dust with them. In the last twenty years very extensive groves of fruit and other trees have been planted round the town, more especially along the river banks to the west. Malaria is endemic among the native population, but is not a scourge to Europeans provided normal precautions are taken. This applies to diseases in general, such as dengue fever, dysentery, typhoid, typhus and the like, which are all to a greater or less extent endemic among the Persian population.

The Isfahan province, which lies roughly between 50 and 54 east longitude and 32 and 34 north latitude, under the present administrative system obtaining in Persia forms the tenth "Ustan," or governor-general's province. This province comprises the following districts: Isfahan and its immediate neighbourhood; Chahar Mahal, chief place, Shahr Kurd (Q4962); Pusht Kuh, chief place, Ardal (Q3423); Sendehistan, chief place, Lurdekan (V5272); Fereidan, chief place, Daran (L0433); Karvan, chief place, Najafabad (Q9798); Linjan, chief place, Falarvarjan or Pul-i-Vargan (R1091); Shahreza, chief place, Shahreza (R4733); Kuhpayeh, chief place, Kuhpayeh (M9715); Ardistan, chief place, Ardistan (M8588); Yezd, chief place, Yezd. These are the official sub-divisions of the province, but in practice the old names of districts, some in use from the earliest days, are still in current use by the people.

Isfahan itself is made up of eight districts or "bulukat," besides the city. They are Jay, Qohab, Burkhar, Marbin, Barzerud, Kararaj, Baraoun, Rudasht. Jay lies immediately to the east of Isfahan, including Khuraskan (M3502) and a strip along the right bank of the river from the Khaju bridge downstream. Qohab lies beyond Jay to the east, including the areas on both sides of the Isfahan-Yezd road from Gavart (M4005) to just beyond Gulnabad (M4806). Burkhar covers the plain north of Isfahan, beginning just east of the Isfahan-Qum road and extending to include Murcheh Khur (M0450) to the north and as far as the mountains bounding this plain to the north-east. Marbin lies west of Burkhar, taking in the villages of Kujun (M2108) and Mahmoudabad (M1415) and extending westwards on the left bank of the river to include Kushk (Koshak) (M0801). Barzerud is a small district on the right bank of the river immediately south of Isfahan, extending from Dastgird (R1799) to the village of Sichun, which lies immediately east of Julfa and west of the Isfahan-Shiraz road. Kararaj lies on both banks of the river to the south-east of Isfahan, extending from Pinart (R3398) to Dasti (R3889) and westwards to take in Marg (R3086) on the Isfahan-Shiraz road. Beyond Kararaj to the east comes Baraoun, likewise lying on both sides of the river but mainly on the right bank beginning with Kabutarabad (R4086) and extending as far as Karna (R6178) and Barsiyan (5990). Further east still lies Rudasht (Rudashtain), which extends along both sides of the river from Khuya (R6394) down to Varzaneh (S1982).

Chahar Mahal is a district lying to the west of Isfahan and east of Bakhtiari. It consists of four districts or "mahals"—Lar, Kiar, Mizdej and Ganduman. The limits of Chahar Mahal are roughly these: on the east the line of the Kuh-i-Bidakun (Badkun) (Q9052) north-west to cross the Zayandeh Rud river east of Saman (Q5774) taking in Lutfi (Q7387) and Qaleh Marg (Q6593) then westwards to include Ben (Bain) (Q3885) but passing south of Bardeh (Q1889) to include Sudejan (Saiyid-i-Gan) (Q0482); a line from Sudejan south to Baba Haidar (Q1460); a line running from Baba Haidar south-east along the ridge of the Kuh-i-Saldarun (Q2538) and the Kuh-i-Zirreh (Q4027); a line continuing along the same ridge to Imam Sultan Ibrahim (V8287) and thence following the loop of the Ab-i-Wanak (V7387) south, east and north to include Imam Qais

(V9799); a line running north to include Burujin (Urujin) (Q9527) and up to the Kuh-i-Bidakun ridge again at the Tang-i-Duzdan (R0138). The Lar district of Chahar Mahal is the most northerly one and contains the chief place, Shahr Kurd. Its most southerly parts are the areas of Qahfarukh (Q6154) and Shamsabad (Q5244). The Kiar district lies immediately south of Lar, and includes the valleys in which lie Dastena (Dasht-i-Tan) (Q4332), Shalamzar (Q4831) and Gahru (Q5627), Kheraji (Q4936), Dehzak (Q6334), Surkh (Q7433), and Deh No (Q7931). Mizdej is the valley lying west of Kiar and including Junaqan (Q3642) and Deh Chashmeh (Q2348). Ganduman district includes Safid Dasht (Q8295), Faradumbek (Q8531), Burujin (Q9527), but not Naghna (Naghuna) (Q9993) which lies in Qashqai territory, Buldaji (Q7219), Imam Qais (V9799), Ganduman and the area south of it to the line of the Ab-i-Wanak.

Pusht Kuh is a district of Bakhtiari proper and comprises the areas round Ardal (Q3424), Naghun (Q4218) and Dashtak (Q1443) westwards up the Karun.

The Sehdehistan, also known as the Janeki Sardisr, is likewise a district of Bakhtiari proper and lies south of Chahar Mahal and south-west of Isfahan. Its limits are as follows: on the north the line of the Ab-i-Wanak (V7187) from Shamsabad (V9272) westwards to join the Karun, and thence along that river to include Bars (V1369) and Saadat (V0475); on the west and south, from Bars eastwards along the line of the Ab-i-Khirsan (V5855) to point V7442 where is the confluence of the Ab-i-Khirsan and the Rud-i-Khirsan (V9247) (according to the map, which is probably inaccurate); on the south the line of the Rud-i-Khirsan; on the east the north-south line of the Rud-i-Khirsan and the Kuh-i-Dur-Delan (V9268). The Sehdehistan (formerly also called the Sehnahiyeh) comprises three districts: Lurdekan (V5272), Khan-i-Mirza (V7575) and Felart (V8956).

Fereidan lies north-west of Isfahan, and its chief place is Daran (L0433). Its limits are: on the east the line of the Darun Kuh (Kuh-i-Daran, L3125), but including Darreh Bid (L0843) and Damaneh (L1237); on the south a line running from point L5306 (height 9634) south-westwards to pass between Qaragach (Q4598) and Garmdarreh (Q4897) thence north of Latun (Q3488) and south of Bardeh (Q1889) turning north-westwards to include Kaugunak (U9983) and passing between peaks 10700 and 9040 just to the west of Kaugunak, thence north-westwards to include Maidanak Bala (P7612) and Sibak (P7029) on to pass west of Chugrub (P6431) and thence northwards to the summit of the pass just west of Darreh Sari (P6359); on the north the Kuh-i-Dotu (7067). Fereidan is from south to north divided into four districts or "nahiyehs." They are Chadegun, Tukhmaqlu, Varzaq, Karchambo.

Karvan is a long straggling district to the west of Isfahan. Its chief place is Najafabad (Q9798) and its boundaries are as follows: on the east Karsang (R0798) on the south and west the line of mountains running north-west from the Kuh-i-Panji (Q9186) to the Kuh-i-Daran; on the north, Gulharun (L3335) and Sultanabad (L2929); on the north-east the line of the Kuh-i-Takhtak (L4733). Also forming part of the Karvan is the district of Arabistan lying north of Karvan proper. Arabistan is the district round Deh Haqq (L5549) including Qamishlu (I8018) and Durr (L2368).

Linjan, which is divided into Upper and Lower Linjan and Garkan and is consequently sometimes called Linjanat, lies along both banks of the Zayandeh Rud above Isfahan. Its chief place is Falarvarjan (Pul-i-Vargun; R1091) and its limits are as follows: on the north or downstream side of the villages of Yezdabad (R1696) and Shahabad; on the north-west Qadrijan (R0593); on the west or upstream side the area of Bagh-i-Badran (Q6965) (wrongly placed on map). Upper Linjan is the area from Bagh-i-Badran down to and including Linj (R1673). Garkan is the area immediately south-west of the Shah Kuh (R2085) and including Deh Surkh (R2577).

Shahreza, formerly called Qumisheh (R4733), lies south of Isfahan on the Isfahan-Shiraz road. The district is a large one and covers the smaller districts of Upper and Lower Semirum and Jarqooyeh, as well as that of Shahreza itself. Upper and Lower Semirum lie west of Shahreza. The northern limit of Lower Semirum is the road from Mubarakah (R1167) to the Tang-i-Bidakun (Q9152), but Mubarakah itself is in Linjan. The west boundary of Lower Semirum is the line of the Kuh-i-Bidakun and the eastern is the line of hills running from the Kuh-i-Zard (R2363) to Shahreza. Immediately south of Lower Semirum lies Upper Semirum and Semirum village itself (W4362). On some maps there are two other places marked Semirum, Yazd-i-Khast (or Izad Khast) (W7581) and Isfirjan (W5497). These places are never known as Semirum. The western boundary of Upper Semirum is the line of the mountains running south from Imam Qais (V9799) and the eastern one is the line of hills lying to the west of

the Shahreza-Abadeh road. The southern boundary is indeterminate, but probably runs roughly east-west a short way south of Semirum village. Jarqooyeh lies south of Rudasht and comprises the area bounded by Rahmatabad (R6775), Nasirabad (R7251) and the villages round Hassanabad (Husseinabad) (R7765).

Qohpayeh, or as the degree sheet incorrectly spells it Kuhpayeh (M9715), district, lies east of Qohab district of Isfahan itself. It includes on the west Sagzi (M6709), on the south Harand (R9897), on the east Faizabad (N3018), on the north the line of the Kuh-i-Marshinan (M9133).

Ardistan (M8588), comprises Jaukand (M9668), Zavareh (G9403), Karimibad (G9808), Chah Nigu (G8728), Mughar (G6711), but not Sarab (N1593). To the south-west the district extends up to the mountains on the other side of which lies the Burkhar district of Isfahan.

Yezd covers the whole of the remainder of the 10th Ustan to the east of Ardistan, the Mulla Ahmad pass (also known as the Bilabad (B3318) pass) on the Isfahan-Yezd road, west of Nain, the Gavkhaneh salt lake and Jarqooyeh. This area amounts to about half the total area of the ustan, but as it lies outside the Isfahan consular district it is not described here.

Isfahan town itself has many sub-divisions. Officially it is now divided into five "bakhsh" or districts, which bear numbers only. In practice older districts—"mahalleh"—names, there are seventeen of them, are still in general use, as follows: Bakhsh 1, Chaharsooq-i-Shirazeha, Mustahlek and Abbasabad, Shamsabad, Chahar Bagh and Pusht-i-Matbakh. In addition there are Lunban, Juzun and Shaish, which are villages on the western edge of the town.

Bakhsh 2, Ab Bakhshan and Darvazeh-i-No, Bidabad, Mahalleh-i-No, Darb-i-Kushk, Masjid-i-Hakim, Pusht-i-Baru, Sunbulestan. In addition, there is Talvaskun, which is a village on the northern edge of the town.

Bakhsh 3, Maidan-i-Kohne, Jubareh, Shahshahan.

Bakhsh 4, Qasr-i-Munshi, Pa-i-Qaleh.

Bakhsh 5, Julfa, Sichun and Husseinabad, which are villages on either side of Julfa. None of these three are reckoned as "mahallehs."

There appears to be no accurate maps showing the limits of the 10th ustan. Such maps as do exist are very inaccurate as regards the placing of rivers and villages and show that the boundary lines of the administrative area have been drawn quite arbitrarily, without any consideration of whether a boundary as shown is a physical possibility or not.

CHAPTER II.—HISTORY.

The first mention of Isfahan in history occurs in Strabo who speaks of it under the name Gabae as one of the dwelling places of the Achaemenian kings (550-330 B.C.). Subsequently it was the capital of a vast province in the Parthian and Sasanian epochs and was conquered by the Arabs either in 640 or in 644. It remained under the Caliphate until the beginning of the 10th century when, with the weakening of the power of Bagdad, it fell into the hold of the Buyid family (sons of Buwaih) whose possession was later confirmed by the Caliphs. In 968 the city was captured and held for a time by Mohamed ibn Makan of Khorassan, but was later retaken by the Buyid Adud-ed-Douleh. In 1030 the Buyid power had to yield to that of the Kakoyid Ala-ed-Douleh, vassal of Mahmud of Ghazna, who was confirmed in the possession of the city in 1033 by Sultan Masud, son of Mahmud. In 1051 the Seljuk Toghrul Beg took Isfahan. Nothing is known of the city itself until after the time of the Arab conquest. At this time it consisted of two parts, Jay (Gabae), later called Shahrstan—"the city"—and still the name of a district of Isfahan and Yahudiyeh—"the Jewry," which later became the present city of Isfahan. It is said that Yahudiyeh was so called because either Nebuchadnezzar or Shushandukht, the Jewish wife of Yezdi-gerd, established a number of the Jews there at the time of the dispersion since the climate was like that of Jerusalem. A Jewish community still exists in Isfahan living mainly in the quarter of the town called Joobareh, which is the site of the old Yahudiyeh. Yahudiyeh was the more important section of the town and had a wall with twelve gates. The Seljuks made Isfahan their capital and from this period date the oldest existing monuments in Isfahan—the north-east (gunbad-i-khaki) and south-west (gunbad-i-Malek Shah) domes of the Masjid-i-Jum'a and several minarets in and around the town. Near Isfahan the mosques at Ardistan and Nain also date from this early period. They, with the Masjid-i-Jum'a of Isfahan, are also of interest as showing the development of the Persian mosque with four archways set round a square court from the

original Arab type of mosque with colonnades set round a court. By the beginning of the thirteenth century Jay and Yahudiyeh were declining. The Mongol conquest followed (1228) and although, as a result, Yahudiyeh recovered its prosperity, Jay never did so and dropped to the importance of a suburb. Towards the end of the fourteenth century Tamerlane (Taimur Lang), Amir Taimur Kurekan, conquered the city, killing a large number of its people. He occupied the citadel of which the ruins still remain on the east side of modern Isfahan, called Qaleh Tabarak. There then followed the dynasties of the Black Sheep, Qara Qoyunlu, and the White Sheep, Aq Qoyunlu. In 1501 the Safavid dynasty succeeded to power in north-west Persia, but it was not until 1598 that the greatest of its kings, Shah Abbas I, moved his capital from Qazvin to Isfahan and opened the best known phase of Isfahan's history. Shah Abbas set about making Isfahan a worthy capital of Persia and began the series of public and private buildings which to-day remain to illustrate his vision and artistic sense and which embody what is best in the golden age of Persian art. The chief among these monuments are the Chahar Bagh avenue and the Allahverdi Khan bridge, 1598; the Lutfullah mosque, 1603; the Ali Qapu and the Maidan-i-Shah, 1611; the Shah's mosque, 1612 (begun); the entrance to the main bazaar, 1620; the Khaju bridge; the Hasht Behesht palace; the Madrasseh and the Caravanserai on the Chahar Bagh avenue built by the mother of Shah Sultan Hussein, 1706-1714; and many other lesser buildings. Shah Abbas also brought to his new capital the entire population of the Armenian town of Julfa on the Araxes, which had been destroyed in 1605 in the course of the Turco-Persian war. These he settled in a newly-built suburb of Isfahan named Julfa on the opposite (right) bank of the river Zayandeh Rud to his own city. He also brought a number of the inhabitants of his native Tabriz and settled them in a quarter of the town still known as Abbasabad. In Julfa the Armenians enjoyed complete liberty of worship and built their cathedral of St. Saviour and other churches, in the years from 1605 onwards. Behind Julfa, under the Kuh-i-Sufeh, lie the ruins of the palace of Farahabad, built by the last Safavid king, Shah Sultan Hussein and destroyed by the Afghans. At the time of Shah Abbas, the population of Isfahan was estimated by European travellers of the day at about 500,000 souls. Julfa at the time of its greatest prosperity towards the end of the seventeenth century, contained 30,000 inhabitants. With the eighteenth century, however, both Isfahan and Julfa declined. The Afghan invasion of 1722 hastened this. The Afghans, of the Sunni sect of Islam, had revolted against Shah Sultan Hussein in 1709, but did not invade Persia until 1721. In a battle near the village of Gulnabad, some fifteen miles east of Isfahan on the road to Yazd, the Persians were defeated and Shah Sultan Hussein abdicated in favour of his conqueror. Isfahan was ravaged and its population decimated. It is popularly said that the inhabitants of the modern Sehdeh, a large village north-west of Isfahan, successfully resisted the Afghans during the whole of the time during which they occupied Isfahan. In 1729 Nadir Shah, by his victories at Damghan and at Murcheh Khur thirty miles north of Isfahan on the road to Tehran, drove the Afghans out of Persia. He then transferred the capital from Isfahan to Meshed and from this time on Isfahan remained a provincial city, underpopulated and with more of its buildings ruined than whole. In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fine buildings which had graced the capital of Shah Abbas fell into decay and many were pulled down. Fath Ali Shah used to visit Isfahan occasionally and died there in 1834. At the end of the nineteenth century the eldest son of Nasir-ed-Din Shah, the Zill-es-Sultan, was for many years Prince-Governor of Isfahan (1874-1907) and at one time during that period ruled most of southern and western Persia from Isfahan. Kermaushah and Shiraz being part of his dominion. He did nothing however to develop the place at all, and even pulled down a number of Safavi and other ancient buildings. In 1909 at the time of the constitutional movement in Persia, a force of so-called constitutionalist Bakhtiari marched on Tehran from Isfahan which they had previously occupied, and with other bands from the north, were instrumental in securing the abdication of the reactionary Mohamed Ali Shah. During the Great War, Isfahan was for long a centre of German influence in Persia as a result of the activity of Dr. Pugin, agent for German dye interests, so much so that in 1915 the British and Russian communities had to be evacuated after the British Consul-General had been fired at and wounded and a Russian *protégé* killed. In 1916 a Russian Cossack detachment re-occupied Isfahan for the allies and later in the same year a British force, the newly-raised South Persia Rifles under Brigadier-General Sykes, lay there for some time on its way to Shiraz. In the last twenty years Isfahan has become an industrial centre of some

importance in Persia. Nine large cotton and wool spinning and weaving mills and several small ones have been erected in this period largely because of Reza Shah's policy of encouraging the development of industry in his dominions. He himself, however, is always said to have disliked Isfahan and to have visited it much less frequently than other cities of equivalent size. In his reign, too, the town was developed by the cutting of new roads through it and the widening of others. The restoration and preservation of most of the important buildings of the past was also begun by a French archaeological expert, M. Godard, who is in the employ of the Persian Government.

The present city of Isfahan covers a wide area on both sides of the Zayandeh Rud river. Apart from its ancient monuments, to which reference has already been made, it has no modern features of beauty or interest. It bears the somewhat untidy appearance of the average Persian town and off the main avenues is a maze of narrow lanes with high walls on either side, behind which are often hidden picturesque houses and pleasant gardens.

CHAPTER III.—ADMINISTRATION.

Isfahan is the chief town in the 10th Ustan or Governor-General's province and is the seat of the Governor-General-Ustandar. He has under him three farm-landers or governors, at Yazd, Shahreza and Shahr Kurd.⁽¹⁾ He has also under him in the Isfahan area nine bakhshdars, or vice-governors, at Isfahan itself for the districts immediately around Isfahan, at Najafabad for Karvan, at Daran for Fereidan (with one at Akhoreh, also in Fereidan, as well), at Falavarjan for Linjan, at Shahr Kurd for Chahar Mahal, at Kuhpayeh, at Ardistan, at Ardal for Pusht Kuh, at Lurdekan for the Sehdehistan. The farmandar of Yazd has under him twelve bakhshdars. The Governor-General does not have any very extensive powers in theory, for he comes under the Ministry of the Interior and controls only the police and gendarmerie, which both depend on that ministry. The other Government departments in theory take their orders direct from their respective ministries in Tehran, but in practice the Governor-General is able to exercise an influence on the spot which amounts to a considerable degree of control over other departments. The Governor-General, as representing the Shah and the Central Government, take precedence over all other Persian officials. He is followed by the officer in command of the 9th Division of the Persian army, which has its headquarters at Isfahan, who is followed by the financial agent (at present there is an American director-general of finance stationed at Isfahan who is over the financial agent).

The 9th Division is stationed mainly at Isfahan. Detachments of troops are sent out to other parts of the province as required by the local situation.

Isfahan is the headquarters for the whole province of the following Government departments, each under its own head: Ustandari (Governor-General), army (9th Division), police, municipality, finance, industry and commerce, public health, roads, registration of property and documents, census, education, agriculture, posts and telegraphs, justice, gendarmerie, conscription. In addition there are the cereals, distribution, opium and tobacco monopoly and road transport departments, which come under the general supervision of the finance department.⁽²⁾ These departments have representatives in the chief towns of the district outside Isfahan. The police only operate within the municipality limits of Isfahan city and in Najafabad. Police work outside these two areas and the maintenance of general security are the tasks of the gendarmerie.

The city of Isfahan is divided into five districts, or "bakhsh" numbered from one to five. Four of these cover Isfahan proper on the left bank of the river Zayandeh Rud, and the fifth comprises Julfa and one or two small villages near it on the right bank. Each bakhsh has a police station, kalantari, and in addition there is a central police office and prison in Isfahan.

⁽¹⁾ The farmandar of Shahr Kurd is also farmandar of Bakhtiari and in practice has autonomy in Bakhtiari tribal affairs, referring direct to the Prime Minister in Tehran. For departmental matters connected with this area he works under the governor-general at Isfahan and for military matters refers to the General Officer Commanding, 9th Division, Isfahan. The bakhshdars of Shahr Kurd, Daran, Akhoreh and Lurdekan are in practice nominees of the farmandar of Chahar Mahal and Bakhtiari, as these are tribal areas with the exception of Daran (Fereidan) which is only partly so.

⁽²⁾ With the reorganisation of the financial side of the administration consequent upon the withdrawal of Dr. Millsaugh, it appears that the cereals, distribution, opium and tobacco monopoly and road transport departments are no longer under the supervision of provincial directors of finance.

The legal organisation comprises the usual machinery to be found in a provincial capital. The lowest court is the "dadgah-i-bakhsh (sulhiyeh)," or court of summary jurisdiction, which has two sections, followed by the "dadgah-i-shahrestan (bedayat)," or court of the first instance. This is followed by the "dadgah-i-ustan (Istinaf)," or court of appeal, and finally there is the "diwan-i-kishvar (Tamiz)," or court of cessation. There is also a "dadsara" or "parquet," under the prosecutor-general of the province—"dadsetan-i-Ustan." A second, and junior, prosecutor-general ("dadsetan-i-Shahrestan"), who presides over the court of first instance. A court for the trial of criminal cases is formed of the appeal court judges sitting under the head of the justice department of the 10th province, who is usually president of the court of appeal.

In addition, there is in Isfahan a "diwan-i-Keifar," or court which deals only with matters concerning Government officials and Government property. There is also a department of claims—"edareh-i-Tasfiyeh"—which deals with commercial and financial matters between companies and merchants.

According to official statistics (1944) there are in the Isfahan province eighty primary schools for boys with 8,723 students and sixteen primary schools for girls with 2,525 students. In Isfahan itself there are eleven secondary schools for boys, of which four are Government schools, and the remainder run by private enterprise. These schools have 1,128 students. There are only two girls' schools in Isfahan, one Government and one run by private enterprise, with 198 students. Najafabad, Shahreza, Ardistan, Sehdeh and Shahr Kurd each have a Government secondary school for boys. Each one teaches about twenty students. Shahreza also has a Government girls' school with twelve students.

Isfahan town has eight hospitals with a capacity of about 450 beds. Three of these—the Khorshid (50 beds), the Amin (60 beds) and the army hospital (60 beds)—are Government hospitals. The remaining five are privately owned. They are the Church Missionary Society with about 100 beds, the Ahmadiyeh with 40 beds, the Boghokhanian with 60 beds, the Kazerooni (maternity) with 40 beds, and the Razi with ten beds. There is also a 100-bed hospital under construction by the mill owners for the use of mill workers. Outside Isfahan itself there is a 10-bed Government hospital at Najafabad. At Shahreza, Sehdeh and Shah Kurd hospital buildings have been erected by the Government, but the hospitals are not yet in operation.

In the villages, administration is in the hands of the village headman—"kadhuda"—who is nominated by the owner of the village or, in the case of a village of peasant proprietors, by the villagers, whereupon the formal appointment is made by the governor of the district. Under the "Kadhuda" are six "sarjuqs"—one for each sixth of the village. These men are appointed locally by the owner (or the villagers, in the case of a village of peasant proprietors) and the kadhuda. They are, with the kadhuda, responsible for law and order. All receive a wage in the form of a small percentage—about one per cent.—of the crops of the village. In addition there is a "mirab" ("madi salar") whose duty it is to look after the village's water supply, and see that it is properly divided, and one or two "dashtban" who look after the agricultural lands of the village.

Isfahan city and district send three Deputies to the Majlis in Tehran. Najafabad (Karvan) and Fereidan together send another. Shahreza sends one and Shahr Kurd and Bakhtiari together send one, making five in all. The Isfahan constituency includes the city of Isfahan, the eight surrounding districts of Jay, Qohab, Burkhar, Marbin, Barzerud, Kararaj, Baraon and Rudasht, and in addition Kuhpayeh and Ardistan districts. Najafabad and Fereidan includes Najafabad itself, Karvan, Arabistan and Fereidan. Shahreza includes, as well as Shahreza district itself, Linjan and Abarguh. Shahr Kurd and Bakhtiari include all Chahar Mahal and Pusht Kuh. Although all males over 21 years of age are entitled to vote it is customary to distribute voting papers, without which nobody can cast a valid vote (in theory, at any rate), in the proportion of one voting paper to every eighth person of the population.

CHAPTER IV.—COMMUNICATIONS.

Isfahan lies in a central position on the Persian plateau and since earliest times has been an important communications centre. Here caravan routes from north to south, from north-west to south-west, and from north-east to south-west have crossed. To the west, north-west and south-west lie the high mountain systems and to the east the deserts of the plateau. To-day these ancient routes have become motor roads, some passable in all weathers, others only passable in the dry season.

At Isfahan the main motor road from Tehran forks, the western fork continuing south to Shiraz and Bushire on the Persian Gulf and the eastern fork running to Kerman and the Indian frontier with a fork at Kerman to the Persian Gulf at Bander Abbas. These roads are fully metalled, but badly worn. From Nain and Yazd, towns to the east of Isfahan on the Kerman road, tracks run across the salt desert to Khorasan. Other similar tracks, now used only by a few camel caravans, run north across the same desert from Kashan, which lies north of Isfahan on the old road to Tehran, to Semnan and the eastern Elburz mountains. A motor road, liable to become snowbound in winter, runs north-west from Isfahan to Sultanabad via Khunsar and Gulpaigan, although it is not the most generally used route between Isfahan and Sultanabad. This road also has a fork to the west at Damaneh (L1237) to the Trans-Iranian railway at Azna. A caravan route runs from Isfahan (road head at Shalamzar) (Q4831) to Khuzistan across the Bakhtiari mountains and an unfinished motor road from Shahreza (road head at Semirum) (W4461) runs further to the south-west towards Behbahan.

A three-wire telegraph line, owned and operated by the Government, runs from Isfahan to Ardistan, Kashan, Qum and Tehran and, in the opposite direction, to Shiraz and Bushire. A similar line runs eastwards from Ardistan to Yazd, Kerman and the Indian frontier. A local line runs from Isfahan via Shahreza to Burujin (Q9527) and Shahr Kurd (Q4963) with a direct line from Isfahan to Shahr Kurd via Safid Dasht (Q8244).

Isfahan is also linked with Sultanabad by telephone (a private company under Government supervision) by way of Najafabad, Damaneh and Khunsar, with a branch line to Ali Gudarz, with Qum by way of Murchekkhur, Nantanz and Kashan, with Shahreza and Abadeh and with Riz (Q9372), Mobarakeh (R1167), Qahfarukh (Q6154), Shahr Kurd and Burujin. It is only possible to speak by telephone as far as Qum and Abadeh on the main Tehran-Bushire telephone line because there are no boosting stations to supply the extra power needed for long-distance calls.

Isfahan has an oil storage depot maintained by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which has a capacity of about 2 million litres of petrol, 1,500,000 litres of paraffin, 1 million litres of black oil and gas oil. A small stock of packed petrol, paraffin and aviation spirit is also maintained as well as a quantity of lubricants. Oil is brought by tanker from Qum by road.

The company has two petrol filling stations, one at the Tehran gate and the other at the Shiraz gate of the town. There are also petrol filling stations at Meimeh on the road to Qum, Kashan, Nain on the road to Yazd, and Shahreza on the road to Shiraz. In addition petrol is sold in small quantities by dealers in the larger villages on the main roads.

The Isfahan airfield, south-east of the town, is not a very good one and is unsuitable for very large aircraft, being small, bumpy and rather near the Kuh-i-Sufeh (R2396). The dimensions are 1,200 yards by 900 yards (approximately). There are two hangars erected for the Persian Air Force by the British Government. At present no Persian Air Force machines are stationed at Isfahan, although up till recently there was a detachment here.

CHAPTER V.—POPULATION.

The population of Isfahan city, i.e., the area enclosed by the circular road round the town which joins the four main entrances to Isfahan, the Tehran, Yehd, Shiraz and Najafabad gates, is 194,064 persons (1945). The total of 194,064 is divided among the districts of the city as follows: district 1, 27,951; district 2, 38,600; district 3, 73,894; district 4, 36,102; district 5, 17,517. The bulk of the population is of the Moslem faith. There are about 5,600 Jews living mainly in the Joobareh quarter (district 3) and about 5,500 Armenians in Julfa (district 5).

For the province the population is divided as follows:—

Chahar Mahal.—Shahr Kurd, 13,516; rest of district (119 villages), 106,194. Total, 119,710.

Fereidan.—Daran, 2,486; rest of district (167 villages), 94,883. Total, 97,369.

Karvan and Arabistan.—Najafabad, 25,150; rest of district (79 villages), 58,082. Total, 83,232.

Shahreza.—Shahreza, 21,230; rest of district (86 villages), 54,740. Total, 75,970.

Ardistan.—Ardistan, 6,942; rest of district (86 villages), 29,028. Total, 35,970.

Qohpeyeh.—Kuhpa, 2,211; rest of district (194 villages), 31,922. Total, 34,133.

Bakhtiari.—59,454 (Bakhtiari villages in the Isfahan province).

The population of the eight buluks of Isfahan is divided as follows:—

Marbin.—Sehdeh, 31,210; rest of buluk (55 villages), 44,218. Total, 75,428.

Rudashtain.—Varzaneh, 3,059; Rest of buluk (46 villages), 5,383. Total, 8,442.

Burkhar.—Gaz, 4,953; rest of buluk (26 villages), 34,930. Total, 39,883.

Qohab.—Qajavaristan, 1,105; rest of buluk (29 villages), 2,330. Total, 3,435.

Jay.—Khorasgun, 6,450; rest of buluk (60 villages), 14,016. Total, 20,466.

Kararaj.—Dashti, 238; rest of buluk (19 villages), 2,015. Total, 2,253.

Baraoun.—Qarneh, 283; rest of buluk (54 villages), 2,597. Total, 2,880.

Linjanat.—Riz, 8,850; rest of buluk (89 villages), 82,104. Total, 90,954.

These figures give, therefore, a total population for the Isfahan province of 943,743 persons, which shows that Isfahan is one of the most heavily populated districts of Persia. This has been obtained from the distribution department, which has recently carried out a census of its own in connexion with rationing. It is a more reliable figure than could be obtained from the census department itself.

CHAPTER VI.—THE PEOPLE.

The people of Isfahan are remarkable throughout Persia for their thriftiness, which amounts in many cases to meanness, and for their capacity for hard work. It is said that if one overhears the conversation of two Isfahanis in the street the subject under discussion is always connected with money. Both the townsman, be he bazaar merchant in a big way or petty shopkeeper, and the peasant have these characteristics. Even the very wealthy are always bethinking themselves of some way whereby they may make just a little more money. Socially the Isfahanis are harder to get to know than the people of most other parts of Persia, for they lack facility for entertainment or for enjoying themselves. All classes of society are divided into many small cliques, the members of which keep closely to themselves and do not mix well with others. There are also, as in all provincial towns, many petty enmities and strifes which it behoves the stranger to know of if he is to avoid unnecessary social difficulties. To their friends the Isfahanis are hospitable enough, but do not set store by outward appearance unless there is some ultimate tangible profit to be had therefrom. As in the case in most Persian provinces, the Isfahani feels himself to be first an Isfahani and secondly a Persian. Tehran, Shiraz and Yazd are looked on almost as foreign countries inhabited by other races.

Racially the population of the area is, with the exception of the Armenians and Georgians of Fereidan, some elements of Turki origin and the Jews of Isfahan, homogeneous and untouched by foreign blood. The population is, in fact, essentially Persian, with the typical long nose and narrow head.

The Isfahani speech is nasal and broader than in most other parts of Persia and has its own dialectic peculiarities, although these are not very pronounced.

The bulk of the population of the district speaks Persian with local variations in dialect. The Armenians naturally have their own tongue, which is widely spoken by them. Printing in the Armenian script is also done in Julfa. Among the Jews a knowledge of Hebrew is not extensive. Other language minorities are the Georgians in Fereidan and a good proportion of Turki-speaking villagers in Chahar Mahal, who are not in any way connected with the Turki-speaking Qashqai tribes of Fars. There are also Turki-speaking villages in Fereidan. Among the Bakhtiari tribe and those of Bakhtiari origin settled in Isfahan, the Bakhtiari dialect of Luri is widely spoken.

A high standard of education is, in all classes of the population, remarkable for its absence and culture, as such, is almost non-existent.

In the past, Isfahan was a stronghold of the mullas, and although these lost their power in the reign of Reza Shah, religious influence is still quite strong in many ways. The number of mullas and religious students to be seen about the streets is relatively large, and much is made of religious festivals.

The Moslems naturally make up the greatest part of the population, and besides them there are small minorities of Jews, Armenians, Persian Christians (other than European and other foreign Christians) and Zoroastrians. The Bahai faith has also a number of followers, mainly in Najafabad, a small country town to the west of Isfahan.

The Armenians form the largest minority, for besides the few thousand in Julfa, the Armenian quarter of Isfahan, there are some 19,000 who live in twenty-four villages (mostly owned by the peasants themselves) in Fereidan, in two in Upper Karvan, and in nine villages in south-eastern Chahar Mahal. A list of these villages is given as Appendix I to this chapter. This Armenian community was transplanted from Julfa on the Araxes River in Azerbaijan and the area around there, by Shah Abbas at the beginning of the 17th century, and has contrived to retain its identity and religion since that time in spite of persecution at various times. In this respect the Armenians are unlike the Georgians brought to Fereidan by Shah Abbas at the same time, for these have now become Moslems, although they retain their Georgian speech and customs.

In character the Armenian has, in many ways, remained the most virile of the Persian minorities. In the 19th and early 20th centuries individual Armenians played important parts in Persian affairs (Prince Malkom Khan, Yprem Khan), but since then the community does not seem to have produced anyone outstanding. The Armenians are mainly middle-class people and peasants. There is no aristocracy or upper class. They are sharp, intelligent, industrious and thrifty, and for that reason have been much used by foreigners in Persia, because they usually know English, Russian or other languages. Many inhabitants of Julfa have connexions with India, Burma, Java and California. Thus the Imperial Bank of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have at one time or another employed Armenians extensively, especially as accountants. They are also good mechanics and the oil company employs them extensively as tanker drivers. On the other hand, because of the religious disability under which they suffer in the eyes of Moslems, they seem to go out of their way to seek the sympathy of the Englishman against the Moslem because he, like them, is a Christian, and to expect the Englishman automatically to take their part against the Moslem for that reason. The Jew adopts this attitude much less. The modern Armenians of the Isfahan area are cultivated a good deal by the Soviet Consulate in Isfahan, which is not altogether surprising since Etchmiadzin monastery in Soviet Armenia is the headquarters of the Armenian Orthodox Church. The Armenian priesthood has much influence, and provides leadership and organisation for the community. Nearly every village has its church, while in Julfa there are eleven churches and one cathedral—St. Saviour. Julfa is the seat of an Archimandrite (Bishop) whose diocese covers Persia, except Tabriz, India and the Netherlands East Indies. He is appointed from Etchmiadzin, and at present the appointment of a new man to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the previous incumbent is awaited. It is probable that the appointment will have to be made with an eye to pleasing the Soviet Government, and there are already signs that the Armenian priesthood is alive to the importance of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Consulate in Isfahan. Most of the priests in Julfa are men of education, having studied in India and elsewhere, but in the villages the standard is less high. In Julfa there is a small number of Roman Catholic Armenians with their own priests and church.

In their mode of life the Armenians have a much higher standard of cleanliness and domestic efficiency than Moslems, and are consequently healthier. In the villages the men wear the same clothes as Moslems, while the women go unveiled and wear their own traditional costumes.

The Armenians have complete freedom of worship and have recently (1942) been allowed to give religious language teaching in the Government schools attended by Armenians—three hours' religious teaching a week and one hour's language teaching every day. Before Reza Shah's reign the Armenians had their own schools, which taught mainly in Armenian. During Reza Shah's reign these were taken over by the Government. As a result of this the older generation of Armenians usually speak very bad Persian while the younger speaks much better.

Communal affairs, religious, political and otherwise, are dealt with by the Ecclesiastical Council in Julfa, an elected body on which both priests and laymen sit.

There is not much friendliness between Armenians and Moslems, although there is at present no evidence of any actual persecution by the latter. Where a Moslem landowner has Armenian peasants, he is usually appreciative of their greater industry as husbandmen compared with Moslems, and in the villages

Moslems and Armenians live on the whole peaceably together. Like other non-Moslems, however, they are under disabilities regarding entering Government service. The Armenians of the Isfahan area, with those of the rest of the south of Persia, combine to elect one of the two Armenian Deputies to the Majlis.

The Jewish community in Isfahan is probably as old as Isfahan itself. Various explanations of its origin exist (see Chapter II). Certainly its history goes back to the time of Cyrus. There is a shrine near Isfahan, at Pir Bakran (R1681), which is supposed to be the tomb of Sarah, daughter of Asher and granddaughter of Jacob.

The Jewish community has at various times suffered persecution at the hands of the Moslems, though this has decreased in modern times. Moslems will even admit that the thrifty character of the Isfahani is due to his having Jewish blood in his veins. Latterly, however, with the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe and the spread, before the present war, of German ideas in Isfahan, some anti-Jewish feeling has developed in Isfahan and during 1942, when the Germans were near the Caucasus, there were frequent attacks made on Jews here, both physical and verbal.

The Isfahani Jew is a relatively poor man. He owns no villages, but may have house property in the town. There are a few Jewish merchants in the bazaar and most of the antique trade in Isfahan is in Jewish hands. For the rest the bulk of the Jews in Isfahan work in one or other of the textile mills or peddle wares of various sorts in the villages. One textile mill in particular, Nakhtab (cotton-thread spinning) employs many Jews and a proportion of its capital is held by Jews. The Jews live mainly in the Joobareh quarter of the town, where, like the Armenians in Julfa, their houses are warren-like with tunnelled entrances and in narrow streets as a guard against Moslem attacks. The Jews have complete freedom of worship in Isfahan and there are eighteen synagogues and two or three rabbis. One of these is officially recognised by the Persian Government for the purpose of registering Jewish marriages and similar matters of Jewish personal status. The community has a committee formed of its leading members for dealing with matters affecting the Jewish community as such. There is a large Jewish school under the management of the "Alliance Israélite Universelle," which managed to keep its schools in Persia when other foreign-controlled schools, such as the British and American missionary schools, were taken over by the Government in 1940. The Jews in Isfahan take no part in politics and seem less anti-Moslem than, for instance, the Armenians. The Persian Jewish community sends one Deputy to the Majlis.

Like the Armenian, the Jew is intelligent and clever. Through having been educated in a French school he usually knows some French and also English and, again like the Armenian, proves himself better than the Moslem at clerical and office work. He practices his religion and keeps his religious festivals, but is rarely able to read the Hebrew scriptures intelligently.

There are estimated to be about 10,000 Bahais in Isfahan and another 3,000 in Najafabad and in Shahreza. They are mainly converts from Islam with only a few Jews, unlike, say, Hamadan, where many Jews are Bahais. As elsewhere in Persia the posts and telegraphs officials are largely of this persuasion, and there are many army officers among them.

There are also some twenty-five Zoroastrian families in Isfahan, but of these twenty-two are Bahais. There is no fire-temple or tower of silence here. The Zoroastrians are mainly small traders and have come from Yazd and Kerman.

The Christian community in Isfahan, apart from the Armenians, consists mainly of about 150 converts of the Church Missionary Society and may be said to belong to the Church of England. Of these two-thirds are Jewish and Moslem converts. In Najafabad and Shahreza there are small off-shoots of this community of about ten persons in each place.

The Georgian population of the Fereidan district was brought here by Shah Abbas from the Kaheti district of Eastern Georgia, about the time he brought the Armenians from Azerbaijan. Like the Armenian population of Fereidan it is entirely agricultural.

It seems that the number of these Georgians is about 13,000. They live in the Karchambo and Tukhmaqlu districts of Fereidan in ten villages which are solely Georgian, while there are four more which were originally Georgian, but are now of mixed Persian, Armenian and Turki population. A list of these villages is given as Appendix 2 to this chapter. A sprinkling of Georgians exists as well in the other villages of Fereidan. Georgians indeed claim that many Armenians are really Georgians who adopted the Armenian faith rather than Islam. The Georgians of Fereidan as a whole, however, have now embraced Islam, but have retained their own language and customs.

APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER VI.

Armenian Villages in Fereidan and Chahar Mahal with Population Figures.

(Census taken in October 1944 by the Armenian Authorities of Julfa, Isfahan.)

FEREIDAN.

Armenian Name.	Persian Name.	Map ref.	Population.
Hadan	Hadan	I-39 O/P8947 ...	669
Aznavaul	Aznaula	I-39 O/P7744 ...	407
Boloran	Boloran	Not on map ...	1,010
Hezar-Jerib	Hezar Jerib	I-39 O/P7144 ...	814
Qaleh-Khahjeh	Qaleh Khajeh	I-39 O/P6746 ...	250
Khoigan	Khoigan	I-39 O/P8336 ...	1,564
Dajan	Dajan	Not on map ...	211
Sang-i-Baran	Sang-i-Baran	I-39 U/P8632 ...	1,710
Khung	Khung	Not on map ...	506
Shahbulaq	Shahbulaq	" " " " ...	276
Bahkert	Bahkert	I-39 O/L0936 ...	250
Shurishkan	Shureshgun	I-39 U/P8526 ...	641
Milagerd	Milagerd	I-39 U/P8924 ...	763
Chigan	Chigan	I-39 U/P9823 ...	176
Drakhtak	Drakhtek	Not on map ...	284
Namagerd	Namagerd	I-39 U/L0229 ...	1,947
Gharghun	Gharghun	Not on map ...	993
Alaran	Alaran	" " " " ...	672
Qaleh Malik	Qaleh Malik	" " " " ...	190
Singerd	Singerd	I-39 U/L0811 ...	746
Mudan	Mughan	I-39 U/L0318 ...	96
Nerkhin (Inner) Khoigan	Khoigan	I-39 U/L0316 ...	171
Adigan	Adigan	I-39 U/L0909 ...	269
Salbardi	Salbardi	I-39 U/L1200a ...	179
Daulatabad	Upper (Daulatabad)	I-39 U/L3826 ...	635
Khrder	Karvan (Kurd)	I-39 U/L4125 ...	582
Total ...			16,011

CHAHAR MAHAL.

Upper Khunarg	Konarg	Not on map ...	368
Lower Khunarg	" " " " ...	" " " " ...	272
Livasion	Livaskan	" " " " ...	264
Mamuran	Mamureh	" " " " ...	204
Albulaq	Albalaq	" " " " ...	382
Sinigan	Sinakan	H-39 D/Q7514 ...	324
Mamukha	Qaleh Mamaka	H-39 C/Q6424 ...	562
Hajiabad	Hajiabad	Not on map ...	486
Sirak	Sirak	" " " " ...	354
Total ...			3,216

APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER VI.

Villages in Fereidan Inhabited by Persian Moslems of Georgian Origin.

Persian Name.	Georgian Name.	Map ref.	Population.
Akhureh Bala	Zemo Martkopi	I-39 U/cP7626 ...	3,685
Buyin	Boini	I-39 O/cP8141 ...	1,143
Sibak	Sibaki	I-39 U/cP7119 ...	897
Jaghjagh	Jaghjaghi	I-39 U/cP7518 ...	835
Aghehen	Aghehah	I-39 O/cP7242 ...	889
Miandash (Dum-i-Kamar)	Toreli, Telveli	I-39 O/cP8142 ...	1,298
Afus	Afusi	I-39 O/cP7535 ...	1,832
Dash Kasan	Tashkezana	I-39 O/cP8237 ...	348
Chaghyurat (Chaga-Yurt)	Chaghyruti	I-39 T/cP6531 ...	696
Khamislu	Khamis Liani	I-39 O/cP8534 ...	987
Total ...			12,610

CHAPTER VII.—BRITISH INTERESTS.

British interests in Isfahan are at present confined in the main to the Imperial Bank of Iran, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Church Missionary Society. As regards official bodies, there is, apart from the consulate, an Anglo-Persian Institute which is under the control of the British Council. There are also smaller trading interests.

Off and on there have been British interests established in Isfahan for over 300 years. In the reign of Shah Abbas, the East India Company established a factory in Isfahan, and in the Christian grave-yard is at least one English grave of that period bearing the inscription "Gulielmus Bell—Joan F. Northumbr—Apud Regem. Abbas. Pro. Anglia. Agiens," with the date of death, 24th February, 1624. Even to-day a certain caravanserai off the main Isfahan bazaar (the Qaisarieh) is called the "teemcheh-i-faranghiha" because it once held the East India Company's factory. This early connexion with England was, however, almost entirely due to private venture in search of trade. No British Consulate existed in Isfahan until 1891. About this time also a Russian Consulate was opened. In 1900 the British and Russian Consulates were raised to consulates-general. In 1933 the British Consulate-General was closed, Isfahan being put under the supervision of the British Consul at Shiraz. The post was reopened as a vice-consulate at the end of 1941 and raised to a consulate in the spring of 1942. With the opening of the British-owned overland telegraph line from London to India in 1870, Isfahan received a small community of British telegraph officials belonging to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, for it was an important station on the line from Tehran to Bushire. In 1931 the line was handed over to the Persian Government, and the British staff left. In 1869 the first missionary of the Church Missionary Society established himself in Julfa (where, as it was anyhow inhabited by non-Moslems, all foreigners were obliged to live until the Persian authorities agreed to the establishment of non-Moslems in Isfahan itself in the last few years of the century). From that date Isfahan has been the Society's chief station in Persia and is now the seat of the Anglican Bishop in Persia and of men's and women's hospitals run by missionary doctors. These hospitals were opened in the early years of the present century and have done much good for the sick of Isfahan and its neighbourhood, as well as being a very useful manifestation of British influence. There was also a very successful school—the Stuart Memorial College—run on English public school lines by the mission, for Persian boys. It was taken over by the Persian Government in 1940. A woman member of the mission staff, a Persian subject, runs one of the only two girls' schools in Isfahan and the mission also supervises a school for blind children which had been started by a German who was later interned.

From time to time various British trading firms have operated in Isfahan. Up to the end of the nineteenth century British manufactured goods and textiles found a ready market here, as did Indian tea, and this led to the setting up of one or two British enterprises here. The best known of these were Lynch Brothers and Ziegler and Company. Both were general trading firms, Lynch Brothers being concerned with shipping on the Karun and Euphrates and Tigris rivers and also with the development of the Bakhtiari caravan road from Isfahan to Ahwaz, and Zieglers with the import of Manchester piece-goods and manufactured articles in general. Lynch Brothers ceased to exist about 1922 and Zieglers was wound up in 1933. Both concerns unfortunately suffered from mismanagement and were forced to close. The Imperial Bank of Persia established a branch in Isfahan in 1890 which has developed into one of the most important of its offices after Tehran. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company also established an office here in 1928. In 1944 Lynch Brothers reopened an office in Isfahan under the name of The Lynch Company with the intention of doing general trading and agency work as soon as the relaxation of war restrictions on the export of British goods will allow.

The British community in Isfahan amounts to between twenty and thirty people as a rule, the majority of them missionaries. There is also a small number of British Indians, mostly motor-drivers or connected with the repair and operation of motor transport. They are mainly Sikhs with a few Punjabi Moslems.

CHAPTER VIII.—OTHER FOREIGN INTERESTS.

1. *Russian Interests.*

Under the 1907 agreement between Britain and Russia, Isfahan fell within the Russian zone of influence. At that time Russian trade in manufactured goods, textiles and oil was ousting that of Britain which had won a commanding position earlier on. Russian political influence does not, however, seem to have established itself in Isfahan in any enduring fashion. With the collapse of the Tsarist régime at the end of the Great War, Russian influence in Isfahan may be said to have virtually disappeared and it has never really developed since. Since 1941 and the re-establishment of a Soviet Russian Consulate in Isfahan at the end of 1942 (the former Consulate-General had been closed in 1933) the Russians have worked hard to create a position for themselves, but have not so far succeeded. Apart from the Soviet Consulate, the only Soviet interests in Isfahan as such are the Transsovtrans road transport organisation, which has recently opened an office here, and the insurance corporation, Gosstrakh. These do not, however, do a large amount of business. If, as is probable, a Soviet nominee is appointed by the Armenian church headquarters at Etchmiadzin in Soviet Armenia to replace the late Archimandrite of the Armenians in Julfa, Soviet influence among the Armenians which is already spreading, will undoubtedly flourish.

2. *United States Interests.*

There are no United States interests in the Isfahan area. An American has since December 1943 been in charge of the Finance Department here, for part of the time with an American assistant, but these two were members of Dr. Mills-paugh's mission.

3. *French Interests.*

For a time, up to about ten years ago, there was a French Consular Agent here, M. Brasseur. Now a school for the Jewish community run by the "Alliance Israélite Universelle" is the sole French interest here, albeit an indirect one.

4. *Vatican Interests.*

Priests and nuns of the order of St. Vincent de Paul have been established here for many years. They seem to devote their time more to educating Persian children than to proselytising. The Vatican also has charge of the spiritual welfare of the small community of Roman Catholic Armenians in Julfa, who are, however, Persian nationals.

5. *German Interests.*

At present, naturally, there are no German interests in Isfahan, but a large proportion of the upper class of Isfahanis has German sympathies, although now these are suppressed. Before this war the Germans had important business interests here, for out of the nine large textile mills, all were laid out by Germans and all except one, Risbaf, had wholly German plant. German influence in the textile industry was paramount and the Isfahan Technical School was run and inspired by Germans. There was quite a large German community in Isfahan as well, which was highly organised for political and propaganda purposes and, through the British Consulate-General having been closed in 1933, was enabled to carry on its work virtually unwatched.

CHAPTER IX.—POLITICS IN ISFAHAN.

On the whole the Isfahani is not very politically minded. He is much more interested in making money. The Isfahan villager is the same. Politics in Isfahan consequently are the pastime of the few. Hitherto the most powerful political group in Isfahan has been that of the land and mill owners. Under Reza Shah they enjoyed the support of the Government and so were absolute. With the change of régime in 1941 and the removal of any ban on Communist propaganda, the Russian-backed Tudeh party began to develop, although it was not until the summer of 1942 that it began to have any influence in Isfahan. This was brought about largely by the intrigues of the pro-Axis military commander in Isfahan, General Zahedi, who, in order to stir up mud for his own political purposes, set the mill workers and their employers against each other by encouraging both sides secretly. Up to this time there had been hardly any political problems in Isfahan that were other than purely local. Since then, however, the

struggle between labour and capital has developed and will continue to do so with various ups and downs. At present Isfahan is the centre of this struggle in central and southern Persia, because of the existence of an easily-organised body of largely uneducated opinion in the ten thousand odd mill operatives whose allegiance the Tudeh has been seeking to win. The struggle naturally has repercussions on the general internal politics of Persia, but apart from this, Isfahan is not normally a centre of Persian politics, that is to say, purely Persian internal politics as opposed to Persian politics in which foreign influence plays a part.

There is no one family or individual in Isfahan with paramount political influence. Sarem-ed-Douleh, the cleverest surviving son of the Zill-es-Sultan, once Prince-Governor of Isfahan for a quarter of a century, has a certain influence, as has his family, but his undoubted political skill and ability are weakened by his lack of energy and personal unpopularity, for one reason or another. There is the small clique of rich mill and landowners (often one and the same person) and landowners, including the Zill-es-Sultan family, who have large share-holdings in the mills; this dominates Isfahan politics if any group may be said to do so, but is riven by individual enmities. These men are mostly ignorant, believing that money can do everything, reactionary to a degree, and solely interested in making as much money as possible. They are, especially now, when the mill workers and the peasants are being awakened by the propaganda of the Tudeh party to a sense, even though it be but dim, of their rights and wrongs, very harmful to Isfahan, for they cannot realise that the only way to deal with Tudeh and Communist propaganda is to win the friendship and respect of their employees, whether peasants or mill operatives, by generous and progressive treatment. The Isfahan area is by the nature of things not a good forcing ground for Communist doctrines, because it has a very large proportion relatively of peasant proprietors and, in Isfahan itself, small tradesmen, who are independent of either landowners or big merchants. Were the big men to assure themselves of the support of these two classes, Tudeh and Communist propaganda would make no headway at all. Persian estimates put the number of peasant proprietors in the district at about 500,000, as against a few thousand large landowners. The largest landowners of all do not own more than six to ten villages. In the town the trade guilds are strong and are able to exercise considerable political power, for instance, at election time.

Much depends on the attitude of the senior Government officials. The Governor-General, if he be an honest man who does not take money and has no personal ambitions, can do a great deal to keep things quiet by discouraging the prosecution of personal feuds or intrigues by the leading Isfahanis, but if he is out to make money he will seek to encourage these so as to take money from both sides. Similarly, the divisional commander has much scope for trouble-making or the reverse. As often as not he intrigues against the civil Governor-General and from such enmities among officials the Isfahanis themselves are quick to profit, for their own ends.

The Bakhtiari khans do not take much part in Isfahan politics to-day but, as shown in another chapter, the general Bakhtiari political situation is important to Isfahan. As long as the townsmen of Isfahan have enough cheap bread and other essential food-stuffs to eat they keep reasonably quiet. This can only occur when the surrounding country is untroubled, so that supplies can be properly collected and sent in to the town, and this in the last resort depends on peace in Bakhtiari, because any explosion there has immediate reactions on security in the villages round Isfahan, and even in Isfahan itself. This is especially the case when the Central Government is weak, as it has been for the past four years.

CHAPTER X.—TRIBES.

The Isfahan province includes a part of the Bakhtiari area, made up of western Fereidan, Pusht-Kuh (west of Chahar Mahal) and the Janeki Sardsir. It is not proposed to give any detailed explanation of Bakhtiari affairs or organisation here, since that already exists in my report on the Bakhtiari tribe, 1944. Only the general influence of the Bakhtiaris on Isfahan affairs will be considered.

The Bakhtiaris are of importance to Isfahan mainly for economic reasons. Chahar Mahal and Fereidan are the two main grain-producing areas for Isfahan town. The Bakhtiaris virtually dominate Chahar Mahal, since the tribes' summer quarters lie next door to it and the khans own a good deal of land in the area. Similarly in Fereidan the fertile area is dominated by another part of the Bakhtiari tribe in the summer. Therefore successful collection of the grain crop

depends on peace in Bakhtiari as a whole. In addition, Isfahan's charcoal, cooking butter and fat and meat come largely from tribal areas or from areas where tribal influence is great. Road communications with the rest of Persia are also subject to raids by Bakhtiari and other tribesmen in the spring, summer and autumn.

In the southern part of the province round Shahreza and the area between Shahreza and Nain, raiding by the Qashqai and Boir Ahmadi tribes is common in the summer. Qashqai influence in the Shahreza area is strong. Moreover, because in past years, especially in the period just before, during and just after the Great War, when Bakhtiari political influence in Persia was at its height, Isfahan and its surrounding villages lay at the mercy of roving bands of tribesmen who occasioned much loss by their robberies, the Isfahani, be he townsman or villager, still fears the tribesman and his khan and mistrusts them. A number of the Bakhtiari khans live permanently in Isfahan and there is a large number of people of Bakhtiari origin settled in the town, notably in the Bidabad, Lunban and Juzdan areas of the town.

CHAPTER XI.—THE LAND, AGRICULTURE AND HUSBANDRY.

Landowners in the Isfahan area are of two classes—those who own comparatively large amounts of land, landowners in the English sense of the word, and peasant proprietors who own only small amounts of land. In the Isfahan area, the number of large landowners is, unlike other parts of Persia, very small indeed compared to the number of peasant proprietors. Land is divided into sixths—"dongs." Each "dong" is divided into twelve "habbehs."

Peasant proprietors who own and work their own land, naturally own everything on the land and take the whole crop. A landowner, however, divides his crop with his peasants and gives them certain services as well. Normally he supplies the land, water, seed (for winter—"shatvi"—crops such as wheat and barley) and housing. For summer—"saifi"—crops and for fruit and nut crops he supplies only the water (melons, peas, cucumbers, marrows, carrots, beetroot, rye, millet). With winter crops the landlord, if he supplies the seed, takes two-thirds of the yield and the peasant receives one-third, but with fruit, nuts, summer crops and opium, where the peasant supplies the seed, the crop is divided into halves, one for the landlord and one for the peasant. In one or two cases more enlightened landlords (Sarem-ed-Douleh is one) divide all their crops equally with their peasants, taking only half the yield.^(*)

Round Isfahan itself and near large villages where land is crowded, the land never lies fallow, but is manured every year with human manure from cesspits and sheep manure from grazing sheep, so that it can stand the strain of continuous cultivation. Where a village is not limited as to space, land is normally only cultivated once every three or four years and is not then manured at all. Horse manure is not used at all, because it makes the ground hard, and cow manure is used as fuel by the peasants. For newly-planted trees, pigeon manure is much used. This is collected in the many pigeon towers to be seen round Isfahan. These are opened once a year and the manure taken out. These towers do not, however, carry the pigeon population they did formerly, for the majority of them are derelict and fallen down. Round Isfahan itself, the peasant digs his land himself and does not use a plough. This is because by digging he can break the soil up better than by using the primitive local plough which can only really scratch the surface. This is important when the same land is cultivated every year. Also, he may not be able to afford oxen to pull a plough. In other less crowded parts of the province the simple plough, an iron-shod wooden prong, is used behind oxen.

The greater part of the Isfahan area bears irrigated crops. Only in parts of Chahar Mahal and Fereidan is there much non-irrigated (rain crop) cultivation. Irrigated cultivation is watered either by water drawn from the Zayandeh Rud and other smaller rivers by means of canals or by water from the underground water channels known as "qanats." The distribution of the water of the Zayandeh Rud river between the many villages which depend on this source of supply, from the Bagh-i-Badran area of Upper Linjan to the point where the river loses itself in the Gavkhaneh salt lake east of Isfahan, is still in the main the same distribution that was devised 300 years ago by one of the Shah Abbas's advisers, Shaikh Bahai. Naturally, since Shaikh Bahai prepared his roll—

(*) In Chahar Mahal the peasant takes two-thirds and sometimes four-fifths of the crop. In the latter case he supplies his own seed.

"Toomer"—setting forth the mode of dividing the waters of the Zayandeh Rud, villages have disappeared and others have sprung up, but nevertheless his basis for distribution was essentially sound and is so to-day. The Isfahan plain is very fertile, but depends entirely on successful irrigation and does not in consequence carry the cultivation it should do. This was realised even in Shah Abbas's day, for he embarked upon an immense scheme for making a cut in the mountain ridge—the Karkunan ridge (I-39-T: U7876) forming the watershed between the Zayandeh Rud and Karun river basins—so as to draw water from the Karun to supplement that of the Zayandeh Rud. This plan never matured, however. Since that time it has been continually under discussion in Isfahan, but although many proposals have been drawn up by Persian and foreign engineers, nothing concrete has yet been done. Additional water for the Zayandeh Rud would certainly help Isfahan's agricultural production greatly.

The wheat and barley production of the Isfahan province, that is, the surplus available after landowners' and peasants' own needs have been met, is, in a reasonably good year, when water is plentiful and there are no pests or diseases such as "senn" (a sort of blight) or rust, about 40,000 kharvars or 11,000 tons. Of this two-thirds is wheat and one-third barley. This surplus goes to supply Isfahan with bread for the year.

There is a Government-owned silo (Russian equipped) of a capacity of 16,000 tons. It has never in fact been full since it was erected. However, flour is issued daily to the bakers of the town in amounts varying from 50 to 150 kharvars daily, according to the bakers' needs. These needs depend in turn on the time of year and on whether it profits the bakers to buy flour from the silo or in the open market. In addition the rich people of the town have their own flour which they either buy or bring in from their villages.

There is also a quite important local production of rice in the Linjan area by the Zayandeh Rud river. Here a surplus of about 6,000 kharvars is given in a normal year. Linjan rice is preferred by most Isfahanis to Mazanderan rice, for it suits the hard water of Isfahan better and has a delicate scent which other rice lacks. In the Ardistan district, which is very dry, a good deal of giant millet is grown.

Isfahan is noted for its fruit: cherries, apricots, grapes, melons ("garmak" and "simsoori," rather like a cantelupe, which ripens early, and "kharbuzeh," a white-fleshed yellow-skinned melon, which ripens late), peaches, apples, pears and other sorts as well. A good deal of stone fruit is dried and sent to other parts of Persia. Najafabad produces good varieties of almonds. Cucumbers, too, are extensively grown in the summer.

In the Daran Kuh in Fereidan a tamarisk tree grows on which a beetle lives which produces a white excretion which, when collected and prepared with sugar, forms the sweetmeat "gaz," for which Isfahan is famous.

In the Isfahan area horses are bred in the villages, and oxen and cows and also sheep and goats. Mules are bred and owned in particular in the villages of Upper Linjan and at Shahr Kurd and Haftshijun (map Hushegun I-39, U-Q4550) in Chahar Mahal. Donkeys are bred and owned in Mahyar (I-39, V-R4051) and Khurzuq (I-39, V-M2216), while camels are bred and owned by the villagers of Mahahbad (I-39, Q-G6905) and Tudeshek (I-39, W-N1816).

CHAPTER XII.—INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE.

Isfahan is, after Tehran, the biggest trading centre in Persia. Indeed, if those commercial activities be set aside which must of necessity be carried on in the capital of a country, Isfahan is a more important commercial centre than Tehran itself. Apart from large general trading interests in the Isfahan bazaar, such as firms and individuals importing tea and sugar there is, for Persia, a large concentration of the textile industry in the nine cotton and wool spinning and weaving mills in Isfahan which, on the whole during the war years (from 1939) have made large and even enormous profits. Prosperity has also been the lot of the smaller merchants and of the landowners, big and small, because of the high price of grain. Those competent to judge aver that there is more money in Isfahan to-day than in any other city in Persia and this is borne out by the fact that current deposits with the Imperial Bank of Iran amount to some twenty-five times the current deposits of pre-war years, while the Persian National Bank also certainly has increased its business though not to the same extent.

The chief products of the Isfahan region are factory-made woollen cloth, hand-made cotton cloth, cotton yarn, opium, tobacco, gum tragacanth, dried fruit,

almonds, givehs (cotton shoes). It is also a distribution centre for other parts of Persia for tea and sugar imported from India. Most of Isfahan's products, especially textiles, find a market elsewhere in Persia. Opium was before the war exported to the Far East, mainly to the Straits Settlements and Japan. Some also went to Britain and America. Since the war and the increase in the price of other crops such as grain, opium cultivation has dropped off because it is a difficult crop to raise successfully, both as regards trouble and expense. Isfahan opium, however, is of high quality, containing up to 11 per cent. of morphine. Tobacco, which is of a high quality for its type, is exported to Egypt where it is used in the making of "Egyptian" cigarettes. Gum Tragacanth goes to Britain. A certain amount of grain is normally sent to the Yazd area, but as a rule Isfahan is only just self-supporting in grain—at least it has been so for the last twelve of fifteen years.

The chief imports of the Isfahan region are manufactured goods of all kinds, motor cars and lorries, bicycles, machinery and raw materials for the textile mills, piece goods, drugs, food-stuffs, charcoal and oil products. Manufactured goods, motor vehicles and bicycles, piece goods, drugs, machinery, dyes for the textile industry, all come from abroad. Oil products and petrol, paraffin, lubricants, diesel oil (now extensively used for heating houses, bakers' ovens and public baths), are supplied by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from Abadan and Kermanshah. Manufactured articles in general in the years before the war came from Germany, Japan and Russia. Germany and Japan had trade agreements with Persia, which to a greater or less extent forced Persia to trade with them in certain commodities. Motor vehicles came largely from the United States and bicycles from Britain, Japan and Germany. Drugs and dyes came very largely from Germany, and piece goods from India, Japan and Russia, with a small amount of high quality lines from Britain. Food-stuffs come from other parts of the country, such as rice from Mazanderan (local rice cultivation was forbidden until after the fall of Pahlevi), cooking butter from the Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes and charcoal from Bakhtiari.

A table is given as an appendix to this chapter showing details of the nine big textile mills in Isfahan. It will be seen that in every case the original capital has been dangerously increased. Reserves are in no case greater than the legal minimum of 10 per cent. All these mills have German power plants (diesel-electric) and all but one, Risbaf, have entirely German equipment. Risbaf has British (Platt Bros., Oldham) cotton spinning machinery, but German wool spinning and weaving equipment. As well, there are several other smaller textile enterprises (Javeed, Zarifi).

Isfahan is also well-known for its engraved silver and brass ware although the value of this trade is not probably of great importance commercially.

Other Industrial activities in Isfahan.

A small amount of hand printing on calico is done in the bazaar and there is local production of carpets. Dyes for these are almost entirely of vegetable origin and locally prepared.

Chemicals.

A small plant owned by Ahmad Sudian is producing sodium, potassium and magnesium salts from plant ash and local magnesite deposits and gives a small amount of nitric and hydrochloric acids as by-products. The appearance and quality of the products were judged good by M.E.S.C. experts who visited the plant in 1943.

Eight small plants in the bazaar produce about one ton per eight-hour day of impure sodium carbonate which is supplied to the textile mills and local glass makers.

Castings.

A small forge operated by Ustad Hassan in the Bazaar Najjar turns out iron and bronze castings from scrap metal. This production with the excellent machine shops attached to several of the big mills results in good quality machine parts being turned out.

Cotton Ropes.

The Risbaf mill makes a satisfactory cotton rope for rope drives out of cotton waste and there is also a small production of this in the bazaar.

Matches.

The Sherkat-i-Firuz Kebrit Sazi factory produces about 10,000 boxes of matches a day.

Glass.

A primitive glass melting furnace in the bazaar produces poor quality glass vessels and bottles up to about one gallon capacity.

Oil Extraction.

Extremely primitive production in the bazaar gives about 120 kgs. a day of linseed, cotton seed and opium seed oil.

Motor Transport.

In the Shahpur Avenue there are several motor repair workshops where ordinary repairs to cars and lorries can be executed. Most of these establishments can do welding as well.

Coal.

A primitive coal mine exists at Soh (L. 9988). It has an output of three or four tons daily, most of which comes to Isfahan for sale.

APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER XII.**Textile Mills in Isfahan.**

1. *Karkhaneh Risandegi va Bafandegi Vatan*.—Capital in 1933, 5,000,000 rials. Capital in 1943, 27,625,000 rials. 5,220 spindles for wool and 1,500 for doubling. 101 looms. 1,200 workers employed.
2. *Sherkat Sahami Mahdood Risandegi va Bafandegi Zayanderoud Isfahan*.—Capital in 1935, 2,076,040 rials. Capital in 1943, 32,026,000 rials. 8,096 spindles for cotton. 171 looms. 1,400 workers employed.
3. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Risaff*.—Capital in 1933, 1,067,620 rials. Capital in 1943, 63,234,000 rials. 8,448 spindles for cotton, 6,000 for wool, 2,000 spindles for doubling. 80 looms. 1,870 workers employed.
4. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Shah-Reza*.—Capital in 1936, 1,224,000 rials. Capital in 1943, 26,702,000 rials. 4,824 spindles for cotton, 500 spindles for doubling. 130 looms. 1,100 workers employed.
5. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Sanaye Pashm*.—Capital in 1936, 2,040,000 rials. Capital in 1944, 48,420,000 rials. 3,200 spindles for cotton, 3,280 spindles for wool, 400 spindles for doubling. 60 looms. 1,150 workers employed.
6. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Pashm*.—Capital in 1936, 2,094,740 rials. Capital in 1944, 60,900,000 rials. 2,578 spindles for cotton, 4,480 spindles for wool. 100 looms. 1,400 workers employed.
7. *Karkhaneh Risandegi Bargh*. Now S.S. *Risandegi and Bafandegi Noor*.—Capital in 1945, 25,000,000 rials. 4,806 spindles for cotton, 600 spindles for doubling. 800 workers employed.
8. *Sherkat Nesbi Haji Syd. Abdul Rassoul Rahimzadeh Roghani and Shoraka*.—Capital in 1933, 438,000 rials. Capital in 1943, 12,120,000 rials. 6,400 spindles for cotton, 680 spindles for doubling. 800 workers employed.
9. *Sherkat Sahami Nakhtab*.—Capital in 1935, 383,333 rials. Capital in 1944, 19,500,000 rials. 2,488 spindles for cotton, 996 spindles for doubling. 500 workers employed.

APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER XII.**Weights and Measures.**

In addition to the metric system which is now the legal system of the country, the old Persian system of weights and measure is still used, especially among the uneducated classes, as follows:—

The Shah Man.

4 gandums	= 1 nukhud.
24 nukhuds (5 grammes)	= 1 misqal.
10 misqals	= 1 donar va neem.
20 misqals	= 1 panj nar
40 misqals	= 1 dah nar.

Weights.**The Shah Man (continued)—**

80 misqals	= 1 bist-o-panj.
160 misqals (800 grammes)	= 1 panjah (charak).
320 misqals	= 1 Sad darham.
640 misqals	= ½ shah man (1 Tabriz man).
960 misqals	= 1 seh charak.
1,280 misqals	= 1 shah man (nearly 6 kilogrammes or 12.98 lbs. avoirdupois)
50 Shah mans (100 Tabriz mans)	= 1 kharvar (649 lbs. avoirdupois).

The Tabriz Man (used much less than the Shah Man).

24 nukhuds	= 1 misqal.
8 misqals	= 1 neem seer.
16 misqals	= 1 seer.
160 misqals	= 1 dah seer or cherak.
640 misqals	= 1 Tabriz man.

Length.

2 bahrs	= 1 gerreh (2.56 inches).
16 gerrehes	= 1 zar'a (41 inches or 110 cms.).
6,000 zar'as	= 1 farsakh—3.87 miles (in theory only, for a farsakh in fact represents the distance a horseman can travel in an hour at a walk and so varies from 3 to 4 miles, according to the nature of the ground).

Area.

26½ square zar'as	= 1 nay.
4 nays	= 1 qefeez.
10 qefeez	= 1 jerib (1,067 sq. zar'as).

[E 5883/31/34]

No. 9.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 13th August.)

(No. 263. Secret.)

Sir,

Tehran, 26th July, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 25th April, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on Persian affairs during April, May and June 1945.

Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's consular officers in Persia, His Majesty's representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Persia and Iraq Command, the Middle East Command, the Minister-Resident in Cairo, and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, etc.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 9.

The Question of the Withdrawal of Allied Troops from Persia.

1. This question took on a more practical form during the quarter as a result of (1) abandonment of the Persian route for aid to Russia, (2) presentation of official notes by the Persian Government to the representatives of Great Britain, Russia and America in Tehran, asking for the removal of Allied troops forthwith, and (3) the announcement that the Big Three would be meeting shortly.

2. When the quarter began, overseas cargo for Russia had almost ceased to arrive at Persian ports, but Russia was still benefiting by the Persian route to the extent that she was receiving aviation spirit from Abadan under an agreement which was due to expire at the end of June. It was decided, however, that

Russia should be supplied from some other source with the June quota of aviation spirit, so that, with effect from the end of May, aid to Russia, with the exception of a small quantity of cargo lying at the ports or on the sea, ceased entirely to be sent across Persia.

3. On the 19th May the Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to His Majesty's Embassy asking for British forces to be withdrawn from Persia forthwith, arguing that it was essential that Persia should be able to return to normal in accordance with the wishes of her people. It maintained that Japan was so remote that the war in the Far East could not be influenced by the presence of Allied troops in Persia and added that in any case Japan on her own showing was no longer allied to Germany. The Tripartite Treaty concluded to promote the war effort against Germany had therefore lost its meaning. The note added that communications on the subject had been addressed also to the Soviet and American Embassies. Under instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Ambassador informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply that although His Majesty's Government could not accept the argument that the Allied Powers were not entitled by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty to keep troops in Persia until six months after the end of the Japanese war, they were nevertheless prepared to consider sympathetically the Persian Government's request that the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should begin before the final date fixed by the treaty. He added that His Majesty's Government were discussing the question with the Soviet and United States Governments.

4. His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington was instructed to inform the State Department of the action taken in Tehran and to explain that it had been taken before consultation with the United States Government because news had just been received that the United States Government intended to withdraw American troops from Persia, and to hand over operation of the railway by the 1st July, and because the attitude of the State Department at the time of the Crimea Conference suggested that it was unlikely there would be any serious difference of opinion between the two Governments on the subject. It was suggested that it would assist Persia and, incidentally, His Majesty's Government, if the United States Government would tell the Soviet Government that they regarded it as desirable that the evacuation of Persia should start at an early date. It was left to the discretion of His Majesty's Ambassador whether to inform the State Department that we were not prepared to withdraw any troops except *pari passu* with the Russians, and that the extent of our withdrawal was limited by the obligation, until the end of the war with Japan, to protect the oil-fields and the refinery. A few days later the American press reported the Acting Secretary of State as saying, with regard to the Persian Government's note, that the United States Government naturally sympathised with the Persian Government's point of view, and that it was, he believed, well-known that the number of American troops in Persia was already being rapidly reduced.

5. The attitude of the American Embassy in Tehran was disappointing. This was seen at its worst in a harangue by the American Counsellor, who argued that whatever we did Persia would be eaten up by Russia in a few years anyhow, and whose conscience disapproved the British attempt to induce the Persians, by the placing of a time-limit on Allied offers of assets for sale, to make up their minds quickly—and thereby give no excuse to any foreign Ally to retain troops to guard its assets. The heart of the counsellor bled like anything, but as it was not quite clear whether the wound was caused by British brutality in trying to hustle the East, or by fear that haste might produce fewer dollars for American assets, it was difficult to find the right styptic. Even the new ambassador, Mr. Wallace Murray, in spite of his avowed suspicion of Russian motives, deprecated a too speedy withdrawal of British troops lest this should interfere with the sale of assets.

6. In reply to the communication from His Majesty's Embassy in Washington the State Department said that they were drafting a reply to the Persian note agreeing to the idea of withdrawing troops from Persia before the final treaty date. The State Department agreed that it would be desirable for British and American troops not to be withdrawn except *pari passu* with the Russian, but on the other hand said that the War Department would not wish to delay the withdrawal of American troops for political reasons. The War Department would wish to leave, until the end of the war with Japan, 500 men to service the air transport command, besides leaving guards on military installations and properties until their final disposal, which might take many months. The State Department were considering what, if anything, they would say to the Russians.

7. The nature of His Majesty's Government's reply to the Persian note was communicated to the Soviet Government in Moscow on the 31st May. The communication was to add that His Majesty's Government now wished to propose formally that Allied troops should start withdrawing from Persia *pari passu* and in stages before the final treaty date, and that military talks should be held to discuss the stages in which such withdrawals might take place. No reply had been received by the end of the quarter—perhaps because arrangements for a meeting of the Big Three had already been made. The Persian Ambassador in Moscow could get no information from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs beyond the fact that the question "was being considered carefully." The Soviet Ambassador was in his permanent state of having received no instructions, but he assured the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the presence of the Soviet troops was only temporary and that the mere removal of material would take a long time.

8. A possible hindrance to our good intentions came to light with the discovery that when the transfer of the railway to the Persian Government relieved the British forces of the responsibility of guarding it, the railway brigade would be moved from the railway and housed in the camp at Hamadan no longer required by the Americans. The advantage of good ready-made quarters in a good climate was fully realised by His Majesty's Embassy, but it seemed that it would completely wreck our attempt to secure a substantial withdrawal of Soviet troops if at this moment we placed a large body of troops much farther forward than ever before, and quite close to Qazvin—the point above all which it is desirable to clear of Soviet forces. It was found, however, that once free of its duties on the railway, the railway brigade would not be needed in Persia at all, and the plan to use the Hamadan camp was abandoned. This was fortunate, for the pro-Russian newspapers in Tehran were already announcing the arrival of British troops as well as a great increase in the British forces at Kermanshah—an allegation which had a nucleus of truth in the seasonal transfer of troops to the Kermanshah area from Iraq to escape the hot weather.

9. The more the question was studied the sharper seemed the unfortunate contrast between our good intentions hampered by the exigencies of the war with Japan and the obvious intention of the Russians to keep a hold on Persia for as long as possible in spite of the fact that this was justified by no military necessity whatsoever. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Paiforce, considered that so long as the war with Japan went on, troops must be kept in the Kermanshah area—the only suitable place in the Middle East with a good climate; and this involves retention of the camp at Bisitun—twenty miles nearer to Tehran than the nearest point allowed to us when the military zones were defined with the Russians in 1941.

10. A curious misunderstanding had to be cleared up, viz., that the proposal for the withdrawal of troops was a policy of appeasement—a feeble attempt to conciliate the Russians. The right policy, it was suggested by the holders of this view, was to tell the Russians that we needed to stay in Persia because we were at war with Japan: the Russians always understood a bold front and would respect us. It was explained in reply that this "bold" policy would delight the Russians, because the more of Persia we occupied, the easier it would be for them to justify the retention of Soviet troops; and that our aim, far from being a policy of appeasement, was to use against the Russians the only weapon in our hands—that of exposure of their "imperialist" tendencies, if they refused to make any substantial withdrawal by making the facts public. This we considered would explode Russia's claim to be the protector of small nations, both in the minds of the Persian public (where it finds little credence even now) and in foreign countries, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States.

11. It is realised that Tehran could not be evacuated in a few days. There are complications, such as a saw-mill run by British military labour which is essential for the erection of quarters for troops at the base, and the military party which is making a ground survey of the Lar Valley on behalf of a British firm which is seeking a contract for building a big dam. In all such cases the question is whether, if military personnel was left, either in uniform or in civilian clothes, the Soviet Government would claim it as a proof of continued retention of British troops in Tehran and as an excuse for staying there themselves. The Royal Air Force, too, have interests which could not be abandoned at a month's notice. They would have to shuffle off their responsibilities for the Doshan Tappeh aircraft factory and, if the British Overseas Airways Corporation were still running their service to Tehran, alternative arrangements for airfield control, meteorological service and signals would have to be made. It seems to His Majesty's Embassy that every day the Russians strengthen their grip on the

north of Persia, and that, consequently, the necessity for the evacuation of at least Tehran with the minimum of delay grows more obvious; and if His Majesty's Government decide for the evacuation of Tehran the difficulties must be attacked from all sides with the greatest vigour, whereupon some obstacles which at present appear large may shrink in size.

12. The problem can now be summed up thus:—

- (1) It will presumably be proposed at Potsdam that we and the Russians should begin the *pari passu* evacuation of our troops forthwith, commencing with Tehran.
- (2) We shall not be embarrassed by the stationing of British troops at Hamadan.
- (3) We shall, however, be embarrassed if it is considered essential to retain troops at Kermanshah-Bisitun after the autumn, since it seems quite certain that the Russians would then wish to retain troops along the Tabriz-Qazvin-Tehran-Semnan-Meshed line, thereby prolonging the paralysis of the capital which serves their political schemes so well. An alternative suggestion made by the embassy was to keep the mobile reserve in a tented camp at Karind, which is only just inside the Persian border, or better still (if there is no suitable place in Iraq) in Palestine. If troops could be brought by air to Abadan or the oil-fields from Palestine in case of emergency, they should arrive as quickly as troops from Kermanshah could arrive by other means. The question whether the airfields in the oil-wells area were or could be made adequate to receive airborne troops remained to be examined.
- (4) An important factor is that dealt with in paragraph 30 of the March quarterly report, whether the security of the oil area could be assured without British troops by some sort of police force. This continued to be debated. At the beginning of June the War Office asked the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Paiforce, whether, in his opinion, the Persian oil-fields could be reasonably well protected against sabotage and disturbances, of internal security, if all British troops were withdrawn from Persia, by some such arrangement as the employment of the Persian army or the use of an armed and trained civilian police force. He was also asked whether the mobile force could be held in Iraq to re-enter the oil-fields if necessity arose. The General Officer Commanding showed the political, strategic and climatic objections to the retention of the mobile force in Iraq, and on the other question he quoted probable American objections to our entrusting the protection of the oil to Persians and to our removing troops before they had had time to dispose of their assets advantageously, and he pointed out that hurried evacuation would probably mean great loss to His Majesty's Government in the price to be obtained for our assets. His conclusion was: if South Persian oil was vital in the war against Japan, then although sabotage in the oil-field was easier said than done and, although security was good at the moment, it was considered essential to retain British/Indian troops in Abadan and desirable to retain our troops in the oil-fields and the reserve brigade in Persia.

13. On the question of the replacement of British/Indian troops in the oil area by a British/Indian armed police force the General Officer Commanding-in-chief calculated that 3,000 would be required, but that if as appeared preferable Abadan was guarded by soldiers, the oil-fields would require 2,000 police. It was agreed by all concerned that the more the Persian authorities could be associated with the defence of the oil area the better: they would perhaps work hard to improve their forces so as to justify us in effecting the maximum withdrawal possible, and that would make the transfer to peace-time conditions easier, and help to ensure the protection of the oil area when the British forces had left the country. This led to an examination of methods of improving the Persian police and gendarmerie, which was still going on when the quarter came to an end.

British Army.

14. The previous report omitted to mention that on the 15th February Paiforce ceased to be an independent command and came under the Middle East Command.

15. During the quarter under review the number of British combatant troops in Persia remained at about 10,200 men.

Proposed Counter-Measures against Soviet Pressure.

16. In April the Foreign Office asked whether more could be done to prepare against further Soviet pressure on Persia, since the Russians might return to the charge at short notice. The standard Soviet complaints against any Government which they wished to subvert were (1) that its failure to maintain order was a threat to Soviet security; (2) that it was "Fascist" and needed to be replaced by a "democratic" Government representing the will of the people. The Russians might well claim that their interests were threatened by disorders in Azerbaijan or Tehran. And it was difficult to maintain that present Persian Governments represented public opinion. In case the Soviet Government tried to confront them with a *fait accompli*, His Majesty's Government should be ready to make firm representations at short notice and to explode any Soviet claim that their own nominees represented public opinion any better. The Foreign Office asked, first, that this embassy should supply notes on Persians whom the Russians might be nursing for this purpose, which notes could be quoted to the Russians. Secondly, they asked for a list of the more notorious cases in which the Russians had prevented the Persian Government from keeping order, by interfering with the latter's proposed security measures. Thirdly, this embassy must maintain pressure on the Shah and Persian Government to carry out social reforms. Another very important factor was publicity (since wide advertisement of the difference between Russian professions and Russian actions was apt to put the Russians off their stroke). This point is discussed in the next section.

Reluctance of Anglo-Saxon Press to Publish News of Nefarious Soviet Activities in Persia.

17. One of the troubles of this embassy is that nearly all foreign publicity about Persia is pro-Soviet. (This was particularly noticeable last autumn when the Soviet Government was putting unfair pressure on the Persian Government to grant them an oil concession in North Persia.) One cause is that the Soviet section of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship conducts a heavy political censorship on messages from foreign correspondents in Tehran, and the latter dare not circumvent it lest they or their colleagues elsewhere should be penalised. Another is that the news agencies disregard messages from their Tehran correspondents and imagine that Persian news is only news if it comes from Moscow. This is disastrous since the Tass Agency in Tehran, as an official agency, is exempt from the Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship and telegraphs what messages it likes, and these form the basis of foreign correspondents' messages from Moscow. Consequently it is only the visiting journalist to Persia who can evade the Soviet censor and speak plainly.

18. The following are illustrations of the effect of the Soviet censorship on foreign correspondents. When Mr. Sulzberger, the *New York Times* special correspondent in Moscow, passed through Tehran he was scornful regarding the way correspondents allowed themselves to be used as instruments of Soviet propaganda about Persia. His words had scarcely died on his lips, when he sent from Tehran an interview with the leader of the Tudeh party, in which he publicised the lie that the Tudeh was a genuinely democratic party. After arriving in Moscow he did worse still, and telegraphed a message stating that the British facilitated the return of Seyyid Zia to Persia, thus representing us and Seyyid Zia as the joint opponents of the Soviet Union and of the Tudeh party. When taxed with this message Mr. Sulzberger alleged that he had written as near as he thought possible to the edge of the Soviet censorship's disapproval with the aim of throwing ridicule on the recent Soviet press comment on Persian affairs; if his message had given a pro-Soviet impression then his sub-editor in New York had failed to detect his ironic intent! Shortly afterwards, the war correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* also telegraphed an interview with the leader of the Tudeh party, containing the whopping assertion that the latter received no money from the Russians. His Majesty's Embassy in Moscow commented that neither of these correspondents was in the least deceived by Soviet propaganda about Persia, but that if they wished to enter Soviet territory again they could not criticise Soviet policy openly.

19. This question was also discussed with the State Department, who undertook to investigate whether an American editorial writer or commentator could produce an impartial article on Persia which might be telegraphed abroad. (So far as this embassy is aware, nothing has come of this suggestion.) This embassy then suggested that the *Daily Express* correspondent in the Middle East should visit Persia and send a message after having left the country. The Foreign Office replied that neither the *Daily Express* nor any other newspaper

wanting to have a correspondent in the Soviet Union or Soviet-occupied Europe would publish any article unflattering to the Russians; the best course would be to get an article published in the *Economist* or *Manchester Guardian*, as they had no Moscow correspondent. This embassy commented that it was disturbing when important English newspapers, including presumably *The Times*, dare not send truthful messages from Persia lest they should lose the privilege of sending untruthful ones from Moscow.

Persian Internees: British-Soviet Amenities Regarding Same.

20. Twenty-six Persian internees were released from internment at the request of the British and Soviet authorities in April and May. However, their war against Germany having ended, the Soviet authorities could not resist currying favour with the Persians at our expense. On the 25th May, the Soviet Ambassador proposed the immediate release of the remainder; and by the 29th May, the Soviet authorities had already informed the Persian police that they were willing to set free all internees, but that the British authorities opposed their release. On the 2nd June, therefore, His Majesty's Ambassador informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the British security authorities desired the detention of those internees only who might be a danger to the countries at war with Japan. Thereupon thirty-one more internees were released. The Soviet Embassy then published a statement in the press that they were not opposed to the release of any of the internees. The Soviet Ambassador also informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs accordingly, and, having ascertained the names of those whom the British authorities wished to keep interned, emphasised that he considered desirable the release of the Mullah Kashani, and General Aghevli (whom the British authorities regarded as especially dangerous). Shortly afterwards, the British authorities found five men in the internment camp, whom the Soviet authorities had interned and then forgotten about, so His Majesty's Embassy had pleasure in informing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that it disclaimed all interest in them. Assuming that the Soviet authorities have now been good enough to liberate them, the total number of Persians released from internment during the quarter was sixty-two.

21. Thirteen Persians now remain interned in Persia, twelve in the Persian camp at Tehran and one, the Mullah Kashani, in the British camp at Kermanshah. A few more, including General Zahedi, are interned in Palestine. On the 2nd June the Persian Prime Minister enquired of His Majesty's Ambassador whether the internment of those in Persia could not be commuted to forced residence in the small town of Mahallat, fifty miles east of Sultanabad. The proposal has been approved by all concerned, except that Kashani is to remain provisionally at Kermanshah; the future of Zahedi and the others in Palestine is not yet decided.

Internal Politics and Soviet Interference.

22. Bayat was still in office at the beginning of April, owing largely to the inability of the Deputies to agree on a successor. His Government was, however, slowly disintegrating. Nasrullah Intizam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on the 1st April; Ibrahim Zand, Minister for War, had gone to Palestine for medical treatment; and the Russians were bringing increasing pressure to bear on Bayat to dismiss Sururi, Minister of the Interior, who had shown firmness in dealing with Tudeh activities. A deadlock appeared, moreover, to have been reached in the Majlis, with Government supporters and opponents in roughly equal strength. This became evident when the Majlis, meeting again for the first time after the No Ruz recess on the 3rd April, proceeded to elect its new president. Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, the retiring president, who was a strong supporter of Bayat, was re-elected by a majority of one vote over his principal rival, Farrukh, the nominee of Bayat's opponents in the Chamber. Bayat, however, appeared to enjoy the support of the Shah, who was believed to be working to expose the futility of the Majlis, and of the Russians to whom a state of continued administrative paralysis was not unwelcome.

23. On the 15th April Seyyid Zia deposited a motion of non-confidence in the Government on the bureau of the Majlis, requesting an early debate. The motion was subsequently withdrawn by the Seyyid when he learnt that Bayat intended to clarify the position of the Government, at the next meeting of the Majlis. This took place on the 17th April, when Bayat made a long speech which was frequently interrupted by cries of dissent, defending his Government's policy, and asking the Chamber to judge between his Government and their

opponents. He complained that instead of taxing the Government in open debate his critics had for some time done their best to undermine the Government's authority by spreading false rumours such as, for instance, the alleged arming of the tribes and the formation of a tribal bloc, or the stories that the Americans leaving Persia were destroying or removing all the installations they had built in this country. He claimed special credit for the speed with which he had settled the Millspaugh problem and denied that it had any adverse effect on Persia's relations with the United States. When, however, the vote was taken only forty-five Deputies voted for Bayat, with three against and forty-three abstentions. The Government thereupon resigned.

24. Although the Shah sent messages urging the Deputies to find a successor to Bayat without delay and to put an end to the crisis, no Government had been formed by the end of April. After endless argument the Deputies decided to nominate representatives from each parliamentary fraction to meet together and try to find a solution. At a secret meeting of these representatives on the 24th April Mahmud Bader received most votes, with Qawam es Sultaneh a close second, and Mansur, Pakravan and Sadiq Sadiqi far behind. Bader was, nevertheless, not chosen because the Russians were against him. The inability of the Majlis to come to a decision was indeed due largely to the fact that some thirty or forty Deputies wished to elect a candidate pleasing to the Russians; and although they were unable to impose a man of their choice on the Majlis, they were able to block anyone of character and ability proposed by their opponents. The Tudeh meanwhile were demanding a coalition Government in which they would be represented, although they have only eight members in Parliament. The result was a compromise, with the selection of a candidate who was considered a harmless nonentity. On the 2nd May Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim ul Mulk), who is old and deaf and has played no important part in Persian politics for many years, was chosen Prime Minister with sixty-four votes, against twenty-four cast for Sadiq Sadiqi (Mustashar ed Dowleh), who was preferred by the Russians, and only three votes for Qawam es Sultaneh.

25. Hakimi presented his Cabinet to the Shah on the 10th May. It was composed as follows:—

Anushirvan Sepahbudi: Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Ghulam Hussein Rahnema: Education.
Nasrullah Khal'atbari (Etela ul Mulk): Agriculture.
Dr. Ismail Marzban: Health.
Abdul Hussein Hajir: Finance.
Abul Qasim Najm: Commerce and Industry.
Ibrahim Zand: War.
Mustafa Adl: Without Portfolio.
Hussein Ali Kamal Hedayat (Nasr ul Mulk): Without Portfolio.
Nadir Arasteh: Roads.

The first two in the above list were new to Cabinet rank, Rahnema being, indeed, a newcomer to political life. The last four had held posts in Bayat's preceding ministry. Khalatbari, who is over 70, had long been in retirement. Hajir was able, but was likely to be opposed by the Tudeh; and Najm, ambassador at Kabul, was expected to refuse appointment. Hakimi himself took charge of the Ministry of the Interior, while the Ministry of Justice was placed temporarily under the direction of the Under-Secretary, Dr. Khushbin, until the return from America of Allayar Saleh, who was designated for the post. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was left temporarily vacant. On the whole the ministers were considered a colourless lot, and met with little general approval.

26. The Prime Minister presented his Cabinet to the Majlis on the 13th May, and on the following day announced his programme, which included agricultural and economic reform; improvement of conditions for workers and peasants; revision of taxes; and the usual declaration of its desire to work for the consolidation of friendly relations with the Allies based on the Tripartite Treaty, the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of Tehran. The Tudeh party immediately declared on principle its opposition to a Government which did not stand for a radical reorganisation of the social system; and with the Tudeh was now also an increasing number of Deputies, who for private reasons found it advisable to court Russian favour. Many Deputies, moreover, who had voted for Hakimi were annoyed that he refused to be influenced by them in his choice of

ministers, and were especially disappointed that they had not secured the appointment of a Minister of the Interior, who would rig the forthcoming elections in their favour. The Deputies of the Right felt that the composition of the Cabinet revealed a desire on the part of the Prime Minister to propitiate the Russians.

27. The position of the Cabinet appeared therefore from the beginning to be none too secure, and its supporters did their best to postpone the taking of the vote of confidence. For a week the Majlis discussed the question of the impeachment for alleged peculation of Taddayun, a former Minister of Food. His enemies fearing he would be acquitted, delivered themselves of a series of fiery speeches demanding his conviction. On the 19th May the Majlis was to meet to vote on this question, but many Deputies absented themselves, and in the absence of a quorum no vote was taken. The President of the Majlis, however, took the opportunity to remind the Chamber that it had not yet discussed the new Government's programme. The debate which followed lasted about two weeks, and was marked by a number of unusually vigorous attacks on the Government by the Tudeh and their sympathisers, and by some spirited rejoinders by their opponents. The Tudeh criticised the ruling classes and the whole existing social system; they made the usual accusations that reactionaries were supporting the feudal tribal system and arming the tribes in the interests of imperialism. The present direction of the army was also attacked and Seyyid Zia came in for much abuse. Better relations and a new treaty with Russia were advocated. The debate, however, did not materially affect the views of the Deputies about the Government. The opposition of the Tudeh and of those Deputies who for personal reasons fear to incur Russian displeasure, could be taken for granted. The bulk of the remainder, having failed to induce Hakimi to appoint ministers to their liking, decided that a different Government might give them a better chance of re-election in the approaching elections. When, therefore, the vote was taken on the 3rd June, Hakimi received the support of only twenty-five Deputies, and resigned.

28. He was succeeded by Seyyid Muhsin Sadr (Sadr ul Ashraf) who was chosen as Prime Minister by the Majlis with sixty votes, and was charged on the 6th June, by the Shah with the formation of a Government. Sadr was, however, like his predecessor, soon in difficulties with the Deputies over the selection of his ministers, particularly the Minister of the Interior, who is able to exert great influence in the elections. Nevertheless, on the 12th June, he presented his Cabinet, composed as follows, to the Shah:—

Prime Minister and Minister of Interior: Seyyid Muhsin Sadr (Sadr ul Ashraf).

Finance: Mahmud Bader.

Justice: Amanullah Ardalan.

Industry and Mines: Abbas Quli Gulshayan.

Health: Dr. Sa'ed Malek (Lughman ul Mulk).

Posts and Telegraphs: Ahmad Itebar.

War: Ibrahim Zand.

Foreign Affairs: Anushirvan Sipahbudi.

Agriculture: Dr. Nakhai.

Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema.

Minister without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl (Mansur es Sultaneh).

Minister without Portfolio: Hussein Ali Kemal Hedayat (Nasr ul Mulk).

All the new ministers had previously held Cabinet rank, and five of them, the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs and Education, and the two Ministers without Portfolio were in previous Cabinet.

29. The eight Tudeh Deputies immediately declared themselves opposed to Sadr. Some thirty others also went into Opposition. They were mostly Deputies from the North, who though at heart anti-Tudeh, vote with them from fear. Dr. Musaddiq and his personal following were also among Sadr's most bitter opponents. All the Opposition Deputies announced their intention of obstructing the Government by all means in their power. The Shah was also said to be against Sadr, and it was probably due to His Majesty's influence that two members of the Cabinet, Itebar and Ardalan resigned within a few days. Ardalan was subsequently replaced as Minister of Justice by Ali Kemal Hedayat, one of the Ministers without Portfolio. The Shah's opposition was believed to be due mainly to his annoyance with the Majlis for rejecting Hakimi's Cabinet, which included some ministers of His Majesty's choice.

30. All the newspapers under Russian influence immediately opened a vigorous campaign against the new Prime Minister, raking up the history of

nearly forty years ago to accuse him of persecuting "the freedom-lovers during the dawn of the Persian Constitution," and declaring that he had always been a hardened reactionary. Although representatives of the pro-Government majority and of the Opposition met frequently during the next two weeks to try and find some way out of the crisis, they were unable to come to any agreement, and the minority maintained its attitude of obstruction. Whenever Sadr attempted to present his Cabinet to the Majlis the minority refused to attend, with the result that there was never the quorum required for a vote to be taken. On the 28th June prolonged discussions took place between the two opposing groups in the Majlis. The minority proposed that Sadr should resign, in which case they would be prepared to co-operate with the majority in the choice of a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. But the majority refused; and the deadlock continued. In an attempt to put an end to the crisis the Shah received representatives of the majority and of the minority, and urged them to do their utmost to find a solution without delay. But no solution was found and Sadr had not received a vote of confidence by the end of June.

31. There was a good deal of activity among the various political parties and the labour movements during the period under review. The order forbidding political demonstrations in Tehran was suspended for the 1st May in order to allow the (Soviet sponsored) Tudeh party to hold a procession in honour of the Red army. Some 5,000 people, mostly Armenians, Turks from Azerbaijan and refugees from the Caucasus took part in the demonstration, which was perfectly orderly. Similar May-Day demonstrations were held in all the main towns in Northern Persia and in Kermanshah and Hamadan. In Meshed the celebrations lasted for two days, and mounted Russian officers and about eighty soldiers with Tommy-guns were on duty in the streets to protect the Tudeh party members. On the 18th May the Adalat party, which advocates a policy of reform by persuasion, and which is opposed to the Tudeh because of its Russian connexion, staged a demonstration in Tehran to celebrate the Allied Victory and to demand the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops, and the release of the internees. The meeting was attacked by members of the Tudeh, and one of the Adalat party was killed and several were injured. The police failed to intervene, possibly because the Government, at Russian instigation, had suspended the Chief of Police at Isfahan for taking action against Tudeh rioters. In retaliation Seyyid Zia's supporters demonstrated on three successive days in front of the Majlis.

32. In April security in Isfahan was good, and the local Russian-Tudeh campaign of intimidation against Persian officials who were striving to maintain law and order seemed to be dying down. But in the middle of May the Isfahan Tudeh leader Bahrampur returned from Tehran with a large sum of money which he used to stir up the Tudeh sympathisers, with the result that there were some clashes between them and anti-Tudeh workers in the town. On the 25th May a leader of the anti-Tudeh Labour Union of Isfahan was murdered by Tudeh ruffians. The result was a wave of resentment against the already seriously discredited Tudeh. The authorities immediately replaced the Acting Chief of Police, who was believed to be in Russian pay, by a military officer, and a number of arrests were carried out. But their failure to bring the principal instigators of the crime to book, subsequently caused a good deal of anxiety as it was felt that the Tudeh, having failed to make headway by lawful means, had now definitely adopted a policy of terrorism.

33. During May there was increased Tudeh activity also in the Kermanshah area culminating in a strike of workmen at the refinery of the Kermanshah Petroleum Company. The strike was not a spontaneous movement caused by genuine grievances against the company, but there was every reason to believe that it was in the nature of a try-out to be followed, if successful, by more serious outbreaks among labour in Abadan and elsewhere. When it became apparent that the strike was a failure, the Tudeh press, which had hitherto been inciting the workmen, published a statement that it had not approved the strike which should be ended as soon as possible to avoid hindering the prosecution of the war against Japan.

34. Seyyid Zia's party, the Iradey i Milli, continued to increase in numbers and activity. It is taking steps to open branches in the provinces wherever the Tudeh is established. The Tudeh and other Left-wing papers continued regularly to attack Seyyid Zia as the agent of imperialism and a would-be dictator. At the end of June, the Seyyid retorted with a violent counter-attack in a speech in which he accused the Tudeh of being the tools of the Russians.

Persian Press and Public Opinion, and Soviet Influence.

35. There have been a number of casualties among the press at the hands of the military governor of Tehran during the period under review. These suppressions have caused the press to protest at the alleged illegal activities of the military governor and to demand the abrogation of the military governorship. In fact, the military government has little authority or power behind it, and the position of the military governor, subject as he is to the whims and caprices of the general officer commanding, the Minister of War, the Court and the Cabinet, any of whom may throw him over on any given point, is instable. This lack of security of tenure has been reflected in a lack of consistency in his treatment of the press. A further factor making for the unsatisfactory working of the military government is the, at times, severe pressure put on the Government and/or the military government by the Soviet Embassy to take restrictive measures against papers which have incurred the displeasure of the Soviet authorities, pressure which few Governments have the courage to resist. The result has been that the military government has not observed the strictest impartiality towards the press. Bitter and distorted attacks on Great Britain have been passed over, whereas papers containing relatively objective accounts of Russian activities in Persia and Communist doctrines have been suppressed at the demand of the Russian Embassy. Further, the period of suppression of any given paper has tended to be lengthy or brief according to whether it was opposed or supported by the Soviet Embassy.

36. The end of the war in Europe was welcomed by the press and the public. The general tendency was to ignore the war in the Far East and to assume that world conditions would return to normal in the immediate future. The Tudeh press warned that the fight against fascism would go on, and, somewhat ominously, tried to make out that fascism and international reaction, having been beaten in Europe, were, in their death-throes, trying to establish themselves in countries such as Persia. The end of the war in Europe was followed by demands from all sections of the press for the release of the internees, and, except for the Freedom Front, by a demand for the evacuation of the country by the Allied forces. In many cases it was argued that the Tripartite Treaty did not cover the war with Japan, and that in any case Persia's services to the Allies could be fittingly rewarded by an early evacuation of the country.

37. The chief cleavage in the press has been between the Freedom Front, composed of Tudeh papers and those papers which, while not officially belonging to the Tudeh party, often take up a more violent, tendentious and uncompromisingly "anti-imperialist," i.e., anti-British, attitude than the Tudeh press itself and the papers which support Seyyid Zia. The position of the Independence Front has been somewhat weakened by the loss of some of its members to the pro-Seyyid Zia group. A bitter struggle has been waged between the Freedom Front and the pro-Seyyid Zia group, in which accusations and counter-accusations, particularly with regard to alleged interference by British and Soviet officials in the elections for the 14th Majlis, have been banded to and from with, on the part of the Freedom Front, little regard for truth. Seyyid Zia is described as an imperialist agent who has been brought back to Persia with a mission to fulfil. The Freedom Front have been at pains to show that they consider Persia indivisible and have tried to convince the public that it was Seyyid Zia and the reactionaries or imperialists who wished to divide Persia into northern and southern zones.

38. The tone of the Freedom Front press has been hostile to Great Britain, whether she is referred to openly or written of under the thinly-veiled disguise of "international imperialism" or "international reaction," &c. An incident which occurred at the beginning of the period under review, when some Persian wire-stealers were shot by an Indian patrol near Tehran, was the pretext for a number of bitter and provocative articles, in which Indians were attacked as the "slaves" of British imperialists and sinister motives were attributed to British colonial and the alleged imperialist policy of Great Britain. The statement by Mr. Richard Law in the House of Commons on British interests in the south of Persia was also seized upon by the Freedom Front to make fantastic allegations about the alleged machinations of British policy in the Middle East. The main theme was Persia as the outpost of India and the wicked intrigues of the reactionaries to preserve their imperial interests, no matter what the cost to others, whether by keeping Persia in a backward and miserable condition, or by encouraging an autonomous movement in Kurdistan, Arab Federation or an Islamic Union to combat growing Russian influence in the Middle East. Mr. Churchill's first election broadcast and recent events in Syria were also grist to the Freedom Front mill. The violent abuse of "international reaction"

and of Seyyid Zia, and the, at times, exceedingly flimsy grounds upon which these attacks are based, coupled with the insistence by the Russian Embassy on the suppression of certain papers may, perhaps, be taken as an indication that the counter-campaign in the pro-Seyyid Zia and Independence Front papers against the Tudeh and their Soviet masters has been more effective than they care for.

39. The official organ of the Tudeh party, *Rahbar*, has had articles stating that Bahrein was an integral part of Persia and that all changes made by a servile Majlis under Reza Shah were invalid. *Zafar*, the official organ of the Workmen's Union, has consistently attacked the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for alleged maltreatment of workers.

40. In internal problems, e.g., the successive Cabinet crises and the Majlis crisis, the line-up of the press has followed similar lines: the Freedom Front on the one side and the pro-Seyyid Zia and Independence Front papers on the other. The keynote of the two last-named groups has been one of anxiety over the internal economic and political situation. The serious nature of the financial situation and the danger of unemployment have been emphasised, though few constructive proposals have been made to remedy the situation. As for the political situation, a growing fear is evinced of possible attempts by the army and Court to reimpose dictatorship.

41. Public opinion has been preoccupied with the unsettled condition of the country, and has looked with growing apprehension on the struggle between the Tudeh and Seyyid Zia, largely because the support which the Soviet authorities have given the Tudeh party has, in recent weeks, been becoming more open. While many are prepared in private to praise the activities of Seyyid Zia and the trenchant articles in the press exposing Soviet activities in Persia and the true nature of the Communist régime, there is a lively fear lest these may not provoke the Russians to even greater interference in the internal affairs of the country. The general tendency is to wish to buy the Russians off by compromise, pending a clarification of the world situation. As usual, the Persian tries to shift responsibility from his own to someone else's shoulders: the fate of Persia, in his view, depends, not on the actions of the Persians themselves, but upon the attitude taken towards Russia's demands in Europe by Britain, and, to a lesser extent, by America. It is to Europe that the anxious eyes of the Persians are now turned.

The Tribes and Soviet Activities among Them.

42. Except in western Azarbaijan (northern Kurdistan) the tribal situation has been satisfactory during the first half of the year. There have been minor ebullitions and instances of banditry, but the disorders that usually accompany the tribal migration were hardly noticeable this year. But the elements of disorder are still there, easily provoked by political agitators or corrupt administration.

43. In northern Kurdistan the attitude of the tribes has been causing the Persian Government much concern. For a long time past the Soviet authorities have prevented the Persian Government from taking any measures to enforce their authority, with the result that the tribes from Mahabad to Maku are practically a law unto themselves, except in so far as they are restrained by Russian officials. For a time endeavours were made to induce the Kurds to join the Tudeh party, but Tudeh principles found little favour in the eyes of Kurdish chiefs. Russian support is now reported to have been transferred to the movement for Kurdish independence, known as *Komala*, which seems to be gaining ground rapidly. The Persian Government expects to be faced, on the withdrawal of Russian troops, with a very serious situation in western Azarbaijan, and there is little ground for hope that they will be proved wrong.

44. In eastern Azarbaijan the hitherto patriotic Shahsavan tribes have been shocked by the impotence of the Persian Government to prevent the arrest and enforced detention in Tabriz by the Soviet authorities of two of their chiefs, whose only crime was opposition to the Tudeh party.

45. Little progress has been made with the collection of the large number of arms in the hands of tribes and others. A thousand or so have recently been seized in southern Kurdistan, mostly from settled tribes and villagers.

Tribal Lands.

46. At long last Sheikh Chassib, the eldest son of the late Sheikh Khazaal of Mohammerah reached Tehran from Bagdad and joined his brothers and sisters in their efforts to get the Persian Arbitration Commission to decide in

their favour a distribution of lands or allotment of revenue from the large landed property seized from their father after his arrest in 1925. It looks as if the five arbitrators want to give an indecisive finding, or one that does not show up the Persian Government's (or rather the late Reza Shah's) gains in this sordid transaction.

Persian Army.

47. Some efforts are being made by the present Chief of the General Staff, General Arfa, to improve the morale of the rank and file. An order forbidding corporal punishment has recently been issued. Soldiers' clubs are being formed at formation headquarters; and insistence on the necessity for a general improvement of management has resulted in the soldier receiving in some formations a larger proportion of the rations to which he is entitled. But officers still remain seriously underpaid, and while this lasts honesty cannot be expected. The current year's budget has not yet been presented to the Majlis, and the army lives on periodical grants of a fraction of last year's inadequate budget. The present Chief of the General Staff is patriotic, professionally well qualified and sincerely desirous of improving the efficiency of the army, but he cannot refrain from dabbling in politics, partly because he is convinced that he can play a part in rallying patriotic elements to make a stand against Russian infiltration via the Tudeh party and partly because he feels obliged to seek support among Deputies and journalists against the intrigues and calumnies of his enemies. Mutual jealousies and individual and faction animosities, encouraged by Tudeh and Russian intrigues, take up much of the time of senior officers and are a great handicap to progress. The Russians are hostile to the present Chief of the General Staff and to the officers he has appointed to the senior ranks of the army. The Tudeh party tries hard to attract the sympathies of junior officers and non-commissioned officers, with some success, it is believed. In spite of all this some slight general improvement is noticeable in the troops in the capital. In the northern provinces of Khorassan and Azarbaijan the troops are entirely demoralised by the high-handed actions of the Russian authorities who allow them no liberty of action, restrict them to certain defined areas and insist on the limitation of their numbers to what amounts to little more than token forces, which add nothing to the authority or prestige of the Persian Government; rather do they make the Persian authorities look ridiculous.

48. The influence of General Ridley and his mission in any matters other than supply is less and less in evidence. The term of their contract ended in March of this year, but at the request of the Persian Government the United States Government has allowed them to stay on for the time being.

Gendarmerie.

49. The gendarmerie, except in the capital, remains much where it has been for the last three years—corrupt, inefficient, creating rather than preventing disorder; and Colonel Schwarzkopf's schemes, rules and regulations are, with a few exceptions, still on paper. Antagonism between the army and the gendarmerie has been steadily increasing, and parties sent out by both forces to pursue robbers have more than once come to blows with each other. Co-operation between the two forces is rare. The retransfer of the gendarmerie to the control and administration of the War Office is now receiving some serious consideration. Such a step should lead to economy and might lead to improved security.

50. Gendarmerie District Headquarters have been abolished except in Fars and Azarbaijan, and gendarmerie regiments are now under the direct command of Gendarmerie Headquarters in Tehran. This will complicate the relations of the Governor-General with the gendarmerie in his province: he previously had the district commander with him at the provincial capital.

Police.

51. As Russian provocation of the proletariat through the Tudeh party and, consequently, the probabilities of disturbance and riots in the towns increase so does the police force become less capable of maintaining order. Always corrupt, it has now reached incredible depths of venality and inefficiency. Many of its officers are in the pay of one or other of the money-making rackets or one or other of the political parties. No impartial action can then be expected in the treatment of any situation. For this state of affairs successive Governments are, of course, primarily to blame. Even if an energetic and capable

chief of police were to be found he would be frustrated by the pusillanimity and inefficiency of Ministers. Only a mission of foreign officers with adequate powers, which once granted can be exercised independently of changes in Government, and adequate funds at their disposal can be expected to turn the Persian police force into an instrument for the impartial suppression of disorder, and even they, as the experience of the American officers with the gendarmerie has shown, will have no easy task. The quality of the Persian police is of particular interest to His Majesty's Government since it is on that force that reliance must, in the first instance, be placed for the protection of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company labour against intimidation and subversive provocation.

Persian Air Force.

52. Under the personal stimulus of the Shah, there has been a good deal of talk about modernising and expanding the air force. The advice of the Royal Air Force as to equipment, training and organisation has been sought and in great measure taken, but in view of the chronically meagre air force vote progress is not likely to be rapid.

53. Meanwhile, there is some superficial improvement in day to day work, but morale under Brigadier Khosrovani remains bad.

Civil Air Lines in Persia.

54. The Iranian State Airline, under the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, now operates two return services a week to Bagdad via Kermanshah and one to Bushire via Isfahan and Shiraz. Passengers are not (officially) carried south of Isfahan pending the installation of wireless facilities on this section of the route.

55. The Persian commercial company talks a lot but has done nothing. No more has been heard of the rumoured Russo-Persian company. The Russian so-called official services between Tehran and Meshed are well filled with Persian commercial traffic as are those to Pahlevi and Tabriz, which, however, appear to be running less regularly than last summer.

56. The Americans claim to have applied to the Persian Government for rights to operate an official commercial service between Bagdad and Tehran to supplement and gradually replace the military services of the United States Air Transport Corps. The French military line continues to carry civilians and has been detected in some dubious practices about visas. The three British Overseas Airways Corporation services a week to Bagdad, Lydda and Cairo are well filled with official load and private travellers can seldom be accommodated.

Finance.

57. The budget results for the Persian year 1323 (21st March, 1944—20th March, 1945) showed a surplus on the ordinary budget of 81 million rials and a deficit on the commercial budget of 543 million rials, making a net deficit of 462 million rials. The total deficit in 1322 was 1,052 million rials. These not unsatisfactory results were due mainly to the efforts of Dr. Millspaugh and his mission. The future prospects now that Dr. Millspaugh has gone are uncertain, especially as the first item on the financial programme of any Government will now be the revision of the income tax law.

58. The Persian Government, following the fall in the London price of gold announced on the 9th June, duly applied for the adjustment of their sterling balances under article 8 of the Financial Agreement. They were informed by His Majesty's Embassy that none of the other Governments with whom His Majesty's Government have similar payments agreements have asked for a similar adjustment, the change in price being the result of the reduction in insurance and transport costs to the United States; but that His Majesty's Government were prepared to adjust their balances if the Persian Government considered it was right to ask for this adjustment.

59. The scarcity of dollars led in June to the National Bank refusing to open dollar credits for goods ordered from the United States. Following this action the Foreign Trade Control Division and the Middle East Supply Centre, Tehran, stopped issuing licences for American goods pending arrangements for the proper utilisation of Persia's dollar resources. Hitherto, the Persian Government have taken no steps to gain possession of dollars in private hands nor to obtain control of the dollars accruing from current exports to the United States. The price of dollars on the free market rose to rials fifty (compared with the official rate of rials thirty-two).

Economic Situation.

60. The Economic Organisation set up to take over the economic departments of the Government set up by Dr. Millsbaugh, functioned rather better than was at first expected, thanks mainly to the legacy of organisation and routine left by the Americans and to the continued presence of many members of the Millsbaugh Mission. For all its shortcomings the Economic Organisation was able to maintain the essential economic services in operation at a time when Cabinet crises would have paralysed these departments had the Economic Organisation not existed. The British cereals and transport teams also continued to function. The future of both the Americans and the British in the economic departments is, however, uncertain, and it is unlikely that they will remain much longer. Corruption and confusion in the issue of import licences increased considerably during the quarter, the tendency being for obscure firms to get licences at the expense of the established importers. The British, United States and Indian Trade representatives have now intervened jointly to try and effect an improvement in this situation.

61. Markets showed no spectacular movements in spite of the end of the war in Europe. It was greeted on the whole without enthusiasm by the merchants, who have had a profitable war and see the days of big profits receding. Exports of carpets, gum and skins to the United States were stimulated by the high premium on dollars. The sale of gold was discontinued by the National Bank on the 22nd May; but the market remained quite active and a steady export to Iraq and Syria continued until late in the quarter.

Disposal of British and American Military Installations.

62. A list of British and joint Anglo-American fixed military installations declared surplus was communicated to the Persian Government, who were invited to state which of them they were interested in buying. The chief of these assets are the Port of Bandar Shapur and the military telephone-line system. It seems very unlikely that the Persians will be able to pay cash, and the terms under which credit would be granted to enable the Persian Government to raise the necessary money over the next few years are under discussion with the Americans. Insistence on payment in dollars has held up American disposals, and it seems likely that the United States authorities will agree to allow the Persians time in which to make the conversion from rials to dollars. Conversion difficulties should not arise in the case of payment for British assets.

Handing Back of the British-American Run Section of the Persian State Railway.

63. The return of the railway south of Tehran from British and American to Persian control was completed by the end of June. British *de facto* responsibility for keeping the railway financially solvent ended on the 1st July, but the British army are prepared to make payments to cover the deficit in the southern section of the line up to the end of September. British and American property on the railway has been handed over to the Persians on a "use, care and maintenance" basis. The future of lend-lease rolling-stock has not yet been decided by Washington, but it is hoped that enough will be offered to the Persians to allow the railway to continue to operate efficiently. The Soviet Embassy have not yet announced their readiness to begin negotiations with the British and the Persians to cover the use of the railway by the Allies during the period the 1st September, 1941, to the 30th June, 1945, though the Persians are pressing for this agreement. There have been no signs that the Russians intend to follow the Anglo-American example and hand back the northern section of the line to Persian control before the expiry of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Allinace.

Cereals Situation.

64. By the end of June the total collections of bread-grains in Persia amounted to 204,000 tons, of which 134,000 was wheat. Reports show that this harvest will be a monster one. A joint Anglo-American enquiry of the Soviet Embassy suggesting the export of food-grains drew a dog-in-the-manger reply deprecating the idea "at this stage." So now the Persian Government must decide whether they will openly ask the assistance of the Americans and British to get rid of the anticipated surplus of some 100,000 tons of rather high-priced wheat, or bow to the bullying of the Russians and risk a real glut and distress amongst the cultivators, who will not be able to dispose of their coming grain-harvest.

Locust Control.

65. This quarter saw the conclusion of the campaign in South Persia, which had been operated by a Middle East anti-locust unit. Although infestation over many parts, notably Bandar Abbas, was large, control was effective and no damage to crops occurred. This speaks highly for the administration of the campaign, since the difficulties *vis-à-vis* the Persian locust officers and labour were many. Usually, the Persian officers' reports of the area infested were greatly exaggerated, in order that they could obtain greater quantities of bait than would be necessary, and sell that which they could not use. Accounts and figures were purposely falsified, until checked by the British Locust Officer.

66. It is understood that no Middle East anti-locust unit will operate in Persia next year.

Economic Warfare.

67. The quarter under review has been marked by the relaxation of controls. The Statutory List for Persia has been reduced to five names. The Black List for Persia has ceased to operate and the sole name on it has been deleted.

68. New regulations concerning trade with Switzerland have been introduced.

New American Ambassador.

69. Mr. Leland Morris left Tehran on the 19th May, and his successor, Mr. Wallace Murray, presented his letters to the Shah on the 5th June.

70. Mr. Murray seems friendly, and if he still retains the suspicion of British imperialism, which he certainly used to possess, he shows no signs of it at present, though whether it has been dissipated by experience or merely outweighed by his greater suspicion of Russia can only be surmised. Mr. Murray is certainly outspoken in his indignation at the methods which Russia is using in Eastern Europe and in Persia, and by his attitude he is helping to put heart into the Persian Government. He is, however, rather timorous of making even the slightest move without instructions from the State Department, and even in seeking instructions he seems rather to leave it to the State Department to decide instead of suggesting the course that the local situation seems to call for. However, he is a great improvement on his two predecessors, and if only his apparent aim in life was not to make ten words grow where one grew before, I should regard him as a very good colleague.

Polish Evacuees.

71. During the period under review the evacuation of Polish refugees from Persia was almost at a standstill, since shipping to Persian Gulf Ports has been greatly reduced owing to the diminution of "Aid to Russia." Only seventy-eight Poles left Persia, travelling overland to Beirut. This left a total of 3,798 in Persia at the end of June.

72. Hitherto, the Poles had, on the whole, been reluctant to leave Persia for more distant destinations, since they hoped to return home soon. As, however, the prospects of a Soviet-controlled Poland appeared to them to increase, their fear of being deported by force to Poland increased also, and most of them longed to leave Persia for any destination. It was unfortunate, therefore, for them that shipping difficulties should have arisen at the same moment.

Indian Affairs.

73. The previous enthusiasm shown by the Persians at the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society's weekly meetings began to flag because of the chaotic state of politics in Persia, which left prominent Persians with insufficient time to devote both to their political futures and to the society. However, by dint of hard work the Attaché for Indian Affairs succeeded in sending off four out of the five students selected for the Delhi Polytechnic courses in textile and ordinary engineering.

74. In May the society entertained a number of guests at a lecture on India and Persia given by C. P. Skrine, Esq., His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, and illustrated by excellent coloured and monochrome cine-films.

75. The English classes given by Indian teachers at Meshed, Yazd and Kerman continued to have somewhat poor attendance. The teacher for Ahwaz arrived in the middle of the "hot weather" and found it difficult to settle down. In consultation with the British Council he (and in turn the teachers from Kerman and Yazd) will attend "refresher" courses at the Anglo-Persian Institute in

Tehran during July and August. A newly arrived second teacher at Meshed seems to have the gift of collecting pupils and of keeping them interested in his English lessons.

Indian Trade.

76. Major M. Hassan, the first Indian Government Trade Commissioner to be appointed to Persia, arrived here on the 12th June. It will be some time before his office starts functioning properly as he has still to receive his staff and his office equipment from India.

77. The Government of India are planning to stage a commercial-cultural exhibition regarding India and Indian manufactured goods in Tehran in the spring of 1946. It would also be shown in other important centres of the country.

British Propaganda Activities.

78. It will be recalled that on the 21st March this embassy voluntarily gave up its propaganda broadcasts from Radio Tehran. Public reaction has been negligible. A few polite letters of regret have been received. The continued use by the Russians of their "cultural" time on Tehran Radio to broadcast objectionable, or at least controversial, material is sufficient justification alone for our withdrawal before foreign broadcasts become so unpopular as to force the Persians to stop them altogether.

British Council.

79. As the Public Relations Bureau of this embassy has been reducing its activities with the end of the war in Europe, the Council has had to reassure the Persian community that its work here will continue after the war. Persistent requests continue for the establishment of English teachers in country districts, and in some cases local eagerness has led to the formation of groups of voluntary English teachers. Unfortunately the Council has not got the staff to assist.

80. French, Russian and American competition in cultural matters is on the increase.

81. Distinguished visitors during the quarter were: Professor Davies, of London University, who inspected technical colleges in Persia and delivered lectures on British engineering; and Professor Boase, of Hertford College, Oxford (Middle East representative of the council), who delivered lectures on mediæval English illumination. Professor Zaehner, of Christ Church, Oxford, who is a member of this embassy's Public Relations Bureau, delivered a lecture on Oscar Wilde. The council's dramatic club produced the play "Granite" by Clemence Dane.

[E 4807/70/34]

No. 10.

(1)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the period 18th June to 24th June, 1945. Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 217 of 25th June.—(Received in Foreign Office, 4th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE deadlock created by the refusal of the Deputies of the Opposition to attend the Majlis if the Cabinet was to be presented has not yet been solved. Of the Deputies present in Tehran some sixty-eight are supporters of the Government, but although this number is sufficient to give the Government a majority on a vote of confidence, it is insufficient to form a quorum in the absence of the Opposition. Some Deputies who are expected to support the Government are in their constituencies and others are at San Francisco. Popular opinion, while criticising the Deputies, as a whole, seems to be becoming increasingly impatient with the obstruction of the Opposition.

2. This impatience would have been greatly increased if the Deputies of the Opposition had not agreed to attend a session of the Majlis for the purpose of voting a credit to the Government to allow of overdue salaries being paid to Government employees. Since the budget for the current year has not been passed, nor even presented to the Majlis, Governments have been subsisting on

credits of a fraction of last year's budget voted at intervals by the Majlis. A credit of one-twelfth was voted on the 17th June.

3. Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet, Minister without portfolio, has been appointed Minister of Justice in place of Amanullah Ardalan who declined the appointment.

4. Queen Fauzieh has left Persia to visit her brother King Farrukh of Egypt.

Economic.

5. In an interview with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Bader, the Minister of Finance, promised an early revision of Dr. Mills' unpopular income tax law, the minimum intervention by the Government in commerce and economic affairs, and the encouragement of the formation of private companies for enterprises of public benefit.

6. The Persian press announces that the Economic Council has decided to remove all restrictions on the operation of motor transport in Persia and to sell all lorries now controlled by the Road Transport Administration.

7. The Council of Ministers has decided to increase freight rates on the Persian railways by 100 per cent. from the 22nd June.

8. A serious accident occurred on the southern section of the railway on the 19th June in which, according to the Persian press, some forty persons were killed and another forty injured.

Appointments—Civil.

9.—(i) Sardar Akram Qaragozlu, Mansur Ali, to be acting Governor-General of Kermanshah.

(ii) Azizullah Bihnia to be Assistant to the Persian Trade Commissioner in India.

(iii) Mahmud Arfa Munfarid to be First Secretary at the Persian Consulate-General in Herat.

(iv) Abdul Hussain Sardari to be First Secretary at the Persian Legation in Berne.

Persian Army.

10. A list of the officers of the American Advisory Mission with the Persian army is attached as Appendix 1 to this Summary.

British Interests.

11. The commander-in-chief in the Middle East and the general officer commanding-in-chief in Persia and Iraq visited Tehran during the week and held conferences with His Majesty's Ambassador.

12. British troops will cease to be responsible for the security of the railway from Andimeshk to Tehran on the 1st July.

Russian Interests.

13. It was recently stated in certain Persian papers that the Russian Ambassador had expressed the opinion that the persons interned by the Allies were innocent of the charges made against them. The Soviet Embassy has now published a statement to the effect that no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the internees had been expressed by any member of the Soviet Embassy staff, but that the Persian Government had been informed that the Soviet authorities had no objection to the release of the remaining internees.

14. It seems that Russian officers may have been engaging in commercial transactions on their own account for the Soviet Embassy has published in the Persian press a warning against entering into commercial transactions with any Russian officer unless he is in possession of a certificate of authority signed by the commander of the Soviet forces in Persia.

15. The newspaper *Zafar*, the official organ of the Tudeh Labour organisation, announces that the Persian "Workers' Union" has issued invitations to the "Workers' Unions" of Russia, Great Britain, America and France to send missions to Persia to study the conditions of the working classes. Russia had accepted this invitation and was sending a mission under Borisov, a member of the executive committee of the Soviet Workers' Union.

16. An example of the type of propaganda that is being addressed to the Persian employees of the A.I.O.C. by the Russian-inspired Persian press is attached to this Summary as Appendix 2.

17. In Azarbaijan the Tudeh party appears to have moderated for the time being its attacks on Persian landlords, tribal chiefs and the partisans of Seyyid Zia and to be devoting more of its energy to championing the cause of the unemployed. In response to notices posted up by the Tudeh Workers' Union some 6,000 unemployed, it is claimed, have now registered at the office of the union. After a meeting of the unemployed a telegram, said to represent the views of 5,000 people, was sent to the Government urging a programme of public works to provide employment. It mentioned, in particular, the completing of the railway from Mianeh to Tabriz, the exploiting of oil and other minerals in Azarbaijan and the building of hospitals and other institutions. A tendency has been noticed in the Tudeh party in Tabriz to widen its appeal to include bourgeois elements, even merchants and landlords.

Tehran, 24th June, 1945.

Appendix 1.

Staff of the American Military Mission to the Persian Army as on 12th June, 1945.

1. Major-General C. S. Ridley.
2. Colonel F. G. Dumont, Transport Services.
3. Colonel T. E. Mahoney, Q.M. Branch.
4. Colonel T. L. Solgard, Accounts Branch.
5. Lieut-Colonel J. A. Lee.
6. Lieut-Colonel K. T. Brunswold.
7. Major M. Wulwick, Medical Adviser.
8. Major R. D. Swick.
9. Major J. E. Calhoun.
10. Major R. F. Conly, S.O. to General Ridley.
11. Captain W. D. De Armond.
12. Captain R. R. Murray.

The above are all on the staff in Tehran.

Advisers on Supply Matters to Divisional Commanders.

13. Lieut.-Colonel E. G. Tremaine, Isfahan.
14. Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Foster, Tehran.
15. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Fields, Sanandaj.
16. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Barker, Shiraz.
17. Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Hall, Ahwaz.
18. Major W. D. Hull, Kerman.
19. Major E. R. Stanley, Zahidan.
20. Major E. M. Collins, Khurramabad.

N.B.—Lieut.-Colonels Tremaine and Barker are both leaving shortly.

Appendix 2.

Summary of article in newspaper "Zafar" of the 17th June, the official organ of the Tudeh labour organisation.

A LEADING article states that due to the severe pressure and the deprivation they had been suffering for several years, which had been gradually killing them under the worst conditions, the workers of the A.I.O.C. had gone on strike two weeks ago. They had submitted nine demands to the authorities of the Oil Company. (These demands are then summarised.) This strike had cost the despotic authorities of the A.I.O.C. very dear, and they were seeking to avenge themselves on the workers instead of fulfilling the workers' demands, they used force, intrigue, and money against the workers. As a result of the despotic decisions of the authorities of the company, 400 workers were thrown out of work. In this way the rights of Persian workers were sacrificed to the lust of a handful of capitalists. Four hundred Persian families were now faced with hunger, misfortune and oppression by the employers. They had risen against foreign capitalists to demand the rights of Persian workers, they had proved

to the world that the Persian workers could not be kept as slaves any longer; this strike was proof of the social and political maturity of the workers. Although the workers had suffered as a result of the cruel behaviour of their masters they would continue the struggle to free themselves for ever from oppression by exploitation. Now that the workers were faced with the ruthless behaviour of the A.I.O.C., they asked help from fellow workers and lovers of freedom. This help to unemployed workers who were subjected to the anger of foreign capitalists would deal a severe blow to the evil magnates and their agents. By helping their fellow workers, Persian workers and lovers of freedom would strangle international reaction. It was the duty of every courageous worker and lover of freedom to lighten the misfortunes and pressure on the unemployed workers of Kermanshah, and in their time of trouble to help them. The paper states that up to now it had received several thousand rials for the unemployed workers and expresses the hope that subscriptions would increase.

[E 5004/70/34]

(2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the Period 25th June to 1st July, 1945. Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 231 of 2nd July.—
(Received in Foreign Office 11th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The political deadlock continues, the minority opposition refusing to attend the Majlis and the majority refusing to consider the resignation of the Prime Minister. The minority, under the leadership of Dr. Musaddiq, proposed that the majority should suggest three names for the premiership and thirty-three names for ministerial posts, and that from these the minority should select a Cabinet with which they would co-operate. This offer was refused. On the 30th June the majority and minority groups were summoned to send five Deputies each to discuss a solution with the Shah. The result is not yet known. Meanwhile, the Cabinet considers itself to be legally constituted, but while its future is so uncertain and since, until it is accepted by the Majlis, it can enact no legislation, neither its actions nor its authority are very effective.

2. Dr. Musaddiq has again spoken at some length to explain the reasons why the minority opposes the present Government. He accused the majority of the Deputies of being indifferent to the interests of the country. This Majlis had had before it, when it first assembled, five urgent tasks: to form a Government that would command the confidence of the people; to ensure the prosecution and punishment of offences against the law; to revise the electoral law; to lower the cost of living and to alleviate poverty; to abrogate the special powers given to Dr. Millspaugh. Only the last of these had been accomplished. In selecting a Prime Minister the majority of the Deputies had no other consideration than to find one whom they could trust to use the influence and authority of the Government to secure their re-election. That was why they had selected Sadr and that was why Sadr was opposed.

Economic.

3. The railway from Tehran to the Persian Gulf has now been handed back to the control of the Persian authorities. The sector between Ahwaz and Khorramshahr, which was constructed by the British army, has been put at the disposal of the Persian authorities, on condition that they maintain it, pending decision as to its disposal. The Russians have as yet shown no indication of an intention to hand back the sector controlled by them from Tehran to the Caspian Sea. The financial deficit on the operation of the whole railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea has hitherto been met by His Majesty's Government. Limited payments will continue to be made by His Majesty's Government up to the 10th September to cover deficits on the operation of the railway south of Tehran only. The Persian Government is being informed that His Majesty's Government accepts no further financial responsibility for the railway north of Tehran.

Internal Security.

Eastern Azerbaijan.

4. It is reported from Ardebil that among the Shahsavans, who have always prided themselves on their loyalty to the Shah, His Majesty's prestige has greatly

suffered from his apparent impotence to prevent the arrest and detention by the Russians of an important Shahsavan chief, Amir Arslan—see Summary No. 22/45, paragraph 6.

Kurdistan.

5. The Persian General Staff has decided to send a column to Dizli, Avroman, Merivan and Rezab. The scope of the operation is not known. It is understood to be to collect unauthorised arms, to show the Persian flag, and to settle some local disputes. In Rezab a certain Hassan Khan has recently unlawfully seized certain villages. In Merivan the behaviour of Mahmud Kanisanani has not been satisfactory. The occupation of Baneh and Sardasht in December 1944 does not seem to have been followed by any excessive oppression by the Persian troops. His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Kermanshah recently visited both villages, and his report shows that economic conditions have improved and that something has been done to reconstruct Baneh, destroyed by Hama Rashid.

6. In Northern Kurdistan, from Mahabad to Khoi, vague reports indicate a general deterioration of the situation as regards the attitude of the Kurds towards the Persian Government. In Mahabad the British Public Relations cinema van recently met with a hostile reception from some Kurdish hooligans.

Khuzistan.

7. Some alarm was caused by the return to Khuzistan of a Bani Turuf sheikh, Yunas Asi, who last November, during the operations for the disarmament of the Arabs, refused to surrender his arms and took refuge with some of his followers in Iraq, where, it is believed, he was ordered to live in Amareh. On his return he was joined by some other sheikhs and together they attacked some Arab villages near Bustan, burnt houses and carried off cattle. They were, however, in their turn attacked by loyal sheikhs. Eighteen of the insurgents were captured and are to be tried by military court. Yunas Asi has disappeared. It is as well that this minor outbreak has been suppressed, since some Persians would be ready to believe that the return of a rebel Arab chief from Iraq is somehow connected with the design, of which the Russian-inspired Persian press frequently accuses the British, of forming an independent Arab province in Khuzistan as part of the Arab federation.

Baluchistan.

8. Sirdar Idu Khan Reki, who is suspected of having been implicated in the murder of the electioneering agent of the opponent in the last elections of his son, has been deported from Khwash to Kerman.

Russian Affairs.

9. Reports from Tehran, Meshed, Birjand, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Senandaj and other places in Southern Kurdistan speak of a general increase in Tudeh propaganda and activities. In the towns the Tudeh have been successful in infiltrating their influence into the police—a necessary preliminary to secure freedom for subversive and provocative activities.

10. In the anti-locust campaign on the Moghan steppe north of Ardebil the Russians are assisting the Persian authorities with eight experts, eight aircraft and forty-eight lorries.

11. It seems that the Arab Federation does not meet with the approval of the Russians, since it has been criticised with hostility in the Persian press inspired by the Russians. It is there represented as another design to preserve Britain's imperial interests and to prevent ideas of freedom spreading to the Middle East; as an extension and consolidation of the policy long followed by Britain to control all the States along the routes to India, a policy obviously dangerous to Persian independence. British intervention in Syria and her alleged desire to exclude Russia from the conference that is to discuss a settlement of the dispute between France and the Levant States are also represented as part of the same policy.

12. The Russians are withdrawing all their security troops from the railway south of Tehran on the 1st July.

Chinese Affairs.

13. Dr. T. V. Soong has arrived in Tehran on his way to Moscow.

Tehran, 1st July, 1945.

[E 5301/70/34]

(3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26, Secret, for the period 2nd July to 8th July, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 238 of 9th July; Received 21st July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. In spite of the Shah's appeal to the representatives of the majority and minority parties to come to a compromise in the interests of the country, the minority continue to prevent the presentation of the Government to the Majlis by absenting themselves and so reducing the number present below the necessary quorum. The legal quorum is fixed at two-thirds of the number of Deputies present in Tehran, and the majority is still a few short of this number. Some of the Deputies of the minority who vote according to Russian instructions from fear and not from conviction had agreed to leave Tehran so as to reduce the number required for a quorum, but they got a very plain hint from the Russians of the dangers they would run in doing so.

2. Public opinion has been greatly disturbed by a statement broadcast by Angora radio, allegedly on the authority of a Reuter message, to the effect that an important element in the solution of the Dardanelles problem was the annexation to Russia of Persian Azarbaijan, which had been demanded by a committee of the province. The whole Tehran press is loud in protest. It is said, with truth, that there is no committee in Azarbaijan that could make such a demand, and, perhaps with less truth, that there is no Azarbaijani who would. The Turks are reproached for giving publicity to such a mischievous statement. The Tudeh press hints plainly that it is a British trick to spoil Russo-Persian relations. One paper says that although there may be justification for reconsideration of the frontiers fixed after the last war, no such considerations apply to Persia's northern frontier which has been unchanged for 120 years.

3. Seyyid Zia, in a recent speech to his party, the Iradeh-i-Milli, made some very outspoken criticisms of Russian actions in Persia. He said that Russian officials had openly interfered in the elections in the north; that Russian troops had intimidated the people into voting for the candidates of Russian choice, and had deported their opponents. He accused the Deputies who had been elected with Russian help of trying to wreck constitutional government and of undermining Persia's independence; of organising violent demonstrations that resulted in the loss of human life; of attempting to terrorise all those who stood for Persian independence or opposed communism. He said that they opposed the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops because they knew that their political life would end with the withdrawal of Russian armed support. The Tudeh press, having little to say in defence of Russian activities in Persia, has counteracted with the usual violent attacks on Seyyid Zia and on the British. To discredit Seyyid Zia it publishes the report that he had an interview with General Paget during the latter's recent visit here.

4. The delegation from the "Workers' Union" of the U.S.S.R. has arrived in Tehran in response to the invitation extended by the Tudeh party labour organisation to the "Workers' Unions" of Russia, Great Britain, America and France (see Summary No. 24/25, paragraph 15). It includes Borisov and Kuznetsov, the former described as vice-president, the latter as chief of the Soviet Workers' Union, also Akhundov, Ibrahimov, and Mme. Simonine Keva. They were met at the aerodrome by members of the Tudeh labour organisation, who garlanded them with flowers.

Economic.

5. The Under-Secretary of Roads and Communications, in a very reasonable statement to the press on the return to Persian control of the railway south of Tehran, paid tribute to the co-operation of the Allies, particularly of the British. The railway, he said, had been handed back in very satisfactory condition; the track and other operating facilities had been greatly improved. Locomotives and rolling stock sufficient for Persian needs had been put at the disposal of the Persian authorities. He had heard suggestions that the Allies should hand over all the locomotives and rolling stock that they had imported. This was, of course, quite unreasonable, firstly because some of it was needed elsewhere for the prosecution of the war with Japan and secondly, because the quantity was much in

excess of Persia's needs. The Allies had developed the railway to a capacity of 11,000 tons a day, whereas Persian requirements were not likely to exceed 3,000 tons a day. Any material that was decided to be surplus to Allied war needs would be offered to the Persian Government at a reasonable price. Moreover the British military authorities were offering 815 lorries at cost price, which would greatly improve the transport facilities of the country and, he hoped, help to reduce the cost of living. The Allies had hitherto financed the railway. The Persian administration was now faced with operating costs of 900 million rials against an estimated revenue of 350 million rials. They had therefore been obliged to raise freights by 100 per cent. Even if that brought in a revenue of 700 millions there would still be a deficit and this could be wiped out only by economies such as reduction of staff. The railway now employed 35,000; at least 13,000 would have to be discharged. He understood that the Russians were disposed to hand back the railways north of Tehran; they had already reduced the number of Soviet officials on the railway by 60 per cent. The Under-Secretary has, of course, been attacked for admitting that the British and Americans had treated the Persian railway administration with fairness.

6. It should have been noted in paragraph No. 3 of Summary No. 25/45 that the Russians control the Persian railway not only from Tehran to the Caspian Sea but also from Tehran to Mianeh and from Tehran to Shahrud.

Appointments—Civil.

7. Ali Muhammad Sadiq Shahbazi to be Farmandar of Maku.

Appointments—Military.

- 8.—(i) Sartip Muhammad Mazheri, Head of the 4th Bureau, General Staff, to be Assistant Head of the Advisory Department of the Ministry for War.
 (ii) Sarhang Ahmad Ihtisabian, Head of the 1st Bureau, General Staff, to be Head of the Military Secondary School, Tehran.
 (iii) Sarhang Hussain Siassi, Head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, to be Director General of Stores in the Army Transport Department.
 (iv) Sarhang Ghulam Reza Shahin Nuri, Head of the 3rd Bureau, General Staff, to be Assistant-Commandant of the Officers' College.
 (v) Sarhang Hussain Manucheri, attached to the Staff, to be Head of the 1st Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.
 (vi) Sarhang Dovum Hassan Akhavi, to be Head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.
 (vii) Sarhang Mahmoud Amini, to be Head of the 3rd Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.
 (viii) Sarhang Ali Asgar Muzayyini, to be Head of the 4th Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.

Internal Security.

Fars and Kuhigalu.

9. Restlessness is again becoming evident in Kuhigalu. There was some minor scrapping in the latter half of June between the followers of Hussein Quli Rustami and those of Ali Qaid Qiveh. Boir Ahmadi. The Boir Ahmadi are also said to be mixed up in an attack made by Muhammad Ali Liravi on the properties of his rival, Fathullah Khan Hiat Daudi. These two were fighting with each other in June 1944, see Summary No. 23/44, paragraph 9, and a settlement of their quarrel had been made some months ago by the Governor-General of Fars. Abdullah Khan Zarghampur is accused of now assisting Muhammad Ali, but he says that it is his half-brother Khosrow, with whom only very recently did he patch up a peace (see Summary 19/45 paragraph 8). Persian forces have been ordered to take action to stop the fighting.

10. In spite of the pact made between Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, and Nasir Qashgai (see Summary No. 32/44, paragraph 8) the Darrehshuri Qashgai have again been raiding into Bakhtiari territory in the Ganduman district and levying tolls on goods passing through their territory.

South Kurdistan.

11. A communiqué issued by the Persian General Staff says that 1,007 rifles have been collected from the inhabitants of the Sanandaj and Saqqiz areas. Some of these are rifles that had been issued to landowners and villagers for their own protection.

North Kurdistan.

12. As a movement for Kurdish independence the J.K. Society appears to have been supplanted by the party known as Komala. According to Persian sources it has been joined by chiefs of the Herki, Shakak, Jalali, of Mergavar and Tergavar, of whom Zero Beg Herki is the most active, and its activities extend from Mahabad to Maku. Zero Beg is a Russian protégé who would have been eliminated long ago by his neighbours if it had not been for Russian support. The Mamish, influenced by Quraini Agha, and the Deh Bukri, under the influence of Amir Assad, are not yet committed to open support of the movement. Whatever the truth may be, the Kurds believe that the movement has Russian approval, and there is much circumstantial evidence to confirm their belief. It is reported, and appears to be true, that attempts are no longer being made to persuade the Kurds to join the Tudeh party, which found little favour with them. Kurdish independence is a more effective slogan.

Russian Interests.

13. An entirely reliable report states that on all roads leading southwards from the Caspian provinces stalwart members of the Tudeh party, wearing arm-bands indicating that they are officials appointed to prevent the export of rice, are stationed within the protective radius of Russian military posts to stop and search all lorries leaving the area for the south. Any rice carried is thrown off. The local inhabitants when questioned said that they were powerless to protest; the Tudeh said that the rice would be exported by the British and that this could not be allowed while Persians were starving. But the Tudeh did not object to rice being exported to Russia. Force was on the side of the Tudeh. Resistance was followed by a beating and the destruction of property. Persian officials gave no protection.

14. Further information has now been received of the hostile demonstration against the P.R.B. cinema van at Mahabad, which was reported in Summary No. 25/45, paragraph 6. It was organised by the Komala party (see paragraph 13), members of which paraded near the van, beating drums and bearing aloft a large portrait of Stalin. The electric leads of the apparatus were twice cut. It is by no means certain that this outburst was approved by the Russians. It may have originated in a spontaneous desire of the members of the Komala party to demonstrate their preference for Russia over Great Britain. There had been no previous indication of anti-British feeling in Mahabad.

15. The total deliveries against the contract made by the Soviet authorities with the Persian munition factories (see paragraph No. 11 of Summary No. 45 of 1942) up to the date when the contract was closed were—

41,590 rifles.
 8,623,000 rounds of small arm ammunition
 10,279 machine pistols.
 The figures stated in the contract were—
 60,000 rifles.
 42,000,000 rounds of S.A.A.
 30,000 machine pistols.

Deliveries began in April 1943 and ended in January 1945.

Tehran, 8th July, 1945.

[E 5444/70/34]

(4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the Period 9th July to 15th July, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 248 of 16th July; Received in Foreign Office, 25th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE political deadlock continues, the minority insisting that Muhsin Sadr must resign, the majority refusing to be dictated to by the minority. The majority have now sufficient Deputies to form a quorum but insufficient, in the

absence of the minority, for a question to be put to the vote. For this it is necessary that three-quarters of the number of Deputies present in Tehran should be present in the Majlis.

2. Seyyid Zia's speech to his followers, mentioned in Summary No. 26/45, paragraph 3, which was printed and widely distributed, called forth a violent and abusive rejoinder in *Pravda*, later broadcast from Moscow. Seyyid Zia himself, the Prime Minister and his Government, friends of the British and every element in Persia that does not truckle to the Tudeh party are attacked with much venom. The reactionaries, it says, have greatly intensified their activities to suppress the movement for freedom and are organising terrorist groups, arming the tribes and forming tribal unions with a view to attacking not only the Tudeh party but also Russian interests. The publication of such an article in an official organ of the Soviet Government is obviously meant to leave on Persian minds the impression that Russia may resort to forcible measures if Persians continue to oppose Russian designs. The Russians began to broadcast the article from the Tehran Wireless Station in the period allotted to the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society for cultural talks; but to hear themselves abused from their own broadcasting station was too much for the Persian authorities, who closed it down and announced immediately afterwards that the Russian broadcast was not in accordance with the conditions on which the Allies were allowed to use the station. In present conditions it is only the Russian version of the situation in Persia, a version grossly false in many important respects, that reaches the world, since the Russian members of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship stop every press message that reports the true facts.

3. The broadcast from Angora stating that the annexation of Persian Azarbaijan to Russia had been demanded by a provincial committee in Azarbaijan (see Summary No. 26/45, paragraph 2) has forced even the Tudeh papers to deny that there is any demand among Persian Azarbaijanis for the secession of their province to Russia or any desire on Russia's part to acquire any Persian territory.

4. The Medical Congress (see Summary No. 23/45, paragraph 4), after a week of daily conferences, was closed on the 8th July. It was evident that the idea of this congress had been forced on the Persians by the Russians to provide the latter with an international audience for their propaganda.

Economic.

5. The Executive Committee of the Government Economic Council has asked for a credit of 10 million tomans to pay for the 815 motor vehicles, surplus to Allied military requirements, which have been offered to the Persian Government by the American authorities.

Persian Forces.

Army.

6. The Ministry for War has decided to construct houses in the vicinity of barracks for the accommodation of officers. Five million rials are to be borrowed from the army bank for this purpose.

7. A number of conscript officers have been released from the army before the end of their full period of compulsory service in order to effect economy in army expenditure.

Gendarmerie.

8. Headquarters of districts have now been abolished in the gendarmerie except in Fars and Azarbaijan, and regiments will in future be under the direct command of central gendarmerie headquarters in Tehran. This is likely to handicap co-operation between the civil and military authorities in the provinces on the one hand and the gendarmerie on the other. Previously the district commander, whose command extended over the province, was located at the provincial capital in close contact with the Governor-General and with divisional headquarters. There is in any case little co-operation and much antagonism between the army and the gendarmerie.

9. Colonel Schwarzkopf, American adviser to the gendarmerie, who has been for the past 21 months in America, has returned to Tehran. He informed the Persian press that the purpose of his journey was to obtain supplies for the Persian gendarmerie and that he had been successful.

Internal Security.

Fars and Kuhgilu.

10. Later reports indicate that Muhammad Ali Liravi's outburst against Fathullah Hiatdaudi's properties near Liravi (see Summary No. 26/45, paragraph 9) is not so serious as to be likely to require the intervention of troops. Although there have been a few casualties, the dispute seems susceptible of settlement by negotiation. Nasir Qashgai, fortified by the encouragement of Qavam-ul-Mulk, has arrived in Tehran to make, it is hoped, his peace with the Shah and the general staff.

Southern Kurdistan.

11. It is reported that the column of Persian troops operating in southern Kurdistan to which reference was made in Summary No. 25/45, paragraph 6, met with some opposition before it succeeded in entering Rezab and that both sides suffered casualties.

Hamadan.

12. Tudeh demonstrations in Hamadan during the first fortnight in July have led to conflicts with the police resulting in injuries to both sides and the arrest of Tudeh leaders.

Russian Affairs.

13. Reports, not yet fully confirmed, say that the control of affairs in Gilan and Mazanderan is passing into the hands of Tudeh committees or Soviets. In Azarbaijan the process of substituting Russian control, whether exercised direct or through the Tudeh party, for Persian continues steadily. Some landlords of Maragheh were prevented from visiting their estates by a party of Tudeh toughs. Two Shahsevan chiefs (see Summary No. 25/45, paragraph 4) are still detained in Tabriz by the Russians and the Persian subjects accused of assault on some Russian civilians are still in Russian custody. The Irano-Soviet Cultural Society has now monopolised the whole of the municipal garden in Tabriz. The Persian forces are immobilised in their barracks. The Kurds of western Azarbaijan snap their fingers at the Persian authorities. The red flag, hoisted by the Kurds at Mahabad on VE-day, flew for three weeks.

14. Two extracts from the Persian press, which may safely be assumed to have been dictated by the Russians, are attached to this summary. The first discusses the Russian attitude to Turkey. The second discusses British policy in the Middle, or rather Near East. The Russian-inspired Persian press has been publishing increasingly violent anti-British articles. Great Britain is accused of opposing all movements of freedom and progress, and of deliberately weakening small Powers so that British imperialism may be dominant.

15. The Soviet Consul-General in Khuzistan has recently made an extended tour of east Persia, visiting Tabas, Yazd, Kerman, Zabedan, Mirjawa, Zabul and Birjand. Photographs were taken of the airfields constructed by the British, which are of much interest to the Russians.

16. Reports continue to be received of an increase of Russian troops on the Perso-Turkish border and of the construction of defences, but they have not yet been confirmed by any reliable source. Manœuvres of Russian troops did take place along the frontier in June, but no reliable information is available as to the number of troops that took part. The suspicion is frequently voiced that the desire to bring pressure on Turkey is an added reason for the retention of Russian troops in Azarbaijan.

(Tehran, 15th July, 1945.)

Appendix A.

Summary of Article in Newspaper Mardum of 6th July, 1945.

A LEADER discusses the Soviet note to Turkey and the false news item broadcast by Angora Radio concerning Azarbaijan, and states that some people had been surprised at the suddenness of the Soviet note, but if the course of events was followed and various items of news were fitted together, one would find that the Soviet measure had not been sudden, but merely one in a series of notes and

discussions concerning the probable revision of the Turko-Soviet Treaty. After enumerating the Soviet demands, the writer states that the Russian note was not in the form of an ultimatum, and a specific time-limit had not been fixed. Any time the Turkish Government wished to open negotiations she could express her acceptance of the terms. Not only the Soviet Union, but any independent and free nation had the right to specify the terms on which negotiations with another Government should be carried on or refrain from concluding a treaty with a country whose attitude she considered unfriendly to herself. Commenting on the terms, the writer states that Kars and Ardahan had been ceded to Turkey at a time when the newly formed Soviet Government was suffering from the ravages of war, and she did not wish to have any differences with the new Turkey whose friendship she desired. She had even helped the Turkish Government, but experience had shown that Turkey preferred to follow other ways than friendship with the Soviet Union. Her attitude to Fascist Germany proved that she was waiting for an opportunity to stab Russia in the back. She was not satisfied with Kars and Ardahan and talked of Pan-Turkism and wished to establish a Greater Turkey. The tone of the Angora Radio and the Turkish press showed that upon the fall of Stalingrad she would attack Caucasus. Her attitude towards the trial of those who had made an attempt on the life of Von Papen left no trace of doubt as to her lack of sincerity towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could not forget that she had to keep many divisions of the Red army idle on the Turkish frontiers when she could have used them elsewhere. Russian interest in Straits was the result of past experience and the war with Hitlerite Germany. The Soviet Union realised that if an unfriendly Government in Turkey should control the Straits, she would be faced with difficulties. The question of the revision of Balkan frontiers aimed at giving Bulgaria access to the open seas. Unfortunately the Turkish authorities instead of removing their differences with their neighbours tried to extend them so that they could take advantage of the situation. The news concerning Azarbaijan was an example of this. The Persians should realise that the position of their country was different from that of Turkey. Persia had joined the United Nations and had contributed her share to the victory and expected to be rewarded. To obtain her rights, Persia should be sincere in her protestations, and prove that she was in favour of preserving friendly relations with her neighbours and establishing perfect democracy in her country. One of the conditions laid down by U.S.S.R. for opening negotiations with Turkey was the fact that Turkey should have a democratic régime. It was natural on the part of the Soviet Union to make such a demand. After having made such sacrifices she did not wish to see a Fascist régime established in Turkey.

Appendix B.

Summary of Extract from Persian Newspaper Rahbar of 12th July, 1945.

A LEADER states that when war broke out in 1939 the balance which existed in the inter-war years had collapsed. This balance was based upon Britain's supremacy, wrapped up in the political machinations of the League of Nations. It was also based upon the encirclement of Russia, ostracising her and excluding America from Europe. It culminated in the tragedy of Munich, support of fascism and the bloody war which ensued. Europe was steeped in blood, artificial frontiers collapsed, puppet Governments fled and Britain was compelled to drag Russia and America into the political crisis of Europe and the world. Realising the impossibility of re-establishing the past balance in Europe, Britain now focussed her attention on the Middle East and tried to consolidate that area, with which her economic and political interests were connected, against the evolution of world policy. The aim of this policy was the exclusion of other rivals from the Middle East. Russia and France had vital interests in the Middle East. Britain tried to come to terms with America with a view to expelling Russia and France from the Middle East. The oil conference and other economic negotiations in Cairo and elsewhere with America were aimed at luring in America, while the organising of the Arab federation, the far-fetched plans for the arming of the tribes and their union, interference in Greece and the formation of a special régime in that country, repeated meetings between British and Turkish statesmen, &c., were aimed at excluding Russia and France from the Middle East. Believing that she dominated the Middle East, Britain interfered in Syria and created a crisis in her relations with France, the repercussions of

which were felt in the West. In the same way that the uselessness of the idea of a "separate peace" or "regional wars" was proved, a world balance could not be partial or local. The great evolutions and progressive movements created in Europe could not be confined to that continent, and while the collapse of German fascism had brought about a new balance of Europe, the effects of this change were manifest in the Middle East, where the situation was bound to follow the general trend of the world. The principles of this new balance would be: (1) the destruction of the domination of any Great Power and of a one-sided policy so that all interested countries might enjoy an equal status in sharing in the solution of general affairs; (2) dictatorial and Fascist régimes, and the influence of imperialism which prevailed in most Middle East countries, would be exterminated.

[E 5575/70/34]

(5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period 16th July to 22nd July, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 259 of 22nd July: Received in Foreign Office, 30th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

MUHSIN SADR presented the following Cabinet to the Majlis on the 17th July:—

Finance: Mahmud Bader.
Justice: Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet.
Commerce and Industry: Abbas Quli Gulshayan.
Without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl.
War: Ibrahim Zand.
Health: Dr. Said Malik.
Agriculture: Dr. Nakhai.
Communications: Nadir Arasteh.
Foreign Affairs: Anushirwan Sipahbudi.
Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema.

A Minister of Posts and Telegraphs will be appointed later and the Prime Minister will assume charge of the Ministry of the Interior. The Government's 11-point programme was then read as follows:—

- (i) To safeguard and strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between Persia and the Allies and other friendly Governments has always been one of the principal aims of the Persian Government. My Government also recognises it as a primary duty to apply all its efforts and energies to strengthening and confirming that friendship. To achieve this goal my Government will base its policy on sincerity and justice, and its policy towards each one of our great Allies will be based on the complete political and economic independence of Persia, and mutual respect, conforming to the Tripartite Pact, the Atlantic Charter and the Tehran Declaration.
- (ii) Study of economic problems with a view to taking steps and creating organisations which will meet the needs and interests of the country and the well-being of the population.
- (iii) Revision of the Income Tax Law and other revenues and the balancing of the budget.
- (iv) Establishment of security throughout the country by strict application of the law and reorganisation of the responsible organisations.
- (v) Provision of work for the unemployed by encouraging special companies and utilising small capitals, and by initiating public works such as the extension of the railway, asphaltting the high roads and irrigation.
- (vi) Improve the lot of the peasants and the workers in accordance with special laws to be passed by the Majlis.
- (vii) Improve the lot of Government employees and revision of the Civil Service Law.
- (viii) Enforce the new organisation of the Ministry of Health after approval by the Majlis Health Commission and the preparation of long-term plans to improve health organisations throughout the country.

- (ix) Study and revision of teaching programmes, accelerate the application of the Compulsory Education Law, and steps to be taken to establish secondary schools throughout the country.
- (x) Revision of the Electoral Law.
- (xi) Preparation of long-term plans to develop agriculture and industry throughout the country and the tabling of Bills to this end in the Majlis.

2. The debate on the programme began in the Majlis session of the 19th July when Dr. Ardekan, speaking against the Government, deplored the absence from the programme of any specific reference to the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops. He pleaded for freedom of the press, and suggested the setting up of a special court to deal with press offences. He then went on to stress the fact that Persia was an agricultural country, that industry could not absorb those now unemployed and about to become unemployed as the result of discharge from Allied war activities, and that Government should take early and energetic steps to provide employment for them. The Deputy Farrukh, who supported Government, also referred to evacuation and later revived the project for the formation of a Tribal Affairs Commission. The debate was to be continued in the session of the 22nd July.

3. The Persian Government has now recognised the new Polish National Government in Warsaw.

4. The Minister of Finance has tabled a further two-twelfths Budget Bill.

Appointments—Civil.

- 5.—(i) Amir Ahmad Mihbud of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to be second secretary at Washington.
- (ii) Ahmad Zahir to be first secretary at Berne.
- (iii) Abdul Hussein Samii to be attached to the Persian Legation, London.
- (iv) Dr. Ali Amini (F.O. 15-M.A. 19) to be Director of the Economic Organisation now placed directly under the Ministry of Finance.

Persian Forces.

Gendarmerie.

6. With reference to paragraph 9 of last Intelligence Summary, Colonel Schwarzkopf has further stated that he has arranged for the supply from America of a further 500 vehicles, W/T equipment sufficient for a network of ten stations, two additional officers—one for W/T, one for administrative duties—and two officer replacements.

American Military Mission.

7. See Appendix I to Intelligence Summary No. 24, dated the 24th June. The revised list is given in Appendix I to this summary.

British Military Interests.

8. At the suggestion of the Chief Signal Officer, South Iraq and Persia, parties of Persian linesmen and technicians are being trained in line maintenance, care of instruments and carrier equipment. This was a necessary step if the whole organisation was not to break down after purchase by the Persian Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.

9. Since the cessation of aid to Russia, *i.e.*, from the 4th May to the 19th July, the British military authorities have discharged the following labour:—

Area.	Skilled.	Unskilled.	Total.
Tehran	1,413	1,413
Burujird	65	610	675
Sultanabad	10	377	387
Qum	7	335	342
Bisitun	1,659	2,070	3,729
Hamadan	526	526
Khurramabad	69	387	456
Total	1,810	5,718	7,528

From August 1944 to July 1945 the following discharges by British military, American military, U.K.C.C., and others had previously been reported:—

British naval and military	2,240
United States army	27,308
U.K.C.C.	318
Miscellaneous (Skodas, &c.)	20
Total	29,886

Internal Security.

Fars and Kuhigalu.

10. Nasir Qashgai has had an audience of His Imperial Majesty the Shah. He has also seen His Majesty's Ambassador. He does not intend to stay in Tehran longer than is necessary for him to arrange for the education abroad of his son Abdullah. A fairly reliable report states that at his audience with His Imperial Majesty the Shah, Nasir Khan spoke bluntly on the general insecurity and indiscipline in the country and warned the Shah that continued lack of a firm Government could only result in the disintegration of Persia in the very near future. Only a Persian could fail to see anything inconsistent in Nasir's adoption of the rôle of mentor and in his conveniently forgetting his own past share in weakening Persia by harbouring her enemies and maintaining in Fars an armed rebellion against the central authority.

In the dispute between Muhammad Ali Liravi and Fathullah Hiatdaudi (see paragraph 10 of last summary) further intervention by the small military force sent to Liravi has as yet been found unnecessary.

Southern Kurdistan.

11. No further news has been received about the activities of the Persian army column which entered Rezab (see paragraph 11 of last intelligence summary). Its tasks, as enumerated by the Chief of the General Staff, seem ill-defined. It is to show the flag in those more remote parts of Southern Kurdistan which lie between the Sennandaj-Merivan and Kermanshah-Naudshah roads, to destroy any armed force of Kurds which may oppose it and to cut off those tribes living round Merivan from support by the Avroman tribes to the south. No arrangements for its maintenance in this inaccessible area will have been made by a non-existent supply department and after a few weeks' sojourn there, during which time it will have commandeered and exhausted the supplies of the countryside it will return to its base at Sennandaj.

12. The J.A.F. nomads are reliably reported to have signed an agreement with the Iraq authorities not to cross the frontier into Persia this summer. They failed to induce the Persian frontier commissioner to modify his conditions for their entry—conditions which they regarded as too onerous.

British Interests.

13. His Majesty's Government are reminded from time to time that the Persian Government has not given up its claim to Bahrein. The claim is rather shadowy as it is based on a total period of sovereignty of 570 years in the last seventeen centuries of which 350 years belong to the pre-Muhammadan era. In more recent times Persia cannot be said to have exercised effective rule for more than 167 years in the aggregate, and it is now over 160 years since she last held the islands. The Persian claim was restated recently in the Russian-sponsored paper *Rahbar*. Still more recently a party of Bahreini pilgrims bound for Meshed were stopped in Khorramshahr on the grounds that, being Persian subjects, their British passports were invalid. The party has now returned to Bahrein and their passports, which had been impounded by the Persian authorities, have been recovered.

Chinese Interests.

14. Dr. Soong, on his return from Moscow, arrived in Tehran on the 14th July and left for Chungking on the 15th.

Brazilian Interests.

15. His Excellency the Brazilian Minister left Tehran on transfer on the 13th July. No successor has arrived as yet.

Tehran, 22nd July, 1945.

Appendix I.

Staff of the American Military Mission to the Persian Army as on 22nd July, 1945.

1. Major-General C. S. Ridley: Head of Mission.
2. Colonel F. G. Dumont: Second in command and Head of Transport.
3. Colonel T. E. Mahoney: Supply.
4. Colonel T. L. Solgard: Accounts.
5. Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Lee.
6. Lieut.-Colonel K. T. Brunswold.
7. Lieut.-Colonel M. Wulwick: Medical Adviser.
8. Major R. D. Swick.
9. Major R. F. Conly: P.A. to General Ridley.
10. Captain W. D. Dearmond.
11. Captain R. R. Murray: Communications.
12. Lieut. R. Houston (and 2 Sergeants for transport duties).

District Inspectors.

13. Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Foster: Tehran.
14. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Fields: Sanandaj.
15. Major W. D. Hull: Kerman.
16. Major E. R. Stanley: Zahidan.
17. Major E. M. Collins: Khurramabad.
18. Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Hall: Ahwaz.

[E 5924/70/34]

(6)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the Period 23rd July to 29th July, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 265 of 30th July; Received in Foreign Office 14th August.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The Majlis stalemate continues. A recent debate was enlivened by exchanges between the windy and woolly Dr. Musaddiq and Ali Dashti. The doctor maintained that free elections could not be held as long as foreign troops were on Persian soil. He was equally averse to postponing the elections until the evacuation of Persia by foreign troops had been completed, because that was an act contrary to the laws of the constitution. He maintained his point of view that the present Government was not representative of and did not enjoy the support of the people. In the meantime Government business is at a standstill. The voting of a proportion of two-twelfths of the annual budget, subsequently amended to one-twelfth, to meet the cost of Government salaries was, however, proceeded with and passed largely owing to the efforts of Ali Dashti.

2. The Persian delegation to the San Francisco Conference has returned.

*Internal Security.**Southern Kurdistan.*

3. According to the latest information given by the Chief of the General Staff, the Persian army column has pushed on from Rezab for a distance of some 15 miles and the Kurdish insurgents are now split into two groups, one about 15 miles south-west of Rezab and the other just short of the Perso-Iraqi boundary. As the result of the successful outcome of the skirmishes at Merivan and Rezab and the retirement of the insurgents to positions further west, the Chief of the General Staff regards the first phase of the operations as successfully completed and is confident of the successful outcome of the second phase, i.e., disarmament. When asked what tactics he intended to adopt if the Kurds refused to stand their ground and let themselves be disarmed, he glibly assumed that the Iraqi army would take up positions along the frontier so as to bar Kurdish ingress into Iraq. Sarlashgar Amanullah Jehanbani has left on a special mission to Kurdistan, from which he is due to return in a fortnight with a report on the advisability of the operations, their possible scope and their conduct.

Fars.

4. Some raiding by Darrashuri tribesmen in Ganduman Burujin and by the Kuhgilu in Janeki Sardsir is reported. According to a report received in the General Staff, but not confirmed from consular sources, Kamaraji of Kamarij, in the face of a threat of punitive action by the Kazerun garrison, has made his submission and handed in the Government rifles which he acquired by burning and looting a gendarmerie post some months ago.

Khuzistan.

5. With reference to Intelligence Summary No. 25, paragraph 7, eighteen rebel sheikhs were captured in all, but Yunis Ali made good his escape. They are to be tried by a military court. Some sympathy for the sheikhs is felt by the Governor-General, a Majlis Deputy and others who feel that they had much provocation for their acts in the land settlement which General Humayuni sought to impose on them, probably not without profit to himself.

Khorasan.

6. The first meeting of Seyyid Zia's Iradeh-i-Milli party was staged to take place in Meshed on the 22nd July. During the early morning of that day Soviet soldiers, accompanied by Persian police, arrested about seventeen members of the working committee of the party, including the brother of Seyyid Zia. Their houses were searched and all documents relating to the party were confiscated. They are at present believed to be in custody at the Soviet Military Headquarters.

Azərbaycan.

7. Hatim, one of the Shahsevan chiefs, is reported to have been released by the Russians, though Amir Aslan is still in their custody.

8. An unconfirmed report states that several thousand people, including Armenians and Assyrians, attempted to emigrate into the U.S.S.R. They did not receive permits and after some days of hardship at Julfa returned to their homes.

British Interests.

9. Major-General W. A. K. Fraser, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., left Tehran on the 26th July for the United Kingdom on relinquishing the appointment of British Military Attaché.

Russian Interests.

10. Of recent weeks the Russians, foreseeing perhaps stronger demands from Persia and her late Allies for evacuation, have intensified their efforts to produce administrative chaos in the zones occupied by themselves and to ensure, in the event of their departure before the next elections take place, that only a Government completely subservient to themselves shall come into power. The anti-British tone of the Russian-controlled press has become more violent. They have openly threatened prominent politicians and public men with their grave displeasure unless they would obey their orders. They have boasted that now victory in Europe has been achieved they are free to turn their attention to Asia and to arrange things there to their satisfaction. Some of them have openly stated that Stalin will never give up Persia nor the Red army evacuate it to allow it to become a hotbed of intrigue by imperialists directed against the Soviet Union. They have egged on toughs of the Tudeh party to usurp the functions of government in Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces, where they have forbidden the export of wheat or rice and have even taken cash deposits from drivers of Persian Government trucks leaving those areas on Persian Government business. They have forced the drivers to carry a spare driver, who must be provided from the ranks of the unemployed under Tudeh control. They utilise time allotted by the Persian Government radio for their Cultural Society to broadcast its own propaganda directed against their Persian political opponents, who are dubbed reactionaries, Fascists and imperialists. They oppose the lifting of the Tripartite censorship lest the truth about their activities in Persia should leak out to the outside world. On a recent occasion they made so bold as to use their soldiery in the British-controlled area of Khorramshahr to search the house of two suspects. Some property was removed and the two suspects were later arrested.

by the Persian authorities as the result of pressure brought to bear by the Russians on the Persian Government in Tehran.

11. The Russian trade union delegation has completed a tour of the Caspian provinces and is shortly to leave for Tabriz. The Russian press and the Russian-controlled Persian press has devoted much space to the wonderful reception given to them, and the spontaneous welcome shown by the 250,000 Tudeh members in Persia. A conservative estimate of the total industrial population of Persia is 150,000, and by no means all of these are members of the Tudeh party, though many are daily being forced into joining by exclusion, unless possessed of a Tudeh membership card, from the utilisation of public transport facilities and even the weekly visit to the public bath.

French Interests.

12. According to a press message from the Agence Pars, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs has decided to raise the status of its legation in Tehran to that of an embassy.

Polish Interests.

13. The number of civilian Polish refugees still remaining in Persia on the 15th July was:—

	Men, women and children.
In Tehran	2,459
In Isfahan	216
In Ahwaz	1,108
Total	3,783

14. As the result of the recognition of the new Polish National Government by the Persian Government, Lieut.-Colonel B. T. Rudnicki, Polish Military Attaché, has been relieved of his appointment. He will stay on in Tehran in an unofficial capacity as observer of the refugees.

Correction.—Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27, dated the 15th July, 1945. Paragraph 15, line 1, for "Khuzistan" read "Khorasan."

Tehran, 29th July, 1945.

[E 6081/70/34]

(7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30, Secret, for the period 30th July to 5th August, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 275 of 6th August; Received in Foreign Office, 21st August.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE situation in the Majlis has remained virtually unchanged. The minority continue their tactics of obstruction and the majority refuse to withdraw their support of Sadr. The minority issued a manifesto, signed by Dr. Musaddiq, Hikmat, Farivar, Tehrani, Iskandari, Raji and Afkhami, which explained their reasons for opposing Sadr. Some press representatives were invited to attend a special meeting at the Majlis, where Ali Dashti replied for the majority to the manifesto. An attempt by some of the more moderate Deputies of both sides to come to an understanding was foiled by Dr. Musaddiq, who refused to have anything to do with the written agreement produced by them. The minority are now reported to be seeking another interview with His Imperial Majesty the Shah at which they intend to reiterate their objections to Sadr and to inform the Shah that, as long as he remains, they will neither participate in Majlis business nor accept responsibility for the government of the country.

2. The newspapers *Nida-yi-Millat*, *Nida-yi-Adalat*, *Kishrar* and *Arzu* have been suppressed at the request of the Russians.

3. The newspaper *Rahbar*, the leading Russian-controlled paper, has published a statement to the effect that the Russian Embassy have officially announced that they have no objection to the release of the remaining internees

and that their further retention must be considered as being at the insistence of the British authorities.

4. A large Tudeh meeting was held on the 5th August. Over 5,000 people are said to have attended. They moved in procession through the town to the Majlis square. Their behaviour throughout was orderly.

5. On the 2nd August, after a delay of several days in order that the Russian and American Embassies might receive their instructions (they have not as yet been received), the Persian Government was informed by His Majesty's Embassy of the recent decision of the Potsdam Conference to evacuate Allied troops from Tehran at once. Gratitude on the part of the Persian Government for British efforts at achieving this decision was hardly to be expected, but, even so, the Persian reaction was disappointing. They were suspicious of Russian intentions because the Russian Embassy had as yet made no communication on this subject; they had hoped that the whole of Persia would be evacuated within three months and, though they would never admit it, they were probably apprehensive of a sharp decline in security now that the evacuation, for which they had clamoured so loudly, was actually about to begin.

Appointments—Resignations.

6.—(i) Hussein Ala, Minister of Court (F.O. 7; M.A. 11), to be ambassador in Washington.

(ii) Nasrullah Intizam (F.O. 92; M.A. 121), who has recently returned from San Francisco, where he headed the Persian delegation to the conference, has left for London as the Persian Government representative on the Executive Committee of the Reparatory Commission. He will have the special rank of ambassador.

(iii) Abul Hassan Behnam to be Persian Consul-General in Palestine.

(iv) Dr. Murteza Azmudeh has resigned from his post of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Agriculture.

(v) Abbas Quli Ardalan to be head of the Transport Department of the Ministry of Finance.

(vi) Mahmud Salahi to be Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(vii) Hassanpur to be Director-General in the Ministry of Roads and Communications.

(viii) Sipihnia to be Governor of Bandar Abbas.

(ix) Ahmad Fariduni to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior.

(x) Abul Hassan Sipihri to be Governor of Ilam.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

7. The members of the Iradeh-i-Milli party arrested by the Russians (see last Internal Summary, paragraph 6) have now been released in Meshed with the exception of Seyyid Hashim Tabatabai (brother of Seyyid Zia-ud-din) and six others, who were taken to Shahrud and released there with orders of banishment from Khorasan. The arrests have aroused deep resentment in Meshed against the Russians and the Tudeh party, though the populace is too scared to give vent to their indignation. The Governor-General, Ali Mansur, though he has been trying to suppress the Iradeh-i-Milli party from the beginning for fear of creating disturbances which would serve as an excuse for Russian intervention, was not, it seems, consulted by the Russians in this latest move. Acting upon information given by the Freedom Front, the Soviet military authorities took immediate action through their creature, Lieut.-Colonel Turaj Amin, the chief of police.

Azerbaijan.

8. The Governor of Maku, Lutf Ali, is reported to have been suspended from his functions at the request of the Russians, and the officer commanding gendarmerie at Miandoab removed at the request of the Tudeh party there. General Zanganeh has been reappointed Acting Governor-General of the 4th Ustan (Western Azerbaijan). Confirmation of the report of the attempted emigration to Russia has been received (see last Internal Summary, paragraph 8). If it was a piece of Russian propaganda designed to show the general urge of the oppressed population of Persia to emigrate to the promised land of the U.S.S.R. its success must be offset by the criticism of Russian methods expressed by the would-be emigrants, who, after being kept waiting at the frontier for

several days, were refused entry visas and sent home in a penniless and half-starved state. Agrarian reform has become an additional plank in the Tudeh platform which, up till now, has chiefly voiced the demands of the unemployed. Maragheh and Sarab have been two important centres of agitation.

Khuzistan.

9. The military court convened for the trial of the rebel sheikhs (see last Internal Summary, paragraph 5) has passed the death sentence on two, a sentence of imprisonment on some others and has ordered the release of thirteen. The death sentences will require confirmation, and the Chief of the General Staff has ordered that no further action be taken pending the arrival of an inspector. The Governor-General has also requested a fresh trial as it is believed in some quarters that General Humayuni, General Officer Commanding Khuzistan Division, may have unduly influenced the court in its findings and sentence.

Mekran.

10. A lorry was recently held up by bandits (believed to be Afghans) at a point 18 miles north of Zahidan on the Zahidan-Meshed road.

French Interests.

11. Lieut.-Colonel M. Jouvel has relinquished the appointment of French Military and Air Attaché with effect from the 1st August on being relegated to the reserve of officers. He has been succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel P. Chavonin of the French colonial army.

Russian Interests.

12. Another instance of unwarranted interference by the Russians in the internal affairs of Persia comes from the gendarmerie. Twenty-five officers, who had recently completed a refresher course at Gendarmerie Headquarters Training School, were sent out to gain practical experience as post commanders on the Tehran-Meshed road. The entire party was stopped at Semnan by the Russians and sent back to Tehran.

Tehran, 5th August, 1945.

[E 6236/70/34]

(8)

Military Attachés Intelligence Summary No. 31, Secret, for the period 6th to 12th August, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 286 of 13th August; Received in Foreign Office 25th August.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Majlis deadlock continues. The President and some of the Deputies were invited to tea by His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 7th August. From press reports of the meeting the Shah does not seem to have done more than discuss generalities, with emphasis on Persia's great need for increased irrigation. A public session of the Majlis was to have been held on the 9th August, but the minority adopted their usual tactics of preventing it by their absence. There seems to be a growing conviction that Sadr will not get his required majority and that he will be forced to resign. The Shah is believed to favour this and to prefer his own previous choice of Hakimi. That the Shah should advise the minority to cease their opposition on condition that Sadr resigned was, however, ruled out by some of the Deputies on the grounds that this would constitute a dangerous precedent for interference by the Sovereign and also for future obstructionist tactics by any minority which desired the removal of a Prime Minister.

2. The Soviet Ambassador has now received his instructions (see paragraph 5 of last Intelligence Summary), and on the 9th August informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the decision to evacuate Tehran forthwith.

3. The recent visit of the Soviet trade union delegation and the question of the representation of the Tudeh at the forthcoming Paris conference has stirred up rival unions to apply for membership. Such are the Workers' and Peasants' Union of Yusuf Iftekhar and the anti-Tudeh Union in Isfahan.

Appointments—civil.

- 4.—(i) Asadullah Masud Ansari, Persian Consul at Suleimanieh, to be consul at Mosul and Erbil, *vice* Muhammad Hajib Davallu, appointed counsellor at Stockholm.
- (ii) Mahmud Isfandiari to be 2nd secretary at the Persian Legation at Stockholm.
- (iii) Ali Reza Bahrami to be 3rd secretary at Stockholm.
- (iv) Daulatshahi to be consul, with the local rank of 1st secretary, at Delhi.
- (v) Abul Qasim Nawai to be Persian Vice-Consul at Karachi.

Communications.

5. According to a press report, the Ministry of Roads and Communications has decided to complete the construction of the Mianeh-Tabriz and Shahrud-Meshed sections of railway. The completion of these sections was part of the original project and it is known that the Persian Government is anxious to provide work for those thrown out of employment as the result of the cessation of Allied war effort in Persia, but, even so, the above announcement must be regarded as premature as the Government has not got the money to spend on railway construction on a scale which will complete this work in the near future.

Internal Security.

Fars.

6. (See Intelligence Summary No. 28, paragraph 10.) The latest news of this dispute is that the Persian military authorities intend to disarm both the Fathullah Hiat Daudi and Muhammad Ali Lirawi factions. The Chief of the General Staff has been informed by the British military authorities that, in view of Fathullah Khan's long-standing friendship with the British, his success in maintaining order in his area with the help of the 200 Persian Government rifles which he holds and his valuable help in securing grain supplies for Bushire town, it might be an act of doubtful wisdom to disarm him at the present time.

Khuzistan.

7. The following note on the land settlement in Dasht-i-Mishan has been taken from His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General's Diary No. 13:—

"The Tehran commission charged with the examination of the whole question of the Dasht-i-Mishan lands and with making recommendation about future policy has made its report. It consisted of representatives of the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, War, and Finance, the last being Mr. Solomon; and the Majlis Deputy Hussein Farhudi, who has been showing a praiseworthy and (considering the weather) surprising interest in the affairs of his constituency. The result of their deliberations has been the adoption of Mr. Solomon's plan of allotting all the land afresh, on a communal village basis, the heads of families being named collectively in the title-deeds. This would greatly shorten the task of registration and enable the villagers themselves to sub-divide the land annually in accordance with the exigencies of the moment; the land, in fact, would be held in undivided shares known by the term "musha." Certain taxes which used to be collected by the sheikh are to be abolished, the only tax remaining being the smaller one payable to the "mubashir" or Kedkhuda. The sheikhs, if friendly, will get up to twenty shares of land, but will have no privileges. It remains to be seen whether this arrangement will work: the peasants ought to welcome it, but, of course, the sheikhs will not, and it will need strong and impartial handling, with frequent inspections."

Khorasan.

8. As a result of the arrest by the Russians of prominent members of Seyyid Zia's Iradeh-i-Milli party (referred to in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary) a reliable report states that Russian-Tudeh liaison is even more in evidence. The Persians, under Russian pressure, are prosecuting non-Tudeh Government employees and forcing them to subscribe to a Russian newspaper.

9. A mass emigration movement, suspiciously akin to that reported from Azerbaijan and alluded to in paragraph 8 of last Intelligence Summary, is reported also from Khorasan. The Soviet Consul-General is said to have received 12,000 applications from Turki and Turcoman motor drivers and others to acquire Soviet nationality and migrate to the U.S.S.R.

10. A party of Indian pilgrims bound for Meshed was held up and robbed by armed bandits about 40 miles south of the town.

Kurdistan.

11. The Chief of the General Staff had no news of interest about these operations and is probably waiting for the return of Sarlash Jehanbani with his report. He mentioned that Jehanbani had telegraphed to advise the despatch of yet another infantry battalion. The Chief of the General Staff intends to send as reinforcements the infantry battalion now located as a temporary measure at Abadeh in Fars.

Azerbaijan.

12. The Soviet Trade Union delegates have visited Tabriz, where they were officially welcomed by the Acting Governor-General. They were accompanied by three Tehran trade unionists. They inspected various factories, where they talked with the workers, but ignored the managers. They have left Azerbaijan for Tehran on their way home to Russia. They are not visiting Abadan, though this was included in an itinerary published in the Persian press some weeks ago.

Chinese Interests.

13. Dr. Soong, Prime Minister, Dr. Wong Shih-chieh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek passed through Tehran on their way to Moscow to resume conversations with the Soviet Government.

Polish Interests.

14. The Government of the Lebanon has agreed to admit 800-odd Polish refugees from Persia.

Tehran, 12th August, 1945.

[E 4637/70/34]

(9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32, Secret, for the Period 13th-19th August, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 287 of 20th August; Received in Foreign Office 29th August.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The minority refuse to come to terms with the majority, and by their continued absence from Majlis sessions have kept all parliamentary business at a standstill. There is increasing evidence that Sadr is finding his position as Prime Minister untenable. A further supply of money, in the shape of a 1/12th Budget Bill, must be voted in the near future and many think that the occasion will be taken by the minority to force a decision.

2. This paralysis at the centre is rapidly affecting the provinces. Ali Mansur has arrived in Tehran from Khorasan and is probably busy assessing his chances of obtaining office as Prime Minister should the present Government fall. Firuz is still in Tehran and it is rumoured that he will not return to Fars. Bahrami is also in the capital and has said that he will not return to Kerman. Azerbaijan is still without a Governor-General since the departure of Dadvar many months ago. There were also reports of a change in Khuzistan but the latest news is that Misbah Fatemi is to remain. Kermanshah has at long last received a Governor-General, Kalantari, a hitherto unknown official of the Ministry of Interior, having been appointed.

3. Much discussion is taking place as to whether the new parliamentary elections should be postponed till all foreign troops have left Persia. Dr. Musaddiq, whose logic is at times difficult to follow, thinks that they should not be postponed, not because the postponement is inexpedient, but because it is contrary to the Constitution. At the same time he maintains that the electoral laws require redrafting. Who is to redraft them when he has brought all Majlis business to a standstill the worthy Doctor has not revealed. Normally the life of the present Majlis would end about the 12th March, 1946, and the new elections should begin three months and the public notices announcing the election should be issued five months before that date.

The Court.

4. H.I.M. the Shah paid a visit during the week to the Lar valley, where he inspected the preliminary work now being carried out by Messrs. Alexander Gibb and Partners to determine the feasibility of the Lar irrigation project.

Internees.

5. The remaining Persian political internees interned in Persia have now been released. Their names are:—

Ali Hayat,
Captain Matini,
General Abul Hassan Pourzand,
Yahya Vira,
Major Mohammad Hussein Sartipzadeh,
Ahmed Akbari,
Ahmed Namdar,
General Farajullah Aghevli,
Javad Aliabadi,
Habibollah Naubakht,
Hussein Neivandi,
Sheikh Abdul Majid Shirazi,
Sayid Abol Qassem Kashani.

Persian Forces.

Gendarmerie.

6. A recent reform of Colonel Schwarzkopf is proving of doubtful value. He considered rightly that small posts of four men were an easy target for robbers. One of the inmates of these small posts was usually absent, one was not uncommonly sick, one had gone to extract supplies from a nearby village and the remaining custodian was normally asleep. The post and its arms therefore were an easy prey. He decided to scrap the small posts and concentrate his men in platoon posts at greater distances apart. A deficiency of M.T. and a failure to keep roadworthy the little transport that they have has defeated Colonel Schwarzkopf's plans. The posts are now not infrequently 30 miles apart and, as they have not the means of patrolling, the intervening stretches of road are a happy hunting ground for bandits.

Appointments.

- 7.—(i) Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 198-M.A. 253) to be Minister at Washington;
- (ii) Bakhuda to be head of the Propaganda Department in place of Safavi dismissed. (Safavi's name will be recalled in connexion with the recent broadcasting incident when, judging that the Russians were making improper use of broadcasting facilities to attack the Persian Government, Safavi closed down the transmission);
- (iii) Sartip Abdul Ali Ittemad Muqoddam to be Military Governor of Tehran vice Sarhang Baharmast.

Internal Security.

Fars.

8. Three gendarmes were recently shot dead by a Qashgai band on the road between Khan-i-Zinian and Dasht Arjin. This murder is said to be in revenge for an affray which took place near Ardekan of a month ago.

9. The Tudeh party recently opened a club at the sugar factory at Mervdasht. On the 9th August a crowd incited by local landlords and the Democrat party attacked and burnt the club. The Majlis Deputy Muaddel is suspected of implication as one of the chief landlords of the district. Two mullahs are also reported to have been sent by Qavam-ul-Mulk to stir up anti-Tudeh feeling.

Kurdistan.

10. Security on the Senneh-Kermanshah road is deteriorating and two incidents of highway robbery have taken place recently. In one of the incidents two British employees of the Kermanshah Petroleum Company were the victims.

According to a senior officer of the Gendarmerie recently arrived from these parts, the closing down of a number of small Gendarmerie posts has facilitated the task of the bandits.

Azerbaijan.

11. The situation in Azerbaijan has deteriorated sharply during the past week. On the 11th August a gang of Tudeh agitators visited the village of Likhvan near Tabriz and attempted to incite the peasants to withhold the landlord's share of the harvest in accordance with the Tudeh programme of agrarian reform. The landlord, Intisham, and his supporters interrupted the agitators and beat them. A party of Tudeh said to number 200 and to be armed with revolvers and daggers, then went to the village where a fight ensued. The proprietor, his grandson and a servant were killed by the gang. The Tudeh on their side suffered casualties amounting to 4 killed and several wounded. The landlord's son was taken away captive to Tabriz. On their return to Tabriz the Tudeh ordered the closing of all Government departments and shops in mourning for their dead. A request by the Ministry of War to despatch troops from the capital in answer to an appeal for reinforcements by the G.O.C. Tabriz has been refused by the Russians. A Commission of Enquiry has been allowed to proceed. It comprises General Amanullah Jehanbani (recently returned from his inspection of the Kurdistan operations), Brigadier Khosrow Panah (Chief of the Gendarmerie), Ahmadi (a former Governor of Tabriz), and a Colonel Taras of the Persian General Staff.

Khorasan.

12. Much excitement has been caused by a report, unconfirmed as yet from consular sources but believed to be substantially true, to the effect that 17 Persian army officers, including one lieutenant-colonel, have deserted from Meshed with arms and joined a gang of Turcoman bandits. According to the Persian General Staff, the Russians have refused a request by the G.O.C. Meshed Division to be allowed to send a punitive column into the area where the gang now is.

British Interests.

13. Colonel R. O. A. Gatehouse, I.A., arrived in Tehran on the 15th August to take up the appointment of Additional Military Attaché at His Majesty's Embassy.

American Interests.

14. Brigadier-General Booth has left Persia on relinquishing the command of United States Persian Gulf Command.

15. Six American officers of Movement Staff have received Persian decorations.

Tehran, 19th August, 1945.

[E 6557/70/34]

(10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33, Secret, for the Period 20th August to 26th August, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 299; Received 5th September.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Majlis majority and minority have not yet come to any agreement and the position shows little change. A special session of the Majlis to mark the end of the war with Japan was held on the 16th August, but the minority did not attend owing to the non-acceptance of their proposal that the Cabinet should not be present and that only the Presidential body of the Majlis should speak. A special session was convened at the request of the Prime Minister on the 18th August at which he blamed the minority for holding up business and said that, although the Government was capable of dealing with current affairs and crises itself, it considered the support of all Deputies desirable. The cause

of this particular crisis was the events in Khorasan (see paragraph 8 below) closely following upon those in Azerbaijan. He proposed to make them a test case to determine the fate of the Cabinet in the Majlis. A debate ensued as the result of which all the majority Deputies affirmed their confidence in Sadr, declared that the minority by their obstructionist tactics were responsible for the disturbances in the various parts of the country and proposed to hold daily sessions at which those minority Deputies who wished to might attend. The Minister for War also made a statement on the recent mutiny in Khorasan (see paragraph 8 below) and urged the speedy passing of the budget to provide the necessary money for the army to carry out their task of restoring law and order in the country.

2. The recent speeches by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Eden in the House of Commons have had a very good effect in this country. Nearly all Persians have been greatly heartened by the references to Persia by the reassuring statement about the reasons for Allied troops entering the country and the equally cogent reasons for now leaving it, and by the condemnation of the system of zones of influence. The overwhelming majority of Persians appreciate the efforts of His Majesty's Government on their behalf at Potsdam; the recent publicity given to Russian behaviour in Persia; these recent speeches in the House and what they believe to be our attitude to the early removal of censorship.

3. Not much reliance is placed on a recent statement by a Deputy to the effect that over seventy Deputies had signed a proposal to postpone the elections till one month after the last of the Allied troops had left Persia.

4. The Cabinet has tightened up the military governorship of Tehran by reimposing a curfew from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. and by the prohibition of all outdoor political demonstrations. These measures were introduced to prevent any repercussions in the capital of the recent events in Azerbaijan and Khorasan and of the arrest of some officers and despatch to the south of others suspected of either plotting with the Russians or of complicity in the Khorasan mutiny.

Economic.

5. The Council of Ministers has reconstituted the Foreign Exchange Control Commission under the Ministry of Finance. Dr. Sajjadi has been appointed director. A black market for dollars and pounds has already come into existence.

Communications.

6. According to the Persian press the Persian State Railway has claimed, and according to the British Transportation Directorate is likely to claim, from the Allies a sum of 100 million tomans (about £7,700,000) on account of freight charges. This is in excess of the £16,500,000 already paid by the Allies to keep the railway going. The Persian State Railway is claiming the full freight rate instead of the agreed rate of 30 rials per ton/kilom. so far paid by the Allies. The Persians base their claim on the fact that, though discussions took place, no railway agreement was ever signed.

Appointments—Civil.

- 7.—(i) Dr. Ali Sajjadi to be Governor of Saveh.
- (ii) Ali Asghar Musavvar Rahmani, Governor of Saveh, to be an inspector in the Ministry of the Interior.
- (iii) Mehdi Shahrukh, Chief of the Department of Justice in Isfahan, to be Governor-General of the 8th Ustan (Kerman) vice Fazlullah Bahrami, resigned.
- (iv) Mohsin Shahrukh to be head of the Contracts and Legal Affairs Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (v) Murteza Mushfiq Kazemi to be head of the Minister's office in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (vi) Abul Hasan Mahjubi to be head of the Cipher Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (vii) Sadiq Fatemi, Inspector-General of the Registration Department, is appointed Director-General in the Ministry of Interior.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

8. Further details are now known of the recent mutiny of Persian army officers in Meshed (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary) on the 16th August. Thirteen officers, including a Lieut.-Colonel Nawai of the Supply

and Transport Department, 2 majors, 5 captains, 5 subalterns, and 4 or 5 soldiers obtained possession of a jeep, 2 lorries, a W/T set and arms and ammunition. To prevent pursuit they immobilised the remaining army vehicles by removing their switch keys and by putting salt in their petrol tanks (sugar, though more effective, is too expensive in Persia). With the connivance of the Russian control post (some say avoiding the control post by a detour) they made their way to Buinurd, having taken the precaution of cutting the telegraph lines between Meshed and Kuchan. On arrival there they gave out that they were come on an inspection of the cavalry squadron stationed there. This they disarmed and made for the Turcoman Sahra. It was thought in Meshed, and the General Staff was so informed by the Russians, that these mutineers would join forces with a band of armed Turcomans, said to number between 1,000 and 2,000, and subsequently attack Meshed. The Chief of the General Staff, having much experience of Russians, did not think that they would go out of their way to give him accurate information about a gang of mutineers with whom they were probably in sympathy, nor did he think it likely that the Russians would tamely allow them to attack one of their garrison towns. He acted, therefore, on the assumption that their information was wilfully misleading and reckoned on the mutineers heading in the opposite direction. Having no troops in Gunbad-i-Qabus, through which place they must pass, he asked for the assistance of the gendarmerie, who acted with the greatest promptness and energy. The local commandant, a lieutenant, hurriedly collected the men from their scattered posts and was able to assemble a force of about one and a half companies before the mutineers put in an appearance. They demanded right-of-way, but were refused. A battle then ensued, in which the gendarmerie, first putting the vehicles out of action, then fired upon their occupants. Seven of the mutineer officers were killed and two were wounded and taken prisoner. The vehicles, arms and ammunition were recovered. The next day three officers and four men were picked up in an exhausted condition nearby on the road between Gunbad-i-Qabus and Shahrud. General Abdullah Hidayet has left for Meshed on a commission of enquiry.

9. Tudeh activity is increasing and on the night of the 18th August 200 or 300 members of that party, mostly "Muhajirs," marched to the Telegraph Office in Meshed, where they demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister. The procession was accompanied by Russian troops armed with tommy guns. New branches of the party have been opened at Fariman and at Gifan in the Yamut Turcoman country.

10. The Russians have opened a branch of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society at Buinurd. They are busy canvassing votes for Seyyid Mahdevi, their protégé for the next elections, with a view to displacing the sitting member, Tussi, who is regarded as "reactionary."

11. The emigration referred to in paragraph 9 of Intelligence Summary No. 31 appears to be continuing, and some fifty persons are said to have crossed the Soviet frontier already. Applications are received daily and are sent to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran.

12. Ali Mansur, the Governor-General, has returned to his post. While in Tehran he suggested to the General Staff the removal of Colonel Vossuq, the General Officer Commanding, Khorasan Division, as he was not popular with the Russians. The Russian Military Attaché also spoke to the Chief of the General Staff on this subject and, when asked for his reasons for their request replied that Colonel Vossuq did not collaborate with the Russian Commander. The Chief of the General Staff says that he replied that such vague indictments could not be followed up and requested the Russian Military Attaché to specify Colonel Vossuq's acts of non-co-operation.

Azerbaijan.

13. The commission of enquiry headed by General Jehanbani has arrived at Rezaieh. The situation is still grave. No further news is to hand from Maragheh, where a band of Tudeh toughs occupied Government offices and gave the officials five days in which to clear out. The Russians have not yet permitted any reinforcements to be sent. There is a garrison of one company in Maragheh and the Chief of the General Staff is anxious as to its fate.

14. The emigration to the U.S.S.R. continues and as many as seventy applications per day are being received, mostly from the minorities, Armenians, Assyrians, &c., and from those comparatively recent emigrants from the U.S.S.R. known as "Muhajirs."

15. Russian methods are well illustrated by a report from Astara—a report which, owing to Russian "censorship" methods, took twenty-three days to reach

the capital. A Russian officer accompanied by a soldier entered the house of the Bakshdar of Astara and shot him dead.

Kurdistan.

16. The Chief of the General Staff states that a minor Kurdish chief and about 100 of his followers have surrendered to the more northerly of the Persian army columns near Merivan. The villages of Rezab and Karabad were occupied on the 12th August. A consular source reports that a Colonel Airom has been appointed military governor of Senneh town and that this new appointment does not meet with the approval of the Governor, Shahub-ud-Douleh, who sees himself being pushed further into the background. While most observers agree that Brigadier Hushmand Afshar is a gallant officer and capable commander, they aver that his harshness, his rapacity and his blind hatred of all things Kurdish are sowing the seeds of further trouble in that area.

Isfahan (see Intelligence Summary No. 15, paragraph 11).

17. The Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem has recently visited Isfahan. He admitted in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador that propaganda for the return of Armenians to the U.S.S.R. has undoubtedly been spread. He says that he pointed out to the Isfahan Armenians that Soviet Armenia was a highly developed and full country, and that there would not be jobs or openings for an unlimited number of immigrants. Persia, on the other hand, was undeveloped and under-populated and presented a better field for Armenian enterprise.

British Interests.

18. Mr. D. W. Lascelles, counsellor of embassy, has left Tehran on transfer to Athens.

[E 6830/70/34]

(11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34, Secret, for the Period 27th August to 2nd September, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 311 of 3rd September; Received 14th September.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The minority and majority in the Majlis still refuse to come to terms and no Majlis business has been done. On the 26th August the Prime Minister tabled a single article Bill for the ratification of the United Nations Charter. The long-awaited debate on the Government's programme was begun but ended in disorder. An attack was made on the Azerbaijan Deputy, Hovanessian, on account of an article in an Armenian paper published in Tabriz in which he had advocated the retention of Russian troops in Persia for so long as a "reactionary Government" was in power. It is believed that the attack would have developed into a request for deprivation of parliamentary immunity and subsequent impeachment, but Hovanessian feigned sickness and made good his escape from the chamber.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

2. The situation in Maragheh (see paragraph 13 of last Intelligence Summary) has deteriorated sharply. The Russian Ambassador officially informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Persian Government was free to take any action it wished in Maragheh and that the leader of the insurgents there, one Kabir, was a charlatan and in no way connected with either the Russians or the Tudeh. (Since the Russians have never ceased to affirm that the Tudeh party has no connexion with them the question by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to how the Russian Ambassador knew that Kabir had no connexion with the Tudeh was a shrewd one.) When the Persian garrison, acting on instructions from the G.O.C., Tabriz Division, had effected the arrest

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of Kabir, the Russian detachment stationed at Maragheh forcibly released him, confined the Persian company to the barracks and posted sentries around them.

Kurdistan.

3. General Jehanbani informed the British military attaché that as the result of his visit to Kurdistan he was not dissatisfied with the progress of these operations. The repulse of Mahmud Khan Kanisenani at Merivan has had a heartening effect on the garrison and a correspondingly disheartening effect on the Kurds. General Hushmand Afshar is making good progress with his circular road from Senneh via the Ab-i-Hang and Durud to Merivan, and the Kurds have been forced back to the hills adjoining the Perso-Iraqi frontier. General Jehanbani is confident that defeats of sufficient severity can be inflicted and arms in sufficient quantity can be collected to merit the withdrawal of the force with most of its objects achieved before winter sets in.

Mazanderan.

4. Widespread disturbances are reported from Shahi, Sari, Babul, Chalus and other places where Tudeh and anti-Tudeh elements have come to blows. The latter have been drawn from the local peasantry, urged on by emissaries of Seyyid Zia's Iradeh-i-Milli party from Tehran.

Isfahan.

5. Murteza Quli Khan is reliably reported to be highly incensed at General Humayuni's failure to prevent large-scale raids on his domains near Deh Diz, Kuh-i-Sefid and Susan by bands of Bahmai and Teyyibi said to number as many as 1,200 men. He even accuses Humayuni of encouraging these raids with a view to discrediting him in the eyes of the Central Government and forcing him to resign.

Persian Army.

6. More information about the recent mutiny in Khorassan (see last Intelligence Summary, paragraph 8) has been received. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British military attaché that eighteen officers in all deserted from the Meshed garrison. Six officers, headed by a lieutenant-colonel on the General Staff, deserted from Tehran and one from Tabriz, and effected a junction with the Meshed mutineers just before the skirmish at Gunbad-i-Qabus. These seven and six of the Meshed mutineers are still at large. Some have made good their escape to a place in the Turcoman Sahra, close to the Russian frontier, and some, including the lieutenant-colonel on the General Staff, are known to be in hiding in the house of the Russian commandant at Gunbad-i-Qabus. In Tehran a commission was appointed to examine the antecedents and contacts of officers of the central garrison. Thirty officers have been found to have close contacts with the Tudeh party or the Russians, and have been detained under a clause of the Military Governorship law until military governorship comes to an end. Ten, less deeply implicated, have been sent away to divisions in the south. Further arrests are being made as further details of the mutiny come to light. The Chief of the General Staff, on the strength of the information so far extracted from the captured mutineers, is of the opinion that a plot for a general uprising existed and that the Meshed party acted precipitately, thus causing the general mutiny to go off at half cock.

Two officers sent by the General Staff to make a full report on the Gunbad-i-Qabus skirmish and to retrieve the captured vehicles and arms have been sent away by the Russians without being able to complete their task. A party of 200 gendarmes proceeding by lorry as reinforcements for the gendarmerie at Gunbad-i-Qabus has been turned back by the Russians at Firuzkuh. A lorry conveying bombs for the Persian Air Force detachment at Meshed has been turned back by the Russians at Semnan. Reinforcements for the Meshed garrison coming from Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam were stopped at the Russian control post south of Meshed. The fact that the original party of mutineers was able to leave Meshed at all and pass through the Russian control posts *en route*, the attitude of the Russian-controlled Tudeh party in Meshed and elsewhere towards the mutiny, and the presence in Buinurd of the Russian Vice-Consul at Meshed a few hours prior to the arrival of the mutineers add to the growing weight of testimony to the effect that the whole affair from beginning to end—and the end is not yet in sight—had the knowledge and approval of the Russians. The Chief of the General Staff has compiled a letter giving chapter and verse for all these incidents and others in the past of Russian interference in Persian affairs which the Minister for War is to lay before the Cabinet to induce

that body to protest officially to the Russian Ambassador. There is no doubt that the financial embarrassment of the junior officers was a prime cause of the mutiny by rendering them receptive to Tudeh propaganda on the subject of better pay and living conditions and the inefficiency and corruption of their seniors.

Economic.

7. The Cabinet has finally sanctioned the abolition of the cotton monopoly. In future there will be no restriction on the local sale or purchase of cotton, but the import of cotton will be subject to permits obtainable from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Censorship.

8. The Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship ceased to function as from the 30th August. The Russian representative, though still without his instructions on the subject, joined in informing the Persian censor that with effect from the 30th August no outgoing or incoming letters or telegrams (including press telegrams) between Persia on the one hand and the British Empire and the United States, or its dependencies on the other, need be shown to the Russian censor.

Communications.

9. 3,300 railway wagons are being transferred to the Russians from the United States Persian Gulf Command.

10. The Ministry of Roads and Communications has announced an extensive programme of road construction and improvement. In spite of the advice given to them by the Royal Engineers that the Persian Government will need all its financial resources to keep in good repair the asphalted trunk routes handed back by the British military, the Ministry of Roads and Communications has announced its intention of asphaltting the stretches Tehran-Qum and Kerej-Kazvin, and of constructing or improving many minor routes. Should funds be available the intention is sound enough as it would provide work for many of those thrown out of employment with the departure of Allied troops from Persia.

Appointments.

11. Muhammad Vahid to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education. He has held this appointment before and has officiated for a short while as Minister of Education.

Obituary.

12. The death occurred on the 1st September at an advanced age of Ayatullah Haji Imam Juma of Khoi, a celebrated divine of Tehran. He was the father of Nizam-ud-din Imami, lately in the employ of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and now on a Persian Government purchasing commission in Bombay, and of Jamal Imami, the Majlis Deputy.

Russian Interests.

13. The Russian Ambassador has left for a tour of Azerbaijan, as he said he had received conflicting reports on the local situation. He announced before his departure that he might be visiting Baku also. As might be imagined, this has given rise to various rumours of his recall or of a change of Russian policy in Persia.

American Interests.

14. The Commander, United States Persian Gulf Command, has stated that American troops will evacuate Tehran in two echelons on the 15th and 25th September respectively, and that his command will be clear of Persia by the 1st November. After that date the only troops remaining will be the guards on camps, installations, &c., and the personnel of the American Liquidation Commission. A communiqué from the United States War Department published in the *Tehran Daily News* gives the figure of these guards as 2,600. It also states that "some Army Air Transport Command personnel will be left to continue operation of the plane routes through the country." The communiqué also stated that the maximum strength of the United States Persian Gulf Command in Persia at the peak period of "Aid to Russia" had been 27,000.

Corrigenda.

15. (i) Reference line 3 paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 33 dated 26th August, 1945, delete (about £770,000) and insert (£7,812,500).
- (ii) Reference paragraph 15 of Intelligence Summary No. 33 dated the 26th August, 1945, the Persian Government now admit that an error in deciphering this message was made and that the Bakshdar was not shot dead but only threatened with death.

Tehran, 2nd September, 1945.

[E 6978/70/34]

(12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35, Secret, for the Period 3rd September to 9th September, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 326 of 10th September; Received 19th September.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The majority and minority in the Majlis have not succeeded in composing their differences though the minority group did consent to attend sessions and provide the necessary quorum. On the 2nd September the Minister of Finance tabled a 2/12ths budget bill to cover the months of Mordad and Shahriwar (23rd July–21st September). As was to be expected, the United States War Department's communiqué, referred to in paragraph 14 of last Intelligence Summary, did not pass unnoticed and Deputy Ardalan asked why 2,600 troops were needed to guard American military assets and why the Americans had not asked the permission of the Persian Government to operate air lines and aerodromes in Persia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the American troops would only remain in Persia until American military assets were disposed of. At the session of the 4th September Deputy Dr. Abduh, a member of the Persian delegation to the San Francisco Conference, made a long and carefully rehearsed speech in which he described the activities of the conference, the drafting of the charter and its application to the Persia of to-day. After referring gratefully to the recent speeches of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Eden he complained of the unwarranted interference by the Russians in Persia's internal affairs. He said that this interference was completely at variance with the spirit of the charter, the same charter which only a few days previously had been signed by representatives of the Soviet Government. Taking stock of the prevention of the despatch of gendarmerie reinforcements to the north, the prevention of the flight of Persian aircraft over Persian soil, and the Soviet refusal to allow Persian vehicles and arms taken from Persian rebels by Persian officials to be transported to Tehran, the natural reaction was to ask whether all the sacrifices which had been made during the past few years had been made in vain. The three great leaders who had signed the Tehran Declaration had borne witness to the inestimable services Persia had rendered Russia in the darkest days of the war, services which had been performed in good heart and good faith because of the certainty that they would help in laying low every form of dictatorship and tyranny. Persians were sure that the Soviet Government could not be aware of the behaviour of their officials in the northern provinces of Persia because it did not make sense that such behaviour should be countenanced by the Government whose leader had always stood in opposition to the use of force. Persia, the Bridge of Victory, Persia, the country which had played the greatest of rôles in the achievement of final victory, had found nothing in the Bridge of Victory, hailed with joy by the Russians, except misery and despair. Persia and the Persians expected the Soviet Government and her other neighbours to evacuate the country within six months in accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Pact; that this expectation would indeed be fulfilled was certain for the Persians were confident of the friendship and sense of justice of the Russian Government. To Persia there was no difference between Great Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union; those who chose to respect Persia's rights would be held dear in the heart of every Persian, but any attempt to ride roughshod over Persian sovereignty would be odious in the extreme. Friendship with all three of her great Allies was desired by Persia but no breach of international law would be tolerated.

Other business at the same session included the approval by a unanimous decision of the United Nations Charter and a bitter attack by Ali Dashti on the minority whose behaviour he compared with that of sulky children. Deputy

Tusi, making himself heard with difficulty over the increasing din, accused Dashti of being a spy in the pay of a foreign Power. After this pandemonium broke loose and Dashti was with some difficulty rescued by his supporters from violence at the hands of his opponents and safely removed from the Chamber. At the session of the 6th September Dr. Musaddiq asked for time in which to explain the recent tactics of the minority group. This was refused. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then made a long speech on Persia's foreign policy. The 2/12ths budget bill was then sent to commission for amendments.

2. Most educated Persians are pinning their hopes on a favourable statement on the evacuation of Persia from the Foreign Secretaries Conference now in session in London. They feel that in this lies their only hope of saving the northern provinces from being incorporated in the U.S.S.R. and of preventing further Russian interference in their internal affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is believed to have demanded permission for the Persian Ambassador in London to attend the relevant discussions, hoping thereby that Persia's case may be represented more strongly and that more publicity will be achieved for Persia's present plight.

The Persian Army.

3. The Ministry for War has under consideration a scheme for bettering the financial condition of Persian army officers. H.I.M. the Shah, at an audience which he granted to the British military attaché on the 3rd September, informed him that the following benefits were to be granted:—

- (i) An increment of pay for every year of service.
- (ii) A free issue of summer and winter uniforms.
- (iii) A children's allowance.
- (iv) Free housing in officers' quarters to be built in the vicinity of barracks.
- (v) The establishment of a co-operative society.

The B.M.A. took the opportunity to represent to H.I.M. that discontented officers, or officers rendered desperate by financial difficulties, were a menace to any army, that paper promises were insufficient, that the houses would take several years to complete, and that much opposition to the scheme might be expected in the Majlis who would probably insist on similar benefits and concessions for civilian employees of Government.

4. There is little further news of the recent mutiny. One more officer, a conscription official at Shahrud deserted but was captured. Two junior officers in Meshed, whose complicity has been suspected, shot themselves. There is growing discontent at the manner in which officers' antecedents and contacts have been investigated and much criticism is being directed against General Arfa, the Chief of the General Staff, for arresting officers on insufficient evidence or on the false testimony of interested persons.

Communications.

5. The maintenance of the Zahidan-Meshed road is being handed back by G.H.Q., India, to the Persian Government. The hand over is to be by sections and is to begin on the 21st September.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

6. The General Staff claim to have collected 115 and 128 rifles respectively from the rival factions of the Haiyat Daudis and Lirawis. Some confusion occurred when columns despatched by the Fars and Khuzistan Divisions arrived simultaneously on the scene claiming that the other had no jurisdiction.

Azerbaijan.

7. The arrival in Tabriz of the military commission of enquiry (see paragraph 13 of Intelligence Summary No. 33) was the occasion for the issue of a manifesto by "the people of Tabriz" appealing for protection against Tudeh oppression. The notices were at once torn down by the Tudeh. The situation in Maragheh is unchanged with the Persian army garrison incarcerated in its own barracks by Russian troops. The municipal accountant is reported to have been beaten to death by the Tudeh. There is some talk of the formation of a new Democratic party in opposition to the Tudeh, but well-informed sources consider this to be merely an electioneering stunt to disarm the general odium and suspicion attaching to the Tudeh on account of its identification with the

Russians, and that the candidates of the Democratic party at the forthcoming elections will be found to be the same Tudeh members in new guise or, as the Persian would put it, "the same donkey with a new packsaddle."

Gilan and Mazanderan.

8. The Russians have now given permission for the Persian army to remove the vehicles, arms and ammunition captured from the mutineers at Gunbad-i-Qabus. They have refused, however, to allow any escort to accompany the vehicles. As the road is known to be infested with armed Turcomans and as the remaining mutineers are still at large in the neighbourhood this permission is not of much practical value. Armed Turcomans with Tudeh armlets now patrol the railway stations of Bandar-i-Gaz and Shahi. The situation at Chalus, Sari, Shahi and Babul is reported to be quieter as resistance to the Tudeh has ceased and the civil administration is virtually in their hands.

Isfahan.

9. A consular report discloses an interesting situation in the district of Fereidan where the villages are, for the most part, owned by numerous small-holders and where the chief elements are Armenians, a colony of Georgians and two rival factions of Chahar Lang, Bakhtiaries. The Armenians are frequently visited by a Father Joachim from the Armenian church at Julfa. This priest is in close touch with the Soviet Consulate-General and has recently preached an anti-conscription campaign. The Georgians, as might be expected, are also in close touch with the Soviet Consulate-General. Murteza Quli Khan has had some difficulty in keeping the peace in this potentially troublesome area.

Appointments—civil.

- 10.—(i) Hussain Pasha Nawai to be Persian Consul-General at Herat;
- (ii) Hussain Ala has left to take up his post as Persian Ambassador at Washington.

Appointments—military.

- 11.—(i) Sartip Muhamamd Baquir Hushmand Afshar, General Officer Commanding 2nd Central Division;
- (ii) Sartip Fazlullah Humayuni, General Officer Commanding 10th Khuzistan Division, to be General Officer Commanding 4th Kurdistan Division;
- (iii) Sarhang Lutfullah Afsharoglu, Commander Kazerun Brigade, to be General Officer Commanding 10th Khuzistan Division;
- (iv) Sartip Mansur Muzayyini, General Officer Commanding 2nd Central Division, to be attached to the General Staff;
- (v) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet to be placed *en disponibilité*.

Tehran, 9th September, 1945.

[E 7117/70/34]

(13)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 36, Secret, for the Period 10th to 16th September, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 331 of 17th September; Received 24th September.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. *The Majlis.*—On the 9th September the Minister of Finance tabled a Bill to revise Dr. Millspaugh's income tax law of November 1943. Deputy Ardalan's proposal that in future foreign nationals should only be engaged after sanction by the Majlis was approved by a large majority. On the 11th September the Minister of Finance tabled a single-article Bill to ratify the 1925 Geneva Convention regarding the export of opium. (The arrival of Persian opium at American ports has recently been the subject of a complaint by the United States Government.) On the same day the Minister for War tabled a Bill asking for provision for two additional divisions for the army of a strength of 12,000 men at a cost of 165 million rials; for a credit of 35 million rials for financial benefits and concessions to army officers (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary),

and for a credit of 3 million dollars for purchase of military equipment from the United States. The Bill was subsequently approved by the Majlis Budget Commission, but is likely to meet with a stormy passage through the Majlis, when the Tudeh members, acting on Russian instructions, will certainly oppose any measures calculated either to strengthen or improve Persia's armed forces. At the same session Dr. Musaddiq made one of his typically turbid and turgid orations. He described the tactics of the minority, prescribed the ideal form of government in Persia, recommended an ideal form of foreign policy, gave a long historical sketch of Persia's relations with Russia and Great Britain, made a long indictment against Reza Shah, and finally attempted to justify his own acts and opinions on any and every occasion in the past. On the 13th September the session was taken up with personal attacks and counter-attacks, the chief bouts being between Tussi and Ali Dashti, and between the Armenian Deputy Hovanessian and Siqqat-ul-Islam. The Minister for War also intervened to defend the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, from slanderous attacks by Hovanessian.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed a note to the British, Russian and American Embassies, in which he stated that the surrender of Japan on the 2nd September, 1945, had given the greatest satisfaction to the Persian Government and congratulated the Allies on this final victory. He also stated that his note dated the 19th May, 1945, on the occasion of Germany's surrender had remained unanswered. In that note his Government had requested the evacuation of Persia by the Allies, so that Persia could regain her normal status. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then stated that, according to the Tripartite Treaty, the period of six months' delay after the cessation of hostilities in which the Allies had undertaken to evacuate Persia would be calculated from the 2nd September, 1945, and that his Government expects that, according to clause 5 of that treaty, not a single Allied sailor, soldier or airman shall remain on Persian soil after the 2nd March, 1946. He added that evacuation before that date would be of the greatest service to Persia.

3. Despite the Military Governor's ban on political meetings in Tehran some forty members of the Tudeh party attempted to hold a meeting in the party's headquarters on the 14th September. Most of the Tudeh Deputies were there. A police officer, who had been sent to order the meeting to disperse, was dragged inside the building, beaten by a Tudeh Deputy, and had his epaulettes torn off. The military governor, on hearing of the incident, stated that he could not arrest the Deputy on account of his parliamentary immunity.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

4. A Meshed Tudeh paper has published a copy of the manifesto posted on the walls of Gunbad-i-Qabus by Lieut.-Colonel Niwai, the senior officer of the Meshed group of mutineers. It calls upon the Turcomans and others to rise and overthrow the present Persian Government.

5. The Tudeh party are making active preparations for the forthcoming elections. Both they and the Russians are reported to be bringing pressure to bear on the Governor-General, Ali Mansur, to ensure that the largest possible number of Tudeh Deputies are returned from Khorasan.

6. Colonel Hatemi has been appointed provincial chief of police *vice* Colonel Turaj Amin. The latter has been frequently reported from consular sources to be a tool of the Russians.

Kurdistan.

7. The General Staff has announced that, as the result of operations in Kurdistan up to the 2nd September, 1,343 rifles have been collected. This figure, in the light of events and the balance of casualties in the recent operations, is undoubtedly exaggerated, and 500 would be a better estimate. Of these, few have been taken from the Kurds opposing the army but from semi-settled tribes, to whom previous commanders had issued these arms for their protection.

Azərbaycan.

8. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British Military Attaché that, according to a report received from the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, a Russian consular officer and the Russian Town Major of Miandoab, by name Namazaliof, recently visited Ghazi Muhammad at Mahabad and asked him to send a force to aid Mulla Mustafa of Barzan in his operations against the Iraqi

army. Ghazi Muhammad showed the Russians a letter to the same effect which he himself had received from Mulla Mustafa. Ghazi Muhammad is reported by the same source as having been non-committal in his reply and to have laid down as a necessary condition for his armed support the crying off by the Russians of all Tudeh activity in his area as inimical to the activities of the Komala, in which alone he was interested. According to the same source the Russians, subsequently, contacted some Mangur and Herki chieftains with the same request. The Mangur pleaded inability to come to Mulla Mustafa's aid on account of their fear of retaliation by the Pushtdar tribe, with whom they were on bad terms. The Herki also showed little enthusiasm for this venture, as they feared punitive action by the Iraqi Government on that portion of their tribe residing within Iraqi territory and made the condition that they should be joined by the Debrukri Kurds.

9. According to a consular report unconfirmed by the General Staff, the Persian army detachment at Maragah has been disarmed by the Russian garrison there and is now allowed to leave its barracks (see paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary).

10. A consular source reports that, following a skirmish between Zero Agha's men and the gendarmerie near Balanej bridge near Rezaieh, in which two gendarmes were killed, a force of seventy gendarmes was despatched from Rezaieh to attack the Kurds. The Russians stopped this force and disarmed it, sending back the arms to the Officer Commanding, Persian garrison at Rezaieh. The Russians claimed that they had acted in good faith, having mistaken the gendarmes for bandits.

11. No visible result has come from the visit to Tabriz of the recent military commission under General Jahanbani. There are no signs of a Russian withdrawal from Tabriz, where they are, in fact, acquiring additional houses, possibly to accommodate troops to be withdrawn from Tehran. A general tightening up of check post control has also been noticed.

Bakhtiari and Luristan.

12. After three years of continued pressure by His Majesty's Embassy the Persian Government announce that they have effected the arrest of Haidar s/o Baqir, Barani s/o Ali and Seyyid Murad s/o Shah Murad all of Feraidan in Bakhtiari who were responsible for the murder in 1942 of Mr. Harris, British Vice-Consul at Isfahan, and of Dr. Griffiths of the Church Missionary Society, and of his small son, and, subsequently, fled to the mountains between Bakhtiari and Luristan. The arrested men are to be brought to Tehran and tried by a military court.

The Court.

13. The prolonged absence of Queen Fawzieh in Egypt had given rise to rumours of an impending Royal divorce. On the 12th September most of the Persian papers published a communiqué from the Persian Embassy in Cairo announcing that rumours of a divorce between the Shah and Queen Fawzieh are completely without foundation and that the Queen is merely passing the summer months in Egypt.

Economic.

14. In order to make good economic losses caused by the war the Finance Ministry is to draw up an economic programme covering trade relations with Great Britain, United States, U.S.S.R., Turkey and India. Dr. Ali Amini has been appointed to go to India to examine the possibilities of Persian exports to India and imports thence. Dr. Ali Amini (F.O. 15-M.A. 19) is a brother-in-law of Dr. Imami who has been in India for more than a year on a purchasing commission.

Education.

15. The Persian Government has accepted the invitation issued by His Majesty's Government and the French Government to send a delegation to the forthcoming International Educational Conference in London. The Persian delegation will consist of Ali Asghar Hikmat (who headed last year's Persian cultural mission to India), Dr. Raadi, Director-General in the Ministry of Education, Dr. Ghulam Hussein Sadiqi, Director-General of the Secretariat of Tehran University, and Dr. Isa Sipah, a professor at Tehran University.

American Interests.

16. Two parties of American Congressmen arrived in Tehran on the 10th September. One party came from Moscow and the other from Syria. They left by air for Saudi Arabia on the 13th September.

Yugoslav Interests.

17. Asim Ali Hadzic, the newly-appointed Yugoslav Minister, has arrived and has presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

Russian Interests.

18. The Russian Ambassador is still absent. The Russian military attaché is also absent on leave.

19. Lorries containing stores and troops have been seen leaving Tehran for the west and a new camp on the western outskirts of Kazvin has been noticed. The information so far received has not been sufficient to enable a calculation to be made as to the numbers of Russian troops which have left and which still remain in the capital.

20. During the past three weeks the Soviet consular authorities have been making difficulties over the granting of passes for British civil and military officials to visit places on the Caspian littoral.

Polish Interests.

21. The number of Poles in Persia as at the 14th September, 1945, is as follows:—

Location.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
Tehran	352	1,103	295	1,750
Isfahan	69	410	394	873
Ahwaz	151	689	279	1,119

In addition there are 812 Poles living in Tehran in employment or privately who are not the responsibility of the Polish Refugee organisation.

The Poles in Isfahan are being transferred in batches to the Lebanon and a certain number of the Poles in Tehran are being transferred to Ahwaz. No other moves inside or outside Persia are at present contemplated.

The future attitude of the Warsaw Government will determine largely the question of future moves either by way of a return to Poland or moves further afield.

Persian Army.

22. Though there is little further information about the recent mutiny it would be premature to consider it as entirely stamped out. During last week one more officer absented himself from Tehran under suspicious circumstances, but returned to duty after three days. Those officers who, as the result of the findings of the commission referred to in paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 34, are to be kept under arrest until the state of emergency comes to an end, are to be transferred to Kerman.

23. The addition of two new divisions to the Persian army, the provision of financial benefits to officers and the demand for a \$3 million credit for purchase of equipment are referred to in paragraph 1 above.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 4961/4961/25]

No. 11.

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him herewith the annual report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda.

Jedda, 1st July, 1945.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, 1st July, 1945.

(Passages marked with an asterisk are taken from previous reports.)

Egypt.

Egyptian representation here tends to be kaleidoscopic. Husni Omar Bey came to the Hejaz for the 1944 pilgrimage. Abdel Hamid Monir Bey left Jedda in April 1945 for Cairo, and Awad Bey al-Bahrawy, who was then also Minister at Bagdad (see 1940 report), arrived as Minister. He left Jedda in May 1945, leaving the Legation in the charge of a recently promoted Second Secretary, Hassan Abdul Ghaffar.

Awad al-Bahrawy is now Minister to Saudi Arabia only, the two posts of Jedda and Bagdad having been separated as a complimentary gesture to the two countries.

France.

M. Maigret, hypochondriac to the last, was replaced in March 1945 by M. Max Rageot, who presented letters as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Provisional French Government, which Saudi Arabia recognised at the end of 1944. M. Rageot's career has been in Morocco, where he was for some time before the war in charge of the Department handling British affairs, and was well spoken of by His Majesty's representatives in Rabat. He was working at the Quai d'Orsay when France fell and remained in Paris during the German occupation. His sympathies were, however, with the Allies; and a German interrogation about listening to British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts ensured him immunity from any process of purge. A pleasant and intelligent little man, he is able to judge French policy in the Levant from a Moroccan angle of relative detachment and he is helpful without being particularly pro-British. His second wife accompanied him to Jedda, and expects a happy event in September. They both left at the beginning of June, together with Maître Bouez, "taking the Legation with them." Hamdi Bil Qassim, an Algerian, was left to look after current affairs. This man was Arabic Secretary to M. Ballereau (see 1941 report) and was then notorious for his pro-Axis attitude. M. Rageot has been warned about him but says that Hamdi is strongly supported by North African personalities and that Paris will not act against him. He has, however, extracted from Hamdi a promise to retire next year.

Iraq.

*Jamil Pasha Ar-Rawi was in Jedda from November 1939 to 1941 as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. After two years at Kabul he has now returned to Jedda as Minister. He presented his credentials on the 4th March, 1943.

He served during the war of 1914-18, first in the Turkish forces and then with his close friend Nuri

Pasha as Said in the Arab forces. Was principal military aide-de-camp to King Hussein.

Jamil Pasha is a very pleasant and friendly colleague, but his health is not good. He is married, but his wife does not appear in masculine society. (Written in 1943.)

*She has now started "coming out" however. (Written in 1944.)

From August 1944 to March 1945, while Jamil Pasha was on leave, the Legation was left in the charge of Muhydeen Mumaiyis, a bumptious and noisy little Effendi who had previously served at Angora. Jamil Pasha returned for a short spell in April 1945 but left again in May. He is due to return for the pilgrimage season. Muhydeen Mumaiyis is at present (June 1945) on leave, and the Legation is in the charge of Mohammed Ali Al Saigh, a pleasant young Attaché who comes from Mosul.

Netherlands.

*Daniel van der Meulen has, owing to the internment in Holland of the titular Chargé d'Affaires, Dr. Dingemans, returned to Jedda, where from 1926 to 1931 he was Consul and later Chargé d'Affaires. He had just been promoted Resident in the Dutch Colonial Service, and is merely seconded for the duration of the war. He is an authority on the Arabic language and customs and speaks good English and French. He is a most loyal supporter of the Allied cause. His wife, who is said to have some Javanese blood, has great charm of manner and is most helpful in counteracting her husband's occasional tendency to pessimism. Four of their children are in Holland. (Written in 1941.)

*M. van der Meulen made a trip to the Yemen by land in the summer of 1942. In his opinion his trip did much to counteract Axis propaganda in the Yemen and served to show the Yemenis that the Netherlands was still a power in the world. (Written in 1943.)

*He was made Minister Plenipotentiary and presented his letters on the 5th November, 1943. In January and February 1944 he made a tour of the Hadramaut. (Written in 1944.)

In December 1944 he went across to Bahrain by car and thence to Persia for a visit, returning in February 1945. His wife left at the end of May for Holland to rejoin her numerous children, all but one of whom were by then known to be safe, and M. van der Meulen is expected to follow her in July 1945, and not to return. The intention seems to be to send Dr. Dingemans, who gave an impression of strong Nazi sympathies when last here, back to Jedda.

Turkey.

*M. Ayashli (see report for 1943) left in 1943, and was replaced as Minister Plenipotentiary by M. Amin Ali Sipahi in January 1944. He presented his credentials on the 3rd February, 1944. His wife is a welcome addition to English-speaking feminine society in Jedda although she left for Egypt with her 11-year-old son after only a short time. M. Sipahi himself is a pleasant and friendly colleague if somewhat inquisitive. (Written in 1944.)

He went on leave in the summer of 1944, leaving the Legation in the charge of the First Secretary, M. Sevket Utkuman, a colourless person who served in Paris during the German occupation. M. Sepahi returned in December 1944, but was taken seriously ill almost as soon as he arrived and had to leave again in January 1945. He is not expected to return. M. Utkuman remains as Chargé d'Affaires.

United States.

Mr. Moose, now in Damascus, was replaced in September 1944 by Colonel William A. Eddy with the rank of full Minister. Colonel Eddy, of the

United States Marines, was born of missionary parents in Syria and has had long experience of the Middle East. He speaks fluent Syrian Arabic. In America he is said to have some reputation as an author and journalist. He has also taught at the American University in Cairo. He is a member of the Office of Strategic Services and served under Colonel Donovan at Tangier in 1942. He first came to Saudi Arabia in March 1944 from Cairo, where he was Attaché at the United States Legation, and he then stayed here for two months as "special assistant" to Mr. Moose. He is a good mixer, with a bluff and friendly manner, and he entertains much and well. This hearty exterior does not, however, entirely conceal a ruthless energy directed towards the furtherance of American political and economic influence in Saudi Arabia, and Colonel Eddy's interpretation of Anglo-American co-operation in Saudi Arabia leaves much to be desired. His wife, also of missionary stock, was born in Chile and looks more Chilean than missionary. She suffers from suppressed Anglophobia and is exceptionally sensitive about America's "mission" in Saudi Arabia.

*Representatives accredited also to other Governments.**Afghanistan.*

*Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, is also Minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He came to Meccah on pilgrimage at the end of 1942, but was not seen by his Christian colleagues. (Written in January 1943.)

Did not come to the Hejaz for the 1943 or 1944 pilgrimages.

Persia.

*Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission in both countries on an unspecified date in 1942, and, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, no successor appears to have been appointed yet. (Written in January 1943.)

No successor has yet been appointed.

[E 6398/209/25]

No. 12.

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Grafftey-Smith (Jedda).

(No. 151.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 29th August, 1945.

THE Amir Faisal accompanied by Shaikh Hafiz Wahba visited me at the Foreign Office on the morning of the 29th August.

2. He gave me a message from his father to the effect that His Majesty desired, in the era of peace upon which he hoped that we had now entered, to continue to collaborate with His Majesty's Government in the same close and friendly manner that he had done during the difficult days of the recent war. His Majesty hoped that, for their part, His Majesty's Government would reciprocate by extending to Saudi Arabia the same support and help that they had given in the past.

3. I said that I should be glad if His Royal Highness would take back to King Abdul Azziz a message of goodwill from His Majesty's Government and an assurance that we should do our utmost to maintain and strengthen the historic ties of friendship existing between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.

4. I reminded the Amir that I had myself been a member of the late Coalition Government and that I had shared in the shaping of that Government's foreign policy throughout the war.

5. The present Government's policy in regard to Saudi Arabia would be the same as that of their predecessors. Indeed, we desired continuity and stability in our relations with all the Arab States.

6. Our position in relation to the Middle East had been made clear in my recent speech in the House of Commons during the debate on the speech from the Throne.

7. The Amir then referred with appreciation to the help which His Majesty's Government had given to the Levant States and hoped that the same help would be given to the Arabs elsewhere, particularly in Palestine.

8. I replied that Palestine presented a difficult problem, but His Royal Highness could be assured that His Majesty's Government would give it the most careful consideration.

9. After an exchange of friendly courtesies His Royal Highness then took his leave.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 4917/8/89]

No. 13.

Report by Mr. Donald Mallett, Regional Press Officer at His Majesty's Embassy, Paris, on his Visit to Syria and the Lebanon.—(Received in Foreign Office, 7th July.)

I LEFT Paris on the 17th June, and travelling via Cairo arrived in Beirut on the 19th June.

His Majesty's Minister explained to me that he had arranged for me to leave for Syria as soon as possible, and wished me wherever I went to see the Syrian, British and French authorities, where the latter still existed.

On my arrival he at once wrote a letter to General Beynet, the French Délégué Général, explaining who I was and asking the General if he would receive me. Within an hour General Beynet telephoned to make an appointment for the next day.

On the 21st June I left Beirut for Damascus. From Damascus I went to Homs, Hama and Aleppo, returning to Beirut on the 25th June.

To all officials and others that I spoke to during my tour I said that I had been sent by His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, at the request of His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States, to see on the spot the state of affairs in Syria and the Lebanon and to hear what the different authorities had to say.

Before leaving for Syria I saw General Beynet on the 20th June. He received me at his residence in Beirut, and M. Schlumberger, the French press officer, was present throughout the whole of the interview, which lasted for more than an hour. I told General Beynet that I had been sent by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris at the request of His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States, and that I had come to see on the spot what the true state of affairs was and to hear what the different authorities had to say. As well as seeing British and Syrian officials, I hoped to see French officials wherever possible. General Beynet was extremely affable and said he had nothing to add or subtract from any of his previous statements, in which he had said nothing but the truth. Nevertheless, he at once started on a résumé of the events which had led up to the present crisis. The intransigence of the Syrian Government was no new thing; for many years they had made every difficulty possible. Encouraged by the British they had refused to negotiate a treaty; finally the French were attacked and had been forced to resist. The British had then intervened and the French had been humiliated and had been forced to retire from many parts of Syria. The French now found themselves in an impossible situation; a violent campaign was being carried on against them in the press, French troops were shut up in barracks, the affair was over, the French were out and the British were in, as they had always planned to be. The whole trouble in Damascus had been worked up by 500 toughs and did not represent the feelings of the population of the city as a whole.

I asked General Beynet why, when the Syrians had been prepared to negotiate a treaty with France, he had delayed so long in Paris instead of leaving at once for Syria with the terms. He said that he did it purposely. He said that he knew it was going to be extraordinarily difficult to negotiate any treaty with the Syrian Government, that he had never wanted this job and had never felt very hopeful about bringing it to a successful conclusion, and that he had delayed in Paris as long as possible, believing that by so doing the atmosphere might in the passage of time become more favourable.

About the Syrians, General Beynet said quite frankly that they were very difficult people, that when the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs talked to him about "Syrian public opinion" it was ridiculous since such a thing did not exist. There is no doubt he personally regards the Syrians as "natives" and has no conception of the strength of Syrian or Arab nationalist feelings. He was quite unashamed about the French bombardment of Damascus; to him it seemed a perfectly normal and logical thing to do. He believed that the French were attacked in Damascus. He said Sir Edward Grigg had said he could not see any bullet holes in the French headquarters opposite the Syrian Parliament

building in Damascus, and he begged me, when I went to Damascus, to go to see them for myself. "Sir Edward," he said, "did not find any bullet holes because he only looked at the outside of the building. There are no bullet holes on the outside of our headquarters because the Syrians fired from close range through the windows, but if you go inside you will see bullet holes in the rooms." (When I went to Damascus I went inside the French headquarters and spent a ludicrous quarter of an hour with General Gross and one of his staff officers searching for these alleged bullet holes. It was like a game of "hunt the slipper." After looking unsuccessfully in two rooms we found a few holes in one curtain and four or five small holes in the wall of one room, and one bullet hole in the hall. General Gross, when I told him that General Beynet had asked me to see these bullet holes, was very embarrassed and said that apart from a few broken windows there was nothing at all to be seen.)

General Beynet also complained at length to me about the humiliation that French officers had been forced to accept at the hands of the British military authorities. He said that his officers in Damascus had been treated by the British worse than the Germans would have treated them. In the course of his conversation he was continually making comparisons between our methods and the German methods. He seems to have been personally very hurt by the charges made against him in Paris of being pro-Vichy. He denied that hotly to me, and said that he was always considered as pro-English. He did, however, admit that he had been at Wiesbaden and that the Germans had treated the French better there than the British here.

At the request of His Majesty's Minister I delivered a message to General Beynet to the effect that the British military authorities in Aleppo were extremely anxious about the safety of M. Fauquenot, the French délégué there, who insisted on driving about the town in his car flying a large French flag, despite their warning. Would General Beynet request him not to go about publicly in such a provocative manner? General Beynet shrugged his shoulders and said he would not ask M. Fauquenot to cease driving about the town. M. Fauquenot would be quite safe; he was well known in Aleppo. General Beynet then rounded on me, pointing out that here was a typical example of how the British went to work. First we tried to frighten the French, then we worked up hostility to the French to support the warning we had given them.

General Beynet also declared that atrocities had been committed by the Syrians on the bodies of French officers who had been murdered. He complained of looting of French property, for which he blamed us since we did not stop the Syrians from looting. When I mentioned to him that the Senegalese troops had been looting in Damascus, he said he thought it was quite true. After all, they were colonial troops and what could you expect? Their discipline was always a little doubtful, and had he had French troops things might have been different.

General Beynet also charged the Syrian Government and the British-controlled radio stations in Palestine with carrying out a campaign to encourage the Troupes Spéciales to desert. He said if this went on his forces would become so reduced that he would have to ask for reinforcements from France and that he had already sent a telegram to Paris explaining the situation to them and warning them that if this went on in the near future they would have to take the decision as to whether to send reinforcements to the Levant or not.

The mentality of General Beynet does much to explain French actions in the Levant. I formed the impression that he is a tired, elderly soldier, who really believes in the colonial methods of the last century. He has no conception of the state of opinion of the Arabs. To him they are all natives who, if they cause any trouble, are quickly subdued with a little shooting. He sees nothing extraordinary at all in the French bombardment of Damascus. I am convinced that he really believes that the British Government has numerous agents of a sinister nature all over the country. His own information must be extremely bad. His last words to me were that if the matter were put before an international tribunal of some sort he was quite sure that the evidence he had in his possession would convince the tribunal that the whole crisis had been provoked by British agents and that the French were in no way to blame for what had happened.

1. Syria.

Damascus.

On the morning of the 21st June I left for Damascus by road with Brigadier Frere. On arrival at Damascus I made a tour of the city to inspect the damage caused during the French bombardment. In general the damage is superficially not likely to impress European public opinion because it in no way

compares with the bomb damage in England or Germany which has been so much publicised in European newspapers. But when one considers that it was carried out entirely by one side, that the other side had no artillery and no aircraft to reply, it is an astonishing sight.

The Parliament building was shelled and the exterior is pitted with shell-holes and the marks of hand-grenades. Inside, nothing has been touched since the fighting ceased. The deputies' seats are overturned, the floor is littered with papers, everything is in a state of complete disorder; there are marks of blood from the gendarmes who were killed there.

The Orient Palace Hotel is still closed to guests while repairs to bedroom walls riddled with bullet holes are being carried out. The exterior of all buildings in this area are covered with machine gun bullets. It is quite clear that the roofs, windows and balconies of all the houses in this central area of the city were sprayed with machine gun fire.

In the railway station is the burnt-out wreckage of a British Red Cross train, set on fire by a stray shell. There is no evidence that the train was deliberately destroyed by the French.

At the Citadel I was taken round by Colonel Hrant, the Armenian Commander of the South Syrian gendarmerie. The Citadel, which is the headquarters of the gendarmerie as well as the prison, was bombarded from the air. Most of the damage has now been repaired, but Colonel Hrant showed me where the first bombs fell on the prison, killing 32 prisoners outright, and where, during the second attack, the headquarters of the gendarmerie was hit and he himself was wounded.

I also saw shops burned out and looted by Senegalese troops.

It is important to remember that all the attacks were concentrated in the administrative district of the city, where all the Government offices are situated. The Parliament House was destroyed and had it not been for the fact that there were not enough deputies that evening to make a quorum Parliament would have been sitting when the attack was carried out. The Orient Palace Hotel was where all the foreign diplomats were living. The Citadel is the headquarters of the gendarmerie—the only force at the disposal of the Syrian Government.

The Syrian Government charges the French with deliberately trying to destroy the whole government machine in Damascus. The Syrians say the French hoped to kill all the deputies while Parliament was sitting and force the Government to flee.

The French reply that they had no intention of killing the deputies. The Parliament building was attacked because it had been fortified by the Syrian gendarmerie and was a strong point from which the French Etat-Major on the other side of the road was being attacked.

Damascus is quiet now, but all the authorities, including the French, are agreed that any Frenchman who appeared in the streets of Damascus to-day would be assassinated, and I think that this is undoubtedly true.

After inspecting the town I talked to Colonel Morgan, who took over from General Oliva-Roget, and who was so much criticised by the General during his talk to the press in Paris.

Colonel Morgan has a very different story from that told by General Oliva-Roget. He says that he did everything possible to foster good relations with General Oliva-Roget. He invited him on several occasions to meals; he took every opportunity of being seen with him whenever possible at public functions so that the Syrians would have no grounds for saying that the British military authorities were not on good terms with the French military authorities. On one occasion he paid a visit to the Druze country with General Oliva-Roget, riding in the General's car, and made a speech, after General Oliva-Roget had made one, in which he made a public reference to the fact that he was glad to have this opportunity of visiting the Druze country in the company of General Oliva-Roget, who was so well known there.

When he received orders to intervene he went to see General Oliva-Roget and told him what his requirements were, following the instructions he had received from the commander-in-chief, and handed him the letter which Oliva-Roget read out at his press conference in Paris. General Oliva-Roget refused to accept these orders, saying that he had had no instructions from his commander-in-chief, General Humblot, in Beirut. General Oliva-Roget was out of communication with Beirut and, when offered the use of British communications, he refused, and it was not until 10 o'clock the next morning, the 1st June, when he saw General Oliva-Roget again, that the general agreed to accept the British orders. This is very different from what General Oliva-Roget said in Paris. In Paris

he said that the British intervened in Damascus on the evening of the 31st May and that French officers were killed during the night of the 31st May-1st June, even though the British had said they had intervened to maintain order and were supposed to be protecting French lives. According to Colonel Morgan, General Oliva-Roget had not accepted our terms until the 1st June, and so we were unable to intervene and protect French lives during that period when General Oliva-Roget charges us with being responsible for the deaths of French officers.

Later that evening I was received by Jamil Bey Mardam, Acting Prime Minister of Syria and Minister for Foreign Affairs and National Defence. Jamil Bey Mardam put to me the Syrian case, which I was to hear repeated in almost exactly the same words by every Syrian official to whom I spoke. Briefly, the Syrian point of view is as follows:—

1. The Syrian quarrel with the French springs from the Syrians' relations with the French during the past twenty years. It is no new thing.
2. The French have progressively cheated the Syrians of their hopes and aspirations for liberty and independence, so that no Syrian has now any confidence left in anything the French say or do.
3. The Syrians' feelings are so bitter that there is now no question of there being good Frenchmen and bad Frenchmen; all Frenchmen are to them equally bad; and they are determined that not a single Frenchman shall stay in the country.
4. The whole population of Syria is united and unanimous in their distrust and hatred of the French and the present anti-French manifestations are not the expression of feeling of any party or section of the country but represents the country as a whole.
5. During the years they have been in Syria the French have done nothing for Syria, and there is no question of the French ever having a privileged position in Syria. The Syrian Government is determined to be free to make whatever treaties and agreements with foreign countries it may desire.
6. The presence of French troops in the country is a continual provocation and there can be no guarantee that fighting will not break out again while French troops remain in Syria.
7. It is useless for the French to cling to the Troupes Spéciales, who are deserting in ever increasing numbers, more than a quarter having already deserted.
8. The Lebanese Government is in complete unity with the Syrian Government and the presence of French troops in the Lebanon is, in the view of the Syrian Government, a danger to Syria. As well as withdrawing from Syria there can be no solution without a withdrawal from the Lebanon as well.
9. The French have always posed as the protectors of the Christians, doing their best to persuade the Christians that they are in danger of persecution by the Moslems. There is no truth in this and Christians and Moslems in Syria are united in their present desire to have no more of French rule.

The following morning I called on Shukri Bey Quwatli, President of the Syrian Republic, at his mother's house. He is a sick man and received me in his dressing-gown propped up on a sofa. It is said in Damascus that his state of health is really serious. He stated the Syrian case on the same general lines as his Acting Prime Minister. He said that in Syria the French had set up barracks on every hill overlooking the main towns. It was there that they had established their armies and their guns had pointed at the towns and villages which lay below. It was not an army that had come to defend the country; it was an army that had come to fight and subdue the country. He spoke at some length about French culture, of which he said the Syrians would have no more, and told me that students were planning to burn their French books publicly in Damascus. I said I thought that this was an act which would be badly received in the world at large, that it savoured of Nazi methods and that one could not destroy truth by burning books. He said it was a spontaneous outburst showing the hatred which every Syrian had for the French. They loathed French culture and they wished to remove all traces of it from their country. We were, during the conversation, talking in French. (I later reported the plan to burn the books publicly to His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, who agreed that it was an act likely to provoke

disorders and as a result protests were made to the Syrian Government, and a large-scale demonstration was stopped.) The President stressed that in his view there was no hope that if General de Gaulle was replaced by another Frenchman that the French relations with Syria and their attitude towards the Syrians would improve. He said that whatever any Frenchman said now who was out of power, once he came to power he would carry on just as the others had carried on. He said that if M. Herriot succeeded General de Gaulle to-morrow there would be no change in French policy towards Syria; M. Herriot would be just as bad as General de Gaulle, and so it would be with any other Frenchman. If General Catroux were to return to Syria the President said he would refuse to receive him.

I asked the President about Syria's relations with the Arab League. He replied that Syria lent its fullest support to the Arab League and that the Syrian Government intended to take its rightful place in Arab councils. Damascus was by tradition a leading city of the Arab world and the Syrian Government attached great importance to its relation with the other Arab States. Finally, he summed up Syrian determination to free themselves from what he called "French domination" by assuring me that if the French bombarded Syria so that half their houses were destroyed over their heads, the Syrians would fight on and would never submit to the French.

I next called on General Gross, who succeeded General Oliva-Roget, the Délégué-Adjoint at Damascus. He had been informed of my visit by General Beynet and received me in a perfectly friendly manner. He explained that he was not in Damascus during the disorders and was not in a position to give an eye-witness account of what happened, but that if I wished to speak to any of his staff, who had been there with General Oliva-Roget throughout the fighting, I was perfectly free to do so. I explained that I was not carrying out an enquiry into the events that had taken place and that I was more interested in the causes of the dispute and the present state of feeling, and asked him what in his view had led to the disorders. He at once said that he had always been known as pro-British and was still pro-British, but that he must say that his experience of the last six months in the Levant forced him to the conclusion that relations between British and French officers were bad and had been so for some time. He went on to say that now, as a result of the British army's intervention, the British had come out into the open and the French military naturally felt humiliated. He spoke at length of the famous interview between Colonel Morgan and General Oliva-Roget. He said that had he been in General Oliva-Roget's place he would never have accepted the orders because of the manner in which they were given. He showed me a copy of the now famous letter and said that he himself would have handed the letter back and said, "You can shoot me if you want to, but I cannot accept orders couched in that language."

We then discussed the fighting in Damascus. He defended the French bombardment of the city and believed that the disorders were stirred up by some thousand or fifteen hundred turbulent characters, inflamed by the Government. He believed that the French, by force, had the city under control and that if the British had not intervened, law and order would have been restored and maintained by the French. He did admit that feeling in Damascus is such that now a Frenchman who appeared in the streets would be assassinated, and admitted that he himself was forced to travel in a British armoured car when he left his headquarters. He also admitted that French civilians, realising their danger, had asked to be evacuated by the British and that he had recommended their evacuation. He admitted that Troupes Spéciales were deserting every day and told me that at one barracks a deserter had been captured before he could get away and that the man was now awaiting court-martial. For this the penalty was death. He said that he himself would preside at the court-martial, but seemed genuinely worried at the prospect of having to condemn to death and execute publicly a Syrian member of the Troupes Spéciales, fully realising the effect that it was likely to have on other Syrians who had up to the present remained loyal to the French, and confessed that there was a danger of the Syrians turning against their French officers.

He complained that there was no French journalist in Damascus and that the French public were not receiving any news from Damascus from French sources. He asked me to raise this with the British authorities and request that a French correspondent should be allowed to go to Damascus. Finally, he complained that French property was still being looted, and that despite our claim to be maintaining order, the Syrians were indulging in anti-French demonstrations. He told me that five days previously a donkey wrapped in the French flag had been paraded in front of his window by some Syrians. He said that it was only with difficulty he had restrained himself from drawing his pistol. He argued

from incidents such as these that we were not maintaining order in the sense of our declared intention and that if we said that we had handed over the responsibility to the Syrian gendarmerie either we were shutting our eyes to the inability of the Syrians to maintain order or we were being deceived by the Syrian Government.

While in Damascus I had conversations with numerous British officials, including His Majesty's Consul, Major Porter, British Security Mission, and Group-Captain Marsack, of the Ministry of Information. All were agreed as to the actual incidents which had been caused by French troops firing wildly at Troupes Spéciales deserters, with the result that civilians in the road were injured, and that the French without hesitation had launched a full-scale attack on the town, with artillery, aircraft, tanks and machine-guns, which had been placed at strategic points on roofs commanding the main streets in the centre of the city. All were equally unanimous with regard to the entire population being concerned in the anti-French demonstrations, and that it was in no way the work of a small group acting contrary to the general feeling. I also enquired into allegations of atrocities committed by Senegalese troops. Brigadier Frere told me that the British military authorities had exhumed the bodies of the Syrian gendarmerie killed in the Parliament building by Senegalese troops. They had certainly found cuts on these bodies but could not say that these were not such as would have been likely to have been caused during the hand-to-hand fighting which took place inside the Parliament building.

I found, however, that the Syrians believe that the Senegalese did carry out atrocities. While waiting to see the Acting Prime Minister, his secretary told me that the Senegalese had cut off the ears and noses of the Syrian gendarmes. Brigadier Frere was present and he denied the story, telling the Acting Prime Minister's secretary of the findings of the British army doctors who conducted the exhumation. Later, in my conversation with the Acting Prime Minister, he repeated the story of the atrocities to me and I again denied it.

There is no doubt that extensive looting was carried out by the Senegalese troops and the British army has recovered a great deal of looted property.

Homs.

I went to Homs on the afternoon of the 22nd June, where I was met by Major Pelloe, of the British Security Mission. The fighting in Homs did not last very long and by the time the British troops arrived the French had already subdued the town. With Major Pelloe I called on the Mohafez, Fuad Hallabi. There are no French in Homs now and I found the same determined anti-French spirit. The Mohafez told me that no one in the town wished to see the French again, and said he hoped that the British would stay. He said quite frankly that what his people wanted was for the French to withdraw and for the British to stay for a period. He did not think the Syrian Government could take over the country immediately. He asked nothing better than that Britain should send technical experts of all kinds to advise and help the Syrians. The French, he said, had never done so. They had sent soldiers to rule them.

Major Pelloe showed me the text of the French terms which were presented to the Mohafez by the French délégué when the town was forced to surrender in the face of superior French force. They included orders to the townspeople to remove barricades, cease demonstrations, allow the free circulation of all French military and civilians to collect food; no traffic was to pass the French délégué and French troops would remain in barracks, but reprisals would be taken for the smallest incident. The last paragraph read: "No complaints of any nature at all will be received either by the military commander or by the délégué, who consider themselves to be worthy of thanks for having stopped the sacking and entire burning to the ground of the town."

Hama.

Later that evening I went on to Hama, where I was met by Major Dearden, the British political officer.

Hama is a purely Arab town on the edge of the desert, in very close contact with the Bedouin tribes. There is an Arab story which starts: "There once was a Jew in Hama. . . ." The story goes no further, as this statement is sufficiently funny to cause all Arabs to laugh. Hama was shelled and bombed from the air by the French. It is estimated that about a hundred people were killed. Using only rifles, the population, aided by Bedouins, captured a French carrier and two tractor-driven armoured cars with machine guns. They also shot down two

aircraft. Despite efforts to get in reinforcements, the French lost the battle of Hama, with the result that Hama, flushed with pride in its victory, is most violently anti-French.

I called on the Mohafez, Khaled Bey Dagheitani. In his office when I called was a deserter from the Troupes Spéciales and another from the Bedouin control. He expressed the unity of his townspeople in their hatred for the French and their determination never to have them back in Hama again. In Hama the hatred has become a blood feud and in certain families and tribes solemn oaths have been taken to carry on the fight against the French from generation to generation. The Mohafez said that all was quiet in the town now, but that while any French remained in Syria there was always the danger of disturbances. Their presence in the Lebanon he regarded as provocation; if they remained in the Lebanon the people of Syria would never feel safe, since the French would try to infiltrate their agents into the country with a view to regaining their previous position.

After seeing the Mohafez I went with Major Dearden to call on Fares Bey Azem, the head of the leading family in Hama, who by his wealth and position, is the most powerful influence in the town. I spoke to him through his son, Abdul Rahman Azem, a very intelligent young man, speaking good French. Speaking on behalf of his father, he outlined the main history of relations between Syria and France, explaining how the confidence of the Syrians had been shaken by the French, first in 1936 when the treaty was never ratified, again in 1941 when General Catroux negotiated no treaty after the Free French forces had supplanted the Vichy administration of General Dentz, and finally shattered by the recent events. I could not help being impressed by the fact that his analysis of the history of France's relations with Syria was practically word for word what I had heard Madame Viennot, speaking for the Socialist party, say in Paris during the first day of the debate on Syria before the French Consultative Assembly. I tried to explain to him that I had heard similar views expressed in France and that perhaps the Syrians were wrong in deciding so categorically that there were no Frenchmen whom they could trust and that from France they would never get independence. He assured me that even if what I said were true it was too late. The Syrian people could never trust anything that was said by any Frenchman again. He reminded me that the present Government were the people who went to Paris in 1936 for the treaty negotiations and who, when they came back to Syria, did tremendous propaganda for France. These men were men of his father's age and were now so embittered that there was no question of them negotiating with any French people, whoever they might be. The young people of his own age could only judge from the Frenchmen they had seen in Syria and what they had seen confirmed what their parents told them.

When we came to discuss the future, he explained to me that in Hama the people and the tribesmen, while they supported the Government in the present crisis, were not in favour of the republican system, but wanted a monarchy. They preferred the idea of a monarchy, and their choice for a king was the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. He told me that they had had contact with the Amir Abdullah, who had sent several envoys to their town, and that a movement in favour of a monarchy had gained a great deal of ground recently. He pointed out that the other Arab States—Egypt and Iraq—were monarchies and that we in England were a monarchy. He insisted that the king must be a member of the Hashimite family and they preferred Abdullah to the Emir Abdullilah of Iraq. As for King Ibn Saud, they did not want him at any cost, and they seemed to have a genuine dread of the Wahabis. One of the reasons he gave for this movement to set up a monarchy was the distrust of the sophisticated coffee-house politicians of Damascus and the belief that Damascus, and so Syria, could only regain its traditional pre-eminent place in the Arab world under an Arab king.

With regard to future relations with the French, he warned me that although they had won their battle of Hama they were not sitting back and taking it easy. They were still collecting arms and were still organising, and if the French came back to Hama they would fight again. The French would find that resistance this time would be even better organised.

There is no doubt that rich families like the Azems in this district are producing money to buy arms, are promising to feed Bedouins who come in from the desert and are very active in organising resistance to the French. Relations with the British and Indian troops in the area are everywhere good.

Aleppo.

I arrived in Aleppo on the evening of the 23rd June. In general the town of Aleppo has escaped the destruction to be seen in Damascus, because it was

never shelled or bombarded from the air. The people have remained more calm than in other towns, due largely to the energy and influence of the Mohafez who, following the advice of His Majesty's Consul, worked ceaselessly to keep the population calm. The disturbances broke out on the 20th May, when a French officer drew his revolver on a crowd of student demonstrators and fired, killing one and wounding six. He managed to escape, but the crowd then marched through the town. A Senegalese, a sergeant, and a French officer were killed at various points, the trams were stopped and tram windows were smashed.

The French reply was to order out armoured cars and by indiscriminate machine-gun fire clear the streets. Thirty people were killed.

I called on the French Délégué Adjoint, M. Fauquenot, at the Délégation. Soldiers in steel helmets stood guard on the roof. M. Fauquenot has been for many years in Syria. He was in Damascus during the revolt of 1925. From the earliest days he said there had been rivalry between Britain and France in the Middle East and in Syria in particular. He assured me of his friendly feelings towards Britain and recalled his services in the British cause in the last war, for which he was decorated.

It became quite clear from the outset that he was thinking in terms of the French returning to Aleppo. He admitted that the French military authorities had not been strong enough to put down the incidents quickly, and I am sure that had he had aeroplanes he would have bombed Aleppo. He claims that order had been restored in the town and that anti-French feeling was beginning to die down before British troops arrived. Since their arrival it had broken out again because the effect of the presence of the British had been to give free rein to all anti-French elements. He said it would certainly be dangerous for a French soldier in uniform to venture out into the town now, and probably equally risky for a French civilian. I raised with him the question of his driving round the town with a large French flag on his car, which I had mentioned to General Beynet in Beirut at the request of His Majesty's Minister. His reply was that he might be shot at, that an escort could never prevent that, and that in any case he was prepared to run the risk because if he did not go about showing the French flag, there was danger that France would be forgotten.

He called the present state of affairs "a fever" which would die down about October. The town, he said, was not united against the French, the Christian community were at heart pro-French, but were hiding their true feelings from fear. He said that the Armenians and Alaouites in the Troupes Spéciales were loyal to France and that was why France could never hand over the Troupes Spéciales because it would be handing over these people to Muslim persecution. He said that even deserters from the Troupes Spéciales were already regretting that they had left the French, as they found themselves worse off with the Syrian gendarmerie. In Aleppo the Damascus Government was already being criticised. The President of the Republic, he said, was pro-German, the Acting Prime Minister was corrupt, and the Prime Minister pro-American. I asked him if he really believed that the British Government wished to supplant the French in Syria. His reply was that perhaps the British Government did not wish to supplant them, but he was sure that the British oil companies wanted the French out of Syria because of potential oil-fields at Deir ez-Zor, and was it not true that General Spears had large oil interests? I asked him why, since he had spent so many years in this country, and was familiar with Arab affairs, France had never concluded a treaty with the Syrians. He said that unfortunately circumstances had always been against them. He said that in 1941 he himself had produced all the Syrian leaders for General Catroux to see and that to each of them General Catroux had put the question of were they in favour of a treaty. They had all stated their desire for a treaty based on the treaty of 1936 with certain modifications, to which General Catroux had replied he was perfectly prepared to discuss these modifications. I then asked who chose Sheikh Tag-ed-din as the first President of the Syrian Republic? His face fell and he told me that in his view this was an error. It was because of that choice that he was in Aleppo now, as he had asked to be transferred from Damascus as he knew it would be impossible to work with Sheikh Tag-ed-din.

I formed the impression that M. Fauquenot is an embittered man, who has worked for years in Syria, who knows more than most Frenchman about Arab affairs (he admitted that he spoke better Arabic than the oft-cited "British Agent," Colonel Stirling). He realises that French intrigues and policy of playing off the Christians against the Moslems have not produced the results they had hoped for. Nevertheless, he is still most active in Aleppo, calling on leaders of

the Christian community to their very great embarrassment. He is going on blindly, trying to spread fear among the Christian communities, which in Aleppo are more numerous than in any other town in Syria, because he does not know what else to do.

M. Fauquenot was most correct and insisted on repaying my call, and as a result came to breakfast at His Majesty's Consulate before I left.

After seeing M. Fauquenot I called on the Mohafez of Aleppo, Ihsan Bey Cherif. What he told me was in fact a complete contradiction of everything M. Fauquenot had said. He charged the French with having sent to Syria second and third-class Frenchmen as their representatives. In the present administration were officers who in 1941 had been simple soldiers. The town of Aleppo was completely united, Christians and Moslems, in its hatred of the French. Proof of this was the fact that half the Troupes Spéciales deserters were Christians. He added that the French were offering double pay to the Troupes Spéciales in an effort to keep them. Another example of Christian feeling was to be seen in an appeal issued by the Armenian Patriarch to all Armenians in French service to leave their posts. Another complaint made by the Mohafez was that the French came to Syria only as officials. There were no business men in the country working in normal commercial relationships with the Syrian business communities. All the French were officials of one sort or another, who wanted to make as much as they could out of the country. No Frenchman came to work with the Syrians in their country. The Mohafez repeated what I had heard elsewhere, that the Syrians would never feel safe even while the French remained in the Lebanon. Order in Aleppo was now good, but only because the French in the town were kept out of sight; their presence, however, was a danger.

While in Aleppo His Majesty's Consul arranged for me to meet a number of the notables of the town. The Iraqi Consul, to whom I talked, told me that the town was now better armed and better organised than it had been during the incidents and that if the French tried to come back they would find more men with more arms against them. He also told me that the demonstration of students from which the disturbances had sprung had been ordered by the Damascus Government.

I had a long conversation with Ihsan Jabri, a National Bloc leader, and a member of the leading family in Aleppo. He warned me that it was becoming increasingly difficult for political leaders like himself to restrain the population from carrying out further acts of violence against the French and French property. He said that the continued presence of French troops in the town was a provocation and that the people wanted them to go and that if we did not evacuate them they might attack them. I was not completely convinced by his arguments, and formed the impression that there is a body of Syrian feeling which would like to stir up trouble in order to force us to evacuate the French.

In conversations I had with His Majesty's Consul and the British army commander I formed the very strong impression that in Aleppo when British troops intervened His Majesty's Consul and the British army commander had taken great trouble to spare French feelings as much as possible. The result is that relations between the British army and the French military authorities are much better than they are in Damascus, and Colonel Gentis, the French commander, accompanies the British commander on all his tours round the district.

I left Aleppo on the 25th June by air, arriving in Beirut the same day.

2. The Lebanon.

The Lebanon is at present quiet. The French are visible and up to the present there have been no disturbances, although the Lebanese Government has issued a joint declaration declaring its unity with the Syrian Government, and it is impossible to separate the Lebanon from Syria in the present crisis.

The bitterness of anti-French feeling in the Lebanon is most noticeable to a returning visitor to what was formerly considered a French stronghold. British officials estimate that only 25 per cent. of the population to-day remains pro-French. This means that a little more than half of the Christian communities, on whom the French have always counted, have turned against them.

M. Henri Pharaon, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me that the fact that the Lebanon had remained quiet was not due to the Lebanese Government, but entirely due to the British Government, and the counsels and assurances given them by His Majesty's Minister, who they believed acted in good faith.

There is no doubt that the Lebanon identifies itself with Syria in the quarrel with the French.

I saw the Prime Minister of the Lebanon, Sheikh Abdul Hamid Karami, on the 20th June. The Prime Minister said that my arrival from Paris was another proof of the interest England was taking in the Lebanese cause. He then plunged straight into an account of Lebanese differences with the French. The French concessions—the Banque de Syrie, the Customs, &c.—he said had been used by the French to rob the Lebanese people of their rightful wealth. The French had also established schools in the Lebanon, but not with the purpose of spreading knowledge, but with the object of doing French propaganda. He said that the Lebanese had had enough of the French teaching their children the life of Napoleon instead of the history of the Lebanon. The French, he continued, kept troops in the Lebanon on the ground that they were necessary to maintain order. If there had been disorders it was because of the presence of these French troops. After what they had seen in the Lebanon in 1943 and just recently in Syria there was no question of the French staying in the Lebanon. The Lebanese demanded the evacuation of the whole of the French troops and the return of the Troupes Spéciales to them. The French had also tried to divide them from the Syrians. This they would not support any longer. They knew that if left to handle their own affairs they could co-operate and agree with the Syrian Government.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying that he well understood the British reasons for friendship with France. We were neighbours in Europe; but he warned me against French jealousy of Britain's prestige in the world, which he said made the French hate us.

M. Henri Pharaon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said there was no question of the Lebanese granting a position of privilege to France. The Lebanese wanted to be Lebanese, independent and free to make treaties with whom they liked.

The French had shown what they thought about the Lebanon during the celebrations on VE-day, when they took paid demonstrators in lorries through the streets crying "Long Live de Gaulle," "We are de Gaulle's children." But when it came to negotiating a treaty, General Beynet came to see him two days before the arrival of reinforcements from France, but he never mentioned a treaty. The General waited until the reinforcements had arrived and then summoned him to Damascus and handed him the terms there. Why did the General wait until the ship arrived? Only because he meant to intimidate the Lebanese.

The Lebanese stood side by side with the Syrians in the present dispute; it made no difference whether the French bombed Damascus with only one aircraft or with a hundred aircraft. The fact that the French should use forceful methods had made them hated by all Syrians and Lebanese alike.

He concluded by making the statement quoted above about law and order having been maintained in the Lebanon thanks to the representations made by His Majesty's Government.

M.I.R.A.

While in Aleppo I talked to Brigadier Clarke, the British director of M.I.R.A., who was formerly the British representative in O.C.P. He gave me the following facts and figures about M.I.R.A.

On the 1st June, when M.I.R.A. was set up, Damascus had supplies for two days and Aleppo for five days. The rest of Syria could feed itself from locally-grown supplies. The Lebanon had supplies sufficient to last until the 5th July.

We had immediately borrowed 5,000 tons from the army, of which 2,500 tons had been distributed.

If M.I.R.A. had not been set up no cereals would have been purchased because French agents would have been lynched in the country, and the Arabs would have refused to sell. The result would have been that the Lebanese would have starved when existing stocks were gone. Syria could have fed itself, though Damascus would have been very hungry.

250,000 tons were needed yearly for Syria and the Lebanon. Of this the Lebanon took 140,000 tons a year and grew only 10,000 tons. That was why we had had to set up M.I.R.A. in the Lebanon as well as Syria, because the Syrians would not provide wheat for the French to distribute in the Lebanon.

The purchasing period was from June to October. Purchases were going on very well. The danger of famine had been averted and by the end of October he thought we could hand the whole organisation over to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

M.I.R.A. was using the O.C.P. offices and furniture and transport but a careful inventory had been made of all French property.

With regard to the amount owing to O.C.P. mentioned by M. Bidault, the sum was £S. 1 million. There was £S. 8 million in hand at the moment and the debt could be paid at any time.

Conclusions.

After so short a visit to the Levant States it would be foolish to pretend to arrive at definite conclusions. I was, however, very much impressed by the following factors in the situation:—

(1) The anti-French feeling in Syria can only be regarded as a national rising against the French. The disturbances started at different points in the country and at different times, but have now become a national revolt by the whole population.

(2) Anti-French feeling in the Lebanon should not be under-estimated because disorders and fighting have not as yet broken out there. It only requires a small incident for fierce fighting to begin. This danger does not decrease with the passage of time.

(3) The French mentality and attitude towards the Arabs is completely out of date and bears no relation to the status and development of these people to-day. General Beynet has no respect for these people. To him they are no better than ignorant Senegalese or Madagascar negroes. He said to me: "There is only one policy for these countries—force or money." He really believes in the colonising methods of the last century. If you have trouble you shoot a few people and they soon learn. He is not the only French official to think on these lines.

(4) The French military assessment of the situation seems to have been hopelessly inaccurate. Had they continued to shell and bomb Syrian towns in the end 150,000 people would probably have been massacred. The French would have been invested in Damascus and Aleppo. They would have had to send for large reinforcements and embark on a war of reconquest. Meanwhile the Lebanon would have revolted as well.

(5) From the point of view of British interests our present position in Syria is likely to develop to our disadvantage. Up to the present we have got along on the goodwill of the Syrians and their liking for us. But British martial law does not exist in Syria and we have relatively few troops. Standing as we do between the Syrians and the French we please neither party. The Syrian Government is co-operating but there are elements who want to keep the fire burning. They have got the French on the run but they have not got them out everywhere. I foresee a difficult time ahead with restraining the Syrians from provocative actions, which is bound to make us unpopular with them. This is also likely to react against us in other parts of the Arab world.

(6) There is little hope of a permanent solution on the basis of the French withdrawing from Syria but remaining in the Lebanon. The French can only stay in the Levant States to-day backed by enormous forces.

(7) The only possible solution seems to be for French and British forces to withdraw simultaneously from both States and for the Troupes Spéciales to be handed back to the two Governments. A French diplomatic mission on equal footing with His Britannic Majesty's Legation might then be acceptable to the two States. The French cannot hope for a privileged position. They would, however, in effect keep a special position since their culture cannot be destroyed overnight. With well-run schools, on lines acceptable to the local Governments, and economic agreements, they might retain something of the position they had in the past.

The United States' interests in the Levant must not be overlooked. To the University at Beirut and the Lebanese colonies in America must now be added the oil concession at Tripoli and the United States demands for freedom of the air.

There is no quick way of solving the quarrel between France and the Levant States. British efforts in the Levant have been concentrated on trying to save for France as much as possible of her former privileges. Since the crisis began Britain has prevented the Levant Governments from breaking off diplomatic relations with France, publishing inflammatory declarations, &c. The French in the Levant have not made our task of helping them any easier, due to their mistrust of our intentions.

The only settlement is a very long-term one.

The first step is to overcome the French mistrust in Paris and get them to see that we alone have tried to help them in the Levant. The only restraining

voice speaking to the local Governments at the moment is the voice of His Majesty's Minister.

If the Levant States will accept a French Legation and French mistrust of British intentions can be overcome it is for His Majesty's Government to try to work out with the French Government, and perhaps with the United States Government, a common Arab policy for the Middle East, so that with the French, Britain can present a united front on Middle Eastern affairs both to the Arabs and to the world.

I have, &c.

DONALD MALLET.

Beirut, 28th June, 1945.

[E 4925/8/89]

No. 14.

(1)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th July.)

(No. 630.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 5th July, 1945.

MY telegrams Nos. 606 and 617.

After further discussions the French agreed to draft a statement concerning the transfer of Troupes Spéciales for publication. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Count Ostrorog to make its tone and substance as sympathetic as possible and the French accepted an amendment proposed by him in this sense. Translation of the draft statement in my immediately following telegram.

2. The Syrians and Lebanese both objected to "the principle of the transfer" in the penultimate paragraph on the grounds that the principle had been admitted long ago and that the acceptance of this formula would not satisfy public opinion and would enable the French to drag things out indefinitely, if they wished. The Syrians also objected to the word "accord." They proposed alternative text providing for "immediate and unconditional transfer" of troops and wished this to cover their arms, equipment and barracks.

3. I told both the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Ostrorog, who have been in constant touch with me, that while I saw force in objection to "principle" I considered Syrian amendment (which the French refused to accept) as unreasonable. As the French maintained, the transfer of arms, equipment and barracks (some of which are French property having been paid for out of French funds and not out of "intérêts communs") must involve discussions between the French and States Governments, moreover, the French seemed perfectly justified in requiring some assurances from the Syrians about security and proper treatment of men and families of the men who had been particularly loyal to them, and also about the right of men who had signed contracts to serve in French regular forces to opt for that if they wished. Ninth Army agreed with me as did Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. After Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had proposed a further formula which the French would not accept, Ostrorog made the following suggestion (in place of the last two paragraphs of draft) which avoids "principle" and "accord":—

"Declares that these troops [two groups undecypherable: ? may be transferred to] Syrian and Lebanese Governments in accordance with arrangements which will be defined in the shortest possible time."

5. After further discussion with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ostrorog I agreed to go to Damascus to-day to do all I could to induce the Syrians to accept the above. Brigadier of General Staff Ninth Army accompanied me.

6. Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs feared that the French might spin out the discussion about arrangements connected with the transfer but he eventually agreed to the formula proposed subject to the Syrian President's approval. We had nearly three hours with Shukri who was in a difficult mood and highly suspicious of French good faith (compare my telegram No. 607). It was eventually agreed that the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs should ask the French to

accept a time limit of two months for discussion of the necessary arrangements. This, the Syrians maintained, was essential to satisfy public opinion. French reaction is awaited.

7. Please regard the above as confidential at present.

[E 4927/8/89]

(2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th July.)

(No. 631.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 5th July, 1945.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text as drafted by Count Ostrorog:—

"The Provisional Government of the French Republic, wishing to respond to request formulated by Syrian and Lebanese Governments concerning taking over of locally recruited units.

"Considering by reason of end of hostilities in Europe there is no longer any obstacle to legitimate desire of Syria and the Lebanon to form national armies.

"Wishing to see Syria and the Lebanon invested with all the prerogatives of sovereignty so that they may play the part incumbent on them in concert of the United Nations.

"Declares that it gives its immediate and unconditional agreement to the principle of transfer of these troops.

"The arrangements for this transfer will be settled with the least possible delay by a common agreement between the three interested Governments."

2. The following was inserted as paragraph 2 at the request of the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs: after "locally recruited units" insert "wishing to display to Syrian and Lebanese Governments its wish for an understanding, and, at the same time, to give them full satisfaction regarding these units."

[E 4927/8/89]

(3)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th July.)

(No. 638.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 6th July, 1945.

MY telegram No. 630, paragraph 4.

Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Syrians, French and Lebanese have agreed to the revised draft declaration, substituting for "in shortest possible time" the words "with a maximum delay of forty-five days."

2. The announcement is to appear in the press of the 8th July.

[E 4942/14/89]

(4)

Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden.—(Received 9th July.)

(No. 972.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, 9th July, 1945.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has issued following communiqué published in Paris press of the 8th July:—

"Under the terms of a declaration issued at Beirut by General Beynet, French Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary in the Levant States, it has been decided in view of the end of hostilities in Europe to accede to the wishes of Syria and the Lebanon to constitute a national army and, consequently, to transfer to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments the locally recruited military units, of which the French command had taken charge.

"The steps by which this transfer is to be effected will be defined within forty-five days."

[E 6094/8/89]

No. 15.

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Duff Cooper (Paris).

(No. 1497.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 16th August, 1945.

I MET M. Massigli to-day and conveyed to him congratulations on the conclusion of the war in the East, which he stated he would pass on to his Government. I then made a tentative approach on the problem of the Levant. As he was going to Paris, I asked him to speak to M. Bidault rather than pass on my views by telegram.

2. I said that he must understand that anything I said would not commit His Majesty's Government since the Cabinet had not yet discussed this matter. It was most desirable, however, that the Levant question should be settled, for that would assist us in dealing with other outstanding problems between our two countries. I understood that the French had suspicions that if the troops of both countries were all withdrawn and trouble thereafter arose the British would go in and remain there. I wanted to adopt means which would remove any suspicion of that character.

3. The tentative suggestions I made were that:—

- (1) Both Governments should agree forthwith to withdraw their troops.
- (2) If the French had fears for the Christian minorities and the likelihood of an attack upon them, it would be left to Britain, America and France, in the interim period before the functioning of the World Organisation, to decide whether they should intervene, and if so to determine what troops would be used. So far as we were concerned, we would support the employment of French troops for this purpose. This, I thought, would have a moral effect in preventing outbreaks and would mean that care would be taken by the Syrians and Lebanese to see that these things did not arise. At the same time, there should be a strict understanding between both of us that there would be no provocation.
- (3) The police force should be organised. Advisers should be sought from Sweden or Denmark.
- (4) Steps should be taken to deal with the problem of exchange in order that the territories might be fed. This would have to be discussed between us.
- (5) The question of a base which was claimed by France should be dealt with by the World Organisation when the time came.

4. M. Massigli then raised the question of air services and I asked him whether he meant purely commercial and he said: "Yes." Both of us had air-fields and both had air services and there would have to be a settlement of this question.

5. I indicated that if this tentative approach appealed to his Government, then I would take the matter up with the Cabinet. If they approved this policy we could set our respective staffs busy to work it out. I said that I had no objection if the proposals on these lines actually came from him. That might assist him; in which case I would remain in the background.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 6228/5484/89]

No. 16.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 25th August.)

(No. 152.)

Sir,

Beirut, 9th August, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an interesting paper, prepared by Headquarters, British Troops, North Levant, on the Christian-Moslem problem in Syria.

2. The paper stresses, rightly in my opinion, the special composition of the population of the province of Jezireh, which (like the Lebanon) contains many different and often mutually antagonistic communities. Some of these, notably the Assyrians and Armenians, are comparatively recent immigrants who took refuge from persecution elsewhere; and it is not therefore surprising that, having up to the present been accustomed to look to the French for protection,

they should now display apprehensions for their safety in the event of a general evacuation of Syria by Allied troops. How far these fears are justified, only the future can show; but it is unfortunately undeniable that in the Jezireh they are widespread amongst the minorities and, indeed, amongst the sedentary population as a whole. They seem to be based less on doubts of the intentions of the Syrian authorities than on disbelief in the ability of those authorities to protect them, e.g., against marauding Bedouin tribes; and they are not likely to be allayed unless, during the period which elapses before a final Allied withdrawal, security is maintained and at the same time the Syrian gendarmerie and Desert Control Force, now in process of formation, can gradually be brought to assure efficient control.

3. In the rest of Syria the prospects of co-operation between Christians and Moslems seem more promising. The Orthodox communities in particular have usually been able to maintain good relations with the Moslems, perhaps partly because, being comparatively neglected by the French authorities, they have found it necessary to do so. It is the less numerous Catholic communities who, from their long tradition of French protection, have tended to adopt an attitude of superiority towards the Moslems and who in consequence now feel themselves most in danger of oppression. The fact that a large number of the French employees in the country were drawn from these communities renders the latter, in the present heat of anti-French feeling amongst the Moslems, particularly liable to retaliatory measures.

4. The present rulers of Syria seem alive to the dangers of the present situation, of which I have spoken to them more than once. As reported in my telegram No. 740 of the 1st August, the Syrian President has convened Christian leaders in order to assure them of his Government's intentions to treat Christians and Moslems on an equal footing; and the Government are understood to have instructed the Moslem *Ulema* to preach religious toleration in the mosques. The Syrian electoral law provides for an equitable distribution of seats in the Chambers amongst all communities, in proportion to their numbers; and it will not have escaped notice that the present Prime Minister is a Christian, and that two of the three members of the Syrian Delegation to San Francisco (which included the Prime Minister) were Christians. So long, indeed, as Christians show themselves to be politically in harmony with the prevailing spirit of nationalism—in the sense of loyalty to the Syrian State—and so long as this spirit is free from religious fanaticism and xenophobia, they need have little fear of persecution, in the towns at least, merely because they are Christians. In the remoter country districts the safety of Christian villages must depend, after the withdrawal of Allied forces, on the extent to which an entirely independent Syrian Government can keep order and impose respect for their authority. Unless the Syrian Government can do this, any declaration they may make of their intention to give full protection to Christians will be of little value in these districts.

5. Syrian Christians are apt to express fears that, in an officially Moslem state the law of which is based on the Koran, they may find the scales of justice habitually weighted against them; and that Moslems will always prefer Moslems when it comes to the choice of contractors or Government employees. This undoubtedly may occur, to some extent at least. But Syrian Moslems are in general not fanatical, and so long as the Syrian Government give proof of their intention to avoid serious discrimination against Christians and provided that any tendencies to fanaticism and xenophobia are kept in check, the only real danger of a more general Christian-Moslem clash, elsewhere than in the Jezireh, seems to lie in the possibility that some of the Christians will not, in the words of paragraph 15 of the enclosed memorandum, be "tactful and correct" in their behaviour towards the Moslems. Such canons of behaviour have not always been followed by minorities elsewhere; and if any of these communities should be led to believe that, even after the establishment of complete Syrian independence, they have only to raise their voices to bring about the intervention of powerful external forces, whether secular or religious, on their behalf, they will be the less likely to settle down to their inevitable final status as members of the Syrian State. It is during the present transitional period, when the abrupt change in the situation hitherto obtaining and uncertainty as to the future have naturally had an unsettling effect, that the activities of ignorant or ill-intentioned agitators can be most mischievous.

6. I attach also a note on the Christian-Moslem question in the Lebanon. Here the problem is very different. In the Lebanon as at present constituted, the Christians slightly outnumber the Moslems and no one community forms a

majority. Christian-Moslem strife in the former "Little Lebanon" is a comparatively recent memory, and the possibility of the Lebanese Christians ranging themselves against the Lebanese Moslems on communal issues is always dormant; but such a division would threaten the very existence of the Lebanon, and there have been many signs of late that the political leaders (Riad Solh, for example) will do everything in their power to prevent it. The issue is, indeed, between those, Christians and Moslems alike, who wish to see the establishment of an independent Lebanon in which all communities will have equal rights, and those extreme Christians, led by the Maronite Patriarch and his clergy, who wish to see the Lebanon converted into a "Christian Home," protected by foreign Powers against any possibility of Moslem domination.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

P.S.—Since drafting the above, I have received from H.Q., B.T.N.L., a résumé of comments on the first enclosure to the despatch, which have been prepared by Brigadier Clayton, of the Minister Resident's office, and P.I.C.M.E. With their permission, I enclose copy of these comments, which in general do not affect the conclusions in my despatch.

T. S.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

(Secret.)

Memorandum by Headquarters, British Troops, North Levant.

THE CHRISTIAN-MOSLEM PROBLEM IN SYRIA.

The Future Relations between the Two Communities when the French and British withdraw.

General.

THE Near East has seen the birth of three of the great religions of the world, the Christian, the Jewish and the Moslem, and it has also seen the division of these religions into many and varied sects, the majority of whom have been engaged in conflict with each other for centuries. The religious differences are often complicated by racial distinctions and it is at times difficult to discern whether a dispute is a religious or racial one, or both. It is usually both.

2. The largest element of the population of Syria is Arab and Moslem. Of these, the greater number are Sunni Moslems, but there are some Shias, and two important sects springing from Shi-ism, the Druzes and the Alaouites. The last two are secret religions, but they probably take something from Christianity and paganism as well as from Islam. The Christian sects in the country are divided into five main groups: Armenians—Catholic and Orthodox, Syrians—Catholic and Orthodox, Greeks—Catholic and Orthodox, Maronites and Assyrian Nestorians. Of these, the largest and most important groups are the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian Orthodox.

Distribution and Numbers.

3. The census of the population of Syria, taken in December 1943, showed a total population of 2,860,000. Of this total 1,971,000 are Sunni Moslems who, therefore, form more than two thirds of the total. The next largest group is the Alaouites who number 325,000. The Druzes in Syria total 87,000. Of the other important non-Christian groups Moslem Shias total 12,700 and the Ismaelites, who are a heretical Shia sect owing allegiance to the Aga Khan, 28,500.

4. The largest Christian group is the Greek Orthodox who number 136,900. They are followed in size by the Armenian Orthodox, with 101,700, and the Syrian Orthodox with 40,000. Of the sects affiliated to the Catholic Church the Greek Catholics total 46,700, the Armenian Catholics 16,700, and the Maronites 13,300. The other Christian groups are of small importance—they are Protestants with 11,000, Chaldeans 4,700, and Latins 5,900. Syria has 29,700 Jews, practically all of whom live in Damascus and Aleppo. The Yazidis, Kurds who practise an interesting semi-pagan religion which includes devil-worship, number only 2,300, and they live in the Aleppo area and in the Jezireh.

5. The Christian communities are distributed throughout the country but, except in the Euphrates and Jezireh Mohafazats, they live mostly in the large

towns. The Greek Orthodox population is concentrated mostly into the four Mohafazats of Damascus (with 23,700), Homs (with 20,200), Hama (with 17,300) and Lattakia (with 58,100). The Armenian Orthodox community have their majority—67,500 in the Aleppo Mohafazat—and the only other large group of them is in Damascus with 16,800. The Greek Catholics are nearly all concentrated into the Mohafazats of Damascus (with 20,300) and Aleppo (with 11,900). Three-quarters of the Maronites are in the Lattakia Mohafazat. All the Nestorian Assyrians live in the Jezireh.

Past Relations of Moslem and Christian Elements.

6. During the 400 years that Syria formed part of the Ottoman Empire the Sunni Moslem element was dominant in all branches of activity. The Sunni Sultan Caliph at Constantinople could feel little sympathy with the religious minorities in his Empire; and too often the Turks solved the minority problem, particularly the Armenian one, by applying the decisive proverb "Stone dead hath no fellow." The frequent interference of foreign Christian Powers, particularly Russia, France and Great Britain, induced the Sultan to take a more statesmanlike attitude towards his Christian subjects, and the Millet System, whereby the religious head of each Christian community was made responsible to the Constantinople Government for the good behaviour and government of his flock, produced a reasonably tolerable status for the minorities. Nevertheless, Christian loyalty to the Ottoman Government was never very strong, and the communities tended to look towards foreign Christian Powers for support—the Syrian and Armenian Orthodox to Russia, the Maronites and Catholic communities to France.

7. The Millet System, in fact, emphasised rather than reduced the differences between Christians and Moslems within the Empire. Emphasised religious distinctions only widened the political gap between the groups. Foreign interference helped in this widening and, when the Ottoman Empire was destroyed, and France came to Syria, there existed a religious disunity born of years of religious discrimination under the Turks.

8. At the same time the growth of Arab nationalism was a factor of importance. The movement was not essentially a Moslem one. The emphasis was on the Arab rather than on Islam. Many Christian Arabs were ardent supporters of the movement. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Arab past and the period of Arab Empire, from which the movement so much derives its inspiration, are inextricably bound up with Islam. In any Arab movement Islam is bound to be a dominating factor. The Christian Arabs realise this, and yet it has not prevented them from being Nationalists.

9. As far as Arab Christians are concerned, therefore, there would seem to be no great fear of persecution or even unfavourable treatment on the part of Moslems. With foreign communities, peoples with no Arab blood, the danger is more pronounced. Events in Palestine have produced a decided anti-Jewish bias throughout all the Arab countries. In Iraq the State showed itself unable to absorb satisfactorily its Assyrian minority. In Syria an anti-Armenian move is by no means an improbability. Racial rather than religious discrimination is the most probable development in an independent Arab State. In Syria the foreign minorities, with the exception of the Jews, are mostly Christian. Therefore, racial persecution would undoubtedly appear also as religious. But the racial cause would be the potent one, the religious one would be only subsidiary.

10. During the years of their mandate in Syria, the French endeavoured to pursue a "divide and rule" policy. They attempted to "play off" the minorities, such as the Christians, the Druzes and the Alaouites, against the Moslem majority. Their efforts met with some success. The unwisdom of French policy in the war years which culminated in their major blunder of May and June of this year have brought about a unity of all religions and races in Syria such as has never been known before. Many "fence-sitters" have veered to the side of the Government, and the minorities have thrown in their lot with the Moslem Arabs. Unity of all communities has been achieved against the French; an uncertain question is whether that unity will continue when the French have gone.

The Situation after a Franco-British Withdrawal.

11. The main areas where there are large Christian groups, other than the Jezireh, are Damascus, Homs-Hama, Aleppo and Lattakia. The situation in all these areas would seem to be similar, and the different religious communities fear the future in varying degrees. The Greek Orthodox Communities, most of

whom are of Arab blood, have been for some time on good terms with the Moslem authorities. Many have shown proof of sincere nationalism. They would undoubtedly be loyal to an Arab State, and would expect to be given religious toleration in return.

12. The Maronites and the communities affiliated to the Catholic Church were always more closely associated with the French, and they have more cause to fear the future. Recently, however, most of them have been anxious to demonstrate their loyalty to the Syrian State, and it is unlikely that they will be persecuted if they show that tact which is so necessary on the part of a minority in a politically undeveloped State.

13. The Armenians are a more complicated problem. They are not Arab, many of them have favoured French rule, and they have memories of cruel Moslem persecution under the Turks. They are a politically-minded people, and a group of them look towards Russia and the attractive goal of Soviet Armenia. A large number of them favour America and Great Britain. They are a wealthy, intelligent and industrious community and, therefore, an easy object of jealousy to the Arab. Any loyalty they would possess to an Arab Syrian State would be entirely based on self-interest and not on deeper instincts. In the recent crisis they have seen clearly where their self-interest lay, and they have supported the Syrian movement. Years of persecution have taught them tact and the importance of not arousing the ire of the ruling majority. Trouble will probably not come from them when the French and British go; and it is unlikely that the Arab Government would seriously persecute a well-behaved and economically important portion of its population.

14. The Jezireh is a potentially more dangerous area. There is a great mixture of Christian sects—approximately 2,000 Armenian Catholics, 8,000 Armenian Orthodox, 2,000 Chaldeans, 3,000 Syrian Catholics, 18,000 Syrian Orthodox, and 9,000 Nestorian Assyrians. The Jezireh is a province in which the authority of the Syrian Government is less strong than elsewhere, and it would be particularly difficult for them to control the large and lawless tribes in that region. The Christians in the area have not reacted favourably to the movement against the French, and the majority feel that their position would be untenable if both the British and French forces left. The Moslems have made efforts to conciliate the Christians and to assure them that they have nothing to fear. It is likely that the Jezireh is an area which might need special treatment when the British and French go. It would need a strong and loyal police force, and the solution might be in a small foreign mission—perhaps American—being attached to the force and ensuring the guarding and fair treatment of the Christians. Any appearance of favouritism towards the Christians at the expense of the Moslems would have to be most carefully avoided.

Conclusion.

15. Other than the Jezireh, which would seem to be a special case deserving special treatment, Moslem persecution of Christians after a Franco-British withdrawal is unlikely. The Christians would have to realise that they are minorities and as such need to be tactful and correct in their behaviour towards the Moslem majority. With foreign influences removed, the Christians would probably come to recognise more and more that they are Syrians and owe loyalty to the Syrian State. The Government, on the other hand, is unlikely to want to alienate such a large section of its people by discriminatory measures. Any discrimination which may occur will probably be racial rather than religious, but is unlikely to take violent form. The Syrian State will not wish to alienate the great Christian Powers, Great Britain, America and Russia, by persecuting Christians. Provided the Syrian Government possesses a reasonably large and efficient police force, it will be able to control the more lawless Moslem elements who might try to make capital out of the withdrawal of Franco-British forces.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

Note by British Legation, Beirut.

The Christian-Moslem Question in the Lebanon.

THE present Lebanon dates only from 1920. Before that date, the present Mohafazats of north Lebanon, south Lebanon and Beirut belonged to the Turkish *Vilayet* of Beirut; the Bekaa (less Zahlé) formed part of the *Vilayet*

of Syria; and the present Mohafazat of Mount Lebanon, plus the district of Zahlé, formed a district, commonly referred to as "The Mountain," depending directly from the Porte, enjoying a large measure of autonomy and guaranteed by five foreign Powers: (Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia).

2. This "Mountain" was populated almost entirely by Maronites (who were in a large majority), Greek Orthodox, and Druzes. When the Lebanon, by the Decree of General Gouraud in 1920, was extended to its present boundaries, its population was increased by many thousands of Sunni and Shia Moslems and by some Greek Catholic and other Christian minorities. As a result, the Christian (Maronite and Greek Orthodox) majority of some 80 per cent. in the Little Lebanon was reduced to its present proportion of some 55 per cent. Since 1920 the Moslems have probably increased faster than the Christians, but against this must be set the influx of Armenian (Orthodox and Catholic) refugees from Turkey who have been settled either in Beirut or in Shia districts in the Bekaa and south Lebanon. It should also be noted that the great majority of Lebanese emigrants established abroad are Christians.

3. Following the Statute of 1864, which laid down the régime for the former "Little Lebanon," Great Britain, France and Russia were recognised as having special relations with the Druze, Maronite and Greek Orthodox communities respectively. The communal system established at that time has been consecrated in the present Constitution of the Lebanon, which provides for equitable division of public functions between all communities and for the representation of the principal communities in the Government. The present electoral law, based on this Constitution, comprises an elaborate formula by which the communities in each Mohafazat are represented by a number of Deputies proportionate to their strength.

4. A considerable cleavage between the different Lebanese communities continues to exist. For this the following factors are all to some extent responsible:—

- (a) The policy of "divide and rule" pursued by the French Mandatory authorities;
- (b) The existing laws of personal status which give considerable powers to the ecclesiastical courts in such matters as the marriage of members of their communities;
- (c) The memories of former intercommunal strife which still haunt the more backward Lebanese, particularly the Maronites inhabiting the "Mountain." Intermarriage between Christians and Moslems is almost unknown; and
- (d) An increasing difference of culture due to the fact that the Christians in general look westwards and the Moslems eastwards.

Whilst all thinking Lebanese are prepared to agree that these communal barriers constitute a serious handicap to the emergence of an independent Lebanon, few, if any, politicians would be prepared to support any change in the existing Constitution or electoral law designed to eliminate their communal basis. It was noticeable that when in 1943 an attempt was made by the temporary Head of the State to amend the electoral law in a manner which increased the number of Christian seats more than that of the Moslem seats, a violent Moslem reaction was at once followed by a Christian counter reaction and a serious crisis arose. The heads of the different communities are constantly insisting on the rights of their communities to a proportionate share of even the lowest Government functions, so that even the recruitment of 100 gendarmes can only be effected by giving so many of the 100 to each community.

5. It is clear from the above that the whole structure of the Lebanon still rests on a communal basis, and that sufficient prejudice still exists amongst the population to oppose any modification. The differences between the various Christian communities are often acute. But, as was shown in the crisis over the electoral law referred to above, there is a general tendency for Christian and Moslem communities to divide into separate camps on such issues. The fundamental risk of Christian-Moslem strife in the Lebanon resides in the attitude of the reactionary Maronites (particularly those inhabiting the "Mountain" and in close touch with the Maronite clergy), for their memories of the 1860 massacres and consequently deep-rooted fears of anything that savours of Moslem domination, seem ineradicable. These fears are much less strong in the other Christian communities; the Greek Orthodox, and to some extent Greek Catholics, have always prided themselves on their good relations with the Moslems, whilst

the Armenians, knowing themselves to be still alien immigrants, are anxious only for a quiet life.

6. On the political plane, Christian-Moslem rivalry is less clearly defined, since many even of the Maronites (for example, the present Lebanese President) are working as enthusiastically as the Moslems for the elimination of French control over the Lebanon. The Moslems, too, are not all of one mind; some of the Sunnis seek the incorporation of the Lebanon into the Arab League and to this end might even welcome the union of the Lebanon with Syria; whilst other Sunnis and most Shias and Druzes dislike the idea of being governed from Damascus and seek only autonomy without foreign control. But the opponents of the present régime, including those who are generally regarded as pro-French, are drawn almost exclusively from the reactionary Maronites; and even those Christians who dislike the French generally favour the establishment of an autonomous Lebanon separate from the other Arab States and guaranteed by one or more foreign Powers against the possibility of any eventual aggression on the part of the Moslems of Syria or elsewhere.

Beirut, 2nd August, 1945.

Enclosure 3 in No. 16.

Comments by Brigadier Clayton on Enclosure 1.

REFERENCE paragraph 2 of the report. The classification of the Christian sects is misleading since it does not stress the fact that the Armenians form an important racial group of their own, as do the Assyrian Nestorians on a much smaller scale. Apart from this racial division, the main religious difference is between the Uniate (Catholic) Churches on the one hand, and the so-called Orthodox on the other. The former comprise the Greek and Syrian Catholics, the Maronites and the Chaldeans; the Armenian Catholics also have ties with this group. The latter group include the Greek Orthodox, the Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) and the Protestants. The Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) and the Assyrian Nestorians are swayed chiefly by racial ties. It might be made clear that all these Christian Churches, except the Armenians and Nestorians, are Arab, just as much as are the Moslems.

2. Reference paragraphs 6 and 7. The Millet system was *not* forced on the Sultan by foreign Powers. When the Turks took Istanbul in 1453, the Sultan gave the Greek Orthodox Patriarch a measure of temporal jurisdiction over his own flock, supported him in his spiritual authority and recognised him as the responsible head of his own community or "millet." This step was taken on the Sultan's own initiative. While the Sunni Caliph in Istanbul may not have had much sympathy with his Christian minorities, he did give them a very considerable measure of protection. It was the frequent interference of foreign Powers and their attempts to trade on their connexion with the Christian minorities for political ends that irritated and frightened the Turks, and was to no small extent indirectly the cause of the massacres. The "millet" system worked tolerably well although, as the report states, it emphasised religious differences. These differences, however, are inevitable where Moslem law is the law of the country, or where the Shari' code is admitted as a civil code. The effects of external irritation, with consequent Christian-Moslem trouble, potential or actual, have been prolonged by the French policy of "protection" in the Levant, which has emphasised and fostered the desire for protection among the Christians. To avoid Christian-Moslem trouble, the need or desire for "protection" has to be removed.

3. Reference paragraphs 9 and 10. In Iraq it was the Assyrian minority that obstinately refused to be absorbed and insisted on retaining not only religious, but also racial and civil separation. It is questionable whether discrimination in Syria will be racial rather than religious. With the exception of the Armenians and the Jews, the other inhabitants of Syria are all of one race and for some time religious discrimination is more likely. The Christians have a very definite minority complex. The Moslems have an equally pronounced superiority complex.

4. The rest of the report is considered reasonable if the conclusions somewhat optimistic. There will certainly be considerable discrimination, but if the conditions outlined in the last sentence of the report are fulfilled, this discrimination should stop short of persecution and will be no greater than in Iraq or Egypt.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 7th September.)

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Beirut, 25th August, 1945.

IN my despatch No. 69 of the 30th April I gave an account of developments in the Levant States, with particular regard to the relations between France and the States, up to about the middle of that month. The time is long overdue to continue the story. The next six weeks were so full of incident that it is scarcely possible to provide an adequate record of the period in the compass of a single despatch. When few have time to read long despatches it may seem out of place to write them, especially about occurrences which must appear trivial in comparison with those in other parts of the globe. But they have had such repercussions, not only in the Arab world but on Anglo-French relations, and they have given rise to so much misunderstanding and misrepresentation that I feel a despatch which enters into some detail may be more valuable and more interesting than one which would be at once briefer and more colourless. While I must write it mainly from the local angle, I shall include in it some account of the more important conversations elsewhere as well as here and I shall venture to draw one or two conclusions. By devoting several paragraphs to events in Damascus between the 29th May and the 1st June, of which I was an eye-witness or of which I learned from others in close touch with me, at the expense of much that might be written about occurrences elsewhere in Syria, I can at least hope that my account will be accurate and objective; but I would beg indulgence not only for its length but also for its shortcomings.

2. Towards the end of April I submitted that we should be under no illusion as to the nature of the *détente* in relations between France and the Levant States, which had been achieved largely by our own efforts but also with the aid of the United States Government and of some of the Arab States. In January and February the tension between the Syrians and the French and conditions in Damascus had been such as to inspire fears of serious trouble. If, in the ensuing months, a better atmosphere had been produced for discussions between France and the States, the positions of the parties had not radically changed. French desiderata, and in so far as they had been divulged, and French activities in the States (*e.g.*, in the Alaouite territory) went to show that the French were determined to preserve as much as they could of their former position. On the other hand, both States' Governments were, if anything, more determined than ever to concede no preference or privilege to France. The Syrians had been taking the lead, partly because the French had so far made no direct approach to the Lebanese (which General Beynet later told me he thought had been a mistake); but the attitude of the Lebanese Government was perceptibly hardening in the same direction, chiefly because they were weaker and were susceptible to attack by Nationalist elements, notably Riad Solh's group, who were bent on making capital out of any appearance of failure on the part of the Government to defend Lebanese independence.

3. In the continued absence of the French Delegate General in Paris, the only Franco-Syrian discussions which had taken place were those on the revised French draft of a University Convention. As the Syrians were only prepared to conclude such a convention as part of a general settlement, no real progress was to be expected until General Beynet returned with proposals concerning other outstanding matters, of which the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* was, in Syrian eyes, by far the most important. In fact, the discussions on the University Convention broke down before General Beynet's return, as the Syrians considered the revised French draft to be unreasonable in that the application of certain of its provisions would have entailed French interference in their educational programme, while the French members of the joint committee, appointed to discuss the draft, said they had no authority to modify it. The Syrians, who believed, not without reason according to local information, that the Americans would have been unwilling to acquiesce in their acceptance of the French proposals, said they would not conclude an agreement which went beyond the terms of the Report by the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education on Cultural Conventions.

4. On the 25th April the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me an account of a frank conversation he had had with Count Ostrorog (acting French Delegate General in the absence of General Beynet) in which he had stated fully and clearly the position of the Syrian Government with regard to their relations with France. The purpose of this conversation, he said, was to induce the French to make the most of the existing *détente* to reach a settlement.

He had also told Count Ostrorog, in response to a suggestion thrown out by M. Bidault, that while there was no objection to the Syrian delegation at San Francisco discussing matters with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, they were not and would not be empowered to conduct negotiations there.

5. In Syria itself, the position of the Government was at this time far from strong. The large proportion of Damascenes in the Ministry was a cause of dissatisfaction in Aleppo and other districts; the mere readiness of the Government to resume negotiations with the French had earned them considerable unpopularity; and in view of their failure to secure the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, and General Beynet's continued absence in Paris, it was becoming daily more difficult for them to maintain their position against the more extreme Nationalist elements in the Chamber of Deputies and elsewhere. They had only succeeded in doing so by reiterating that the result of the forthcoming negotiations with the French would be satisfactory to Syria; and it was only to be expected that if General Beynet's proposals disappointed Syrian hopes, more extreme elements, to whose policy the President would be forced to conform, would come into power.

6. Early in April a report, which was confirmed on the 26th April, had reached His Majesty's Legation that a further potential cause of trouble was in the offing in the shape of fresh regular French troops on board two cruisers. The latter were to be used because the French had no civil transport at their disposal and had objections to moving the troops overland, *e.g.*, from Alexandria. I reported that both States were confident that we would not allow the French to reinforce their troops in the Levant States, and that if we were unable to prevent such reinforcements, disillusionment might well excite Nationalist elements in both countries to violence. Intelligent opinion in both countries was alive to the fact that His Majesty's Government alone had admitted and advocated a privileged position for France; that we, the British, had played the leading part in bringing the States to the point of resuming negotiations with the French; that we had been unable to move the French to give them satisfaction over the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* or the effective armament of the gendarmeries; and that we were not in a position to prevent activities by the local French authorities, such as those in the Alaouite territory, directed against the States' Governments. While the latter and the local populations still had confidence in us, largely because of the continued presence of the Ninth Army, the sands were running out. The States had looked to His Majesty's Government more than anyone else to induce the French to be reasonable; and if they were now confronted with demands which they had so often said they would not concede to France, *e.g.*, for military bases, they would be likely to feel that we had led them up the garden path. On the other hand, the formation of the Arab League, the successive recognitions of the States' independence by other Powers, without qualification, and their enrolment in the United Nations and acceptance at San Francisco, had led the States' Governments to believe that we were not their only friends and supporters.

7. My United States colleague having expressed to me his concern lest the States' Governments might feel that we had not played fair with them, if we failed to warn them what the French proposals were likely to be, I requested instructions on this point. I was informed, in reply, that it was precisely because His Majesty's Government did not wish to be committed to, or associated too closely with, the initial French proposals that they had not asked the French Government in any detail what these proposals were. If we were to continue to use our influence with both parties, as we inevitably must, we must keep our hands free as long as possible. It was believed that the French understood that we alone could not support them in insisting on demands which were unacceptable to the Levant States. We had always emphasised that a freely negotiated settlement was the only solution and the French knew quite well that the Levant States might get support from the United States and the Soviet Union as well as from Middle East countries. Whatever the French proposals might turn out to be, it was essential in the States' own interests that they should not reject them out of hand but that they should examine them sensibly and, if necessary, put forward counter-proposals, as both had promised to do.

8. By the beginning of May everything possible had been done, not only locally, but also in London, Paris and San Francisco, to urge the French Government to hasten General Beynet's return and to ensure that the proposals which he would bring with him would be moderate. It had also been strongly represented to the French Government, both by His Majesty's Government and the

United States Government, that the despatch of French troops and warships to the Levant at such a time would inevitably be regarded in the Levant States as provocative and as a threat to bring the States' Governments to heel in their negotiations with the French. It seemed, indeed, that if we failed to stop such developments, the States' Governments would be likely to lose all confidence in us, quite apart from the harm which might result to our own position in the whole Arab world and the danger to security in the Middle East base of operations against Japan.

9. The French Government, however, remained unmoved by our representations. In conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the 30th April, General de Gaulle had said he did not understand why the matter should concern the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces. He recognised that there might be trouble in the Middle East, though he considered it would come in Palestine rather than in the Levant States; and he was prepared to discuss with His Majesty's Government the necessary precautions with a view to the greatest possible Anglo-French co-operation. But he insisted that the maintenance of order in the Levant States was a French responsibility under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement and that he could not hand over the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States without increasing the number of regular French troops. He went on to say there would be no disorder in the States unless it were stirred up by the British, a statement to which Mr. Duff Cooper took strong exception, pointing out that we had never attempted to stir up disorder but had on the contrary done everything in our power, as we were still doing, to improve relations between France and the States. General de Gaulle remained incredulous and it was clear that, despite all our statements to the contrary, he firmly believed it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to weaken the position of France in the Levant. He remarked that if we were prepared to withdraw all our troops from Syria he would withdraw all his, even though he did not consider it would be wise to do so.

10. On the 4th May, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris gave General de Gaulle a personal message from the Prime Minister, regretting that the General appeared to view the situation in the Levant States in the light of the respective prestiges of France and Great Britain, drawing his attention again to the dangers of reinforcing French troops in the Levant at the moment, assuring him that His Majesty's Government had no designs against French interests in the Levant States and stating that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to withdraw all British troops from the States whenever a treaty had been concluded and was in operation between the French Government and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. General de Gaulle said he was willing to believe that we had no ulterior design on the Levant; and he hoped we would believe that it was no part of his policy to annex Syria or the Lebanon. He was quite prepared to leave them to govern themselves, although he doubted whether they were fit to do so, but he did desire a military base in the Levant. When he asked whether His Majesty's Government would support him in making such a demand, Mr. Duff Cooper replied that he was not in a position to give him any assurance on the subject; he thought that the whole question of defence bases on foreign territory would have to be solved by international agreement at a later date. General de Gaulle said that General Beynet would be leaving shortly for Beirut and that he would be empowered to hand over one brigade of the *Troupes Spéciales*, which was rather more than the reinforcements which the French were sending. As regards a simultaneous withdrawal of British and French troops, General de Gaulle said he had meant that he would withdraw French troops from the Levant if we would withdraw all ours from the Middle East; a policy which he did not think it would be at all wise for us to adopt.

11. On the 6th May, General de Gaulle replied to Mr. Churchill's message to the effect that France had recognised the independence of the Levant States and that French interests there were mainly cultural and economic. France also had strategic interests because she wished to have a position in the Eastern Mediterranean in these dangerous times and to maintain her communications with the Far East. As soon as these matters had been settled, France was determined not to intervene in the government of the States and would hand over to them the control of the *Troupes Spéciales*.

12. On the 2nd May, by when the news of the French intention to send troops and warships had leaked out in the Levant States, I had been informed that, notwithstanding our representations and contrary to the express request

of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, the French cruiser *Montcalm*, carrying 800 men, was being sent to Beirut on General de Gaulle's orders, and that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to intercept it at sea nor forcibly to prevent the French troops from landing. It was pointed out that the French were within their technical rights in sending troops and that it was difficult to accept any limitation on the movements and stationing of troops in the Levant States while the war continued. There was as yet no agreement in this respect between the French and the States' Governments, and the present events merely showed how necessary it was that such agreement should be reached. It would be preferable for any advance communication to be made to the Governments by the French; in any case, I was to avoid creating the impression that the French troops were arriving with the previous consent of His Majesty's Government. The French authorities, in fact, informed the States' Governments in advance at our instance; and although it was made clear to the local Governments that the arrival of these troops was in the nature of a relief, they were gravely concerned and apprehensive lest reinforcements should follow.

13. On the 8th May the Lebanese Delegation at San Francisco raised the matter with Mr. Eden, who counselled patience and caution pending General Beynet's return with the French proposals for a settlement. The Lebanese stated that M. Bidault had said that the French would withdraw their troops from the Levant as soon as the British withdrew theirs. Mr. Eden replied that His Majesty's Government had already made proposals to the French Government for the withdrawal of British troops, which would be removed at once if the Levant States so wished. The Lebanese Government received from their delegation at San Francisco about this time a telegram stating that M. Bidault had given all assurances that France was ready to transfer the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States' Governments immediately and to withdraw her troops at the same time as all other troops of foreign Powers which had recognised the independence and sovereignty of the States. This statement of French intentions was very different from that made by General de Gaulle to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

14. The *Montcalm* arrived at Beirut on the 7th May and disembarked one battalion of Senegalese troops. She sailed again two days later with the battalion which had been relieved. The realisation that French troops could arrive had a profound local effect. The majority of the population could not believe that troops could come against our wishes, and suspicions that we were doing a deal with the French at the expense of the Levant States, and would let the latter down, as they claimed we had done in 1920, were freely expressed in many quarters. The immediate reaction of the two Governments was to send in notes, in similar but not identical terms, to the French, ourselves, the Americans and the Russians, stating that in their view the end of the war made it desirable that the presence and movement of Allied troops on their soil should be regulated in accordance with international usage and requesting that in future such troops should not be brought in without the previous consent of the Government concerned.

15. Tactless French ebullitions of feeling during the V.E.-day celebrations on the 8th May appreciably raised the temperature in all towns, especially Beirut. Here, unfortunately, about 200 soldiers of the 16th Palestine Arab Battalion were induced by local Moslems to join in Arab Nationalist demonstrations, in the course of which a portrait of the ex-Mufti was paraded through the streets, and, because a stone thrown at it was thought to have come from a French convent, the convent was damaged and many French decorations in various parts of the town were pulled down. The battalion in question was immediately withdrawn from the Levant States; but the French, both here and in Paris, made the most of the incident, and even went to the length of stating publicly that these soldiers were responsible for the whole state of tension in the Levant States. In fact, the Palestinians hardly contributed to it, and their participation was almost immediately forgotten by the population, which on the other hand remembered vividly the exaggerated displays of tricolors, the parades of lorries filled with French employees shouting, "The country is yours, de Gaulle," and similar extravagances. Although actual clashes were not serious in either country, it was clear by the 12th May that the comparative *détente* between the French and the States was at an end. In a telegram sent from Beirut, after a visit to Damascus, Sir E. Grigg drew attention to the gravity of the situation in the Levant States.

16. On the 12th May General Beynet at length returned from Paris. In his first official contacts with the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers, it was made clear to

him that they would be prepared to negotiate if, and only if, further French troops did not arrive. It was, however, already being rumoured in Syria that this would in fact occur; and demonstrations with a strong anti-French flavour began in the principal Syrian towns from the 13th May onward. I and my staff continued to urge the States' Governments not to break relations, but to consider General Beynet's proposals, when he presented them, in a reasonable spirit.

17. On the 17th May the *Jeanne d'Arc* arrived with about 600 more troops on board, and on the 18th May General Beynet met the two Foreign Ministers together in Damascus. In answer to reproaches about the arrival of reinforcements, General Beynet attempted to take the line, which the French Government also adopted, that we had recently sent a British division into the Lebanon. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated categorically that no division had come in since the presentation of the Lebanese Government's note asking for previous consultation in such cases.

18. General Beynet then gave the Foreign Ministers identical notes containing an outline of the French Government's proposals. These notes, after recounting the French initiative in granting independence to the States, stated that France wished to preserve her legitimate interests, which were of three sorts, cultural, economic and strategic. It was proposed that the cultural interests should be safeguarded by a University Convention; the economic interests by agreements on the lines of usual international procedure; and the strategic interests by bases which would guarantee the lines of communication between France and her Far Eastern possessions. When agreement had been reached on these three points, the French Government were prepared to hand over the *Troupes Spéciales*, with the reserve that they should remain under French military command so long as circumstances did not allow the full exercise of a national command. The notes contained no reference to the immediate transfer of a brigade of *Troupes Spéciales*, which had been General de Gaulle's pretext for the despatch of reinforcements.

19. Little discussion on the French notes seems to have taken place at the meeting, but after it the two Governments concerted action and on the 19th May presented notes to the four Powers stating that, in their opinion, the despatch of further French troops to the Levant after the presentation of the States' notes and after the end of the war in Europe constituted an infringement of their sovereignty; and that the French notes contained proposals which were incompatible with their independence. The States were not prepared to negotiate under a threat of force, and in renewing their protests threw the responsibility for what might occur on the French Government. A joint communiqué in the same sense was issued on the 21st May.

20. From then onwards the Levant States' dispute with the French came into the international field. Ibn Saud and the Iraqi Government had already issued strong protests against the despatch of French reinforcements, and the Secretary-General of the Arab League made two strongly worded pronouncements on the subject. The Syrian and Lebanese Delegations at San Francisco gave a press conference which was widely publicised, and the French Delegation made a somewhat ineffective reply.

21. The news of the arrival of the reinforcements and of the contents of the French notes, when they became known, caused general indignation, and it was suspected that General Beynet had purposely postponed his return in order that the reinforcements should accompany his proposals. The French failure to make any concession over the *Troupes Spéciales* was particularly resented. The Syrian towns at once closed in sign of protest. The first serious riot took place on the 20th May at Aleppo, where demonstrators, after stoning French posts and being fired on, murdered a French officer, a N.C.O., and a soldier; the French then used armoured vehicles to clear the streets and several civilians were wounded. In Damascus on the following days a number of attacks were made on individual Frenchmen, and a series of large demonstrations, though well controlled by the gendarmerie, strained the resources of the latter to the utmost.

22. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, visited the Levant States at this time. He and I had received instructions to explain to the local Governments that the function of British troops in the event of disorders would be to protect local British war interests as well as lives and property. General Sir B. Paget was appealed to by the Syrian Government to issue additional arms for the gendarmerie, who were obviously tiring, but the French, to whom this proposal was referred, categorically refused it on the grounds that the arms might be used against them. All British authorities continued to urge the States' Governments in the strongest possible terms to preserve calm, and, *inter alia*, to avoid

accepting deserters from the *Troupes Spéciales* who were already coming over to the Syrian Government in increasing numbers. In response to our representations the Syrian Government sent back to the Djebel Druze a whole formation which had so deserted. General Beynet, and the French authorities generally, at first adopted an attitude of extraordinary nonchalance towards the situation and appeared to think that it would blow over. As late as the 19th May, the general, on whom I had endeavoured to impress the gravity of the situation, declined to admit that it was worse than it had been in January and February. He remarked that if disorders occurred, a few shots in the air were generally enough to send the crowds packing. I mentioned the reactions in Egypt, of which I myself had been a witness, to events in the Lebanon in November 1943; General Beynet rejected any comparison between conditions then and now and denied the soft impeachment that any *coup* like that of 1943 was under contemplation. When the commander-in-chief and I saw him on the 21st May, and spoke earnestly of the danger to the whole Middle East of disturbances in the Levant States, he appeared to be more concerned; he said the *Troupes Spéciales* were mostly reliable; and while he mentioned the possibility of "performing a surgical operation," he went on to say it would serve no useful purpose. When it was suggested to him that the arrival of French troops when he was returning with proposals to put to the States' Governments was inopportune, he took the line that the Government would have rejected his proposals anyway. He even remarked that he had not hurried back because he was sure of this—a disappointing statement, to say the least, after all our efforts to bring the two parties together! By this time the French had begun to take military preparations for the defence of their installations and colonies in Syria, many of which measures appeared to the Syrian Government to be unnecessarily provocative in form. The British military authorities and I continued to urge the French to avoid excessive measures.

23. In the Lebanon, where the Government had better control over the situation, there was a complete three days' strike of protest from the 19th May to the 21st May, but no serious disorders. The Syrian Government, at this juncture, appeared uncertain how to act; there was obviously a large body of opinion pressing them to have a show-down with the French there and then, before further reinforcements arrived, and they appeared to have begun to take soundings amongst the tribes and Druzes and with neighbouring Arab Governments, with a view to ascertaining how much support they could command for this purpose, but, whatever the results of these enquiries, events outran them. In the meantime, the general strike continued throughout Syria and Damascus looked like a city in a state of siege, with frequent incidents during the day and intermittent firing all night.

24. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government were in touch with the United States Government, who were also concerned at developments in the Levant, with a view to finding means of averting a dangerous explosion. The two Governments agreed that a further approach to General de Gaulle was necessary, but the United States Government favoured the presentation of diplomatic notes while His Majesty's Government felt that results would only be achieved by a meeting. On the 26th May His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris saw General de Gaulle, who showed great irritation at the suggestion that the Americans should take part in the discussions; he said that they were not concerned and that he would never consent to France being put in the dock by the United States and Great Britain. He would be prepared to discuss the whole Arab question, including Palestine—the source of all trouble—and Egypt, with us and the Americans, but not the Levant alone. All Mr. Duff Cooper's counter-arguments fell on stony ground. The ambassador later saw M. Bidault who spoke of resigning if he failed to make any impression on General de Gaulle. He remarked that General Beynet had not carried out the instructions which he, M. Bidault, had given him; he had no doubt received different instructions later from General de Gaulle.

25. Forceful representations were also made to the French Embassy in London regarding provocative measures on the part of the French in the Levant States, such as guns laid on the towns, aircraft flying low over mosques during the hour of prayer, and a reported threat by General Monclar to shell Aleppo if his column evacuating the citadel were fired on. The French were urged in particular to send no further reinforcements to the Levant States. (If that had happened I have no doubt that the Lebanon, as well as Syria, would have exploded.)

26. At this time I was closely questioned by the States' Government as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of the French attempting to coerce them. I replied by citing Mr. Churchill's statement that it was not for Great Britain alone to defend by force either the independence of the States or the French privilege.

27. On the 27th May such serious disturbances broke out in Homs and Hama that the Syrian Government told the United States Minister and Mr. Young, whom I had sent to Damascus, that they could no longer be responsible for internal security since events had overtaken them. About this time the Syrian Government showed Mr. Young the text of what they alleged was a draft proclamation by General Oliva Roget, the French Delegate in Damascus, referring to the imminence of "la grande bagarre" and indicating his intention to proceed with aggressive measures for cowering the Syrians. The French Deputy Delegate at Damascus subsequently admitted privately that this proclamation was authentic, but said he had burnt it. The Syrians posted up on the walls of Damascus on the 28th May, with abusive comment, what they alleged was the text of another and even more threatening proclamation by General Oliva Roget.

28. On the 28th May I went to Damascus to relieve Mr. Young. The car in which my wife and Captain Stokes, my personal assistant, came over later in the day was hooted by Senegalese troops in one of the barracks on the main avenue leading into the city—no doubt because, like other British military vehicles, it carried the Union Jack painted on the body. On my arrival in Damascus I called on my United States colleague (who was about to return to Beirut) to discuss the situation and also on the Syrian Acting Prime Minister. Jamil Bey Mardam took me at once to see the President, who was ill in bed, in consequence of an internal hæmorrhage for which he had again been treated, as he had been a year before, by a British doctor. The President and Prime Minister were calmer than I had expected; Shukri Kuwatli said he had done all he could to carry out the advice given to him by Mr. Churchill in Cairo (paragraphs 14 to 17 of Foreign Office print of 17th May), but the Syrians could not negotiate with the French under the threat of force. He had been astonished at the French demand for military bases which Syria could never give. He realised that the Syrians must try to show "British patience" but their tolerance was being strained to the utmost.

29. The 29th May was a day of unnatural quiet in Damascus until shortly after 7 p.m., when heavy firing broke out in the centre of the city, followed soon after by French shelling. The legation house in Damascus is some distance from the centre of the city, but commands a wide view of it. There are a number of gardens in the neighbourhood, in which deserting *Troupes Spéciales* were apt to take cover. The French often fired on them and they not infrequently retaliated. There was a Syrian sniper in one of the gardens, and there was also a French machine-gun post in a house not far from the legation. It was not long before two bullets (presumably directed at the sniper) came through the windows of our dining-room into the hall, which was full of people. The glass door between the dining-room and the hall was shattered, and my wife had a fortunate escape when a splinter struck her near the eye. One of the bullets, by that time fortunately spent, hit a British officer in the arm. The Union Jack on the roof of His Majesty's Legation was subsequently found to be full of bullet holes.

30. When the shelling of the city began I telephoned instructions to Mr. Young in Beirut to see General Beynet forthwith, and also to telegraph to Mr. Eden, urging that the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces, should be given full powers to deal with the situation. Mr. Young found General Beynet in calm and cheerful mood; he maintained that the situation was not serious, but that the Damascus abscess must be lanced, and he added, somewhat contradictorily, that the atmosphere of battle suited him and that now the barrel had been breached the wine must be drunk. Mr. Young suggested that it might prove somewhat bitter. General Beynet said he had no precise information about the situation, but he telephoned, in Mr. Young's presence, to General Oliva Roget, who reported that French posts in several places had been simultaneously attacked at 7.15 p.m. Machine guns, he said, had fired on the French delegation's premises from the Parliament House, causing casualties, and French artillery had fired on the citadel. General Beynet ordered General Oliva Roget, in Mr. Young's hearing, to cease artillery fire during the night and to do as little damage as possible.

31. I shall not attempt to describe in full the events of the next few days, even in Damascus itself. A detailed account of them is contained in the valuable report by Mr. Acting Consul Evans enclosed in my despatch No. 105 of the

20th June. A further report on the subject, by the station manager of the B.O.A.C. in Damascus, was forwarded in my despatch No. 123 of the 2nd July. Events in Hama, where casualties from French bombing were heavy, were described in the interesting report by Major Dearden enclosed in my despatch No. 119 of the 28th June; and those in other parts of Syria (notably the heavy bombing of Deir-az-Zor and, in contrast, the rapid and almost bloodless liquidation of the French garrisons in the whole of southern Syria by the local inhabitants), have been covered in a number of telegrams, weekly summaries, &c. In this despatch I will confine myself in the main to reporting what I and those who were with me in His Majesty's Legation at Damascus, including Colonel Furlonge, saw, heard and did, with such conclusions as I think may be fairly drawn.

32. The Syrian Chamber of Deputies had been summoned to meet on the evening of the 29th May. In fact, there was no quorum because many of the Deputies were absent from Damascus. Just before the firing began the Acting Prime Minister had convened a number of Deputies and notables to the Serail (in the centre of the city) in order to read to them the following message from Mr. Churchill (which I had communicated to him on instructions) and to urge them to abstain from provocative action of any kind:—

"I have received your Excellency's telegram of the 23rd May regarding the situation in Syria and asking for my intervention.

"I have heard with much regret of the breakdown of negotiations between the Syrian Government and the French Government. For reasons which I explained personally to his Excellency the President of Syria at our meeting in Cairo, we are anxious to see a settlement of the outstanding questions between the Syrian, Lebanese and French Governments which will be satisfactory to all parties and which will take full account of your independence.

"You may rest assured that we shall give careful attention to this new development. We are already in consultation with the United States Government and in constant contact with the French Government. For the moment I cannot say more than this, but I must definitely ask that both sides will work to relieve the present tension until wider issues can be considered. I cannot see that anything has happened which could possibly justify hostilities or bloodshed such as you refer to and, indeed, it is the duty of Syria, as one of the United Nations, to refrain from precipitating any situation which would almost certainly impede the war with Japan.

"I have been very sorry to learn of the illness of Shukri Kuwatli Bey. Please convey to his Excellency my personal good wishes and hopes for an early recovery."

Soon after the firing started Jamil Bey Mardam telephoned to me as follows:—

"Just at the moment when I received Mr. Churchill's message I summoned Deputies and notables of Damascus to tell them to do nothing to upset calm and order in the country. Now we have French aggression from every side. I have given strict orders to the gendarmerie on no account to fire on the French."

On a subsequent visit to Damascus the Saudi Arabian Minister, who was present in the Serail on this occasion, told me that he had heard Jamil Bey Mardam give this order.

33. It may be recorded here that no evidence has reached me from British or American eye-witnesses of the outbreak in Damascus—and there were many circulating at the time in various parts of the city—to support the French contention that a concerted attack was made by the Syrians on their installations. The French buildings, including those adjacent to the Parliament House, which the French alleged was one of the focal points of Syrian aggression, have been carefully examined, both inside and out, amongst others, by Mr. Donald Mallett of His Majesty's Embassy in Paris, who inspected them in the company of General Gross (who had succeeded General Oliva Roget) at General Beynet's suggestion. They show scarcely a trace of bullet marks; while the Parliament House itself was heavily mortared and machine-gunned at point-blank range on the evening of the 29th May by French troops who occupied it during the night, slew most of the Syrian gendarmes protecting it and then proceeded to loot and break up the offices and the Chamber itself in an orgy of wanton destruction. Photographs of this, taken by the American Office of War Information, have been sent to your department.

34. As explained in my telegram No. 544 of the 15th June, there was no foundation for General Beynet's contention that a concerted attack was made on French installations in other parts of Syria at the same time as the alleged attack in Damascus. It is worth noting, too, that neither General Beynet nor General Humblot, the French territorial commander in the Levant, visited Damascus during what has been called the three days' reign of terror from the 29th May to the 31st May. It would seem that General Oliva Roget, who has spent a large part of his career in Syria and was thoroughly imbued with the mandatory mentality, was given a free hand and that the troops under his command did much as they pleased. It is noteworthy that, despite General Beynet's order to him not to shell Damascus during the night of the 29th May, the centre of the city was again bombarded, as I myself saw and reported, at midnight.

35. On the morning of the 30th May French aircraft flew over the city and during this and the next day bombs were dropped on the citadel, which contained the headquarters of the gendarmerie and also a civil prison. A considerable number of the prisoners serving sentence there, including a British Indian subject, were killed or wounded.

36. The Syrian President, having sent for me early on the 30th May, I repaired to his house, where he was still in bed, in one of the armoured cars which the British military authorities had kindly placed at my disposal to guard His Majesty's Legation and enable me and my staff to move about the city. A large crowd gathered outside the house, cheered the arrival of the car. The President said he was unable to get into touch with the Syrian Government, who were all together in a house somewhere in the city. What was he to do if they resigned? What was he to tell his people, who were asking why the British army sat by as spectators in face of this monstrous attempt by the French to force themselves again on Syria? How could we expect Syria to conclude treaties or give military bases to people who behaved like this? Where was the Commander-in-Chief, M.E.F., who was responsible for security in the Middle East? Had France a mandate to act as she was doing in a country recognised as sovereign and independent by so many Powers? Was General de Gaulle to be allowed to wreak his will uncurbed? And so forth. I could but tell his Excellency that I had reported urgently to His Majesty's Government on the situation and that I was glad to be in Damascus, as I could give them first-hand accounts. The President having asked whether I could arrange for the United States Chargé d'Affaires to visit him, I sent an armoured car to bring Mr. Satterthwaite to his Excellency's house and later to His Majesty's Legation to discuss matters.

37. The Syrian Government succeeded soon afterwards in making their way to the President's house and I or Colonel Furlonge saw one or more of them there on each of the ensuing days, which disproves the statements made later by Generals Beynet and Oliva Roget that they had left Damascus. A statement by M. Bidault, heard over the wireless on the morning of the 30th May, to the effect that reports that France was trying to intimidate the Levant States were malicious propaganda, was the subject of a good deal of acid comment in Damascus.

38. Among the buildings on which heavy French fire was directed was the Orient Palace Hotel, the leading one in the city. I have never fathomed why this was done. It is true that Saadallah Jabri, the President of the Chamber of Deputies and a strong Nationalist, was living in the hotel; but, according to our information, there were only eight gendarmes there and I have been told, on good evidence, that Saadallah himself told them not to fire and arranged for them to leave the hotel in civilian clothes. Also resident in the hotel at the time were a number of diplomatic and other officials (one of whose bedrooms at least was riddled with bullets), and the Patriarch of Russia, and his suite. My Soviet colleague gave me a graphic description of the difficulties and dangers he encountered in removing his compatriots to Beirut, owing to the wild fire in which the French were indulging. He telephoned to General Oliva Roget to ask him to cease fire while he was evacuating the Russians; the general offered him a French escort, which he declined. M. Solod felt he could not refuse the request of Saadallah Jabri, who was due to go to Cairo for a meeting of the Arab League, to take him as far as Beirut. One of the many bursts of French fire on the Orient Palace Hotel resulted in the death of a British officer, Major Scott Nicholson, who was on his way to take cover in the basement. The hotel was eventually occupied by French troops and many of the guests who had found life there too uncomfortable to remain, failed to find their belongings on their return.

39. On the 30th May Count de la Garde, the French deputy-delegate, telephoned to complain that a British soldier was firing from the roof of His Majesty's Consulate. Investigation showed that the culprit had been a French Senegalese soldier, moving from roof to roof, and Count de la Garde apologised. Another British subject, Mrs. Gray of the Church Army, was killed in the Church Army house near His Majesty's Consulate.

40. In the afternoon of the 30th May an armistice was arranged between the British and French military authorities for the evacuation from Damascus of British and American civilians. During the armistice the British Area Commander saw a French armoured car firing with machine guns. In reply to his enquiry the French officer in charge said he knew of the armistice but he had seen some Syrians and thought he would have a shot at them. This was by no means the only breach of the armistice reported; and it was clear from the manner in which French troops had been driving about the streets firing indiscriminately at vehicles (including British), houses and people, that they were quite out of hand. I saw the Syrian President again at his request during the afternoon; the Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Education were with him; and it was obvious that they were becoming unnerved. On this occasion there were the first signs of something like animosity on the part of the Ministers (for which the President sent me an apology on the following morning by Colonel Furlonge whom I had sent to see him). The President implored me to urge again on His Majesty's Government the need of British intervention and next day he sent me a personal appeal to Mr. Churchill.

41. After the armistice the centre of the city was subjected to the heaviest shell fire yet experienced; and the noise of firing by all arms continued during the night. At one time the rattle of machine-guns was so intense that a British officer who was spending the night in His Majesty's Legation and who had been at Anzio, said it exceeded anything he had heard there. We thought at least that the Syrian tribesmen must have come to town and that a concerted attack was being made on the French barracks whence this intense fire appeared to be coming. But no such reason—nor indeed any other apart from nerves or deliberate terrorisation—was ever discovered for this episode. Two large fires were burning during the night in the centre of the city—one of these, we learned later, was a British Red Cross train in the railway station; the other a block of buildings of which an ancient, if minor, mosque formed part.

42. At dawn on the 31st May Colonel Furlonge toured the city and found the few people about in a state of abject terror. The British armoured car in which he travelled was still cheered at times, but as the day went on the mood of the population, who could not understand why the British army did not intervene, became uglier. The United States Chargé d'Affaires reported that an American school had been hit by French shelling and that starvation was setting in in the heavily-shelled quarters of the city. (This might, indeed, have been the case everywhere had not a British officer, Major Dai Jones of the O.C.P., visited all the bakeries he could reach during the night and succeeded in inducing them to bake so that the population could at least have bread. For this action he has since been officially thanked by the Syrian Government.) The head of one quarter had told him that the French had not allowed the Syrians to extinguish one of the fires caused during the night; and the Syrian Director of Public Health reported that Red Crescent ambulances had frequently been fired on by the French (a Syrian Government driver was killed in one of them, a photograph of which, riddled with bullets, has since been published), and that the latter had also posted machine-guns round his hospital near the British Consulate. Large numbers of wounded were lying in streets where the ambulances could not operate. The British Victoria Hospital, which did excellent work throughout this period under Dr. Thomas, was filled to overflowing with wounded and was beginning to run short of linen and other necessities. The British military medical authorities lent invaluable assistance in furnishing supplies and collecting wounded. During the afternoon my wife visited Syrian and British hospitals in an armoured car. We received a welcome visit from Major-General Pilleau, commanding 9th Army, who, with his staff, were in close touch with me throughout the proceedings and to whom I wish here to record my gratitude for all their help.

43. The French had ceased shelling Damascus after the morning of the 31st May, but firing of other kinds continued in the city during the day. In the afternoon a second armistice was arranged for the evacuation of some remaining British and American civilians and for collection of wounded.

44. I myself made a tour of the city during the armistice and saw Senegalese and *Troupes Spéciales* looting shops. The Syrian Government had by that time

sent most of their remaining gendarmes out of Damascus because they were being fired on at sight by the French. The Government assured me that they had taken this step because they were anxious faithfully to observe their promises to me to avoid provocation from their side.

45. At 6 p.m. we heard on the wireless the news of His Majesty's Government's decision to intervene. About the same hour I received a telegram from Mr. Eden reporting the meeting of the Cabinet on the evening of the 30th May (when it was decided to send a message from the Prime Minister to President Truman), the conversations which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had had with the French Ambassador in London after the Cabinet meeting (when M. Massigli was given clearly to understand that the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Force, would be receiving instructions to intervene in the immediate future), and the Cabinet's decision on the 31st May to despatch a message from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle and to send instructions to General Paget to intervene, without waiting for President Truman's reply. The President, in fact, telegraphed his approval and support of the proposed order to General Paget on the morning of the 31st May.

46. The message to General de Gaulle was as follows:—

"In view of grave situation which has arisen between your troops and Levant States and severe fighting which has broken out we have, with profound regret, ordered the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in interests of security of whole Middle East, which involves communication for war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French forces we request you immediately to order the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks. Once firing has ceased, and order has been restored, we shall be prepared to begin tripartite discussions in London."

It was received by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris at 14.50 hours on the 31st May; and as General de Gaulle was not immediately available, it was delivered without delay to M. Palewski for communication to the General. A copy was also given to M. Chauvel, who had already heard from M. Massigli of the statement made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons. The news of British intervention spread like wildfire in Damascus, and Colonel Furlonge, whom I sent to the President to inform him of His Majesty's Government's decision, was loudly applauded by the few people who had ventured into the streets. A sense of relief was at once apparent amongst the British officers and men with whom I was in contact, who had been appalled by what they had witnessed in Damascus in the last two days and nights. The President and Acting Prime Minister lost no time in telegraphing their gratitude to His Majesty's Government.

47. When, on the evening of the 31st May, the General Officer Commanding 9th Army communicated to the French territorial commander the decision of His Majesty's Government to intervene, General Humblot stated that he had received orders from Paris not to oppose the decisions of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces. According to the printed version of General de Gaulle's "public declarations" in Paris on the 2nd June, circulated by the French authorities here, the General stated that the order to cease fire was given on the 30th May at 11 p.m. and was put into effect on the 31st May. He repeated this statement in reply to a subsequent question by a newspaper correspondent, who remarked that, according to a communiqué issued on the 1st June, the order to cease fire had been given not on the 30th but on the 31st May. The correspondent observed that it was regrettable that the order had not been made known earlier. Whenever the order was issued, it is certain that the French military authorities here had made no mention of it to the British authorities before Major-General Pilleau made the above communication to General Humblot; and it is no less certain that while, as stated above, the shelling of Damascus ceased after the morning of the 31st May, the firing which continued throughout that day in the city was severe enough to necessitate a second armistice during the afternoon. When General Oliva Roget, in Damascus, was informed by the British Area Commander on the evening of the 31st May of the instructions given to General Sir Bernard Paget, he at first took the line that he would never obey the orders of a British officer and he launched into a violent tirade against the Syrians and ourselves. After reference to General Beynet (not to General Humblot, with whom his relations had for long been said to be strained), he accepted the position.

48. One of the first orders issued to General Oliva Roget by the British military authorities was one to stop looting by French troops. Such looting, nevertheless, continued during the morning of the 1st June, and only ceased after British armour had been able to reach Damascus during the afternoon in sufficient

strength to restore order effectively. Amongst the objects removed by the French from Syrian Government offices were the seals from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a safe from the Chamber of Deputies, which was eventually traced to General Oliva Roget's house. The French said it had been removed thither for safe custody. Unsuccessful attempts had been made to open it. General Oliva Roget subsequently declared that order had been restored on the 31st May. In this connexion I would cite the following paragraph from Mr. Acting Consul Evans's report:—

"There is no doubt that the savage attack which the French launched had the effect of completely demoralising the city. The bombardment of the Citadel effectively put the gendarmerie out of action, and it is reported that word was passed to the quarter leaders that, in the event of a hostile rising, the quarter concerned would be obliterated. These measures were certainly successful in the sense that there was no mass rising of the population and the quarter of Souq Sarouja capitulated. This was presumably what General Beynet meant when he said that he had the situation in hand, although at no time could the French have made their appearance in any part of the town except with armed strength. There are, however, indications that General Oliva Roget's statement in Paris that there were negotiations for the surrender of the city on the 31st May was not completely without foundation."

49. In the circumstances it was hardly surprising that Syrians retorted by looting French establishments as soon as they felt able to do so. For the next few days our efforts were constantly directed to preventing a population, whose main idea was that of revenge, from retaliating against the French, not only in Damascus but in all Syrian towns which had been the scene of conflict. The Syrian Government co-operated well with us so far as their means allowed. Thus, on the morning of the 1st June, before the arrival of our armour, when a large demonstration began to form in the Souqs and threatened trouble, the Acting Prime Minister, in response to a request from Colonel Furlonge, at once sent the Minister of the Interior to the spot, with the result that the demonstrators were dispersed to their homes. But a French officer and two Senegalese, who ventured into the streets on the 2nd June, were murdered by the crowd with a promptitude which demonstrated the temper of the population.

50. And so we were faced with the situation which we had striven ever since January to avoid. It was clearly one which called not only for firm but tactful handling; not only French property but the life of every French citizen in Syria was in danger; and means had to be found to ensure their safety while making every endeavour to avoid humiliating our Allies. The "mixture of falsehoods half truths, suppressions of inconvenient facts and insincerities against Britain"—to quote His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris—in which General de Gaulle and other French authorities immediately indulged, were not helpful to those on the spot. But the principal danger which confronted us—that of a clash between British and French troops—was successfully avoided, not only thanks to the admirable behaviour of the British troops but also to the manner in which General Beynet interpreted the instructions he had received from Paris to put no difficulties in the way of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces.

51. On the 1st June I went to Beirut to meet General Sir Bernard Paget. The Commander-in-chief was escorted by a squadron of Spitfires and H.M. destroyers *Musketeer* and *Exmoor* arrived at Beirut on the same day. Vice-Admiral Tennant arrived in H.M.S. *Arethusa* on the following morning. General Paget and I called on the Lebanese President and Government in the Serail, outside which a large and enthusiastic crowd had gathered, and also on General Beynet, who was informed of the measures which the Commander-in-chief considered necessary to give effect to his instructions to restore order. General Beynet himself reported to Paris that the interview had been friendly, but the French Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed indignation at the terms of what he called General Paget's "proclamation." In fact, no proclamation was issued by the commander-in-chief; and M. Bidault's complaints were based on misunderstanding of the nature and of the terms of a written communication handed to General Beynet, to which no publicity was given either then or later.

52. General Paget and I then proceeded to Damascus where we saw the Syrian President—still in bed—and the Acting Prime Minister. The President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies and the Lebanese Prime Minister were also present. The Syrians expressed their profound gratitude and assured General Paget that they would give him all assistance in his task. He had only to tell them what he wished them to do. They at once agreed to impose a curfew during

the hours of darkness for as long as necessary. (M. Bidault complained to Mr. Duff Cooper that a curfew was being imposed on the French alone, whereas it in fact applied to all the inhabitants of Damascus.) General Paget was received everywhere in Damascus by cheering crowds; but on the following day I reported that there was no such enthusiasm; the Syrians were licking their wounds and Damascus was in a dangerous mood (as exemplified by the murders of Frenchmen referred to in paragraph 48 above); the life of any Frenchman was not likely to be worth a moment's purchase for some time to come, and any prospect of France's obtaining any sort of special position in Syria had irrevocably vanished.

53. Subsequent developments must be reported in a further despatch. I will only say here that our first efforts had to be directed to explaining to the Syrians that we had not intervened, as they hoped, in order to throw the French out of the Levant States. The first essential was to prevent, in so far as possible, the loss of further French lives in Syria, where, unfortunately, all too many Frenchmen seemed oblivious of their peril. General Beynet had assured the commander-in-chief and me that the Méharistes squadrons of the *Troupes Spéciales* were reliable. But the words were scarcely out of his mouth before one of these squadrons mutinied and murdered most of their French officers and non-commissioned officers. For that we were in no way to blame. The rapid deployment of British troops was effective in preventing similar catastrophes in the remaining squadrons; but there were unfortunately occasions on which French officers, who disregarded the instructions issued for their safety, were killed. The second essential was to prevent trouble in the Lebanon. In this we have so far been successful. But so long as French troops remain in either country and so long as the local French authorities continue to play upon the Christian elements in both countries and to maintain the remnants and the trappings of the mandatory régime—as they are doing—there will be a constant danger to security and to the eventual stability of these two small but complex countries.

54. Under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement concluded on the 23rd July, 1941—a few days after the final occupation of the Levant States by the British and Free French forces, to which the Free French were in a position to contribute but the small fraction of one brigade—the French territorial commander assumed responsibility for internal security in the States. The agreement, which recognised the over-all responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, M.E.F., for security in the Middle East, was designed to consolidate Allied military control over an area which was part of the zone of operations against our enemies. The States' Governments, who had no say in the agreement, have not only never accepted it, but have increasingly resented the powers which it accorded to the French and which, they maintain, the French used to restore and preserve their former position in the Levant despite their recognition of the States' independence in 1941. The French had linked with that recognition the conclusion of a treaty with the States; but in 1941 and for a long time afterwards circumstances prevented the negotiation of such a treaty—the war continued and there was no French authority with whom a treaty could well be signed. In 1937 and thereafter, the French had themselves declined to ratify a treaty which the States had accepted in 1936; the golden opportunity was thus lost; by 1941, French prestige and power were at a very low ebb; the whole French position in the Levant had been grievously shaken by the submission of the Vichy authorities to the Axis Powers; and nationalist sentiment in the States had greatly increased. In the circumstances, the French could scarcely hope to secure a treaty or indeed any privileges in the States unless they made progressive concessions to national aspirations; but they resisted constant pressure by His Majesty's Government to do so. Persistence in this attitude was bound to lead, sooner or later, to a clash; and it duly came in the Lebanon in November 1943, when the French authorities arrested the President and Government, with the result that we were compelled to intervene with the threat to proclaim British martial law in order to maintain security. The French then made considerable concessions to the States, but after some six months of conciliation, troubled mainly by the question of the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, their attitude proceeded to harden.

55. The French action in Syria in 1945 was to all intents and purposes a repetition of their action in the Lebanon in November 1943, tougher methods being employed on the harder Syrian nut; and as its repercussions in the rest of the Arab world were a more serious and a more immediate menace to security in the Allied base in the Middle East than those with which we had been faced in 1943, we were again compelled to intervene, this time more directly. The French apparently saw no possibility of reaching a settlement with the present Governments in Syria which would give them satisfaction; and they realised that any

other Government acceptable to the Chamber of Deputies would only be more extreme. General Beynet's argument that the despatch of cruisers and troops at the same time as his return from Paris with the French Government's proposals was merely a pretext for the States to break off negotiations, ignores the fact that the proposals themselves were unacceptable, not only because of the demand for military bases but because no concession was made in respect of the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* which everyone knew to be of primary concern to the States. General Beynet has told me more than once that he has ample evidence to prove that the Syrians were about to rise against the French, but he has never given me chapter and verse. While it is true that in the days preceding French action, attacks were made, with loss of life, on individual Frenchmen and Senegalese (whose presence here has been particularly resented since the events in the Lebanon in November 1943), there is no evidence from our sources that any such concerted attack was being planned; and however fervently the Syrians wished to see the last of the French, they were clearly unprepared to meet the French assault, when it came. I doubt whether any impartial observers on the spot would admit that the savagery of that assault was justified. From the Syrian point of view—and perhaps also from our own—it is fortunate that the French military commanders did not dispose of more cannon and more aeroplanes than they did. Even if the Syrian capital had surrendered to General Oliva Roget, and the puppet Government which is said to have been in readiness had been placed in office on the 31st May, all the evidence goes to show that the resistance of the country as a whole would not have been broken. The French might well have realized that by taking thought to their own recent history; and General Beynet surely showed greater wisdom in his statement to me that a "surgical operation" would be futile because it would have no lasting effect, than in his actual attempt "to lance the Damascus abscess."

56. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad, the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine, the British Middle East Office in Cairo, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the External Affairs Department of the Government of India.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 7607/5/89]

No. 18.

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 170, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th July, 1945.—(Received 10th October.)

General.

Count Ostrorog returned from Paris on the 27th June and called on His Majesty's Minister on the same evening. In reply to an enquiry, His Majesty's Minister gave him a frank description of the situation in the Levant States, as he saw it. On the 28th June Count Ostrorog informed the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, "unofficially," that the French Government, in order to improve the atmosphere with the Levant States, might be prepared (1) to transfer the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States immediately, (2) to give a guarantee to withdraw French troops at the same time that British troops were withdrawn, (3) to discuss the transference of all remaining Intérêts Communs services. Asked about the normalisation of the Delegation, he said he would consider it. There was, according to Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, no mention of a treaty. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, after consulting the Syrian Government and His Majesty's Minister, informed Count Ostrorog that both States' Governments gladly accepted the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, but that the other points should be left for subsequent discussions.

After further discussions between the Lebanese, Syrian, British and French authorities—the Syrians, who refused to have any direct contact with the French, being kept in the picture by the Lebanese and ourselves—the Délégation Générale was authorised by the French Government to issue the following declaration on the 8th July:—

"The Provisional Government of the French Republic, wishing to answer the demand made by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, concerning the transfer of the military units recruited locally:

"And desirous of manifesting to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments its good will by giving them full satisfaction concerning these units:

"And considering that in view of the end of hostilities in Europe there is no longer any objection to the legitimate desire of Syria and Lebanon to form their own national armies:

"And glad to see Syria and Lebanon invested with all the prerogatives of sovereignty and able to play the rôle which is due to them in the family of the United Nations:

"Declares that these troops are hereby transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments according to formalities which will be defined within a maximum of forty-five days."

On the evening of the 9th July the Lebanese and Syrian Governments issued a joint declaration in reply. The declaration as at first drafted would have been offensive to the French, but, after strong representations by His Majesty's Minister, the draft was amended and, in its final form, consisted of a formal acknowledgment and an expression of satisfaction by both Governments at "taking over their troops." The Lebanese Government issued a further communiqué in which the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated he hoped that the transfer of the services due to be restored to the Lebanon would not be delayed nor occasion any difficulty; the withdrawal of the troops of foreign powers should form the subject of a simultaneous arrangement between the interested parties. The Syrian Government were unwilling to associate themselves with this expression of opinion on the ground that they did not wish to suggest in any way that they desired the withdrawal of British forces.

A conference is to be held at Chitaura on the 12th July, at which Syrians, Lebanese and French will be represented, to consider the ways and means of handing over the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States' Governments.

While general satisfaction has been expressed in the Syrian Press and in some sections of the Lebanese Press, less public interest has been shown than might have been expected. This is due to the feeling that the French action is only a very tardy admission of rights which should have been accorded long ago, and that in any case the French hand was forced by the steadily increasing desertions from the *Troupes Spéciales*. The French gesture has therefore failed to impress. In the Lebanon, which is less directly affected, public attention has been focussed largely on internal political intrigues.

The press has reported conversations between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese Minister in Paris in which the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Levant States and the conclusion of a Franco-Lebanese Consular convention are stated to have been discussed. Many rumours have been circulating in the States to the effect that further Franco-Lebanese talks are in progress regarding consular and economic conventions and the transfer of various other services still held by the French, particularly the Beirut Broadcasting Station; but there does not appear to have been more than a preliminary exchange of views on these subjects and the Lebanese Government have now officially denied that any such negotiations are in progress.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 16th June-7th July, 1945, amount to 23,697 tons, a daily average of 1,077 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945-46 crop up to 25,376 tons.

On the 3rd July the M.I.R.A. agreement referred to in Weekly Political Summary No. 169, Economic, was signed by the G.O.C., Ninth Army, on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, the Acting Prime Minister of Syria and the Prime Minister of the Lebanon.

The Syrian Government have confirmed the signature of the Interim Air Agreement and have also telegraphed to their delegate at the San Francisco Conference authorising the signature of a transport agreement with the Americans, with the Fifth Freedom specifically excluded; there is reason to believe, however, that the Americans are bringing some pressure to bear on the Syrians to concede this Freedom.

Syria—Damascus.

The general situation in Damascus for the last fortnight has been normal, though there has been a marked increase in internal political activity. It is possible that when the Syrian delegation return from San Francisco on or about the 20th July, there will be a Cabinet reshuffle. On a number of occasions His

Majesty's Legation have made representations to the Syrian Government to ensure that instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, are being carried out in outlying parts of the country. On the whole the Syrian Government have been successful in controlling their local authorities, though the position in Aleppo is still unsatisfactory.

Colonel Abdullah Atfeh has now submitted a report on the proposals for the reorganisation of the Syrian security services which were prepared by the British military authorities. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott and a training team of British officers and n.c.o.s have been lent by Ninth Army to the Syrian Government to assist in training the Syrian security services in the use of the new mechanical equipment and arms provided by the British Army.

By the end of June nearly 6,000 of the *Troupes Spéciales*—approximately one-quarter of the total force—had deserted, and some uneasiness is felt in connexion with their enlistment in the Syrian gendarmerie force for the following reasons:—

- (1) In view of their long service with the French their loyalty to the Syrian Government could not be fully guaranteed.
- (2) As the *Troupes Spéciales* officers are retaining their present rank the promotion chances of regular gendarmerie officers are lessened.
- (3) The *Troupes Spéciales* officers continue to receive their old rates of pay, which are considerably higher than those obtaining in the gendarmerie.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs are engaged on the preparation of a black book to be published in Egypt, on the subject of the recent crisis and the events leading up to it.

The Syrian Government have requested the Egyptian Government to undertake their consular representation in Turkey and the issue of visas in Turkey and Switzerland. The Saudi Arabian Government have been asked to issue visas on behalf of the Syrian Government in Saudi Arabia pending the arrival of the Syrian Chargé d'Affaires. It has been taken for granted that His Majesty's Government would undertake this work in other countries where Syrian visas were formerly issued by the French, though no official approach in this sense has yet been made to His Majesty's Legation.

A decision of the Council of Ministers, taken on the 19th June, authorised Syrian judges to deal, pending the settlement of the mixed courts question, with urgent cases and cases affecting persons under arrest. The Acting Prime Minister explained that this decision had been taken particularly for practical reasons and that no question of principle was involved. On the 30th June the Council of Ministers decided that the gendarmerie military courts should have jurisdiction in all cases which, under the existing laws, should come before military courts. It is understood that this action was taken because the French are in the process of trying a number of Syrians in French military courts at Mezzé and that the Syrian Government wish to have an alternative legal authority.

The British Council representative discussed with the Minister of Education on the 2nd July, the question of providing British educational facilities in Syria to fill the gap left by the French schools, which in future will have little or no attendance. Two alternatives were considered, namely, that the British Council should open a school, or—should this not be possible—that the necessary funds should be collected by local subscription.

Aleppo.

The press in Aleppo has continued to be openly hostile to the French and a suspension of the Aleppo newspaper *El Hawadess* was not put into effect by the Mohafez until some ten days after its publication in the Syrian official journal. There has been a series of incidents involving shooting with some casualties, and there is little sign of the situation improving as long as the French remain. A hand-grenade was thrown into the garden of Edmond Homs, a Christian Deputy and former Minister of Education. He and his son were slightly injured. This incident has greatly perturbed the Christians who see in it, and in the failure of the gendarmerie to find the assailant, or to arrest others who in recent weeks have extorted money by threats and terrorised the population, an indication that the Central Government are unable or unwilling to prevent Moslem attacks against Christians. It is possible that the grenade was intended for the délégué, whose garden is at the corner of the next street.

On the 1st July an order issued by the Anglo-French Joint Staff in the name of the commander-in-chief, was communicated to the délégué, restricting the

movements of the civilian and military members of the staff of the *délégation*, whose lives were considered to be in danger. The *délégué* protested strongly against this order and took the opportunity of returning to His Majesty's Government the insignia of the M.B.E. (Military Division) awarded to him and Madame Fauquenot in 1919.

The broadcast report that Turkey might recover Aleppo and its hinterland as compensation for territory ceded to Russia, caused anxiety amongst the Syrians and considerable delight amongst the French. In this connexion the Turkish Consul-General again expressed his opinion regarding the advantages that would accrue to Aleppo if it were reincorporated into Turkey. Facts and figures, however, do not support the view that commercial activities in Aleppo have declined since 1919; the city has increased in population and is certainly commercially no poorer than it was 25 years ago.

The French had been recruiting Armenians into the *Troupes Spéciales*, offering attractive pay and French nationality, with the option of serving either in the Levant States alone or in the French colonies. The British military authorities took the matter up with the French authorities and His Majesty's Minister made representations to Count Ostrorog, with the result that the recruitment has now been stopped. The Orthodox Armenian Archbishop, at a meeting in Aleppo, impressed on those present the danger to the community of joining the French forces at this time.

Homs and Hama.

On the 1st July firing broke out in Tel Kalakh as a result of the desertion of some *Troupes Spéciales*; the town was subjected to small arms and mortar fire. Within a few hours a small British force had arrived and firing ceased, with gendarmerie in control of the town and the French forces confined to barracks. On the 2nd July other sections of the Dundashi tribe from neighbouring villages in the Lebanon and a number of armed men from friendly tribes in the Homs area arrived in the neighbourhood and set up road pickets to prevent the arrival of French reinforcements. The tribesmen at first refused to disperse until the French had been withdrawn from Tel Kalakh, as they feared a resumption of hostilities; they also refused to lay down their arms at the request of the British officer in command, since this, they said, would lay them open to attack from the neighbouring tribes. Strong representations to the Syrian Government, however, resulted in the tribesmen dispersing to their homes the next day.

Jebel Druze.

The situation in Jebel Druze and the Hauran is becoming rather more stable, although the Syrian Government does not yet command any real authority in the neighbourhood; such support as it receives is largely due to the belief that it has, and will continue to have, British backing.

There is evidence that the French are still sending agents into the Jebel. One has been arrested and openly admitted that he had been sent from Mezzé; he succeeded in inducing some 25 persons from the area north-east of Chahba to go to Mezzé to petition the French to return to the Jebel.

There are indications that the isolationist sentiments of the Jebel are reviving; the Emir Hassan Atrash has admitted to the Political Officer that he has no sincere feelings of loyalty to the Government, and that he intends henceforward to work for a Greater Syria under the Emir Abdullah.

The Atrash family regard the *Groupement Druze* as their own private army and there is talk of Zeid Bek, brother of Soltan Pasha, being appointed as "commander-in-chief."

Alaouites.

On the 5th July a French vehicle in Lattakia knocked a man off his bicycle, without injury. An angry crowd immediately collected and at least three *Troupes Spéciales* soldiers were attacked and stabbed. French troops returned to barracks and started to fire on the town, rifle grenades being used from the roof of the *état-major* and other French establishments, including civilian houses. Hand grenades were also thrown indiscriminately from the barracks and some 20 mortar bombs were fired. Indiscriminate and undisciplined fire continued for some time. British forces occupied Qalaa Hill, a position commanding the town, early on the morning of the 6th July. Considerable casualties are reported amongst *Troupes Spéciales* and Syrian civilians. The French troops are confined to barracks and the town was closed for five days, but is now almost fully reopened.

On the evening of the 9th July firing broke out at Banias and continued for 20 minutes. Rifles, machine-guns and mortars were used by the French against the town. The officer commanding the gendarmerie informed the French that if they did not cease fire they would be held responsible; the French complied. Two civilians were killed and three wounded. A British armoured car was sent from Lattakia and the situation was reported quiet on the 10th July. The origin of the incident is not yet known.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The French garrisons at Ras-el-Ain, Amouda, Kabur-el-Bid, Tel Kutcheh and other small isolated posts were withdrawn on the 29th and the 30th June and concentrated at Derbessiye, Qaimichlie, Derik and Hassetché. On the 3rd July news was received that the French garrison at Derbessiye had gone over to the Syrian Government. The position is still not clear, but 25 men who remained loyal to the French have been moved to Qaimichlie. In view of this further desertion the French are considering the advisability of withdrawing also from Derik.

On the 2nd July the Transjordan Frontier Force Mechanised Regiment (less one squadron) arrived in the Jezireh.

Lebanon.

Riad Solh's opposition group are continuing their attempts to secure the overthrow of the Government, but are still far from possessing the requisite majority. The Government's prestige still stands comparatively high, especially since the announcement of the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*. The irregularities which are widely believed to have been committed by Riad Solh and other members of his last government before their resignation, still constitute a serious obstacle to their return to power. It is now generally believed that, on the return this week of the Lebanese delegation to San Francisco, a reshuffle or enlargement of the Government will take place, after which the Government will call for an extraordinary session of the Chamber and will ask for a vote of confidence. Many names have been mentioned as possible additions to the Government; the most surprising amongst them is ex-President Alfred Naccache, who is regarded as head of the pro-French minority in the Chamber. It is known that he has for some months been in close touch with Henri Pharaon, who continues to pursue his policy of placating elements considered to be opposed to the present régime; but it would be surprising if the nationalist elements submitted to the inclusion in the Government of one so closely identified with the former mandatory régime. It is, in fact, this policy on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs which forms the chief target for opposition attacks on the Government.

During the last few days signs have become apparent of a movement amongst Lebanese Christians to express fears for the safety of the Christian communities in the event of a withdrawal of French and British troops. The Apostolic delegate, who is in close touch with the political bureau of the *Délégation Générale*, visited His Majesty's Legation on the 9th July to state that he had reported to the Vatican his fears of a massacre of Christians by Moslems in the Jezireh. Similar fears are being expressed in conversation by Lebanese Maronites and other Catholic communities. While Christian fears of Moslem domination are deep-rooted in the Lebanon, it is highly probable that the present agitation is being systematically worked up by reactionary French political elements in order to create a demand for the maintenance of some form of French control. A petition to be signed by some of the notoriously pro-French notables like Emile Eddé, and then transmitted to the French Government, is said to be circulating.

Further dismissals of French officials employed by the Lebanese Government or the *Intérêts Communs* have now been announced; they include the French advisers in nearly all Lebanese departments. These advisers have long been cold-shouldered, so that their disappearance will make little practical difference.

[E 5590/5/89]

(2)

Weekly Political Summary No. 171 Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for the week ending 17th July, 1945.—(Received 1st August.)

1.—General.

THE French, Syrian and Lebanese Commissions to arrange the details of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales met at Chtaura on the 12th and 16th July. At both meetings the attitude of all concerned was correct and on the whole satisfactory progress was realised. Provisional agreement was reached for the transfer of certain barracks which are indisputably Syrian property and of certain of the Troupes Spéciales on the 20th and 26th July respectively, and sub-committees were formed to study the questions of personnel, barracks and equipment. The question of the so-called "Avenantaires" (local troops enlisted in the French regular forces) is, however, presenting some difficulty, and both parties have reserved judgment, the Syrians maintaining that they should be handed over with the other troops. (See also Section 3, paragraph 2.)

The United States Government have been asked by His Majesty's Government to agree to American participation in the operation of Mira, and to the provision of an American training team for the Syrian gendarmerie and security forces. It is felt that such participation might do much to dispel the French impression that His Majesty's Government desire to oust the French from Syria in order to substitute British influence.

A party of Syrian and Lebanese journalists left Beirut for the United Kingdom on the 12th July for a tour to be conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Information.

2.—Economic.

Total purchases for the period 8th to 15th July, 1945, amount to 16,040 tons, a daily average of 2,005 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945-46 crop up to 39,737 tons.

3.—Damascus.

Fares el Khouri, the Syrian Prime Minister, and Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance, returned to Damascus from San Francisco on the 14th July. Rumours of a Cabinet change persist and Jamil Mardam has confirmed that it is the intention of the Government to convene an extraordinary session of the Chamber; it is possible that on this occasion the Government may resign or, alternatively, announce a reshuffle.

The Syrian Prime Minister was interviewed by B.G.S., Ninth Army, on the 14th July, in connexion with the difficulties which had arisen over the "Avenantaires." He pointed out that they were in any case few in number and suggested that they could be divided into three categories: (1) those who wished to continue their service with the French; (2) those who wished to transfer to the Syrian army; and (3) those who wished to be demobilised; each category being allowed to act in accordance with their wishes.

The President of the Republic, however, held strong views on the subject, and His Majesty's Minister was obliged in consequence to send him a personal message pointing out the deplorable impression which would be created in England if the negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales failed owing to the insistence of the Syrians, contrary to British advice, on 100 per cent. satisfaction of their demands. The President took note of the message but raised certain objections on points of detail, pending discussion of which the question of the Avenantaires would be held over.

Other points discussed between the B.G.S. and Jamil Mardam Bey at their interview included the discipline and accommodation of the Troupes Spéciales during the period of transfer, and the size and composition of the new Syrian army. On the latter question the B.G.S. suggested that the plan put forward by the head of the gendarmerie for a force of 11,000 was overlarge, and that the Syrians might do well to decide at once on the size of the force they envisaged, in order to avoid the expense of taking over too much equipment from the French. Jamil Mardam agreed that an army of something like 8,000 would be more reasonable, and said that the matter would be studied urgently; as for equipment, his Government's policy was to take over everything that was theirs and to consider the question of further requirements in the light of the size of the army which should be decided on.

Abdul Qader Midani, a lawyer, has been appointed Mohafez of Jezireh; this is his first Government appointment.

Lieut.-Colonel Hrant has been appointed Acting Chief of the Gendarmerie and Police in Aleppo. He is an exceptionally competent officer, and his presence in Aleppo in such a tense period will be valuable; but he is anxious lest the appointment may be permanent and his chances of promotion thus prejudiced. Colonel Rashid Atfeh, brother of Colonel Abdullah Atfeh, has been appointed in Colonel Hrant's place to command the First Legion.

A delegation from Transjordan arrived in Damascus bringing a gift of LP. 10,000 for those who had suffered in the recent disorders.

4.—Aleppo.

During the past week a state of calm has prevailed throughout the district of Aleppo, largely as a result of the Transjordan Frontier Force patrols, which have undoubtedly restored confidence. In Aleppo itself the uneasy calm of the past two weeks has continued, except when on the 9th July heavy firing broke out as a result of the desertion of Alaouite Troupes Spéciales from the Mussy Barracks.

There have been some signs during the past week of the emergence of a more reasonable attitude. The local press, while continuing its anti-French campaign, has shown a tendency towards moderation and has published a few reasonable articles. The Mohafez, on the 11th July, addressed a meeting of Quarter Leaders, urging restraint and moderation while the negotiations were in progress over the Troupes Spéciales; he stated that the Franco-Syrian dispute was being considered on a high level, and urged the population to appear on the streets unarmed and refrain from molesting Syrian employees of the French. He also addressed newspaper editors and urged on them the paramount need of restraint in writing on all matters affecting the French.

5.—Homs-Hama.

Nothing to report.

6.—Jebel Druze.

Nothing to report.

7.—Alaouites.

The situation still remains uneasy in Lattakia and Tartous and wherever other French garrisons remain.

8.—Euphrates and Jezireh.

The political officer reports that there is a certain uneasiness amongst the Christians, particularly in Deir ez-Zor and Kamichlié, at the prospect of the withdrawal of French support. A number of the more wealthy Christian families from Deir ez-Zor have left for Aleppo.

Firing, including a few mortar bombs, was reported from Raqqa on the night of the 6th and 7th July. The French stated they were defending themselves against an attack but there was no confirmation of this, nor were any casualties reported. Subsequently, on the night of the 10th and 11th July, some shots were fired against the French, but at the request of the local British commander the French did not return the fire. The Kaïmakam arrested some local civilians and a curfew was imposed the following night.

Following the evacuation of all French posts west of Kamichlié, complaints have been received by both French and Syrians of acts of provocation against each other. On the 14th July a French sergeant was arrested by Syrian gendarmes at Kamichlié, having in his possession a live grenade. He was taken in charge by a British officer and conveyed back to the French fort. Later in the afternoon rifle and machine-gun fire broke out from the fort and lasted for about half an hour. The local British commander reports that the gendarmes behaved extremely well, though two of their number were wounded by French fire. British troops were fired on at the same time (including an ambulance prominently displaying a Union Jack); no shot, however, was fired in return. Two gendarmes were killed and two civilians wounded. The British officer commanding Bedou force visited Kamichlié on the 15th July accompanied by the French Délégué and arranged that the French troops in the town would be largely disarmed; all automatic weapons are to be dismounted from the perimeter of the fort and other weapons locked up under French guard. French troops in the Jezireh will in future be strictly confined to barracks.

9. Tribal.

A gendarmerie force assisted by a detachment of British troops has succeeded in collecting the ninety-three camels claimed by the Shammar from the Agaidat. These have been taken to the frontier and will be handed over to Iraqi officials as agreed at the Bagdad conference.

10. Frontier.

Nothing to report.

11. Lebanon.

It is now possible to assess reaction in the Lebanon to the French statement of the 8th July of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. While the pro-French section of the press welcomed the declaration as an important step towards establishment of Franco-Lebanese friendship, the Nationalist press took the line that France was handing over to the States only what rightfully belonged to them. Some newspapers took the opportunity to list the additional Lebanese desiderata, prominent amongst which were the transfer to the control of the Lebanese Government of the Radio Levant Broadcasting Station and the Banque de Syrie, and the return of the gold reserves of the latter which General Dentz took to France in 1941. Public opinion on the whole took only lukewarm interest in the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, which has never been a live issue in the Lebanon, but in general was suspicious of French good faith.

The Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs met at Ain Sofar in the morning of the 16th July, before the meeting of the Franco-Levant States Special Commission (see Section 1, paragraph 1 above). The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was wrongly reported in the press to have said that agreement had been reached between "all interested parties" regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Levant States. A *démenti* published the following day stated that what he had said was that a *modus vivendi* had been discussed regarding the presence of such troops in the Levant States.

The Lebanese Delegation to San Francisco returned to Beirut on the 12th July. Intrigue and rumours on the subject of a Lebanese Cabinet reshuffle have continued, but nothing definite is yet known. The Speaker of the Chamber is ill and, as his deputy is not considered competent, an extraordinary session cannot be held for the time being. So far as can be seen, the President still clings to the idea of a reconciliation between Abdul Hamid Karami and Riad es Solh, possibly on the basis of the inclusion in the Ministry of two of the latter's supporters; Karami himself seems determined to make no change in the Government, and to confront the Chamber with his present team; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs apparently still hankers after appeasement, in the form of the addition to the Ministry of one or two members of the so-called Nationalist (pro-French) group in the Chamber. These conflicting views are at present cancelling each other out.

The French authorities celebrated the 14th July with commendable discretion, and there were no incidents. General Beynet held the usual reception at the Residence for "Friends of France," but the attendance was noticeably smaller than in previous years. The Lebanese Government were represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chief of Protocol, but are understood to have instructed Government officials not to attend. His Majesty's Minister and the staff of His Majesty's Legation attended.

Some agitation has occurred in the Lebanese silk-weaving industry as a result of the delivery by the British supply authorities to silk producers of a quantity of rayon yarn, in an effort to obtain silk in exchange. As a result of the complaints from the weavers, who considered that they should have had their share of this yarn, the Prime Minister signed an order requisitioning it; this order was, however, considered illegal by the Minister of National Economy, who secured its cancellation. The matter is under discussion between the competent authorities, but in the meantime the weavers are understood to be on strike in protest.

12. Press.

The French decision to transfer the Troupes Spéciales to the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments was received by the Damascus press with general satisfaction. Most of the Damascus papers, however, pointing out that had this gesture been made earlier it would have saved a lot of trouble and strife, stressed the point that the transfer of these troops will not necessarily lead to a resumption of negotiations with the French, the Government and people of Syria

being determined that the French shall effect complete evacuation before negotiations are reopened.

In the Lebanon, also, general satisfaction was expressed by the press; this satisfaction was, however, tinged with suspicion in the Nationalist papers in view of the fact that the new proposals have been made by the men who were responsible for the recent events in Syria. The general consensus of opinion in the Nationalist papers was that the importance of this French gesture should not be exaggerated, as there are more that must follow, including the all-important prerequisite to a resumption of negotiations, viz., complete French evacuation. The Beirut Communist paper advocated that the question of the Levant should be solved on an international basis, saying that any solution based on the consideration that the Levant States lie astride imperial communications would be a further attempt to bring the Levant States under a new form of colonisation.

The pro-French papers continued to urge that the present moment is propitious for the conclusion of an agreement with France.

The Lebanese papers continued to give prominence to the Russo-Turkish question, but local comment was scanty, being confined chiefly to comment from the foreign press. Several Armenian papers expressed the belief that the Turks were bluffing in their stand against the Russian claims, and that Great Britain will not support Turkey to the extent that the latter believes.

There has been a slight recrudescence of commentary on the Zionist question, and one Beirut paper called the attention of the Government to the extensive Zionist commercial enterprises in the Lebanon.

[E 5896/5/89]

(3)

Weekly Political Summary No. 172, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 24th July, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 13th August.)

1. General.

DURING the week arrangements for handing over the Troupes Spéciales have proceeded rapidly. At one stage the Syrians felt that the French were making unnecessary difficulties about the transfer of the barracks, but the B.G.S. Ninth Army was able to assure the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs that the removal of all French equipment from barracks would necessarily take some time. British military authorities assisted in the transportation of French equipment in Damascus, and on the night of the 22nd July the Syrian troops moved into the Hamidieh Barracks.

Considerable progress was also realised in the matter of the "Avenantaires." The B.G.S. was able to assure the Syrians that no French recruiting had taken place since the 8th July (see section 3, paragraph 3 of Weekly Political Summary No. 171).

A French circular issued on the 21st June which stated that the French were prepared to offer protection to the families of Avenantaires, and advised them to move into French zones, was referred by the B.G.S. to the French, who agreed to suspend its operation. The Syrians agreed that 6,000 men who had signed applications as Avenantaires, but whose contracts had not been completed by the French, should be demobilised by the French and paid gratuities; all Avenantaires units would be similarly treated, but men who wished to stay in French service would be allowed to do so. Finally, it was agreed that the solution of the outstanding problems connected with the Avenantaires should be postponed until the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales had been completed (for further details of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales see section 3 of this report).

Negotiations in connexion with the restarting of the civil air services from the Mezzé aerodrome near Damascus have continued and a satisfactory solution has since been reached. The Syrian authorities are anxious to take over the aerodrome *in toto* from the French. The commander-in-chief has, however, explained to the President of the Republic that the four main aerodromes in the Levant States, namely, Mezzé, Aleppo, Beirut and Rayak, are essential for the Allied war effort, and the Allied air force must retain the right to use them until the conclusion of hostilities with Japan; the British are responsible for Aleppo and Beirut aerodromes, and the French for Mezzé and Rayak; for technical and administrative reasons it is not possible for these arrangements to be changed at present; in the event of any agreement being reached in the future for the

transfer of the aerodromes to the States it would be essential that the necessary technical staff should be trained before the present control could be withdrawn; the withdrawal of the Allied air force could not in any case be considered before the general withdrawal of the Allied forces. The Syrian President, at first took the line that he was unable to accept arrangements which would admit of French control, but later agreed to reconsider this.

General Officer Commanding Ninth Army has received a letter dated the 19th July from the Commander-in-Chief French troops in the Levant, stating that the extension of the powers of French military courts to cover cases of Syrian and Lebanese subjects who have committed offences against the British army in the Levant is no longer justified now that the maintenance of security and order no longer devolves upon French army; from the 1st August, therefore, the services of French military justice will not be able to deal with offences against British forces. The letter which is courteously worded ends with an expression of thanks for the spirit of co-operation shown by British services who have had dealings with French military justice during the past four years, and a request that the necessary arrangements may be made for replacing French military courts in tasks they have hitherto performed on behalf of Ninth Army.

2. Economic.

Figures for weekly grain purchases not yet available.

3. Damascus.

At the end of last week there were strong rumours that the Minister of the Interior had resigned and a Damascus newspaper stated that the Prime Minister had expressed the wish to relinquish office. The following day the press published an official *démenti*, and the Prime Minister in a press interview declared that his mission as the head of the Syrian delegation to San Francisco had not terminated, as no report had yet been made to Parliament, and the San Francisco Charter had not yet been ratified. There is no doubt that the Minister of the Interior did in fact hand in his resignation as a protest against interference in the administration of his department. At a meeting of the Cabinet on the 19th July a decision was taken disapproving of interference by Ministers in the administration of departments other than their own. When this decision was communicated to the Minister of the Interior he agreed to withdraw his decision.

It was recently learnt that the Syrian Government intended to publish a "Black Book" setting out in detail the events leading up to the bombardment of Damascus and including evidence of French provocation and atrocities. Material had been collected and the book was to be published in Egypt. The Acting Consul in Damascus conveyed to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the view of His Majesty's Minister that publication of the "Black Book" at this stage would be inopportune. His Majesty's Minister also raised this question personally with the President of the Republic on the 22nd July, suggesting that only a limited number of copies should be distributed, and that they should be sent only to the heads of Arab States. On the following day the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he had sent a telegram to Tewfik Yazigi, who had proceeded to Egypt in connexion with the printing of the book, instructing him if printing had not started to return to Damascus, or alternatively to limit the number of copies.

Further problems in connexion with the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales were discussed with the Syrian President and the Commander-in-chief on the 21st July. Of the 20,000 Syrian Troupes Spéciales, excluding Avenantaires whose contracts are effective, approximately 8,000 have deserted to the Syrians. Of the remaining 12,000, half are Avenantaires whose contracts have not been completed (see section 1, paragraph 2 above), the majority of whom the French hope to demobilise. There thus remains some 6,000 for transfer to the States. The B.G.S. Ninth Army informed the Syrians that it was the intention of the French authorities to hand over the arms and equipment necessary for the pre-war strength of 12,000. If the Syrians decided to maintain under arms all the troops taken over, additional equipment would be required and this would have to be paid for. The Syrians are therefore favourably inclined to the suggestion that the French themselves should demobilise as many of the Troupes Spéciales as possible.

In an interview with Renter's correspondent on the 20th July the Syrian Prime Minister paid tribute to the French attitude in connexion with the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and said that they had been "faithful to their promises and most helpful." He further stated that it was the intention of the Syrian

Government to be liberal in the matter of compensation for buildings taken over, but added that compensation for the damage done to Damascus during the troubles would be included in the final account. He hoped that the evacuation of foreign troops, with the exception of those required for the war effort in the Far East, would be completed before the end of the summer.

4. Aleppo.

The past week in Aleppo and district has been quiet and the slightly more reasonable attitude towards the French adopted by the local authorities has been maintained.

On the 20th July the Mussy Barracks, the Dépôt de Remontes, the Muslimieh Barracks and the Marché aux Bestiaux, all previously held by the French, were handed over under British military supervision to representatives of the Syrian Government. On the same day the Citadel—effectively occupied by the Syrian gendarmerie since the 24th May—was formally handed over by the French military authorities. On the 22nd July the large Turkish Barracks situated in Aleppo to the north-west of the Citadel was formally handed over to the Syrians to use.

The American College in Aleppo is planning to extend its classes next autumn in order to meet the growing demand to learn English, and it is proposed to admit at least 200 more boys. His Majesty's Consul has been approached by many persons with requests that a British school should be opened in Aleppo.

5. Homs and Hama.

No report received.

6. Jebel Druze.

Commandant Hamid el Atrash has been appointed to command and reorganise the Groupement Druze under the supervision of the Emir Hassan. He has informed the Political Officer that he has been instructed by the Syrian Government to reduce the numbers, and particularly to get rid of undesirable elements.

7. Alaouites.

No report received. The French garrison from Massiaf was withdrawn without incident to Tartous on the 22nd and 23rd July.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

No report received.

9. Tribal.

No report received.

10. Frontier.

Nothing to report.

11. Lebanon.

The transfer of the Troupes Spéciales has on the whole proceeded smoothly in the Lebanon. There have been no popular demonstrations, and none is anticipated. Such difficulties as arise are on the technical plane and are being gradually sorted out by the technical commissions appointed for the purpose. The principal barracks occupied by the Troupes Spéciales in the Lebanon will be handed over shortly, and the transfer of the troops themselves is arranged for the 1st August.

With this thorny problem in the process of settlement the Lebanese Government have turned their attention to the question of the transfer of certain services which still remain in French hands or of which transfer has not yet been effected in practice. Amongst the former, the most important is the Radio Levant Broadcasting Station; amongst the latter, the railways and the port of Beirut. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he has had a satisfactory conversation with Count Ostrorog on these subjects, and seems hopeful that no insuperable difficulties will arise. Meantime, the Lebanese Government have formed a technical commission to study these various questions, and complain that the Syrian Government are not displaying sufficient energy in doing the same. However, the two Governments held another meeting on the 23rd July at which they claim to have made satisfactory progress and to have maintained complete agreement.

The internal political situation has again come to the forefront. On the 21st July Gabriel Murr, the Vice-President of the Chamber, resigned, being hurt at Government statements which he regarded as a reflection on his competence to manage the Chamber in an extraordinary session during the illness of the Speaker. On the 23rd July he gave a lunch party at which twenty Deputies assisted, eight more absenting themselves, but promising support in advance to any decisions which might be taken. As a result, a deputation of four, composed of Murr himself, Riad and Sami Solh and Georges Zouein, waited on the President of the Republic to demand the convocation of the Chamber. This was accorded, and it is understood that the session will start about the 1st August. The Government intend to demand a vote of confidence, which it is generally expected they will obtain.

The publication in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* of a letter from the Maronite Patriarch suggesting that French protection was necessary for the Christians of the Levant and that a treaty with France was in Lebanese interests, has aroused considerable opposition, not only amongst Moslems, but also amongst the many Christians who favour Lebanese independence. *L'Orient* published an article (inspired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs) criticising the Patriarch's "dangerous attitude." The Greek Orthodox Archbishop has published a statement entirely dissociating himself and his community from the Patriarch. This latest manifestation of extreme Christian sentiment, whether or not at French inspiration, has certainly done more harm than good.

The deadlock over the appointment of a commander for the new Lebanese forces continues. Meantime the Lebanese Government have welcomed the proposal that an American Mission might be sent to reorganise their gendarmerie; though the President of the republic on the 20th July expressed some misgivings on the subject, stating that he had no desire to give privileges to any foreign Power. The necessity for some such mission, and the impossibility of its being carried out by the British, was explained to him. The question was further discussed at the Syro-Lebanese meeting on the 23rd July.

The functioning of the Lebanese Finance Ministry is beginning to cause concern, as the lack of effective direction seems to have resulted in serious disorganisation. It has been noted that the Lebanese merchants have still not paid up the arrears of war profits tax for which they had compounded and it is generally believed that revenue is not coming in properly and that expenses are not controlled. A project for the establishment of a "Cour des Comptes" for the purpose of improving control over public finance is on the agenda for the next session of the Chamber.

12. Press.

The tone of the Damascus press, in its comment on the Franco-Levant situation, subsided in violence during the week, partly on account of representations made by the British Press Censor. The press continued to insist, however, on the complete evacuation of the Levant States by the French.

One Damascus paper, referring to a French statement to the effect that bygones should be treated as bygones, said that France, after her recent action in Syria, should be the last country in the world to utter this plea.

The French communique on the conflict in Algeria received wide publicity under headlines such as: "Figures Speak for Themselves" and "Forty-four Arab Villages demolished by the French in Algeria."

Comment in the Lebanese press on the general aspect of Franco-Levant relations has been less voluminous than hitherto, the papers dealing more with questions of detail. A certain amount of conjecture on the Government's eventual choice of the officer to command the national forces has appeared, and some papers have deplored the fact that political and religious considerations are again being allowed to influence an important decision by the Government.

Suspicion of French intentions has again been expressed, and *Ad-Diar* insinuated, without mentioning names, that the delay in the presentation of the joint Syro-Lebanese note to the French Government, as well as the recent indulgent attitude shown by the Government towards the French, was not unconnected with a certain British influence.

The alleged activities of the Maronite Patriarch have been criticised in a Nationalist organ, which reminded him that he has no right to speak on behalf of all Lebanese Christians.

Russo-Turkish relations were again given prominence; comment, however was scanty, being mainly confined to quotations from foreign sources.

The Zionist danger was again emphasised in both the Syrian and Lebanese papers, and one Lebanese paper urged the Government to take the necessary steps to counteract the Zionist menace to the Lebanon arising out of her proximity to Palestine.

Anti-Government papers in Syria seized on the return of the San Francisco delegation to suggest a change of Cabinet, but changed their tone after a declaration made by the Prime Minister, who led the delegation at San Francisco.

The Damascus *Al-Insha* continued to complain of the newsprint quota and against the lack of press freedom in Syria.

[E 5992/5/89]

(4)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 173, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for Week ending 31st July, 1945.—(Received 17th August).

General.

THE result of the British general election has been widely discussed in both States. The first reaction was that the resumption of power by the Labour party, and, in particular, the defeat of General Spears, foreshadowed a closer alignment of British foreign policy with the French, and a tendency to favour the Zionist rather than the Arab cause. While after a few days it appeared to be more generally assumed that policies and not personalities are predominant in Great Britain, and that a change of Government need not necessarily bring about a drastic change of British foreign policy, fears about Palestine continued to be voiced in most quarters. In the Lebanon public opinion later tended to take the view that since General de Gaulle's French critics were mostly of the Left, his personal policy towards the Levant States was unlikely to find favour with the new British Parliament.

Further meetings took place between the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd and the 27th July. The *Troupes Spéciales* will be handed over to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the 1st August, and appropriate measures were begun on the 25th July, when officers of the two Governments made contacts with their units. Officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks who do not wish to serve in the National armies will be allowed to return to their homes. "Avenantaires" who have signed since the 30th June, 1945, and who do not desire, or are not accepted for service in the National armies will return to their homes before the 31st July; those who desire to serve in the National armies will be transferred with the remainder of the *Troupes Spéciales*; and the Avenantaires remaining in French service, together with French personnel will be withdrawn from their units. Owing to the special conditions obtaining in East Syria only nominal transfer will take place on the 1st August, to permit the evacuation of those who wish to continue in French service and the troops who wish to be transferred. The French authorities have agreed to the withdrawal from East Syria of their political officers, who will be replaced by four Officiers de Mission for liaison purposes.

The French have informed the States' Governments that they are prepared to hand over the remaining services in French hands, loosely known as "common interests" and both the French and the States have appointed technical commissions to arrange for the transfer.

As far as can be ascertained these include Radio Levant Broadcasting Station, the Office Economique de Guerre, the Sequestration Office, Beirut and Tripoli aerodromes, the telephone service and control over the Beirut Port Company, Radio Orient and the D.H.P. railways. Of these, Radio Levant is purely French-controlled and the French claim it was built with French money, whereas the Lebanese Government claims that it was built with Intérêts Communs money; the principle of the transfer of the control of the D.H.P. railway and the Beirut Port was agreed by a Protocol dated the 5th June, 1944, but the details of transfer of control have never been worked out; the telephone system in both States is French military property, which the States now wish to purchase and run for themselves.

A member of the staff asked Count Ostrorog whether the French had made any official declaration to the Lebanese Government that they would withdraw their troops as soon as British troops were withdrawn. Count Ostrorog stated

that his original offer (see Weekly Summary No. 170) had been made officially, on the instructions of his Government in Paris; that he had not received any more instructions, and that the situation had not changed in any way.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 16th to the 22nd July, 1945, amount to 8,419 tons, a daily average of 1,202 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945-46 crop up to 48,156 tons.

Damascus.

On the 25th July the President of the Syrian Republic invited the heads of the Christian communities in Damascus to the Presidency and informed them that all communities in Syria were equal and that his door would always be open to them. He gave them an assurance that all Syrians, irrespective of religion, would enjoy the same rights. He added that he had on the previous day received 30 Ulema and had spoken to them in no uncertain terms regarding the necessity of co-operation between the various religious communities. The Bishops, who stayed with the President for an hour and a half, were well pleased with their reception.

On the 26th July the Prime Minister convened members of the Chamber of Deputies who were in Damascus and discussed with them current problems, including the forthcoming meeting of the Chamber, which will take place about the 14th August. The Prime Minister gave the Deputies some account of the proceedings at the meeting in San Francisco.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the Acting Consul that the "Black Book" has not gone to press and that the project has been dropped.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the American Minister that if the American Government were prepared to provide technicians for the training of the Syrian army and gendarmerie the Syrian Government would gladly accept, provided the appointments were for a limited period and in no sense constituted a military mission.

The British Overseas Airways Company restarted their civil services from Mezzé aerodrome on the 25th July. Syrian customs and security formalities are performed at the B.O.A.C. Office, the Company being responsible for transferring passengers to and from the airport.

Aleppo.

The past week has been quiet in Aleppo town and district. The transfer of most of the barracks and certain buildings has taken place with the minimum of friction, and the British military authorities have successfully handled the difficult problem of evacuating many hundreds of *Troupes Spéciales* with their families, finding temporary accommodation for them and supplying them with rations.

Homs and Hama.

On the 24th July representations were made to the Prime Minister regarding the unsatisfactory conduct of Abdul Ibrahim. Sheikh of the Muwali tribe. Muwali tribesmen have recently been responsible for attacks on the railway, British army dumps and Mira grain depots. The Prime Minister was informed that, if necessary, British military forces would support the Syrian gendarmerie; he agreed that strong action should be taken against the sheikh and undertook that if the Political Officer at Homs discussed the problem with the Mouhafez the Government would stand by their decision in the matter. Sheikh Abdul Ibrahim was accordingly arrested on the 24th July.

Alaouites.

Incidents have continued to occur in the Alaouite area and the situation remains tense. On the 29th July, the whole of the Second Levant Battalion, except twelve Christians, were discharged, but before returning to their villages the Alaouite troops broke into the magazines and seized arms to prevent these being handed over to the Syrians who they fear will use them against the Alaouites. The greater part of these arms have now been recovered and are under British guard, but discipline is entirely lacking among the remaining Alaouite troops, who threaten to destroy all Syrian property. It has now been arranged

that they will be replaced by Moroccan troops from Tartous. British troops are now guarding all material and barracks due to be transferred to the Syrians, and there is no doubt that only the presence of British troops is maintaining order.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The final transfer of *Troupes Spéciales*, entailing the evacuation of French "avenantaires," discharged men and any remaining families, is planned to begin on the 30th July, from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Very few men will remain to be transferred to the Syrian Government in this area, where the new Syrian army will consist very largely of the 600 or 700 deserters who left the French earlier.

In an attempt to reduce the number of "avenantaires" remaining in French service, and at the same time induce more men to accept transfer to the Syrian Government, an Anglo-French Commission has visited each place where there are still French garrisons. In general the net result of these visits has been to increase the category of men wishing to be discharged without substantially altering the numbers accepting transfer.

As far as can be ascertained the following figures represent the various categories of men at Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor when evacuation took place:—

	Raqqa.	Deir ez-Zor.
Avenantaires	178	109
Men for discharge	344	284
Men for transfer	28	77

Following a visit to Beirut, the Political Officer informed the Mouhafez that His Majesty's Minister viewed with concern the reports of petty persecutions of Christians in the town by individual Moslems. The Mouhafez was requested to take all possible measures to stop these incidents and to ensure that no discrimination against Christians was permitted. He willingly agreed to repeat the instructions he had previously given in this respect.

The evacuation of French garrisons from the Jezireh began on the 30th July with the despatch of a convoy of families from Derik to Hassetché, whence they will move on to Raqqa and Aleppo. Military personnel and baggage will be moved by train. Qamichlie, and finally Hassetché, will be dealt with in the same way. It is not expected that evacuation will be complete before the 14th August.

Lebanon.

Now that the Extraordinary Session of the Lebanese Chamber has been definitely called for early August, political activity has increased. Habib Abi Chahla has been trying to act as liaison officer between the Prime Minister and Riad Solh, but has merely fallen foul of both in the process, with consequent prejudice to his own chances of forming part of any new Government. A meeting of Opposition representatives was held at Broumana on the 30th July, at which Naccache's so-called National party decided to oppose the Government so long as they were not represented in it. As a result of this meeting it is suggested that there are some twenty-seven Deputies likely to vote against the Government on a vote of confidence. If, however, the date of this vote is postponed, there are many chances for political bargains, and the result must be held to be extremely open.

Amongst draft laws transferred by the Government to the Chamber for consideration during the Session, are one regarding the flying of foreign flags on Lebanese territory and another designed to abolish the power of French military courts over Lebanese nationals.

The Lebanese gendarmerie have now begun attempts to destroy the hashish crops in the Bekaa and North Lebanon. It has not been possible this year to provide British military assistance, on account of the heavy security commitments of the British military authorities, and it is not thought probable that the gendarmerie's efforts will result in destruction of more than a fraction of the total crop. The areas sown with hashish are everywhere reported much greater than last year.

[E 6379/5/89]

(5)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 174, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for Week ending 7th August, 1945.—(Received 30th August.)

General.

The transfer to the States Governments of the Troupes Spéciales has taken place during the week without major incident, though the Syrians are somewhat perturbed at the large number of troops who have expressed a desire to remain in French service. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs anticipates trouble from his colleagues on this question, and it is probable that the matter will be raised at the meeting of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 14th August. Jamil Mardam Bey has been informed that, if the Syrian Government are prepared to leave this question until the 21st August, there may be a considerable change for the better, since the French Command are definitely anxious to keep down to a minimum the number of troops who will continue in French service and will, therefore, have to be evacuated to French territory with their families.

The first meeting of the French, Lebanese and Syrian Commissions to study the question of the transfer of the remaining services still controlled by the French took place on the 2nd August. Little progress was made, as the States' representatives professed ignorance as to what services there were to discuss and asked for information. A further meeting is to be held shortly. There seems to be some divergence of views between the Lebanese and Syrians, the former being extremely anxious to get these matters concluded, whilst the latter, who are less directly interested in many of them, are taking the line that the French are bound to show bad faith in any such discussions. It is understood that the questions to be discussed include Radio Levant Broadcasting Station, completion of the transfer of control of the railways and Beirut Port (the protocol signed on the 5th June, 1944, not having been executed), the custodianship of enemy property, the O.E.G., telephones and Radio Orient.

Discussions have taken place during the week between the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs about the eventual recognition of the States by Turkey. Jamil Bey has expressed to a member of the legation staff the view that the question of the recognition of Syria by Turkey did not arise, since this had taken place at the San Francisco Conference; that discussion was only necessary as regards the exchange of diplomatic representatives; that the Syrians and Lebanese were prepared to exchange representatives immediately and leave the problem of the Hatay to a later date; but that the Turks wished this matter to be settled before the exchange of representatives took place. No decision was reached, and it is understood that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs will inform the Levant States whether or not his Government is prepared to agree to an exchange of representatives without prior agreement about the Hatay.

Damascus.

A decree has been published convening the Chamber of Deputies to an extraordinary session on the 14th August. The agenda includes draft laws for (1) the transfer of the army and the necessary credits, (2) the establishment of new schools, (3) an amnesty for prisoners who were released from the prison of Damascus during the bombardment, (4) ratification of the Covenant of the United Nations, and (5) promotion of police and gendarmerie personnel.

Reports that an agreement had been reached between General Paget and General Beynet to the effect that French troops would be retained on the Syrian littoral have caused concern and an official *démenti* was published by the Syrian authorities.

The transfer of the Troupes Spéciales on the 1st August passed without major incident. The approximate position at present is that, apart from the 3,000 original Avenantaires, 3,000 remain with the French, 2,500 have been demobilised, and 2,000 have passed to the Syrian army. When informed of the number of troops still remaining under the French, Jamil Mardam showed considerable concern and said that the figures confirmed his suspicion that the French were going back on their engagements. He referred to a "Note de Service" which had been issued by a French commander on the 28th July, and which stated that, "contrary to their previous declarations," the French were prepared to keep on troops who were disposed to serve overseas. At a meeting with His Majesty's Minister and the British military authorities at Sofar on the

3rd August, Jamil Mardam Bey agreed to leave the question until the 21st August.

The Syrian Government are now studying the reorganisation of their armed forces. It is clear that immediate attention needs to be concentrated on improving the gendarmerie and police, and that the formation of a desert guard is of particular urgency. The Syrians are, however, very army-conscious at present and seem to be less interested than they were in the formation of the desert guard. A committee has been set up under the Minister of Defence to work out the details of the reorganisation.

Further difficulties have arisen over the Mezzé aerodrome. The Misr Aviation Company applied for permission to open their Cairo-Damascus service, but this was refused. The Misr representative pointed out that the B.O.A.C. were already operating (see Section 3, paragraph 5, of Weekly Summary No. 173), and the Syrian Government, in the absence from Damascus of Jamil Mardam, cancelled the arrangements whereby Syrian customs officials carried out their formalities in the B.O.A.C. office, as they considered that for their officials to have to show passes, albeit Syrian ones, to a French sentry on the aerodrome was an affront to their national dignity. Jamil Bey was subsequently able to reverse this decision, and formalities for B.O.A.C. passengers are now being carried out in the B.O.A.C. offices in Damascus.

This question was also discussed between His Majesty's Minister, the British military authorities and Jamil Mardam Bey on the 3rd August, when it was pointed out that every effort had been made by the British authorities to arrange this question in a manner which would take account of Syrian susceptibilities, and that civil air services must continue pending any modification of the existing control of the aerodrome, which for the present must remain vested in the French. It was finally agreed that the Syrian Government should make an official request for the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Syro-Lebanese Commission to study the whole question of the control of aerodromes in the Levant States. It is clear that the Syrian public is taking the keenest interest in the solution of this problem, and the Government will probably be heckled on the subject when the Chamber next meets.

Aleppo.

The calm and generally improved situation in Aleppo has continued, but there is little improvement in Franco-Syrian relations. The hand-over of Troupes Spéciales and the subsequent procession through the streets of the newly-acquired vehicles and equipment aroused much local jubilation, but no disorder.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The transfer of the Troupes Spéciales was finally concluded in the Euphrates on the 2nd August, when the barracks at Deir ez Zor were formally handed over to the Syrian authorities, the barracks at Raqqa having been handed over on the 31st July.

In the Jezireh the Troupes Spéciales, with the exception of about half a dozen men in Hassetché, who have accepted transfer to the Syrian Government and some twenty who have accepted their discharge, form a solid block of Avenantaires totalling 1,582 men. These with their families, amounting in all to nearly 5,500, still have to be evacuated during the next week or two. The immediate departure of so large a number of people is causing some concern in the area.

By a decision of the Anglo-French Joint Staff French officers have been appointed to remain in Dez, Hassetché and Qamichlié to look after French interests in East Syria after the general evacuation is complete. Instructions received by the Délégué-Adjoint state that these officers will make liaison with the Contrôle Bédouin, the Syrians and the British authorities. As the Contrôle Bédouin is purely a Syrian responsibility and the Syrian authorities have received instructions to have no contacts with French officers, it is difficult to see how these officers will carry out their mission; for any contact they may have with the local population is liable to create a trouble to the local authorities.

Frontier.

The French frontier posts on the Syrian-Turkish frontier have now all been evacuated. The British military maintain patrols in the area, but do not deal with frontier questions, for which the Syrian authorities are wholly responsible,

and it appears that the Turkish authorities are developing *de facto* contacts with their Syrian opposite numbers pending the regularisation of relations between the two Governments.

Lebanon.

Further discussions and intrigues amongst Deputies have in general strengthened the position of the Government, which is now expected to achieve a vote of confidence without difficulty when the Chamber is convened on the 14th August.

The Maronite Patriarch's letter to a Paris newspaper advocating a Franco-Lebanese treaty giving France a privileged position in the Lebanon has evoked some vigorous press polemics. Nationalist papers maintain that the Patriarch has no right to speak in the name of the Lebanon, while their opponents assert that his position as head of the largest Christian community gives him full right to speak in the name of the Christians. The Minister of the Interior visited the Patriarch during the week, and stated on his return that the Patriarch was claiming that all he advocated was a Franco-Lebanese treaty which would consolidate Lebanese independence. Meantime, the heads of the Greek Orthodox and Protestant communities have dissociated themselves from the Patriarch's attitude.

On the 1st August a review was held of Lebanese troops at which the Lebanese President presided. He surprised spectators by his obvious vigour. This has been confirmed by a report that he recently broke a telephone when violently rebuking a Minister.

A commission formed by the Lebanese Government to study post-war problems held its first meeting on the 2nd August, and formed three sub-committees to consider problems of finance, economics and social welfare. It is understood that an approach will be made to the British, American and Egyptian authorities with a view to obtaining guidance on the measures taken in these countries to surmount post-war difficulties.

The staff of the military school from Homs with all the pupils who had been evacuated to Tripoli, and subsequently transferred to a camp near Kousba, began agitating on the 1st August for their gratuities. A number deserted and threatened to attack the French, but they were subsequently rounded up by British troops and brought back. They have since been disarmed and are now waiting to be sent back to Syria. All Lebanese naval personnel at the French naval base are understood to be still under French command.

There was a certain amount of discontent amongst the *Troupes Spéciales* in Tripoli at the end of July, and information was received from a reliable source that many of the Alaouite troops who do not wish to serve under the Syrian Government were planning to leave their barracks during the night of the 31st July and, with the assistance of the French, were going to take their rifles and machine guns and escape to their homes in the Alaouite mountains. The prompt action of the British military authorities in disarming the battalion on the 31st July prevented the plan being carried out. These arms are now under British guard and will be handed over to a detachment of Lebanese troops who are expected to arrive in Tripoli shortly.

[E 6380/5/89]

(6)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 175, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for Week ending 14th August, 1945.—(Received 30th August.)

General.

The French, Syrian and Lebanese commissions nominated to discuss the transfer of the remaining services still controlled by the French have now held three meetings, but have registered little progress. The French representatives have adopted the attitude that it is for the States to say what they would like to take over, whilst the States maintain that they wish to take over everything, but cannot know what services there are until the French, who control these services, tell them. The French have now agreed to divide the services into three categories: (1) those in respect of which the principle of transfer has been admitted, (2) those in which transfer is dependent on financial settlements, and

(3) those which are disputable on account of private or foreign interests being involved. A list of those services in category (1) has now been drawn up and will be discussed between the French and Lebanese; the Syrian representatives have temporarily been withdrawn, their Government maintaining that they are ready to discuss the details, but not the principle, of transfer. Since the French and Syrian representatives had tended to snap at each other during meetings, more rapid progress is likely with the Syrians absent; they will be reassociated when any definite result is in sight.

The French steamer *Marrakesh* arrived in Beirut from France on the 9th August, bringing back 183 Syrian and Lebanese students from Europe, some civilian employees, 300 Syrian and Lebanese *Avenantaires* and some North African troops domiciled in Syria, for demobilisation. She sailed for France on the 12th August, taking away some 500 French civilians and a number of French military personnel. A few of the returning Lebanese and Syrians were detained for two days by the British security authorities for interrogation. Reports will be forwarded to their respective Governments in due course for such action as may be necessary.

Damascus.

During the week there has been some political activity in preparation for the sitting of the Chamber on the 14th August. The Damascus group of Deputies, led by Lutfi Haffar and Khaled el Azm, are concentrating their energies on securing a change of Government and are counting on the support of the Aleppo group owing allegiance to Saadullah Jabri. The brunt of their attack is directed against Jamil Mardam, who, in self-defence, appears to be looking for support to the rival Aleppo faction led by the Mudarres family and Dr. Kayyali, and also to Druze and Haurani Deputies. Although it is difficult to prophesy, the last word will probably lie with the President; and despite the close co-operation of recent weeks between the latter and Saadullah Jabri on the one hand and Saadullah Jabri and Lutfi Haffar on the other, the President is understood to be in favour of maintaining the existing Government for the time being.

At the special sitting of the Chamber on the 14th August proceedings were opened with a minute's silence as a tribute to the "martyrs" who died during the May-June troubles. A bitter attack was made on the Government by a Homs Deputy, who blamed them for what had occurred, on the grounds that they had not taken the advice of the Chamber in breaking off relations with the French at an earlier date and in calling over the *Troupes Spéciales*; the Deputy also accused members of the Government of promoting their own interests and favouring their friends and supporters. In reply the Prime Minister asked that the Deputy should either withdraw or substantiate his charges against members of the Government and offered to hold an enquiry if definite allegations were made. The Prime Minister then went on to give a brief account of the part the Syrian Delegation had played at the San Francisco Conference. Draft bills dealing with the taking over of the army and emergency education measures were passed to the relevant Committees, who were asked to study them urgently and report to the House at the next sitting on the 20th August.

Commenting to pressmen on the Japanese offer to surrender, the Prime Minister stated that the solution of certain questions affecting Syria depended on the cessation of hostilities and that he anticipated that these questions would shortly be settled.

The Ministry of National Economy are negotiating for the engagement of foreign technical experts. These include (i) an agricultural expert (the Rockefeller Near East Foundation has been asked to approach Professor Goodman of Cornell University); (ii) an entomologist (Professor Bodenheimer of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem has been directly approached); (iii) a statistician (M.E.S.C. have been asked to obtain particulars of a suitable candidate); (iv) a geologist; (v) a veterinary surgeon.

Aleppo.

The general situation remains unchanged. A feeling of uneasiness is undoubtedly prevalent amongst the Christian minorities although no serious cases have been brought to light of Moslems having maltreated, attacked or robbed Christians.

There is still no sign of any intention on the part of the Mohafez to resume contact with the French Delegate, though the latter has expressed the hope that

Franco-Syrian relations may soon be re-established. The French authorities hope that their schools will reopen as usual in the autumn and that French influence will thereby be enabled gradually to recover lost ground. The Syrian authorities are taking measures to increase the accommodation for pupils in Government schools, but placing the 4,000 children concerned and finding suitable teachers will present problems of great difficulty.

A dispersal camp has been opened in Aleppo for Avenantaires, disbanded Troupes Spéciales from East Syria and their families, and already nearly a thousand disbanded Troupes Spéciales have been returned to their homes.

On the 7th August the French personnel of the Sûreté aux Armées in Aleppo left under British armed escort for Beirut with their archives. Since the 4th August the French have not participated in the work of the Aleppo Bureau Régional de la Circulation du Levant.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hrant has been transferred to Damascus as Officer Commanding Gendarmerie, and has been succeeded as Director of the Gendarmerie and Acting Director of Police in Aleppo by Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Bey Kassab Hassan, who was formerly at Deir-ez-Zor.

Homs/Hama.

A Communist pamphlet of Damascus origin was distributed in Homs during the week asking for the return of Alexandretta to Syria.

Jebel Druze.

In general the area has been quiet, but an incident occurred in Soueida when Youssef Pasha el Atrash attempted to take possession of the house previously occupied by the Délégué, which has been empty since the beginning of June. Other claimants for the house intercepted him and a number of shots were fired into the air. No casualties occurred. The house remains vacant, but is likely to remain a bone of contention amongst the local notables.

Alaouites.

The week has been quiet, but the presence of troops and H.M.S. *Jarvis* is still considered necessary for the preservation of order. The Mohafez, who is genuinely attempting to secure normal circulation in the town, has been asked to guarantee the security of the main streets of Lattakia and the main road down the coast for the passage of French troops, but professes himself unable to do so as long as Capitaine Boussiquet remains in Lattakia, his argument being that no car which might contain him is safe owing to the hatred and distrust felt against him by the population as a result of his activities during the past year.

The Moroccan Battalion from Tartous has replaced the Alaouite Battalion at Lattakia, and six desertions from it have been reported since its arrival.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The Euphrates and Jezireh have remained quiet during the week and in the Jezireh evacuation of French troops and their families has been proceeding according to plan. Avenantaires with their families and baggage were all finally evacuated from Qamichlié by the 7th August, and the following day the fort was handed over to the Syrian military authorities.

The decision to allow French "Officiers de Mission" to remain at Deir ez-Zor, Hassatché and Qamichlié has seriously perturbed the Syrian authorities in that area, who cannot recognise the need for any French officers to remain in East Syria and are convinced that it is merely another attempt to maintain French propaganda.

Tribal.

The Mohafez of Deir ez-Zor has not yet heard what success has attended the Iraqi authorities' attempt to restore the 4,000 sheep taken by the Shammar from the Agaidat (see Weekly Summary No. 174, section 9, paragraph 1). He is still awaiting the return of these sheep before consenting to hand over the camels and cash, which he has ready, to fulfil the terms of the Bagdad Conference. Unconfirmed reports have been received of two further raids by the Shammar, in which some 60 camels and some 250 camels are alleged to have been stolen from the Agaidat and Afadla tribes respectively.

Lebanon.

Whilst it became steadily clearer during the week that the Government would have no difficulty in obtaining a vote of confidence when the extraordinary session of the Chamber opened on the 14th August, the Government's existence was jeopardised on the 12th August when the Constitutional party, to which two of the Ministers belong, decided (by a very small majority) to call on these Ministers to resign. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at once announced to all and sundry that they would resign soon after the vote of confidence had been passed and would not accept office in the new Government. At the sitting of the Chamber on the 14th August the Government obtained a vote of confidence by 34 votes to 9, with 2 abstentions.

It is now taken for granted in local political circles that a change of Government is imminent; but there is considerable diversity of opinion as to who will compose it. The choice of Prime Minister presents the chief difficulty. Riad Solh, who would normally be the natural choice, is still unpopular (on account of the alleged irregularities of his last Government) and is particularly disliked by the President's entourage; Abdullah Yafi, who is favoured by Henri Pharaon, is disliked by the President himself; and Sami Solh, who has considerable middle and lower class Moslem support, is recognised in responsible circles as being so vain and impulsive as to be liable to constitute a danger. There are thus unlimited possibilities of intrigue in the next few days and the situation must be regarded as entirely fluid at present.

The Communist parties of Syria and the Lebanon met on the 9th August, and their executive committees later issued a long statement. Much of this was devoted to attacks on the present Governments, but one passage significantly stressed the following points:—

- (a) That the British Conservative party, which pursues a reactionary Colonial policy in the interests of British capitalists, has been adopting a double-faced attitude towards Syria and the Lebanon, for whilst claiming to support their independence it has recognised a privileged position for France.
- (b) The Syrian and Lebanese peoples demand the abolition of this policy, which aims both at sharing influence in these countries with reactionary French elements, and also at securing control over the rights and powers now being handed over to the States' Governments.
- (c) All foreign forces, British as well as French, should be withdrawn from the two countries.

A Polish subject named M. Gadowski arrived in Beirut from Palestine on the 11th August, apparently to take up the appointment of diplomatic representative of the Warsaw Government. The Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs have asked this Legation for advice as to the footing on which he should be treated.

[E 6710/5/89]

(7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 176, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for Week ending 21st August, 1945.—(Communicated by the British Legation, Beirut; Received in Foreign Office, 11th September.)

1. General.

THE only official celebration in the Levant States of the end of the war with Japan was a reception given by the Lebanese President to the Diplomatic Corps and notables in Beirut on the 18th August. Public opinion everywhere showed a complete lack of interest in the conclusion of hostilities. There are, however, already indications that the local Governments and others may use the occasion to raise a number of questions of which consideration has hitherto been postponed; prominent among these are likely to be the evacuation of foreign troops and the abolition of military controls. At a sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 20th August the Prime Minister stated that the evacuation of all foreign troops from Syria must be considered now that hostilities have ceased, and press articles on the same subject have already been appearing.

Owing to the Lebanese political crisis, no further meetings have been held between the French and Lebanese to discuss the transfer of services.

3. Damascus.

The second anniversary of Shukri Quwatli's election to the presidency was celebrated on the 17th August by a parade of the Syrian armed forces when the President presented colours to the Syrian army. The same evening the President offered a dinner to members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps and high Government officials.

The position of the Cabinet still remains uncertain but has probably been weakened by the Prime Minister's handling of the Chamber on the 14th August (see section 3, paragraph 2, of the Weekly Political Summary No. 175) when, instead of taking the initiative and giving the house an account of recent developments, he allowed the Opposition to get in first with a slashing attack. Although the President is apparently not in favour of a change of Administration at present, the key to the situation is the attitude of Saadullah Jabri who, though he professes to share the President's view, declares himself unable to intervene. The position of his supporters and of their present allies, Khaled el Azm and Lutfi Hafar, is therefore considerably stronger, and the possibility that the Government may fall, or at least be reshuffled, cannot be excluded. Syrian suspicions of French intentions are increasing. Last week the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the acting consul that leading Frenchmen, in conversation with foreign diplomats and visitors, were referring to the inevitability of troubles in Syria, and saying that the Syrians were incapable of maintaining order and that the British authorities would not be able to assist them. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also stated that the Syrians were in possession of information which showed that the French were making use of agents well supplied with money to stir up trouble amongst the ex-Troupes Spéciales, the Alaouites, the Cherkess and the Druzes.

The draft Army Bill which is being presented to the Chamber (see Weekly Political Summary No. 175, section 3, paragraph 2) provides for the taking over of the troops in their present state with the same rates of pay, for the incorporation in the new army of the auxiliary force enlisted earlier in the year, for an increase of credits from 15 to 23 million Syrian pounds for the enlistment of retired officers and for the engagement of foreign experts.

A Department of Arab Affairs under the direction of Tewfik Yazigi, has been established in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

4. Aleppo.

The lull in every form of local activity which became noticeable early in the month, has continued during the past week. His Majesty's Consul reports that after three months' virtual imprisonment and humiliation, a very noticeable feeling of impatience is growing among the French, and it is clear that their tempers are becoming frayed after so long-drawn-out a period of enforced inactivity. Although French feeling is primarily directed against the Syrians, anti-British feeling continues to increase.

Evacuation via Aleppo of "Avenantaires" and their families from East Syria has continued during the past week.

Two Aleppo newspapers which have previously been suspended for publishing matter censored by the British Military Censor resumed publication on the 20th August. On the 16th August another newspaper, *El Hawades*, published a number without submitting proofs to the British Military Censor. The proprietor claimed that now the war was over there were no reasons to justify the continuance of the military censorship which he would ignore in future. The matter has been taken up by His Majesty's Consul with the Mohafez.

7. Alaouites.

During the past week the French in Lattakia have attempted in various ways to recover some of the privileges which they previously enjoyed. An attempt to re-establish themselves and their North African sentries in the Cercle des Officiers, the Délégation Office and elsewhere were met with hostile demonstrations and there have been two cases of dynamite throwing near French installations. The Syrian authorities have done their best to comply with the British requests to facilitate a return to normal conditions and they are in consequence beginning to incur the mistrust of the population.

The liquidation of the "Avenantaire" units at Tartous took place without incident on the 14th and 15th August. Of the Coast Defence Unit 148 members, and of the All-Alaouite unit, 29 have opted to continue in French service.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The evacuation of French troops from Jezireh was completed on the 16th August according to plan when the infantry barracks at Hassetché were taken over by the Syrian authorities.

One of the civilian secretaries to the French Officier de Mission at Hassetché was found in the town during the week after dark and attacked by Syrian soldiers; he was not seriously injured, but it is clear from this incident that the French cannot yet move freely in the Jezireh without danger to themselves or their staff.

11. Lebanon.

Despite the vote of confidence obtained by Abdul Hamid Kerami's Government on the 14th August, there was never any doubt that the Government intended to resign. The Prime Minister, in fact, drafted his letter of resignation on the 17th August, but was persuaded not to sign it by the President, who wanted a quiet week-end. It was duly signed, and the resignation accepted, on the 20th August.

The circumstances in which the Government persisted in resigning after receiving an overwhelming vote of confidence are somewhat difficult to explain to the outside world, and have led to some bitter criticisms in the local press on the failure of the Lebanese parliamentary system under which all important matters are arranged in the lobbies and the debates count for nothing. Abdul Hamid Kerami's determination to quit office may be ascribed principally to his unfamiliarity with local politics and consequent thinness of skin in the face of attacks which would leave more seasoned parliamentarians unmoved. He had also been at odds with the President, who, he complained, constantly thwarted his endeavours, and no doubt realised that the longer he remained in power the more his political reputation would suffer. He has since spoken of his determination never to resume office unless the Constitution is modified in a manner which will enable him to govern without being constantly at the mercy of self-seeking Deputies. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose determination to resign was even greater, seems to have become tired of the constant attacks made on him by his political adversaries and to have felt that he could pull the strings more effectively from the bosom of the Chamber. The other ministers meekly followed the lead of their chiefs.

The President has made no secret of his distaste for the task which now confronts him in finding an alternative Government and, in particular, an alternative Prime Minister. He has made several attempts to obtain directives from this legation, but these have been steadfastly refused, to his frank disappointment. In the welter of intrigue of the past few days in which it would have been undesirable for the legation to become involved, it has become clear that there is little chance of Riad Solh returning to power at this juncture; the choice therefore lies between Sami Solh and Abdullah Yafi, if the premiership remains a perquisite of the Sunni Moslem community, with the odds rather on the former in view of the latter's known connexions with members of the pro-French minority. A suggestion that the premiership should be given to the present Speaker, a Shia, has met with violent Sunni opposition, and should be ruled out by the Speaker's known lack of capacity and moral character.

The press has published with evident relief messages from London reporting assurances stated to have been given to the Lebanese Minister by Mr. Bevin and to a Lebanese journalist by Sir R. Campbell, that British policy towards the Levant States remained unchanged.

The Phalange party, which has been much affected by Henri Pharaon of late, is at present showing a great activity. It held a large rally on the 19th August and the leader is proposing next week to undertake a flag-showing tour in North Lebanon. These manifestations are annoying the Moslems, and Riad Solh, amongst others, has expressed his fears that the gap between the Christian and Moslem communities of the Lebanon is being deliberately widened by those who oppose the consolidation of Lebanese independence.

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary, No. 177, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for week ending 28th August 1945.—(Received 19th September).

General.

THE new Lebanese Government (see this Summary) are clearly determined to press on with the negotiations for the transfer of the remaining services still controlled by the French, which they are conducting for both States, though they have held no discussions during the week with the Syrian Government owing to the political crisis in Damascus. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed the Lebanese commission to show themselves as reasonable as possible in the negotiations and not to "quarrel over the piastres" in the questions which involve finance. He himself has made it clear to General Beynet and Count Ostrorog, both of whom have officially called on him, that the Lebanese Government wish to see these questions out of the way as soon as possible. The Prime Minister has taken particular interest in the question of the Grand Serail, which is Lebanese Government property, but in which the offices of the French Delegation General and *état major* are housed, and has pressed General Beynet strongly to hand it over, in order that the Lebanese Government Departments, which are at present scattered all over Beirut, can be collected in one place. General Beynet has apparently promised to study this question sympathetically.

The Zionist Conference in London, and President Truman's declaration on Palestine, have evoked strong reaction in the press in both countries. Many papers have taken the line that only Arabs are entitled to dispose of Arab Palestine, and have reproduced declarations by Arab leaders (including the Syrian Prime Minister) to the effect that 60 million Arabs are determined to defend Palestine. The question is also to be raised shortly in the Lebanese Chamber. Despite reported Jewish attempts to win sympathy amongst the Lebanese Maronites, it is noticeable that Christian opinion is in general as anti-Zionist as Moslem.

Damascus.

At a meeting of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 20th August the Prime Minister gave an exposé of the Government's policy which was followed by reports by the individual Ministers.

At the same sitting, at the request of Michael Elian (Aleppo) a petition signed by fifty-two Deputies was read, urging the necessity of the Government enjoying the full confidence of the Deputies. The President of the Chamber stated that it was not permissible to raise the question of confidence at an extraordinary session which had been convened for the purpose of passing specified laws. No action was taken by the Government for two days, but it was evident that their position in the Chamber had become untenable. The desertion *en bloc* of its former supporters, Saadullah Jabri's Aleppo faction, under the leadership of Michael Elian, who made common cause with Lutfi Haffar and Khaled Azm, left it virtually without support.

On the 22nd August Naim Antaki and Said Ghazi resigned, and on the following day the Prime Minister tendered his resignation. He was immediately asked by the President of the Republic to form a new Government. Negotiations for the formation of a coalition Government continued for two days but eventually broke down, probably owing to a conflict of personalities. On the 26th August, however, Fares Bey succeeded in forming his Government, the composition of which was as follows:—

Prime Minister: Fares el Khouri (Protestant).
Interior and Deputy Prime Minister: Lutfi Haffar (Sunni Moslem).
Foreign Affairs: Michael Elian (Greek Orthodox).
Finance and Defence: Khaled el Azm (Sunni Moslem).
Justice and Wakfa: Sabri el Assali (Sunni Moslem).
Education and National Economy: Ahmed Sharabati (Sunni Moslem).
Public Works: Hikmat el Hakim (Sunni Moslem).
Supply and Ravitaillement: Hassan Jabbara (Sunni Moslem).

This included five members of the outgoing Government; and three of the group which had formed round Saadullah Jabri. Six of the Ministers were from Damascus, two from Northern Syria, and none from any other part of the country.

The Chamber of Deputies met again on the 27th August. One of the Deputies raised the point that a Cabinet of eight Ministers was unconstitutional, a heated debate followed and the matter was referred to the Constitutional Committee of

the Chamber, which gave as its opinion that a Cabinet of eight members was unconstitutional: the Chamber, however, rejected this ruling. The President of the Chamber nevertheless suggested to the Prime Minister that he should reduce the number to seven. The appointment of Michael Elian as Minister for Foreign Affairs was sharply criticised on the grounds that he had no experience and no qualifications for the post.

Another sitting of the Chamber has been fixed for the 29th August, by which time the Prime Minister will have had an opportunity to conform with the wishes of the Chamber. It appears extremely doubtful whether any Government which he or anyone else can form will be able to count upon a stable working majority, and an eventual dissolution of the Chamber, of which the President has been speaking, may prove the only solution of the impasse.

His Majesty's Minister and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, were received by the Syrian President on the 21st August. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were also present. The evacuation of foreign troops, Mezze Aerodrome, French diplomatic representation, *Avenantaires* and the organisation of the Syrian security forces were discussed.

The commander-in-chief said that he was leaving shortly for the United Kingdom, where he would raise the question of simultaneous evacuation of British and French forces. With regard to the Mezze Aerodrome, the commander-in-chief said that this would have to form part of the final settlement of outstanding matters between the French and Syrian Governments. The Minister for Foreign Affairs complained that the French still retained some 5-6,000 Syrian troops, some 2,000 of which were *Avenantaires* who had signed contracts before the 30th June, the remainder being Troupes Spéciales who had volunteered for service on the *avenant* basis but whose contracts had not been completed. The commander-in-chief undertook to speak to General Beynet about these latter. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then went on to say that the British military authorities' proposals for the organisation of the Syrian security forces were acceptable to the Syrian Government, subject to discussion on points of detail. The question of the Desert Guard was also raised by the commander-in-chief, who emphasised that if British troops were to be evacuated in the near future it was essential that these forces should be put on a sound basis without delay. With regard to the question of equipment and technicians for these forces, the commander-in-chief said the French would transfer certain equipment and that he would be prepared to consider a request for equipment once requirements had been worked out by an Anglo-Syrian Committee. He also undertook to explore the possibility of enlisting the support of Egyptian technicians.

The Syrian Government have agreed in principle to the sending of three Syrian trade union representatives to attend the International Trade Union Conference in Paris next month.

Alaouites.

The past week has seen a steady deterioration in Franco-Syrian relations and feeling is running high against the Syrian Government as a result of its alleged toleration of the French in the Mohafazat of Lattakia. Violent articles have appeared in the local press urging the immediate evacuation of French forces. As a result of the commander-in-chief's visit (see paragraph 3 above), the general officers commanding the British and French troops in the Levant States visited Lattakia on the 25th August in order to investigate French complaints of the treatment their troops are receiving in the area and made certain arrangements for improving matters.

Lebanon.

Sami Solh succeeded in forming a new Lebanese Government late on the 22nd August in the following form:—

Sami es Solh (Sunni Moslem): Prime Minister, Supply, Commerce and Industry, Posts and Telegraphs.
Gabriel Murr (Greek Orthodox): Deputy Prime Minister and Public Works.
Hamid Frangieh (Maronite): Foreign Affairs and National Education.
Joseph Salem (Greek Catholic): Interior.
Ahmed el Assad (Shia Moslem): National Defence and Agriculture.
Dr. Jamil Talhouk (Druze): Health.
Saadi Munla (Sunni Moslem): Justice.
Emila Lahoud (Maronite): Finance.

Public opinion has, on the whole, welcomed the new Ministry. Hamid Frangieh is generally recognised as being outstandingly able, and Joseph Salem, though he has many enemies, is also regarded as competent and sensible. It is to be hoped that these two Ministers will be able to restrain the Prime Minister, whose cardinal faults are impulsiveness and vanity, from indulging in any of those extravagances which caused him so much unpopularity during his last tenure of office in 1942.

On the 23rd August the new Prime Minister made declarations to press correspondents containing the following points:—

His Government's foreign policy would in no way differ from that of its predecessor;

His Government would endeavour to maintain and strengthen relations with Arab countries and with those Allied countries, including Great Britain, which had supported the Lebanese cause;

Conversations regarding the evacuation of Lebanese territory (presumably by foreign troops) would be pursued.

The Chamber would be asked to hasten ratification of the Charter of the United Nations.

The first problem which his Government should study and solve was that of unemployment. The Prime Minister would also apply himself to the question of lowering the cost of living.

The reference in this declaration to the withdrawal of foreign troops has aroused some comment, and one or two Nationalist newspapers have been publishing articles outspokenly calling for the withdrawal of both British and French troops from the Levant States now that the war has ended.

The Lebanese Government have sent instructions to their Minister in London to limit the validity of the Lebanese passport of Mgr. Akl, the Maronite archbishop who has been sent on a mission to Europe by the Patriarch, so that he can only return to the Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government have been officially invited to attend the forthcoming Educational Conference of the United Nations to be held in November and are proposing to accept.

[E 6996/5/89]

(9)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 178, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for Week ending 4th September, 1945.—(Received 19th September.)

General.

THE French in the Levant States are clearly becoming restive at the continued restrictions on their movements and freedom of action. In both Latakia and Aleppo they are anxious to move about more freely and without British protection, and this week French officers attended a reception at Baalbek, where no French officers have shown themselves since the French Political Office was evacuated in June. The incident at Tartous (see paragraph 7) has, however, conclusively shown that the time for any appreciable relaxation of the present restrictions has not yet arrived.

Damascus.

The new Government faced the Chamber at a sitting held on the 28th-29th August. The Prime Minister presented the Government's programme, which was similar to that of the previous Government, with the additions that the Government intended to study a project placing the army, gendarmerie and police under a unified command; that foreign experts would be employed only if free of all political influence; that the Ministry of Supply would be abolished; and that Syrian students would be sent abroad for technical training.

During the debate the following points of interest emerged:—

- (1) Asked whether he would fix a time-limit for the evacuation of foreign troops, the Prime Minister said that the question had been discussed with the commander-in-chief, who had left for a ten days' visit to London and would give an answer on his return.

- (2) In reply to the question whether the Government would employ French experts, the Prime Minister replied "No."
- (3) It was alleged that the Black Book had been suppressed in order to please certain foreigners.
- (4) Reference was also made to the abolition of the Mixed Courts and to the question of the return of the Hatay to Syria.

After an adjournment the Prime Minister announced that Ahmed Sharabati (Minister of Education and National Economy) had resigned and that he himself would take over the Ministry of Education and Hikmat el Hakim (Public Works) the Ministry of National Economy.

At the fifth sitting of the extraordinary session of the 30th August, the Chamber unanimously passed a Bill for the ratification of the United Nations' Charter. The Chamber met again twice on the 1st September and once on the following day and on each occasion was adjourned owing to the lack of a quorum, the approach of Bairam having taken many of the Deputies away from Damascus.

It is clear that the Government's position is far from being strong. Ahmed Sharabati stated in the Chamber that he had resigned on the grounds that the Government was based on a one-man party and that he refused to be the tool of the one man, i.e., Michael Elian. The new Minister of the Interior, Lutfi Haffar, has refused to take up office and has already tendered his resignation, but at the request of the President has agreed to postpone it. Jamil Mardam was asked by the President of the Chamber to represent Syria in Geneva at the forthcoming Conference of Parliamentary Representatives, but has excused himself; he told the acting consul that he considered it would be unwise for him to absent himself at the present time from Damascus.

Faiz Khouri, Syrian Minister to Moscow, has returned to Damascus ostensibly on the grounds of ill-health. He is reported to have been far from pleased with the reception accorded to him by the Soviet authorities.

The conference of the National Arab Women's Union was held in Damascus on the 30th August, when speeches were made by ladies representing Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine: all concentrated on the Jewish problem in Palestine.

Aleppo.

Opinion regarding the newly formed Syrian Cabinet, though inclined to be favourable at first, has now begun to be critical; widespread dissatisfaction has been expressed at the continued existence of the Ministry of Supply. Pamphlets were distributed by the "National Youth of the Arab Union" and by the "Bureau of the Students' Union," attacking the policy of the Government and appealing to the Syrians to urge upon the Government the need for the immediate departure of the "colonising foreigner."

The arrival on the 29th August of four 25-mm. cannon and forty boxes of ammunition in two French aircraft has not yet become generally known, though anxiety has been expressed at the recent activity displayed by the French authorities in connexion with the erection of new sandbag defences and the installation of one at least of the 25-mm. cannon at the French "Subsistence" depot in the Jemilieh quarter of the town.

On the 27th August Bedreddin Sabbagh, Assistant Director-General of the Bedouin Contrôle, arrived at Aleppo to assume charge of the North Syrian area, which includes the Mohafazats of Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Jezireh.

Alaouites.

There has been an increase of tension between French and Syrians in the Mohafazat. On the evening of the 31st August parties of unarmed French *Avenantaires* were fired on by civilians. One Alaouite *Avenantaire* n.c.o. was killed and two other ranks slightly injured. British troops intervened and a curfew was imposed. The initial cause of the trouble was the continued occupation of the barracks by the French, in open violation of their agreement to hand them over to the Syrians. General Humblot has ignored the request made to him by the British Military authorities in this matter. On the 3rd September Alaouite *Avenantaires* showed signs of breaking bounds to avenge the attack, and the situation was made more difficult by the arrival of French rifles, light machine-guns and mortars. A British cordon was placed round the garrison and both sides warned of the consequences of trouble. The Syrian Government were asked to prevent the threatened arrival of 500 Syrian troops at Tartous on the

4th September and though they denied that this move had been ordered, they agreed in any case not to move troops there at present.

Lebanon.

The new Lebanese Government confronted the Chamber for the first time on the 3rd September. The Prime Minister's declaration of policy closely followed the lines already indicated by him to journalists (see Weekly Political Summary No. 177 of the 21st August). The outstanding speech in the ensuing debate was that of Habib Abi Chahla, who criticised the statement of policy as being too full of generalities, like previous ministerial declarations, and made the following points:—

(1) Outstanding questions which must be settled with the French included the withdrawal of the *Sûreté aux Armées* and postal censorship, retention of which appeared to him no longer justified, and the transfer of the Tripoli Refinery and the Beirut port. (2) The Lebanese nation demanded that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Lebanese territory. He distinguished between troops which had entered the Lebanon for purposes connected with the war, and which had rendered great services in safeguarding Lebanese independence, and troops whose presence was not connected with the war and derived from the former mandatory régime. In any case, all these troops should now be withdrawn. (3) Questions which he had previously asked the Government regarding civil aviation and oil refineries had remained unanswered. He had heard rumours that a concession was to be granted for oil refineries on similar lines to one granted before the war under the mandatory régime (he clearly referred to Haifa). Such a concession would not respond to the present needs of the Lebanon. (4) Finally, the Palestine question vitally concerned all Arab countries, especially the Lebanon, and should now be called the Arab question. He did not understand why the Arab League had not been summoned to discuss it. It was unfortunate that certain Great Powers appeared to favour the creation of a Zionist State in Palestine, which could not survive without the goodwill of the surrounding Arab countries. Zionism had already infiltrated into the Lebanon and the Government should take steps to check it.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the debate, stated that he had received from the French authorities the same assurances as had been given to his predecessor, namely, that French troops would be withdrawn simultaneously with British, and that he was taking up the matter with the British authorities. As regards Palestine, this question was occupying his mind and that of the President, and the utmost efforts were being expended on it. Negotiations were already in progress with Allied authorities for the lifting of war-time restrictions.

On the 4th September the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a Bill for the ratification of the United Nations' Charter. Present at the session was a delegation of six United States Congressmen, who are paying a visit to the Middle East, and who left for Syria on the following day.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed this Legation that the Lebanese President has already been in touch with Iraq and Egypt with a view to the Arab League being convened to discuss the Palestine question, in the light of the resolutions to the Zionist Conference and of President Truman's declaration. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained that the Lebanese Government feels well placed to take the initiative in this matter because the Lebanon is the only Arab State with a Christian President and, moreover, is geographically closest to Palestine, from which country Zionist infiltration is believed already to have begun.

The former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Hamid Karami and Henri Pharaon, have formed a new political party, named the "Independent party," to which they claim twenty-eight Deputies have already adhered. The party comprises most of those elements which consider Riad Solh's group as being too extremist—or who differ from him for personal reasons. The party held its first meeting on the 30th August.

One of the first acts of the new Lebanese Government was to sign a decree appointing Edmund Abuhadeh as head of the Lebanese *Sûreté*. Although the *Sûreté* was handed over by the French to the Lebanese in June of last year, little progress has been made in its development. Until this week no official had been appointed to direct its activities.

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EASTERN AFFAIRS

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CONFIDENTIAL

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 63.—OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1945

CHAPTER I.—IRAQ

[E 7324/7324/93]

No. 1

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 1st October.)

(No. 378.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 15th September, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 320, Confidential, of the 3rd August, 1944, I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Iraq for 1945.

I have, &c.
G. H. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 1

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Bagdad 1945.

Afghanistan.

Abdur Rahman Khan, Minister (21st October, 1941).

A friendly and amiable colleague. Has served in Bombay and Paris and has travelled extensively in Europe and Russia. He has now established a fairly wide circle of friends in Iraq. He speaks English. Is married to a very good-looking wife who makes infrequent appearances in society. Can be very interesting when he chooses.

Egypt.

Awadh al Bahrawi Beg, Minister (8th February, 1945).

Awadh Beg paid a brief visit to Bagdad to present his credentials and then returned to Egypt. In June King Farouk signed a Royal Rescript appointing Mahomed Yassin Beg as Minister in Bagdad. Nothing further has been heard of this appointment, which would separate for the first time the appointments to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. As usual the Egyptian Legation has been in charge of a junior secretary throughout the summer.

Persia.

M. Mohsen Rals, Minister (28th July, 1943).

M. Rals was formerly Persian Representative to the Vichy Government and later held a ministerial post for a short time under the Qavam-es-Sultaneh. He and his wife are pleasant, intelligent and travelled well above the average of the Bagdad diplomatic corps. They are good hosts and deservedly popular.

Saudi Arabia.

Assad al Faqih, Minister (9th May, 1943).

Assad Beg, who is a smooth Syrian, is friendly and co-operative in such matters as jointly affect our two missions. In 1945 he formed part of the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco Conference and it is now rumoured he is to be appointed to London.

Soviet Union.

Grigori Titovitch Zaitzev, Minister (14th February, 1945).

After considerable hesitation and very reluctantly the Iraqi Government agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia in 1944. The Minister appointed, M. Zaitzev, did not at first make a favourable impression, as he is of youthful appearance and considered by the Iraqis to be too junior for the post; moreover, on his arrival he spoke little English and no Arabic. He improves on acquaintance and his English is becoming almost fluent. He speaks good Persian. M. Zaitzev personally has proved easy to get on with, having a keen sense of humour, but he and his staff have little knowledge of the world. The belief is current that the Counsellor, M. N. Klimov, is the real power in the mission; I think that this has no other foundation than the fact that M. Klimov, who speaks passable English, acted as the Minister's interpreter on all official occasions when the mission was first opened.

Mme. Zaitzev, by appearance a plump and quiet housewife, is popularly but erroneously credited with having served as a partisan and accounted for some 30 Germans with her rifle. She is struggling to learn English. I personally find the Zaitzevs both agreeable people.

Syria.

Baha ud Din al Bakri, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*.
Diplomatic relations were opened with Syria for the first time in 1945 by the establishment of a Syrian Legation at Bagdad and the appointment of Baha ud Din al Bakri as First Secretary and Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*. He took up his post on the 11th February. Baha ud Din is a pleasant and cheerful young man with more energy than most of his fellow countrymen. He graduated from Kansas University as a Bachelor of Science and speaks good English. He has assumed charge of Syrian and Lebanese consular interests in Iraq.

Turkey.

M. Nabil Baty, Minister (17th March, 1945).
M. Baty spent four months in Iraq after presenting his credentials on his arrival from Kabul, and then left for the summer. He seems pleasant and cordial but a trifle colourless.

Representatives accredited to Iraq but resident elsewhere.

Belgium.

M. Egbert Graeffe, Minister (27th April, 1945).
M. Graeffe is Minister at Tehran where he resides. He is a very Gallic Belgian and a typical Latin diplomat with a fund of stories about the errors and failings of his colleagues and a strong interest in protocol. He is an amateur archaeologist with a good conversational knowledge of Middle Eastern antiquities. He pays a brief annual visit to Bagdad, sometimes accompanied by his wife. He has proved co-operative on the few occasions when co-operation has been required.

China.

Mr. Li Tieh-Tseng, Minister (8th April, 1944).
Mr. Li has been in the Diplomatic Service since 1931 and has served in London for four years, during which period he acted as Secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference. In 1934 and 1935 he was Secretary to the Chinese delegation to the League Assembly. He speaks good English and has an agreeable manner. He visited Bagdad in the spring of this year.

The Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* is Mr. Yu Hono-Joei, Second Secretary to the Legation. He has a Polish wife. Both are amiable, ineffective and slightly pathetic. They both speak good French and some English. Roman Catholics and very devout.

Czechoslovakia.

M. Josef M. Kadlec, Minister (11th April, 1944).
Also Minister at Tehran where he resides. He has only once visited Bagdad, when I found him heavy in the hand.

Denmark.

Dr. M. A. E. C. Fensmark, Chargé d'Affaires (17th June, 1939).

United States.

Mr. James Moose, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*.
Mr. Loy Henderson, after a rapid tour of the Middle East and a visit to India, left Iraq on the 7th April to take up the post of Head of the Division of Middle Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department, whence he still makes his influence felt in Iraq. No new Head of Mission has yet been nominated, and it is believed that the United States Government may refrain from action until they can appoint an Ambassador. The Mission was for a time in charge of Mr. W. D. Moreland, a colourless and ineffective secretary, and latterly Mr. James Moose, who came from Damascus to assume the post of Counsellor and act as Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*.

The Americans here are not as friendly as they used to be. They give the impression of being jealous of our rather special position, while the dollar shortage, which militates against United States trade expansion and participation in capital development, is a constant source of irritation.

Dr. Fensmark resides at Tehran and seldom visits Bagdad. He is friendly, garrulous and a little tiresome.

Holy See.

Mgr. de Jonghe d'Ardoye.
A charming and dignified prelate with a twinkle in his eye. An acute observer of politics and personalities. He is a Belgian. Although not officially recognised by the Iraqi Government, a point on which he is somewhat sensitive, he is invited to and attends all diplomatic functions. He has served for many years in the Far East and has travelled extensively in China and Burma.

Netherlands.

The Minister, Dr. P. L. C. Visser, was transferred to South Africa in 1944. His successor has not yet been seen.

Poland.

M. B. Kosciolkowski, Chargé d'Affaires.
The Polish Legation at Bagdad has been in charge of M. Kosciolkowski, a devout adherent of the London Government, since November 1944. The Iraqi Government having just withdrawn their recognition, M. Kosciolkowski's functions have ended, and he will soon be on his travels.

Sweden.

Dr. G. Jarring, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*.
Dr. Jarring, who resides in Tehran, has been Chargé d'Affaires since the recall of Mr. S. H. Pousette to Sweden in July last. He has not so far visited Bagdad.

protracted, furniture and fittings had to be imported or locally constructed at enormous cost, office equipment arrived but slowly, and it was no easy matter for M. Zaitsev or his staff to secure cars for their transport. However, after some uncomfortable weeks these and other minor difficulties were ironed out with the expenditure of several thousand pounds so that the legation to-day is a going concern and, so far as I have been able to gather, a pretty happy one. I do not know the exact strength of the staff, but the minister is very proud of the school he has established for their children, who number a dozen or more.

2. From the beginning, our relations with the Russians have been extremely cordial. The minister is a cheerful, pleasant little man with a sense of humour. His wife, a comfortable country type, has smartened up noticeably since coming to this shabby capital, and no longer commits the gaffes of inexperience, such as appearing at an evening reception in a hat. This sort of thing was, of course, never of any importance, except that it provided the excuse for foolish sniggering in the background, and was consequently better avoided. Mme. Zaitsev is learning English, her progress lately having been fairly rapid, thanks, I believe, to the arrival from Moscow of a young woman secretary who, though never previously out of Russia, speaks our tongue fluently and now accompanies her "chefess" on most social occasions. Of the rest of the legation, M. Klimov, the counsellor, is the one we know best. A rather sinister personality, he is popularly reputed to be the secret power behind the throne. He speaks English slowly, but quite well, and has always been most courteous and amicable in his contacts with us, though scarcely forthcoming and excessively cautious. Neither he nor his minister allow themselves to be drawn into any political discussion of any sort or kind, maintaining in this respect a truly admirable discretion. To sum up, and with the reservation that I have never so far found myself on the opposite side of their barricade, I consider the Zaitsevs and the Klimovs pleasant and intelligent people.

3. In the eyes of the Iraqis, however, the Soviet Legation is a somewhat menacing institution. To the well-to-do majority, it represents the vanguard of a mysterious and ruthless aggression. They are uneasy at having the Russians in occupation of Persian territory on their very borders, especially in the vicinity of troubled Kurdistan. Recently Iraqi apprehensions have been increased by news items concerning Russian ambitions in the Straits and the Mediterranean, and by reports of their attitude in the discussions of the five foreign ministers. Then the rich, and the ultra-conservative religious leaders, are fearful of local "Communist" intrigues which, rightly or wrongly, they firmly believe are inspired by the legation. The fact is that the Iraqis in political, official and propertied circles are afraid of the creeping shadow from the north. Film displays in the wide garden of M. Zaitsev's official residence, illustrating as they do the formidable military might of Russia, do nothing to allay apprehension—in the stillness of the desert night one can almost hear the measured tramp of those magnificent columns through the Red Square. There is a growing feeling that Stalin is more Tsarist than the emperors ever were. This suspicion is reinforced by factors peculiarly operative in any backward, but changing, oriental land. Long-established and powerful vested interests, tribal and urban, fear lest Russian influences and Russian ideas may undermine, and ultimately rob them of, their age-old privileges and perquisites. Thus, any overdue move for the amelioration of the fellah's lot or of working conditions in the towns is all too frequently associated in reactionary minds with the dynamism that emanates from Moscow. Here, as elsewhere, the fevered imagination of the privileged detects a bearded Bolshevik peering round every corner.

4. In contrast to the above, there can be no doubt that to the young "effendi" and to many of the working poor the Soviet is of absorbing interest. As we learnt to our cost during the melancholy decade that preceded the second world war, youth in particular in this country is attracted by novel slogans and posturings, by the mass evolutions of uniformed thousands, by the bawlings of semi-deified leaders. They like newsreels of huge, white rectangular buildings, of great industries humming with activity, and so on and so forth. Yesterday the Fascists provided stimulation on these lines. To-day it comes from Russia. And Soviet propaganda has an added appeal—it is securely based on great achievement and it is anti-imperialist in the sense that it attacks the policies and theories and aims of the so-called Anglo-Saxon land and money-grabbers, old-fashioned exploiters of the weaker nations. Here, incidentally, is one reason why I personally greatly welcomed the terms of the Foreign Office communiqué that announced the end of your conferences with His Majesty's representatives

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[E 7495/104/93]

No. 2

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 8th October.)

(No. 398.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 26th September, 1945.

HAVING been responsible in some degree for advising a rather reluctant Iraqi Government to grasp the nettle of entering into diplomatic intercourse with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it has been a matter of particular interest to me personally to observe the manner in which the new Russian Legation has fared since its establishment here in February last. Materially speaking, its beginnings were difficult. The search for suitable premises was

in the Middle East, for it referred to the "financial, economic and social" needs of the area in question. Too long, it seems to me, have we refrained in our official pronouncements from registering any interest whatever in the well-being of the ordinary inhabitants, the countless little people, in countries such as this. Now that we have started on this path of emphasising our concern with public welfare, let us continue bravely ahead, for here is one way of promoting a growing and necessary appreciation of the progressive element in British policies. By emphasising the modernity of our thought and action, we can influence in our favour the many, still largely unorganised and inarticulate, who to-day in Iraq seek a better life for their fellows. The small minority of convinced extremists who now call themselves "Communists," and who five years ago mostly sported the Swastika, must always have an enemy which, as long as we carry our present responsibilities here, will inevitably remain Britain.

5. In the above connexion, I have for some months endeavoured, with the assistance of our specialist services, to ascertain to what, if any, extent the coming of the Russians has complicated our task in Iraq, described by Sir K. Cornwallis as one of the most difficult States in the world to govern. So far my enquiries have had no startling results. While there is all too much evidence of silly anti-British criticism and talk generally on the part of certain of my American colleagues, no whisper has reached me of similar activity by the Russians. That M. Zaitsev and his subordinates are active is undeniable—they entertain quite a lot and they welcome at the Soviet Legation guests not usually seen elsewhere, such as junior Iraqi officials from this or that obscure bureau, schoolmasters, young journalists, and other rather humble folk. But of any so-called subversive activities I have up to date found no trace. And the British head of the Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department states that "nothing has been brought to the notice of this department to indicate that the Russians are now exerting, or are attempting to exert, any action which may cause any of the political parties, or any individual, to be affected or influenced in their favour." Similarly, in the case of the present troubles in Kurdistan, there has reached us no indication of Soviet participation, direct or indirect. This does not mean that no Iraqi Kurds have been befriended by Russians in Persia. No doubt that has occurred. No doubt, too, that M. Savaroff of the legation is engaged in some species of intelligence work. But so, for that matter, is Captain Roosevelt of the United States Military Attaché's office, while we all know too much about "Colonel" Dayton of the O.S.S. and the United States Steel Corporation. I may add that we searched in vain for signs that the Soviet Legation are subsidising this or that organ of the vernacular press (and nothing could be easier to do) or any Iraqi individual, again no difficult task.

6. I am conscious that in this despatch I may have depicted a surprising and possibly unique state of affairs. From the local point of view it is none the less satisfactory for that. Perhaps it is but temporary, and that sooner or later it will alter to our disadvantage, so that we find ourselves caught up in an orgy of queer intrigues and manoeuvres, such as seemingly enliven the diplomatic scene in Persia. But I hope not. Meanwhile, I think that our only policy here in dealing with the Russians is to be frank and friendly, for there is nothing in our relations with Iraq that calls for concealment or equivocation. And I believe that it is only by friendliness and frankness, coupled as circumstances may dictate with firmness, that we can hope to overcome the suspicions and defensive psychology of our allies which, combined as it is with what Lord Vansittart once described as the "Old Adam" element in human nature, makes them difficult, and indeed incalculable, to handle by western standards.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the General Officer Commanding and the Air Officer Commanding, as well as to the Office of the Minister Resident.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

[E 7496/6265/65]

No. 3

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 8th October.)

(No. 403.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 28th September, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Eastern Department's letter of the 8th September on the subject of communism in Iraq, and to transmit a copy of a memorandum on the Iraqi Communist party which has been prepared by C.I.C.I.

2. I agree generally with this memorandum, but desire to make certain reservations. I do not consider, for instance, that the statement in paragraph 3 that "the conditions of the railway workers are probably much higher than in any other form of organised labour in Iraq" is true. At the time of the strike in April of this year it was considered that wages which the unskilled labourers were then drawing (about £4 a month) were quite inadequate. They certainly compared unfavourably with the wages paid by, for example, the oil companies, and the director-general, Iraqi State Railways, was advised accordingly at the time. I raised this matter again with Colonel Smith on his recent return from the United Kingdom. Apart from the duty which, in my view, is always incumbent on us to use our influence to raise the level of the people and to assure them so far as possible of "freedom from want," we have a special responsibility in the matter of the railways, inasmuch as the director-general and all the senior officers are British. Any criticism of the railways, therefore, becomes quite justifiably criticism of Britain and British methods in Iraq.

3. As regards "communism" in general, members of this embassy lose no opportunity of impressing on Ministers and all responsible Iraqis with whom they come in contact that their first line of defence against communism is an advanced social programme. Communism, we always say, only flourishes in discontented countries. This line of argument has become more than ever appropriate since the establishment of the Russian representation here, and the fears of officially-inspired "Communist propaganda"—so far as I am aware so far unfounded—to which it has given rise.

4. There are signs that progress is being made on the social front. The Iraqi Government have just decided to appoint an experienced British adviser to the staff of the Ministry of Social Affairs to deal exclusively with labour problems, having selected as a candidate a Major Boyd Smith of Paiforce. The Ministry has also been most receptive to advice tendered by the British Army Labour and Pioneer Department in regard to the establishment of labour exchanges and the amendment of the Labour Law. There is also in existence a Central Iraqi Labour Committee under the chairmanship of the Oriental Counsellor, on which are represented the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi State Railways, the British army, the Royal Air Force and the oil companies, i.e., all the major employers of labour in the country. The aim of this committee is to avoid inequalities and anomalies of employment and to ensure fair wages and conditions for the workers. In this regard it is worth placing on record that the oil companies always take an enlightened and liberal view of their obligations to their workers.

5. With regard to paragraph 7 of the memorandum, it is much to be hoped that the railways trade union will again be established. The workers are evidently in earnest; a deputation of railwaymen called on the Regent less than a week after His Royal Highness's return to demand that the union be restored. It is, in my opinion, both wrong and foolish to deny the fundamental rights of labour representation to the workers of Iraq, for such representation must come sooner or later and might as well be accepted without a futile struggle and the bitterness it must engender. Nor do I agree with the observation in paragraph 10 that the Middle East Labour Conference would place the Iraqi Government in an awkward position. It is perfectly true that many so-called "Communists" are merely extreme Left-wing nationalists who, no longer being able to belabour the Fascists and Nazis, naturally attack us as being the predominant foreigners in the country, and will continue to do so as long as we have an interest, sometimes a controlling interest, in so many concerns here, such as the railways and the port. On the contrary, I consider that a Middle East Labour Conference would be concrete proof of the interest which we take in the social advancement of the peoples of the Middle East. I am sure, too, that the Government of Iraq would respond by sending a delegation which would adequately represent not only the Iraqi Government but also the workers of the country.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 3

(Secret.)

Iraq Communist Party.

PLEASE refer to your 791/16/45 of the 22nd September, 1945.

2. The pamphlet enclosed in your letter under reference is but one of many published by the so-called Iraq "Communist" party. It was commented upon in

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our Security Summary No. 75, period the 1st May, 1945-1st June, 1945, paragraph 6 (c), and many comments on the growth of the Labour and Communist movements in Iraq have been quoted in this and other Security Summaries. The original pamphlet is a Qaida publication, of which we hold the copies in Arabic. It was widely distributed during the last week of May 1945 in Basra, Bagdad and at nearly all stations on the Iraq State Railways. The translation itself in all probability came from the director-general of railways with whom I discussed the matter at the time.

3. The allegations contained in the pamphlet are extremely exaggerated, and but few of the attacks on General Smith and the railways administration are at all justified, in fact, as stated at the time of the railway strike, the conditions of the railways workers are probably much higher than in any other form of organised labour in Iraq. It is unfortunate it is true that certain of the regulations laid down in the Iraq Labour laws are contravened by the railways administration, but it is also true that they are contravened to the advantage of the workers. This fact is entirely lost sight of in the many tirades published by these so-called "Communists." It is not easy to give answers in a few words to the questions in your letter, but we will endeavour to do this as briefly as possible hereunder.

4. All that can be said as to the present strength of the Iraq Communist party is that it very definitely exceeds in membership 6,000. Its headquarters is in Bagdad, but it has sub-sections in all the large towns and in many of the smaller. Its influence has been increasing steadily as far as Labour is concerned. It also has a strong group amongst lawyers, particularly the Law College, in the army, amongst the school teachers and more advanced students and, of course, in all the various unions.

5. The Iraq Communist party has no legal standing and the provisos in the Bagdad Penal Code make any form of communism an offence against the Crown. Unions, however, are in certain cases legal and a number of them have been registered since September 1944.

6. Here it is worth while noting the activities of Mohammad Salih al Qazzaz. In 1924 this man made an application to the Ministry of the Interior for permission to open a Labour club. This was refused. Meetings under this man continued until 1929, when the Government authorised the formation of a trade society, of which Qazzaz was president. In 1932 this society was closed down by Muzahim al Pachachi, then Minister of the Interior, as a result of its organising an internal strike. Qazzaz was arrested and ordered to live outside Bagdad. In 1932, however, an engineers' society was formed under Qazzaz, and in 1933 this society was changed to the Labour Union Society. This continued until the middle of 1935, when the society was declared illegal by the Government and, later in the year, the president and leading members of the committee were arrested and exiled. A few days later the society was closed and several members were arrested, having been caught distributing pamphlets urging the people to declare a general strike. From this period until the autumn of 1944 the Government did not sanction the formation of any legal Labour movement.

7. The Labour movement came back legally in September 1944 when the Railways Workers' Union was sanctioned by the Government. At the first meeting of the Railway Workers' Union on the 7th November, 1944, Hashim Jewad of the International Labour Office was in the chair and administrative and supervising committees were elected. Ali Shukur was elected president with Abboud Hamza as secretary; a committee of seven was inaugurated and a supervising committee of twelve persons was also elected. Amongst these nineteen persons were many agitators and so-called Communists. This committee lasted until the railway strike early this year, when the union was closed by the Government. Though now illegal, it is still operating underground and is exercising great pressure on the Government to be allowed to operate once again.

8. There are twelve other unions of which some of the stronger are: the Mechanics' Union, the Weavers' Union, the Shoemakers' Union, the Cigarette Factory Workers' Union. All these have at times caused trouble to their employers and have featured in the illegal publications of Al Qaida group.

9. To summarise Iraq's Labour movement, it may be said that there is a growing Labour conscience, but that in the main their efforts are often misdirected by unscrupulous persons, particularly the Qaida group.

10. Reference paragraph 3 of your above quoted letter, it should be noted that should a Middle East Labour Conference be convened it will probably place the Iraq Government in rather an awkward position. Undoubtedly, not only persons of integrity such as Hashim Jewad would wish to attend such a

conference, but also many of the extremist riff-raff should they come to the fore in the various unions. Many of these people call themselves "Communists," but they have no legal standing and they are in essence, in the main, against their own Government and in particular against what they call British imperialism. Any such meeting would undoubtedly be a little stormy, and were it sponsored by the Ministry of Labour and National Service might place both ourselves and the Iraqi Government in the queer.

11. It is regretted that, though we have answered the questions contained in your letter, we leave the picture far from completed. It has, however, served to bring to our notice the fact that London has quite obviously got some peculiar ideas on Labour and communism in Iraq. We therefore hope to produce a paper covering the subject more fully in the course of the next week or so.

12. I return herewith the photostat copy of the pamphlet, and should you wish to see the Arabic original or any other of Qaida's numerous clandestine publications, we are in a position to provide you with them.

P. REX MARRIOTT

Defence Security Officer.

Bagdad, 25th September, 1945.

[N 13970/10764/38]

No. 4

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 16th October.)

(No. 410.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 3rd October, 1945.

IN connexion with your despatch No. 232 of the 13th September asking for information about the Communist party in Iraq, I have the honour to invite attention to Mr. Thompson's despatches Nos. 398 and 403, of the 26th and 28th September, reporting on Russian activities and communism in Iraq.

2. From these despatches it will be seen that although communism, or something passing under that name, has a considerable following in this country, there is at present no evidence that the Iraqi Communists are directed by or in contact with Russia or any organisation outside Iraq.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER-BIRD.

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

[N 14021/10674/38]

No. 5

Mr. Young to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 17th October.)

(No. 181).

Sir,

Beirut, 5th October, 1945.

IN reply to your despatch No. 200 of the 13th September regarding the relations between the local Communist parties and Moscow, I have the honour to inform you that there is little to add on this subject to the reports already furnished in my despatches Nos. 37 of the 5th March, 71 of the 6th May and 106 of the 20th June.

2. The information in the possession of this Legation suggests that the answers to the questions contained in paragraph 3 of your despatch under reference are as follows:—

- (a) and (b) Very little, except in so far as the newspapers run by the local Communist parties follow general Soviet directives in commenting on world affairs.
- (c) The Syrian and Lebanese Communist parties are in close touch and frequently hold meetings in common, but are not known to have any particular relations with Communist parties in neighbouring countries.
- (d) The acknowledged leader of the Syrian Communist party, Khalid Bagdash, is Moscow-trained, but no indications have been received that any Communists have recently returned to this country from Russia.

3. As has previously been pointed out, the Syrian and Lebanese Communist parties are little more than trades union organisations, and except in the case of a few uninfluential individuals their members have no knowledge of, or sympathy with, Communist ideology.

I have, &c.
G. P. YOUNG.

[E 8322/8/89]

No. 6

Mr. Shone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 2nd November.)

(No. 193.)

Sir,

Beirut, 20th October, 1945.

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of Mr. Young's telegram No. 984 of the 15th October reporting a conversation with the Lebanese President, I have the honour to report that information received from British sources in all parts of Syria during the past two months has indicated a marked recent increase of talk in favour of the institution of a monarchy in Syria, especially amongst the tribal and Alaouite leaders, in Homs and Hama, in Aleppo and in the Jebel Druze.

2. The Monarchist issue has been latent in Syria since the French expelled King Faisal in 1920, but until lately there has been much difference of opinion as to the choice of candidate for the throne. It has now, however, become clear that the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan enjoys more support than any other claimant, partly, no doubt, on account of the propaganda and discreet distribution of largesse in which he appears to have been indulging, and partly because his accession would directly contribute towards the realisation of the Greater Syria project, which makes strong appeal to some Nationalist circles. The Regent of Iraq, who at one time appeared to be a potential rival, is now rarely mentioned in this connexion and seems to have few supporters; and other possible candidates, such as Faisal, Ibn Saud, have faded into the background.

3. Most of the so-called Monarchists have only a vague conception of what a monarchy would imply and little real enthusiasm for the Amir Abdullah or any other candidate; and their profession of Monarchist ideas, where not merely an emanation of that fickleness and love of change which is so pronounced a Syrian characteristic, may be accounted chiefly a measure of their dissatisfaction with the present régime.

4. Since the Troupes Spéciales were transferred in August, Franco-Syrian relations, for the first time in many years, are no longer in the forefront of public interest, which has tended in consequence to concentrate on internal affairs. These have given little cause for satisfaction. Since 1943 Syrian political life has been dominated by the National bloc, whose policy of unremitting opposition to the French has best interpreted popular sentiment. Successive Governments have been chosen from amongst its members and have consequently contained an unduly high proportion of Damascenes. The bloc Ministers have, for the most part, no special aptitude for administration and, in addition, have been wholly occupied in external affairs, so that no Government has succeeded in improving the administration or in promoting the urgently required social services; whilst this same preoccupation has prevented the President and the Ministers from undertaking those extended tours of the provinces which are so necessary if Syria is ever to acquire a national spirit. The provincial Mohafezes are mostly men who had previously been seen in the rôle of subordinates to the French provincial officials, and consequently lack prestige; and the security services, which are only now beginning to emerge from the chaos into which they were thrown by the events of last May, and the subsequent mass desertions of the Troupes Spéciales, are not yet an effective instrument. Throughout the provinces, therefore, there is widespread lack of respect for the authority of the Government and a tendency to regard it as a "Damascus racket," bent on furthering the interests of the bloc rather than of the country as a whole. Hence the feeling that any régime is preferable to the present one.

5. Monarchist advocates, besides dwelling on the shortcomings described in the previous paragraph, adduce the following arguments:—

- (a) That the republican form of government was foisted on Syria by the French, and is quite unsuited to the country's need, since its effect is merely to place the power in the hands of an unrepresentative oligarchy.
- (b) That parliamentary government in Syria is unworkable on account of the feudal organisation of the country, which makes it impracticable to hold elections on anything like a true democratic basis.
- (c) That the Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Palestine are historically and economically one unit, and should be united under one ruler.

6. That the Syrian President is seriously exercised at the growth of the Monarchist movement was shown, even before his conference with the Lebanese President, reported in Mr. Young's telegram under reference, by the fact that he raised the question in the course of recent interviews with three separate British officials. In each case he began by enquiring what a British official would reply if asked whether His Majesty's Government preferred Syria to be a monarchy or a republic. On being told on each occasion that the reply would naturally be that this matter concerned the Syrian people and not us, he gave each an almost identical dissertation on the theme that this policy was not in conformity with British interests and that, since it was well known that an expression of British views would affect public opinion in this matter more than any other factor, we should abandon this neutral attitude in favour of a more active support for himself and his régime, at least on the lines that a change of régime was inexpedient so long as Franco-Syrian relations remained unresolved. His main arguments were as follows:—

- (a) The establishment of a monarchy would not conduce to stability in Syria, but rather the reverse; history showed that nearly every king, caliph or sultan in the country had either been murdered or exiled by revolution, and Syrians, who always wanted a change, would never remain loyal to a dynasty for more than a short time.
- (b) To institute a monarchy in Syria at this time would seriously weaken the Arab League, which Great Britain was known to favour. If the Syrian throne were given to a Hashimite, Ibn Saud would be disgruntled; if it went to a son of Ibn Saud, the Hashimites would be disgruntled; and if to an Egyptian prince, such as Mohammed Ali, both the Hashimites and the Saudis would be disgruntled.

(c) Finally, the great advantage of Shukri Quwatli himself was that he had come to power through the will of the people and had not been imposed on Syria by the British; whereas King Faisal and the Emir Abdullah had been so imposed by us, and King Farouk was known to be maintained on his throne by us. Thus, when the President carried out his policy of close collaboration with ourselves, the effect was infinitely greater.

7. The Monarchists have, naturally, not scrupled to suggest that their schemes have British support; for example, Fauzi Bakri, who recently visited Transjordan with a group of Opposition Syrian Deputies, and saw the British Resident at Amman, gave it out on his return that the latter had indicated British support for the claims of the Amir Abdullah, although reports from the Resident show that he carefully avoided any expression of opinion and, indeed, refused to discuss the matter. A report reached the Syrian President that certain British officers had been indulging in pro-Hashimite propaganda; it has been possible to convince him that this report was unfounded, but, in addition, instructions have been sent to His Majesty's consuls and political officers by this legation, and to all military formations by the British military authorities, to refuse to discuss the Monarchist question with anyone.

8. On the other hand, the President's contention that British views on the question, if known, would have a decisive effect, is probably well founded. For the moment, with the formation of Saadullah Jabri's new Ministry, Monarchist talk has died down; but there will undoubtedly be a recrudescence in the near future unless another crises with the French blows up. Since it is clearly undesirable that the internal situation in Syria should be further complicated by this issue at the present time, there would seem to be some advantages in letting it be known locally that, in the British view, the present is not the time to raise it. I should be glad to receive your instructions on this point.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and the Middle East Office in Cairo.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 9699/8/89]

No. 7

Mr. Bevin to M. Massigli.

Foreign Office,

13th December, 1945.

Your Excellency,

WITH reference to the discussions on the problems of the Levant and the Middle East which were begun between M. Bidault and myself in September last, I now have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree to the terms of the two documents annexed hereto regarding the evacuation of British and French forces from the Levant States and regarding the situation in the Middle East.

2. If your Excellency's Government likewise accept the terms of these documents this note, and your reply to that effect, will be regarded as establishing the agreement of the two Governments in this matter.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7

BRITISH and French military experts will meet at Beirut on the 21st December, 1945, to draw up the details of a programme for evacuation by stages, with a corresponding regrouping of forces.

One of the objects of this discussion will be to fix a very early date on which the withdrawal will begin.

It is understood that the evacuation of Syria shall be carried out *pari passu*, in such a way as to be completed at the same time by the British and French forces.

The programme of evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it will ensure the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security, until such time as the United Nations Organisation has decided on the organisation of collective security in this zone.

Until these arrangements have been carried out, the French Government will retain forces regrouped in the Lebanon.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government will inform the Lebanese and Syrian Governments of the details of the evacuation, and will invite those Governments to appoint as soon as possible representatives empowered to discuss the dispositions to be jointly agreed upon as a result of these decisions.

The discussions will also deal with the measures to be taken in order to enable the Lebanese and Syrian Governments to discharge their duty of maintaining order.

London, 13th December, 1945.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7

THE Provisional Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, having examined the situation in the Middle East, declare that they are animated by the same intention to do what is required of them to ensure that the independence which has been promised to the countries in question, shall be assured and respected.

The two Governments are agreed that it is in their mutual interest to promote, in collaboration with other Governments, the economic well-being of the peoples of this region in conditions of peace and security. They will exchange information as may be required regarding the best means by which this object may be attained. It is their desire that by such exchanges of information they will be able to avoid divergencies of policy which might impair their mutual interests. Each Government affirms its intention of doing nothing to supplant the interests or responsibilities of the other in the Middle East, having full regard to the political status of the countries in question.

It is in this spirit that they will examine any proposals submitted to the United Nations Organisation on the subject of collective security.

London, 13th December, 1945.

[E 8083/5/89]

No. 8

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 179, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 11th September, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 25th October.)

General.

INTEREST in both countries has been centred during the past week on the meeting in London of British representatives from the Middle East, and much speculation has taken place, both in the press and in political circles, as to the effect of these discussions on the problems of the Levant and of Palestine.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 1st-7th September, 1945, amount to 7,826 tons, a daily average of 1,118 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945-46 crop up to 140,998 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Bairam holidays have much restricted public business during the week. The position with regard to the new Syrian Cabinet remains obscure. It is reported that the resignation of Lutfi Haffar has not been accepted by the President, though he has not yet appeared in his office to take up his work; at one time it appeared likely that he would insist on his resignation being accepted and that the Ministry of the Interior would be taken over by Sabri el Assali.

The uncertain position of the present Government and the unfavourable impression created by the recent attacks in the Chamber have resulted in widespread demands for the dissolution of the Chamber and new elections, and considerable speculation on electoral reform and constitutional changes. It seems certain that the Monarchist elements have gained considerable ground and Opposition elements are crystallising round Jamil Mardam. While a personal reconciliation has been effected between Jamil and Saadullah Jabri, it is not likely to mean any degree of political co-operation and considerable political difficulties are probable during the course of the next few months. The administrative machine has, during the last few weeks, been even less effective than usual; this is particularly evident in the Ministry of the Interior owing to the absence not only of the Minister but also of the Director-General, who is now acting as Chief of Police; but a similar state of affairs also exists in other departments, and half of the Ministries have not yet prepared their budgets.

The General Officer Commanding British Troops, North Levant, and the Brigadier-General Staff were received by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence on the 5th September, when the following subjects were discussed:—

- (i) The General Officer Commanding submitted a proposal providing for the participation by the Syrian army in the work at present being done by Bedouforce in the Jezireh. The proposals were readily accepted by the Syrians.
- (ii) The General Officer Commanding referred to the recent attacks on three French soldiers in Tartous, which had resulted in the death of one of them, and pressed the Government to take action against the assailants. The Prime Minister agreed to arrange for an enquiry to be made and for the necessary action to be taken.

The prominent pro-Monarchists, Fawzi Bahri Pasha, Assad Bakri, Saïd Mahasen and others visited Amman before the Bairam and were received by the Amir Abdullah.

Sharp rivalry between the trade unionists and Communists became evident at the meeting of the Syndicates Union held in Damascus at the end of last month. As a result the Government have reconsidered their decision to approve of Syrian participation in the International Trades Union Conference at Paris, and for the same reason the celebration of Syrian labour day on the 6th September was postponed.

Alaouites.

The situation in both Lattakia and Tartous remains unchanged. Tension continues high and scarcely a day passes without some minor incident. Dissatisfaction with the present régime in Syria seems to be growing, and there is evidence of increasing sympathy for the idea of a monarchy, though, as elsewhere in Syria, there is no general agreement as to the person of the proposed king or the form the régime should take.

The Lattakia press has been running a campaign against Suleiman Murshed. The political officer has pointed out to the Mohafez that such a campaign is making it more difficult than ever to reconcile Sunnis and Alaouites. The Mohafez has sent a strongly-worded statement to *El Khaba*, one of the newspapers concerned, pointing out that gendarmerie investigations have proved that Murshed had had nothing to do with the recent robberies of which the paper had accused him and suggesting that such charges should be verified before publication.

Captain Boussiquet, the notorious head of the French political service in Lattakia, left on transfer on the 1st September. He has, however, been replaced by Captain Touzé from East Syria, whose reputation is also not good.

H.M.S. *Jervis* left Lattakia on the 6th September and is not being replaced.

Lebanon.

At the sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 4th September at which the Bill for the ratification of the United Nations Charter was passed (see Political Summary No. 178, section 11, paragraph 4) Riad Solh suggested that the Charter conflicted with the Covenant of the Arab League in that the latter recognised Palestine as an independent Arab State whereas the United Nations Charter considers it as mandated territory. After the debate the Chamber adopted a resolution stating that their ratification of the United Nations Charter did

not imply any recognition on their part of the abnormal situation and temporary status of Palestine and Transjordan, which they regarded as two independent Arab countries in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the Arab League, and announcing their determination to pursue their efforts to aid these States to attain sovereignty.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has had further conversations with the French authorities regarding the transfer of the outstanding French-controlled services. Finding the French representative inclined to stall, he appears to have spoken strongly to him stressing that this matter must be settled without delay. It is reported from another source that the French authorities are now resigned to handing over the Grand Sérail to the Lebanese Government as soon as they can find alternative accommodation for their services.

The Lebanese Government has now approved a scheme for the organisation of the Lebanese security forces. The scheme provides for a total strength of 5,000, made up of 2,500 military personnel, 2,000 gendarmes (an increase of 250 over the present strength) and 500 police. The intention is understood to be that these forces shall all come under the Ministry of Defence, i.e., the gendarmerie and police will be transferred from the Ministry of the Interior, on which they depend at present. The figures of 2,500 for the army is substantially smaller than that suggested by the Lebanese military authorities, who have envisaged a total strength of some 4,000; this the President considered excessive and too expensive for the country's small resources.

Posts and Telegraphs censorship ceased in the Lebanon by agreement between French and British authorities at midnight on the 7th September. Other Allied security measures, such as frontier controls, the B.C.C.L. (control of visas for the Levant States), the Mieh-Mieh internment camp and film censorship, are to cease on the 15th September. British military press censorship is also expected to be abolished in the near future.

Negotiations between the American oil companies and the Lebanese Government regarding the grant of a concession for the erection of two oil refineries at Tripoli are stated so far to be held up by the insistence of the Government that the refineries and their personnel shall pay Lebanese income tax. The Americans maintain that this would put the refineries at a disadvantage compared with the Haifa refinery; but the Lebanese maintain that the concession for the latter was granted under a mandatory régime and that its terms cannot therefore be taken as a precedent for a concession to be granted by a fully independent State.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has reinstituted the Higher Economic Council, which was suppressed in 1943.

[E 8084/5/89]

(2)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 180, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 18th September, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 25th October.)

General.

The reference in General de Gaulle's recent statement to *The Times* regarding the Levant States has aroused indignant comments in the press of both countries. After a meeting between the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs on the 14th September, the Lebanese Prime Minister on the 15th September issued an official statement commenting on General de Gaulle's remarks. He declared that the Lebanese, whilst glad of any Anglo-French agreement, since this would help to guarantee world peace, could in no way accept that the Levant States, or other Middle Eastern countries, should become "zones of influence" for Great Britain and France or any other foreign Power; for the equal status of these countries had been recognised by the United Nations Charter. He also pointed out that General de Gaulle seemed to have overlooked the importance of the Arab League, which, he said, had been recognised by the United Nations Charter as one of the regional organisations which would guarantee world security. He could have wished that such a declaration had not been made at this stage since its only effect could be to disturb the atmosphere and raise doubts of the intentions of foreign Powers. All the newspapers in Syria published an official reply from the Syrian Prime Minister in the following terms: "General de Gaulle is free to say what he likes in regard to his wish for the strengthening of the traditional

friendship between Britain and France, but we deny him the right to make the prerogatives of the Middle East States a subject of bargaining for the maintenance of this friendship."

The question of the despatch by the States' Governments of a joint note to Great Britain and France requesting the evacuation of their troops from the Levant States has continued to figure prominently in the press. It was discussed at the meeting of the two Governments at Bludan on the 12th September and, it is understood, by the two Foreign Ministers when they met on the 14th September. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs later informed this legation that, in deference to British representations, the joint notes would not be despatched, at least for the present; and, while the Syrian Prime Minister stated that his Government had addressed a telegram to their Minister in Paris instructing him to inform the French Government that, as the war was now over, the Syrians were unable to see why the evacuation of French troops should be further delayed and to request that the evacuation should be expedited; and that no similar request had been addressed to His Majesty's Government, to whom, however, a copy of the note to the French Government is apparently to be sent with a request that His Majesty's Government should use their good offices to secure compliance with its terms. Both Governments continue to display impatience to learn what progress in this matter has been made in London.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 8th-16th September, 1945, amount to 5,308 tons, a daily average of 589 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945-46 crop up to 146,306 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian Chamber of Deputies met on the 15th and 16th September and passed draft laws for education, amnesty and taking over the army. The following are the main points of interest raised during the debate:—

- (a) The Prime Minister said that the question of the *avenantaires* was still under consideration.
- (b) The Prime Minister said that the Government would not allow French schools to reopen. (This question is now under discussion between the British and French authorities.)
- (c) The Prime Minister stated there had been rumours regarding strategic bases, frontier modifications, &c., being under discussion at present in London; these were matters for settlement by the world organisation under the United Nations Charter; although this was well known, as a measure of precaution, the Government had addressed a memorandum to the Big Five.
- (d) The Government were authorised to engage foreign and Arab experts for periods not exceeding three years. The debate concluded with a speech by Jamil Mardam in which he called for unity and pointed out that great efforts were still required to ensure the independence of the country. Jamil Bey had hoped that this appeal would receive some support from the Prime Minister or President of the Chamber, but this was not forthcoming.

On the whole the general political situation has somewhat improved during the past week. Urgently required legislation has been passed and in the coming month the Government will be in a position to reform and to attend to its work without embarrassment from the Chamber. It was expected that Lutfi Haffar would attend the meetings of the Chamber, but instead of doing so he caused a communiqué to be published in the press to the effect that he was unable to accept office with a Chamber as at present constituted. On the 16th September Sabri Assali also resigned owing, it is reported, to differences of opinion with the Prime Minister, whose weak policy Sabri Assali criticised.

M. Cuinat, representative in Damascus of the French Délégation Générale, was the victim of an attack by a group of youths on the 17th September. His injuries are fortunately slight—a knife wound in the leg. The acting consul called upon him and was allowed to read his official report on the incident; he had been visiting the Frères Maristes School and was returning in a horse-cab accompanied by a Syrian plain-clothes policeman when the vehicle was attacked; M. Cuinat and the policeman defended themselves and the assailants dispersed when the policeman fired a couple of shots in the air with his revolver. In his

opinion the incident was a clear indication of the anarchy prevailing in Damascus, where even police officers were open to attack, but he admitted that he did not believe that the attack had been intended for him. The report concluded with a warm tribute to the police officer whose conduct had been exemplary. The acting consul suggested that the real significance of the incident lay in the clear indication it afforded of the attitude of the Syrians to the reopening of French schools and that there might therefore be advantage in postponing the opening for a term when the atmosphere might be more favourable.

The desertion at the instigation of their tribal sheikhs of some sixty Méharistes at Palmyra (see section 5 of this report) led the Government to decide that their dismissal was the only possible course. Nuri Ibish, director of the Bedouin Control, tendered his resignation at this moment, on the grounds of interference by the military in affairs of his department, but was induced by the Prime Minister to withdraw his resignation after he had received a satisfactory definition of his functions and prerogatives.

Jebel Druze.

There has been some disturbance in the Jebel during the week arising out of the alleged murder by the Druze of two men from the Midani quarter of Damascus some two months ago. The official Government report which stated that the murders were committed by semi-nomad Arabs was not accepted by the Midani quarter, and for some weeks there has been a series of incidents ending last week with an attack in Jerramana (near Damascus) upon some Druze by assailants alleged to be from the Midani quarter. A noisy demonstration of considerable size was staged in Soueida and a small party of armed men set out for Damascus to avenge the death of the man murdered at Jerramana. The party, however, was induced to return to Soueida by the Acting Mohafez, Zeid Atrash, and the Syrian Prime Minister has arranged for a commission of representatives of the Druze and the Midani quarter to enquire into the whole affair; both parties have accepted the setting up of the commission and all is quite for the moment.

Lebanon.

A gentleman's agreement has been reached with the Lebanese Government under which British press censorship in the Lebanon shall be considerably relaxed, on the understanding that the Lebanese Government will do their utmost to ensure that the press refrains from publishing material which is either violently anti-French or of such a nature as to impair the morale of Allied troops or reveal items of great security interest.

No agreement has yet been reached between the Lebanese Government and the American oil companies regarding their application for a concession to erect two oil refineries at Tripoli. The Lebanese have now put forward a counter proposition and await the American reaction.

The Syrian National party (formerly P.P.S.) held a large rally at Baaklin in the Chouf on the 15th September. On this occasion their inveterate opponents the Communists did not stage a rival demonstration and there were no incidents. The party's aims include complete Lebanese independence and the abolition of confessionalism.

[E 7623/5/89]

(3)

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 181 Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for the week ending 25th September, 1945.—(Communicated by British Legation, Beirut; Received 11th October)

1. General.

Public interest during the past week has centred in the various reports, official and unofficial, received from London about the Middle East Representatives' Conference and the Conference of Foreign Ministers. These conferences, coupled with the report of King Farouk's visit to Jedda, have given rise to a strong

impression that big events are pending, and some uneasiness is being felt about what is going on; but while some fear is expressed that Middle East affairs, particularly those affecting the Levant States and Palestine, will be settled in the absence of representatives of the local Governments, there is on the whole a feeling of confidence that His Majesty's Government will not fail to take full account of the Arab point of view. The disclosure of President Truman's letter to Mr. Attlee regarding Jewish immigration to Palestine has also aroused some excitement, and there is a tendency in the press of both countries to rate Palestine as being in a high state of tension and liable to explode at any moment. It is certain that this question will increasingly preoccupy local opinion in the near future, unless and until the question of the States' relation with the French again comes to the forefront.

2. Economic.

Total purchases for the period 17th-22nd September, 1945, amount to 6,054 tons, a daily average of 1,009 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945-46 crop up to 152,360 tons.

3. Syria—Damascus.

Efforts to complete the Syrian Cabinet by the appointment of Ministers of the Interior and Justice continued throughout the week, but have so far been unsuccessful. The situation was complicated on the 25th September by the retirement to bed of the Prime Minister with a severe attack of heart trouble. If he recovers sufficiently to continue in office, it is possible that an attempt will be made to fill the existing vacancies in the Cabinet. If, on the other hand, his health does not allow him to return to work, it is thought that Saadullah Jabri, or Khaled el Azm, may be asked to form a new Government. Lutfi Haffar, Hashim Atassi, and Jamil Mardam Bey are also mentioned as possible Prime Ministers, though it does not seem likely that Jamil Mardam Bey will agree to take office at this stage.

It is noteworthy that in the course of the week the President has taken an active part in trying to form an operative Government, and that he has abandoned the policy of giving a free hand to the Prime Minister in the formation of his Cabinet, a policy which, when the present Government was formed, he considered necessary in order to secure the passing of urgently required legislation.

The President of the Republic in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires discussed the internal situation at length and did not conceal his anxiety regarding the turn which events had taken; he also spoke of the pro-Monarchist campaign which is being conducted by opposition elements throughout Syria, and argued that it was in the interests of His Majesty's Government to define their attitude more clearly if they did not wish to see the break up of the Arab League.

In conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires the Prime Minister has agreed to submit to the Cabinet a British suggestion for the replacement of the press censorship by a press liaison office, to which the newspapers would be required to submit, prior to publication, articles affecting the movements and morale of Allied troops, together with an undertaking by the Government to do all in their power to prevent the publication of violently anti-French material. During the same conversation the Prime Minister agreed to take no action with regard to the prevention of the reopening of French schools in Syria, which the Chamber had recommended, until His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had had an opportunity of discussing the problem with the French in Beirut.

Abdul Rahman Azzam and Hafez Wehbeh arrived in Damascus on the 19th September. In an interview with the press the former said that the Arab world was faced with three main problems, Palestine, French evacuation from the Levant States and Libya. He was received by the President of the Republic and the leading members of the Government and a number of public functions were given in his honour.

Hassan Jabbara, Minister of Supply, has been appointed Syrian representative on the M.I.R.A. Commission in place of Jamil Mardam Bey.

Subhi Khatib (Damascus), Mustafa Jallad (Aleppo) and Chafic Fattouh (Homs) have been elected by the Syrian Syndicates to represent Syria at the International Trades Union Conference at Paris. It is reported that the Prime Minister is in favour of the Communist party sending two representatives to the conference.

An article which appeared in a Damascus newspaper on the activities of the Red army in Berlin has resulted in a strong protest by the Russian Minister, who has demanded the suspension of the newspaper.

4. Aleppo.

The past week has been quiet, and the recent order from Damascus to the Mohafez that he should deal with any elements threatening the peace, coupled with the Mohafez' known determination to enforce such orders, has materially altered the French Délégué Général.

There has been a marked tendency of late for French officers to wander about the town unescorted, despite the fact that local antagonism towards them has increased. M. Fauquenot, the Délégué, has been informed by the Officer Commanding British Troops that if he persisted in touring Aleppo unescorted, the British Military authorities could not be responsible for his safety. He has told His Majesty's Consul that he cannot accept British military protection without orders from the French Délégué Général.

Two Aleppo advocates representing the Aleppo Committee of a proposed new Labour party have requested His Majesty's Consul to obtain a copy of the "constitutions and principles" of the British Labour Party.

[E 8085/5/89]

(4)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 182, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 2nd October, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 25th October.)

General.

BOTH Governments during the week have shown increasing anxiety at the absence of news from London of the discussions which are known to be going on about the future of the two States. President Truman's letter to Mr. Attlee asking for the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has continued to give rise to much unfavourable comment in the press, and the visit of the American Congress members to Beirut and Damascus has tended to increase the publicity given to attacks on American support for the Zionist case.

Salah ed Din Sabbagh, the sole surviving member of the "Golden Square," who was being transferred by British military authorities from the Turkish frontier to Iraq, escaped from Aleppo on the 30th September. The Syrian authorities are giving full co-operation in the steps being taken for his recapture.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 23rd-30th September, 1945, amount to 8,927 tons, a daily average of 1,116 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945-46 crop up to 161,287 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

Efforts by Faris Bey Khouri to fill the two vacancies in his Cabinet continued until the 30th September, when Hassan Jabbara and Hikmat el Hakim both resigned, probably after receiving a broad hint from the Presidency; as a result Faris Bey Khouri found himself left with a Cabinet of only three. Although under the Constitution such a state of affairs can exist without the resignation of the Cabinet, it has become an established custom in Damascus that when a Cabinet is reduced to three or less by any cause, it can be considered by the President of the Republic not to exist. In these circumstances Faris Bey, after a stormy audience with the President, tendered his resignation. Late in the same day, Saadullah Jabri announced the composition of the new Cabinet as follows:—

Saadullah Jabri: Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Lutfi Haffar: Minister of the Interior.
Sabri Assali: Minister of Justice and Wakfs and Acting Minister of Education.
Naim Antaki: Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works.
Hassan Jabbara: Minister of National Economy and Acting Minister of Supply.

After several weeks of uncertainty the fall of the Khouri Government and the formation of the Saadullah administration resulted in a feeling of relief

among the general public. The new Ministers are individually capable and experienced. The position of the Chamber, however, is not yet clear. Khaled el Azm will, no doubt, attack the new Government with all the means at his disposal but his following among Deputies is slight. Though Michael Elhan is at present highly incensed at the overthrow of the Government, it is unlikely that his opposition to Saadullah Jabri will be long lived and in any case his influence with the Parliamentary bloc can only be slight without Saadullah Jabri behind him. Contrary to expectations the new Government is a purely party Government relying for support on the national bloc. Saadullah Jabri has, however, two portfolios available and it is probable that he will make use of them to gain further support for his Government when he has had time to study closer the reactions of the Deputies and to negotiate with their leaders. Jamil Mardam informed the acting consul that he had been requested by the new Prime Minister to join the Government but had declined while promising to support it in the Chamber. He stated that he himself would have accepted to form a Government but as he has not been asked to do so he preferred to stand aside.

In the course of the week there has also been some activity among Opposition elements outside Parliamentary circles. On the 25th September, a meeting took place in the house of the Emir Jaafar Jazairli at which representatives of the five parties—the Liberal party, the Arab party, the Syrian Popular party, the Unity party and the League of National Action—took part. A committee of two members from each of the parties was formed to draw up a programme for the realisation of Greater Syria.

Nuri Said Pasha visited Damascus on his way from Angora to Bagdad. He was received by the President and members of the Government. The question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Turkey was discussed; a Turkish formula providing for recognition of the integrity of the existing frontiers did not appeal to the Syrians.

In conversation with His Majesty's chargé d'affaires, Saadullah Bey Jabri stated that no steps would be taken by the Syrian Government to close French schools, though it is generally felt that few Syrian pupils will apply for admission. M. Cuinat, representative in Damascus of the French Délégation Générale, informed the acting consul that it had been decided to evacuate the Frères Maristes School situated in the Sudois Barracks. This building is Syrian Government property rented to the French. He pointed out that in return for the evacuation of the school the Syrians would be required to hand over the French Prévôté building which had been lent to the Syrian army, and added that three or four of the Frères Maristes would be installed there to ensure continuity.

Dr. Crawford, of the American University of Beirut, visited Damascus in the course of the week in connexion with the opening of an American secondary school in the capital. Dr. Crawford stated that it was proposed to begin as soon as a suitable building could be found and that this year provision would be made for some 150 pupils in two elementary classes. In view of the present circumstances the bulk of the instructions would have to be in Arabic, but it was hoped to establish a special English class, and English would be increasingly used as circumstances permitted.

The three Syrian representatives of the Syrian Labour Syndicates have so far been unable to proceed to Paris for the International Trades Union Conference owing to visa and transport difficulties. The two Communist representatives, however, did not experience the same troubles and it is understood that they are already in Paris.

Les Echos, a French language Damascus newspaper, which was suspended for three months on the 7th June, recommenced publication on the 1st October. It is understood that the Faris Khouri Government felt that it was necessary for a foreign language newspaper to be available over which the Syrian Government would have some control, as French newspapers were being smuggled into the country in fairly large numbers from the Lebanon.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to refrain from presenting a formal note on the subject of the simultaneous withdrawal of British and French troops. The Minister for Foreign Affairs finally agreed to take no action, provided he could be given an assurance that His Majesty's Government would not withdraw British troops from the Levant States so long

as French troops remained there; any such assurance would be regarded by the Lebanese as strictly confidential and would be given no publicity whatever.

The Palestine question has come into somewhat artificial prominence in the Lebanon this week, as a result of the alarmist tone adopted by Reuters in reporting on Palestine events, and consequent scare headlines in the local press. Mrs. Bolton, a United States Congresswoman, who arrived in Beirut on the 28th September on a tour of the Middle East, was closely questioned by journalists regarding Mr. Truman's *démarche*. Her reply, which was to the effect that this *démarche*, even if made, would not bind the American Government until passed by Congress, was prominently reported. Various political bodies have submitted resolutions to the Lebanese Government or to foreign representatives supporting the Arab case in Palestine. The Lebanese Prime Minister was questioned in the Chamber of Deputies on the 2nd October as to what steps his Government were taking as a result of Mr. Truman's reported letter to Mr. Attlee, and replied that their policy was unchanged and that the Lebanese Minister in Washington had been instructed to discuss the question with Mr. Truman personally.

At the same sitting of the Chamber the Prime Minister announced the list of French-controlled services of which the transfer to the States' Government has now been agreed, and stated that a Protocol confirming these transfers was in course of preparation. He added that certain other questions, including the evacuation of foreign troops, the telephone service, Radio Levant, and the Tripoli Topping Plant, were still under discussion.

The Chamber also unanimously voted a number of measures which included:—

- (a) A general amnesty.
- (b) A law controlling the flying of foreign flags on Lebanese territory.
- (c) A law forbidding the local sale of goods imported in Customs franchise (which includes N.A.A.F.I. goods).
- (d) The repeal of all restrictions on the circulation of motor vehicles.

Questioned as to the effect on Lebanese currency of the possible devaluation of the franc, the Minister of Finance explained that the 1944 Financial Agreement contained provisions designed to prevent any such eventuality, but that the Lebanese Minister at London had been instructed to watch the question closely.

A temporary wave of feeling against the United States is noticeable in the Lebanon at present. It results chiefly from Mr. Truman's Palestine initiative, which is naturally hotly resented; and also from the impression which has gained ground that the United States are exploiting their political position in order to obtain commercial advantages at the expense of the Lebanon. It is currently said that the American representatives, negotiating in regard to the refineries concessions and Fifth Freedom, have been attempting to browbeat the Lebanese authorities and that the refineries concession which they finally extracted is unfavourable to Lebanese interests. It is now probable that this concession will be ratified by the Chamber; but there may be some plain speaking in the course of the debate.

The Lebanese President gave a large reception on the 1st October to inaugurate the opening of the Palace of Beteddin, which has now been redecorated to serve as an official summer residence. Some 250 notables attended, as well as General Beynet and foreign representatives.

The Lebanese Government has instituted measures to regularise the position of the Armenian settlement at Ras-el-Ain, in South Lebanon, which was instituted by the French mandatory authorities in 1939 to harbour refugees when the Sandjak of Alexandretta was ceded by them to the Turks. The Lebanese state that the land on which the settlement was constituted was irregularly registered by the French in the name of the French Government, although they paid nothing for it. They are accordingly having this registration cancelled and the land re-registered in the name of the Lebanese State, after which the refugees will be allowed to continue in occupation without molestation.

[E 8262/5/89]

(5)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 183, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 9th October, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 31st October.)

General.

THE Syrian and Lebanese Governments, while continuing to express impatience at the apparent lack of progress in the matter of the withdrawal of French forces from their territories, have so far accepted the advice of His Majesty's Legation to take no initiative until the results of the present discussions in London are known. The Lebanese Government are still discussing with the French the transfer of the remaining French-controlled services and have reached agreement on a number of the less important ones, though Radio Levant, the telephone service, the Tripoli Topping plant and certain others still remain unsolved. The Syrians, however, have refused to participate in these discussions and so far have even refused to sign the resulting protocols, maintaining that their immediate requirements, before they will have direct dealings with the French, are complete French military evacuation and the conversion of the Délégation Générale into a Diplomatic Mission. In the face of this refusal, the French authorities have been instructed by their Government to suspend all further action on these transfers.

Alarmist reports on the situation in Palestine are still appearing in the local press. As a result, both Governments have decided to take special measures to control their southern frontiers, with the object of preventing the passage both of illegal immigrants into Palestine and of refugee terrorists escaping from it; both have offered to co-operate with the British security authorities on the two sides of the frontier for this purpose. In addition, the Syrian Government have turned back 105 Bulgarian Jews who arrived from Turkey with transit visas for Syria granted by the French representative in Bulgaria and valid visas for Palestine, and have made it clear that they intend to offer no further facilities of any kind for Jews proceeding to Palestine.

Salah ed Din Sabbagh, who recently escaped from a British military guard in Aleppo (see Weekly Political Summary No. 182) was recaptured in Aleppo on the 5th October and has been flown to Bagdad for delivery to the Iraq Government.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 1st-7th October, 1945, amount to 4,921 tons, a daily average of 703 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945-46 crop up to 166,208 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

Saadullah Jabri, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, received the heads of Diplomatic Missions individually on the 3rd October. He gave His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires the following outline of his foreign policy:

- (1) He insists on the withdrawal of all French troops from both Syria and the Lebanon, while emphasising that this must not be taken to signify a demand for the evacuation of British troops.
- (2) The French Délégation Générale must be transformed into a legation.
- (3) No member of the délégation who was in the Levant at the time of the events in May would be accepted as a member of the future French Diplomatic Mission.
- (4) French political officers must be withdrawn.
- (5) French troops must immediately be forbidden to circulate in any area.

He went on to say that while Syria would never sign a treaty with the French, the Syrian Government would be prepared to sign, for example, protocols with the French when the above demands were satisfied. Later the same day the Syrian President confirmed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires his complete agreement with this programme.

The opening of Parliament has been adjourned for one month; repairs to the Parliament building are still proceeding and no alternative accommodation can be found.

In conversation with British military authorities the Prime Minister raised the question of aerodromes and said that the operations of French airlines in the present circumstances meant that the Syrian authorities had no check on arrivals; further, that it might be difficult for the Syrian Government to resist

requests for Fifth Freedom facilities from the Americans, who were arguing that the French had a privileged position as regards aviation. The Prime Minister expressed his intention of writing an official note to His Majesty's Legation suggesting that a joint commission should be set up to examine this question so that the British authorities might take the matter up with the French.

The Délégation Générale are understood to have received instructions to have all French-sponsored schools in Syria reopened on or after the 15th October, partly as a result of formal assurances given by the Prime Minister to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that no steps had been, or would be, taken to prevent attendance at them. Since, however, students are by no means completely under control, disturbances are not unlikely, especially in Aleppo, when this occurs. The British military authorities have made it clear to the French that they cannot provide extra protection for these schools and that if their reopening causes trouble it may be necessary to secure their temporary closure.

The opening of the Government elementary schools has been postponed until the 20th October and all secondary schools until the 3rd November; the faculties of law and medicine will open on the 8th November.

The Prime Minister informed journalists at a press conference that the Government were prepared to abolish the military press censorship provided newspapers refrained from publishing statements regarding movements of troops, visits of commanding officers and matters likely to affect the morale of the forces. Journalists have agreed to consider this proposal.

Les Echos (see Weekly Political Summary No. 182, section 3, last paragraph) appeared only for two days, the new Prime Minister reversing his predecessor's decision and informing the proprietor that he would permit the paper to appear only in the Arabic language.

The representatives of the Syrian Labour Syndicates have been obliged to abandon their plans to attend the World Trade Union Conference in Paris. It appears that the French aviation authorities insisted on a formal application from the Syrian Government for passages for the syndicates' representatives, although they made no difficulty about the two Communist representatives.

Aleppo.

In Aleppo the formation of Saadullah Jabri's Cabinet has not aroused as much interest as might have been expected. Although there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction that the President should have again called upon the same group of politicians to form the new Government, Dr. Khayali and Rushdi Kekhia, the chief Opposition leaders in this area, have both expressed their intention not to attack the Government for the sake of opposition but to wait and see.

The French delegate has informed His Majesty's Consul that there is no intention of reopening the "Ecole Laïque" this year, since it has not been possible to secure new teachers. (As this school was a wholly French establishment it would be particularly exposed to attack.) The delegate has stated, however, that the Terre Sainte Boys' School and the Franciscan Girls' School, both founded more than fifty years ago, will reopen on or about the 15th October and it is probable that the "Marist" school for boys and the St. Joseph's school for girls will also open on the same date.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese President, accompanied by all but two of his Ministers, spent from the 4th to the 8th October touring the province of North Lebanon, the first of a series of such tours which he intends to undertake in this part of the country. This province contains at least two elements which might have been expected to show little enthusiasm for the President and the régime he represents, namely, the Moslems of Tripoli and the Akkar, who before the war were supposed to favour the separation of their district from the Lebanon and its reincorporation in Syria, and the reactionary Maronites of the Kadisah valley (where their patriarch has his summer residence), amongst whom the French have always believed they could count some of their most faithful adherents. Despite this, the tour seems to have been a resounding success and certainly evoked what had all the appearance of genuine pro-Lebanese sentiments. Large crowds applauded the President wherever he went, and the Lebanese security authorities claim that they had nowhere to take special precautions to maintain order, still less to encourage the people to attend the various receptions. The President seems to

have acquitted himself well; his public utterances dwelt on the unity and brotherhood of Moslems and Christians in the Lebanon, on his Government's intention to grant no foreign nation a privilege position, and on the right of the Lebanon, as a small nation, to count on the protection and support of the Great Powers. Only at the patriarch's residence, where the party spent a night, does the atmosphere seem to have been chilly. The President heard many petitions, dealing mostly with questions of public works, and promised to have the various grievances looked into.

The press describes the tour as "a plebiscite for independence" and stresses the national sentiment displayed everywhere. The Prime Minister, in a statement in the Chamber of Deputies on the 9th October, said that the purposes of the tour were to enable the President to establish direct contact with the population and hear their needs, and to explain to the people the aims of the Government in their policy of independence. He claimed that this policy had been everywhere fully approved.

The Lebanese Government have approved the British proposals for converting British military press censorship into a censorship liaison office, and have published a communiqué urging the press not to publish matters which might affect Allied military security or the morale of Allied troops; or which contains violent attacks on "any foreign Power."

The Bill setting up a Lebanese military court was finally passed by the Chamber on the 9th October. The Lebanese judicial authorities now intend to bring out a military code to govern the proceedings of this court, and have privately asked for details of the British military regulations for guidance.

Sami el Khoury, the President's brother and the present Director-General of Foreign Affairs, has been appointed Lebanese Minister in Cairo in succession to Joseph Salem. The appointment has been criticised, with some justice, on the grounds that he is incapable of representing the Lebanon worthily in this important post.

Elie Harfush, the editor of *Hadiss*, returned from his ill-starred visit to Great Britain and France on the 2nd October. He was at once arrested and interrogated, but after denying having uttered any of the "anti-Lebanon" statements attributed to him, was released on bail. The case will probably now be allowed to drop.

Senator Pepper, another of the series of globe-trotting United States politicians, arrived in Beirut on the 4th October and dined with the Lebanese President, who is understood to have left him in no doubt of the Lebanese attitude on Zionism.

[E 8362/5/89]

(6)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 184, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 16th October, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 3rd November.)

General.

ON the 13th October the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents met at Zebdani in the Anti-Lebanon, accompanied by a number of their Ministers.

Interest in Palestine appears to be increasing in both countries. The press continues to devote most of its space to it, and unofficial bodies periodically issue declarations supporting the Arab case there. After the meeting of the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents referred to in the preceding paragraph an anodyne communiqué was issued reflecting the official feeling that there was nothing for the Governments to do in the matter, unless and until some change in His Majesty's Government's present policy was announced; on the other hand, much publicity has been given in the Lebanon to the formation of a committee composed of all political associations with the object of combating Zionist infiltration into the Lebanon and illegal Jewish immigration through the Lebanon into Palestine.

The negotiations between the French and the Lebanese, who are acting also on behalf of the Syrians, for the transfer of the remaining French-controlled services are at present held up owing to the refusal of the Syrian Prime Minister to sign the protocols for the transfer of those services upon which agreement had been reached; he suspects a French trap and does not accept General Beynet's status as Délégué Général. At the meeting of the 13th October (see paragraph 1 above) he was persuaded by the Lebanese President to agree to sign a single protocol covering all the outstanding services, if the French were

prepared to do so, and the Lebanese undertook to approach the French in this sense.

According to President Khoury both President Quwatli and himself are disturbed by the increase in talk and press articles advocating the establishment of a greater Syria under the Amir Abdullah as king, which they believe to be largely inspired by the Amir himself. The Lebanese President particularly fears the effect of this proposition on the Lebanese Christians who, however favourable to Lebanese independence, look with apprehension on any suggestion that the Lebanese should be incorporated in what would certainly be a predominantly Moslem State.

The opening of the French and Catholic schools on the 15th October (see under "Syria—Damascus") seems likely to result in trouble of one kind or another.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 8th–15th October, 1945, amount to 4,182 tons, a daily average of 523 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945–46 crop up to 170,390 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Syrians are showing increasing impatience concerning the apparent lack of progress towards a final settlement with the French. The following questions are causing particular concern:—

- (a) *Exchange Control*.—The Prime Minister alleges that the French are using their control of foreign exchange to strangle the economic life of the country.
- (b) The movement of French military personnel and civilians in Aleppo and Latakia.
- (c) The absence of Syrian control at French-occupied aerodromes, which has resulted in the infiltration of French agents.

The possibility that the Syrian Government will react and take positive action cannot be excluded though every effort is being made by the British authorities to counsel patience.

A demonstration took place on the 10th October in Damascus after a meeting held at the Moslem Youth Club; the demonstrators dispersed without incident after the Prime Minister had refused to receive the delegation. Two days later a group of students decided to organise a further demonstration after Friday prayers and a strike the following day. The Prime Minister gave orders that if necessary force should be used to prevent these activities, but it did not prove possible to prevent the crowd leaving the Mosque from proceeding to Merje Square. Shops remained closed on the following day for a few hours in anticipation of a demonstration which did not materialise.

Faiz Khoury, Aref Nakad and Emir Mustafa Shehahi have been appointed Acting Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Director-General of the Police and Director-General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, respectively, and a committee of inspection, composed of representatives of the Ministries of the Interior, Finance and Justice, has been appointed to report on administration conditions in the Mohafazat.

M. Cuinat, representative in Damascus of the French Délégation-Générale, intimated to the acting consul that the Lazarist, St. Paul and Franciscan schools would open on the 15th October. The Area Commander informed M. Cuinat that responsibility for the protection of the French schools belonged to the Syrian Government, but that in the event of the reopening of a school leading to a disturbance of the peace, he was empowered by G.O.C., B.T.N.L., to order the closing of the school. M. Cuinat assured the Area Commander that he could count on his fullest co-operation and that, should it prove necessary, he would himself order the closing of the schools.

On the 15th October these three French schools opened, but the head of the Franciscan school was informed during the course of the morning by an official of the Ministry of Education that the school could not remain open as it was not in possession of the necessary Syrian Government permit. The Lazarist and St. Paul schools remained open with about 300 students each. No incidents have been reported.

Jebel Druze.

The political officer reports that as a result of the quarrel between Emir Hassan and Hamad Atrash, the former is demanding Hamad's removal and replacement by a Syrian officer, a step which, in the opinion of the political officer, would be disastrous, since no outsider could hope to control the Groupement as at present constituted. The continual absence of the Mohafez during the past three months and this recent quarrel have resulted in a deterioration of law and order; the Juge de Paix at Soueida has complained that his function has become a farce as he is prevented by deception and pressure, and even threats upon his life, from carrying out his duties impartially and thoroughly.

Three members of the Atrash family, Mteih Bek, Hussein Pasha, and Tewfik Bek, have recently visited the Amir Abdullah at Aman, where they seem to have been made much of; the first has a certain political importance but the other two are nonentities.

It is reported that during the past month the French have given scholarships at schools in Beirut to children of a number of Druze notables.

Lebanon.

The main political activity in the Lebanon has centred in the election of a Speaker for the Chamber, in which the outgoing Speaker, Sabri Hamadi, was challenged by Adib Osseyran, also a Shia. The latter's supporters sprang a last-minute mine by securing publication in a newspaper the day before the election of a facsimile of a deed of sale of land to Jews in Palestine, executed by Ahmed Assad, the present Minister of Agriculture, who is Sabri Hamadi's brother-in-law. This revelation, however, was too blatantly a political manoeuvre to have much effect, and in the event Sabri Hamadi was re-elected by 33 votes to 14.

Another and more important scandal occurred on the 10th October, when the British military authorities, at the request of the Lebanese Sûreté and on information supplied by them, arranged a road block on the Beirut-Damascus road near Chtaurah, and caught a Moslem Deputy of the Bekaa with sixteen good German rifles in his car. The Deputy was conducted to Beirut and handed over to the Lebanese police, who released him; but he then insisted on bringing them to his house and voluntarily handed over to them nineteen similar rifles and much ammunition stored there. The following morning he was rearrested by the Lebanese police and imprisoned. The case was debated in the Chamber on the 13th October, when some Deputies endeavoured to argue that he could claim immunity; but the Constitution expressly states that such immunity does not apply if the offending Deputy is caught *in flagrante delicto*, and the Chamber unanimously agreed that the case must go on. The suggestion has been made that the arms were intended for the Zionists, but there is no proof of this, and present indications are that the Deputy was merely buying them cheap in the Alaouites in order to sell them to his own followers in the Bekaa.

Renter's correspondent in Beirut, a Palestine Jew, was brusquely expelled by the Lebanese Government on the 15th October, on the pretext that his handling of Palestine news was pro-Zionist. The charge is probably unfair since he is not responsible for the policy of his agency, but in any case a Palestine Jew could hardly expect to escape some such measure in the present state of local feeling.

[E 8699/5/89]

(7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 185, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 23rd October, 1945.—(Received 13th November.)

General.

THE Syrian Government, as foreshadowed by the new Prime Minister when he assumed office, have now embarked on a process of making life unpleasant for the French who remain in Syria. The French garrison at Mezzé aerodrome, near Damascus, and the French "Officiers en Mission" in the Jezireh, have found difficulties placed in the way of their local purchases of food, and have had to be supplied with British military assistance.

On the 17th October, following an incident on the Syro-Lebanese frontier, when an unescorted French vehicle drove through the Syrian control post, orders

were issued to the gendarmerie to stop all French vehicles at the frontier, to turn back unescorted ones and only to allow escorted ones to proceed after notifying the gendarmerie headquarters. Road blocks were erected on all the roads leading into Damascus to facilitate this procedure. Later it was reported that orders had been given to forbid the entry of any French vehicles whether escorted or not, but after strong pressure by His Majesty's Legation, the original orders were restored.

French and Vatican-controlled schools opened in Damascus and Aleppo on the 15th October. On the following day, however, one of the Damascus, and all the Aleppo, schools were closed by the Syrian authorities on the ground that they had failed to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Education. The French authorities contended that, even if the Syrian Educational Law of the 21st December, 1944, had stipulated that permits were necessary (in point of fact, the law appears to require permits only in the case of newly founded schools), their schools were exempted from any such formalities by reason of a Franco-Turkish convention of 1901; they, however, agreed to communicate to the Syrian authorities, through His Majesty's Legation, assurances on the two points to which the Syrian Government seemed to attach greatest importance, namely, the establishment of a curriculum based on that laid down by the Syrian Government and the acceptance of inspection by Syrian officials. The Syrian Prime Minister held that such assurances were inadequate, and insisted on application for permits, on the ground that the Ministry of Education must have full particulars of the persons responsible for running the schools; it remains to be seen whether he can be brought to accept the French proposals. Meantime, three French schools are functioning in Damascus with from a quarter to a half of their normal complement of pupils, and with Syrian staffs.

In the Lebanon, where French schools have been allowed to reopen normally and where no Franco-Lebanese incidents have taken place, the Government are becoming exasperated at the obstruction encountered from the French side in the negotiations for the transfer of the remaining French-controlled services. Having persuaded the Syrians (see last week's summary) to agree to sign one protocol covering all these services, they now find that they are unable to make any progress in the matter of those services whose transfer has not yet been agreed upon.

The Palestine question remains one of the principal subjects of conversation and of press articles, and has aroused considerable political activity. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has presented an aide-mémoire to the United States Minister emphasising the solidarity of Syria and Palestine on the Zionist issue, pointing out that the present situation largely results from declarations published in Washington, and stating that the Syrian Government expect the United States to take account of Arab views on this question. In both Syria and the Lebanon political and youth organisations have been busy holding meetings, issuing declarations and pamphlets, and preparing for the 2nd November, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, which is apparently to be made the occasion of a general strike throughout both countries and of mass demonstrations in favour of the Arab cause in Palestine.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 16th to the 22nd October, 1945, amount to 2,875 tons, a daily average of 411 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 173,265 tons.

It is now becoming apparent that the target figure of 250,000 tons for this year's cereal collection will not be reached, largely on account of hoarding by producers. This in turn is thought to be due in the main to uncertainty as to whether Government control of cereals will continue. Both Governments are, therefore, being urged to make a statement removing any uncertainty on this score, to conduct propaganda designed to secure the co-operation of producers in the scheme, and rigorously to repress hoarding and "black market" transactions.

Damascus.

It has been announced that Jamil Mardam Bey has accepted the appointment of Syrian Minister in Cairo and will proceed there this week. To have secured his acceptance undoubtedly represents a success for the Government, as their greatest potential rival has thus shown his solidarity with the National bloc leaders, and his absence will simplify their task; moreover, his wide political experience and prestige throughout the Arab world will be particularly valuable at the headquarters of the Arab League.

The Prime Minister has not yet completed his Cabinet, as his attempts to separate his chief remaining opponents, Michael Elian and Khaled-el-Azm, by offering the former a portfolio, have so far failed. He is at present concentrating on administrative appointments. The election for the presidency of the Chamber is already giving rise to political activity; the two obvious candidates are Fares-el-Khoury and Lutfi Haffar, but Jamil Mardam has announced his intention of returning from Cairo for the election and might well present himself if circumstances prove favourable.

A Soviet-Syrian cultural society was inaugurated in Damascus at a reception on the 14th October under the patronage of Faiz Khoury, the recently returned Syrian Minister at Moscow.

The Syrian Government have informed the former London Polish Minister that they recognise the Warsaw Government.

Arrangements for this year's pilgrimage are proceeding satisfactorily, but it is estimated that only some 5,000 will proceed, as against a first estimate of 10,000.

Aleppo.

The Christian minorities, assiduously worked on by French agents (including priests and nuns), have long been expressing fears that the Moslems will sooner or later make life intolerable for them, and the closing of the French schools, of which their communities are the chief supporters, is being widely taken to confirm these fears.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese President on the 20th October broadcast a message to the Lebanese colonists abroad, on whose behalf there have been several recent meetings in various parts of the Lebanon. In his speech he made the familiar points that the Lebanon would not accept the protection, mandate or supervision of any foreign Power, and would make no treaty giving a privileged position to anyone; that his Government demanded the complete evacuation of Allied troops without distinction; that the Lebanese could not live apart from their Arab brothers; and that they were pledged to defend Arab Palestine.

The Lebanese Budget for 1946 has been submitted to the Chamber by the Council of Ministers. It totals £ Sy. 58 million as opposed to £ Sy. 43 million for 1945, the increase being almost entirely due to the larger credit allotted to the Ministry of Defence as a result of the Lebanese assumption of control of some 3,800 Lebanese Troupes Spéciales.

The town of Tripoli has been quiet and so far no incidents have been reported following the release of Rashid Mokaddem's two sons, Nafez and Mayezm, who returned to Tripoli on the 17th October. Their arrival there was rather unexpected as it was originally intended that they should be kept in Beirut pending a reconciliation with Abdul Hamid Karami. The French Political Officer called on the Mokaddems the day after their arrival to welcome them back. It is to be expected that the French will endeavour to use Nafez and Mayez to strengthen the opposition to the Government, but it is doubtful whether they will obtain the full support from them which they anticipate.

[E 9408/5/89]

(8)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 187, Syria and the Lebanon, 6th November, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 4th December.)

General.

PALESTINE has been the centre of public interest during the week. On the 28th anniversary of the Balfour declaration, the 2nd November, the shops of a number of towns in Syria and the Lebanon were closed, many newspapers appeared with black edges and there were orderly demonstrations in most places. The speeches made were mostly moderate in tone but in some cases attacks were made on Great Britain for sponsoring Zionism; in Jebel Druze, Deraa and Beirut demonstrators specifically called for the return of the Mufti. Petitions on the usual lines were received at the legation and in some cases were handed to British

representatives in the provinces, many of them calling for the release or pardon of the "detained Palestinians whose only crime was having defended their country." The only serious trouble occurred in Beirut where there was a clash between the bitterly opposed Communist and Syrian popular parties, involving at least two deaths. In Damascus anti-Zionist posters stuck up by Communists were torn down by the so-called Palestinian Defence party on the grounds that Palestine was an Arab question in which no foreign sponsored party should meddle; a French civil aircraft flew low over the town during the demonstrations but fortunately the crowd did not react. The Syrian authorities took great trouble to prevent disorders and their efforts were successful; special precautions were also taken by British military authorities to protect French installations, particularly in case the crowd demonstrated against them, but they had no occasion to intervene.

A further meeting between the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers took place at Shtaura on the 31st October. According to an official communiqué issued to the press, the questions discussed included the withdrawal of foreign troops, the transfer of the remaining powers, French representation, supply, common interests, and currency. It is understood that it was decided to delay the sending of a formal note to the French authorities requesting the withdrawal of French troops until the matter had been further discussed with the British.

Little progress has been realised in connection with the reopening of French schools. The Syrians are still insisting that schools should apply to the competent Syrian authorities for registration and a permit. On the 1st November the Prime Minister received a deputation of bishops and informed them that they could open their schools and teach in the French language provided they applied for a permit from the Government and followed the Government's programme as far as possible. The Prime Minister requested M. Stefe, the Syrian Catholic Bishop, to write to Cardinal Tappouni in these terms.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 1st-7th November, 1945, amount to 1,724 tons, a daily average of 246 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 177,519 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian President has continued his tour in the Euphrates and Jezireh areas (see that section of this summary) (*) accompanied by the Minister of the Interior, the Inspector-General of the Gendarmerie and the Secretary-General of the Presidency. The preliminary reports received in Damascus indicate that the tour has been successful, and the Prime Minister anticipates that as a result his Government will be in a stronger position when the Chamber of Deputies meets after the Bairam holiday.

During the week the Syrian Prime Minister made a number of complaints against the French to members of the legation staff, amongst them were:—

- (a) Low flying of French aircraft over Damascus and towns in the Euphrates and Jezireh.
- (b) The appearance of a party of armed French troops in the village of Mezze near Damascus on the night of the 22nd October.
- (c) The addition without notification to the Syrian Government of two vehicles containing ammunition and shells to a French convoy arriving at the frontier.
- (d) The proposal to relieve a French North African unit in Lattakia by French Metropolitan troops.

On the 3rd October, shortly after dawn, a hand grenade exploded outside the Banque National d'Industrie et de Commerce and on the following night a similar explosion occurred in the Bab Srijeh quarter; little damage was done and there were no casualties. The cause of the incidents has not so far been discovered.

The last of the five pilgrimage trains left Damascus on the 5th November. The total number of Syrian pilgrims this year is stated to be 4,271, a considerable reduction in last year's figures, probably owing to fears of disturbances in Palestine.

Saleh Aqil, Syrian Consul in Mosul, has been transferred to Jedda and has left to take up his appointment.

(*) Not printed.

The Emir Mustafa Shehabi (Syrian personalities No. 177) has taken up his appointment as Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

Aleppo.

A general strike occurred in Aleppo on the 2nd November and the Committee for the Defence of Palestine organised demonstrations. Anti-Zionist speeches were made and the procession marched noisily through the town but there were no incidents; a protest not, however, couched in anti-British terms was handed to His Majesty's Consul.

The Greek Catholic Archbishop M. Fattal has informed the Mohafez that the Terra Santa and Sacred Heart schools were expected to apply to the Syrian Government for permission to reopen in the very near future, and the Director of Education in Aleppo has issued a statement expressing his agreement to the opening of all sectarian schools, providing they comply with the Government conditions.

The Turkish Consul-General has informed His Majesty's Consul that the Soviet Minister, M. Solod, did not appear to encourage any anti-Turkish propaganda during his tour in North Syria, but that he had learned from several Armenian sources that M. Solod had raised the hopes of Armenians that in the not too far distant future they might be given an opportunity of going to Soviet Armenia.

Lebanon.

Demonstrations held in Beirut on the 2nd November were for the most part orderly, but a sharp brawl developed between members of the Communist and Lebanese Popular parties, who have long been at daggers drawn, and two deaths resulted. At a large meeting held by representatives of all the principal parties, resolutions were passed advocating the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and the prohibition of land sales in Palestine to non-Arabs; the disarming of Jewish colonists, the disbanding of Jewish organisations, and the denial to the Jewish Agency of the right to interfere in official matters; and the return of Arab exiles, especially the Grand Mufti. Resolutions were also sent to the Arab League advocating the boycotting of Jewish products in all Arab countries, and the passing of measures to prevent Jewish infiltration into any of these countries.

The Lebanese Prime Minister was able to announce in the Chamber of Deputies on the 30th October that the French authorities had transferred a number of services formerly controlled by them to the Lebanese Government. It is understood that the delegation's letter announcing these transfers requested the Lebanese to pass on to the Syrians their part in the services transferred. The actual transfer of one of the services in question, the control of Beirut Port, gave rise to some difficulty, as the Lebanese declined to take over the Port Police, who had been recruited and trained by the French; but a compromise was eventually reached. The services in question are, however, of comparatively minor importance, and the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in particular is showing increasing impatience at the obstruction which he alleges the French are displaying in negotiations regarding the more important services, such as the Beirut Broadcasting Station.

The Maronite Patriarch in an interview with the correspondent of the Egyptian weekly *Akhbar el Youm* made the following points:—

- (a) He did not favour any form of mandate or protection for the Lebanon by any foreign Power.
- (b) France had governed the Lebanon for twenty-five years and it was right that a treaty should mark the end of this period and define the rights and obligations of the two countries.
- (c) Although he did not accuse any Powers of working against the independence of the Lebanon, he did not wish to see the French mandate replaced by a mandate held by Great Britain or any other foreign Power; it was important that the country should not be dominated either from the West or from the East.
- (d) Unhappily he had no confidence in the Arab League, it appeared to him that certain people were thinking of a unity which could be realised only to the detriment of the Lebanon; Syrian leaders had often said that the Arab League was only the first step towards Syrian unity and would be followed by Arab unity; others were talking about the unity of Islam.

The Parliamentary Committee which is studying the oil refineries concession at Tripoli is reported in the press to have again adjourned without reaching a decision.

The meeting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 30th October was cut short by a violent dispute between the Speaker and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, arising out of the former's refusal to allow the latter to make what he said was an important statement regarding the transfer of powers. The Minister for Foreign Affairs threatened to resign, but a reconciliation has apparently since taken place, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by the Minister of Justice and Habib Abi Chahla duly left on the 5th November to represent the Lebanon at the meeting of the Arab League.

The Council of Ministers at a meeting on the 1st November, approved a plan for the creation of a press syndicate, and decided to announce the total abolition of press censorship. The Minister of the Interior on the following day published an announcement in this sense, at the same time exhorting journalists to show discretion in their handling of a list of subjects (previously communicated to him by the British authorities) which might embarrass the Allied military authorities. On the following day the complete abolition of British military press censorship was announced by the British authorities.

In addition to the French Sûreté agent, who is now being sent twice a week to Baalbek, a member of the French political staff remains three days a week in the town. Two officers from the Rayak French aerodrome have visited a village to the north of Rayak making enquiries about the religion of the villagers on the Lebanese Syrian frontier and the number of arms in their possession. It is said that they also promised to provide the inhabitants with some French rifles.

[E 9461/5/89]

(9)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 188, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th November, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 5th December.)

General.

ON the morning of the 13th November copies of the text of the statement on Palestine being made that afternoon by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs were communicated by His Majesty's Legation to the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents. The Syrian President was grateful for this advance information and showed understanding of the difficulties of the Palestine problem, but appeared at first to take a gloomy view of the statement; he assumed that the absence in the statement of any reference to the White Paper, to which he said the Arabs attached the highest importance, meant that it had been superseded, especially as under it Jewish immigration was to cease once the quota of 75,000 had been filled. The Prime Minister, who was also present, was unhappy about the principle of trusteeship, to which, as he pointed out, the Arab representatives at San Francisco have objected, and wondered whether the promise of eventual independence held out in the White Paper still stood. The Lebanese President's first reaction was less unfavourable. Both Presidents suggested that the question fell to be dealt with by the Arab League, and agreed to study it further with their Governments before pronouncing a final opinion.

There has not yet been time to assess public reactions to the statement.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 8th–15th November, 1945, amount to 1,591 tons, a daily average of 199 tons, which brings the total for the 1945–46 crop up to 179,110 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian President, who returned to Damascus from his tour on the 8th November, is slightly indisposed.

The internal political situation remains obscure as a large number of Deputies will not return to Damascus until after the Bairam holidays. It seems probable, however, that the President's recent tour in North and East Syria, during which he has made a point of stressing the need for all Syrians to pull together, has done something to strengthen the position of the existing Government.

M. Cuinat, representative in Damascus of the French Délégation Générale, left on the 10th November to take up an appointment in France; before leaving he stated that he would not be replaced and the Délégation Générale is thus no longer represented in Damascus.

A meeting was organised on the 6th November by the Moslem Youth Club in support of the Indonesians and a resolution was passed promising full support of the Indonesian Liberation Movement.

Some uneasiness is discernible in Jewish circles in Damascus. Complaints have been received that the Syrian Sûreté are refusing to issue exit permits to Jews intending to travel, but in reply to an enquiry the Prime Minister stated that no instructions have been issued denying travelling facilities to Syrian nationals of Jewish origin. He admitted, however, that special efforts were being made to prevent suspects, either smugglers or persons engaged in furthering illegal immigration, from travelling.

A reorganisation and purge of the police force is being undertaken, and it is intended to improve the standard of recruitment. Fifteen commissioners are already stated to have been dismissed.

The former Transjordan consul, Abdul Muneim Rifai, visited Damascus during the week and pro-Monarchist speeches were made at parties given in his honour.

Muayyad el Muayyad el Azam and Nadim Attar have been appointed Syrian vice-consuls in Haifa and Jerusalem respectively.

Ahmed Bey Lahham has been appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Defence.

Lebanon.

The Lebanese President spent from the 8th November to the 11th November touring Bekaa, where he appears to have received at least as much acclamation as during his recent tours of North and South Lebanon. There was some slight friction at Baalbek owing to the President's refusal to call on the Greek Catholic Archbishop, whose pro-French sympathies are notorious, but elsewhere, especially in the turbulent regions of Hermel, enormous crowds gathered to express loyal sentiments. The President's public utterances followed the general lines of his previous speeches, but at Baalbek he took up the position more clearly than ever before on the Palestine issue. The tour concluded at Rashaya on the 11th November, the second anniversary of the incarceration of the President and his Ministers there, and the President unveiled on the walls of the Citadel commemorative plaques referring to it as the birthplace of Lebanese independence.

It is announced that certain Jewish newspapers have been excluded from the Lebanon on account of criticisms recently published in them of the Lebanese President's public espousal of the Arab cause in Palestine. News of the disturbances in Tripolitania and Egypt has aroused considerable interest and the disorders are generally deplored as tending to prejudice the Arab cause at this moment.

The press reports that the Lebanese and Syrian Legations at Washington have published declarations denying the truth of the pro-French utterances attributed to Mgr. Aql during his tour of the United States, and that the Maronite Patriarch has summoned Mgr. Aql to return home.

General Beynet's departure to Paris has aroused the usual speculation as to whether he will return or will be replaced, as is wishfully thought, by a diplomat.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has put through a first list of administrative appointments. Many of these unfortunately follow the bad tradition of the past, high posts being allotted to non-graded officials and a number of unjustified promotions made. The announcement of this reshuffle has aroused strong criticism, and the President has been much blamed for not having prevented these irregularities.

The Chamber of Deputies met on the 13th November before the announcement of His Majesty's Government's decision on Palestine had been communicated to the Government. The only matter of importance dealt with was the amnesty laws, which, as finally voted, provide for a general scaling-down of sentences imposed by both Lebanese Courts and the French Military Courts prior to the 3rd September, 1945.

The draft concession for American oil refineries at Tripoli has finally been approved by the Judicial Committee of the Chamber and has been passed to the Chamber, which is expected to accept it.

Both the Communist party and the P.P.S. have appealed to the Government as a result of the fracas which took place between them on the 2nd November, and the former have been indulging in an intensified press campaign designed to brand their rivals as "Fascists." The Minister of the Interior has bluntly informed both parties that he regards them as illegal organisations and will therefore listen to neither. He has also stopped a cable addressed to Moscow by the Tass representative of Beirut, because it not only repeated the accusation of fascism against the P.P.S., but endeavoured to prove that the Lebanese Government's toleration of the latter showed that they were anti-democratic. The Soviet Minister has protested against this action on his part but apparently without success.

[E 9877/5/89]

(10)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 189, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 20th November, 1945.—(Received 18th December.)

General.

OWING to the Bairam holidays the newspapers in Syria and the Lebanon have been unable to comment fully upon Mr. Bevin's statement on Palestine. On the whole public opinion appears to be more favourable than unfavourable, though it is reported from Aleppo that some anti-British feeling manifested there during the past week was partly due to dissatisfaction with the statement. Some newspapers have pointed out with satisfaction that the statement has drawn a distinction between Zionism and the Jewish refugee problem and between a Jewish National Home and a Jewish State. But the continuation of immigration is unpalatable and it has been suggested that the trusteeship proposal constitutes a whittling down of the assurances of self-government given to the Arabs under the White Paper; though in conversation with His Majesty's Minister the Syrian President, while still uncomfortable about the continuance of Jewish immigration and the implied departure from the White Paper, adopted a realistic attitude towards the proposals in general and admitted that he thought trusteeship was the best solution in the circumstances, as an independent Palestine was obviously impracticable at the present stage. One Damascus newspaper used the opportunity to argue that His Majesty's Government should arrange for the return of the Mufti, Jamil Husseini and Dr. Amin Ruweiha.

The Syrian President and Prime Minister visited the Lebanese President and Ministers at Aley on the 18th November, primarily in order to discuss Mr. Bevin's statement. As a result of the meeting Saadullah Jabri was sent to meet Jamil Mardam Bey in Palestine and to convey to him the unified views of the two Governments. These views were as follows:—

- (a) They felt that the statement must be very carefully studied before the Arab League pronounced on it, and that the League's opinion, which if possible must be agreed by all the Palestine Arab parties, should then be communicated by each Arab Government to the British representative accredited to it.
- (b) In general the two Governments approved the declaration, but there were some points they disliked and others which they thought required clarification. (This last category seems to have included the questions of illegal immigration and trusteeship.)

At the same meeting the Lebanese Ministers informed the Syrians of the steps that had been taken to secure the transfer of the French-controlled services. It appears that the French have now agreed to transfer the control of the D.H.P. railway, and that agreement has also been reached in regard to the handing over of the Office Economique de Guerre.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments are considering setting up air training schools and aircraft supplied by the Hunting Aviation Management Company.

Economic.

Weekly grain purchase figures not yet available.

Negotiations have now been initiated by the Lebanese Government and the I.P.C. in regard to the disposal of the topping plant erected at Tripoli in Vichy times. The I.P.C. had previously been negotiating with the Délégation Générale and had almost reached agreement with them for this plant to be transferred direct to themselves; but the Lebanese Government then intervened and insisted that this plant must be considered as a French-controlled service and must therefore be transferred to them in the first place. It has now been proposed that the plant shall be transferred from the French to the Lebanese Government and simultaneously from the Lebanese Government to the company, and that an operational agreement shall be subsequently concluded between the company and the Government which will enable the former to operate the plant.

Damascus.

There are no developments to report as regards internal politics, activities have been limited by the Bairam festivities. It is anticipated, however, that in the course of the coming week before the opening of Parliament on the 24th November there will be very considerable manoeuvring. The Constitutional Liberals will meet on the 22nd November to discuss the offer of co-operation made by Michael Elian and Kaled el Azm. According to a member of this party Saadullah Jabri's position might be seriously affected if the policy of co-operation were approved. The strength of the rival parties will be tested at the election for the presidency of the Chamber, for which post Saadullah Jabri may support Lutfi Haffar or Mohamed el Ayesh, the Acting President.

At a press conference the Prime Minister stated that he hoped the question of the withdrawal of French troops would be decided soon but denied a press report that the President of the Lebanese Republic had been informed by Count Ostrorog of the date of the withdrawal. On the subject of schools the Prime Minister differentiated between French and Christian schools; permit would be granted to religious schools provided they were prepared to comply with the Syrian law.

It has been reported in the press that the appointment of a Belgian expert in the Ministry of the Interior has been approved. A suggestion in this sense made by the Belgian Minister before his departure was welcomed by the Syrian Prime Minister but no decision has in fact as yet been taken.

Jamil Mardam Bey has been appointed Syrian Minister to Saudi Arabia in addition to his post as Syrian Minister to Egypt.

Abdul Karim Bey Gailani, the Iraqi Consul in Damascus, has been replaced by Ibrahim Fadli.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

Franco-Syrian tension in the Jezireh has somewhat increased during the week, as a result of a series of small incidents. The most important of these was the arrest on the 11th November by the Syrian police of the officer in charge of the French aerodrome at Hassatche, Lieutenant Laurent, together with two French n.c.o.s and two members of the French meteorological service, whilst they were returning unescorted from Mass. The Mohafez at first refused to release these men, despite repeated appeals by the officer commanding the British troops in the Jezireh, and gave instructions that they were to be sent direct to Aleppo under escort. Strong representations by this legation to the Syrian Government, however, caused these instructions to be reversed, and the arrested men were eventually released at Deir es-Zor.

On the 6th November a fire broke out at the Hassatche aerodrome, probably due to the storage of petrol and a generating plant in the same room. One building was gutted and considerable damage was done. All possible help was given by British troops on the spot, but, as a result either of a misunderstanding or a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts, Lieutenant Laurent has accused the officer commanding troops at Hassatche of refusing the available assistance.

There are continued reports of unidentified low flying aircraft in various parts of the Euphrates and Jezireh provinces, and of other aircraft flying at high altitudes along the Syrian side of the Turkish frontier.

Further reports from the Jezireh confirm that the Christians and other minorities, while still somewhat uneasy as to the ability of the Syrian Government to protect them, have been much reassured by the declarations made by the

Syrian President during his recent tour of the region. A number of the Christians who left during the summer for the Lebanon are returning to their homes in the Jezireh, their fears of persecution not having materialised; while some of them previously employed by the French say that they have not received the increased salaries and special facilities which were promised to them.

Lebanon.

Dissension in the Lebanese Cabinet appears to be growing, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance being on bad terms and the Minister of Defence, Ahmed el Assad, being the subject of a virulent press campaign on account of the alleged sale of land to Jews, and (with more reason) of his habit of stocking his Ministry with members of his own clan. A reshuffle eliminating him is therefore not unlikely.

The Phalange party have been celebrating the tenth anniversary of their foundation with their usual boisterousness. The Lebanese President sent them a message of congratulation and was represented by the Prime Minister at the chief celebration. Phalange speakers attacked the Greater Syria project, whilst affirming their determination to work for a completely independent Lebanon and demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

A squadron of eighteen light tanks, manned by "avenantaires" has moved from Beirut to join the French garrison in Tripoli. They will be stationed outside the town.

[E 9925/5/89]

(11)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 190, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 27th November, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 19th December.)

General.

IN the Lebanon during the past week interest has been sharply focussed on the Greater Syria scheme, as a result of declarations in its favour attributed to the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan (in an interview with a correspondent of the *Sunday Despatch*) and to his Foreign Minister in Cairo. These declarations, particularly that of the Foreign Minister, in which it was alleged that 50 per cent. of the Lebanese would favour the inclusion of the Lebanon in a Greater Syria comprising Palestine and Transjordan, have aroused the usual protests in Christian circles, and the press has engaged in a lively polemic on the subject, the nationalist papers taking the line that the project, if desirable in principle, is not expedient at the moment, whilst the more extreme Christian papers condemn it root and branch. A statement in reply, issued by the Lebanese Foreign Minister in Cairo, recalling that the Arab League had been founded on the basis of the independence of its members within their existing frontiers and threatening to take the matter before the League if public advocacy of the Greater Syrian project were not abandoned, has been received with general satisfaction; and in the Lebanese Chamber on the 26th November, Riad Solh (who is well aware that, apart from the danger of Christian-Moslem dissension, most Lebanese Moslem politicians know that their own positions would be diminished if the Lebanon were merely to become a province in a Greater Syria) declared roundly that the Lebanon was an independent sovereign State and that the Lebanese should pay no attention to this Greater Syria talk. The Lebanese President is understood to have asked all interested parties, particularly the Phalange (who, in their usual rôle of champions of a Lebanon kept separate from the Moslem world, had been displaying excitement on the question), to refrain from any provocative declaration on the subject, which it is now expected will be dropped. In Syria no particular interest has been shown in the Transjordan statements.

Interest in the evacuation of foreign troops was stimulated by reports in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers that Radio Brazzaville had announced an Anglo-French agreement on the subject. The question was mentioned during a conversation between the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, His Majesty's Minister, and the Lebanese President, after a luncheon given by his Excellency

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in honour of General Paget on the 22nd November, but there was little information which could be given to the President beyond that discussions on the subject between London and Paris were proceeding.

In Syria Mr. Bevin's statement on Palestine continues to receive much attention and the decision of the Arab League is awaited with interest.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 15th-22nd November amount to 918 tons, a daily average of 131 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 180,028 tons.

The draft concession for the erection of American oil refineries at Tripoli came before the Lebanese Chamber on the 26th November. Habib Abi Chahla, its principal critic, had sent a telegram from Cairo, where he is a member of the Lebanese delegation to the Arab League, requesting that the debate should be postponed until after his return. The Chamber, however, rejected this plea and, after a short debate, approved the concession by a large majority.

On the 26th November the negotiations between the Lebanese Government, the French authorities and the I.P.C. regarding the disposal of Tripoli topping plant were successfully concluded by an exchange of letters between the three parties providing for simultaneous transfers of the plant from the French to the Lebanese Government, and from the Government to the company. It was further agreed that negotiations would be initiated between the company and the Government for an operation agreement to enable them to work the plant.

The Lebanese and Syrian Governments on the 22nd November published an identical communiqué reporting a meeting which took place between them on the 21st November to consider commercial and industrial matters, notably the lifting of restrictions on trade imposed during the war. It was stated that agreement had been reached on numerous points, amongst them the suppression of import and export licences for certain products, which would constitute the first steps towards the return of normal trading conditions.

Damascus.

At the first meeting of the fifth Ordinary Session of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 24th November, the late Prime Minister, Faris el Khouri, was elected President of the Chamber by 54 votes to 43 votes for Lutfi Haffar. Mohammed Ayesb and Said Ghazzi were elected Vice-Presidents, and Hamed el Khoja and Badawi el Jebel secretaries.

The Prime Minister, Saadullah Jabri, read a statement of the Government's policy (see below) and asked the Chamber for a vote of confidence, but acceded to the request of an Opposition Deputy, Akram Haurani, that the question of confidence should be postponed until the next meeting in order to enable the members to study the Government's statement.

The following are the main points of the statement:—

- (a) The Government's foreign policy was based on complete independence. All powers and attributions with the exception of the telephone and broadcasting services had been taken over. As regards the evacuation of foreign troops, discussions were now in their final stage between the British and French Governments. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that these discussions would soon be concluded and that he would be able to inform the House of satisfactory results. The Covenant of the United Nations and of the Arab League formed the basis of Syria's foreign policy. The question of Palestine was being studied by the Arab League and the Syrian Government would await the League's decision before taking action.
- (b) The Prime Minister admitted that there was room for improvement in the internal administration of the country after twenty-five years of foreign occupation; the Government, with the help of experts, would prepare the requisite reforms; hospitals and clinics would be organised throughout the country.
- (c) A scheme for the distribution of land to the tribes had been started; artesian wells would be provided and special attention would be paid to the health and education of the tribesmen.
- (d) The Government, with the assistance of specialists, hoped to build up the Syrian army on the basis of other Arab armies.
- (e) The Ministry of Supply would be abolished from the 1st January, 1946.
- (f) When the present M.I.R.A. agreement came to an end at the beginning of the next harvest the Government would adopt a new agricultural policy.

- (g) The Prime Minister regretted that certain foreign schools had refused to comply with the instructions of the Ministry of Education and remained closed. Provision would be made for the education of those who had formerly attended foreign schools.

As had been anticipated, this meeting of the Chamber was preceded by considerable political activity on the part of the Government supporters and the Opposition. At a meeting of the Parliamentary bloc on the 23rd November, which was attended by Michael Elian and Khaled el Azm, it was decided to follow Saadullah Bey's leadership, and, in appearance, therefore, a reconciliation has been effected, though when voting took place for the election of the Speaker of the Chamber it appears that some sixteen members of the Parliamentary bloc voted against the Government candidate.

The Syrian President received the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, and the General Officer Commanding British Troops, North Levant, with His Majesty's Minister, on the 21st November, and entertained them to luncheon. There was some discussion regarding the evacuation of foreign troops, and the importance of patience and restraint while conversations on this subject were still in progress was emphasised. The President again referred to the continued occupation of Mezze aerodrome by the French as not only inconvenient but potentially dangerous; and he also spoke of the need for training Syrian personnel to take over the aerodromes when that became possible. Other matters discussed were the Syrian Desert Guard and the question of *avenantaires* still serving with the French.

Mr. Brown, until recently head of the American O.W.I. in the Levant States, has returned to Damascus and taken up his appointment as technical adviser to the Antiquities Department.

430 Poles passed through Syria in transit from Persia to the Lebanon on the 24th November. Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining Syrian transit visas, and at the last moment only vigorous action by His Majesty's Legation in Damascus succeeded in preventing the Syrian authorities from delaying the party in order to conduct a "witch hunt" for Jews.

Farid Zein ed Din left during the week for London as Syrian representative to the United Nations Conference, accompanied by Abdul Kerim Dundashi, who will take up his appointment as secretary at the Syrian Legation in London and act as secretary to the Syrian representative at the United Nations Conference. He has been replaced at the Political Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Assem el Naili.

Lebanon.

The anniversary of the return of the President and Ministers from internment in 1943 was celebrated on the 22nd November by a military parade (which for the first time included the former Lebanese *Troupes Spéciales* as elements of the national army) and a reception by the President and Government for the Diplomatic Corps, Allied officers and notables. The local attendance at these functions was good, the only notable absentee being the Maronite Patriarch; he had said he would be present, but the President, having discovered that he intended also to call on the French authorities and to stay with a particularly pro-French Lebanese, had seized on a report that an attempt was to be made to assassinate him as a pretext for advising him not to come.

The Lebanese security forces have again been reorganised. The gendarmerie have been taken away from the Ministry of Defence and reattached to the Ministry of the Interior (according to the Minister of the Interior, because of the malpractices in which his colleague had been indulging) and they and the police have been unified under one command, though the *Sûreté Générale* has been kept separate. This move has aroused further criticism in the press, which is still fulminating about recent administrative appointments. The latter has now been defended in a Government communiqué which maintains that only one non-graded official, and that a well-known expert from Transjordan, has been appointed to a high post.

Tailpiece.—The Soviet Minister has officially protested to the Lebanese Government against the 9th November instalment of the comic strip "Jane," in the *Eastern Times*, on the ground that the comparison drawn there between the relative merits of "Jane" and Stalin as "pin-ups" constitutes an insult to the Soviet Union.

[E 10237/5/89]

(12)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary, No. 191, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, of 4th December.—(Received in Foreign Office, 31st December.)

General.

SPECULATION as to the Arab League's reply to His Majesty's Government's declaration on Palestine continues in both countries, though surprisingly little mention of the subject has been made during the week in the Syrian Chamber. In general the press, which has given much prominence to Palestine news, inclines to the view that the league will reject the clause permitting further Jewish immigration, and the principle of trusteeship is also expected to be criticised. The Syrian Young Men's Moslem Association has distributed leaflets protesting against Mr. Bevin's statement and a variety of other matters, including events in the Dutch East Indies.

The storm aroused in the Lebanon by Transjordan utterances on the Greater Syrian project has somewhat died down, though a series of articles in a Damascus newspaper has kept the subject alive in Syria (see "Damascus" below). The Lebanese Najjadé party have followed the lead of the Phalanges by publishing a declaration on the subject favouring the complete independence of the Lebanon and its close collaboration with the other Arab States.

On the 29th November a two hours' strike took place in all the principal Syrian towns in support of the return of the Hatay to Syria; leaflets were distributed and various political organisations deposited petitions with His Majesty's Consuls, Political Officers and His Majesty's Legation. No disorders were reported and in most cases the towns were normal by the afternoon.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 23rd-30th November amount to 1,336 tons, a daily average of 190 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 181,364.

Following a series of statements in the Lebanese press attempting to suggest that the present unsatisfactory state of the distribution of cereals in the Lebanon, and the consequent high cost of living, was partially attributable to M.I.R.A., the British Director of M.I.R.A. gave a press conference on the 1st December in the course of which he pointed out the obvious truth that M.I.R.A. is concerned with collection and that all responsibility for distribution lies on the Lebanese Supply Department. This statement caused a considerable stir. The Prime Minister visited the Supply Department the next day, and the press immediately published articles alleging serious irregularities in the department, of which the opponents of the Government were not slow to take advantage.

Damascus.

A vote of confidence in Saadullah Jabri Bey's Government was put to the Chamber of Deputies at the second sitting of the Fifth Ordinary Session on the 28th November. A number of Deputies addressed the House and attacks were made on Lutfi Haffar by members of the Constitutional Liberal party. Ahmed Bey Sharabati attacked the Prime Minister about the effects of the financial agreement made in February 1944, which preserves the link between Syrian currency and the French franc; he also said that, in spite of the Prime Minister's declaration that no pre-eminent position would be granted to any nation, both the French and British had, in fact, been granted the fifth freedom for the operation of airlines. In his reply the Prime Minister agreed with Ahmed Bey's contention that the fifth freedom should be granted to all nations "should it not be possible to prevent French aeroplanes from using our aerodromes." Several Deputies raised the question of the Mixed Courts, the retention of which they considered incompatible with full Syrian sovereignty; in reply Saadullah Bey also said that the Government would study the question of their complete abolition. Before voting took place a number of Deputies, including Khaled el Azm and Michel Elian, left the Chamber, 72 Deputies voted for the Government, 18 members of the Constitutional Liberal party voted against and 1 abstained.

The Damascus Garrison Officers' Club gave a tea-party on the 1st December in honour of the President of the Republic, who was described on the invitation card as Supreme Commander of the Syrian Army, although there is no constitutional justification for this title. In his speech the President, after tracing the history of the Syrian army and referring to the glory and honour of Meysaloun (where General Gouraud defeated the Amir Faisal's Syrian army in 1920), sent

a special message to the army encouraging them to perform their duties towards the nation as defenders of their country and its independence.

The Transjordan Consul in Damascus has protested to the Syrian Prime Minister against one of a series of articles published in a Damascus newspaper on the subject of a Greater Syria on the grounds that the article was derogatory to the position of His Highness the Emir and constituted an attack on his country.

Lebanon.

Both the Lebanese President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (who returned from Cairo on the 4th December) have expressed to His Majesty's Legation serious concern at the continued delay in any announcement regarding the tenor of the Anglo-French discussions on the evacuation of troops. Their anxiety has been increased by certain press reports which have led them to fear that His Majesty's Government and the French Government may be doing a deal at the expense of the Levant States behind their backs; for example, a Paris message quoted General Beynet as stating that under the proposed settlement France will retain "certain responsibilities" in the Levant States, and a report in the *Palestine Post* took a similar line. The Lebanese are particularly desirous of receiving assurances that no decision vitally affecting the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon will be taken without their being consulted.

The gold reserves of the Banque de Syrie, which were taken to France by General Dentz in 1941, returned to Beirut on a French vessel on the 28th November in execution of a promise to that effect made by the French authorities to the Lebanese Government in the course of negotiations for the transfer of powers.

Three of Abdel Hamid Karamé's assailants (see Weekly Political Summary No. 141 of the 13th December, 1944) have now given themselves up to the police in Beirut. The fourth refused to surrender on the advice of Nafez Mokaddem and has remained in hiding.

[E 213/213/89]

(13)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 193, Syria and the Lebanon, 18th December, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 8th January, 1946.)

General.

His Majesty's Minister, on instructions from the Foreign Office, handed to both the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents on the 13th December, the texts of the Anglo-French agreement on the evacuation of troops from the Levant States and on the similarity of aims of Great Britain and France in the Middle East, together with the text of the official communiqué being released in London that afternoon.

Both Presidents spoke to His Majesty's Minister with appreciation of the great efforts that had been exerted to secure the agreements, but raised very strong objections to a passage in evacuation agreement which appeared to mean that French troops were to remain alone in the Lebanon. President Khoury maintained that this would encourage all the latent pro-French elements and that no independent Lebanese Government could survive such a situation. Further, he could not admit discriminatory treatment between Syria and the Lebanon in this respect; he, therefore, begged for an assurance from His Majesty's Government that British troops would not, in fact, leave the Lebanon before the French. He expressed his pleasure at the phrase referring to the consecration of independence by the admission of Lebanon to the United Nations, and raised no objection to the statement on similarity of aims, though the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was present at the interview, appeared somewhat doubtful. President Quwatli expressed disappointment that no date was fixed for the final evacuation; his attitude and that of his Prime Minister was one of extreme caution and they made it clear that they would have to have time to study the documents.

Count Ostorog later handed the texts of the agreement to the Lebanese President.

In both countries the communiqué was received by the public with, at best, reserve, and, more particularly in Syria, with suspicion, which was much increased by an unfortunate Reuter message by Harold King from Paris suggesting that French forces would regroup in the Lebanon and British forces in a mandated territory.

[32429]

On the 15th December the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents and Ministers for Foreign Affairs met at Aley to discuss the agreement. The same morning His Majesty's Minister was authorised by the Foreign Office to assure both Governments that there was no intention of withdrawing British troops from either Syria or the Lebanon in such a way as to leave the French there alone. This assurance was immediately communicated to the two Presidents who expressed great relief, but raised a number of points in the agreement on which they required elucidation. They particularly wished to learn at what stage their Governments would be brought into Anglo-French discussions on evacuation. Their queries were referred to the Foreign Office.

Although no strikes have yet occurred, there has been a steady deterioration in the attitude of the press in both countries, and there is a strong feeling that the conclusion of these unpublished agreements without the participation of the States' Governments must mean that a deal has been done by the British and French Governments at their expense. Various Nationalist and Youth Organisations have published unfavourable declarations.

In a *note de service*, dated the 17th December, circulated to all French units, General Humblot stated that, in view of the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement, he had decided to lift all restrictions affecting the entry to British establishments of French military personnel.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 7th-14th December amount to 5,698 tons, a daily average of 814 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 188,445.

In order to implement the Arab League's decision to boycott Zionist goods, a Syrian committee composed of representatives of all the Ministries has been set up and held its first meeting on the 13th December. Considerable interest is evident in commercial circles, where it is realised that Palestine is Syria's best customer, and the possibility of measures of retaliation is not overlooked.

In the first report published by the Hadjas Railway Administration since the railway was taken over by the Syrian Government, the Director-General points out that the deficit of £S.1,333,354 anticipated by the French company for the current year has been reduced by £S.960,000. During the first six months of the Syrian Administration, an excess of revenue over expenditure (excluding the compensation paid to dismissed workmen) amounting to £S.46,210 had been realised.

A Lebanese aircraft belonging to the Middle East Air Lines has made a trial run on the Beirut, Aleppo, Hassetché, Qamichlié, Beirut route.

Damascus.

In Damascus discussions regarding the Anglo-French agreement, similar to those held with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Section 11 below), took place between His Majesty's Consul and the Syrian Prime Minister, who maintained that he was unable to "accept" certain of the clauses in the communiqué and in the actual texts, particularly the reference to the French proclamation of independence of 1941, and the provision that French forces should remain in the Lebanon until the United Nations had decided on the organisation of collective security in this zone; this he considered was prejudging the decision of the United Nations, and would be giving a privileged position to the French.

During a budget debate in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 18th December, the Government were violently attacked by Opposition Deputies on the grounds that the Minister of the Interior had sent a telegram to Aleppo encouraging demonstrations of approval before the Chamber had had an opportunity of studying the terms of the agreement. A heated altercation arose but the Speaker intervened and maintained that the agreement could not be discussed at a budget sitting; a special session to discuss the agreement was fixed for the 22nd December. It appears that the Prime Minister has been considerably upset by the violence of this attack on his Cabinet and, as a result, his attitude of caution and suspicion has become even more marked.

At the meeting of the Chamber on the 10th December motions were tabled for:—

- (1) Gradual reduction in the strength of the Syrian army.
- (2) Conscription.
- (3) Amalgamation of the police and gendarmerie.
- (4) Abolition of the Tribal Directorate. This latter proposal was strongly opposed by Sheikh Trad el Mulhem.

There has been considerable speculation regarding a possible reshuffle of the Cabinet. Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works, tendered his resignation on the 12th December, but it was not accepted. (When the present administration was formed he was offered the portfolio for Foreign Affairs but was persuaded by the Prime Minister to accept the Ministry of Finance until the budget was framed). He has agreed to continue for the present in Finance on the understanding that his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs will be soon announced, but this may be delayed as Saadullah Jabri is likely to insist on handling the negotiations in connexion with the Anglo-French agreement himself.

Zuhair Murabet has been appointed Syrian Consul in Mosul.

Aleppo.

The conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement was welcomed in the Aleppo area, insofar as it holds out a prospect of the early withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria. On orders from the Mohafez, flags were hoisted on public buildings and a small number of shops were beflagged, but it is clear that these outward signs were half-hearted as misgivings are widely entertained as to the scope of the agreement and how long the French forces will remain in the Lebanon where it is felt they will always remain a threat to Syrian independence. Satisfaction is, however, tempered by a feeling of regret that British troops will soon leave Syria and Christians, in particular, and not a few Moslems, have expressed fears for the future of the country if abandoned by Great Britain.

The Délégation Générale decided to call M. Fauquenot to Beirut for consultation, and as a result of strong representations by His Majesty's Legation to the Syrian Government, instructions were sent to Aleppo that no attempt should be made to interfere with his departure. M. Fauquenot left from the Aleppo airport on the 13th December, Commandant Gave from Beirut taking up residence in the Délégation in Aleppo. The Syrian Prime Minister has undertaken that M. Fauquenot will be allowed to return, but it is clear that the Syrian authorities would greatly prefer that he should not do so.

There has been a strike of about 1,500 factory weavers in Aleppo during the past week, in protest against the high cost of living, the great profits recently made by local factory owners, and the high wages paid in Damascus and other towns in Syria. An orderly party of demonstrators marching to the Serail was roughly handled and dispersed by a strong police force; 85 persons were arrested and imprisoned.

Lebanon.

The communiqué on the Anglo-French Agreement was read to the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the afternoon of the 13th December by the Prime Minister, but was not debated. The President himself took the unusual step of attending the sitting. The reception of this communication by the Deputies was reserved and somewhat frigid, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs reflected the general feeling when he stated that the Lebanese would not be bound by the terms of any agreements not submitted to their approval.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently had two long discussions with His Majesty's Minister on the texts of the two agreements. He explained that, had the agreement been between, for example, Great Britain and the United States, it would not have aroused the same misgivings or called for the same explanations, since there were no doubts about our good faith; it was only because of the suspicions resulting from past experiences of French policy and activities in the Levant, and from the intensive propaganda, employment of agents, &c., in which the French still indulged here, that his Government were forced to examine the agreements with the utmost care, if they were to accept them and to reassure public opinion about them. He was particularly concerned at the phrase "interests or responsibilities," which was differently worded in the French text, as his Government could not recognise that France had any responsibilities in the Levant. He also objected to the differentiation between Syria and the Lebanon in the evacuation plan, and considered that if French and British troops must remain in the Lebanon, at least a token force should remain in Syria as well until the final evacuation. He required assurances that the reference to the French proclamation of Lebanese independence in 1941 did not imply an obligation on the part of the Lebanon to conclude a treaty with France, and that

the reference to Anglo-French economic collaboration with the States did not imply unwanted French interference in their affairs.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was strongly urged not to insist too much on points of detail, and to prevent as far as possible any irresponsible public comment or actions, such as strikes (which had been threatened). In the Chamber on the 17th December he stated that the withdrawal of foreign troops would take place simultaneously and that no restriction would be placed on Lebanese independence and sovereignty. He also appealed to the press only to publish authenticated news, and addressed an assurance to the public, especially Youth Organisations, that the Government were still studying the agreement and that if they found anything detrimental to Lebanese rights, which so far they had not, they would not hesitate to denounce it.

On the 11th December, during the opening debate on the 1946 Budget in the Lebanese Chamber, the Prime Minister spoke optimistically of the financial situation and explained that the increased size of the budget (£L.58 million as opposed to £L.43 million for 1945) was due to increased expenditure on the Ministry of Defence and other security measures. He denied that the Government intended to contract an internal loan, but on the other hand stated that the Banque de Syrie had been approached to provide a loan of £L.10 million for municipal constructions and that the Government were projecting a scheme involving a loan of £L.15 million for the development of agriculture and industry. Deputies expressed concern at the increasing expenditure, especially on the engagement and promotion of officials, and deplored the large proportion of the budget which went on unproductive expenditure and the Government's extravagance. The Prime Minister, as usual, claimed that officials could not be dismissed and left to starve.

The Maronite Patriarch came to Beirut on the 16th December on his first State visit for more than a year. He was for one night the guest of the President, who is having his activities carefully watched. So far he has said nothing displeasing to the Government.

The Lebanese Government have rejected the Anglo-French option agreement regarding the disposal of the H.B.T. Railway, and have instead expressed their desire to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government for the purchase of the line on their own account.

The Lebanese frontier authorities recently intercepted a party of Jewish children being escorted from Palestine to the Lebanon by some armed Zionists, one of whom was arrested with a grenade in his pocket. The Lebanese Government are understood to intend to take the opportunity of this incident to strengthen their frontier defences and to request the Palestine Government to do the same.

[E 321/213/89]

(14)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 194, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 25th December, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 10th January, 1946.)

General.

FRENCH and British military experts held their first meeting in Beirut on the 21st December and exchanged their instructions, in which considerable divergencies were revealed. The main Anglo-French committee of military experts decided to set up a sub-committee to examine the respective instructions with a view to co-ordination. When this sub-committee met on the 24th December, the French representative handed in a note from General de Larminat on the divergencies, on which he had referred to Paris for further instructions.

The French note made the following points:—

1. The British instructions foresaw that the regrouping of British forces evacuated from Syria would take place in the Lebanon, whereas it was stated the agreement of the 13th December did not provide for any such regrouping in the Lebanon except for French forces.
2. The British instructions foresaw that the French and British forces stationed in the Lebanon must be in proportion to their present strength whereas the agreement of the 13th December made no mention of any operation based on the proportion of troops.

3. There was no mention in the British instructions of the maintenance of security until the establishment of the organisation for collective security, whereas the agreement of the 13th December provided for the maintenance of such forces.

The sub-committee agreed, however, that enough common ground existed to recommend to the main committee that planning for the evacuation of Syria could begin. The sub-committee will meet again on the 27th December to prepare a report for submission to the main committee on the 28th December.

The texts of the Anglo-French Agreement were published in London and Paris on the 21st December. It was felt in London that leakages might occur or that distorted versions appearing in the press might be used for propaganda purposes; in so far as the Levant States were concerned, early publication was desirable in view of the wild fears and suspicions to which the local press and public opinion were already giving vent, even though certain passages in the texts were bound to give rise to strong criticism as soon as they became known.

By the time the agreements were published the initial reaction of the Levant States Governments themselves, which had not been unfavourable, had given way to doubts and apprehensions, as a result of their own probing into the documents, of press messages from abroad and of the trend of local opinion, despite every effort on the part of His Majesty's Legation to persuade them to consider the agreement objectively and to dwell on its advantages rather than to pick holes in it.

In Syria demonstrations against the agreement took place in the principal towns on the 22nd and 23rd December. For the first time these demonstrations were anti-British as well as anti-French. In the Lebanon the reaction of public opinion was comparatively restrained.

Economic.

No figures available.

Damascus.

Since the first favourable reaction of the Syrian Government to the Anglo-French Agreement after His Majesty's Minister had communicated the texts to the President and Prime Minister on the 13th December (following which the Minister of Interior had instructed local authorities to hang out flags, for which he was later violently attacked in the Chamber)—the attitude of the Syrian Government has passed through certain distinct phases.

By the 15th December doubts had been aroused by detailed study of the documents and by press messages from abroad, as well as by the first unfavourable reactions of the local newspapers. The anxieties of the Lebanese Government were also no doubt a contributory factor. It was in this frame of mind that the Syrian Government met the Chamber of Deputies on the 17th December (not the 18th as stated in Weekly Summary for the week ending the 18th December).

The rough handling the Government then received probably brought it home to them that they must take a definite line. The President's influence seems to have been instrumental in bringing the Government to decide that the agreement despite certain features to which they took exception, offered some advantages to Syria. On the 18th December the President and the Prime Minister interviewed a large number of Deputies and it is reliably reported that they used the threat of dissolution if the Chamber proved recalcitrant. Efforts to prevent a demonstration by students were almost successful.

By the 20th December the Government had become still more doubtful, especially as the strength of local opposition was realised; and the President sent an emissary to Beirut with a view to inducing the Lebanese Government to protest against the agreement.

On the 21st December His Majesty's Minister went to Damascus and had long conversations with the President (whom he found in a dour and morose mood) and with the Prime Minister who was at first very difficult but was at length induced to write down notes for use in his speech to the Chamber on the following day. He said, however, that he would have great difficulty, especially as regards the phrase "interests or responsibilities" and the provision for maintaining forces in the Levant to ensure security for an indefinite period.

When the Syrian Chamber of Deputies debated the Anglo-French Agreement on the 22nd December, the Prime Minister emphasised that whereas the agreement had many points which called for elucidation, there were two elements favourable to Syria, the evacuation of foreign forces and the maintenance of order; this the Syrian Government would be able to ensure, provided the necessary

equipment was made available to the security forces. As regards the doubtful points, he gave the Chamber explanations on the lines which he had received from His Majesty's Legation covering the reference to independence, French and British interests in the Middle East, &c. There was, however, one point on which he had not been able to obtain satisfaction, namely, the retention of the foreign forces in the Lebanon pending a decision by the United Nations Organisation regarding security in the Middle East; this was unjustifiable as it anticipated the decision of the United Nations. The Prime Minister's speech was less unsatisfactory than it might have been although he failed to give a lead and left the decision for the Chamber. The speech was on the whole well received and the relative documents were referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee for study before the debate, which will be continued on the 27th December.

Assad Haroun has been appointed Syrian Minister in Tehran; Faiz el Khouri, Syrian Minister in Moscow, who has been in Damascus for several months, has requested to be put on the retired list.

Aleppo.

Speculation about the Anglo-French Agreement occupied the minds of all sections of the population during the period under review. The Government came in for considerable criticism on the grounds that they either knew all about the negotiations but did not inform the Chamber and the public, or that they were insufficiently firm in their attitude towards the British and French and did not insist on being kept fully informed regarding the negotiations. The feeling was prevalent that the British and French Governments had failed to consult the Levant States during the negotiations and on the 22nd December, when a demonstration of protest took place, anti-British shouts were raised for the first time.

The National Bloc appears to be losing ground in the Aleppo area, because of the corruption and inefficiency which it is believed to have tolerated, if not encouraged. Opponents of Saadullah Jabri's Government seized the opportunity of a visit to Aleppo by Nazim Bey Qudsi, the Syrian Minister in Washington, to stage a demonstration against the Government.

On the 17th December a large group of Armenians in Aleppo was addressed by speakers who urged the Armenians in Syria not to leave for Russia but to remember that they had acquired Syrian nationality and had the same rights and duties as Syrians.

On the 23rd December a grenade was thrown at the French Delegation and a little later another was thrown at the residence of the French Officer Commanding troops; neither caused damage or casualties.

His Majesty's Consul reports that the resolution of the United States Senate advocating unrestricted immigration into Palestine has aroused bitter criticism. Abdul Melek Khedari, the Iraqi Consul in Aleppo, is being transferred as First Secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Cairo.

Lebanon.

On the 22nd December the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to a member of the legation staff the text of the following communiqué, which he said the Lebanese Government had felt obliged to issue to the press:—

"Two official documents were published to-day in London and Paris referring to the recent Franco-British Agreement, and concerning—

"1. The evacuation of French and British troops from Lebanese and Syrian territory.

"2. The concordance of British and French aims in the Near East.

"These documents lay down principles and establish procedure for the evacuation of troops.

"On the subject of these documents, and in order to obviate any ambiguity of error in interpretation, the Lebanese Government solemnly declares once again, that—

"1. Not having taken part in the talks which led to the agreement referred to above, Lebanon cannot be bound by the decisions, taken in its absence, which tend to infringe its rights or interests.

"2. Lebanon's independence and sovereignty are and will remain inviolable: Lebanon, as a member of the United Nations Organisation, will act in respect of the agreement in the manner dictated by its independent status.

"3. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanese territory will take place simultaneously, in accordance with the solemn assurances given to this effect on several occasions, and of which the Lebanese Government has just received a renewal.

"4. The Government declares that it will not accept any act or reservation tending to modify Lebanon's status, either within the United Nations Organisation or in respect of the Arab League.

"5. The Anglo-French military talks, which commenced in Beirut to-day the 21st December, and the results of which will be communicated to the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, will be given the most vigilant attention by the Lebanese Government in close conjunction with the Syrian Governments."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed that His Majesty's Minister, who was in Damascus on that day, would be likely to take strong exception to the communiqué and was urged to get into touch with him before issuing it. This, however, did not prove possible and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when informed later of His Majesty's Minister's surprise at the terms of the communiqué, defended its issue on the grounds that it was imperative for the Government to take an unequivocal position forthwith in order to prevent disturbances and possibly a split in the country; the communiqué was intended solely for internal consumption and he had hastened its issue because General Beynet on his return to Beirut the day before had been reported as saying to a journalist that the French were to leave Syria but were to remain in the Lebanon.

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the 24th December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement on the Anglo-French Agreement of which the following are the main points:—

1. The Lebanon did not consider herself bound by any agreement in which she had not participated; her independence had been recognised by all Powers and she wished for good relations with everyone without privilege for any.

2. The Anglo-French Agreement was obscure; it stipulated for simultaneous withdrawal of all troops but fixed no date, and referred to sufficient forces remaining in the Levant pending the formation of United Nations Organisation which would have to establish the conditions in which the maintenance of international security would be affected. Since the Lebanon had been invited to take part in the labours of this organisation, she would there express her point of view and would demand the complete withdrawal of troops; attention should be drawn to two points of capital importance—

(a) Article 82 of the United Nations Charter only foresaw the stationing of international security forces at strategic points in territory placed under trusteeship.

(b) Collaboration in the maintenance of international security ought to take place in accordance with article 43 of the United Nations Charter in virtue of agreements concluded between the interested parties and ratified by constitutional means.

3. Reports which had reached the Lebanese Government from its representatives abroad did not justify pessimism. The Lebanon and Syrian admitted no agreement and no action susceptible of modifying their position as regards either United Nations Organisation or the Arab League; the Government would undertake no action without the prior agreement of the Chamber.

The Lebanese President is reported to have received a deputation from various political groups and to have told them that some explanations on the obscurities in the agreement had already been received and that others were expected. He urged them to do all in their power to maintain calm in order to allow the Government to devote itself to examining the situation.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 195, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 1st January, 1946.—(Received 16th January.)

General.

Despite all efforts to reassure the Governments and public opinion in the Levant States, the Anglo-French Agreement is still viewed in both countries with suspicion and apprehension. Apart from the particular points which have been mentioned in previous summaries, there remains widespread mistrust of French intentions and the fear that, as in 1920 and 1941, Great Britain has come to an agreement with France at the expense of the Levant States, which will result in our assisting the French to recover and maintain a special position.

The Anglo-French Military Committee met again on the 28th December and approved with some reservations a report submitted by the sub-committee. The latter was then instructed:—

- (1) To recommend measures necessary to raise the Syrian forces in the shortest possible time to the requisite state of efficiency to maintain order.
- (2) To draw up in outline a plan for the evacuation of Syria.
- (3) To collate data in regard to the Lebanon.

On the 31st December General Oliva-Roget landed in a French aircraft at Mezzé and was flown on to Beirut, but not before his arrival had been reported to the Syrian Government. The Syrian Prime Minister immediately ordered that road blocks should be placed at all exits from Mezzé and on the roads crossing the Syrian-Lebanese frontiers, that no Frenchman was to be allowed to leave Mezzé or to enter Syria, and that no French convoys or French personnel, even escorted by British forces, were to be allowed to pass the blocks.

On the same day the French landed 186 military and air force personnel at Beirut from a French ship which had come from Marseilles. The Lebanese Prime Minister first learned of this during a meeting of the Chamber and announced, amidst loud applause, that he would prevent these troops from landing by force, but they had already landed.

It is too early yet to assess the effects of these two events, but despite the French explanation that General Oliva-Roget's visit is only to pack his bags before taking up an appointment in Europe, and that the newly-arrived personnel have come to replace men posted home for reasons of sickness, leave, termination of service, &c. It is already clear that both Syrians and Lebanese are more than ever convinced that there has been no change of heart by the French.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 23rd–30th December amount to 615 tons, a daily average of 88 tons, which brings the total for the 1945–46 crop up to 184,780 tons.

The devaluation of the franc has been widely commented on in the Syrian press and satisfaction has been expressed that Syrian currency remained unaffected. This is described as "the first great advantage obtained by Syria at the break with France" and the complete separation of the franc and the Syrian pound is now demanded.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments held a series of talks on economic matters on the 25th and the 29th December, as a result of which it was announced in the Lebanese Chamber that they had agreed (1) to make a final division of the Customs revenues for the years 1943–45 in the proportion 56 per cent. to Syria and 44 per cent. to the Lebanon; (2) to suppress the Ravitaillement tax on imported goods with effect from next February; and (3) to reorganise the Office des Changes so that each Government would be directly represented on it and French participation would be eliminated.

Syria—Damascus.

On the 27th December the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Syrian Chamber presented its report on the Anglo-French Agreement; its general tone was unpromising. In the debate which followed leading members of the Opposition spoke with violence against the agreement and, after a heated exchange during which the Government were again reproached with having originally expressed approval of the agreement, the Prime Minister insisted on a vote of confidence, which he obtained by 59 votes to 8, with one abstention, some 10 Deputies leaving the Chamber before the vote.

On the 31st December the Chamber unanimously passed a resolution based on the recommendations of the Foreign Affairs Committee and stating that they had decided:—

"That the Government should protest to the United Nations Organisation against the agreement and against the maintenance of any foreign forces on Syrian territory, and should ask the United Nations Organisation to intervene to secure complete and immediate evacuation."

"That the Government should forthwith call for a meeting of the Council of the Arab League so that it might study the agreement, which affected not only Syria and the Lebanon but all Arab countries, and take measures with a view to the execution of its decision regarding the evacuation of all foreign forces from Syria and the Lebanon."

"That the Government should take all necessary measures to face every eventuality tending to prejudice the country's independence and sovereignty."

Early in the debate an Opposition Deputy introduced a fourth resolution to the effect that the Chamber rejected the Anglo-French Agreement, but His Majesty's Minister sent a personal message to the Syrian Prime Minister during the adjournment urging him to take any steps open to him to prevent any such exaggerated measure being passed.

According to the press Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance, has submitted his resignation on health grounds. He is confined to his house and it is known that his eyes are giving him trouble.

Count Ostrorog has informed His Majesty's Minister that the Syrian Minister in Paris has replied to the French protest on the closure of schools in Syria. His note enclosed a copy of the circular letter sent on the 30th October by the Syrian Ministry of Public Instruction to foreign schools other than French, and stated that no discriminatory measure had been taken against French schools which could function in the same conditions as other foreign schools, *i.e.*, if they complied with this circular. Count Ostrorog said that in these circumstances the French proposed to open their schools on the 4th January. The Syrian Prime Minister, when shown a copy of this note by His Majesty's Minister, said that the French schools in Syria might reopen when they had conformed to the regulations of the Ministry of Education but not before, and he again referred to the failure of French schools to reply to the Ministry of Education's circular of March 1945. Count Ostrorog was informed in this sense and it was pointed out to him that to open French schools in face of Syrian opposition at this juncture might have unfortunate consequences in view of the prevailing excitement over the Anglo-French Agreement. He said he would consult his experts, particularly as to whether it would be possible to agree to French schools replying to the circular of last March, and promised to discuss the matter again with His Majesty's Minister when a decision had been taken.

Lebanon.

The tone of the Lebanese press on the subject of the Anglo-French Agreement, which continued to hold first place, became almost violent by the 27th December, but has since been somewhat moderated, though it is clear that suspicions are still widely entertained that Great Britain has done a bargain with France at the expense of the Lebanon which the French never intend to quit. Pro-French elements endeavouring to profit from this situation are not improving matters.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned Count Ostrorog on the 31st December and protested against the troops on the "Sagittaire" having been brought in without the previous consent of the Lebanese Government (see "General" above). Count Ostrorog, after explaining that these men constituted neither reinforcements nor replacements of existing units, said that General Humblot would be instructed to concert with the General Officer Commanding, British Troops North Levant, means of notifying the Lebanese Government in future of any movements of French or British troops into or out of the Lebanon. The Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to have been reassured.

The Lebanese Chamber, after a series of meetings, had made considerable progress with the budget, but were unable to complete it before the end of the year and another session will be necessary for the purpose.

The Lebanese Chamber on the 19th December protested against the reported vote of the United States Senate in favour of unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine.

When the budget of the Ministry of Justice was debated in the Chamber on the 28th December, two Deputies pressed for the abolition of the Mixed Courts and the Minister of Justice replied that the Government were studying the necessary measures to that end.

Rifaat Kazaoui, the Deputy caught redhanded smuggling arms in the Bekaa, was sentenced on the 21st December to 15 days' imprisonment (which he had already served) and £Syr.100 fine. He subsequently resumed his seat in the Chamber. A more serious matter was the arrest at Beirut Airport of the counsellor of the Lebanese Legation in Paris in possession of 750 sovereigns, which he was alleged to be about to smuggle into France. In subsequent interrogation he has incriminated the Lebanese Consul-General at Marseilles and other officials. His resignation from the Lebanese Foreign Service has been accepted.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE

[E 7611/3/65]

No. 9

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Farquhar (Cairo), No. 677; Mr. Grafftey-Smith (Jedda), No. 176; The Earl of Halifax (Washington), No. 1772; Mr. Young (Beirut), No. 230; Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird (Bagdad), No. 266.

Sir,

Foreign Office, 8th October, 1945.

AZZAM BEY, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, came to see me this afternoon. After an exchange of greetings, he expressed anxiety about our attitude towards the Arab League. I replied that I was equally concerned about the Arab League's attitude to us. Did they want to be friendly? Azzam Bey replied "Yes."

2. I referred to the terrible conditions in Europe due to racial hatreds—the Jews stood out as the prime sufferers on this score. The Jews, I said, were first cousins to the Arabs and, instead of approaching them as though they were enemies, could not the Arabs come to look upon them as friends? Azzam Bey agreed that this was the right approach. "God," he said, "has punished the Germans for what they have done to the Jews."

3. What, I asked, were the chances of representatives of the Arab and Jewish world meeting me and talking over the present problem? To this Azzam Bey replied that he had been present in 1939 when Mr. Malcolm MacDonald had got the Jews in one room and the Arabs in another. (Incidentally, Dr. Weizmann, whom I had seen a few days previously, made a similar remark.) I pointed out that it might take a dozen talks to accomplish anything; but the first point was, would the Arabs participate? Azzam Bey thought they would, if they were approached in the right way.

4. In conclusion, Azzam Bey expressed gratitude at my receiving him and especially for my talking so frankly.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 8742/15/31]

No. 10

Extract from House of Commons Debate, 13th November, 1945.

Palestine (Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I should like, with the permission of the House, to make a statement.

His Majesty's Government have been giving serious and continuous attention to the whole problem of the Jewish community that has arisen as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, and the conditions arising therefrom. It is, unfortunately, true that until conditions in Europe become stable the future of a large number of persons of many races, who have suffered under this persecution, cannot finally be determined. The plight of the victims of Nazi persecution, among whom were a large number of Jews, is unprecedented in the history of the world. His Majesty's Government are taking every step open to them to try to improve the lot of these unfortunate people. The Jewish problem is a great human one. We cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe, and should not be permitted to live again in these countries without discrimination, and contribute their ability and their talent towards rebuilding the prosperity of Europe. Even after we have done all we can in this respect, it does not provide a solution of the whole problem.

There have recently been demands made upon us for large-scale immigration into Palestine. Palestine, while it may be able to make a contribution, does not, by itself, provide sufficient opportunity for grappling with the whole problem. His Majesty's Government are anxious to explore every possibility which will result in giving the Jews a proper opportunity for revival.

The problem of Palestine is itself a very difficult one. The mandate for Palestine requires the mandatory to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced thereby. His Majesty's Government have thus a dual obligation, to the Jews on the one side and to the Arabs on the other. The lack of any clear definition of this dual obligation has been the main cause of the trouble which has been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. His Majesty's Government have made every effort to devise some arrangements which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and to co-operate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. Any arrangements acceptable to one party has been rejected as unacceptable to the other. The whole history of Palestine since the mandate was granted has been one of continued friction between the two races, culminating at intervals in serious disturbances.

The fact has to be faced that, since the introduction of the mandate, it has been impossible to find common ground between the Arabs and the Jews. The differences in religion and in language, in cultural and social life, in ways of thought and conduct, are difficult to reconcile. On the other hand, both communities lay claim to Palestine, one on the ground of a millenium of occupation, and the other on the ground of historic association coupled with the undertaking given in the first world war to establish a Jewish home. The task that has to be accomplished now is to find means to reconcile these divergences.

The repercussions of the conflict have spread far beyond the small land in which it has arisen. The Zionist cause has strong supporters in the United States, in Great Britain, in the Dominions and elsewhere; civilisation has been appalled by the sufferings which have been inflicted in recent years on the persecuted Jews of Europe. On the other side of the picture, the cause of the Palestinian Arabs has been espoused by the whole Arab world and more lately has become a matter of keen interest to their 90 million co-religionists in India. In Palestine itself there is always the serious risk of disturbances on the part of one condition or the other, and such disturbances are bound to find their reflection in a much wider field. Considerations not only of equity and of humanity, but also of international amity and world peace, are thus involved in any search for solution.

In dealing with Palestine all parties have entered into commitments. There are the commitments imposed by the mandate itself and, in addition, the various statements of policy which have been made by His Majesty's Government in the course of the last twenty-five years. Further, the United States Government themselves have undertaken that no decision should be taken in respect of what, in their opinion, affects the basic situation in Palestine, without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Having regard to the whole situation and the fact that it has caused this world-wide interest which affects both Arabs and Jews, His Majesty's Government decided to invite the Government of the United States to co-operate with them in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, under a rotating chairmanship, to examine the question of European Jewry and to make a further review of the Palestine problem in the light of that examination. I am happy to be able to inform the House that the Government of the United States have accepted this invitation.

The terms of reference that have been agreed between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government are as follows:—

- (1) To examine political, economic and social conditions of Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein, and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.
- (2) To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and the practical measures taken, or contemplated to be taken, in those countries, to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish, or will be impelled by their conditions, to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
- (3) To hear the view of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 above, and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of the United States for *ad interim* handling of those problems, as well as for their permanent solution.

- (4) To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question, or by the provision of facilities for emigration to, and settlement in, countries outside Europe.

Those are the terms of reference. The procedure of the committee will be determined by the committee themselves and it will be open to them, if they think fit, to deal simultaneously, through the medium of sub-committees, with their various terms of reference. The committee will be invited to deal with the matters referred to in their terms of reference with the utmost expedition. In complying with the second and fourth paragraphs of their terms of reference, the committee will presumably take such steps as they consider necessary in order to inform themselves of the character and magnitude of the problem created by the war. They will also give consideration to the problem of settlement in Europe, and to possible countries of disposal. In the light of their investigations they will make recommendations to the two Governments for dealing with the problem in the interim until such time as a permanent solution can be submitted to the appropriate organ of the United Nations.

The recommendations of a Committee of Enquiry such as will now be set up will also be of immense help in arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem. The committee will, in accordance with the first and third paragraphs of their terms of reference, make an examination on the spot of the political, economic and social conditions which are at present held to restrict immigration into Palestine and, after consulting representative Arabs and Jews, submit proposals for dealing with these problems. It will be necessary for His Majesty's Government both to take action with a view to securing some satisfactory interim arrangements, and also to devise a policy for permanent application thereafter. This enquiry will facilitate the finding of a solution which will, in turn, facilitate the arrangements for placing Palestine under trusteeship.

So far as Palestine is concerned, it will be clear that His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of their duties and responsibilities under the mandate while the mandate continues. They propose, in accordance with their pledges, to deal with the question in three stages:—

- (i) They will consult the Arabs with a view to an arrangement which will ensure that, pending the receipt of the *ad interim* recommendations which the Committee of Enquiry will make on the matter, there is no interruption of Jewish immigration at the present monthly rate.
- (ii) After considering the *ad interim* recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry, they will explore, with the parties concerned, the possibility of devising other temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it can be reached.
- (iii) They will prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations, and if possible an agreed one.

The House will realise that we have inherited in Palestine a most difficult legacy, and our task is greatly complicated by undertakings given at various times to various parties, which we feel ourselves bound to honour.

Miss Rathbone: What about your own policy?

Mr. Bevin: Any violent departure without adequate consultation would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's Government but would probably cause serious reactions throughout the Middle East and would arouse widespread anxiety in India.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the course which they propose to pursue in the immediate future, is not only that which is in accordance with their obligations, but is also that which, in the long view, is in the best interests of both parties. It will in no way prejudice either the action to be taken on the recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry, or the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement which will supersede the existing mandate, and will, therefore, control ultimate policy in regard to Palestine.

His Majesty's Government in making this new approach, wish to make it clear that the Palestine problem is not one which can be settled by force, and that any attempt to do so, by any party, will be resolutely dealt with. It must be settled by discussion and conciliation, and there can be no question of allowing an issue to be forced by violent conflict. We have confidence that if this problem

is approached in the right spirit by Arabs and Jews, not only will a solution be found to the Palestine question, just to both parties, but a great contribution will be made to the stability and peace in the Middle East.

Finally, the initiative taken by His Majesty's Government, and the agreement of the United States Government to co-operate in dealing with the whole problem created by Nazi aggression is a significant sign of their determination to deal with this problem in a constructive way and a humanitarian spirit. But I must emphasise that the problem is not one which can be dealt with only in relation to Palestine: it will need a united effort by the Powers to relieve the miseries of these suffering peoples. I would add, in conclusion, that throughout there has been the closest consultation between my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies and myself in this matter, which concerns him since the mandatory status of Palestine brings that territory within the responsibility of the Colonial Office, but which is also a deep concern to me, since the problem is clearly an international problem. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government that the problem shall continue to be handled in close collaboration between our two Departments, in order that the particular question of Palestine, and the wider international issues which are involved, may be harmonised, and treated as a whole, as a great human problem.

Colonel Oliver Stanley: The right hon. gentleman has just made a most important statement on a most delicate and difficult problem. There are obvious questions, and there are matters on which we should like explanation, but I personally feel, and I think many hon. members will agree, that I would much prefer not to have to put them until we have had an opportunity to study the right hon. gentleman's statement, and that any discussion should take place, not in the atmosphere of questions and answers, which, in delicate matters like this, always presents certain dangers, but in reasoned debate. If the right hon. gentleman can say, as I hope he will be able to say, that the House is soon to be given an opportunity to debate this urgent matter, I would prefer to postpone any comment.

Mr. Bevin: I think that if the right hon. gentleman would put that question to the Leader of the House on Thursday we might have an opportunity to consider it. We have not considered a debate, but if representations are made—*[Interruption.]* I ask hon. members not to get excited. I personally do not deal with arrangements for debates.

Colonel Stanley: Can I put a question to the Leader of the House now? The position is that I, and I think many other hon. members, would be prepared to waive our right to ask questions now if we were assured that there would be a debate. I do not ask that, immediately, the Leader of the House should settle the arrangements and the day, but perhaps he would say, in response to what I think is a united request on the part of the House, that he would give a day soon for debate.

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison): We shall not be difficult on that point at all, if there is a general wish in the House for a debate, and I gather there is. My right hon. friend and I thought that as the statement has just been made, it would be as well if members were to read it carefully, and then, if they want to talk about it, an approach could be made through the usual channels, and, if necessary, I would make the announcement on Thursday.

Mr. Janner: I would like to ask the right hon. gentleman whether, in view of the statement he has made that the responsibility of the mandate rests upon our shoulders, he proposes that that responsibility should be carried out until some new policy is adopted; and whether he proposes to insist that that should be in the forefront of any new policy; also if he will bear in mind the fact that, at the present time, there are some 1,250,000 people anxious to go to Palestine, and see what arrangements can be made?

Mr. Bevin: I would say to my hon. friend that this problem has been one of the most baffling in the world, and I would appeal to him not to introduce racial feeling. From my point of view, I can assure him that I am struggling to the best of my ability as Foreign Secretary to solve this problem, not, I hope, on the basis of the passions involved in the immediate difficulties now facing us. But I am sure that this House and Jewry as a whole, apart from the Zionist organisations, are anxious to see a final solution. I give my hon. friend my personal assurance, as I gave it to one of the Jewish leaders the other day, that

I will stake my political future on solving this problem, but not in the limited sphere presented to me now.

Mr. Stokes: I want to ask the Foreign Secretary a question on this very important point. I have no wish to raise controversy on this matter. *[Interruption.]* I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he will bear in mind that his preamble, while referring to specific promises made to the Jews, did not make any specific reference to the categorical promises made previously to the Arabs. Particularly, may I ask the right hon. gentleman whether he is aware that the Arabs have made perfectly clear to everybody their willingness to help in this vital problem by admitting Jews into territory other than Palestine.

Mr. Bevin: I beg my right hon. friend, in this crisis, not to pursue racial antagonisms. It is the most difficult thing in this world to settle anything when racial antagonism is raised. The Arabs are meeting me very well, and I thank them for it. There is a great sense of responsibility, except for one small section among Jewry, and all the Jews are not Zionists. They want this problem settled. I am pursuing this course in the hope of trying to find a solution. I know it has difficulties. This is the first time I have heard the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) not being controversial. But, when we have had so many wars, so much bloodshed, over racial antagonism, I would appeal to this House to help me to carry out my job, and find a solution of this problem.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: In view of the arrangement that has been made, I do not want to ask my right hon. friend any questions. I think it would be wrong, however, to let the opportunity pass, without thanking the Foreign Secretary for his very careful and lengthy statement, and for the spirit in which it was made, and to congratulate him on having secured the co-operation, in this difficult matter, of the United States Government.

[E 9852/119/31]

No. 11

Lord Killearn to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 18th December.)

(No. 1600.)

Sir,

Cairo, 5th December, 1945.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2541, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note from the Secretary-General of the Arab League enclosing the reply of the League Council to your proposals regarding Palestine.

2. This text is obviously a translation from the Arabic original and is very lame in various places.

I have, &c.

KILLEARN.

Enclosure in No. 11

The Secretary-General of the Arab League to the British Ambassador.

NOTE.

5th December, 1945.

THE Secretary-General of the League of Arab States presents his compliments to his Excellency the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty and has the honour to enclose herewith the reply of the Council of the League to Mr. Bevin's statement on Palestine.

In accordance with the wish of the Council of the League, the Secretary-General requests the favour of forwarding this reply as soon as possible to his Excellency the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary-General of the League expresses to his Excellency the Ambassador his best thanks and avails himself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of his very high consideration.

Reply of the League on Mr. Bevin's Statement on Palestine.

STATES of the Arab League were informed of the statement of your Excellency, delivered on the 14th November, in the House of Commons.

The Council of the League had seen the statement and the note with which it was communicated, individually, to the Arab States.

The Council appreciate the British Government's will to implement the assurances given in 1939, and their promise to consult the Arab States regarding Palestine, since its fate directly concerns these Arab States, both in the present and in the future.

The Council realised from your statement the sincere effort you have made in understanding both the Palestinian and the Jewish problems in their various aspects.

The Council appreciate your Excellency's emphasis to the Arab eternal and actual rights in Palestine, and your clearness in distinguishing between the Zionist and the Jewish problems, and your endeavour to act in helping the European Jews and others who had suffered persecution under Nazi and Fascist régimes, so that they may be able to live peaceful and secure in their national homes.

The Arab States recognise in your endeavours a worthy human act that leads to a lasting peace by avoiding to cure an old injustice with a new one, and to relieve the persecution of a people by persecuting another.

If Zionism was allowed to realise its objective in Palestine, the Arabs would definitely lose their national rights in their own country, and their democratic right by which they can determine their own fate in the land handed over to them by their ancestors from time immemorial—this is in itself a persecution to the Arabs not less cruel than the lamented persecution of the Jews in other countries.

The victory of democracy and the utter destruction of the nazism and fascism, fortunately, facilitate the attempt to solve the world Jewish problem on democratic principles and, in accordance with the prevailing spirit of our time, on the basis of freedom of opinion and freedom of religion. Thus making it possible for the persecuted Jew to return to the land from which he was alienated by Nazi and Fascist fanaticism, and settle down in the proper homes with whose communities he shares the same languages, cultures and traditions.

In the period of twenty-six years since the Balfour Declaration it has become quite clear that it is impossible to cure persecution by another sort of persecution. The Zionist attempt to force a Jewish majority and to create a Jewish State in Palestine is making it impossible to find a compromise between Arabs and Jews. Moreover, it has created a permanent friction between both parties that is leading to a struggle between Jews on one side and Arabs and Moslems on the other, which had no precedent in history.

To the contrary, the Arabs and Moslems were, all through history, the most tolerant people on earth, and the most friendly to Jews. This new struggle will have the most undesirable consequences, not only on the Jews themselves, but also on the peace and security of the East.

Therefore, your Excellency's statement is clearly adjusting the state of affairs by confirming the unchallenged Arab right in Palestine, and your intention not to support the creation of a Jewish State in that country.

The League Council hope that such an attitude would lead towards supporting democracy, and thus enable the majority to practise its right of self-determination and realise the independence of Palestine which was pledged by your Government.

Your Excellency had pointed out in your statement, and in the attached notes to the Arab States, that you desire to continue immigration into Palestine at the present monthly rate, even after the entry of the full number of 75,000 that was granted in the White Paper of the 17th May, 1939.

Your Excellency expressed your wish to consult the Arabs in order to obtain their acquiescence to continue Jewish immigration.

The Arab States did not know on what basis the figure mentioned to some of them was formulated, nor was it clear what contributions the United States or the British Empire propose to contribute during this period in this matter, while you propose further new immigration to an Arab land.

The Arab League, by failing to understand the full reasons of your proposal asking for further immigration into Palestine, fear that it was proposed as a result of Zionist political pressure in Great Britain and another friendly country. If it is so, it is the more a reason for refusal to consent to a new immigration than to accept it.

The Zionist object is a Jewish majority and a Jewish State in Palestine, and for realising this object the Zionists are using all means of persuasion and violence. The Arabs, on the other side, will never be able to agree to a Jewish immigration emanating from Zionist pressure. When Britain gave her assurances of 1939 and pledged a final policy in Palestine, Jewish persecution was at its worst. This policy was voluntarily laid down by Britain in view of her experience and her responsibility towards Arabs and Jews.

Seventy-five thousand immigrants were to be allowed, excluded the number of illegal immigrants, in five years, and by 1944 it was definitely declared that no further immigration shall be allowed, save with Arab acquiescence.

Now that the situation has been relieved of the exceptional circumstances of 1939 and the Fascist and Nazi régimes are utterly destroyed, and the persecuted Jews became in the safe trust of the victorious democratic Powers, the Arab League see no reason for further exceptional measures to be carried against the interests of the local population of Palestine, and which will only continue the troubled state of affairs in Palestine and expose dangerously the peace in the whole Middle East.

It is known in many circles that a great number of Jews in Palestine itself desire to leave the country to the United States and to other places. They have expressed their desire, despite the Nazi Zionist terrorism which, unfortunately, dominates Palestine, and which opposes its authorities, and restricts the freedom of the Jews themselves as individuals or groups to express their own free opinions and wishes.

The case being so, would not your Excellency find it more reasonable and just to acquiesce to these legitimate desires to leave Palestine than to agree to a further Zionist immigration?

The States of the Arab League, who enjoy with Great Britain and the United States the best friendly relations, believe that all investigations by Committee of Enquiry for further immigration into Palestine are not justified, because, in the opinion of the Arab League, they will be enquiring into the same question in which previous commissions, conferences and others have enquired in various parts of the world. They are sure that all investigations would lead to the truth, which is indivisible. They are also sure that democratic principles, on whose basis they co-operate as members of the United Nations, will not reflect any doubt on Arab rights in Palestine, nor on their desire for self-determination and independence which is eagerly expected.

The League Council avail themselves of this opportunity to assure your Excellency of their desire that friendly understanding should always rule Arab-British relations, and that the approach of problems and solving them should be in the light of supreme human principles, which must be established all over the world to overcome the miseries and calamities of the present time, and lead humanity to a new era, in which permanent peace can be secured and the spirit of toleration and justice can reign, and the exchange of world blessings in the interests of all on the basis of equality and fraternity.

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA

[N 14694/10674/38]

No. 12

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 29th October.)

(No. 359.)

Sir,

Tehran, 12th October, 1945.

IN reply to your despatch No. 215, dated the 13th September, I have the honour to state that there is no Communist party in Persia. There are individual Persian Communists, but they have not formed a party. The Tudeh party, which is frequently called Communist, repudiates the title, and its published programme is reformist. It is to be supposed that if the Tudeh leaders came into power they would become extreme in programme as well as ruthless, on Soviet lines, in methods, but it is not correct to call the party Communist; and if reasonable reforms were introduced in this country, it is possible that many members would fall away from the Tudeh, which at present seems to hold out the only hope of an improvement in social conditions.

2. The support given by the Russians to the Tudeh party, which is obvious enough, is given through various channels. In Tehran the Tudeh Deputies and other leaders are in contact with the Soviet press attaché, but they also see the Soviet Ambassador not infrequently. In Azerbaijan it is the Soviet Town Commandants who seem to inspire Tudeh action and to protect its members. In the industrial town of Isfahan the Soviet vice-consul took part in the organisation of Tudeh "trade unions," which have, however, since collapsed.

3. It remains to be seen what will happen when the Soviet troops have evacuated Northern Persia. The Tudeh party has become greatly discredited by its open dependence on Russia, and may disappear. In that case we might see the "Democratic" party of Azerbaijan extending to Tehran and other towns, but here, again, the name is suspect. Reza Shah did not allow the Communist party to exist in Persia, and he persecuted individual Communists, and it is probable that any Persian Government that had the power would try to suppress communism rather than remedy grievances. There are plenty of Russian-trained Communists, mostly Armenians, in Persia who are qualified to carry on propaganda after the withdrawal of the Russian troops, but many of them may leave with the Russians or moderate their tone. For instance, Ohvanessian, the violently Communist Armenian Deputy from Azerbaijan can hardly hope to be elected again unless the elections take place before the Russians leave, and without his immunity as a Deputy he might find it difficult to carry on propaganda.

4. Persia then is in too elementary a stage, and too extraordinary a condition, to fall exactly within the limits of your above-mentioned despatch. When their troops have left Persia the Soviet Government will presumably take stock of the position and adapt their policy according to whatever situation may develop. Even if a Persian dictator of the force of character of Reza Shah should arise, it seems probable that the Russians will not submit to a resumption of the policy by which he prevented all Communist propaganda and executed or imprisoned any Communists on whom he could lay his hands. Which channels they decide to use will depend on how openly they find it possible to work.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 9218/31/34]

No. 13

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 28th November.)

(No. 387. Secret.)

Sir,

Tehran, 7th November, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 263 of the 26th July, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on Persian affairs during July, August and September 1945.

Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's Representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Persia and Iraq Command, the Middle East Command, the British Middle East Office and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 13

Internal Politics, Majlis.

1. The political deadlock which began in June owing to the refusal of the minority group in the Majlis to accept Sadr as Prime Minister continued over nearly the whole of the period under review. The minority persistently maintained their tactics of obstruction. Simply by absenting themselves from the Chamber whenever it appeared likely that a vote of confidence might be taken, they reduced the number of Deputies present below the quorum, which is absurdly high. The majority for their part refused to accept the dictation of the minority and to withdraw their support from Sadr, and eventually, on the 17th July, Sadr was able to present his Cabinet to the Majlis when 104 members were present. The Tudeh Deputies did not attend.

2. An inconclusive discussion of the Government's programme continued for some time. The minority eventually issued a manifesto against Sadr, and sent a deputation to the Shah to say that they would not accept any responsibility for the government of the country. Although the Shah was reported to have been entirely non-committal in his reply, it was generally believed that His Majesty was not in favour of Sadr, but would have preferred his own previous choice of Hakimi as Prime Minister. In the meantime Government business was at a standstill, the only Bill passed being one to authorise the Government to incur expenditure up to one-twelfth of the annual budget to cover current needs, particularly the cost of Government salaries.

3. A special session of the Majlis to mark the end of the war with Japan was held on the 16th August, but the minority did not attend. The minority, consisting of some thirty-two Deputies who, for various reasons, opposed the Government, appeared to have formed, together with the eight Tudeh members, a solid anti-Government bloc, determined to oppose Sadr at any price. Some of these Deputies were undoubtedly influenced by their desire to see Sadr replaced by a Prime Minister more likely to favour their re-election in the approaching elections, though a growing number of Deputies, including even some of the minority, were coming round to the opinion that no elections should be held until all foreign troops had left Persia.

4. On the 18th August the Majlis, at the Prime Minister's request, held a special session to discuss a mutiny of army officers, which had occurred in Meshed a day or two earlier, and also the disturbances which had recently broken out in Azerbaijan. Sadr let it be known that he considered the discussion on these events a test to determine the fate of his Government. In the ensuing debate the majority reaffirmed their confidence in Sadr, declared that the minority by holding up the work of Parliament were responsible for the disorders in the country, and proposed to hold daily sessions and to invite the minority to attend. The result was an improvement in the position of the Government, and although the two groups in the Majlis failed to compose their differences, the minority group did, early in September, consent to attend sessions and thus to provide the necessary quorum.

5. At the session of the 4th September, after Dr. Abduh, a member of the Persian Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, had made a long and carefully prepared speech on the activities of the Conference, on the drafting of the United Nations Charter, and its application to the Persia of to-day, the Majlis approved the Charter unanimously.

6. On the 9th September a proposal by Deputy Ardelan that in future no foreign national should be engaged without the previous sanction by the Majlis was approved by a large majority. On the 27th September a Bill was passed by 85 votes out of 105 authorising the Government to incur expenditure up to two-twelfths of the annual budget to cover expenses for the period the 20th July to the 20th September. Little further business was done by the Majlis up to the end of September. Although the minority maintained their opposition to Sadr, and although even the majority began to show signs that they did not intend to keep Sadr in office indefinitely, there was a large measure of agreement among all but

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the Tudeh and a few extremists, that it would be unwise to remove Sadr and precipitate a crisis at a moment when the fate of Persia was perhaps being discussed at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London.

7. On the 28th September the Sadr Government at last obtained its vote of confidence from the Majlis by seventy votes to forty. This rather unexpected success for Sadr was obtained at a moment when much indignation was felt in Tehran at a telegram sent to the London Conference by a newly-formed "Democratic" party of Azerbaijan which demanded autonomy for that province, and claimed the right, while submitting to the general laws of Iran, "to be masters in their own land." Under the influence of a debate on Azerbaijan which aroused feeling against the minority, the Majlis gave its vote of confidence to Sadr.

Soviet Penetration.

8. Early in July a delegation of prominent Russian trade unionists arrived in Tehran in response to an invitation issued by the Tudeh party labour organisation. The visit was arranged without the permission of the Persian Government who, however, did not dare to stop it. Similar invitations issued to trades unions in Great Britain, the United States and France appear to have met with no response. The delegation made a tour of the Caspian provinces and visited Tabriz where they inspected various factories and talked with the workers but ignored the managers. The Russian-controlled Persian press devoted much space to the "spontaneous" welcome said to have been shown to the visitors by 250,000 trade unionists in Persia. A reasonable estimate of the total industrial population of Persia is 150,000 and by no means all are members of the Tudeh unions. At Isfahan, for instance, which is the main industrial centre, the great majority of the workers belong at present to a trades union which is opposed to the Tudeh, a fact made abundantly clear by the omission of the Russian delegation to visit that town where they were uncertain of the reception they might receive. By agreement with the British military authorities, His Majesty's Embassy informed the Soviet Embassy that for security reasons it would not be possible to allow the Soviet Trade Union Delegation to visit the southern oil area. The Soviet Ambassador replied that they had no intention of doing so, though he could not understand what objection there could be.

9. In July there were signs of a general increase in Tudeh propaganda in Meshed, Hamadan, Kermanshah and Southern Kurdistan. In reply to a speech by Seyid Zia attacking Russian and Tudeh policy in Persia the *Pravda* published a violent article, later broadcast from Moscow, accusing Seyid Zia, the Prime Minister, and his Government, of reactionary activities and attempts to suppress freedom, of organising terrorist groups, arming the tribes, &c. The Russians broadcast the article from the Tehran Wireless Station. The Persian Minister of Propaganda intervened just too late to stop it, but in time to cut the transmission short. The pro-Russian section of the local press was now publishing increasingly violent anti-British articles accusing Great Britain of opposing all movements of freedom and progress in the interests of British imperialism.

10. Meanwhile, in Gilan and Mazandaran control of affairs seemed to be passing into the hands of Tudeh committees or soviets, and in Azerbaijan Russian control, exercised either directly or through the Tudeh party, appeared to be making headway. The Russians seemed to be intensifying their efforts to produce administrative chaos in the zones occupied by themselves. The Tudeh were stopping the export of rice from North to South Persia, and seemed to be trying to strangle the lorry traffic from Tabriz to Tehran. Government officials were threatened and sometimes suspended or expelled unless they were completely subservient to the Russians. The Tudeh which had hitherto chiefly voiced the demands of the unemployed, now included agrarian reform in their programme and began to stir up unrest among the peasants. In August Tudeh agitators in a village near Tabriz, while trying to induce the peasants to withhold the landlord's share of the harvest, clashed with the landlord and his supporters, and a fight ensued in which some persons, including the landlord, were killed. At Maragheh, in Azerbaijan, the Tudeh occupied the Government offices and turned the Government officials out. Although the Russian Ambassador disowned this movement on behalf of the Russians and (rather suggestively) on behalf of the Tudeh, and told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Government was free to take any action it liked to restore order in Maragheh, the Persian troops who ventured to arrest the local Tudeh leader were themselves confined to barracks by the Russians, who also released the prisoner. In Khorassan Tudeh complicity was suspected in a mutiny of the Persian army officers described below in the

section entitled "Persian Army." Tudeh activity it is true was not allowed to go entirely unopposed. Local peasantry encouraged perhaps by emissaries of Seyid Zia's party frequently came to blows with the Tudeh, especially in Mazandaran, but by early September the civil administration at Chalus, Sari, Shahi and Babul was virtually in Tudeh hands, and armed Turcomans with Tudeh armlets were patrolling the railway stations of Bandar i Gaz and Shahi.

11. As a result of these disturbances and of reported disaffection in the army the Government ordered, on the 23rd August, the strict application in Tehran of the Military Government law including the prohibition of all political demonstrations, the suppression of newspapers which incite to violence, and the re-imposition of a curfew. The Government also sent a commission of enquiry to Azerbaijan and their arrival early in September was the occasion for the issue of a manifesto "by the people of Tabriz" appealing for protection against Tudeh oppression. The notices were, however, at once torn down by the Tudeh, and the commission of enquiry appears to have achieved little. In fact, the activity of the Russians in the North continued to cause increasing anxiety. They were paralysing the Persian administration, encouraging a Kurdish nationalist movement, and allowing no political party except the Tudeh to exist. Until the removal of the censorship in September they filled the world with Tass propaganda about Persia, and used the censorship to suppress news from other sources. A new development was reported at this time from Azerbaijan—the formation of a "Democratic party" which issued a proclamation on the 3rd September demanding autonomy for Azerbaijan "with due respect to the independence of Iran," and the right of the Azerbaijanis "to manage the affairs of the province as they wish." The close connexion between this new party and the Tudeh was obvious from the beginning. The Tudeh movement had recently incurred much odium owing to its open connexion with the Russians. Its complicity in the military mutiny in Meshed had also by now been clearly established. It was therefore doubtless thought necessary to adopt new tactics. Hence the reorganisation, under Soviet inspiration, of the forces of disintegration in Azerbaijan under the new title of the "Democratic" party. This party held a meeting in Tabriz on the 25th September at which it elected sixty delegates to attend a General Conference of the party to be held early in October.

12. Of other party activity during this period there is little to report. Seyid Zia's party, the Iradeh i Milli, had planned to hold its first open air meeting at Meshed on the 22nd July, but early in the same morning Soviet troops, accompanied by Persian police, arrested many members of the party committee, searched their houses and confiscated documents relating to the party. Subsequently, most of the arrested men were released, but seven were banished, and after the dispersal of Seyid Zia's supporters the close co-operation of the Tudeh and the Soviet military propaganda authorities in Meshed was more in evidence than ever.

13. Tudeh attempts to hold party meetings and demonstrations in Tehran in mid-September were frustrated by prompt measures taken by the military governor who closed the party offices. A considerable number of Left-wing newspapers were also suppressed during September, though some reappeared under other names. The Persian Government began also to show unusual courage in protesting to the Soviet Embassy against Russian activities in the North and in giving information on the subject to the press. They were encouraged to do so partly by the realisation that the evacuation of the whole of Persia by Allied troops was only a matter of months and partly by the abolition of the censorship on press telegrams which allowed the Persian Government to defend itself against the scurrilous and partial reports of Tass. The Persian Government's protests against Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the country either met however, with no response or provoked a series of counter-accusations to the effect that Persian officials and police were inciting anti-Soviet activities. An article by an ex-Tudeh member in a Tehran newspaper accusing the Russians of transforming the Azerbaijan Tudeh party into the new Democratic party called forth a violent protest from the Russian Ambassador, who demanded an explanation, to be submitted to M. Molotov, within twenty-four hours. The Soviet "war of nerves" was, in fact, in full swing at the end of the period under review.

Tribal Situation.

14. The tribal situation during the past three months has given the Persian Government little or no anxiety for Kurdistan. In Southern Kurdistan operations around Merivan and in the Avroman area have been undertaken to punish

Mahmud Khan Kanisenani for his attack on Merivan, to show the flag and to collect arms. Little has been achieved though the equivalent strength of two Persian divisions has been engaged. The Kurds have taken refuge in difficult terrain on the Iraqi frontier and the approach of winter will bring the operations to a close without any result having been achieved. The ill success of the Iraqi army in the early stages of its operations against Mulla Mustafa Barzani has certainly emboldened the Persian Kurds. There is some talk of a Persian Government commission being sent to Kurdistan to effect a settlement. If military officers of the Reza Shah school can be eliminated from its ranks, and if the commission sets about its task in the belief that the tribes of Persia have common rights to educational, medical and economic benefits and to a reasonable share in local Government employment, something may be achieved.

15. Northern Kurdistan, though not recently the scene of any military operations, is potentially the more dangerous area in that the Russians have encouraged both Tudeh activities and the Komala or Kurdish Autonomy party, the full effects of which cannot yet be assessed. A party of Kurdish chieftains was recently taken to Baku by the Soviet authorities, but it is not known whether the Kurds are being asked to support a separatist movement for Azerbaijan or whether Kurdish autonomy in addition is implied.

16. From other tribal areas there is nothing of interest to report.

Withdrawal of Allied Troops.

17. On the 10th July the Foreign Office set forth His Majesty's Government's aims regarding the withdrawal of Allied troops. Their object was to relax the Russian grip in North Persia and, if possible, to get all Russian troops out of Persia before the date prescribed by the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty (*i.e.*, six months after the armistice with Japan). His Majesty's Government had already proposed to the Russians simultaneous withdrawal by stages and military discussions to work out details, but had had no reply. It seemed clear that the Russians did not wish to withdraw their forces in the near future. They probably hoped by remaining to get so firm a hold in North Persia that they could establish their domination over the Persian Government. If they were successful the consequences for His Majesty's Government and their imperial interests in South Persia would be most serious. His Majesty's Government intended to propose at the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam, that British and Soviet forces should withdraw simultaneously from the Tehran district on an agreed date. Our only hope of dislodging the Russians lay in our readiness to withdraw British troops. We had no other form of pressure except to confront the Russians with the alternatives of withdrawal simultaneously with us or of being shown up publicly to Persia and to the outside world as the Power responsible for perpetuating foreign occupation of Persia. We could not be certain that the Russians would choose the alternative we desired but there was a reasonable chance that they might.

18. At Potsdam His Majesty's Government circulated a memorandum to the other delegates of which the following is a summary:—

The time had now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia. His Majesty's Government proposed three stages:—

- (1) British and Soviet forces to withdraw completely from Tehran at once.
- (2) British troops would then be withdrawn to Abadan and the southern oilfield area and Soviet troops to a zone in either north-east or north-west Persia.
- (3) British and Soviet troops would then be withdrawn from Persia altogether.

19. It was agreed at Potsdam (on about the 23rd July) that British and Soviet forces should withdraw from Tehran at once and that the Council of Foreign Ministers at their first meeting in September 1945 should consider further stages in the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia.

20. The Foreign Office instructed His Majesty's Ambassador to make with his Soviet colleague a simultaneous notification to the Persian Government of the decision to withdraw from Tehran. He should not at present mention the proposed discussion by the Foreign Ministers of further withdrawals. The co-ordination of arrangements for withdrawal of British, Soviet and United

States forces from Tehran should be arranged locally by the embassies concerned. The following were the principal points for discussion:—

- (a) The timing of the withdrawal. Our first aim should be to agree with the Russians on as early a date as possible for the evacuation from Tehran of all combatant troops.
- (b) The arrangements for the liquidation of British military assets.
- (c) The future of the British Airways service to Tehran.

21. As the Soviet Government obstinately refused to send instructions to their ambassador here, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires (Mr. Lascelles) informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs alone on the 2nd August that British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Tehran at once. Mr. Sepahbodi received the communication with gloom because he had been hoping for much more and because he had not had a similar communication from the Soviet Ambassador. He also enquired whether "Tehran" meant the town alone or surrounding district. Mr. Lascelles replied that our nearest point would be Qum, and we hoped that the nearest Russian point to the west would be Qasvin (which was almost equidistant). The next day Mr. Lascelles informed the Soviet Ambassador of his action and the latter seemed ready to admit that the Russian troops should withdraw to Qasvin. As the embassy had foreseen, however, he then fell back on the zones as defined in the exchange of letters of August 1941. (This had laid down that the British zone should be Khuzistan and the Kermanshah area, while the Russian zone would be Azerbaijan and part of Khorassan; Meshed was not to be occupied, but Russian troops were to guard the airfield.) He did not regard the withdrawal of the British troops to Qum as the equivalent of the Soviet withdrawal to Qasvin, because he argued that Qasvin was in the Soviet zone and Qum was far outside the British zone. His Majesty's Ambassador consequently pointed out to the Foreign Office that there was little hope of persuading the Russians at the Council of Foreign Ministers to withdraw from any part of their zone while we not only remained in ours but spread far beyond it.

22. With regard to point (c) above, the embassy pointed out on the 5th August that the withdrawal of troops involved a prior decision about foreign air lines using Tehran as a terminal. The position of air lines was this:—

- (a) British Overseas Airways Corporation was a State line for the period of the war, though if there was room it carried private passengers on payment. The authority under which it operated to Tehran would come to an end with the departure of the last of the foreign troops and the consequent cessation of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty.
- (b) The Russians operated a military airline between Russia and Tehran and, in addition, used military aircraft for cabotage between Tehran, Meshed, Pahlevi and Tabriz.
- (c) American Army Air Force operated military aircraft to and from Tehran carrying private passengers when it suited them.
- (d) The French operated a military airline by agreement with us. The agreement was constantly infringed by the acceptance of civilian non-official passengers.

23. The aerodrome position was this:—

- (a) *Mehrabad* was used by the British Overseas Airways Corporation, the Royal Air Force, the French and the Persian Air Service. The ground staff was provided by the Royal Air Force.
- (b) *Qaleh Murgeh* was occupied by the Russians and the Americans, the latter being there as our tenants.

If we retained British Airways with its present status, the Russians could argue that this justified the retention of their airlines as a military measure. The embassy recommended therefore that British Airways should apply to the Persian Government for a commercial concession. It would be difficult for the Russians not to follow suit and if they replaced their military by a commercial airline they could hardly maintain their cabotage lines in Persia.

24. On the 7th August the embassy reported that the American military authorities in Tehran had provisionally fixed the middle of September as the date by which all American troops except for the United States Army Liquidation Commission should have left Tehran.

25. On the 9th August the Soviet Ambassador told His Majesty's Ambassador that his embassy had at last notified the Potsdam decision to the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Soviet forces would leave with the greatest possible speed. In reporting this to the Foreign Office the embassy pointed out that the Russians had the advantage over us and the Americans in that they had no assets of any importance in Tehran.

26. On the 19th August the Foreign Office communicated to the embassy their new proposals, revised in the light of the virtual end of the Japanese war, for the withdrawal of British, American and Soviet troops, for discussion at the Foreign Secretaries' meeting in September. Two alternative courses seemed possible:—

- (1) To agree on the exact date in 1946 by which the withdrawal must be completed, and to publish the date.
- (2) To act as in (1) above and to press in addition that there should be an intermediate time-limit by which British and Soviet troops would have to withdraw to specified zones. These withdrawals could be either on the lines of point 2 of our Potsdam proposals, or as a withdrawal to the British and Russian zones defined in August 1941.

27. His Majesty's Embassy replied on the 22nd August that course (1) should be excluded as a first line of approach to the Russians, as it amounted to saying publicly that the Allies regarded themselves as free to profit to the utmost by the letter of the treaty long after any excuse remained for so doing. This would play into the hands of the Russians and Tudeh mischief-makers. As to course (2) the embassy suggested that His Majesty's Government should propose to the Russians the total withdrawal of both troops in less than six months. Now that the war with Japan was over, the only delaying factors were physical difficulties of transport and the disposal of assets, and it should be possible to surmount these in less than six months in view of the political issues at stake. It would be invaluable if we could inform the Russians that we were ready to withdraw completely by about the 12th December—the date on which the Persian general elections were due to be held. If they rejected the proposal merely because they saw no reason to hurry, the world would then know that the blame for the delay did not lie with us. If, on the other hand, they decided to move out with us, it would hamper their plans for interfering with the elections.

28. Meanwhile, on the 20th August, the Foreign Secretary of the new Labour Government, Mr. Bevin, had announced in Parliament that His Majesty's Government did not desire, and did not believe that their Soviet Allies desired, to take advantage of the treaty facilities in Persia for any purpose other than for the prosecution of the war. Mr. Eden, in commenting on this speech for the Opposition, agreed entirely, and added that His Majesty's Government had only one interest in Persia, to see her prosperous, united and strong; the last thing they wanted was a recurrence of the zones of influence of many years ago.

29. On the 23rd August the embassy returned to the charge about the position of British Airways. They pointed out that the work of the Royal Air Force at Mehrabad aerodrome was so closely bound up with the British Airways service to Tehran that the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force could not be planned until the future of that service was known. Nor could the embassy discuss details of the withdrawal with the Russians as they would raise the question of the airfields immediately. If British Airways applied forthwith to the Persian Government for a commercial concession, the embassy could negotiate with the Persians accordingly and seek to arrange for Royal Air Force personnel to provide essential services at Mehrabad (which would be handed back to Persian control) until they could be replaced by British Airways officials pending the establishment of a suitable Persian organisation with the necessary foreign technical assistance, which, it was hoped, would be British. The alternative was to withdraw altogether, but this would throw the Persians into the hands of other airlines—probably American. Meanwhile, army plans for withdrawal from Tehran by the end of September were going ahead, and unless the main party of the Royal Air Force could keep pace with them they would be in a very difficult situation, as they depended on the army for administrative services. *A decision about British Airways was thus an essential preliminary to the withdrawal of British troops.*

30. The Foreign Office replied on the 25th August that in British post-war plans for overseas air services Persia would not be served by any British airline, though a service from Egypt to Tehran might be operated by the new Anglo-Egyptian Company if and when it was set up. Also, British Airways were in

touch with local interests in Iraq and Persia and it was His Majesty's Government's intention that they should act as technical advisers to the Iraqi and Persian airlines concerned. His Majesty's Government did not therefore wish to negotiate a long-term agreement with the Persian Government. The alternatives were either to maintain such facilities at Mehrabad aerodrome as to keep British Airways in operation until the expiry of the treaty or to stop their service to Tehran immediately.

31. The embassy answered on the 28th August that, since no British airline would run to Persia after the expiry of the Tripartite Treaty, it would make the evacuation of British troops from Tehran a much more clear-cut affair, and would be better for a number of technical reasons, if British Airways service ceased by the 2nd October, when the withdrawal of the main body of Royal Air Force and British military forces would have been effected. In fact, the cessation of this military line would have an excellent political effect as marking the end of the British evacuation of Tehran. His Majesty's Government agreed to this proposal on the 2nd September.

32. Meanwhile the Foreign Office had been repeatedly enquiring of the embassy why Allied troops had not been withdrawn from Tehran at once as agreed at Potsdam. The embassy replied on the 30th August that, so far as the British troops were concerned the withdrawal began at once but to complete it in a few days was not possible. It was complicated by many factors. The railway was now run by the Persians and worked slowly. Signals alone must take a considerable time to move. The 1,700 odd British troops in Tehran were split up into small units each with equipment, stores, &c. These were moving south all the time. Nearly all combatant troops would go on the 15th September and headquarters and everything else except rear parties would leave on the 1st October. This methodical evacuation enabled them to make arrangements for disposal of assets which otherwise would have been impossible. The whole scheme of evacuation had been delayed for lack of a decision about British Airways. Nor had it been possible to begin discussions with the Soviet authorities until that was settled. As regards Russian withdrawal from Tehran there was no sign of this yet, but they had so much less here than we had that that was not surprising.

33. Anticipating His Majesty's Government's decision about British Airways by a few days, the military attaché to this embassy on the 28th August approached his Soviet colleague about arranging the withdrawal. Needless to say, he failed to elicit a reply. On the 11th September, therefore, the Foreign Office instructed the embassy to inform the Soviet Embassy in writing exactly what the British position in Tehran would be by the 2nd October and to request the Soviet Embassy to supply details of the evacuation of Tehran by Soviet troops. The embassy made the prescribed communication on the 19th September (adding particulars about the withdrawal of British troops by the 15th October). It stated that—

- (i) by the 2nd October the British army and the Royal Air Force would have withdrawn from Tehran except for rear parties;
- (ii) by the 15th October the only British troops in Tehran would be a liquidated party of sixty-two officers and men;
- (iii) a military survey party of 105 officers and men engaged by the Persian Government in connexion with the Lar irrigation project would be working south of Tehran until the 30th November.

The note also asked for corresponding information about the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Copies of this note were sent to the Persian Government and to the American Embassy. The Soviet Embassy has not replied to it.

34. Meanwhile the Persian Government had sent a note on the 9th September to the British, American and Soviet Embassies offering congratulations on the end of the war with Japan and requesting that, in accordance with article 5 of the Tripartite Pact, Persian territory should be totally evacuated by the 2nd March (*i.e.*, six months after the signature of the Japanese armistice); furthermore, any action taken for evacuation before then would arouse the gratitude of the Persian nation.

35. The departure from Tehran of British combatant troops began on the 12th September. Suddenly and without warning the Russians withdrew their troops from Qaleh Murgeh airfield and barracks on the night of the 18th-19th September—leaving them in filthy condition. Intourist personnel, however, remain, and the existing Russian airlines to and within Persia continue, serviced by ground staff pretending to be civilian. The Russians continue to hold

the northern railway, and at Tehran railway station they keep a considerable number of employees, some in uniform. They also retain in Tehran about forty-five houses, some of them containing uniformed personnel.

36. British Airways' final flight from Tehran took place on the 29th September.

37. On the 30th September the Foreign Office telegraphed the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Persia, taken on the 22nd September. It was to the following effect:—

The council noted that letters had been exchanged between Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov and agreed that there was now no need for the withdrawal of troops from Persia to be discussed by the present conference.

38. The following is a summary of the letters referred to:—

(1) Mr. Bevin to M. Molotov, dated the 19th September.—Since it was decided at Potsdam that the further stages in the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, the situation has been changed by the end of the Japanese war. Our two Governments will now withdraw their forces from Persia by the 2nd March, 1946, six months after the Japanese armistice, and all we need do is to ask the council to note this date. I further propose to suggest that, when the question comes up, our two Governments shall agree that by the middle of December, 1945, their respective forces shall be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that until the 2nd March, 1946, British forces may remain in the southern oil area to the south of and including Andimeshk, and Soviet forces may remain in Azerbaijan.

(2) M. Molotov to Mr. Bevin, dated the 20th September.—The decision regarding the withdrawal of troops from Tehran has already been put into effect from the Soviet side. As regards the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia, the Soviet Government consider that this should be effected within the period laid down in Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty. If necessary, the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops from Persia could be discussed between us towards the end of that period. The Soviet Government accordingly see no need for this question to be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

39. In a subsequent exchange of letters Mr. Bevin reiterated his view that the final date for withdrawal was the 2nd March, 1946, and the Soviet Foreign Minister replied reiterating the importance which his Government attached to the strict fulfilment of obligations (thus evading any commitment as to the actual date of the withdrawal).

40. The Foreign Office at the same time instructed the embassy to communicate the text of the council's decision to the Persian Government, with reference to their note of the 9th September. The embassy were not to communicate the substance of the exchange of letters for the present.

Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.

41. On the 2nd July, His Majesty's Embassy suggested to the Foreign Office that the political censorship on press messages from Persia might now be abolished, and that the Russians should be asked to agree. The American Ambassador was also telegraphing to his Government in this sense. The British military authorities had no objection provided no information about numbers and movement of troops, &c., was sent out. The embassy added that the censorship was based on article 3 (ii) (d) of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty and was intended to protect the communications mentioned in 3 (ii) (b). Article 3 (iii) required that in the working of the censorship full consideration should be given to the essential needs of Persia. The needs of Persia, in the view of the embassy, required that both sides of the internal political question should be presented to the world. At present, Russia was (through the Tass Agency, which, being official, was exempt from censorship) presenting one side and at the same time using the censorship to prevent the dissemination of even the mildest reports written from another point of view. This could not be reasonably claimed as necessary for the protection of Allied communications now that aid to Russia was no longer passing across Persia.

42. After discussion between the Foreign Office, the embassy, the United States Ambassador and Persia and Iraq Command, it was agreed that the

definition of condemnations in article 5 of the agreement of January 1942 under which the censorship was exercised should be replaced by the following:—

"Any communication which conveys information concerning the deployment of troops or supplies in the prosecution of the war against Japan and the output in Persia, and distribution, of petroleum or other strategic products for use in the war against Japan."

43. Meanwhile, on the 31st July the Persian Government sent to the British and Soviet Embassies an official request for the abandonment of the political censorship.

44. The embassy was still pressing His Majesty's Government to accept the redefinition of condemnations described above, as political trouble in Azerbaijan made it important that political news should get out untrammelled, when the end of the war with Japan arrived. His Majesty's Government immediately instructed the embassy to inform the Persian Government and the Soviet Embassy that they regarded the continuance of Allied censorship as unnecessary. The embassy were to make a joint communication to the Persian Government with the Soviet Embassy, but, if the latter had no instructions within a week, His Majesty's Embassy were to make the communication alone. The Soviet Embassy, as usual, received no instructions, so His Majesty's Embassy, acting alone, duly informed the Persian Government on the 30th August that British censorship had ceased that day.

45. Inspired by this the Soviet section, on the 3rd September, ceased censorship of all telegraphic and postal communications between Persia and the British Empire and United States.

46. On the 18th September the Persian Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones instructed the Persian Post Office to cease sending mail to the Soviet section of the censorship and the Soviet censor protested. This courageous move on the part of the Persian Government, however, passed unnoticed as it was immediately overtaken by further developments. On the 19th September the Soviet Ambassador informed the Persian Government that all Soviet censorship was ceasing forthwith.

The Persian Army.

47.—A. *Morale.*—Certain factors militating against good discipline have been noticed in previous reviews of the Persian army. They still persist. Recently discontent at their financial position among the officers has increased. The Russians were not slow to notice this and, through their agents, the Tudeh party, fanned the flames of this discontent. In mid-August eighteen officers of the Meshed garrison, headed by a lieutenant-colonel in the Supply Department, obtained possession of a jeep, two lorries, a wireless-telegraphy set and arms and ammunition. To prevent pursuit they immobilised the remaining army vehicles by removing their switch keys and by putting salt in their petrol tanks (sugar, though more effective, is too expensive in Persia). With the connivance of the Russian control post (some say avoiding the control post by a detour) they made their way to Buynurd, having taken the precaution of cutting the telegraph lines between Meshed and Kuchan. On arrival there they gave out that they were come on an inspection of the cavalry squadron stationed there. They disarmed the squadron and made for the Turcoman Steppe. It was thought in Meshed, and the General Staff was so informed by the Russians, that these mutineers would join forces with a band of armed Turcomans said to number between 1,000 and 2,000 and subsequently attack Meshed. The Chief of the General Staff, having much experience of Russians, did not think that they would go out of their way to give him accurate information about a gang of mutineers with whom they were probably in sympathy, nor did he think it likely that the Russians would tamely allow them to attack one of their garrison towns. He acted, therefore, on the assumption that their information was wilfully misleading and reckoned on the mutineers heading in the opposite direction. Having no troops in Gunbad-i-Qabus, through which place they must pass, he asked for the assistance of the gendarmerie, who acted with the greatest promptness and energy. The local commandant, a lieutenant, hurriedly collected the men from their scattered posts and was able to assemble a force of about one and a half companies before the mutineers put in an appearance. They demanded right of way but were refused. A battle then ensued in which the gendarmerie, first putting the vehicles out of action, then fired upon their occupants. Seven of the mutineer officers were killed and two were wounded and taken prisoner. The vehicles, arms and ammunition were recovered. The next day three officers and four men were picked up in an exhausted condition nearby on the road between Gunbad-i-Qabus and Shahrud.

Later, six officers from the Tehran garrison, headed by a lieutenant-colonel on the General Staff, had deserted and effected a junction with the Meshed mutineers just before the skirmish at Gunbad-i-Qabus. These seven, and six of the Meshed mutineers, are still at large. Two others from Tehran and Tabriz who deserted later have also joined them. In Tehran a commission was appointed to examine the antecedents and contacts of officers of the central garrison. Thirty officers have been found to have close contacts with the Tudeh party or the Russians and are to be detained under a clause of the Military Governorship Law until military governorship comes to an end. Ten, less deeply implicated, have been sent away to divisions in the south. Further arrests are being made as further details of the mutiny come to light. The Chief of the General Staff, on the strength of the information so far extracted from the captured mutineers, is of the opinion that a plot for a general uprising existed and that the Meshed party acted precipitately, thus causing the general mutiny to go off at half-cock. Two officers sent by the General Staff to make a full report on the Gunbad-i-Qabus skirmish and to retrieve the captured vehicles and arms were sent away by the Russians without being able to complete their task. A party of 200 gendarmes proceeding by lorry as reinforcements for the gendarmerie at Gunbad-i-Qabus were turned back by the Russians at Firuzkuh. A lorry conveying bombs for the Persian air force detachment at Meshed was turned back by the Russians at Semnan. Reinforcements for the Meshed garrison coming from Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam were stopped at the Russian control post south of Meshed. The fact that the original party of mutineers was able to leave Meshed at all and pass through the Russian control post *en route*, the attitude of the Russian-controlled Tudeh party in Meshed and elsewhere towards the mutiny and the presence in Buinurd of the Russian Vice-Consul at Meshed a few hours prior to the arrival of the mutineers add to the growing weight of testimony to the effect that the whole affair from beginning to end—and the end is not yet in sight—had the knowledge and approval of the Russians. A Bill has been introduced in the Majlis asking for a credit of 35 million rials (about £300,000) to provide certain financial benefits to officers, such as free quarters, free issue of uniform, yearly increments of pay, children's allowance and the formation of a co-operative society. Unless the Bill is passed and the promises are implemented it would be unsafe to say that the mutiny has been entirely stamped out.

48.—*B. Administration.*—No changes in administration have been made and the work of General Ridley's American Military Mission is less and less in evidence. A Bill has been presented to the Majlis for a credit of 165 million rials for the formation of two additional divisions numbering about 12,000 men in all. A Bill has also been presented to Parliament for a credit of 3 million dollars for purchases of military equipment from the United States.

49.—*C. Command.*—Ibrahim Zand and General Arfa continued to fill the posts of Minister for War and Chief of the General Staff respectively. Changes in the commands of the 2nd Tehran Division, 5th Senneh Division and 7th Kerman Division were made.

50.—*D. Operations.*—The only operations in progress during the past three months have been those in Kurdistan in the Dizli and Avroman areas. Some 1,500 arms from the settled districts—mostly arms previously issued to friendly chiefs for road protection duties—have been collected, but as an operation to disarm the main Kurdish tribes the operations have been unsuccessful as the Kurds have retreated to inaccessible country on and even across the Perso-Iraqi border. The approach of winter will compel the Persian forces to withdraw to their permanent garrisons.

Persian Gendarmerie.

51. Colonel Schwarzkopf continues to work with energy for the improvement of the force and seems at last to have realised that the efficient administration of what Persia has and can afford will bring in better returns than grandiose schemes for what he thinks Persia should have but which Persia cannot afford. His mission has been reinforced by two more American officers. Further progress would appear to be limited by Colonel Schwarzkopf's failure to realise that, however efficient his direction at the centre may be, constant inspection of his provincial posts is equally necessary. Most striking is the contrast between the improvements effected in Tehran and the constant reports from consular posts as to the sloth and corruption of the provincial detachments. Nevertheless the success of the gendarmerie at Gunbad-i-Kabus (paragraph 47 above) in stopping the deserters from the Meshed garrison might well be claimed by Colonel Schwarzkopf as a sign of improvement in the force.

Persian Police.

52. There is nothing to add to previous reviews save that, if possible, efficiency has declined still further. The force is useless and nothing but a complete overhaul by a foreign police mission can alter it. Colonel Schwarzkopf states that he has been approached unofficially to ascertain his readiness to accept the direction of the police in addition to the gendarmerie. He replied that he did not think the United States Government would consent to supplying the number of military officers required or that the Persian Government could afford to pay them.

Persian Air Force.

53. During the quarter there has been much discussion of proposals to expand and modernise the Persian air force by substantial purchases of British equipment, mainly Hurricane aircraft, and by reviving in some form the connexion between the force and Hawker-Siddeley aircraft which existed up to 1942. With the help of the R.A.F. and of a representative sent out by Hawkers for the purpose, a fairly comprehensive plan was worked out which is believed to have been approved by all concerned up to the point of facing the appropriate committee of the Majlis, where the inability of the Minister of War to answer elementary questions on it has caused a postponement which may well be fatal.

54. With these developments in the offing, morale in the air force has improved, though it will hardly be able to stand the shock of a collapse of these hopes. Some keenness has been aroused during September by the return of airfields and the attempt, albeit a rather poor attempt, to maintain the signals and meteorological services on which the R.A.F. have taught them to lean. Meanwhile, almost entirely as the result of the efforts of the officers recently returned from the United Kingdom, there has been by Persian standards a notable improvement in flying training. Other training remains hardly perceptible.

Finance.

55. The Persian Government have formally submitted a request that the gold payment due to them under the Financial Agreement shall be placed at their disposal in Ottawa. The Government's sterling holdings fell from £18,600,000 to £14,900,000 during the quarter. The stock of gold held in Tehran by His Majesty's Government was transferred to Cairo at the end of September.

56. The free market price of sovereigns rose during the quarter from 683 rials on the 1st July to 716 rials on the 30th September. The sale of gold by the National Bank was resumed on the 23rd July. The market was fairly easy during the period, the chief demand being for export to Iraq.

57. The free market rate for the dollar rose to 68 rials as compared with the official rate of 32 rials. Sterling commanded a small premium varying from 146 to 142 rials as against the official rate of 130.75 rials.

Exchange Control.

58. It was announced in August that the Minister of Finance had appointed an Exchange Control Commission to consider a reimposition of exchange control regulations and to draw up revised regulations. As a temporary measure, the Exchange Control Commission has authorised banks to grant sterling exchange freely against imports on production of the necessary documents and to open documentary credits. Facilities have also been given in regard to limited personal remittances to the sterling area. Owing to their shortage of dollars the Persian authorities are imposing severe restrictions on the opening of dollar credits, and most of the private trade with the United States is at present conducted on the basis of black market dollars which command a premium of over 100 per cent. It is possible that the Exchange Control Commission may recommend a reversion to the system previously in force by which foreign exchange could only be obtained by the purchase of export certificates giving the importer who bought them the right to a specified percentage of the value in foreign exchange.

Imperial Bank of Iran's Concession.

59. The Bank Melli has given the Imperial Bank of Iran six months' notice to terminate its present agreement; the effect of this denunciation would be to deprive the Imperial Bank of Iran of its right to deal in foreign exchange and would leave the bank without any provision in regard to the transfer of profits.

Concurrently with this action on the part of the Bank Melli, however, the Imperial Bank of Iran were negotiating direct with the Minister of Finance for a new concession which has now been ratified by the Council of Ministers and now awaits signature by the Minister of Finance.

Economic Situation.

60. The end of the war brought in its train the liquidation of Allied supply organisations in Persia. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation no longer carries out any supply or transport functions and its remaining staff is concerned solely with the work of liquidation. Middle East Supply Centre was also, by the end of September, making arrangements for its withdrawal at the end of October.

61. The United States advisers continued to serve the various departments to which they are appointed, but they are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the indeterminate nature of their functions and many of them wish to resign.

62. There has been no improvement in the machinery of economic control exercised by the Persians themselves and, in particular, the import licensing department continues to be ineffective and corrupt. The business community has tended to take more and more advantage of the increased confusion in Government Departments and is now openly flaunting its contempt of controls despite the fact that the law still requires importers to obtain import licences for all commodities. The largest part of the goods which has come in during the last few months has been dumped in customs and then cleared by persuasion. To make this situation even more absurd, officials in the licensing departments are informing applicants orally that they need no longer bother to lodge applications.

63. In July the Cabinet sanctioned the abolition of the cotton monopoly, only retaining control over the import of raw cotton.

64. Markets were dull throughout the quarter despite the end of the war. This was mainly due to the reimposition of exchange control and a realisation that goods could still not be obtained freely from abroad. Despite the premium on dollars, exports to the United States were confined to small quantities of caseins and lambskins.

Cereals Situation.

65. Although there is a huge surplus of food-grains the Government still dare not offer it for export for fear of exposing themselves to the allegation from Russian-inspired quarters that they wish to starve the Persian population for some nefarious end. For the same reason, useful as the surplus would be in such countries as Greece, the British Embassy has refused to make proposals for its purchase and have said that any proposal for export of grain must come officially from the Persian Government.

66. At the end of September the total collection of bread-grains in Persia amounted to 170,000 tons, of which 108,000 tons was wheat. The stocks at Tehran equalled 211 days' supply.

67. It remains to be seen how the "Cereals and Bread Section" will succeed in the collection and distribution of wheat and flour now that the Middle East Supply Centre with its team of British officers employed in grain collection is closing down and that Colonel Ataullah, I.M.S., who has been the mainstay of the central cereals organisation for nearly three years is leaving.

Transport.

68. *Railways.*—With the return of the southern section of the railway to Persian operation the usual statistics covering traffic movements have ceased to be available. Stocks of oil and cereals have both been adequately maintained in spite of the slower turn-round which Persian operation has brought about. The full effect of the reduced efficiency of the system will not be felt until the coming winter.

69. *Road.*—The Persian Government is proposing to sell by public auction about 3,600 used lorries, the property of the now defunct Road Transport Administration.

70. The importation of passenger cars has been decontrolled, but the actual number likely to be available for some time will be below importers' expectations.

71. Tyre prices have fallen heavily as the result of the sale of numbers of second-hand tyres by the military authorities.

Civil Air Lines in Persia.

72. As recorded above, British Overseas Airways Corporation stopped at the end of September. The Russian services, which seem to be civil or military at will, were not brought to an end when the Russian troops left Qaleh Morgheh. The French are apparently trying to keep their military service in being pending the grant of commercial rights, and have said that the Persian Government asked them to carry on since the British had let the Persians down by stopping. The Americans have not yet replaced their military services by civil lines, though they are evidently anxious to do so. Meanwhile they propose to run occasional military aircraft as long as they have any troops left in Tehran.

73. The Iranian State Airline has run with commendable regularity between Tehran and Bagdad and Tehran and Bushire, though its operations are very inefficient and it is far from making full use of its few aircraft. It would be easy to expand frequencies, if not routes, had it only some managerial skill at its disposal, and it is not to be wondered at that the Ministry of Posts who control it should be lending an ear to proposals from private interests to take it over.

74. The private interests are, however, squabbling among themselves. They are in two groups which centre round the Mayor of Tehran, G. H. Ebtehaj, who runs (among other things) Irantour, and General Ahmad Nakhchevan, who seems to be relying on his past glories to put himself into a position where he can get a substantial rake-off from somebody. Efforts to bring the two groups together have so far failed. Iranian Airways, the company with which Ebtehaj is associated, have made a provisional agreement with the American Transcontinental Western Air for a joint subsidiary to run DC3s on terms very favourable to Transcontinental Western Air, but nobody really expects the deal to be completed. Iranian Airways have also applied for four Dominie aircraft on hire from His Majesty's Government.

Disposal of British and American Military Assets.

75. *Telecommunication System.*—An agreement was concluded (it was signed after the end of the quarter) providing for the sale to the Persian Ministries of Communications and of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, of the entire poled wire routes in Persia, together with the entire carrier and associated equipment. The American carrier equipment was not available for sale and was withdrawn. The purchase price was £300,000, payable as follows:—

- (i) 25 per cent. of the purchase price against signature of the present agreement.
- (ii) 25 per cent. within three months of signature.
- (iii) 50 per cent. within two months after the beginning of the next Persian financial year, i.e., as from the 22nd March, 1946.

76. *Fixed Assets (General).*—Fixed military installations in the North Persia area were offered to the Persian Government but they declined to buy on the ground that from their interpretation of article 4 of the Tripartite Treaty, buildings should revert to them free. As a further approach merely produced a reiteration of this claim, tenders were invited in the public press for the purchase of these installations. In general they have been sold at satisfactory prices, but the Convalescent Camp at Vanak did not produce any satisfactory offer owing to the fact that it was built principally upon Crown land. The camp has accordingly been dismantled and the buildings are in the process of being demolished. Difficulty is also being experienced as regards the saw-mill which is on land belonging to the Persian State Railways. Negotiations are still continuing with the Railway Administration for the purchase of this saw-mill by them, but if these fall through, the installation will be dismantled and the machinery will be sold to private buyers. Schedules are being prepared of installations south of Hamadan and the Persian Government will, in due course, be asked to state whether they are interested in their purchase. We shall probably receive the same reply as that given in the case of the Northern installations, and in this event sale will be carried out by public tender.

77. *Railway Assets.*—This question is likely to be a very thorny one because, apart from the fact that we shall have to overcome the Persian claim that all buildings should revert to them free, we are also handicapped by the absence of any agreement regarding freight rates.

78. The railway administration entertain large hopes that a substantial amount, in the neighbourhood of £7,700,000 will be paid to them in addition to

the sums we have spent to maintain the railways since 1942, but this hope is likely to be disappointed. At the end of the quarter, His Majesty's Embassy were on the point of addressing a note to the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs setting out the lines on which it is suggested negotiations, both for the settlement of freight rates and of payment for assets, shall be conducted.

79. *American Assets.*—The Americans offered for sale to the Persian Government their fixed installations in the Northern Area but no reply had been received by the end of the quarter. An agreement was reached between the United States Embassy and the Persian Government by which the latter purchased 68 American locomotives, 1,350 wagons (including 277 oil tank cars) and surplus American railway stores to the value of \$500,000. The purchase price was \$10 million. The 277 oil tank cars in question are considered by the British and American railway experts to be the minimum number, in addition to the 303 tank cars already owned by the Persian State Railways, to ensure an adequate distribution of oil in Persia. This view is not shared by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which estimates that a further 146 tank cars should be purchased. These are available in Persia but they will be shipped elsewhere by the United States authorities unless the Persian Government come to a very early decision to pay dollars for them.

Press and Public Opinion.

80. Comment in the Persian press during the period was on well-established lines—wild or mischievous misinterpretations of foreign affairs and the actions of the great powers; violent criticism of internal policy and of those who apply it, without the offer of anything constructive.

81. Foreign interference in Persian affairs was a constant theme. The coming elections aroused particular anxiety in this connexion: the Soviet stranglehold on the northern provinces caused deep and articulate apprehension to the Right-wing press, while its few remaining opponents countered with allusions to the alleged interference of British officials (sometimes designated by name) in the 1943 elections in Fars and Kermanshah.

82. The military government of Tehran was abused as a recrudescence of dictatorship—especially by the Left-wing "freedom front," most of whose papers it had suppressed. This muzzling of the pro-Russian press left the way almost entirely clear for its opponents to attack the Russian policy in northern Persia and those elements (sc. the Tudeh party and its offshoots; the "Democrat" party of Azarbaijan and the Kurdish-nationalist "Kumala" group) which supported it. At the beginning of the period the Left-wing papers were opposing the evacuation of foreign troops; but this opposition was damped down by the publication in late July of an article in the *Times* in which evacuation was taken for granted, and extinguished by the appearance of the Bevin-Molotov correspondence in which M. Molotov, though he appeared to be evading mention of the 2nd March, agreed to evacuation within six months of the end of the war with Japan. It may be said that Persians in general are waiting with hope rather than confidence to see whether the Russian withdrawal will be completed by the 2nd March.

83. The *Pravda* attack on Persia, the Khorassan mutiny, the more recent visit of Kurdish nationalists to Baku and divers high-handed actions of the Red army against the freedom of the individual (whether true or fabricated) have further exasperated Persian opinion against Russian interference in the northern provinces. Right-wing papers have, on the whole, been bold and outspoken against Russia.

84. America has come in for criticism for the first time since the days when the newly-arrived American troops laid themselves open to attack by their rather free and easy behaviour in Tehran. The storm aroused by the discovery that the United States Government was not giving something for nothing is described below in the section headed "American Interests." The appearance of the American Embassy's communiqué and the after-thought that American support might some day be useful brought about a change in the attitude of the press which from hostile became conciliatory—in some cases almost sycophantic.

85. The Foreign Ministers' conference in September had aroused high hopes in Persia, and its failure caused profound disappointment. The Persians expected their problems to be given high priority in the agenda, forgetting that they were already provided for by Treaty. The not unnatural reaction has been to interpret the conference as a sign of dissension among the great Allies—a dissension which the less scrupulous papers are not reluctant to foment. Disagreement between Britain and the United States over oil and the situation in Palestine has been hailed with satisfaction in some papers.

86. The end of the Japanese war made small impression, and the atomic bomb also has aroused remarkably little comment; though one paper announced the discovery of uranium on the Caspian coast and hoped that this discovery would not be as troublesome to Persia as that of petroleum.

87. Mr. Bevin's statement of the 20th August on evacuation and Mr. Eden's reply mentioning Britain's opposition to the principle of spheres of influence both had a particularly good effect. The advent of the Labour Government was at first regarded with suspicion, some circles supposing that it would try to conciliate Russia at Persia's expense, others declaring that since British foreign policy did not change it was a cunning ramp. General opinion has now settled down and accepts it for what it is.

88. Alexander Clifford's articles on Persia in the *Daily Mail* achieved wide publicity, and though they received abuse from the "Freedom Front" it was impossible to disprove the revelations they contained. Hitherto only Tass had been allowed to export news from Persia, and the appearance of information from another source, with the revelation of the working of the Soviet censorship, had a soothing effect on public anxiety. The *Times* article on Persia aroused less anger than sorrow that it should be left to the foreign press to point out the defects of the Persian administration.

89. Near Eastern politics have received little mention. The wild Persian claim to Bahrain crops up periodically. The Arab Federation is opposed by the Left wing as a plan imposed by foreign imperialists in order to keep the Arabs in a backward and primitive condition.

British, and other, Propaganda Activities.

90. Following Ministry of Information instructions, drastic steps have been taken to reduce expenditure in the Public Relations Bureau of this embassy. The budget estimates for the year beginning the 1st December, 1945, amount to £49,315, compared with the sum of £122,764 for the year ending the 30th November, 1945. Furthermore, various economies already effected will probably result in a saving of approximately £34,000 on the latter figure. The budget may be divided into three headings, namely:—

	£
(a) Staff salaries and allowances	41,400
(b) Operational expenditure	23,765
Total	65,165
(c) Receipts	15,850
Net proposed expenditure for 1945-46	49,315

91. From a total of some 186 persons at the beginning of the current year, of whom 26 were British, the staff has now been reduced to about 80 persons, of whom only 7 are British. (Although the budget figures quoted include expenditure by consulates in the provinces, the figures of staff employed do not include those engaged wholly or partly for publicity purposes by consulates in the provinces.)

92. By far the largest economy is the closing down of the *Tehran Daily News*, the last number of which was due to be published on the 12th October. It was to be replaced by a daily roneoed bulletin issued privately to subscribers. Other economies have been effected by ceasing publication of the women's magazine (*Alam-i-Zanan*, a monthly illustrated periodical); by drastically curtailing the visual publicity section's activities in the production of material; by giving up two of the bureau's seven touring cinema vans; by handing over the bureau's newsreel cinema back to its Persian proprietor, who will continue showing our films (but at his own expense and not ours); by the closing down of the Allied liaison section; by reducing the number of reading rooms in the provinces and otherwise curtailing consular publicity activities; by closing the British Information Centre in Tehran; by stopping the Public Relations Bureau courier service, and by other general reduction in expenditure.

93. No evidence has been seen of any parallel reduction in propaganda activities by the Russians. On the contrary, there are many signs that they are still engaged in stretching out their tentacles into the provinces. In addition, the press section of the French Embassy has grown considerably and is becoming much more active than before. In spite of the abolition of the Office of War Information, the American Press Attaché's staff has grown recently, though so far his activities have appeared to be confined to Tehran.

94. Certain of the activities of the Public Relations Bureau may have to be reconsidered after the 2nd March next year when the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty expires.

Indian Affairs.

95. During the hot summer months the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society was dormant, with most of its members out of Tehran, but the autumn has brought signs of its revival.

96. The "Iran League" of Bombay have presented to Persia a bronze statue of the Persian epic poet, Firdausi. It has been erected in a prominent position in the City of Tehran and was to be unveiled with pomp and ceremony on the 2nd October.

97. The Director-General of Archaeology in India (Dr. Mortimer Wheeler) is expected here by the end of October to start a thirty-days' tour of the archaeological treasures of Persia before going on to Iraq.

98. The Indian teachers of English at Ahwaz, Kerman and Yezd took "refresher" courses under the British Council at Tehran and it is felt that they will now be able to arouse more interest among the Persian pupils.

99. In December 1944 the Persian Government promised to allow the removal to India, for urgent use in connexion with the war with Japan, of some two miles of rails from an unwanted railway siding at Mirjawa, the frontier town on the railway from India to Zahidan. However, by expert procrastination they succeeded in omitting to implement their promise until the arrival of VJ-day made it difficult to continue to press for the rails.

Indian Trade.

100. The Indian Government Trade Commissioner is now installed in his office. Many trade enquiries have been received from Indian merchants and Persian importers. Although trade is still controlled from both ends, the parties concerned are showing a keen interest and eagerly awaiting the relaxation and ultimate removal of the various restrictions. The importance of India as a source of supply is being realised. India has a good chance of taking a considerable share of Persia's import market. During the war also, it has been the principal supplier of tea, cotton piece goods, spices and jute manufactures. It is hoped the internal supply situation in India will improve quickly and so permit a greater flow of the commodities in demand in Persia at the moment. Trade enquiries received show that the goods most needed are cotton piece goods, sugar, tea, spices, jute manufactures, leather goods and electrical equipment. Persian merchants are full of complaints against the various Persian State monopolies, particularly that of cotton piece-goods.

(a) *Cotton Piece-goods.*—The Government of India have been pressing for some time, through the Middle East Supply Centre, that the Persian Government should agree to the importation of cotton piece-goods from India to be effected through normal trade channels. For the first half of 1945 they were willing to let the Persian Government make purchases up to 50 per cent. of the quota through their trade agent at Bombay, and let the other 50 per cent. to be bought through merchants. For the second half of 1945, they had stipulated that the entire quota be bought through merchants. The Persian Government have not been accommodating, and the question is still hanging fire.

(b) *Tea.*—The Government of India are also dissatisfied with the block-purchase scheme by which Persia imports her requirements of tea from India, and have represented this to the British Ministry of Food. The Persian Government have not yet replied whether they agree to the conditions made by the Ministry of Food for the procurement of tea from India.

101. The Persian Government are showing an interest in developing trade with India, and have deputed Dr. Ali Amini, a senior officer of the Ministry of Finance, to visit India and explore the possibility of strengthening the commercial links between the two countries.

American Interests.

102. The visit of Senator Pepper in September on his way home from Moscow, served as an occasion for the exchange of American-Persian compliments. In a press account of a party given to Mr. Pepper by the Speaker of the

Majlis, the Senator was reported as expressing the affection of Americans for Persians and declaring that the American Government supported the independence of small countries, and neither interfered themselves nor allowed others to interfere in the affairs of weak nations. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senator Pepper expressed the same thoughts, but even more strongly, at a dinner given to him at the Ministry. The fact that in the speech at the Majlis he declared that it was attachment to Persia that had prompted his visit to Tehran did not prevent Senator Pepper from pressing the request of an American airline for facilities in Persia. With disarming simplicity he explained to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that while the average American is full of idealism, a little concrete interest always helps.

103. For some time the T.W.A. (Transcontinental Western Air) had been negotiating with a Persian company, offering terms which left the management to the Americans and the risk to the Persians, but the negotiations fell through. The American Embassy then applied for facilities for this company and at the same time urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to sign the Chicago Agreements, including the Air Transport Agreement. Knowing nothing about the Chicago Agreements, and being in general against the signature of anything in the nature of a concession until the last of the foreign troops should have left, the Minister for Foreign Affairs pleaded for time to consider the matter, in spite of the argument advanced by the American Ambassador that to give the Americans this material stake in Persia would engage the interest of the United States against possible aggression by Russia—aggression which he suggested Great Britain would hardly be able to meet alone.

104. Having learned (thanks to the British air attaché) what the Chicago Agreements with their Five Freedoms involved, the Minister for Foreign Affairs decided (1) to tell the American Ambassador that the Persian Government must postpone consideration of so complicated a matter but (2) to offer to the Americans permission for their civil aircraft to fly to and from Tehran without prejudice to any future arrangement, and (3) to promise that after the withdrawal of the foreign troops the Persian Government would be prepared to conclude with the United States a civil aviation agreement, provided that it took account of the aviation rights and needs of Persia in this region.

105. The hesitation shown by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the American demand for air rights intensified the annoyance which the American Ambassador was already feeling at the criticisms published in some of the Tehran newspapers at the news that the United States Government intended to remove from Persia not only certain assets it needed but the remainder too, unless the Persian Government or Persian individuals were prepared to pay for them. The attacks were usually based on the fact that the presence of American troops in Persia had never been sanctioned by the conclusion of an agreement, and some times they proliferated into abuse of the United States or into criticisms of the behaviour of the American troops in Persia. On the 27th September the American Embassy published a communiqué explaining the attitude of the American Government in regard to the assets, and asserting that if the presence of American troops was not governed by an agreement that was because the Persian Government delayed discussion of a draft put forward in 1943 by the American Ambassador, not only on behalf of his Government, but personally. He considered an agreement to be necessary. These attacks were resented by the American Ambassador not only on behalf of his Government but personally. He had long regarded himself as the champion of Persian independence, and as proof he claimed to have been the author of the Declaration about Persia, which was issued after the Tehran Conference in 1943; and in his violent reaction against what he considered ingratitude to him in person he presented a sad spectacle of the disillusioned sentimentalist.

106. Although we did not hear of it officially until October, Mr. Murray was worrying about the failure of the Persian Government to make use of the American advisers, and was in correspondence with the State Department on the subject. We did know, however, that as soon as he took office, M. Bader, Minister of Finance in the Sadr Government, began to consider a reduction in the number of the advisers. His ostensible plan was a good one—to get rid of the less efficient (there are many who would be no loss) and to keep perhaps eight or ten for tasks where disinterestedness and indifference to Persian political or personal pressure would be of most value, e.g., arbitration, partition of the crown lands among the tenants, and so on. Private information, however, showed that he came to think that Persia could dispense with all the advisers, and this doubtless influenced his attitude, made him unwilling to consult the

Americans (though it is true that he tended to ignore his Persian assistants too), and therefore drove the American Embassy to the conclusion that the American mission was unable to perform any useful service and was doing harm to United States prestige by remaining here.

Transfer of Polish Legation to Warsaw Government.

107. Late in June the Warsaw Government sent a telegram to the representative of "Polpress" in Tehran, M. Lopatniuk, instructing him to take all steps to secure the property of the Polish Government in Tehran. His Majesty's Embassy explained to the Foreign Office that he was an ex-chauffeur of the Polish legation and had been convicted for theft, and was hardly suitable to be the official representative of the new Polish Government. The embassy added that instructions issued to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires by the Polish Government in London were to wait until the Persian Government withdrew their recognition from him and recognised so-and-so as duly accredited representative of the new Polish Government. He was then to ask the Persian Government to take over the Polish Legation and property here. The embassy added that the property and funds employed by the Polish delegation in Tehran for the benefit of the Polish refugees were presumably to be treated separately and not handed over to the representative of the new Government. The Foreign Office agreed.

108. On the 23rd July, the Persian Government recognised the new Polish Government and in the middle of August they accepted a M. Eugene John Milnikiel as chargé d'affaires. In peace-time he had been an inspector of schools; he had been captured by the Russians in 1939 and released in 1941, and had come to Palestine, where he was court-martialled and imprisoned by the former Polish military authorities on a charge of having defamed the Polish Government whilst in Russia.

109. The new chargé d'affaires presented his letters to the Persian Government on the 22nd September, and took over the Polish Legation premises from them. When he called on His Majesty's chargé d'affaires he asked for information about the Polish refugees and this was supplied to him.

Polish Refugees.

110. The dissolution of the Polish Government in London left the Polish authorities there anxious lest the refugees in Persia should be deported to Russia against their will. The Foreign Office enquired whether there was any danger of this. The embassy thought not, particularly since the embassy had formed a Polish refugee section and the refugees were thus under its auspices. On the other hand, the presence of these refugees in a country partially occupied by the Russians was a potential source of Anglo-Russian friction, and it was desirable to remove them to less contentious territory. The history of the quarter is therefore largely concerned with the proposal to evacuate the refugees to the Lebanon. The first set-back was early in July, when the movement to the Lebanon of the children's school at Isfahan and their attendant teachers and parents, totalling 800 odd persons, was cancelled owing to the anti-French trouble there. The rest of the quarter was spent in overcoming various difficulties. The first difficulty was that the Lebanon Government demanded further assurances from His Majesty's Government that the refugees would not be left indefinitely in the Lebanon. This assurance His Majesty's Government eventually granted. The second difficulty was the question of accommodation in the Lebanon. By the end of the quarter the move to the Lebanon of the Isfahan Poles had been once again approved, but not the move of the remaining 3,000 Poles.

111. Late in July U.N.R.R.A., Middle East, pointed out that, although they had theoretically taken over the obligations of M.E.R.R.A. *vis-à-vis* the Poles in Persia, they neither controlled the policy nor the camps, nor did they supply the finance, all this being still in the hands of His Majesty's Government and the Treasury Anglo-Polish Committee which was winding up the affairs of the London Polish Government. U.N.R.R.A. therefore requested to be relieved of their existing obligations, though they would be ready if asked to take over the Poles on their own terms and, for example, run the camps themselves on their own more economical lines.

112. On the 24th August the embassy pointed out to the Foreign Office that their position of protectors of the Polish refugees was proving invidious. On the one hand, Moscow newspapers were accusing representatives of the former Polish Government of sending to other countries Poles who desired to return to Poland, and since these representatives were controlled by His Majesty's Government, these accusations reflected on them. On the other hand, the obligation

imposed on the embassy by His Majesty's Government to reduce the expenditure of the refugees made the embassy unpopular. The embassy therefore recommended that the refugees should be entirely transferred to U.N.R.R.A. as soon as possible. On the 1st September the Foreign Office informed the embassy confidentially that they had asked U.N.R.R.A. to assume responsibility for displaced persons, the majority of whom were Poles, in the British Empire, and, where U.N.R.R.A. had not done so already, in the Middle East, including Persia. U.N.R.R.A. had not, however, replied by the end of the quarter.

113. At an interview with the Polish Refugee Section of the Embassy, the new Warsaw Chargé d'Affaires said that he was unable at present to give official assistance to any refugees wishing to return from here to Poland, though any who could travel at their own expense were welcome to go back. Nor could he maintain any refugees who adhered to him or establish camps for them. He, however, expressed a wish to visit their camp and asked for facilities to circulate his Legation's bulletin there as the refugees knew nothing about the present Poland. The Embassy agreed to both these requests. Finally, the Chargé d'Affaires explained that he saw no objection to the move of the refugees to the Lebanon since repatriation to Poland from there would be easier than from Persia.

114. The attitude of the Chargé d'Affaires made matters politically much less difficult for this Embassy, since his acquiescence in our arrangements minimised the prospect of Soviet misrepresentation. On the other hand, his refusal to repatriate or maintain his adherents meant that none would declare themselves openly for him as otherwise they would forfeit their benefits under the existing refugee organisation. It is thought, however, that if given a firm chance of returning to Poland, about 300-400 (*i.e.*, some 10 per cent. of the total) would go.

115. By the end of the quarter the number of Poles in Persia had gone down from 3,798 to 3,475.

Persian Internees.

116. All remaining Persian internees, including both those interned in Persia and those interned in Palestine, were released on the 15th August or a few days later. In order to anticipate any manifestation in their favour, representing them as Persian patriot martyrs, a communiqué was published at the same time in the press by His Majesty's Embassy, emphasising their complicity in the German conspiracy against the Allies and reproducing, in facsimile, the letter addressed by the Sayyid Abul Qasim Kashani to the Grand Mufti and Rashid Ali in Berlin.

European Internees.

117. In consultation with the Security Authorities it was decided on the 7th June that, in principle, none of the several hundreds of Europeans deported from Persia or arrested in Persia in and after the year 1941 should be allowed to return, except for compelling compassionate reasons. The grounds for this decision were—

- (1) That under present economic conditions in Persia, Europeans would rarely be able to find employment.
- (2) That the return to Persia of several hundred Axis partisans having little love for the Allies would be undesirable for reasons of security.
- (3) That the necessary consultations with the Russians might cause difficulties.

118. Although the British Security control of entry into Persia was surrendered in August at the time of the end of hostilities against Japan, the Persian authorities appear to be unwilling to permit the entry of ex-internees without express British approval. In these circumstances the above decision was then upheld and was made known to the Persian Government and to the Australian Government and the Government of India.

119. A considerable number of applications for permission to return to Persia have already been rejected in accordance with this policy. The six Germans still remaining in internment in Persia have similarly been refused permission to remain in the country after release, and are to be repatriated in due course to Germany.

120. The problem of the disposal of the wives, children and interests in Persia of repatriated persons remains to be solved.

British Council.

121. In view of the considerable cuts in the Council's allocations to Persia, the staff of the Council here have been analysing the possibilities of intensifying

their efforts with a minimum of expense and have reached the conclusion that this can best be achieved in the following ways:—

- (a) Maintenance of the present scale of English language classes with the assistance of Persian teachers, since British teachers are not available in sufficient quantities.
- (b) Concentration on the professional classes, appealing to them through their specialised subjects and through professional societies or groups to be formed in conjunction with the Institute activities. The professional classes are able—and eager—to finance such societies themselves, requiring of the Council only accommodation for meetings and up-to-date British professional literature.
- (c) The appointment to the Council's staff in Tehran of scientific and medical advisers to cultivate Persians with scientific and technical qualifications.

122. The high lights of the quarter were the production of Shakespeare's *Tempest* (in English) and Flecker's *Hassan* in a Persian translation, both at the Tehran Institute's summer school at Shemran. Both were fine performances, and the second was notable as the Council's first attempt to acclimatise drama in Persian.

123. On the 30th September, 1,327 students were registered at the Tehran, 417 at the Isfahan, and 348 at the Shiraz Institutes.

[E 356/5/34]

No. 14

Correspondence concerning Discussions on Persia at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R., 16th-27th December, 1945.

List of Documents.

1. Extract from record of Secretary of State's first meeting with M. Molotov, 18th December.
2. Extract from record of Secretary of State's first conversation with Generalissimo Stalin, 19th December.
3. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 119, Worthy, of 25th December.
4. Memorandum circulated by United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, 24th December.
5. Extract from record of Secretary of State's second conversation with Generalissimo Stalin, 24th December.
6. Soviet amendments to British memorandum (No. 4 above), 25th December.
7. Draft terms of reference for the proposed Tripartite Commission, as finally accepted by the United Kingdom Delegation, 25th December.
8. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 164, Worthy, of 27th December.
9. Discussion of United Kingdom Delegation on two Soviet amendments to draft on Tripartite Commission for Persian Affairs; and record of Secretary of State's second (private) conversation with M. Molotov, 26th December (with Annex). (Reference paragraphs 4 and 5 of No. 8 above.)
10. Extract from record of informal meeting of Foreign Secretaries, 26th December. (Reference paragraph 6 of No. 8 above.)
11. Note of private conversation between the Secretary of State and M. Molotov, 26th December. (Reference paragraph 7 of No. 8 above.)
12. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 168, Worthy, of 27th December.
13. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 169, Worthy, of 27th December.
14. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 171, Worthy, of 27th December.

(1)

Extract from Record of Meeting, 18th December, 1945.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY went on to say that there were parts of the world where Soviet interests and British interests touched, for instance in Greece, Turkey and Persia. There would be no misunderstanding if we and the

Russians fully appreciated each other's motives. The last thing he wanted was to see ourselves in conflict with the Soviet Union.

MOLOTOV asked: What else? THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that there remained the question of peace treaties, but this would be better discussed in the company of Mr. Byrnes. Reverting to Iran, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he was not making any concrete proposals, but he would like Molotov to understand that for many reasons there was deep sympathy and feeling in the United Kingdom for Iran, and that constant questions about that country were put in Parliament. He had been at special pains in his replies to say nothing that could be provocative to the Soviet Union.

MOLOTOV then turned to Iran and reminded the Foreign Secretary that the question of the withdrawal of troops had been discussed twice within recent months, in Berlin and in London. On both occasions it had been agreed to abide by the treaties. There had been no disagreements. The Soviet Government had recognised the treaties as binding and did not see why the matter should be taken up again. The events which had occurred in Azerbaijan had been a completely natural phenomenon of post-war conditions. Far from helping this movement, the Red Army had been careful not to involve itself in any way. The whole matter was one of "local national aspirations." It was a purely internal matter for Iran. Of course, if the movement had been hostile to the Russians, the Soviet Government could not have played the part of impassive onlookers, because of the proximity of Azerbaijan to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. But, in fact, the whole thing had been a national democratic movement directed neither against the Persian Government nor the Soviet Government. The Russians were determined not to intervene, although the troubles were occurring on their frontiers.

(2)

Extract from the Record of a Meeting at the Kremlin on 19th December at 10 p.m.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that Mr. Byrnes had then put to him questions about Iran. He had spoken about the withdrawal of troops and had asked for the views of the Soviet Government. Generalissimo Stalin had told him that the Soviet Government did not propose an early withdrawal; they desired to safeguard Baku and the oil wells there. There was no guarantee of security in that region on account of the hostile attitude of the Iranian Government.

MR. BEVIN asked whether the Soviet Government were afraid of an attack from Iran.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN replied that he was afraid of acts of sabotage.

MR. BEVIN said that it was important to bring out into the light of day the misgivings which either side might have. He himself was quite ready to tell the Generalissimo what was feared in England. It was thought there that the Soviet Government were following a policy aiming at the incorporation of Azerbaijan, or making it into a satellite State. He did not say that the Government were taking that view, but it was held in the House of Commons and in the country at large. Generalissimo Stalin must realise what a sensitive point Iran was to both Governments. He had observed to M. Molotov the day before that, if there was any point of friction between their Governments, it was important at once to try to remove it at an early stage. His Majesty's Government had interests in Iraq and in Mosul and the oil of those regions. If only His Majesty's Government could know what it was exactly that the Soviet Government wanted it might be possible to co-operate.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that, frankly and honestly, he had no claims against Iran, that was to say, he had no idea of incorporating any part of Iran into the Soviet Union and no intention of impairing the sovereignty of Iran. But he wished to safeguard the oil of Baku against diversionary activities. There were many extreme nationalists in the Iranian Government who wished to damage the Baku oil industry and who had plans of long standing for the incorporation of Baku in Iran. As to this, he had little fear but there was a real danger of diversionary activities. He had no territorial claim against Iran or any intention of infringing Iranian sovereignty.

MR. BEVIN said that we could assume then that Azerbaijan would remain in Iran, to which GENERALISSIMO STALIN replied that Azerbaijan in fact consisted of two different regions, only one of which was genuinely Persian.

MR. BEVIN said that, at any rate, the Persian part would remain in Iran and GENERALISSIMO STALIN indicated his assent.

MR. BEVIN said that he had taken an interest in the proposal for the establishment of provincial councils throughout Iran. His Majesty's Government had suggested to the Iranian Government that that ought to be done. Could we not set up a tripartite commission to advise and assist them. The Iranians did not seem capable of carrying out reform by themselves. This reform seemed to be necessary and might effect a settlement of Persia. If this suggestion appealed to the Generalissimo, his personal opinion was that, if the latter favoured it, he (Mr. Bevin) might advocate it with the United States Government.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that he might support this idea, but he must know exactly what was intended.

MR. BEVIN explained that the measure had been provided for in the Iranian constitution but had never been carried out. He thought it was essential to carry it out but he feared that the Iranian Government would be unable to do it without assistance.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN thought that that was probably the case and said that he would study the matter and then discuss it further. He thought it possible that agreement might be reached on this point.

(3)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 26th December.)

(No. 119. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.)

Moscow, 25th December, 1945.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran was authorised by the Foreign Office to suggest to the Persian Government that they should announce their intention to introduce a scheme of provincial councils for the whole of Persia, including Azerbaijan. Suggestion was made to the Prime Minister and in a speech to the Majlis he made a statement in the proposed sense, though he told His Majesty's Ambassador that it would be dangerous to hold provincial elections so long as there were Russian troops in the country. It seemed to me that the Persian Government, in its present state of paralysis, would be unable to carry through such a scheme unaided, and in my first talk with Stalin I suggested that the three Allies should assist the Persian Government to set up provincial councils throughout the country. Stalin asked for time to consider the proposal, but his reception of it was on the whole encouraging. American delegation was at first inclined to regard our proposal as constituting intervention in the internal affairs of Persia instead of as a joint attempt to get Persia out of the mess which has been brought about by the entry of the troops of the three Powers. Byrnes, in so far as he was articulate, seemed to be in favour of our taking a strong line about the unnecessary retention of a large Russian army in North Persia and of announcing our intention to ask the Persian Government if they should decide to make a protest at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations Organisation. I communicated to him to-day the draft of a letter which I proposed to send to Molotov. Letter to you with remonstrances about the Russian troops in Persia and their unfortunate effect on Persian sovereignty, put forward our proposal for a tripartite commission to help the Persians to create a general scheme of provincial councils and to supervise the first provincial elections, set forth what seemed to me the essential points in the terms of reference for the proposed commission, and pressed this scheme as preferable to the obvious alternative, viz., that the question should be raised by the Persian Government with the United Nations Organisation. Byrnes proposed that the remonstrances and arguments should be put forward orally and proposed a memorandum consisting of our suggested terms of reference expanded by the inclusion of provisions designed to protect the Persians and of a clause empowering the commission also to "look into the question of facilitating the early withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia and to make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the three Powers."

I thought it as well to accept the American memorandum as it stood, since it is with some difficulty that they had been brought to accept a share of the responsibility and I am putting it to the Russians as my own. It is true that it may take some time to set up the commission and that little of the six months from the conclusion of hostilities may be left before it makes recommendations for the withdrawal of Allied troops, but this is perhaps of little importance in view of the obvious intention of the Russians to keep their troops in Persia until the last moment. In my telegram No. 53, Worthy, I informed you of Stalin's allegation about the danger to Baku from the present "unfriendly" Persian Government—a theme which he developed still more strongly in his talk with Byrnes.

(4)

Memorandum circulated by the British Delegation at the 11th Meeting.

Suggested Draft Terms of Reference for Tripartite Commission on Iran.

1. The Commission to take as its point of departure the fact that during the presence in Persia of Allied troops the Persian economy and governmental organisation have been disturbed and difficulties have arisen between the central government and the inhabitants of certain provinces. The Three Powers recognise that they may have some responsibility for this and should, therefore, endeavour to assist the Persian State in re-establishing normal conditions to the satisfaction of all elements of the population and maintaining friendly relations with other countries.

2. With a view to allaying the apprehensions of the Persian Government, and to remove causes of international friction, the Commission to look into the question of facilitating the early withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia and to make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers.

3. The Commission to keep in mind (a) the undertaking given by Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the Treaty of January, 1942, to respect the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia; and (b) the declaration about Persia issued during the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

4. With a view to reconciling the existing differences between the central Persian Government and certain regions of the country, the Commission to advise and assist the Persian Government in the establishment of provincial councils, in accordance with the provisions of the Persian constitution.

5. The recommendations of the Commission (which must receive the approval of the Three Governments before being submitted to the Persian Government) to cover the whole of Persia including Azerbaijan.

6. Existing laws amplifying the relevant provisions of the constitution (with respect to provincial councils) to be taken as the point of departure, but the Commission to recommend any amendments which seem to be required, especially in regard to the elections to the local councils, the powers and duties of the councils and the manner in which they are to be furnished with funds.

7. The Commission also to make recommendations as to the use of the minority languages such as Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish for educational and other purposes.

8. The Commission to consult closely with the Persian Government and with representatives of all important elements of the population in the process of formulating its recommendations.

9. The Three Powers to use their best endeavours to persuade the Persian Government to pass into law and to put into execution the recommendations made by the Commission.

10. The Commission to make no recommendation which would weaken the fundamental unity of the Persian State.

11. The first provincial elections to be carried out under the supervision of the Commission.

Moscow, 24th December, 1945.

Extract from Notes of a Conversation at the Kremlin on Monday, 24th December, at 7 p.m.

Iran.

MR. BEVIN said that he had communicated with His Majesty's Government, who could not help feeling that although, of course, they recognised that the Soviet Government were entitled to take all measures to protect the Baku oilfields, the situation was not such as to justify the maintenance of so large a force in Northern Iran. British troops had been reduced in number to 4,000, and these were stationed at a considerable distance from the capital. Even if the last British troops were withdrawn, the situation which had developed would mean that there was no complete settlement. Therefore, he had submitted to M. Molotov a proposal for a Three-Power Commission with a draft of their terms of reference. He felt, and His Majesty's Government felt, that the three Governments having had this area placed at their disposal for the purposes of the war, it would be unfortunate if they had to come before the United Nations in order to clear up the situation. Nor did they wish it to give rise to any misunderstanding between our two Governments. He thought that the proposal now submitted offered a chance of clearing up the situation, safeguarding the integrity of Iran and removing difficulties between Russia and the United Kingdom.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that this proposal might serve as a basis for some sort of agreement. He would have some amendments of no very great substantial importance to propose, and he would communicate these that night or the following morning.

MR. BEVIN said that these amendments, when received, would be carefully considered, and he would then consult with Mr. Byrnes and M. Molotov and try to get an agreement.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that he hoped that our two Governments might find a common ground. What was Mr. Byrnes's position?

MR. BEVIN said that Mr. Byrnes had not definitely committed himself, but he would see him on the following day.

Soviet Amendments to Memorandum circulated by United Kingdom Delegation (No. 4).

THE Soviet Delegation proposes to introduce into the draft on the question of the competence of the Tripartite Commission on Iran the following amendments:—

1. The heading to read as follows: "On the Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions."
2. The draft to begin with the following introductory sentence: "The Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions."
3. Second paragraph to read thus:—

"With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the Commission shall deal with the question of the acceleration, as far as possible, of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran and make corresponding recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers."

4. In paragraph 5 for "certain regions of the country" read "certain provinces of the country."
5. Paragraph 7 to read as follows:—

"The Commission shall also make recommendations concerning the free use of the languages of national minorities, such as Arabic, Turki, Kurdish, for purposes of education, &c."

25th December, 1945.

Draft as finally accepted by the United Kingdom Delegation.

Tripartite Commission for Iranian Affairs.

THE Governments of Great Britain, U.S.S.R. and the United States have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions and are submitting this agreement to the Iranian Government for their concurrence.

The terms of reference are as follows:—

1. The Commission shall take as its point of departure the fact that, during the presence in Persia of Allied troops, the Persian economy and governmental organisation have been disturbed and difficulties have arisen between the central government and the inhabitants of certain provinces. The Three Powers recognise that they may have some responsibility for this and should therefore endeavour to assist the Persian State in re-establishing normal conditions to the satisfaction of all elements of the population and maintaining friendly relations with other countries.

2. With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the Commission shall deal with the question of the acceleration as far as possible of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran, and shall make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers.

3. The Commission shall keep in mind (a) the undertaking given by Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the Treaty of January 1942 to respect the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia; and (b) the declaration about Persia issued during the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

4. With a view to reconciling the existing differences between the central Persian Government and certain provinces of the country, the Commission shall advise and assist the Persian Government in the establishment of provincial councils, in accordance with the provisions of the Persian constitution.

5. The Recommendations of the Commission (which must receive the approval of the Three Governments before being submitted to the Persian Government) shall cover the whole of Persia, including Azerbaijan.

6. Existing laws amplifying the relevant provisions of the constitution (with respect to provincial councils) shall be taken as the point of departure, but the Commission shall recommend any amendments which seem to be required, especially in regard to the elections to the local councils, the powers and duties of the councils and the manner in which they are to be furnished with funds.

7. The Commission shall also make recommendations as to the free use of the minority languages such as Arabic, Turki and Kurdish for educational and other purposes.

8. The Commission shall consult closely with the Persian Government and with representatives of all important elements of the population in the process of formulating its recommendations.

9. The Three Powers shall use their best endeavours to persuade the Persian Government to pass into law and to put into execution the recommendations made by the Commission.

10. The Commission shall make no recommendation which would weaken the fundamental unity of the Persian State.

11. The first provincial elections shall be carried out under the supervision of the Commission.

25th December, 1945.

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 29th December.)

(No. 164. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.)

Moscow, 27th December, 1945.

MY immediately following telegram gives the United States draft based on my scheme which I circulated to the conference as my proposal. Stalin's amendments, which are contained in my telegram No. 166, bore out his statement, as

reported in my telegram No. 142. Worthy, that they would be of no very great substantial importance. I decided, however, that we ought to try for amendments on the following three points:—

- (a) In the preamble the addition of the words "and are submitting this agreement to the Persian Government for their concurrence." Mr. Byrnes agreed that it would be right to obtain Persian concurrence.
- (b) In paragraph 2 omission of the words "as far as possible" and amendment of the paragraph to read "acceleration of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia which is due to be completed by the 2nd March, 1946, at latest."

I was inclined to propose omission altogether of this clause since I was advised that in actual practice it would be difficult for any acceleration of the withdrawal to take place before the 2nd March seeing that the commission could hardly get to work before mid-January and would take time to complete its recommendations on this question, while troop movements would have to begin several weeks before the 2nd March if they were to be withdrawn before that date. There was, therefore, a danger that the Soviet Government would use this clause as a pretext to delay withdrawal. Mr. Byrnes was, however, insistent on the retention of the clause.

- (c) In paragraph 7 I considered that we should return to the original language of our draft, viz., "The use of the minority languages"

2. An amended draft containing the Soviet amendments and the three counter-amendments was discussed at an informal meeting on the 25th December. Mr. Byrnes remained silent except to support me when I deprecated the limitation of "acceleration" in the second paragraph by "as far as possible." I proposed "maximum possible acceleration," but this Molotov would not accept as to paragraph 7. I objected that "free use" might tie the hands of the commission from the beginning and proposed "right to use." There was also some discussion about the use of the word "national minorities," which seemed to me to beg the question; but in the end it was agreed that the word might be used in the Russian idiom and Soviet practice while the English text would read "minority languages." Thus, at the end of the informal meeting on the 25th December there were in our belief only two points left over for further consideration, viz., "as far as possible" in paragraph 2 and "free" in paragraph 7.

3. The next day I had decided that the insertion of "free" would not embarrass the proposed commission and that "as far as possible" could be accepted on the grounds that, if we accept the Soviet assurance of their intention to leave by the end of six months, we must conclude that the removal of stores and troops would probably be in full swing before the commission could make any recommendations.

4. I therefore had a private conversation with Molotov before the informal meeting on the 26th December and said that I was prepared to accept the two outstanding Soviet amendments. To my surprise Molotov said that the Soviet delegation proposed to drop the Persian question altogether. The pretext he advanced was that they could not agree to the proposal that the agreement should be submitted to the Persian Government for their concurrence, and that as it would not be possible to proceed without the concurrence of the Persian Government, the proposed agreement should be dropped. I emphasised the strong interest aroused in Great Britain by the situation in Persia, and said that a very bad impression would be created if it could not be announced that the matter had been raised in Moscow and an understanding reached.

5. I suggested that we should announce that views had been exchanged between them on proposals which were now being taken up with the Persian Government through the diplomatic channel. Molotov refused my proposal, and said that the furthest he could go was to consider including a passage in the communiqué to the effect that views had been exchanged between the three Foreign Secretaries, that understanding had been arrived at, and that the next step would be for the question to be pursued through diplomatic channels. He would not commit himself to agreeing that the approach to the Persian Government should be on basis of our draft proposals.

6. At the informal meeting on the 26th December immediately following this discussion I raised the question of Persia, and Molotov said that the Soviet delegation considered that the question should be dropped. He gave no reason for dropping the matter beyond alleging that it had been decided at the beginning

of the conference that it was to be taken off the agenda. He added that we must not say that nothing had been done: we had exchanged views. Mr. Byrnes gave me no support. I left Molotov in no doubt as to the unfortunate effect which the Soviet attitude would produce on His Majesty's Government. The meeting then went into recess and I requested an interview with Stalin.

7. In the evening I saw Molotov again and told him that I had informed His Majesty's Government of Stalin's views and that, if the subject were now to be dropped without any agreement being announced, it would cause great perturbation and misunderstanding. Molotov, besides employing the arguments he had used before, laid much stress on the hostile attitude of the present Persian Government, which was abusing the Soviet. To this I retorted that the Persian Prime Minister was possibly speaking under a certain feeling of frustration, due to his inability to visit certain parts of his own country. As it was plain that I could get nowhere with Molotov I broke off the interview after about an hour's discussion, but on leaving Molotov I made a very frank statement to him. I said that I did not want to be faced with *faits accomplis*. No one was more anxious than I to work in peace and collaboration with the Soviet Union, but I definitely resented being faced with *faits accomplis*. Public opinion at home was quite convinced that a *fait accompli* was being staged. People might be wrong, but that was the impression which prevailed. Molotov replied that there were no grounds to look for *faits accomplis*. The Persian question was always open to discussion and Russia was making no claims on Persian territory.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 825 and 204 respectively.

(9)

United Kingdom Delegation's Discussion on the Two Soviet Amendments in the Draft on the Tripartite Commission for Persian Affairs; and Record of Secretary of State's Second (Private) Conversation with M. Molotov, 26th December (with Annex) (Reference: Paragraphs 4 and 5 of No. (8)).

THE Secretary of State discussed with Sir A. Cadogan, Sir R. Bullard and General Jacob this morning the two Soviet amendments in the draft on the tripartite commission for Persian affairs which were left unsettled at last night's meeting with the three Foreign Secretaries.

2. The first amendment was the insertion of the words "as far as possible" after the phrase "acceleration of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran" in paragraph 2. It was felt that in actual practice it would be difficult for any acceleration of the withdrawal to take place before the 2nd March, since the Commission could hardly get to work before mid-January and would take some time to complete its report on that point, while it would be necessary for the movement of troops to begin in early February if they were to be withdrawn by the 2nd March. It was therefore decided to drop the clause altogether from the proposals if the United States Delegation agreed.

3. Sir R. Bullard ascertained from Mr. Byrnes that he was insistent on the retention of this clause which was the feature in the proposals which mainly attracted the United States Delegation. (The clause did not appear in our original terms of reference, but was lifted by the United States Delegation from the draft letter to M. Molotov which had been put before them, and inserted by them into the revised terms of reference which they produced.) On the strength of the attitude of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State decided to accept the Soviet amendment, and to drop his request for the insertion of the reference to the treaty date.

4. The Secretary of State also decided to accept the Soviet amendment of clause 7 (the free use of the languages of national minorities) though he would make one further attempt to secure the phrase "the right to use."

5. Before this afternoon's meeting at 2.30 p.m. the Secretary of State raised the question of the Soviet amendments with M. Molotov (Sir A. Cadogan, M. Vyshinski M. Pavlov and I were also present).

6. M. Molotov at once raised the question of obtaining the concurrence of the Persian Government. The preamble to the Document ran as follows: "The Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States have agreed to the formation of a tripartite Commission for Iranian questions." The United

Kingdom Delegation, said M. Molotov, had at first suggested the insertion of the words "with the approval of the Persian Government." They had later withdrawn this amendment and added the words "and of submitting this agreement to the Iran Government for their concurrence." The Soviet Government did not consider that the draft agreement had any value if it was subject to the approval of the Persian Government. On the other hand they saw the difficulty of the three Governments deciding to set up a Commission to deal with Persian affairs without having obtained the approval of the Persian Government. M. Molotov therefore suggested that as we could do neither of these things the whole matter should be dropped.

7. In order to test M. Molotov's attitude, the Secretary of State raised the two Soviet amendments mentioned above. On the first amendment (concerning the withdrawal of Allied troops) he said that for his part we stood by the treaty and the notes exchanged with M. Molotov in London. Did M. Molotov confirm that it was the intention to withdraw by the treaty date? M. Molotov indicated that this was the Soviet intention. The Secretary of State therefore said that he did not wish to press for the inclusion of the reference to the date of the 2nd March by which withdrawal was due to be completed by the latest. In regard to the second amendment, he hoped that M. Molotov would be able to meet him by accepting "the right to use." M. Molotov said he would consider this latter suggestion.

8. Returning to M. Molotov's suggestion that the whole agreement should be dropped owing to the difficulty about consultation with the Persian Government, the Secretary of State emphasised the strong interest in Great Britain which had been aroused by the situation in Persia, and said that a very bad impression would be created unless it could be announced that the matter had been raised in Moscow and an understanding reached. He therefore suggested that the published communiqué should state that views had been exchanged between the three Governments on the subject and that agreement had been reached between them on proposals which were now being taken up with the Persian Government through the diplomatic channel.

9. M. Molotov demurred to a statement on these lines, since he could not agree to say that agreement had been reached. The furthest he would go would be to consider the inclusion of a passage in the communiqué to the following effect:—

"Views were exchanged between the Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom, United States and the U.S.S.R. on the Persian question, and understanding was arrived at. The next step will be for this question to be pursued through diplomatic channels with the Persian Government."

M. Molotov said that he would let the Secretary of State know later whether this suggestion could be accepted.

10. The Secretary of State enquired whether the approach to the Persian Government, if agreed, could be made on the basis of the draft agreement under discussion. M. Molotov assented. But his assent was presumably subject to confirmation as in the case of the suggested formula.

11. During the discussion with M. Molotov, which was hurried, the attached formula was drafted, but not produced, its object being to make sure that the approach to the Persian Government would be on a firm and agreed basis, and to hold the Soviet Government to the terms of the draft on which, subject to our acceptance of the two outstanding Soviet amendments, agreement seemed to have been reached last night. But the Secretary of State felt that it would be useless to press M. Molotov further on the matter.

Moscow, 26th December, 1945.

P. DIXON.

ANNEX.

I.—In the Protocol and the published communiqué.

VIEWS were exchanged between the Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. on the Persian question, and agreement was reached between the three Governments on proposals which are now being taken up with the Persian Government through the diplomatic channel.

II.—In the Protocol only (not published).

Tripartite Commission for Iranian Affairs.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. have agreed on the following proposals regarding Persian affairs.

A Tripartite Commission consisting of representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. shall be formed with the following terms of reference:—

[See draft as finally accepted by the United Kingdom Delegation (No. (7)), subject to our request for substitution of "the right to use" for "the free use" in paragraph 7.]

(10)

Extract from Record of 13th (Informal) Meeting of Foreign Secretaries,
26th December.

3. Iran.

M. MOLOTOV felt there was no purpose in discussing Iran further. It was not on the agenda.

Mr. BYRNES said that they had agreed to discuss it informally. They had better discuss the communiqué now and then revert to it.

Mr. BEVIN said that Austria and Germany were not on the agenda either, but he had agreed to discuss them informally. He also wanted to clear up Iran informally.

M. MOLOTOV said there had been a lot of talk about Iran already, with no result.

Mr. BYRNES said that if no solution were reached they would meet again for the U.N.O. session in London.

M. MOLOTOV said that M. Vyshinski would probably represent the Soviet Government on that occasion. He would agree not to discuss Iran further if his colleagues did not want to.

7. Iran (again).

Mr. BEVIN said that he wished to raise again the question of Iran. He asked whether it was the final word of the Soviet Government that they would not enter into any understanding as to how this problem should be approached. The question of Iran had been raised and discussed and he had thought that Generalissimo Stalin had virtually agreed with his proposal. He himself had accepted virtually all the Soviet amendments except the one question of obtaining the concurrence of the Iranian Government. He would be satisfied if the document which he had put forward were accepted as an understanding on the basis of which the Iranian Government would be approached with a view to the setting up of a Commission.

M. MOLOTOV said that he could not accept that. It should suffice that there had been an exchange of views, that the question had not been left on the agenda, that no decision had been reached, and that there should be no reference to this matter in the communiqué.

Mr. BEVIN asked what M. Molotov thought the British Government's next step would have to be?

M. MOLOTOV replied that he thought that Mr. Bevin knew this well enough.

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Mr. BEVIN said that he thought he understood the position. He regretted it. He had thought that his proposal constituted one of the steps that might be taken to clear up what looked like being a very awkward situation between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It was a question which provoked a good deal of feeling.

On the proposal of Mr. Byrnes it was agreed to adjourn.

(11)

Note of Private Conversation between the Secretary of State and M. Molotov held at Spiridonevka Palace on 26th December, 1945.

Mr. BEVIN said he would have liked to speak to Stalin on the subject of Iran. There was great public disquiet in the United Kingdom about the position there, and he was most anxious that nothing should happen in that country to disturb the relations between their two Governments. He had advised the British Government of Stalin's views and if the subject were now to be dropped without any agreement being announced it would cause great perturbation and misunderstanding.

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that the question of Iran had not been on the Conference agenda. In any case, several other questions had already been settled.

Mr. BEVIN said it was expected that there would be a written agreement between their two Governments regarding Iran, and he thought he had virtually achieved an understanding with Stalin as a result of their conversations. What had happened to prevent this understanding being fully realised?

M. MOLOTOV said there was an understanding and also a treaty. Views had been exchanged both in London and Berlin.

Mr. BEVIN said that much had happened since then and the British Government did not know what the present Soviet policy was regarding Iran.

M. MOLOTOV said Mr. Bevin had had several talks with the Generalissimo.

Mr. BEVIN replied that everything seemed to have been withdrawn.

M. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government was not withdrawing. Talks would be resumed when the time came.

Mr. BEVIN asked when the time would come if no Commission were appointed. Would it not be best to send a Commission to Iran to examine the position and help the Iranian authorities? He was afraid that the Iranian Government might change and serious political difficulties arise.

M. MOLOTOV said that that would not be the first time such changes had occurred. He had been perfectly happy with the present Iranian Government until it began to abuse the Soviet.

Mr. BEVIN wished to be quite frank. His Majesty's Government were afraid of the policy pursued by the Soviet Government. He had felt reassured after his talk with Stalin that a satisfactory understanding would be reached. He would find it very difficult to sign a protocol which would make no mention of an understanding about Iran.

M. MOLOTOV said that would be Mr. Bevin's affair. There were no grounds for mentioning Iran in the protocol. As to the talk with Stalin, Mr. Bevin knew perfectly well that the Generalissimo "did not say his words for nothing and scatter them to the winds."

Mr. BEVIN agreed, but it was his understanding that the United Kingdom memorandum was acceptable, subject to minor amendments. He had been prepared to accept the original draft reading "... with the approval of the Iranian Government ..." if that would ensure an understanding. He thought the document submitted offered a satisfactory basis of agreement, subject to some amendment. Was that understanding to be regarded as withdrawn?

M. MOLOTOV asked what Mr. Bevin had in mind.

Mr. BEVIN enquired whether, if the concurrence of the Iranian Government were received, the document would still stand. It would be disturbing to British public opinion if no firm understanding could be achieved on this problem. The understanding was more important to him than the document.

M. MOLOTOV thought the document would remain a scrap of paper unless the concurrence of the Iranian Government were secured. Until then the question would remain open. No definite decision had yet been taken.

Mr. BEVIN pointed out that he had accepted all the amendments and yet there was still no decision. Would the approval of the Iranian Government offer a basis for implementing the agreement?

M. MOLOTOV reminded Mr. Bevin that he had had talks both with himself and Stalin, and had made proposals, but asked how it was possible to talk of an agreement with the present Iranian Government which kept on denouncing the Soviet Union.

Mr. BEVIN asked what was meant by denouncing

M. MOLOTOV referred Mr. Bevin to the London Press. If this were not enough, he need only read a statement made by the Persian Prime Minister to the Majlis.

Mr. BEVIN pointed out that the Prime Minister was possibly speaking under a certain feeling of frustration, due to his inability to visit certain areas of his own country. He himself would strongly object to obstacles being put in the way of his visiting Scotland, for example.

M. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Bevin seemed to be justifying the Persian Prime Minister's action. He could not accept that.

Mr. BEVIN said that His Majesty's Government were deeply concerned in the affairs of Iran.

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that Iran was even closer to the Soviet Union than Great Britain was.

Mr. BEVIN agreed that both countries were close to Persia.

M. MOLOTOV then reverted to the "abuse" which was being showered on him by the Iranians. He resented it.

Mr. BEVIN replied that he himself got lots of abuse, but he brushed it aside. Could M. Molotov say what the position would be if the Iranians agreed. Would the Commission be proceeded with?

M. MOLOTOV said that was a matter to be discussed. As it was not possible to take a decision now, it was not much use going through the document. Mr. Bevin was aware of Stalin's views.

Mr. BEVIN assented, but pointed out that the matter had not crystallised.

M. MOLOTOV said this was due to the fact that a decision was not yet "ripe."

Mr. BEVIN asked what decision.

M. MOLOTOV said the decision which Mr. Bevin was seeking—the appointment of a Commission. Mr. Bevin had himself arrived at the conclusion that nothing could be decided without the assent of the Iranian Government. With that he agreed. It was meaningless to sign a document to which the Iranian Government had not agreed. The way the question was being put was not acceptable to the Soviet Government.

Mr. BEVIN reverted to his query whether the approval of the Iranian Government would offer a basis for implementing the agreement.

M. MOLOTOV said the way Mr. Bevin was putting the question was not acceptable to him.

Mr. BEVIN said that the two Governments would have to watch the course of events.

M. MOLOTOV said the two Governments would find a way out of the difficulty.

Mr. BEVIN asked when.

M. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Bevin and himself were "lively people," and would find a way out. There would be many occasions for discussing this question. Meanwhile, it would be good if the Persians would stop their abuse.

Mr. BEVIN said he did not wish to see similar difficulties arise as had occurred in Bulgaria and Roumania. He would have liked to see the two Governments pursue the same line of policy and not get involved in complications on account of small countries.

M. MOLOTOV agreed.

Mr. BEVIN wished to be completely frank. He did not want to be faced with *faits accomplis*. No-one was more anxious than he was to work in peace and collaboration with the Soviet Union, but he definitely resented being faced with a *fait accompli*. Public opinion in the United Kingdom was quite convinced that a *fait accompli* was being staged. They might be wrong, but that was the impression which prevailed.

M. MOLOTOV said there were no grounds to look for *faits accomplis*. The Persian question was always open to discussion and Russia was making no claims on Persian territory. Mr. Bevin had had a long talk with Stalin and had learned his views, which had not left the matter obscure.

As M. Molotov's arguments were becoming trivial, the Secretary of State broke off the conversation.

(12)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 28th December.)

(No. 168. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.)

Moscow, 27th December, 1945.

MY telegram No. 164, Worthy.

Best course now appears to be that Sir R. Bullard, who is returning to Tehran via London as quickly as possible, should acquaint the Persian Government with the course of the negotiations and try to elicit from them expression of the opinion that the draft proposals would be satisfactory to them (I gather that it would be slow and perhaps dangerous to ask for Majlis approval). This opinion, which the Persian Government should communicate to the United States Government as well as to His Majesty's Ambassador, would enable me to approach M. Molotov again and to suggest that the agreement should now be concluded. Even if this approach failed, discussion in the British press, with favourable comment on the reasonable attitude adopted by the Persian Government, should greatly assist the Persians and damage the cause of the Azerbaijan extremists.

2. It is possible that, while accepting the draft as whole, Persian Government may want to omit clause 2 and to say that they rely on the treaty of 1942 and in the assurances given recently by M. Molotov as to the intentions of the Soviet Government to remove its troops by the due date. United States delegation attached great importance to this clause. They were inclined to regard our proposals as putting the Persian Government in the dock and to consider clause 2 as the only provision designed to recognise the Persian Government's complaints as having some justification. There is something in this argument and Sir R. Bullard will not raise the point himself. If, however, the Persian Government should themselves declare the clause to be unnecessary, the United States Ambassador in Tehran will presumably deal with that point.

3. I realise the difficulty we shall have in dealing with a Persian Government which is already shaky and which may be shaken still further by the Russian refusal to consider an agreement about Persia. It is conceivable that the failure (as it may be called) of the British and the Americans to obtain any satisfaction for Persia at this conference may bring about the overthrow of Hakimi and his replacement by a Prime Minister who will recognise the Azerbaijan movement and in this way also do what the Russians want. I consider, however, that it

would be difficult for any Prime Minister to reject our scheme and at the same time to recognise Azerbaijan autonomy and that we ought, therefore, to continue to back our scheme even if a pro-Russian Government should come into power in Tehran.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 829 and 208 respectively.

(13)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 28th December.)

(No. 169. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.)

Moscow, 27th December, 1945.

MY telegram No. 164, Worthy.

Pretext finally given by Molotov after auspicious beginning for refusal to enter into agreement about provincial councils for Persia was Persian abuse of Russia. I realise that Persians must defend themselves, but it might ease the tension if, for the next week or two, Persian Ambassadors in London and Washington refrained from making public statements about Russia and if the anti-Soviet newspapers in Tehran kept their criticism within narrower bounds than usual.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 830 and 209 respectively.

(14)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 28th December.)

(No. 171. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.)

Moscow, 27th December, 1945.

MY telegram No. 164, Worthy.

Following is text of letter dated the 27th December, in which Mr. Byrnes has concurred, which I am sending to Molotov on my departure from Moscow, 28th December:—

"It has been a great disappointment to me that, after my friendly exchange of views with the Generalissimo, we have been unable to come to a final agreement about the treatment of Persian questions, and I am sure that my Government will be equally disappointed. However, I will report to them fully the exchange of views that has taken place and the amendments to my proposals which you suggested and I accepted.

"I feel that it would not be right to keep the Persian Government uninformed, and I am therefore instructing Sir R. Bullard to acquaint them with the course of conversations in Moscow and the proposals which were submitted for their views. I have informed Mr. Byrnes of the contents of this letter, who is advising his representative in Tehran in a similar sense."

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 832 and 211 respectively.

[E 5/5/34]

No. 15

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Farquhar (Tehran).

(No. 311.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, 31st December, 1945.

THE Iranian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He enquired what had happened at Moscow, with special reference to the statement by Mr. Byrnes regarding the setting up of a commission. I told the Ambassador that it was true that we did propose a commission of the three Governments with a view to

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establishing for all provinces, including Azerbaijan, the provincial councils arranged under the Iranian Constitution of 1907, and also to consider whether the Allied troops could not be removed more speedily. Sir Reader Bullard was on his way back now to consult with the Iranian Government, and if a reply could be obtained quickly then we would go into the matter again immediately. I had not been in a position to settle anything in Moscow because I had not the views of the Iranian Government as to whether they would favour the proposal. I advised the Ambassador to tell his Government to keep calm and steady, and consider the whole in discussions which could be taken up with them as soon as our Ambassador arrived in Tehran.

2. The Ambassador also raised with me the question as to whether we would support Iran as a member of the Security Council on the ground of early entry into the war, geographical distribution and the services they had placed at the disposal of the Allies. I told him I would consider it, but could give him no assurance at the moment.

3. At the end of our talk the Ambassador expressed the fear that pressure would be brought to bear to bring his Government down. My advice to him was that the best step to take would be to move with speed and decision as soon as the Ambassador arrived.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

[E 7339/70/34]

No. 16

(1)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37, Secret, for the Period 17th September to 23rd September, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 336 of 24th September; Received in Foreign Office, 1st October.)

Persian Affairs.

The Majlis.

1. No business of any importance has been done during the past week. At the session of the 16th September the debate on the Two-Twelfth Budget Bill was resumed but was not concluded. On the 18th September there was no public session as the Prime Minister had asked the Speaker to convene a special joint meeting of the Majlis Budget and Foreign Affairs Commissions to discuss ways and means for the transference of American military assets in Persia to the Persian Government. Representatives of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Roads and Communications and Finance also attended this meeting. On the 19th September the Majlis met but rose on account of there being no quorum. On the 20th September the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement in amplification of his recent note to the British, Russian and American Embassies on the subject of the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary). In reply to criticism of his note he explained that, in giving the 2nd March, 1946, as the date by which the evacuation of Persia must be completed, he wished to establish that date as legally correct. His Government did not wish to convey the impression that they were willing to see the Allied occupation of Persia continue up to that date. On the contrary, the Persian Government regarded it as an essential preliminary to the return to normality that the evacuation should be begun as speedily as possible and concluded, if possible, before that date.

Political.

2. There is some evidence to show that the Majlis majority does not intend to keep Sadr in office indefinitely but that it is wise enough to realise that a change of premiership during the present crisis would be a very dangerous step. The name of Hakim-ul-Mulk is again being mentioned as a possible successor to Sadr.

3. Growing anxiety is felt in political and ministerial circles at the lack of news from London about the decisions taken at the Foreign Secretaries Conference in respect of the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops. The Persians, dilatory in expediting other people's business, invariably give the highest priority to their own and cannot understand why their own particular problem was not put down as No. 1 on the agenda. A telegram, alleged to have been sent by the Persian Ambassador in London, to the effect that the London press, in publishing

the agenda of the conference, had made no mention of Persia, contributed to the general feeling of suspense. More recently a message from Reuters alluding to a rumour current in London that the Russians might possibly ask for the separation of Azerbaijan from Persia has added to this consternation.

The Tudeh.

4. The stock of the Tudeh party in Tehran has slumped during the past week. The reasons are:—

- (i) The closing of the Tudeh party offices by the Military Governor;
- (ii) the suppression of some of the Tudeh papers;
- (iii) the injuries sustained in a scuffle with the military by Dr. Kishawarz, the Tudeh leader;
- (iv) the communiqué issued by the Chief of the General Staff on the recent mutiny in the Persian army in which Tudeh complicity is made amply clear;
- (v) the evacuation of Tehran by Soviet troops by which the Tudeh realise that Russian armed assistance will be no longer available to save them from the consequences of their acts of hooliganism.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

5. Increased activity is being shown by the newly-formed Democratic party (see Intelligence Summary No. 35, paragraph 7) and by the Russians in giving open support to it. It has revealed its true colours and origin by its insistence on provincial autonomy for Azerbaijan. Nobody is likely to be deceived by this and everybody will realise that from provincial autonomy through separation from Persia to inclusion in the U.S.S.R. is but a short step. The Azerbaijan Tudeh party has announced the severance of ties with the central Tudeh party in Tehran and of its adherence to the Azerbaijan Democratic party.

Isfahan and Kuhgilu.

6. The General Officer Commanding, Isfahan Division, has despatched an infantry battalion to Fereidan to assist in disarming some of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari khans.

7. General Humayuni, who has recently relinquished the command of the Khuzistan Division on being appointed to Kurdistan, gives a version differing widely from that of Murteza Quli Khan on the recent raids by Bahmai and Teyyibi tribesmen on Murteza Quli Khan's domains near Deh Diz (see Intelligence Summary No. 34, paragraph 5). The general states that the raiders did not exceed 350 in number and that Murteza Quli Khan's own bakshdar at Izeh, one Ali Khalili, though supplied with 150 rifles by the State to maintain order, made no attempt to do so nor in fact reported the raid to any Government authority.

Kurdistan.

8. A delicate situation is likely to arise if the General Officer Commanding, Kurdistan Division, carries out the orders recently given him by the Chief of the General Staff. The latter, anxious to achieve a decisive victory and conclude these operations before winter sets in or other commitments arise, and impatient at the lack of success by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in securing Iraqi co-operation in closing the frontier to Kurds attempting to flee before the advancing Persian army columns, has ordered the General Officer Commanding to pursue the Kurds if necessary across the frontier and continue his disarmament operations inside Iraqi territory.

Persian army.

9. A short summary of a communiqué on the recent events in Khorasan and the mutiny in the Persian army which was given to the Persian press by the Chief of the General Staff is published as Appendix B to this summary.

Appointments.

- 10.—(i) Muhammad Namazi, a well-known business man and brother-in-law of General Muhammad Hussein Murza Firuz, has been appointed Persian Trade Commissioner in the United States;

- (ii) Muhammad Muazzimi Gudarzi to be 2nd Secretary at Washington;
- (iii) Abul Qasim Pannahi to be consul in New York;
- (iv) Ghulam Abbas Aram from 2nd Secretary, Berne, to be 1st Secretary at Washington;
- (v) Dr. Parviz Mahdavi to be vice-consul, New York;
- (vi) Ghulam Abbas Quli Khalatbari to be 2nd Secretary at Berne;
- (vii) Ali Asghar Shukuh to be 2nd Secretary at Beirut;
- (viii) Muhammad Hussein Najm to be Chief of the Personnel Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
- (ix) Drs. Sang and Abbas Nafisi to be Persian Government delegates from the Red Lion and Sun Society at the forthcoming International Red Cross Congress at Geneva;
- (x) Engineer Habib Nafisi has been appointed chairman of the committee which is to represent Persia at the International Labour Conference which is to be held in Paris next month and Shahab Khusravani is to represent factory owners. Representatives for the northern and southern factories and one representative for the workers are to be appointed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and it is also probable that a Ministry of Finance representative will attend the conference. Dr. Hisam-ud-din-Ihtisham is also one of the delegates;
- (xi) General Muhammad Hussein Firuz, late Governor-General of Fars, to be an Inspector-General of Military District No. 5 (Kurdistan).

British Interests.

11. A note by the commercial secretary of this embassy on the present position regarding the disposal of British military assets in Persia is attached as Appendix A to this summary.

12. His Majesty's Embassy have communicated to the Soviet Embassy and the Persian Government the programme for the evacuation of Tehran by the British military forces. It is as follows:—

- (i) By the 2nd October all British army units will be clear of Tehran except for small rear parties. By the same date the Royal Air Force will have withdrawn from Tehran except for a rear party of approximately 86 British officers and men and 60 Royal Air Force Levies who will be located in the camp at Mehrabad;
- (ii) By the 15th October these army and Royal Air Force rear parties will also have left and the only British troops remaining in Tehran will be those employed in liquidation of assets, disposal of claims, &c., as per list below:—

	Officers.	British other ranks.
Hirings, Disposal and Claims	6	5
Transportation Finance	3	5
Department of Movements	1	1
Administration Officer	1	1
Signals Department	1	11
Middle East Supply Centre	11	7
British Embassy—Representative for Polish Refugees	1	—
Royal Engineers Stores Organisation (Sawmill)	—	3
Public Relations Bureau	—	6
	23	39

- (iii) A survey party engaged by the Persian Government to survey the area connected with the Lar irrigation project will also be working south of Tehran till the 30th November. Their numbers are as follows:—
5 officers and 100 British other ranks.

- (iv) The Royal Air Force propose to retain their rights under the protocol of the 30th June, 1942, in respect of Qaleh Murgheh airfield until the Soviet forces are withdrawn from the airfield and adjacent buildings. It is not intended to keep any Royal Air Force personnel in Tehran in this connexion.

The above information has also been given to the American Military Attaché and the Persian Chief of the General Staff.

Russian Interests.

13. The Soviet Ambassador has returned to Tehran.

14. The Russians withdrew their troops from Qaleh Murgheh aerodrome during the night of the 18th–19th September. Some twenty-five Intourist personnel have remained to operate the Russian military air services to Tabriz, Meshed and Moscow. The Soviet Ambassador informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th September that Soviet troops had evacuated Tehran and its environs and Qaleh Murgheh aerodrome and that Soviet censorship had been removed. In reply to a question by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Ambassador stated that the troops evacuated from Tehran would return direct to the U.S.S.R.

Polish Interests.

15. The new Polish Chargé d'Affaires, M. Eugene Melnitsky, has taken over the Polish Legation on behalf of the Warsaw Government from the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His predecessor, owing allegiance to the Polish Government in London, had refused to hand over to M. Melnitsky.

Tehran, 23rd September, 1945.

Appendix A.

Disposal of Assets—Persia.

1. Railways.

(i) The present position as regards British assets is that an impasse has been reached. The Persian Ministry of Communications stand by the draft agreement made in 1942, by which all fixed assets should revert to them free of charge. Unfortunately, the draft agreement was never ratified and, although the British representative on the Transportation Committee defined what he conceived to be fixed assets, i.e., only the actual buildings, there is no record that any agreement on this point was reached with the Persians. The result is that the Persian Railway Commission have so far declined to discuss prices unless it is conceded that fixed assets should revert to them free of charge. It is hoped that the position will be clarified in a few days' time.

(ii) The Americans have also reached a deadlock. They offered their locomotives, freight wagons and oil-tank wagons for sale, but failed to receive any firm offer from the Persian authorities. They have accordingly instructed the P.S.R. to remove all their rolling-stock south for shipment elsewhere. The American locomotives could, at a pinch, be replaced by British locomotives, but these are of a small type and unsuitable for Persia. Also, British freight wagons are open-sided, whereas box-cars are needed. The most serious aspect of this matter is, however, the withdrawal of the oil-tank wagons. The Persians themselves possess only 303, and to maintain adequate oil distribution a minimum of 580 and a maximum of 716 are needed. The withdrawal of the American oil-tank wagons would lead to a total breakdown in oil distribution this winter. Representations have been made to London and Washington, asking the Americans to reconsider their attitude.

(iii) The Persian Government have claimed from the British military authorities (but not from His Majesty's Embassy) the sum of £7,700,000 in respect of freights in excess of the £16,500,000 which has already been paid since 1942 to keep the railways running. They are likely also to lodge an additional claim in respect of passenger traffic. The Persian Government are not making the question of purchase of railway assets contingent on the settlement of their claim for excess freights. What they have done so far is to decline to discuss the question of purchase of what they conceive to be fixed assets.

2. Telecommunications.

The Persian Government want to buy the entire pole and line system, including the American section, representing some 31 per cent. The latter is, however, not for sale. They also want to buy the entire carrier installations. The British Military Disposals Board asked an over-all price of £400,000, and the Persians offered £200,000. A final offer of £300,000 was then made, and they were

informed that, unless they accept it by 1 o'clock on the 23rd September, the British military will dismantle the pole and line system and ship the carrier system out of the country.

3. Other Fixed Assets.

The disposal of camps, cinemas, &c., in the North Persia area is proceeding normally. Satisfactory offers have been received for all installations offered for sale by public adjudication. Prices realised have been quite satisfactory. An agreement with the Persian Government has been reached about the payment of customs duty and a claim from the Ministry of Finance for the payment of sales tax has been rejected, as this tax is payable by the seller, and the British contention is that one Government cannot levy taxes against another Government.

4. Mobile Assets.

The sale of these by public tender is proceeding normally.

Appendix B.

Communiqué in Press by Chief of the General Staff on recent Mutiny in Persian Army.

"Certain dissatisfied officers in contact with suspected elements had attempted to bring about a general mutiny, which was timed to break out at the end of September, under the auspices of the Tudeh party.

The General Staff had deemed it necessary to carry out a transfer of ring-leaders from their distant posts or to deprive them of their appointments. It was thus that two officers, who had received transfer orders, decided to precipitate the mutiny without further preparations. This it was that constituted the "Meshed" incident.

The Tudeh party plan met with complete failure. Not only were the rebels members of the Tudeh party, duly registered, and were, by orders of the party, giving out Communist propaganda, but had created the incident in Khorasan on its orders and with its assistance.

In spite of this, the corps of officers had remained loyal to their Shah, which was proved by the telegrams of numerous formations expressing these sentiments.

A commission is investigating the antecedents of the officers involved. Twenty-six have been transferred under arrest to Kerman and nine others to distant places."

[E 7839/70/34]

(2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 38, Secret, for the period 24th to 30th September, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 346 of 1st October; Received in Foreign Office 18th October.)

Persian Affairs.

The Majlis.

1. At the session of the 25th September Dr. Kishawarz, with his head suitably swathed in bandages, described the injuries which he had sustained in his scuffle with the military. He gave his interpretation of parliamentary immunity, attacked the Chief of the General Staff for having an English mother and an English wife, complained that no less than thirty-six newspapers had been suppressed, and wound up by saying that, in oppression and harshness, the present military governorship in Tehran was just as bad as the tyrannical dictatorship of Reza Khan [sic]. On the 26th September the Prime Minister asked for a vote of confidence, but the Tudeh members and the minority walked out leaving no quorum. The majority members persuaded them to return as the minority leader, Dr. Musaddiq, was to speak. The two-twelfths budget bill was then passed. The session of the 27th September was remarkable for a fine speech by the Deputy Panahi, who ridiculed the idea of there being any

genuine separatist movement in Azerbaijan. Exposing the real nature of the Azerbaijan Democratic party's programme, he said they were democrats in nothing but name. The freedom they claimed was merely freedom to oppress, rob and murder their political opponents. He admitted that reforms in Persia were long overdue, but said that they could not be affected by terrorism. Two other Deputies, Reza Hikmat (Sardar Fakhir) and Misbah Fatemi, spoke on much the same lines and described the high-handed acts now being perpetrated by the Tudeh in Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Khorasan and, more recently, in Zenjan. Dr. Musaddiq pushed his long nose into the debate and got it punched for his pains by the Minister of Finance who accused him of untruthfulness. This affront to his dignity caused the doctor to burst into one of his customary fits of sobbing. Accurately sensing the temper of the House, the Government seized the opportunity to ask for a vote of confidence, which it secured by seventy votes against forty, there being four abstentions. Thus ends the first round of the fight between the Government and the Opposition which began as long ago as the 17th July.

Internal Affairs.

2. The Ministry of Justice is to set up a commission to hear complaints by the Tudeh party against the Military Governorship and complaints by that body and by individuals against the Tudeh.

3. The Government has announced that any of its nationals who have sustained damage at the hands of the Axis Powers should state their claims to the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.

4. The Ministry of Roads and Communications is reported in the press as having asked the Soviet Embassy to begin discussions for the handing back of the northern sections of the Iranian State Railway, i.e., Tehran-Bandar Shah, Tehran-Mianeh and Tehran-Shahrud. No mention was made of the section Tabriz-Julfa.

5. The sub-governate (bakshdari) of Qasr-i-Shirin is to be raised to the status of a governate (farandari).

6. A disastrous fire broke out on the 24th September in the bazaar quarter of Kazvin and over 600 shops are said to have been destroyed.

7. A riot occurred in Zenjan on the 28th September between the Tudeh and their opponents. The Governor was seriously wounded when attempting to calm the crowd.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

8. According to consular sources the operations in Kurdistan are not going so well as the General Staff would have the public believe. General Hushmand Afshar's road turns out to be but a fair weather track roughly completed only as far as Rezab. The Persian forces have not yet succeeded in capturing Dizli and there is little prospect of any result being achieved before winter sets in. General Humayuni, the newly-appointed commander of the Senneh Division, is far from enthusiastic about his task. He stated to the British Military Attaché that, as far as he could see, there was no objective the gaining of which would achieve any finality. As for disarmament, that was only possible if the Kurds stayed to be disarmed, whereas at this moment there were no Kurds within striking distance of the Persian army columns as they had either fled across the Iraqi border or had split into small parties in the inaccessible mountains. Winter would force the Persian army to fall back to its permanent garrisons before it forced the Kurds to return to their villages. General Humayuni gave the infantry strength of the forces now deployed as, Saqqiz one battalion, Baneh two battalions, Merivan two battalions, Avroman nine battalions, Sardasht one battalion and one battalion on the L. of C. near the Garan Pass. He hinted that a mixed commission with representatives of other ministries might visit the area soon and try to effect a settlement.

Khorasan.

9. No very recent news of the mutiny has been received. A party of 100 gendarmes proceeding from Bujnurd to Gunbad-i-Qabus to round up Colonel Nawai's band of mutineers was turned back by the Russians. Ali Mansur, the Governor-General, has arrived in Tehran. In Meshed it is thought that he will not return.

Communications.

10. Neither in the recent discussions about the disposal of British military assets nor in the previous negotiations regarding the handing back of the I.S. Railway to the Persian Government for operation was any mention made of the Zahidan-Mirjawa section of the Indian N.W. Railway. The reason, probably, was that neither the construction nor the operation of this line had put the Persian Government to any expense. It is, however, a matter which must come up for discussion before the expiry of the treaty period.

Appointments.

- 11—(i) Saifullah Nawab to be Governor-General of Mazanderan;
- (ii) Naukhuda III (Lieut.-Commander) Sultan Muhammad Ardelan to be Assistant Military [sic] Attaché at Washington;
- (iii) Sartip Ibrahim Muizzi to be Commander Khwash Brigade;
- (iv) Sarhang Azizi to be General Officer Commanding 7th Kerman Division *vice* Sartip Sha'ri recalled;
- (v) Sartip Ghulam Hussein Naqdi (Judge Advocate-General) is placed *en disponibilité*;
- (vi) Musa Nuri Isfandiari, Muwaffaq-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 100) to be Persian Ambassador in Angora;
- (vii) The appointment of Mehdi Farrukh, Mutasam-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 61; M.A. 85) as Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan had been announced in the press some weeks previously. The appointment would now appear to have been confirmed as a press report states that the Cabinet have agreed to the demands made by Farrukh as a condition of his acceptance of the post. These demands included the provision of funds for the extension of the railway from Mianeh to Tabriz and for road construction. He also secured the Cabinet's approval of the appointment of his nominee Muhammad Wali Nuban as Deputy Governor-General and Governor of Tabriz.

Persian Army.

12. The text of the single article bill referred to in Intelligence Summary No. 36, paragraphs 1 and 23, is reproduced as an appendix to this summary.
13. One more Persian army officer, a captain on the staff of the Officers' Training College, deserted during the week and is said to have left Tehran to join the band of mutineers still at large in Mazanderan.
14. A passing out ceremony for cadets was held on the 23rd September at the Officers' Training College in the presence of H.I.M. the Shah. The categories and numbers were as follows.

Military Accounts Department	51
Infantry	37
Cavalry	13
Artillery	7
Engineers	14
Transport	9
Medical	40

Persian Gendarmerie.

15. Two new American officers have arrived to join Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission. Colonel Pappa is to replace Colonel Boone, and Major Biges is an additional officer.
16. The Cabinet have approved a proposal of the Ministry of the Interior to extend the period of Colonel Schwarzkopf's engagement by two years.

British Interests.

17. His Majesty's Ambassador returned from the United Kingdom on the 24th September.
18. Miss Lambton, Press Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy for the past six years, has left Persia to take up an appointment at the School of Oriental Studies, London.
19. A party of Persian students has left Tehran to pursue their studies in London under the auspices of the British Council.

Corrigenda.

- 20.—(i) Intelligence Summary No. 37, paragraph 15, for "Melnitsky" read "Milnikiel."
- (ii) Intelligence Summary No. 37, paragraph 10 (xi) for (Kurdistan) read (Kerman and Khorasan).
- (iii) Intelligence Summary No. 37, Appendix "A," paragraph 2, line 3, delete "This latter is, however, not for sale" and substitute "They also wish to buy the entire carrier installation but the American part of the equipment is not for sale."

Tehran, 30th September, 1945.

Appendix.

Extract from Press.

(Single Article Bill tabled by the Minister of War on the 11th September, 1945, for the formation of two new Army Divisions.)

The following is the text of the Single Article Bill tabled by the Minister of War on the 11th September for the formation of two new army divisions. (Note: This Bill has not yet become law):—

Article 1.

The Majlis shall authorise the Government to provide the following credits in addition to the present budget of the Ministry of War and to pay such credits to that Ministry:—

- (a) 165 million rials for the addition of two divisions (numbering 12,132 men) to the present army organisation, for which a budget of 165 million rials has been estimated, payment of the budget for the last six months of the year to be made gradually as the organisation of the two divisions by the Ministry of War proceeds.
- (b) An estimated sum of 35 million rials to be paid annually by the Ministry of Finance for the improvement of the living conditions of officers in respect of child allowances, difference in the cost of living at different posts, increase in pay for years of service, and the grant of two suits of service clothing each year.
- (c) The credit to cover the above expenditure, amounting to 100 million rials for the last six months of the year, will be paid to the Ministry of War gradually as required; should the State revenue for 1324 not be sufficient to cover this additional expenditure, the Government shall be authorised to borrow the same from the National Bank, and to provide for its refund in the following years' budgets.

Article 2.

Up to 3 million dollars credit shall be approved for the provision of military equipment and supplies for the year 1324, and the Ministry of War shall be authorised to place orders with the United States for the purchase of the equipment within the limit of this credit, and to pay for them after delivery; the credit for these purchases amounting to the above figure shall be provided in rials in the Ministry of War's budget for 1324.

[E 8002/70/34]

(3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period 1st to 7th October, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 354 of 9th October; Received in Foreign Office, 18th October.)

Persian Affairs.

The Majlis.

1. No public session was held on the 30th September as the Prime Minister had asked the Speaker to call a secret session to discuss the purchase of American

surplus military assets in Persia. The Minister of Finance explained why the Government could not maintain its contention that all American assets should be handed over to the Persian Government free of charge and that the Government had decided to purchase those assets of which it stood in need. The House agreed on condition that the Persian Government should not be forced to pay in dollars for assets which they did not require or for those assets which were sold in the open market. For these the purchasers and not the National Bank must provide the dollars. At the session of the 2nd October the Minister of War asked for discussion of his Bill for the provision of two additional divisions. (See Intelligence Summary No. 38, paragraph 12.) The Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement regarding the purchase of American military assets and also gave the reasons for the non-conclusion of a treaty governing the entry of American troops into Persia. Dr. Musaddiq also spoke, repeating his assertion that Sadr had undertaken to resign should the Opposition to his Government reach the figure of forty. The Prime Minister denied ever having given any such undertaking. There was no public session on the 4th October, but a number of Deputies, said to be as many as eighty, prepared the draft of a Bill to postpone the next elections till, at the latest, one month after the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops. A new Electoral Law is also to be passed which will result in the new elections being concluded in a much shorter time than hitherto. (The Government's proclamation about the new elections should normally have been issued on the 16th September.) At the session of the 6th October Dr. Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai was re-elected President of the Majlis by 64 votes against 47 cast for Ali Dashti. At the session of the 7th October Malek Madani and Amir Teymour were elected vice-presidents.

Political.

2. The Prime Minister is reliably reported as having announced his intention of resigning at an audience with H.I.M. The Shah. He said that, notwithstanding the vote of confidence which his Government had secured, the continued attacks made on him and his Cabinet by Dr. Musaddiq and the minority had made continuance of his task impossible. The Shah is reported to have asked Sadr to continue in office a little longer.

3. Persian anxiety about the outcome of the Foreign Secretaries' Conference in London seems to have diminished slightly. The more sensible realise that, disappointing as the Russian attitude to immediate evacuation was, the existence of a treaty containing a fixed date for this evacuation does afford a reasonable hope of liberation within five months from the present Russian stranglehold on the four northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, and Khorasan.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

4. Seven members of the Komala (Kurdish Autonomy party) visited Baku between the 17th and 23rd September at the invitation of the Soviet Government. They were headed by Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad. According to the press, the Persian Government, incensed at this visit without their permission and even without the obtaining of exit visas by the party, have protested to the Soviet Embassy and even demanded the extradition of the seven Kurds.

Fars.

5. The downward migration of the Qashgai and Khamseh tribes is well under way and no acts of brigandage have been reported as yet. This year 500 additional families of Darrashuri have remained behind in the summer quarters, making 1,000 families in all. These are divided into fifteen settlements.

Persian Air Force.

6. Doshan Tappeh airfield and the aircraft factory were handed back to the Persian Air Force by the R.A.F. on the 1st October.

Persian Army.

7. H.I.M. The Shah is reported to be greatly relieved at the fizzling out of the recent mutiny. Not everyone would agree, however, that the trouble is completely over. As is usual with Persians, treatment for a disease tends to stop when the malady passes from the acute to the chronic stage. In this case, the root cause of the mutiny was the appalling financial conditions under which officers have to serve, though it cannot be denied that the Tudeh party fanned the flames

of discontent with their propaganda. If the recent promises for the financial relief of officers are not implemented it can safely be predicted that the trouble will break out again.

Civil Aviation.

8. The Americans are pressing the Persian Government to give an American commercial air line operating rights to Tehran, and appear to have suggested that the existing American military service might be continued meanwhile to keep the route open. The Persian Government attitude is understood to be that, as long as any foreign troops remain anywhere in Persia, they will give no such rights to any foreigner. They obviously fear that, if they admit the Americans, they will be unable to resist similar or more extensive demands from the Russians.

Persians generally are realising the inconveniences which they will suffer from the lack of adequate air communications with the outside world, which they are not yet in a position to provide from their own resources, and this realisation, coupled with a typical desire to please the Americans, from whom they expect material benefits, may make it difficult for the Government to maintain their attitude indefinitely. It is expected that the Persian Government will grant limited rights to the Americans within the next few days.

At the Chicago Conference the Persian delegates followed the British lead, which was opposed to the grant of "Fifth Freedom" rights such as the Americans are now demanding.

9. The Persian Government have requested that a small party of R.A.F. be left in Persia to supervise the training of Persian personnel in the maintenance and operation of aircraft control and meteorological signals.

Economic.

10. Export and import figures (in rials) for the first five months of 1324 (March-August 1945) are given as follows:—

Exports—

Commercial goods	533,136,436
A.I.O.C. products	1,505,269,136
Fisheries	6,298,780

Imports—

Goods on which Customs Duties have been paid	968,184,269
Goods exempt from Customs Duties	146,257,544
Confiscated goods (not cleared from Customs)	2,364,112
Fines collected	1,660,900

Appointments.

11. (i) Husain Khalipur to be Governor of Maku.
- (ii) Musa Reza Lutfi to be Governor of Khalkhal.

British Interests.

12. An invitation to visit the United Kingdom has been given by the Ministry of Information to six editors of Persian newspapers.

13. The British and American Embassies have announced that M.E.S.C. (Middle East Supply Centre) in Persia will be dissolved as from the 1st November.

14. The Tehran *Daily News* will cease publication with its issue of the 12th October. A daily news bulletin will be issued after that date by the Public Relations Bureau of the British Embassy.

15. The Persian Government signed, on the 7th October, the agreement to purchase the British Military telecommunications. (See Intelligence Summary, No. 37, Appendix "A," paragraph 2.)

American Interests.

16. American resentment has been aroused by the attitude of the Persian Government and the tone of the Persian press regarding the purchase of assets and the absence of any treaty governing the presence of American military forces in Persia. The American Embassy has published a communiqué explaining its attitude to both questions. Regarding the assets the communiqué states that the American Government has never given any undertaking to hand

over its surplus military assets free of charge. Concerning the non-conclusion of a treaty it states that such a treaty was, in fact, proposed, but was dropped at the suggestion of the Persian Government as being unnecessary.

17. The air attaché and assistant military attaché of the American Embassy recently applied for a pass to the Russian military authorities to visit Meshed, travelling via Gorgan. They have been informed that a pass to visit Meshed can be granted but that the applicants should not travel via Gorgan as this area is unsafe. As the Soviet Embassy have turned back Persian gendarmerie proceeding to Gorgan to restore order and have repeatedly refused permission for Persian troops to be stationed there, their attitude is illogical though quite consistent with the widely-held belief that there are things going on in that area which they do not wish to be made public.

Russian Interests.

18. There are reports, almost certainly exaggerated, from Persian sources of large-scale Russian troop movements in western Azerbaijan towards the Perso-Turkish frontier. According to one source, over 200 Russian aircraft were seen heading for the frontier, a hundred tanks had been seen making for Maku and Russian troops had been constructing defences in plain view of the Turks. Shots had even been exchanged between the opposing armies though no actual crossing of the frontier had taken place. Steps are being taken through consular sources to confirm or refute these reports.

Chinese Interests.

19. His Excellency Mr. Li Tieh-tseng, Chinese Ambassador, has left Tehran for China on leave.

Koweit Interests.

20. The existence of a Persian claim to Koweit was brought to mind recently by the question of the despatch of some Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's technicians from Abadan to Koweit. The Persian Government do not recognise the sovereignty of Koweit and will not issue visas for that country. The Koweit authorities, in their turn, insist on Persians wishing to enter Koweit having Persian passports with Koweit visas. To circumvent this, it is customary for Persians to visit Iraq first and obtain a Koweit visa there.

Tehran, 7th October, 1945.

[E 8127/70/34]

(4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40, Secret, for the period 8th October to 14th October, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 362 of 16th October; Received in Foreign Office, 27th October.)

Persian Affairs.

The Majlis.

THE only important business of the week has been the presentation of a Bill to postpone the next elections till the evacuation of Persia by all Allied troops is completed. Procedure of "double urgency" was sanctioned. The Bill was then passed by a large majority. Some minor officials of the Majlis presidential body was elected. They were:—

Secretaries: Zulfikari, Jawad Masuli, Hashimi and Dr. Mujtahidi.
Tellers: Afkhami, Hishmati and Mirat Isfandiari.

2. The Ministry of the Interior has addressed a circular to all Governors-General and Governors which states that the present time is not ripe for the setting up of provincial councils. Since the days of the second Majlis various laws have been passed which in fact run counter to the original laws providing for these councils. The centralisation of all governmental activities, which was such a feature in Reza Shah's dictatorial régime, has rendered the establishment of these councils impractical without further legislation. It is obvious that, with all this clamour for autonomy in Azerbaijan, it would be unwise for the Persian Government to provide such a weapon for the separatists to use.

3. The Persian Government has announced the continuance of the ban on the Mecca pilgrimage as their relations with the Saudi Arabian Government have not been clarified.

4. The Cabinet has approved a proposal of the Ministry of the Interior that the Governorates-General (ustandari) of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan should be amalgamated.

Appointments.

5. Mustafa Quli Khosrovi to be Governor of Sari and Deputy Governor-General of Mazanderan.

Communications.

6. The cost of constructing the Mianeh-Tabriz railway extension has been estimated at 50 million rials, and a Bill to authorise the necessary credit is to be tabled in the Majlis shortly.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

7. The Azerbaijan Democratic party concluded its first annual general meeting on the 5th October. At one of the earlier meetings it passed a resolution allowing the Persian Government one year within which it had to substitute Turki for Persian in all schools. It also expressed its disapproval of the appointment of Mehdi Farrukh as Governor-General of Azerbaijan and threatened violence if he attempted to take up his duties. As a counterblast, four hundred Azerbaijani notables have telegraphed to the Prime Minister to express their disgust at the actions of a few unknown immigrants in claiming to represent the population of Azerbaijan, and in despatching a telegram demanding autonomy to the Foreign Secretaries' conference while in session in London.

Khorasan.

8. The Tudeh party have recently turned their attention to students and teachers. Had not the party lost much ground recently through exposure of their aims, methods and Russian support, this latest investment would bring in a handsome dividend. Badly paid teachers and disillusioned students unable to find employment after completion of their studies offer as good a target for Tudeh propaganda as peasants and workers hitherto approached with offers of agrarian and industrial reforms.

British Interests.

9. The telecommunications agreement referred to in last Intelligence Summary, paragraph 15, provides for the payment of £300,000 as follows: 25 per cent. against signature, 25 per cent. within three months of signature and 50 per cent. within two months of the beginning of the next financial year (22nd March, 1946). Under this agreement the British military authorities undertake to supply line maintenance equipment and vehicles to a value of £30,000 for which separate payment will be made.

10. The six newspaper editors referred to in paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary have left Tehran for the United Kingdom.

American Interests.

11. The American Ambassador has addressed a note to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the American financial advisers. The note states that they are not in a position to do any good and that this is injurious to the prestige of the American Government. As individuals scattered among various departments they are powerless to achieve anything, but concentrated as a mission under a chief they could make their presence felt. The Persian Government, while prepared to recognise one of their number as spokesman or chief, for the purposes of internal administration of the advisers' affairs, see in this request a veiled attempt to secure executive powers comparable to those previously wielded by Dr. Mills-paugh. Such powers they would under no circumstances grant to any individual adviser. No settlement has been reached as yet and there has been some talk in the press of the advisers resigning unless the situation is clarified.

12. Agreement has been reached on the sale of American railway assets. The Persian Government has paid 8 million dollars, and is to pay a further 2,100,000 dollars and is to receive 68 locomotives, 1,350 wagons, including 277 oil tank wagons, and 500,000 dollars' worth of railway stores still in American possession.

Russian Interests.

13. A consular source reports that a party of five Russian officers recently visited the town of Neh between Birjand and Zahidan. They were engaged in some sort of survey.

14. A protocol to the 1935 agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Persia relating to co-operation in combating agricultural pests has been signed in Tehran.

15. The Soviet Consul-General at Meshed has arrived in Tehran. The probable reason for his visit is to ensure that, in the event of Ali Mansur not returning to Meshed, a sufficiently subservient Governor-General may be appointed.

16. His Excellency the Soviet Ambassador has again left for Moscow, again without informing his colleagues. Before his departure he gave some vague reassurances to the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning evacuation, and blandly said that the question of Persian troop movements in the Russian zone was of minor importance in the light of "Soviet general policy," by which he meant presumably evacuation by the expiry of the treaty period.

17. For some weeks there have been reports of an intention on the part of the Persian Government to send a good-will diplomatic mission to Moscow to improve the present strained relations between the two countries. The name of Ali Mansur, Governor-General of Khorasan, was mentioned as a possible leader of the mission. It was hoped that advice from various quarters might have led the Persian Government to abandon a plan which seemed unnecessary and possibly dangerous. It is now learnt, however, that the Persian Ambassador in Moscow, acting on instructions from his Government, did actually make the suggestion to the Soviet Government. Their reply was briefly to the effect that relations between the two countries could easily and instantly be improved by the Persians by reopening the question of the northern oil concession.

Tehran, 14th October, 1945.

[E 8319/70/34]

(5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41, Secret, for the Period 15th to 21st October, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 370 of 23rd October; Received in Foreign Office 2nd November.)

Persian Affairs.

The Majlis.

1. Very little business was done during the week. At the session of the 14th October the Minister of Finance tabled five Bills, among which the most important were requests for a credit of 50 million rials for road and railway development in Azerbaijan, a request for credit for the purchase of American Railway assets, and a 2/12th budget Bill for the period the 21st September–20th November, 1945. On the 15th October a number of influential Deputies met to discuss measures for the prevention of unconstitutional acts by Government employees during the intervening period between the 14th and 15th Majlises which will now occur as the result of the postponement of the new elections.

2. The letters exchanged between Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov on the subject of the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops have been published in the Persian press.

The Court.

3. The Court has announced that, in view of the presence of foreign troops in Persia, the usual celebrations and receptions in connexion with the Shah's birthday (26th October) will not be held this year, with the exception of the official "salam" (levée). The expenses incurred by these celebrations in normal times will be devoted to poor relief during the coming winter.

Appointments.

- 4.—(i) Abdul Husein Salar Yahipur to be Governor of Maragheh.
- (ii) Muhammad Hadi to be Governor of Zahidan.

Mehdi Farrukh (Mutasam-us-Salteneh) has not yet taken up his appointment as Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan (see Intelligence Summary No. 38, paragraph 11 (vii)), nor is it now believed that he will do so. A Moscow paper stated that, in view of Mehdi Farrukh's past history and present political beliefs, his appointment by the Persian Government to this post must be regarded as an act of deliberate provocation. This Russian opposition and the fact that Farrukh is temperamentally unsuited for this, or, indeed, for any other post, will almost certainly induce the Persian Government to find some more suitable man. The name of Ali Mansur, who has had ample experience of Russian methods during his three years' tenure of the post of Governor-General, Khorasan, is being mentioned as a possible candidate, as is also that of Khalil Fahimi (Fahim-ul-Mulk) (F.O. 59; M.A. 82) who was Minister without portfolio in Bayat's Cabinet of April 1945.

Persian Army.

5. Four more officers from Khorasan, two from Tabriz and one from Kazvin have been arrested in connexion with the recent mutiny.

6. The Chief of the General Staff is fully aware of the urgent necessity for bettering the appalling financial conditions under which Persian officers serve and has asked the Minister for War to lose no time in procuring Cabinet and Majlis agreement to his proposals for financial relief.

7. Ibrahim Zand, the Minister of War, is reliably reported to have tendered his resignation to His Imperial Majesty the Shah, who has not yet accepted it. The alleged reasons are ill-health, disagreement with the Chief of the General Staff and a premonition that the Cabinet will soon fall. He is leaving for Palestine immediately to undergo another operation.

Civil Aviation. (See Intelligence Summary No. 39, paragraph 8.)

8. The Americans appear to be pressing for (i) immediate provisional rights to run a Tehran-Abadan service to connect with the outside world, (ii) later on, for rights on a route Turkey-Persia-Afghanistan-India-China, for which Pan-American Airways hold a C.A.B. licence.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

9. A report emanating from the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, states that Mullah Mustafa Barzani, having fled from the Iraqi forces, has taken refuge in Persia. Accompanied by 2,000 followers (of whom 500 are armed and in possession of a field gun) he arrived in Western Azerbaijan on the 16th October. He has, apparently, been allowed by the Russian military authorities to camp in a village 15 kilom. south of Rezaieh. The Persian commandant of Rezaieh has been ordered by the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, to inform Mullah Mustafa that he is a fugitive from justice and that he must lay down his arms and obey the orders of the local Persian commander. Unless the Russian military authorities, who are in complete control of the area, endorse these orders, there is but little chance of their being obeyed.

10. There is some reliable evidence to show that at least four lorry-loads of rifles have been delivered by the Russians to Ghazi Muhammad in Mahabad, and some less reliable evidence to the effect that others have been delivered by the Russians to Kurdish tribes, including those actually engaged in hostilities against the Iraq Government.

Fars.

11. There are signs of the recrudescence of the old rivalry between Nasir Khan Qashgai and his uncle Ali Khan, Salar Hishmat. The latter is believed to be intriguing with the Shisbulukis, and possibly with other sub-tribes of the Qashgai, to entice them away from Nasir Khan's overlordship. The Shiraz paper *Paigham*, in its issue of the 4th October, published the text of a telegram sent by Nasir Khan to the Persian Government in Tehran, in which, after extolling his own efforts to keep the peace in Fars since the outbreak of the war, he declines any further responsibility in this respect, because the present Government is

reactionary, differs little from that of Reza Shah, and shows no sign of desiring to better the living conditions of the poor in Persia. Though no immediate threat to the prevailing peace of Fars is expected as a result of this telegram, its effect is, none the less, unfortunate as tending to shatter the solidarity of the Qawam-Nasir Khan-Murteza Quli Khan alliance and as embarrassing to the Persian Government at a time when their attention and armed resources must shortly be devoted to the restoration of order in the northern provinces.

British Interests.

12. Some progress has been made in inducing the Persian Government to take adequate measures to ensure the safety of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's area of operations after the evacuation of British troops. The Persian Prime Minister has promised to table a Bill in the Majlis as soon as possible to obtain the necessary credit for increased police allowances. The chief prefect of police has sent telegraphic instructions to the chief of police of Khuzistan to begin enlisting 100 extra constables. The agreement of the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief Prefect of Police and the American Chief Adviser to the Gendarmerie has been obtained to the responsibility for the security of the A.I.O.C. area being vested in the General Officer Commanding, Khuzistan Division, who will co-ordinate the tasks of the army, gendarmerie and police under this head without interfering in their administration. So lacking is the liaison and so strong are the jealousies between these departments (as, indeed, between any two departments of the Persian Government) that this agreement has not been easy to obtain.

13. Despite the fact that the so-called "evacuation" of Tehran by Russian troops has resulted in little diminution in their numbers the Moscow press has attempted to make political capital out of it by stressing the fiction that, whereas the Russians and the Americans have evacuated Tehran, the British have not yet done so. Although the figures for those remaining behind in Tehran ("British Army Liquidation Staff") had been communicated to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as long ago as the 20th September (and also to the Russian and American Military Attaches, and to the Chief of the General Staff on the 18th September), it was judged expedient to publish these figures as a press communiqué. This was done on the 17th October. Detailed figures for officers and other ranks were given. The nature of the various duties, e.g., disposals, hirings, claims, &c., was explained and a forecast made as to when the various departments would have concluded their tasks and have left Tehran. The communiqué has had an excellent effect.

American Interests.

14. To remedy the acute shortage of railway oil tank wagons the United States Military Disposals Board are prepared to sell to the Iranian State Railway a further 200 against a payment of \$600,000. Some obstruction from the Majlis may be expected when the Bill is tabled to ask for the rial credit sufficient to provide this sum and the \$2,100,000 still due to the Americans (referred to in paragraph 12 of Intelligence Summary No. 40). In the event of a refusal by the Majlis to grant these credits the Minister of Finance will probably request a loan from the Imperial Bank of Iran.

Russian Interests.

15. Reports have reached the embassy from various sources which tell of Russian activity in the matter of oil in Northern Persia. There is little doubt that they have concluded a geological survey in the Semnan area roughly corresponding with what are believed to be the boundaries of the old Khurian concession. An undoubted oil-drilling rig has been observed at Haft Tan beside the railway between Shirgah and Shahi. A report, more difficult to credit, states that the Russians are actually shipping oil from the Ashuradeh peninsula in the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea. Efforts are being made to verify this, but the area has been made almost inaccessible by the Russians.

Polish Interests.

16. Some difficulty is being experienced in the move of about 3,000 Poles who still remain in Persia after the evacuation of the Isfahan contingent of Poles. This difficulty is due to the inability of the Lebanon authorities to absorb them as quickly as was first estimated.

French Interests.

17. M. Pierre Lafond, delegate in Persia of the Provisional French Government, has been appointed Ambassador to Persia and presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 20th October.

P.S.—The Persian Prime Minister tendered his resignation to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 21st October, 1945.

Tehran, 21st October, 1945.

[E 8553/70/34]

(6)

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 42, Secret, for the Period 22nd October to 28th October, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 376 of 30th October, 1945; received in Foreign Office 8th November.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. As reported in a postscript to last Intelligence Summary, Muhsin Sadr tendered his resignation to H.I.M. the Shah on the 21st October. Press accounts give as the reason for his resignation the continued attacks by Dr. Musaddiq and the continued opposition by the Majlis to all bills tabled by his Government even after the securing of a vote of confidence on the 27th September. With all his disappointments, however, Muhsin Sadr can claim some small achievements during his period of office. The general situation in the country is no worse. The Tudeh, largely through the firm action of his Cabinet, has been rendered harmless for the moment in Tehran though in part their disappearance from the arena is due to the cessation of open support by the Russians in Tehran who, now that they have in theory evacuated the capital, can no longer provide protection for bands of Tudeh toughs by escorts of Russian soldiers armed with tommy guns. Sadr has found the money for the purchase of British military telecommunications and the greater part of the American military railway assets. He has paid Persia's contribution to U.N.R.R.A. He secured the passing of the law to postpone the next elections till all foreign troops have left the country. He has, at least, shown himself aware of the pressing needs of security in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's area and had undertaken to table a Bill to provide the necessary credits. In the face of the prevailing apathy in all Government departments, the hostility of the Russians, the ceaseless opposition of the minority and the obstruction of the Majlis as a whole, his record bears favourable comparison with that of his predecessors.

2. The President of the Majlis was received in audience by the Shah on the 21st October and was requested to urge the Majlis to choose a new Prime Minister by the 24th October. This they did with commendable promptitude and, at a secret session on the 24th October, elected Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim-ul-Mulk), who received seventy-five votes as against six cast for Qawam-us-Saltaneh. There were thirteen abstentions. Hakimi was Prime Minister for about one month in May of this year. Hakimi has not yet presented his Cabinet to the Majlis.

3. Other business in the Majlis during the week has been the election of the various Majlis commissions, an announcement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Persia would be evacuated by Allied troops by the 2nd March, 1946, discussion of the Bill to authorise payment for the remaining American railway assets and the passing of a 1/12th budget Bill for Mihr 1324 (23rd September–22nd October, 1945).

4. On the 26th October, the birthday of H.I.M. the Shah, the customary levee was held in the Gulestan Palace.

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Appointments.

- 5.—(i) Major Farzanegan to be assistant military attaché in Washington *vice* Ali Qawam (son of the Qawam-ul-Mulk), who has returned to Persia. Major Farzanegan spent some time in England under training with Marconis. He speaks good English and has for the past three years been Persian assistant to General Ridley of the American Military Mission.
- (ii) Abbas Sadr, Chief of the Hamadan Municipality, has been appointed acting Governor of Hamadan *vice* Sardar Akram recalled.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

6. Khorasan is still without a governor-general and the governor and mayor have not yet returned to Meshed from Tehran. Fathullah Pakrevan (Amir-i-Arfa) (F.O. 169-M.A. 208) is reported to have refused the post of governor-general. Opposition to his appointment is also reported to have come from religious circles in Meshed who have bitter memories of Pakrevan's previous tenure of that post from 1934 to 1942, during which period Asadi, the custodian of the shrine, was shot for treason and a number of rioters were machine-gunned within the precincts of the shrine.

7. Security on the Meshed-Zahidan road has deteriorated and all traffic between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari after sunset has to travel in convoy with a gendarmerie escort.

Khuzistan.

8. The following extract from Ahwaz Consulate-General Diary No. 18 (1st-15th October) gives an interesting picture of affairs on the Perso-Iraqi border:—

Sepehr-Rad, the aged inspector of the Ministry of the Interior, has inspected Dasht-i-Mishun, of which he was governor seventeen years ago. He brings back a story that about ten days before he left, Brigadier Humayuni gave certain assurances to some Bani Turuf Sheikhs living across the frontier, relying on which, Muhammad Asi, the brother of Yunus, came back to Persia and, as reported in Ahwaz News No. (15), was killed by the Sawari tribe. The inspector paints a sorry picture of inefficiency and intrigue. His version is as follows: At present the Persian Government has armed Moulā Nasrullah, bakhshdar of Hewaizeh, and relies on him and his followers to neutralise the Bani Turuf. Meanwhile, the number of Persian Government departments is absurdly large for such a small area; there is an O.C. Garrison, a Frontier Commander, a Security Officer, a Gendarmerie Commander, and a Head of Police, with civilians such as the Director of Posts, Civil Registration, Customs, Economics, Finance, &c., all nominally under a Farmandar, who assisted by a Mayor or head of the Municipality. All these officials are at daggers drawn with one another. The Security Officer, Mustafa Khuzistani, does not take bribes but is no politician and cannot keep order. The inspector's solution is (1) disarmament of all tribesmen, including the Hewaizeh Arabs, and the increase of the garrison from 30 to 100, the area being run by a strong military governor; (2) exile of the accused Bani Turuf Sheikhs and also of Moulā Nasrullah, Ahmad Ziarat, and Sheikh Ismail, and (3) equitable redistribution of the lands."

Bakhtiari.

9. There is growing discontent among the rival branch of the tribe at Murteza Quli Khan's autocratic rule and at what they consider to be his virtual monopoly of the fruits of office. That Bakhtiari is comparatively tranquil matters but little to them who would prefer disorder and a "free for all" situation. Recently Manuchihr Khan assembled a band of malcontents in Junagan where he had collected arms and money, but in the end wiser counsels prevailed and he obeyed the summons to return to Isfahan which had been given by the General Officer Commanding, Isfahan Division.

Azerbaijan.

10. A consular source states that the first result of the Russians' gift to Qazi Muhammad of a printing press and two tons of paper has been a manifesto of the "Democratic party of Kurdistan." This document, which is printed in Persian and Kurdish in parallel columns, after a preamble glancing at the wrongs suffered in ages past at the hands of Persian tyrants, makes the following demands:—

- (a) An autonomous Kurdistan within the frontiers of the Persian State;
- (b) The use of the Kurdish language in schools and the administration of Kurdistan;
- (c) The immediate election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise all social and Government affairs;
- (d) Selection of Government officials exclusively from the people of Kurdistan;
- (e) Promulgation of a law to regulate relations between peasants and landlords;
- (f) Co-operation with the other races of Azerbaijan, Armenians, Assyrians, &c., to establish unity and brotherhood in the country;
- (g) Exploitation of the natural resources of Kurdistan for the benefit of its people.

11. The Russians are laying new military telephone lines between Tabriz and Julfa and between Tabriz and Maragheh.

12. The Persian General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, hearing, incorrectly as it subsequently turned out, that Mehdi Farrukh was arriving to assume the duties of governor-general, despatched a party of twenty-five Persian military to meet him at Bostanabad not only as a guard of honour but also to prevent any disturbances such as had been threatened by the Tudeh party if he should arrive. The General Officer Commanding first obtained from the Russian military headquarters the pass which is necessary for all Persian armed forces to have before movement is permitted by the Russians. On arrival at the Russian military check post at the eastern exit of the town of Tabriz the party was stopped by the Russians on the grounds that, though the pass was for twenty-five men, there was no mention of their arms!

Fars.

13. Ali Khan, Salar Hishmat (see paragraph 11 of last Intelligence Summary) has telegraphed to the Persian Prime Minister to say that, as Nasir Khan Qashgai has renounced his charge of the tribe he, Ali Khan, has assumed it. The local General Officer Commanding does not consider this as a serious threat to security as Ali Khan's influence is not such as to enable him to assume this responsibility. The General Officer Commanding also advised Nasir Khan that poverty and a sense of grievance have induced Ali Khan to take this step and that restitution of the properties which Saulat-ud-Dowleh, Nasir Khan's father, stole from Ali Khan would be the best method of settling the dispute.

14. The Boir Ahmedi have started raiding in the Abadeh-Semirun-Yezdikhwast area which they do every year after that area has been evacuated by the downward migrating Qashgai. A small motorized force of gendarmerie has been sent to protect that section of the Isfahan-Shiraz road which is within reach of these raiders.

British Interests.

15. Mr. H. L. Farquhar, M.C., arrived in Tehran on the 26th October, 1945, to assume the duties of counsellor at His Majesty's Embassy.

Tehran, 28th October, 1945.

[E 9145/70/34]

(7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 (Secret) for the period 29th October to 11th November, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 396 of 13th November; Received in Foreign Office 26th November.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The Prime Minister, Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim-ul-Mulk), presented his Cabinet to H.I.M. the Shah on the 3rd November and to the Majlis on the 4th November. It comprises:—

Without Portfolio: Hasan 'Ali Kamal Hidayet.
Interior: Khalil Fahimi (Fahim-ul-Mulk).
Justice: Amanullah Ardalan.
Finance: 'Abdul Husain Hajir.
Agriculture: Ahmad Husain 'Adl.
Without Portfolio: Allahyar Salih.
War: Major-General Riazi.
Posts and Telegraphs: Muhammad Nariman.
Health: Dr. Malik.
Education: Ghulam Husain Rahnama.
Communications: Major-General Muhammad Husain Firuz.
Foreign Affairs: Abul Qasim Najm.
Commerce and Industry: To be appointed, provisionally under Prime Minister.

With the exception of Najm (believed to be on his way from Kabul, where he has been ambassador) and Firuz, all the above have previously held Cabinet rank. Hidayet, Dr. Malik and Rahnama were members of the previous Cabinet.

2. On the 4th November the Prime Minister presented his Government's programme to the Majlis. It contained six points, which can be summarised as follows:—

- (i) Maintenance of friendly relations with foreign Powers and fulfilment of Persia's undertakings under the United Nations Charter.
- (ii) Rehabilitation of the armed forces of the country to enable them the better to carry out their duties in maintaining security.
- (iii) Budget reform, tax revision, raising of the standard of living.
- (iv) Reorganisation of the Ministry of Health.
- (v) Revision of laws governing the organisation and administration of the country.
- (vi) Conduct of the next elections.

3. On the 6th November the Government obtained a vote of confidence on its programme, receiving 97 votes out of 103. The six Tudeh Deputies did not vote, though Kambakhsh, the Tudeh Deputy, made a violent attack on the Government, the governing classes, the army, and Persia's foreign policy, which were leading to an estrangement between her and Russia.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan (South).

4. The Chief of the General Staff stated to the British Military Attaché that no withdrawal from their forward positions near the Perso-Iraqi frontier had yet been begun by the Persian troops. He also stated that the Kani senani and Dizli chieftains were still in refuge across the frontier in Iraq and that he had asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to approach the Iraqi Government with a view to their preventing the return to Persia of these two men. In this connexion it will be interesting to learn what replies are given by the Persian Government to a parallel request believed to have been made by the Iraqi Government to the Persian Government for similar services in respect of Mulla Mustafa and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, who had conversely fled from their forces into Persia. In actual fact, the Persians could render no such assistance as the area in which the two fugitives are now living is completely under Russian military control. The C.G.S. also stated that the troops would be withdrawn to their winter quarters within a month, two battalions being quartered at Merivan and the remaining nine at Baneh, Sardasht, Saqqiz and Senneh.

Azerbaijan.

5. One of the Kurdish chiefs, who recently visited Baku, is reliably reported to have said that the party was received in an interview by Baghirov, the President of the Azerbaijan Republic, who promised Soviet support for the Kurdish Independence movement provided the Kurds would work with the new Democratic party of Persian Azerbaijan. The Tudeh party was never popular with the Kurdish chiefs because of its programme of agrarian reform, highly repugnant to such large land-owners, but the Democratic party is not so repugnant being less radical in its programme.

6. A consular report states that Mulla Mustafa and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani have conferred with Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad on the Kurdish Independence movement and on the chances of continuing their struggle next spring against the Iraq forces.

Reports from other sources tell of other Kurdish chieftains being taken in Russian military lorries, on the 20th October, to Mahabad, to attend the same conference, and on the 22nd October of seven lorry loads of Russian rifles and 400,000 rials being delivered to Ghazi Muhammad, also the staging of a conference by the Russians at Maku between Persian Azerbaijani notables and Kurds and, lastly, of a withdrawal of Russian troops from the Perso-Turkish border to their garrison towns of Maku, Khoi, Rezaieh, &c. If these reports are true, as they seem to be, two possible conclusions are (i) that the Russians are anxious to unite Persian Azerbaijanis and Kurds in support of the Autonomous Azerbaijan movement, and (ii) that they intend to use the Kurds of Persia and Iraq and not their own troops to further these designs in anticipation of the period subsequent to 2nd March, when they will have no troops in Persia to use in this connexion.

7. The Democratic party has announced its intention to begin forthwith the arrangements for both Majlis and Provincial Council elections.

Appointments.

8. (i) Dr. Nasr, previously Governor-General of Mazandaran, to be Inspector-General of the Ministry of the Interior.
- (ii) Muhsin Shahrukhi, formerly head of the Personnel Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be Director of the Contracts and Legal Affairs Department in the same Ministry.
- (iii) Muhammad Husain Najm to be head of the Personnel Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (iv) Hadi Arbabi to be Governor of Shahriza.
- (v) Daulatshahi, recently appointed Director of Finance for Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, has also been appointed acting Governor-General of the two Ustans pending an official appointment by the Ministry of the Interior.

Persian Gendarmerie.

9. Colonel Schwarzkopf stated to the B.M.A. that—

- (i) There was an overall shortage of about 4,000 in the total establishment of fifteen regiments.
- (ii) That he was disregarding the prohibition of enlisting as gendarmes men who had not performed their military conscription service and that, when asked by the Ministry of War to surrender an individual wanted for conscription, he refused to do so on the ground that the man was, in the gendarmerie, performing military service of equal importance.
- (iii) That he hoped soon to get Cabinet sanction for his proposed gendarmerie officers' training college which would enable him to train his own officers and to dispense with the leavings of the Persian army which formed his present officer cadre.

British Interests.

10. The C.I.G.S. and the G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East, visited Abadan and oilfields between the 2nd and the 4th November.

11. Sir William Fraser, chairman of the A.I.O.C. Limited, visited Tehran at the end of October. He was received in audience by H.I.M. the Shah and was entertained at an official luncheon at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

12. A commission was held in Ahwaz on the 5th November to arrange for the gradual re-assumption of responsibility of the Persian Government for the security of the A.I.O.C.'s area of operations. British consular representatives, representatives of the A.I.O.C. and the Persian military gendarmerie and police chiefs attended. The Commander, South Persia Area (British), presided. The strength and disposition of the Persian army in Khuzistan were considered satisfactory. Gendarmerie reinforcements not being available, the organisation out of the existing Khuzistan regiment of two companies each of three platoons, especially for A.I.O.C. protection, was considered the best solution for the time being. The police again maintained that the low rates of pay offered prevented them recruiting the extra numbers required. Pressure brought upon the last Prime Minister to provide the necessary credits for increased pay is being maintained upon his successor. The agreement of the gendarmerie and police headquarters in Tehran (an agreement not obtained without difficulty) to place their forces in Khuzistan under the orders of the Persian Army Divisional Commander for purposes of A.I.O.C. security will, it is hoped, lead to better co-ordination of these duties.

Russian Interests.

13. The Russian consular agent at Zabol recently visited Zahidan, Khwash and Bam, and spread rumours to the effect that the Americans were to receive oil concessions at Safidawa and Khwash, adding that such concessions would be beneficial to Persia. It is reasonable to draw the conclusion that such rumours, invented by the Russians, would justify the granting of similar concessions in the north-west of Persia to the Russians by the Azerbaijan Provincial Council which, from all reliable accounts, the Russians are actively trying to form.

14. The Russians are preventing the despatch of food-stuffs, dried fruits and leather from Tabriz to Tehran. Russian cotton goods are allowed to pass. The Russians played this game before, creating a surplus with cheap prices in those parts of Persia under their military occupation and a shortage with high prices in the rest of the country. Their hireling press then expatiated on the joys of living in the Russian "zone."

15. Some months ago the Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society decided to send forty-one students to study at Moscow University. The students were chosen after open competition and are to leave gradually for Russia. The first six left by plane last Sunday. They are to spend one year first learning Russian in Baku and they will then enter Moscow University.

American Interests.

16. The American Embassy, on instructions from the State Department, has informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that, as the conditions on which an American economic and financial mission had been sent to Persia were no longer in force, the functions of the mission would terminate on the 21st November next. It is, however, left to individual members of the mission to make, if they so desire, individual contracts with the Persian Government. It is thought that some six of them will elect to remain in Persian Government service (see Intelligence Summary No. 40, paragraph 11).

17. The Commanding General, A.M.E.T., has accepted the responsibility for the security of all American military personnel in the Persian Gulf Command with effect from mid-December having been informed that, owing to the gradual evacuation of Persia, British troops will not be available for that purpose after that date.

18. The Americans have now been paid a sum of \$2,139,000, being the balance due from the Persian Government for rolling-stock, tankers and locomotives (see Intelligence Summary No. 41, paragraph 14).

[E 9275/70/34]

(8)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44, Secret, for the Period 12th November to 18th November, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 402 of 19th November; received 29th November.)

Political—The Majlis.

THE session of the 11th November was mostly taken up by one of Dr. Musaddiq's long-winded orations in which he attacked Mahmud Bader, the Minister of Finance in Sadr's recent Cabinet, for alleged malpractices in the

sale of crown lands and also pressed for more speedy action in the matter of the indictments against Suheili and Tadayyun. On the 13th November, after a long debate in which the Tudeh Deputy, Dr. Kishavarz, violently opposed the employment of any foreign advisers in any capacity, the Bill for the engagement of Dr. Avery as adviser to the Ministry of Health was passed. The amended Conscription Bill was also passed (see paragraph 2 below). A question was put to the Prime Minister by Deputy Fuladwand asking, in view of the British communiqué on the evacuation of Tehran, Hamadan and Kermanshah, which cities of Persia had been evacuated by the Russians. At the session of the 15th November several Deputies expressed surprise at the announcement by Radio Paris of the existence of separatist movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The Minister of War tabled his Bill for the two new divisions, for a credit for purchase of material and a credit to provide financial relief for army officers (see Intelligence Summary No. 38, Appendix). In the ensuing debate the Tudeh Deputies, Kambaksh and Radmanish, made attacks on army administration, the Chief of the General Staff in person and the misuse of military power by employing it to oppress labour movements. The debate is to be resumed.

Persian Army.

2. The main points in the new Conscription Law passed by the Majlis (see paragraph 1 above) are as follows:—

- If the lists of those liable for conscription in any one area show a surplus over requirements, then conscripts shall be chosen by lot.
- If the availability lists show a deficit, then conscripts who drew exemption in last year's lot will be taken to make up the deficit.
- If a conscript draws exemption in successive years till he is aged 26 he will be considered as permanently exempt and relegated to the reserve.

Economic.

3. The import and sale of cloth will no longer be a Government monopoly but owing to financial stringency the monopoly tax, in addition to custom duty, will continue to be levied.

Appointments.

- (a) *Civil*.—Ahmad Mashayikhi to be Governor of Rezaieh.
- (b) *Military*.—(i) Sarlashgar Farajullah Aghevli to be head of the Military Tribunals *vice* Sartip Naqdi, transferred to the General Staff. (This general officer, once Chief of the Gendarmerie, will be remembered as one of the more important interneers.)
- (ii) Sartip Muhammad Baqir Amir Nizami is reappointed additional Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
- (iii) Sartip Muhsin Diba from Director of Artillery to be Director of the Officers' Club.
- (iv) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet from *en disponibilité* to be Director of Artillery.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

5. Security has further declined and some more hold-ups are reported between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari; Meshed and Nishapur and near Turba-i-Sheikh Jam.

Azerbaijan.

6. Reports from more than one Kurdish source tell of the forcible billeting of Mulla Mustafa's followers by the Russians on the various Kurdish tribes in the neighbourhood of Lake Urumiyeh. According to one source 150 families are billeted at Bukan, 150 on villages between Suldaz and Mahabad, 100 on Mahabad itself. The rest appear to be distributed between Ushnu and Naqadeh. A considerable sum of money has also been collected from the Persian Kurds for relief. The same source reports that, left to themselves, Mulla Mustafa's followers would probably prefer to seek an amnesty from the Iraqi Government and return to Iraq, but that the Russians are preventing this and have instructed the fugitives to say that they have been reduced to their present plight by bombing from British aircraft.

7. The Azerbaijan Democratic party has sent a circular to foreign consuls in Tabriz giving details of alleged atrocities committed by gendarmes against peasants and asks that the Great Powers be informed of the "people's" sufferings. That the people have suffered is true, but not at the hands of the gendarmerie but at the hands of hireling cads of Armenians, Assyrians and

Chaldeans, who, emboldened by the support of their Russian masters, have the temerity to style themselves the people of Azerbaijan. Meetings of the Democratic party held in Tabriz on the 15th November demanded immediate election of the Provincial Council and the adoption of the Turki language.

8. The general situation has deteriorated sharply in Azerbaijan during the past few days. A party of Democrats attacked Mianeh Railway Station, overpowered the railway police and shot an officer and four Persian soldiers of the Conscription Department, the sole representatives of the Persian army in Mianeh. The town is said to be in their hands. Near Maragheh a skirmish took place between Democrats and gendarmes. Two of the Democrats were wounded and thirteen made prisoner. Later the Russian Commandant at Maragheh intervened by disarming the gendarmes and setting free the prisoners. The Chief of the General Staff also informed the British Military Attaché that the towns of Ahar, Maragheh and Sarab are in the hands of the Democrats, that they are being issued with new Brno rifles by the Russians, that these rifles are part of those taken by the Russians from the Persian army at the time of the occupation, that Red army soldiers have been put into mufti and armed, that attacks on Persian Government buildings and Persian army barracks are expected very soon and that the Persian General Officer Commanding, Tabriz Division, had been ordered to defend these localities to the last.

Russian Interests.

9. Some further news has been received regarding the report that the Russians were actually engaged in shipping oil from the Ashuradeh peninsula near Bandar Shah (see Intelligence Summary No. 41, paragraph 15). It now appears that the pipes and other material seen were brought for the purpose of construction of oil tanks at the port of Bandar Shah and the improvement of the pipe-line from the port to the town in order to facilitate the discharge of oil from tankers.

10. There is no sign of any relaxation of Russian control of the northern, north-western and north-eastern sections of the Iranian State Railway. Some twenty officers of field rank are still employed at Tehran railway station alone.

Iraqi Interests.

11. Seyyid Abbas Mehdi Beg, formerly Iraqi Minister in Tehran, has been appointed Minister in Moscow and has arrived in Tehran on his way to his new post.

Czechoslovak Interests.

12. The Czechoslovak Military Attaché has announced that his office has been temporarily closed. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lipa and Captain Kalmus are to leave shortly.

13. A party of some 300 Czechs are to leave shortly for their country via Russia on repatriation. They have been in Persia since before the war and were mostly employed by Skoda or as railway technicians. About 150 Czechs will remain in Tehran in the employ of Skoda.

Tehran, 18th November, 1945.

[E 9591/70/34]

(9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 45, Secret, for the Period the 19th-25th November, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 413 of 27th November; Received 8th December.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE recent events in Azerbaijan have occupied the Persian Government's attention to the exclusion of nearly all other business. They are described in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 below.

The Majlis.

2. At the session of the 18th November speeches on the situation in Azerbaijan were made by Deputy Dr. Shafaq, the Minister for War and the Minister without Portfolio. The debate on the Minister for War's Bill was

concluded and the Bill was passed by 80 votes out of an attendance of 87. The Tudeh members abstained from voting. For the text of the Bill see Appendix B to this summary. On the 20th November, at a public session following a secret session, a Kurdish Deputy expressed surprise at the announcement on Radio Paris of the existence of a separatist movement in Kurdistan and reaffirmed the loyalty of the Kurds. A crowd of Azerbaijanis resident in Tehran, said to number 1,000 persons, came to the Majlis, professed their loyalty to the Central Government and asked for permission to go to Azerbaijan to defend their homes against the rebels. On the 21st November there was a secret session. On the 22nd November the Minister of Finance tabled a Bill to provide for the participation of Persia in U.N.R.R.A., and a one-twelfth Budget Bill for the month of Aban (23rd October-21st November). This was passed.

3. On the 17th November the Persian Government addressed a note to the Soviet Embassy in which it stated:—

- (i) That a number of Kurds in Azerbaijan and Mahabad had obtained arms from foreign sources to further aims which were at variance with the territorial integrity of Persia.
- (ii) That the Kurds had obtained a printing press and paper from the U.S.S.R.
- (iii) That a party of Kurds had visited Baku without completing the usual formalities of passports and exit visas.
- (iv) That Mulla Mustafa Baizani was allowed by the Russians to foment trouble in Kurdistan.
- (v) That the Russian authorities exercised a complete control by means of passes and forbade entry into their zone.
- (vi) That the Russians had stopped the despatch of food-stuffs from their zone to the south, thereby causing a rise in price, losses to merchants and a dislocation of the economic life of Persia.
- (vii) That maintenance of law and order by the Persian forces had been rendered impossible by the prevention of the despatch of reinforcements.
- (viii) That a cessation of Government administration had been caused in certain provinces because no governors existed or could be sent.
- (ix) That the Russians had removed the Persian frontier guards and officials and had thus rendered impossible the prevention of smuggling of live-stock, &c.
- (x) That the Russians had rendered impossible the pursuit of malefactors though they themselves took very speedy action against any person regarded by them as undesirable.
- (xi) That the Russians had prevented Persian troops from maintaining order or defending themselves in Mianeh on the 17th November and Maragheh on the 26th August and that conversations with the Russian authorities had produced no result.

The note concludes by saying that if the Russians continue to prevent the despatch of Persian military, gendarmerie or police to areas where they desire to restore law and order, the Persian Government must hold the Russians responsible for any disorders which occur. The substance of this note was given by the Persian Ambassadors in London and Washington to the Foreign Office and State Department respectively, and the Persian Ambassador in Washington, in addition, gave a summary of it to the American press. The Persian Government have now telegraphed to their ambassador in London to make the contents of the above note available to the British press.

4. At the same time as the above note was presented to the Soviet Embassy the Chief of the General Staff asked the Soviet Military Attaché to notify the Soviet military authorities in Qazvin and procure their consent to the despatch of two infantry battalions and a gendarmerie battalion to Mianeh and Tabriz. As no reply was received either to the note or to this request by the General Staff, the latter decided to despatch the force. It left in lorries on the 19th November and the advanced guard reached a point about 40 kilom. from Qazvin, when it was stopped by a Russian staff officer, who said that, if the column went on, it would be fired at. The officer commanding advanced guard replied that he had received orders to advance even if fired upon and continued to advance. When the advanced guard reached the orchards on the outskirts of Qazvin town it was stopped by one Russian battalion in position across the road with four tanks and two armoured cars. The main body on receiving this information halted at Sharifabad, 7 miles short of Qazvin and about 85 miles from Tehran, and a rear party, halted by Russian troops at Kerej, some 21 miles west of Tehran,

was allowed, after two days, to join the main body and to take its tents and rations of which it had been deprived during two days of incessant rain. The advanced guard subsequently retired to Sharifabad, where the column still remains. The Russians have allowed four of its lorries to make one trip daily to Qazvin to obtain fresh supplies and bread.

5. Regarding Russian movements in and around Tehran the Chief of the General Staff informed the British Military Attaché that:—

- (i) Arrivals and departures of Russian troops at and from Tehran by rail during the past twelve days had resulted in an overall increase of some 300. They all carried arms and in some cases carried wooden arms chests and bundles done up in cloth of about 1 metre in length. These arms have been seen in transit to various Russian military hirings in Tehran, to their military headquarters (still in existence despite their official evacuation of Tehran) and even to the Soviet Embassy.
- (ii) Persian railway workers belonging to the Tudeh had been armed by the Russians at stations between Semnan and Garmsar (some 40 miles east of Tehran).
- (iii) That the Tehran garrison, after the arrival of a battalion from Isfahan and one from Ahwaz, now consisted of twenty battalions.
- (iv) In his opinion the increases in the Russian garrisons at Semnan and Kerej, the recent infiltration of Russian troops into Tehran, the bringing in of large quantities of rifles into Tehran by the Russians all pointed to an impending occupation of the capital by Russian troops to coincide with a rising of the local Tudeh and similar risings by the Democrat rebels in Azerbaijan. (The British Military Attaché informed the Chief of the General Staff that he did not share this view and that the Russians could obtain their immediate objects without doing so, these objects being to establish a provincial council in Azerbaijan which would bring about autonomy and give them an oil concession.)

The Press.

6. An interesting article signed by eighty "intellectuals" has appeared in the paper *Bakhtar* of the 2nd November. It states that Persia has been occupied by Allied troops for four years and three months, its economic life has been upset, its currency has been inflated, Allies have interfered with its administration and intervened in its elections, it has not been paid the cost of the military Aid-to-Russia freight carried over its railway, disaffected elements have been encouraged and assisted by the Allies and the despatch of food-stuffs has been prevented. The article contrasts the promises and achievements of the British and Russians in the matter of evacuation and finally asks that British, American and French parliamentary delegations be sent to Azerbaijan to see for themselves whether the present separatist movement is a genuine one or inspired by foreigners.

Appointments.

- 7.—(i) The appointment of Murteza Quli Bayat (Foreign Office 47; Military Affairs 65) as Governor-General of Azerbaijan, which had been announced in the press some weeks ago, has now been confirmed. He was due to leave for Tabriz by Russian plane on the 25th November but was held up by bad weather.
- (ii) Abdul Husein Ansari (Foreign Office 21; Military Affairs 29), a Director-General and head of the Tripartite Treaty Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be Governor-General of Gilan.
- (iii) Husein Samii (Adib-us-Sultaneh) (Foreign Office 199; Military Affairs 254) to be Governor-General of the 9th Ustan (Khorasan).

Administration.

8. The Cabinet has cancelled its decree raising the status of Ardakan sub-governorate to a governorate. It thus remains part of the "Shahristan" of Yezd.

The Court.

9. Prince Ahmad Reza, fifth son of the late Reza Shah (by his third Queen Ismet-ul-Muluk), has been betrothed to Miss Simin Bahrami, daughter of Husain Bahrami, Thya-us-Sultaneh (Military Affairs 59).

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

10. There is but little definite news from Azerbaijan itself as telegraphic communications have been interrupted and the Persian army's wireless telegraphy links with Rezaieh, Miandoab, Khoi and Ardebil are not working. The General Officer Commanding at Tabriz is still in touch with Tehran by wireless-telegraphy but can give very scanty information. The intelligence organisation of the Persian General Staff seems very inadequate and ill-trained and incapable of checking the accuracy of any report which it receives. Actually very few fresh events of major importance from the military point of view have occurred in Azerbaijan since those reported in the last Intelligence Summary, and the chief interest centres on Russian military movements around Tehran, on what the Persian Government has done and will do in Tehran *vis-à-vis* the Russians and what the Persian Government hopes the British and American authorities will do to bring home to the Russians that their present actions are at variance with their undertakings as signatories of the Tripartite Treaty.

11. On the 14th November the Democratic party of Azerbaijan announced in the press that the "first phase of their organisation" was complete, i.e., that the Tabriz Committee and those in the smaller towns were in being, and that the second phase, that of organisation of village councils, would begin. About the same time it was announced that the party had decided to ignore the decision of the Tehran Government to postpone the Majlis elections and that Azerbaijan, under the leadership of the Democratic party, would proceed with the elections both of the Majlis and of the provincial and town councils.

12. From information obtained from the Chief of General Staff and from consular sources the situation, in brief, appears to be as follows:—

Tabriz.—The town is quiet but apprehensive of future offensive action by the Russians or the Democrat party, action which the Persian military are probably incapable of resisting. The General Officer Commanding is in touch with the Persian General Staff by wireless. Telegraphic communications between Tabriz and Zenjan, Tabriz and Rezaieh, Tabriz and Astara, Tabriz and Kermanshah interrupted. Many merchants are leaving for Tehran. The Democratic party has patrols checking all civilian movement and preventing all Persian military, gendarmerie and police movement on all roads leading out of Tabriz.

Rezaieh.—Believed to be quiet, but no wireless communication exists.

Khoi.—Believed to be quiet, but no wireless communication exists.

Azarshahr and Ajabshahr.—32 and 50 miles respectively south-west of Tabriz, gendarme posts overpowered by Democrat rebels.

Maragheh.—Persian Army garrison of one company, confined to barracks and town in hands of rebels. Two thousand rifles said to have been distributed by the Russians to the rebels.

Miandoab.—According consular report, believed to be in rebels' hands, but Chief of General Staff believes that the Persian Army garrison of one battalion is still in control of the town.

Sarab.—In rebel hands, the garrison of one platoon having been disarmed and made prisoner.

Ardebil.—No communication by wireless, but Chief of General Staff believes the garrison of one battalion to be safe though not in command of the situation. Eight thousand rifles said to have been distributed to Democrats by the Russians.

Mianeh.—In rebel hands—two lorry loads of rifles said to have been distributed by the Russians. Pickets of "Muhajirs," Russian speaking and of a military bearing, control all movement between Tabriz and Mianeh.

Gendarmerie Posts.—Most of these are said to have been disarmed and captured. There are none remaining between Tabriz and Mianeh.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz sums up by saying that, while reports of fighting have been much exaggerated, the Democratic party really mean business. The Central Government has no authority whatsoever between Mianeh and Tabriz, and the Democratic party is in control in every town and village of eastern Azerbaijan. A clear sweep has been made of the gendarmerie and the opportunity has been taken to liquidate a number of landlords obnoxious to the Democrats. What has happened in Mianeh will happen on a bigger scale during the next week in Tabriz and an autonomous Azerbaijan will have come into being.

13. The People's Congress has distributed a French translation of their manifesto to foreign consuls in Tabriz. The document is reproduced as Appendix A to this summary.

14. *Corrigendum* (reference paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary).—To the list of communities actively carrying out Russian designs in Azerbaijan should, of course, be added certain Kurdish elements (chiefly Shakkak and Herki) and "muhajirs" imported from the U.S.S.R. That some Persian Azerbaijanis support the Democrat party is not denied, but the paragraph referred to was designed to show that minorities, disaffected tribal elements and immigrants form the backbone of the party.

British Interests.

15. Dr. Mortimer Wheeler, Director-General of Archaeology in India, arrived in Persia via Zahidan on the 26th October for a four weeks' tour of Persia under the auspices of the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society. He visited Isfahan, Shiraz and Persepolis, but was not permitted by the Russians to proceed to Meshed via Gunbad-i-Qabus, or even to travel to Meshed by the direct route by air. The party returned to India via Baghdad.

American Interests.

16. Having sold their railway locomotives and 277 of their oil tank waggons for the highly satisfactory figure of 85 per cent. of their cost, the Americans are considering the sale of their remaining assets on the basis of 7½ per cent. of their original cost. It is proposed to include in this sale, but not on the 7½ per cent. basis, the remaining 184 tank waggons which the Americans have for disposal. The American proposal would result in a satisfactory overall percentage, particularly as the buildings and camps, which form the major part of these assets, would fetch very little in the open market. It would, however, adversely affect British military disposals if the British were obliged to adopt a similar figure, firstly because the British have not "cashed in" on any items comparable to the American railway assets and, secondly, because they still have for disposal some valuable material chiefly in the form of harbour installations.

Russian Interests.

17. An A.I.O.C. source in Tabriz considered reliable reports the erection of an oil drilling rig by the Russians at a hamlet *Sennikh* (not marked on the map), some 15 miles from Tabriz on the Tabriz-Marand road.

18. The Moscow press has given prominence to events in Azerbaijan where, it asserts, genuine democratic and labour movements are being harshly repressed by Persian military and gendarmerie. It accuses the B.B.C. of falsifying news of the recent events in order to divert world attention from the discreditable happenings in Palestine and Indonesia.

Tehran, 25th November, 1945.

Appendix A.

Déclaration du Congrès National d'Azerbaïdjan.

Le Congrès national qui est formé à Tabriz du 29 au 30 aban 1324 (20 au 21 novembre 1945) de tous les délégués de tous les départements et communes d'Azerbaïdjan décida à l'unanimité à sa quatrième séance de référer par la déclaration suivante, au Gouvernement central de l'Iran et aux Puissances démocratiques du monde (Etats-Unis, Grande-Bretagne, l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques, la France et la Chine), et déclarer ses desiderata justes et légaux qui se résument dans les articles ci-dessous :

1. La nation azerbaïdjanienne, pour des causes et des événements historiques innombrables dont la mention est hors de ce cadre, possède une nationalité, une langue, coutumes, particularités et traditions, qui la mettent en droit, comme toutes les nations du monde, tout en conservant l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Iran, de se faire sa destinée librement et d'obtenir son autonomie en conformité du Pacte de l'Atlantique.

2. Etant donné l'attachement et les relations culturelles, économiques et politiques de la nation azerbaïdjanienne avec les peuples des autres provinces

et départements de l'Iran et en raison des multiples sacrifices que les Azerbaïdjanais ont subis pour la fondation et la création de l'Iran actuel (qui ont été effectivement ses fondateurs), pour ces raisons, voulant conserver à tout prix l'intégrité de son territoire, ils ne sont aucunement décidés d'établir leurs desiderata légitimes sur sa division ni de porter atteinte à ses frontières.

3. La nation azerbaïdjanienne réclame de toutes ses forces le régime démocratique qui est en Iran sous forme de Constitution et Gouvernement national.

4. La nation azerbaïdjanienne, comme les habitants de tous les points de l'Iran, participera dans l'administration des affaires sociales et du Gouvernement central en envoyant ses Députés à "Madjlessé Chourayé Milli" et en payant ses justes contributions.

5. (1) La nation azerbaïdjanienne déclare ouvertement et officiellement qu'à l'exemple de toutes les nations actives du monde entier, a droit tout en conservant bien entendu l'intégrité territoriale conformément aux principes démocratiques et souveraineté nationale.

6. La nation azerbaïdjanienne a supporté des peines abondantes et a donné de sacrifices innombrables pour la liberté; elle voudrait par conséquent que son Gouvernement autonome soit établi sur une base démocratique réelle. C'est pourquoi, se conformant aux statuts approuvés par son "Congrès national," elle élit son "Parlement national" et elle trouve en même temps nécessaire que le Gouvernement national régional d'Azerbaïdjan soit constitué des membres élus parmi les Députés du Parlement national et soit responsable vis-à-vis de lui.

7. La nation azerbaïdjanienne est particulièrement attachée à sa langue maternelle; l'imposition d'une autre langue l'a retardée jusqu'ici de la caravane du progrès et de la civilisation et a été comme un obstacle pour l'avènement de sa culture nationale. Pour obvier à cet inconvénient et s'assurer les moyens progressifs de l'Azerbaïdjan, le Congrès national a ordonné au "Comité national" de mettre en vigueur au plus tôt possible la langue azerbaïdjanienne dans les administrations de l'Etat et de pratiquer son enseignement dans les établissements scolaires publics et privés.

8. Le Congrès national, qui a été constitué par la participation et suivant la signature de cent cinquante mille personnes et la délégation de sept cents représentants des différents points de l'Azerbaïdjan, s'est appelé "Assemblée constitutionnelle nationale" par la volonté du peuple et il a élu un "Comité" de trente-neuf membres pour l'administration de questions et affaires intérieures de l'Azerbaïdjan, à qui il a donné plein pouvoir d'employer des mesures nécessaires pour la réalisation de ses vues nationales et d'entrer en pourparlers avec les autorités compétentes, ainsi que de prendre à leur charge les élections du "Madjlessé Chourayé Milli" et du "Parlement national."

Attirant enfin l'attention du Gouvernement iranien et des Puissances démocratiques du monde sur les questions susmentionnées, le Congrès déclare ne vouloir employer que des moyens de propagande et d'organisation pour arriver à ses buts pacifiquement et ne permettre en aucune façon ni dispute ni guerre intérieure à moins que le Gouvernement central ne veuille piétiner ses droits légitimes par contrainte et force armée. Dans ce cas, il défendra ses droits à tout prix et combattra jusqu'à la dernière personne pour imposer enfin son autonomie nationale coûte que coûte.

L'Assemblée constitutionnelle a donc donné carte blanche au "Comité national" d'entrer en pourparlers avec les autorités compétentes pour assurer l'autonomie d'Azerbaïdjan et d'en obtenir la solution pacifiquement; mais le "Comité national" ne peut en aucune façon passer outre des droits de l'autonomie régionale et du Gouvernement national, ni faire quoi que ce soit contre l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance de l'Iran.

Nous voudrions que le monde démocrate sache qu'il existe un peuple sur le globe qui s'est préparé à défendre ses droits de tout son pouvoir pour dresser le pavillon de la liberté sur un coin de l'Asie et qu'il est décidé d'assurer son autonomie par son énergie nationale et nous espérons que les autorités compétentes iraniennes et les Puissances démocratiques de l'univers ne nous épargneront pas leur gracieux

(1) The French translation of the Persian and Turki texts of the "Declaration of the National Congress of Azerbaijan" was made by the Azerbaijan Committee itself.

The Acting Consul-General at Tabriz reports that a phrase appears to have been omitted from paragraph 5 of the French version, which he considers should be understood in English as follows:—

"The people of Azerbaijan officially and publicly declare that like other living nations of the world they have the right to form, while respecting the integrity of Iran, a local national Government to manage their own national and local affairs; and this Government, while respecting the independence and integrity of Iran, is empowered to manage the affairs of Azerbaijan in accordance with the principles of democracy and national sovereignty."

concours dans la réalisation de notre but national, qui est basé, du reste, sur le Pacte de l'Atlantique.

Avec ses considérations distinguées :

La Direction du Congrès national (Assemblée constitutionnelle nationale) de l'Azerbaïdjan.

(Seal.)

Appendix B.

The following is the text of the Ministry of War Bill passed by the Majlis on the 18th November, 1945:—

Single article: "The Majlis shall authorise the Ministry of Finance to provide the following credits in addition to the Ministry of War's present budget and to pay them to that Ministry.

- (i) The Ministry of War shall be authorised to add 12,132 men to the present army strength, for which the budget for the last four months of the year, amounting to approximately 52 million rials, shall be paid by the Ministry of Finance.
- (ii) To improve the living conditions of army officers a credit of 5 million rials shall be paid annually by the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of War, to be used for the following purposes:—
 - (a) A monthly allowance of Rials 100 for each minor child, irrespective of the officer's rank.
 - (b) To officers who do not receive promotion an increase of pay shall be paid in the second year of the time when they could normally have expected promotion, representing the difference between the pay for the higher rank and the lower rank. In subsequent years also one fourth of this difference shall be paid annually as an increase in pay.
 - (c) An allowance of up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of every officer's pay shall be paid monthly on account of the difference in the cost of living in the various parts of the country.
 - (d) Two suits of service clothing shall be granted to every officer each year.

NOTE—The Ministry of War shall be authorised to re-commission in their former rank those regular officers who have by this date resigned but who now desire to re-enter the army, provided that they have not been sentenced by any criminal court and that they have no past record.

[E 9871/70/34]

(10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 46, Secret, for the Period 26th November to 3rd December, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 427 of 4th December, 1945; Received in Foreign Office 18th December.)

Persian Affairs.

AFFAIRS in Azerbaijan have monopolised the attention of the Persian Government during the past week. The Persian Government anxiously awaits the reply of the Soviet Government to the notes presented by the American and British Ambassadors. The Soviet Embassy's reply to the Persian Government's note of the 17th November (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary) is reproduced as an appendix to this summary. It will be seen that the Russians flatly deny all charges brought against them and bring counter-charges against the Persian Government. Over the most important question, that of the despatch of Persian troops, the Russians give no satisfaction but throw the onus of responsibility on to the shoulders of the Persians, adding the threat that any Persian troop movements will necessitate an increase in Russian garrisons. The Russian argument, if such it can be called, depends on two false assumptions, viz., firstly, that the existing Persian garrison of Azerbaijan—some 4,000 effectives out of a total of 6,000—even if reinforced by two battalions and a battalion of gendarmerie, could possibly constitute a menace to Russian forces totalling at

least 30,000 men; and, secondly, that the existing garrisons are, in fact, garrisons. The gendarmerie throughout the province are known to have been disarmed and the military are either restricted in action to an area within 5 miles of their barracks, as at Rezaieh, or confined to barracks as at Maragheh, or besieged in their barracks as at Miandoab, or allowed to perform static guards under Russian surveillance as at Tabriz. The one thing they are not allowed to do is to take action against Democrat rebels when disturbing the peace. Such action brings instant intervention by the local Russian town major, who orders the Persian troops back to barracks and liberates anyone made prisoner by them.

2. On the 22nd November the Persian Government addressed a second note to the Soviet Embassy, in which it protested against the continued presence of Russian troops in Tehran after the town had been declared officially as evacuated by them. The note also protested against the introduction into the capital of refugees in plain clothes.

3. The speeches of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Eden in the House of Commons have greatly heartened Persians of all classes.

4. The Russian military have evacuated their military movements staff and all troops from Tehran railway station and are said to have established them near Firuzkuh. They have also evacuated their military headquarters (which has gone to join its parent body at Qazvin), and some, but not all, of their billets. They still have a camp some 5 kilom. west of the town.

5. The Persian Government has addressed a note to His Majesty's Embassy asking that an invitation be procured for the Persian Government to attend the International Conference on War Indemnities now in session in Paris, on the grounds that Persia has been at war with Germany and has thereby suffered many direct and indirect losses.

The Majlis.

6. On the 25th and 28th November the Majlis Budget Commission met to discuss the 4-12ths Budget Bill recently tabled by the Minister of Finance. The Minister of the Interior made a short speech, mainly about the departure of Bayat, the newly-appointed Governor-General for Azerbaijan. The urgency of the Peasants' Insurance Bill was discussed, but there were insufficient Deputies present for a division. The urgency of the Justice Commission (Powers) Bill was also discussed but no decision was taken. In view of the developments in Azerbaijan a secret session of the Majlis was held on the 26th November, at which the Prime Minister informed the House of the steps he had taken during the past few days. At a secret session of the Majlis on the 27th November it was decided to appoint a commission of sixteen members appointed from all the Majlis groups, to study the recent events in Azerbaijan and the decisions taken by the Government, and to keep in constant touch with the Government. Malik Madani and Niqabat were appointed to represent the Mihan group; Iskandari and Farmanfarmayan the Azadi group; Shari' Atzadeh and Hismati the Ittihad-i-Melli group; Siqat-ul-Islami and Samsam the Democrats (no connexion with the Azerbaijan Democrats); Dr. Kishavarz and Shahab the Tudeh; Mas'udi and Dr. 'Abduh the Mustaqil group, and Dr. Musaddiq and Dr. Shafaq the Independents. The commission met for the first time on the 28th November.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary).

7. Events which have occurred since the last Intelligence Summary was written are as follows:—

Maragheh.—The Governor has been shot by Democrat rebels.

Astara.—This place has been seized by the rebels who shot the Persian frontier commissar and then marched down the Caspian coast as far as Shifarud (some 25 miles short of Pahlevi).

Mianeh.—No change. The rebel garrison is believed to number 250.

Zenjan.—This place, though not in Azerbaijan, has been occupied by the rebels. The rebel garrison is believed to number 200.

Tabriz-Zenjan Road.—Some 300 rebels are distributed in pickets along the road. They control all movement and search vehicles and travellers.

Nir (near Sarab).—A party of Shahsevan tribesmen came to the rescue of Sardar Nusrat, their chief, who was besieged by rebels. The Shahsevan defeated the rebels and rescued their chief, killing fifty-seven rebels and recovering a number of rifles.

[32429]

Qazvin.—Tudeh or Democrat pickets reported (requires confirmation) to be in charge of all exits from the town and to be preventing the transit of all food-stuffs.

Miandoab.—The garrison of one Persian battalion is still intact though besieged in its barracks. It has succeeded in establishing contact by messenger with the Persian garrison of Saqqiz.

Saqqiz.—The garrison has despatched two companies on detachment to Tikab, some 70 miles north-east of Saqqiz, to prevent any southward movement of the rebels towards Bijar and Hamadan.

Khorasan.

8. A consular source reports that the arrival of a party of Tudeh leaders in Meshed is causing the local authorities some alarm. They feel they can control the local leaders but fear that newcomers, possibly followed by bands of "muhajirs," may be more difficult to deal with.

9. Ten lorry loads of arms and ammunition sent from Tehran for the Persian military garrison in Meshed are reported to have been detained *en route* by the Russian military authorities.

10. The same source reports that the survivors of the Meshed mutineers, after having been in hiding with the Turcomans at Gavash Teppe near Gunbad-i-Qabus for some time, have now joined the Azerbaijan Democrat rebels.

Persian Army.

11. Reinforcements, amounting to a battalion in each case, have been brought to Tehran from Shiraz, Isfahan, Khuzistan and Khurramabad.

12. During the past week there has been some activity, mostly from the Tudeh members, designed to displace General Arfa, the Chief of General Staff, as being obnoxious to the Russians. Several prominent Deputies have represented to the Prime Minister and the president of the Majlis the unwisdom of such a change during the present crisis. The Prime Minister is believed to have agreed with their views.

Appointments.

13. (i) Abul Qasim Najm, Minister for Foreign Affairs designate, has arrived in Tehran from Kabul.

(ii) Bayat, the newly-appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan, has arrived in Tabriz by Russian plane.

(iii) Mubasir Roshani has been appointed Deputy Governor-General of Azerbaijan and Governor of Tabriz.

(iv) Samii and Mehdi Farrukh are both reported to have refused the governorates-general of Khorasan and Fars respectively.

Administrative.

14. The Cabinet have approved a proposal of the Ministry of the Interior that the governorate of Zabul, at present part of the 8th (Kirman) Ustan, should be retransferred to the 9th (Khorasan) Ustan.

Russian Interests.

15. The United States Air Attaché, who returned from Tabriz last week, reports that he saw twenty-seven I L 2 Stornovik 2-seater machines under covers on the Tabriz aerodrome and eight fighters at Qazvin. He considers that the Russians are doing very little flying of any sort.

British Interests.

16. The long-range squadron, which has been operating in East Persia for the past two years, has now returned to India.

Tehran, 3rd December, 1945.

Enclosure.

Translation of Russian Embassy Memorandum of the 26th November, 1945, handed to the Second Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at 10.30 a.m., the 26th November, 1945.

THE Soviet Embassy present their compliments to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and in reply to Memorandum, dated the 17th November, 1945, have the honour to state that the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Soviet officials are interfering in the internal affairs of Iran is unfounded and is not consistent with the actual facts. Likewise, the question of Soviet authorities rendering assistance to the Kurds in their political activities in those areas is completely unfounded, and in particular they have had no connexion with the activities of the Kurdish tribal chiefs living in the 4th Ustan (Mahabad), nor did they have anything to do with Mulla Mustafa Barzan's crossing the Irano-Iraq frontier as alleged in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' memorandum.

It is clear in the mind of the Soviet Embassy that the Soviet representatives did not, as alleged in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' memorandum, request the release of any of those people detained by the gendarmerie at Quli Kundi, nor is there any question of Persian military guards, who were proceeding towards the prison building in Tabriz, being detained by the Soviet authorities.

To confirm that Soviet authorities prevent the passage of Persian subjects in the northern provinces would not be consistent with the true facts; it is obvious that the Soviet system of issuing passes for travelling to the northern provinces of Persia, where Soviet forces are stationed, applies to subjects of other countries. The statement made in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' memorandum that Soviet officials are interfering in the economic life of the northern provinces is unfounded; it is clear, on the other hand, that the Soviet Government, in accordance with its duty of friendship, rendered assistance to Persia in May 1943 at the most difficult of times even for the Soviet Government, by providing 25,000 tons of wheat for the populace of the capital of Persia—Tehran. By importing other Soviet goods Soviet commercial organisations during the war improved the distribution of goods for the Persian people.

It is obvious that the Soviet Government cannot be held responsible for the absence of Governors-General and other Government officials in the northern provinces. As regards the departure of such officials to the places of their appointment the Soviet transport organisation have, in this respect, always assisted the Persian Government; only a few days ago the Soviet Embassy proved their assistance by providing a plane for the departure of M. Bayat to Tabriz. Without giving it much consideration the Ministry for Foreign Affairs raised the question of protecting the Persian-Turkish borders; the relevant Persian authorities repeatedly informed the Soviet officials that the establishment of frontier posts on the Persian-Turkish border present great difficulties for them and in spite of repeated proposals by Soviet officials in this respect they have refused to protect this frontier. Under these circumstances the objections raised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the absence of gendarmerie posts on the Persian-Turkish border cannot be considered relevant.

The statement to the effect that Soviet authorities appear to have interfered in the judicial affairs of Persians and to have prevented the enforcement of the penal code with regard to Persian subjects is very surprising in view of there being no foundation for such a statement and its inconsistency with the actual facts, and it cannot be ignored that local Persian officials have repeatedly created obstacles in the unearthing of treacherous elements and local judges have repeatedly exonerated such elements or have purposely issued light sentences for persons disturbing public order in the areas where Soviet troops are stationed and for persons stealing Soviet military property and even for the murderers of Soviet military officials. In spite of this the Soviet military officials did not have recourse to interference in the judicial proceedings in Persia, but desired the protection of the interest of Soviet nationals and institutions in accordance with the current laws of Persia, and it is obvious that Soviet officials could not overlook the methods of investigation and trial adopted by the Persian officials with regard to Persian subjects who committed important crimes against certain Soviet officials and military personnel. However, this can in no way be considered as interference in the judicial affairs of Persia.

Activities on the part of certain Persian political parties in the northern provinces, such as the incidents which took place in Mianeh and Maragheh, were

referred to in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' memorandum, which connected such activities with the Democratic party of Persian Azerbaijan. Information received by the Soviet Embassy does not confirm the questions brought up in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' memorandum. In any case, the incidents in the northern provinces of Persia which are connected with the activities of political parties constitute in fact Persian internal problems. Soviet officials and military authorities have not interfered and do not interfere in the political life of the northern provinces. Therefore the Soviet Embassy strongly rejects the efforts to transfer responsibility for these incidents from the Persian to the Soviet authorities, who have in no way interfered in these incidents.

Since the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to support its statements, thought it necessary to appeal to the Tripartite Pact, the Soviet Embassy is obliged to state that the above-mentioned pact, dated 1942, is fully and carefully observed by the Soviets.

At the same time, the Soviet Embassy is obliged to point out that the section of the above-mentioned pact connected with the maintenance of security inside Persia is often not observed by Persian officials; the behaviour of certain members of military and gendarmerie groups has not been consistent with the establishment of security in the areas of their appointment. This matter was duly mentioned in memorandum of the 20th August, 1944, and in subsequent correspondence from the Soviet Embassy. Information in the hands of the Soviet Embassy bears witness that recently certain gendarmerie officials have not only failed to render any help in establishing security and order in the northern provinces, but have very often been responsible by their own behaviour for undesirable incidents between local residents. In connexion with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' statement concerning the entry of military reinforcements to the northern provinces, the Soviet Embassy would draw that Ministry's attention to the following points. Taking into consideration the fact that any undesirable incidents must be avoided in the interests of both the Persian and the Russian Governments, and the fact that this question is connected with the entry of new Persian troops into the northern provinces of Persia, the Soviet Government does not deem the entry of such troops at the present moment to be expedient, and it must be taken into consideration that if any new forces, in addition to the regular Persian army and gendarmerie stationed in these districts, should enter these areas, then such action would lead to disturbances and bloodshed in the northern provinces of Persia. The Soviet Government would then be obliged, for the maintenance of the security of the Soviet garrison, to bring in new reinforcements of their own. As the Soviet Government does not desire to bring reinforcements into Persia, does not, therefore, deem it expedient for Persian military reinforcements to enter the northern provinces of Persia.

[E 9995/70/34]

(11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 47, Secret, for the Period 4th December to 9th December, 1945. Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 436 of 11th December.—(Received in Foreign Office 21st December.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The Persian, though capable of spasmodic feats of bravery, is not renowned for that dogged brand of courage which sustains prolonged resistance in adverse circumstances. His vanity leads him to think that his vital interests must be those of the entire world. He is ignorant of how democracies work and how they conduct their diplomatic business. He was dismayed that approaches made to the Soviet Government by the British and American Governments did not immediately elicit favourable replies. All these factors have combined to cast a gloom over political circles and it is not surprising that the Persian's courage is beginning to ooze away. The Majlis majority behind the Prime Minister, seeing no immediate or tangible results from his policy of resistance, have begun to waver and the minority, led by Dr. Musaddiq, with their policy of appeasement began to gain ground. Supporters of the Qawam-us-Saltaneh began to lobby on his behalf and some forty-five Deputies are believed to have signed a document pledging their support of him. His policy, of which he makes no secret, is that of appeasement in general and, in particular, that of granting the Russians an

oil concession, agreeing to hold the elections on the original date and the removal of officials obnoxious to the Russians. Like most Persians, he is obsessed with the idea of his own cleverness and thinks that, if he were to come into power, he could by prevarication and procrastination keep the Russians dangling on the end of a string until the 2nd March—a belief which few outside the ranks of his countrymen would share. The recent news of the forthcoming meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries in Moscow has slightly diminished this gloom and given the Persians a ray of hope that their problem may yet be settled.

2. The Cabinet is said to be considering the idea of asking the three Big Powers, and possibly France and China in addition, to supervise the next elections so as to refute the Russian accusation that the Persian Government is reactionary.

3. The Soviet Embassy's reply to the Persian Government's note of the 22nd November (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary) merely referred to the Persian Government to the Soviet Embassy's reply of the 26th November (see appendix to last Intelligence Summary) to which it had nothing to add. A further note by the Persian Government dated the 4th December has not yet been answered.

4. On the 26th November the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to His Majesty's Embassy a memorandum of which copies had been sent to the Soviet, American, French and Chinese Embassies in Tehran. This is reproduced as an appendix to this Intelligence Summary.

The Majlis.

5. At the sessions of the 2nd, 4th and 6th December the attention of Deputies was almost entirely devoted to events in Azerbaijan. The only Majlis business conducted was a discussion of the Prison Reform Law at the request of the Minister for Justice and the tabling by the Minister of Finance of the Income Tax Amendment Bill.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

6. There is a change for the worse in the situation as reported in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary. News from some places, because it concerns Democrat activities, is given in this paragraph for the sake of convenience even though these places are outside the boundaries of Azerbaijan. Bayat, the newly-arrived Governor-General, issued a proclamation on the 3rd December addressed to the people of the province. No mention of the autonomists was made and he expressed his readiness to enter into negotiations with representatives of all classes and strata of the population. He admitted the urgent need for reforms throughout Persia and, in particular, in Azerbaijan. He deprecated attempts to secure these reforms by violence and murder. He stated that he had instructed the police to maintain law and order and appealed to all Azerbaijanis to co-operate in this task. According to reports received, the Democrats have so far ignored Bayat's approaches. Voting for the National Parliament ended on the 2nd December. A Democrat paper has warned the Persian army that the first shot fired by them will be the signal for battle between the Democrats and the army.

News from the various centres is as follows:—

Tabriz.—A police officer was murdered by the rebels outside his office about a week ago and another was murdered on the 8th December by five Caucasians in civilian dress who subsequently fled to a Russian military billet. The effect on the Tabriz garrison's morale is said to be bad as the officers feel that they will be slaughtered one by one while Russians look on and render them powerless to resist. The Chief of the General Staff is of the opinion that matters are coming to a head in Tabriz and that the rebels will soon begin attacks on public buildings and the garrison in order to present a *fait accompli* to the Moscow Conference when it meets.

Maragheh.—No accurate information but a report from the General-Officer-Commanding Tabriz Division states that, after murdering the governor, the rebels have left the town.

Astara and Caspian Coast.—No change.

Mianeh.—No change.

Zenjan.—The governor is reported to be a prisoner in the hands of the rebels who are holding him as a hostage for two of their number who had been arrested and removed to Tehran some weeks ago. The Democrat leader, Dr. Jehanshadlu, has assumed the duties of governor and is issuing orders in the town.

Tabriz-Zenjan Road.—No change but see paragraph 12 below.

Qazvin.—From the Persian press and from another source comes the news that the governor has succeeded in persuading the Tudeh pickets to permit the passage to Tehran of food-stuffs in transit.

Miandoab.—No change.

Marand.—This place, about midway between Tabriz and Julfa is now in rebel hands. They shot three prominent landlords.

Sarab.—Confirmation from two sources has now been received of a report heard as long as ten days ago to the effect that after the military garrison of one platoon had been overpowered, disarmed and taken prisoner by the rebels, two officers and twenty-one men of the gendarmerie were taken outside the town and murdered in cold blood.

Shahin Dej (previously known as *Sain Qaleh*).—The rebels who hold Bukan have now penetrated as far as this place which is some fifty miles north-east of Saqqiz where there is a strong military garrison.

Babulsar in Mazandaran is reported as being in Tudeh hands, and in Mazandaran and Gilan in general Tudeh activities have much increased. A no rent campaign has been successfully launched among the peasants by the Tudeh.

Kerej.—The Russians have posted a strong picket on the main Tehran-Kerej road about twenty miles west of Tehran.

In Tehran itself the town is quiet and the military forces are adequate to deal with any outbreak unless the rioters are reinforced from outside. On the 8th December four lorries, driven by Russian soldiers, deposited at a Russian billet a total of about 100 Caucasians in civilian clothes.

Isfahan.

7. The movement against Murteza Quli Khan has flared up again and three Bakhtiari Khans of the rival faction have been trying to stir up trouble in Chahar Mahal. A summons to return to Isfahan issued by the General-Officer-Commanding Isfahan Division has, so far, prevented the trouble spreading.

Fars.

8. Some attempts have recently been made to compose the differences between the Nasir Khan and Ali Khan branches of the Qashgai family. Nasir Khan is reported to have offered to Ali Khan a monthly allowance of 30,000 rials. The latter has not yet accepted this offer and would prefer a gift of land or, more accurately speaking, the just restoration of lands previously his. The acceptance of a monthly allowance, he feels, would brand him as Nasir's paid servant and diminish his prestige. It might also damage his reputation in the eyes of the Persian Government if, in the event of any future misconduct on Nasir Khan's part, he was thought to be Nasir's paid accomplice.

Appointments.

- 9.—(i) Muhammad Nariman, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, has been appointed Mayor of Tehran in addition to his other duties. The sudden dismissal of Ghulam Husein Ibtahaj (F.O. 89, M.A.117) is believed to be due to pressure by the Russians with whom he was highly unpopular on account of his firm attitude to Tudeh agitators.
- (ii) Abul Qasim Kahalzadeh to be Director of the Propaganda Department. (There is no information as to the previous career of this obscure individual.)

British Interests.

10. A statement in some Persian newspapers to the effect that large British reinforcements had been landed in South Persia was officially denied in the *Daily News Bulletin*. One newspaper came out with the fantastic story that several British battleships had arrived in the Shatt el Arab.

11. The British military authorities propose to hand over to the Persian Government on varying dates between the 11th and 22nd December the following:—

Kerman aerodrome, Kerman-Zahidan road, Zahidan-Mirjawa road, Zahidan aerodrome, British military buildings in Zahidan.

12. The British Embassy courier van was stopped on its way to Tabriz on the 4th December at Zenjan by a picket of Democrat rebels. The driver showed his Russian pass but the picket insisted on examining the contents of the truck and even demanded that he open the various packages. This the driver refused to do but could not prevent the picket from entering the truck and seeing what there was. The driver was obliged to drive to a garage while the rebels took a decision. Eventually two Russian officers arrived and, after explanations by the driver, they told the rebels that the truck should be allowed to proceed.

American Interests.

13. Unfounded rumours published in some Persian newspapers, to the effect that large American military reinforcements had arrived in Tehran, produced an official denial from the American Embassy. The rumour was probably caused by the arrival of a draft of some 200 service personnel as guards for the American camp at Amirabad to relieve a similar number of men due for discharge.

Russian Interests.

14. About a week ago local Armenian newspapers published an announcement by Moscow Radio to the effect that the Council of National Representatives in Moscow, in view of the numerous petitions received from Armenians resident abroad, had acceded to the request of the Government of Soviet Armenia that the gates of the Soviet Armenian Republic be thrown open to Armenians wishing to immigrate. They would be granted free customs entry and advances of money to build houses up to 50 per cent. of the cost. Since then small crowds of Armenians have been seen daily outside the Soviet Consulate-General in Tehran. In April 1945 some propaganda to the same effect by the Archimandrite of Julfa (Isfahan) was reported in the Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary.

15. Reference paragraph 15 of Intelligence Summary No. 26, dated the 8th July, 1945, the Under-Secretary for War gave the British Military Attaché some additional information about the losses incurred over the contract for supplying the Russians with arms and ammunition from the arsenal. The revised figures are as follows:—

(i) *Deliveries to Russians.*

41,950 Brno rifles at 910 rials each, though the cost price to the Persian Government was 2,062 rials.
10,282 machine pistols at 710 rials each, though the cost price to the Persian Government was 2,840 rials.
8,623,000 cartridges at 1.46 rials each, though the cost price to the Persian Government was 3.40 rials.
600,000 ramrods, for which no charge was made.
415 series of spare parts for machine pistols, for which no charge was made.

(ii) *Payments by Russians.*

The Russians have paid:—

10,000,000 rials to the Persian Government.
2,500,000 rials to Skoda.
1,800,000 rials to Iran-Sovtrans for transport.
5,000,000 rials as an initial advance to the Persian Government.

(iii) At the same time the Russians are making *unspecified* claims for materials and tools furnished by them for the manufacturing, in addition to 7,200,000 rials due in salaries to Russian specialists, experts and advisers.

(iv) The Russians proposed to settle by giving the Persian Government 262,191 metric tons of steel. It is estimated that this would settle Russia's debt for the above material if calculated on the basis of \$4,000 per metric ton.

(v) Persian Government claim that, even if settlement as at (iv) is made (the matter is still under discussion as the Russians say "they await instructions from Moscow") they have lost on the deal 86,485,772 rials.

Polish Interests.

16. The movement of Polish refugees to the Lebanon has been in progress for some weeks. Isfahan is now clear of Poles and the numbers in Tehran and Ahwaz as at the 8th December was as follows:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
Tehran ...	159	442	66	667
Ahwaz ...	44	624	350	1,018
	203	1,066	416	1,685

Swedish Interests.

17. M. Sven Harald Pousette, who was Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran from October 1941 to June 1945, has returned as Swedish Minister and presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 6th December. Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the counsellor of the legation since December 1942, has been transferred to Addis Ababa.

Tehran, 9th December, 1945.

*Appendix.**The Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy.*

(No. 5624.)

Memorandum.

Tehran, 26th November, 1945.

The Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, and have the honour to state that:—

As the embassy are aware, a limited number of people have had recourse to certain measures in the Ustans 3 and 4 of Azerbaijan, raised certain undesirable voices and even issued a proclamation in support of their statements with the result that they have created a situation which entirely violates the Organic Law and which is against the security, peace and tranquillity of the country. Chaos and disorder is increasingly widening. In many places these elements have attacked security officials, have occupied many towns and are interfering on the roads and disturbing traffic security. As a result the Central Government have, owing to interruption of the telegraphic and telephonic communications, no true information as to the situation of their officials in these Ustans, and cannot send necessary instructions to the officials concerned in a proper manner and be confident that these instructions will be carried out.

The Government's views are that if every individual, group or community in the country has any allegations to make, which are not of a rebellious nature, against the Central Government and the Organic Law, then such legitimate allegations will be examined and peace and tranquillity established in every district. At the same time the Government is compelled to restore security in face of such elements who may have recourse to certain measures against the prestige and honour of the country, to take certain fundamental measures in order to establish and maintain the power of the Central Government throughout the country in the interests of public welfare.

The expectations of the Imperial Government, while taking into view the friendship and good relations existing between herself and her agreeable Allies, particularly in view of the guarantees given in the proclamation issued by the leaders of the three Powers in Tehran and signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Mr. Churchill, are that the Allied Powers, whose military forces are still in this country, without having the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, should express their views about the measures and action taken by the Central legal Government and inform the Imperial Government of the nature of any recommendations which they may have to make for the restoration of security in those Ustans. It is evident that they should also take into view the fact that the Government, with a view to maintaining security and assuring peace and tranquillity of the public, will have to utilise the security forces of the country by sending a sufficient number of them as reinforcements to wherever this be found necessary. The Imperial Government's forces should enjoy freedom of action inside the country in order to be able to stop the activities of the rebellious elements and to restore security in the places involved. As they seem to intend to take

certain measures shortly in the Ustans 3 and 4 which would be against Organic Law, it is desirable that they should bear in mind that the matter is of great importance and urgency, and the Persian Government therefore request that the relevant authorities of the friendly and Allied Governments may give immediate instructions to quarters they deem expedient to extend the required assistance and co-operation.

A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Embassies of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in Tehran. A copy has also been sent to the Embassy of the Provisional French Government and a copy to the Chinese Embassy in Tehran.

(Sealed)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[E 10246/70/34]

(12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 48, Secret, for the Period 10th December to 16th December, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 443 of 18th December; received 31st December.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

DURING the past week events in Azerbaijan have moved rapidly to their inevitable conclusion and have fulfilled to a remarkable degree the prediction of His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz recorded in paragraph 12 of Intelligence Summary No. 45. They are described in paragraph 8 below. The first round has gone to the rebels and, for the time being at least, Azerbaijan is in the Russian bag.

2. Meanwhile in Tehran certain actions by the Prime Minister have tended to estrange still further the Majlis majority which supported him. These actions are four in number. Firstly, the Prime Minister refuses to take the Majlis sufficiently into his confidence and, in reply to numerous questions, merely replies that active steps to end the deadlock are being taken. Even the Cabinet would appear not to have been consulted in some of his decisions. Secondly, he has convened a "high council" of elder statesmen. That this council is entirely unofficial has been stressed but, all the same, their reputations and political leanings do not inspire confidence among the advocates of resistance. The Qawam-us-Saltaneh, who has vast estates in the Russian Zone and whose candidature for the premiership the Russian-controlled press has long been advocating, makes no secret of his belief in a policy of appeasement in general and, in particular, of granting an oil concession to the Russians, of removing officials obnoxious to the Russians and in holding the elections for the next Majlis on the original instead of the postponed date. Mushtashar-ud-Dowleh is a tool of the Tudeh and closely related to the leader of the rebels who staged the disturbances in Zenjan. Ali Mansur (Mansur-us-Saltaneh), though intelligent and able, has a dubious record as Governor-General in Meshed, where His Majesty's Consul-General recently described him as "either the Pétain or the Quisling of Khorasan." Pirnia, though honest, is far advanced in senility. Baha-ul-Mulk Qaragazlu is inept and foolish. It was inevitable that the selection of such men by the Prime Minister as his unofficial advisers should arouse mistrust. Thirdly, without informing His Imperial Majesty the Shah or the British or American Ambassadors, the Prime Minister has suggested to the Soviet Government, through the Persian Ambassador in Moscow, that he and the Minister for Foreign Affairs should go to Moscow "for conversations." The possible consequences of this are obvious and would provide justification for the Russian view, so often expressed in the Moscow press and in the Russian-controlled Persian press, that the Azerbaijan affair is a domestic one between Russia and Persia and should not be raised to the status of an international issue. Realising how greatly this direct approach will have weakened the position of the British and American Secretaries of State, His Imperial Majesty the Shah prevailed upon the Prime Minister to retrieve his mistake, as far as possible, by making a public appeal to the three Powers to remove their troops from Persia immediately and by addressing a request to the three Governments that Persia should be represented, in virtue of article 6 of the Tripartite Treaty, at any discussions in Moscow affecting Persia. Fourthly, in his desire to avoid any action provocative to the

Russians, the Prime Minister, against the advice of the Chief of the General Staff, despatched a telegram to the garrison at Tabriz ordering them to resist in principle (whatever that may mean), ordering the officers to disband the soldiers, to destroy their arms and make their way to Tehran.

3. While Persians continue to pin their faith to a successful outcome of the Moscow Conference, there are few who regard the recent Russian success in Azerbaijan as the limit of their aims in Persia. That the Tudeh movements in Gilan, Mazanderan and Khorasan will follow suit is their conviction, while the truly pessimistic aver that all these are but first steps to a Russian domination of the whole country, their acquisition of a warm water port on the Persian Gulf, their seizure of the Khuzistan oil and severance of Britain's communications between the Near East and India.

The Majlis.

4. Apart from speeches on the Azerbaijan situation the only noteworthy proceeding has been the continuation of the debate on the Income Tax Law (Amendment) Bill.

Legislation.

5. The Cabinet have decreed that, as from the 5th December, the import and export of Persian currency notes will be strictly forbidden. Travellers will be allowed to bring in or take out Persian currency to the value of 1,000 rials (about £7 10s.). Rials in excess of this will be confiscated and offenders will be prosecuted.

6. The Government are preparing a Bill amending the Provincial Councils Law, which was passed forty years ago, since the duties and powers of such councils as laid down in the old law do not correspond with the present day needs. The Ministry of the Interior have prepared a seventy-article Bill which will shortly be tabled in the Majlis. This Bill, if passed, will probably take the place of the old law instead of merely amending it. The new Bill is reported to define the powers of provincial councils, the methods by which the councils will be elected. The capital town of each Ustan to have twelve representatives and each "shahristan" of the province to be represented by one member, all meeting in the capital town of the province to form the council. Independent "shahristans," like Qazvin and Arak, will be represented at the capital town of each Ustan by six representatives, and the "districts" of such independent "shahristans" by one representative.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

7. Bayat, the Governor-General, has returned to Tehran as the Democrats had broken off relations with him on the grounds that their plans had already been made and could not now be modified.

8. The elections for the Tabriz Deputies to the Azerbaijan National Council have been concluded. The provincial results are not yet to hand. There were in all forty-seven candidates for twelve seats. The "successful" candidates all obtained from 21,000 to 23,000 votes, while none of the others received as many as fifty. The poll is headed by Pishaveri, who was elected two years ago as a Tudeh candidate to the Majlis from Tabriz but who had his credentials rejected. The second is Biriya, a prominent Labour agitator educated in Baku. The tenth, Ipekchian, is a Tudeh member of the present Majlis. The eleventh, Mashinji, was an unsuccessful Russian candidate for the Majlis. Among the general populace the attitude to the elections seems to have been one of indifference amounting to apathy, but much activity was shown in conveying crowds of youths in lorries to the polls. As most of these would be illiterate and as ballot papers had to be written on the spot, the supervising committee at each polling booth would not have been without influence.

9. The National Council, now styling itself the National Parliament, opened on the 12th December. The Soviet Consul-General attended the ceremony. The British, American, Turkish and Iraqi Consuls-General, though invited, did not attend. The National Parliament proceeded to the election of a Cabinet of eleven members. This Cabinet includes a Minister for War.

10. The manager of the National Bank received instructions from Tehran to hand over his cash to the Imperial Bank of Persia for safe custody. Though informed by the manager of the Imperial Bank of his readiness to accept it, the National Bank manager feared to carry out his instructions lest the transfer of the cash should be observed by the Democrats. The National Bank deposits are, therefore, now in rebel hands.

11. The press attaché of the American Embassy, who has just returned from a five-day visit to Tabriz, states that Pishaveri, in an interview with him, admitted that the Democrats were receiving Russian support. The press attaché found the atmosphere of terror typified by the difficulty of getting interviews with non-Democrats. He gained the impression that during the past few days events had been speeded up, probably in order to confront the Moscow Conference with a *fait accompli*.

12. Four British newspaper correspondents who applied to the Russian Consulate in Tehran through this embassy a week or more ago for passes to enable them to proceed to Tabriz have not yet received their passes.

13. The situation in Azerbaijan from the military aspect is, briefly, as follows:—

Tabriz.—The General Officer Commanding, of whose loyalty and will to resist the Chief of the General Staff and His Majesty's Consul-General have long been in doubt, sent a wireless-telegraphic message to the General Staff to the effect that he and his garrison had been invited by the Democrats to join their cause. The Democrats had stated that those officers who did not elect to join them would be free to go. The General Officer Commanding asked what reply he was to make. He was told to resist. A later message from his Chief of Staff said that the General Officer Commanding had personally gone over to the rebel cause and that the remaining officers and men were still in barracks and were being sniped. The Chief of the General Staff prepared a message ordering them to resist to the end, but was prevented from despatching it by the Prime Minister, Minister of War and His Imperial Majesty the Shah, who substituted for it the message summarised in paragraph 2 above. A further message was received on the evening of the 14th to the effect that the officers were ready to leave for Tehran. Since then there has been no wireless-telegraphic communication with Tabriz and it is to be feared that the garrison and its arms are in rebel hands. The garrison, according to the Chief of the General Staff, numbered only 750. Their arms consisted of rifles, light automatics and three mountain guns.

Rezaieh.—Wireless-telegraphic communication with Tehran has been re-established and the garrison of two battalions is still in its barracks. Looting of shops by Democrats is reported. Some Caucasian immigrants have recently arrived from Tabriz.

Khoi and Shahpur are believed to be in rebel hands. There are no Persian garrisons there.

Miandoab.—The garrison, a weak battalion of 250, reports by wireless-telegraphy that it is besieged by a force of about 2,000 Kurds, Assyrians and Democrats. A break-out to the south to join the Saqqiz brigade is impossible. It is, apparently, still resisting. The Chief of the General Staff has ordered a battalion from Saqqiz to go and attempt its extrication, but it is unlikely that the Russians and Kurds will allow this force to pass Bukan.

Ardebil.—No news and it is feared that the garrison will disintegrate.

Maragheh.—No news of this company. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company's manager there has been murdered.

Other Troop Movements outside Azerbaijan.—A Persian battalion is being sent via Qum, Arak (Sultanabad) and Malayer to Hamadan, which is an important source of supplies for the capital and which has no garrison. It could also deal with any rebel infiltration into that area southwards from Bukan and Shahin Dej via Bijar.

The Persian column of two battalions and a company of gendarmes which had been at Sharifabad near Qazvin ever since the beginning of the crisis has returned to Tehran. Once the Government control of Azerbaijan had ceased and as long as the Russians refused to allow troops to enter Azerbaijan it served no useful purpose.

Kurdistan.

14. It will be recalled that Hama Rashid, after sacking Baneh, fled into Iraq and gave himself up to the Iraqi authorities in November 1944. Negotiations for his extradition broke down and the Government of Iraq would only agree to an enforced residence for Hama Rashid at Kirkuk. The Persian General Staff now claim to have received information that Hama Rashid has been allowed to leave or has escaped from Kirkuk and has arrived at Penjwin on the Perso-Iraqi border. They fear that his presence there may endanger the recent and precarious peace secured in this area by the surrender to the Persian forces of Mahmud Khan Kanisenani, by the death of Mahmud Khan Dizli and by the flight and surrender to the Iraqi authorities of Hasan Khan Rezabi.

Khorasan.

15. Khorasan is still without its Governor-General and Meshed its Governor. There have been further arrivals of Tudeh leaders from Tehran. "Muhajirs" of Caucasian origin have been seen in Nishapur and Sabzewar. Villagers in the Sarrahs area and in the Turcoman Sahra have refused to render their share of grain to the landlords. A Russian loudspeaker installed in Meshed announces the independence of Azerbaijan and calls upon all Azerbaijanis to return to their province. Kishawarz, the Tudeh leader, has arrived in Meshed by a Soviet plane and has left for Tashkent to attend the celebrations on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the university.

Fars.

16. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British Military Attaché on the 15th December that the Persian Government had proclaimed "a general amnesty for the Tribes of Fars" and that Nasir Khan Qashgai and other tribal leaders had telegraphed their warm appreciation of this generous gesture. No confirmation of this news has so far appeared in the press. With their hands full in the north and one eye cocked on the south as a possible bolt-hole, it is difficult to see what other "gesture" the Persian Government could have made at this time. It is too much to hope that the tribal leaders of Fars will fail to detect the Persian Government's motives behind this gesture, but there is a reasonable hope that they will refrain from blackmailing the Government in its present plight.

Appointments.

17.—(i) Nasr Quli Itimadi (Nasr-ud-Dowleh) (Foreign Office 101) has been appointed Governor-General of the 9th Ustan (Khorasan).

(ii) Mehdi Farrukh (Mutasimm-us-Saltaneh) (Foreign Office 61; Military Attaché 85) has been appointed Governor-General of the 7th Ustan (Fars). It was reported in paragraph 13 (iv) of Intelligence Summary No. 46 that he had refused the appointment. He appears to have reconsidered his decision as it is announced in the press that he will leave for Shiraz in a few days.

Persian Army.

18. Colonel Mazheri has left for Paris to attend a course of eight months' duration at the French Staff College. This officer is an instructor at the Persian Staff College and was one of the Persian Military Mission invited to Mideast in 1943.

British Interests.

19. His Excellency the Ambassador left Tehran on the 14th December to attend the Foreign Secretaries' Conference in Moscow.

Tehran, 16th December, 1945.

[E 315/315/34]

(13)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 49, Secret, for the Period 17th December to 23rd December, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 449 of 24th December, 1945; Received 10th January, 1946.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THOUGH important news has come from Azerbaijan, except for some excitement on the 19th December, caused by the arrival in Tehran of the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, interest seems to have shifted to Moscow and an air of tense expectancy as to the outcome of the conference prevails.

2. On the 18th December in the Majlis the Prime Minister made his long-awaited speech on affairs in Azerbaijan. It was firmer in tone than any of his previous utterances and accused the Russians more directly of interfering in the internal affairs of Persia. He reiterated his intention to proceed to Moscow.

In this connexion it is learned that the Persian Ambassador there has so far been unsuccessful in his attempts to contact any responsible official in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They invariably plead pressure of business as an excuse for not seeing him.

3. The programme of the Azerbaijan Government, as reported by Radio Baku and published in the Tudeh organ *Rahbar* of the 18th December, is reproduced as Appendix "A" to this summary.

4. An account of the inaugural meeting of the Azerbaijan National Assembly, taken from the paper *Rahbar* of the 18th December, is published as Appendix "B" to this summary.

5. An article in the Russian paper *Pravda* of the 14th December, discussing the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia, states that "in reality, there is no question at all, as the Soviet-Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1942 clearly defines the tasks, conditions and period of stay of Soviet troops in Persia." While there is nothing new in this attitude, a more ominous note is heard when the article goes on to say that "in any case, under the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921, the Soviet Union has the right to bring its troops into Persian territory." For the benefit of those recipients of this Intelligence Summary who have not a copy of the treaty referred to, the following relevant paragraph is reproduced here:—

"VI. If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed."

It would appear that the writer of the article has an elastic conscience or that he failed to notice the preceding paragraph which states that the two high contracting parties undertake—

"To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia."

6. The ninth and tenth days of Moharram passed off quietly in Tehran. Mourning processions had been strictly banned by the Military Governor as it was thought that bands of armed hooligans might be assembled under the guise of religious fervour.

The Majlis.

7. At the session on the 13th December the Income Tax (Amendment) Bill was passed by a majority vote of 81. A translation will appear in a later issue of this Intelligence Summary. At the session on the 18th December the Prime Minister made a lengthy speech about the situation in Azerbaijan and the steps taken by his government. The speech was frequently applauded. (See paragraph 2 above.)

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

8. On the 19th December Sartip Darakhshani, G.O.C. Tabriz, accompanied by 14 of his officers, arrived in Tehran by Soviet plane. He had, apparently, thought better of his decision to join the rebel army and availed himself of the invitation given previously by the Democrats that those officers who did not wish to join them would be free to leave. He is now under arrest and will be tried by court martial. It was reported in the press on the 23rd and 24th December that a further 70 officers of the garrison have arrived in Tehran by motor coach and train. This leaves about 30 still in Tabriz awaiting transport. Of the 750 rank and file all are reported to have fled, about one-third of them taking their arms. The total of arms seized by the rebels in the deserted barracks is about 800 rifles, 18 machine guns and one mountain gun.

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9. The latest news about other garrisons in Azerbaijan is as follows:—

Miandoab.—Garrison surrendered. A party of 85 gendarmes made its escape to Saqqiz losing about 35 on the way in casualties and desertions.

Ardebil.—Garrison surrendered.

Maragheh.—Garrison surrendered.

Rezaieh.—No definite news but Moscow radio reported that fighting is in progress.

Mishkin Shahr.—This small place (50 miles north-west of Ardebil) was omitted from a list of Azerbaijan garrisons previously given to the B.M.A. by the C.G.S. It is now learnt that its garrison of one platoon has surrendered after losing two officers and half its strength killed.

Other troop movements consist of the despatch of a battalion from the Saqqiz garrison to Bijar to protect Hamadan.

10. According to the Governor of the National Bank, the balances at the Tabriz branch which fell into rebel hands (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary) amounted to 40 million rials (about £300,000), most of which represented private and not Persian Government deposits. According to the same authority, the National Government of Azerbaijan has had the effrontery to ask for more funds to be sent from Tehran. This request has, of course, been refused. It is possible that the Azerbaijan Government may now issue some form of notes of its own. Meanwhile it has prohibited the drawing of more than 20,000 rials (£154) on any private account and has advertised the sale of 100 tons of Persian Government sugar which should bring in about 6 million rials (about £45,000).

11. The exchange of the Governor of Zenjan for two Tudeh members (see paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary, No. 47) has now been completed and the governor has returned to Tehran.

12. His Majesty's Consul-General Tabriz reports that the town is quiet with the Democrats exercising strict control. Their armed forces appear to be less than before.

Gilan, Mazanderan and Gorgan.

13. According to reports reaching the general staff from Persian police sources and reports (*) received in this embassy from other sources, Tudeh activity in these provinces is increasing. Recent arrivals and departures of Soviet troops show an overall deposit of some 500 remaining in the area. The Tudeh party is said to be preparing a proclamation of autonomy for "Tabaristan." (This classical geographical name properly covers the provinces of Mazanderan and Gorgan, but is certainly intended to include Gilan also.)

*From that and other sources comes the news that they are calling for volunteers and appear to be anxious to build up an Azerbaijan army of sufficient strength to oppose any Persian forces sent against them if and when the Russian troops withdraw. Recruits are reported to have been offered 150 rials per mensem in addition to clothing and food.

Bakhtiari.

14. Murteza Quli Khan has been summoned to Tehran for discussions. He is stated to be loth to obey this summons as long as that firebrand Abul Qasim Khan is left behind in Bakhtiari to sow the seeds of dissension and possibly revolt in his absence.

Fars. (See paragraph 17 of last Intelligence Summary.)

15. Allusion to this "general amnesty" has been made in the press. Coupled with the amnesty was a permission to "bear arms with a licence during the present crisis." The Russian controlled press has not been slow to detect in this an arming of the southern tribes by the reactionary Government of Persia which seeks thereby to start a civil war between these tribes and its freedom loving subjects of Azerbaijan.

16. Mehdi Farrukh, the newly-appointed Governor-General of Fars, has arrived in Shiraz. He called on His Majesty's Ambassador before leaving and stated that he would seek the advice of His Majesty's Consul in Shiraz on all matters affecting the welfare and security of his province.

Appointments.

17.—(i) Ahmad Ali Baniadam to be Governor of Shiraz and Deputy Governor-General of Fars.

(ii) Imad Mumtaz, Director-General of the Tribal Department of the Ministry of the Interior, to be Governor of Meshed and Deputy Governor-General of Khorasan.

(iii) Ahmad Qadimi Navai to be Persian Consul at Quetta.

(iv) Yusuf Sadiq to be Persian Consul at Kerbela.

(v) The Persian Press announces the appointment of Hashem Sahba, a Director of the Agricultural Bank, as Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines—a portfolio hitherto vacant in the present Cabinet.

(vi) The same communiqué announced the appointment of Allahyar Saleh, Minister without Portfolio, as Minister of the Interior vice Khalil Fahimi appointed "Ustandar of the West," i.e., Governor-General of Kermanshah. An unconfirmed report says that Fahimi has denied his appointment to this post and has challenged the Prime Minister's right to drop him from the Cabinet. Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 198-M.A. 253) is reputed, on fairly good authority, to be one of the three Cabinet ministers who consistently advocate a policy of appeasement *vis-à-vis* the Russians in the present crisis. The other two are General Muhammad Husein Firuz and Nariman. Fahimi, as a member of Saed's Cabinet of August 1944 to November 1944, which refused the Russians an oil concession, incurred Russian displeasure. His reappearance, as Minister without Portfolio in Bayat's Cabinet (November 1944–April 1945) and as Minister of the Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet of November 1945 re-kindled this resentment. More recently he has been attacked by Dr. Musaddiq in the Majlis and in the press. He is believed to have cordial relations with Seyyid Zia-ud-Din. The recent change, therefore, has the appearance of a sop to the Russians.

British Interests.

18. The following item of news appeared in a recent issue of the *Daily News Bulletin* in Tehran:—

"A few days ago rumours appeared in a Tehran paper that a British firm was exploiting chrome deposits in Iranian Baluchistan. This absurd allegation was denied by the B.B.C. in its Persian service of the 11th December. It was not considered necessary to repeat the denial in this country, since, of course, anyone is free to go to Baluchistan to see the facts for himself. The same applies to other equally ridiculous rumours of what is happening in Baluchistan. Commentators point out that so far no independent witnesses have been permitted to proceed to the north to investigate charges of illegal exploitation of petroleum in Azerbaijan and Mazanderan."

American Interests.

19. The large American camp at Amirabad near Tehran, though included in the general sale of their remaining assets on the basis of 7½ per cent. of their original cost, was actually sold to His Imperial Majesty the Shah who presented it to the university of Tehran. At a formal ceremony in the presence of the Shah the American flag was hauled down and the camp handed over. The ceremony was marred by a rush of looters who fell upon the camp as soon as the American guards were withdrawn. Telephones were the chief attraction, but, according to one witness, the mob tried to remove "everything that was not screwed down."

20. The American Military Mission has recently received some officer replacements and reinforcements. The wives of General Ridley and two of his senior staff have also arrived. Though no official announcement of the prolongation of the contract of the mission has been made, it would appear that the mission expect to stay for a year at least. Results of their work are less and less in evidence.

Russian Interests.

21. Consular diaries for November received from Zahidan report some increased activity by Russian officials in South-East Persia. They have contacted local officials and their commercial agents and have made enquiries about the strengths of British troops in the area and the extent of British trade. Their chief tribal contact appears to be Sardar Muhammad Reza Khan Purdili.

Tehran, 23rd December, 1945.

Appendix A.

The Programme of the Azerbaijan Government.

IN the programme of the Azerbaijan National Government it is stated that:—

The Azerbaijan National Government starts its functions with the object of putting an end to all the hardships and difficulties of the nation. It announced its programme as follows:—

1. It should be announced to all men and to the public throughout the world that Azerbaijan has obtained autonomy within the boundaries of Persia. The Government is obliged, with a view to consolidating Azerbaijan's autonomy, to approach the Central Government and to obtain the agreement of the central authorities.

2. In order that a national government may be formed in conformity with the desire of the people, the public must be allowed to share in the administrative affairs of the country by provincial councils.

3. With a view to the development of the provinces the election of provincial councils must be started.

4. Honest and liberal persons must be appointed as Bakhshdars and Farmandars.

5. The gendarmerie and police must be cleared of treacherous elements and criminals, and the gendarmerie and police activities must be so regulated as to ensure public tranquillity and convenience.

6. A budget must be drawn up after the full needs of Azerbaijan have been studied and estimated.

7. With a view to defending Azerbaijan's autonomy the armed detachments formed in the provinces must be converted into national guards.

8. In the matter of education two problems must be solved: (1) The Azerbaijan language must be taught and made official in all schools and departments. (2) Compulsory education must be enforced so as to make the public literate, and steps must be taken to establish a national university of Azerbaijan with a view to providing an educational cadre.

9. In connexion with industry, great importance must be attached to the expansion of industry in the country.

The National Government will acquire the necessary means to develop commerce, and will endeavour, by the expansion of industry, to meet the requirements of the people.

10. The establishment of complete order and discipline on all telegraph and telephone communication lines and the repair of roads and highways.

11. In order to remove any differences between peasants and landowners, laws to be enacted which will afford satisfaction to both parties.

12. With a view to fighting unemployment and eliminating it, the Crown lands and property belonging to reactionary elements who have escaped from Azerbaijan to be distributed among the peasants. The latter class also to be helped through agricultural banks in order that they may be able to buy the lands which the landowners are prepared to sell at reasonable prices.

13. In order to ameliorate the living condition of the public, the artisans and guilds to be helped.

14. With a view to ameliorating the living conditions of labourers, laws, including Labourers' Insurance Law, to be passed and enacted.

15. The Government of Azerbaijan, who attach great importance to hygiene, will provide free means of treatment for the public.

16. The Government of Azerbaijan, who believe in private ownership, will support all measures showing initiative and which are aimed at increasing wealth and finance.

17. The Government of Azerbaijan admits full respect towards freedom of thought, faith and conscience.

18. The Government of Azerbaijan admits equal rights for various nationalities resident in Azerbaijan, such as the Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, along with the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, and will allow them to study their native tongue.

19. The Persian Azerbaijan Government recognises the Central Government and will carry out its orders so long as it does not contravene the laws and decisions of the National Consultative Assembly of Azerbaijan.

Appendix B.

The Inauguration of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan.

WEDNESDAY, the 21st Azar, 1324 (12th December, 1945), will be considered an historic date in the history of the valiant Azerbaijanis, and future generations will celebrate this victorious day. On that day the nation of Azerbaijan, by founding their National Assembly in a very honourable manner, proved to the world that they are mature and self-dependent and can decide their own destinies and that they are the rightful persons to manage their own houses. On Wednesday morning the Deputies of Tabriz and those of other towns and districts gathered together in the Assembly's public hall. Great crowds gathered in the street to watch the opening of the Majlis. At 9 a.m. a public session was held at which about eighty Deputies were present. M. Nizam-ud-Dauleh Rafi'i was elected as President of the Assembly and opened the first public session of the Azerbaijan National Assembly by making a short inaugural speech. The internal regulations of the Assembly were read out by Vulla'i, were fully explained by Pishehvani, and were all passed. The presidential body of the Assembly was then elected by a secret vote. Haji Mirza Ali Shabistari was elected as Speaker and MM. Padigan and Judat were elected as his deputies; and Azima and Vulla'i as secretaries. The Speaker then pronounced the desire of the majority in connexion with Pishehvani's premiership and appointed him to form a Government. In the afternoon of the same day the Cabinet was formed and presented to the Assembly:—

Sayyid Jafar Pishehvani: Prime Minister.

Dr. Javid: Minister of the Interior.

Jaafar Kaviani: Minister of the National Forces.

Dr. Mahtash: Minister of Agriculture.

Muhammad Birja: Minister of Education.

Dr. Urangi: Minister of Health.

Ghulam Riza Ilhami: Minister of Finance.

Yusuf Azima: Minister of Justice.

Kabiri: Minister of P.T. and Roads.

Rasuli: Minister of Commerce and Economics.

Minister of Labour will be appointed later.

Zainul Abedin Qiami was appointed as head of the Supreme Court, and M. Ibrahim as Public Prosecutor of Azerbaijan by Pishehvani, and it was stated that, as they had no intention to separate from Persia, no Minister for Foreign Affairs will be appointed, and that their Minister for Foreign Affairs will be the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Later the Prime Minister submitted the Cabinet's programme to the Assembly; it was passed by a majority vote.

[E 319/315/34]

(14)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 50, Secret, for the Period 24th December to 30th December, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 458 of 31st December, 1945; Received 10th January, 1946.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

SUCH news as has appeared in communiqués on the Moscow Conference and such information as has so far been given to the Persian Government and the deductions made therefrom by intelligent Persians have caused widespread despair. It is too early to appreciate the full effects but a sharp decline in British prestige and a further weakening of Hakimi's Cabinet are already noticeable.

2. Two political forces appear to be working. The first is a move by Hakimi himself to get rid of those Ministers obnoxious to the Russians. Fahimi has gone. Hajhir's displacement is imminent. Without informing General Riazi of his decision, Hakimi has approached General Yazdan Panah with the offer of the War Ministry. The latter refused. The second is a move by the Right to overthrow Hakimi's Cabinet and introduce one with more will to resist. Advice has been tendered to the effect that a change would be premature until His Majesty's Ambassador returns with more detailed information about what has transpired at Moscow and with advice as to the course now to be pursued.

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3. The election of Provincial Councils (see paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 48) is engaging the attention of the Persian Government and instructions to this end have been issued to Provincial Governors. It is not yet clear whether they will be elected according to the original law providing for them (which is in many details out of date) or by an amended law now said to be ready for presentation to the Majlis. Many Persians believe that the setting up of these councils at this time is dangerous and that they will merely provide a legal way of creating a situation in other provinces similar to that recently created illegally in Azerbaijan. Their fears, naturally, are chiefly over the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan and Khorasan, which are still in occupation by Russian troops.

4. Dr. Siyasi, Dr. Kishavarz and Sadiq Hidayet, invited by the Government of the Uzbekistan Republic to attend the commemoration ceremonies of Tashkent University, have returned to Tehran.

5. The Persian delegates to the United Nations Organisation which is to meet in London on the 10th January are as follows: The Persian Ambassador in London, Nasrullah Intezam, Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Saltaneh), Seyyid Baqir Kazemi. The following are attached to the delegation: Abul Hasan Hakimi, Fazlullah Nabil, Assadullah Bayendor.

The Majlis.

6. Since the 23rd December the Majlis has met daily. A one-twelfth budget Bill to cover the period of Azar 1324 (22nd November-21st December, 1945) was passed. The Bretton Woods Agreement has been ratified unanimously.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

7. The garrison of Rezaieh has surrendered. It was the sole remaining Persian military force in Azerbaijan. A Tass agency message of the 18th December reported that the commander of the garrison had been wreaking vengeance on those inhabitants who were in sympathy with the Democrats. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, who visited Rezaieh on the 22nd December, reported that the Democrats had been in complete control of the town since the 19th December, the garrison having surrendered. Its commander, Colonel Zanganeh, is believed to be a prisoner in Democrat hands in Tabriz. The remaining officers, as well as the balance of the Tabriz officers, have either arrived in Tehran or are on their way. Only one, a Captain Hormuz Farivar, is reported to have joined the rebel army. Regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the garrison before its surrender, His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports that on the 15th December a column of gendarmes, supported by light tanks, drove a party of armed Democrats from the village of Dedhar Baksh situated about 1 mile from Rezaieh. From the evidence of the Chaldean inhabitants of the village it appears that the Democrats suffered no casualties and that no villager opened fire on the Persian column. The Persian commander maintains that he was fired upon and that he opened fire in defence. Nine villagers were killed and ten wounded. The light tank is said by the Russians and Chaldeans to have driven over the bodies of those killed. The Soviet Vice-Consul later visited the scene and photographed the bodies. The Russian press will make the most of this affair.

8. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General has also visited Maragheh, where all is quiet with the Democrats in control. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's manager whose murder was reported in the last Intelligence Summary appears to have been killed on account of his being a landowning capitalist and not because of his association with the company.

9. In general Azerbaijan is quiet with Government officers functioning under Democrat control and police, aided by Democrat volunteers, maintaining strict order.

10. A recruiting drive for the "Azerbaijan People's Army" opened in Tabriz on the 19th December. Some fifty horsemen and 2,000 infantry volunteers were brought into the town. The section commanders carried Tommy guns and the rank and file rifles. A few light machine guns were also seen.

11. General Hasan Muqaddam, a former Governor-General of Azerbaijan, has left for Tabriz by Soviet plane. He has vast estates between Maragheh and Miandoab. He is reported to have been offered a post in the Azerbaijan National Government. He is a brother-in-law of Kabiri, the Azerbaijan Government Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and Roads. He is clever, able and unscrupulous.

12. Financial difficulties may cause the Azerbaijan Government to declare its complete independence. It has accused the Central Government of attempting to starve it by cutting off funds and strangling trade. The National Bank has ceased payment. There are two small private banks which are being taken over by the National Government. The Perso-Soviet Bank has never influenced trade. The Imperial Bank of Iran is still functioning. No purchaser for the 100 tons of Persian Government sugar has yet come forward. The National Government has demanded 30 million rials from the Central Government for the payment of officials' salaries for the next six months.

13. Another source reports that three types are distinguishable among the Democrats' armed forces, viz.:—

- (a) Officers and soldiers of the Red army in civilian clothes, dressed in dark blue coat and "plus fours" tucked into the ordinary short black leather Russian boot. They are armed with light machine guns and grenades.
- (b) Caucasians ("Muhajirs") imported into Azerbaijan by the Russians. They are clad in leather coats and fur hats and armed with rifles and machine pistols of Persian arsenal manufacture.
- (c) The native Azerbaijani armed variously with iron-shod sticks and Brno rifles of Persian arsenal manufacture.

14. Mr. Harold Minor, chief of the Eastern Department in the American State Department and a former secretary in the American Embassy in Tehran, who came to Tehran a fortnight ago to study events in Azerbaijan, has not been able to proceed to Tabriz as the Russian authorities have refused to give him a pass. Six American and British journalists have likewise been prevented from entering an area where Russia "is in no way interfering in internal affairs."

15. Some short personality notes on the members of the Azerbaijan National Government are given in Appendix A to this Summary.

Khorasan.

16. A consular report states that Muntasir, brother of Saulat, is organising an anti-Government gang near Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam in order to revenge his brother's death. He is receiving Tudeh support. The same report states that the Bicharanlu Kurds near Shirevan and Quchan are armed and in sympathy with the Tudeh party. It will be recalled that Saulat-us-Saltaneh, a Hazara chief, rebelled against the Persian Government in January 1942 and was killed while attempting to escape from a gendarmerie post in the autumn of 1943.

Fars.

17. Mehdi Farrukh, the newly appointed Governor-General, has had a chilly reception. A movement to boycott him and force him to return to Tehran, largely the work of Khosrow Qashgai, was frustrated by the efforts of the Qawam-ul-Mulk, who persuaded Nasir Khan Qashgai to desist from this unwise plan. Nasir Khan is reported to have realised that any disturbance in Fars at this juncture will only embarrass the Central Government at a time when their hands are full and play into the hands of the Russians.

18. The announcement of the general amnesty (referred to in paragraph 15 of the last Intelligence Summary) has had a good effect according to a consular report from Shiraz. It gives both sides cause for satisfaction. It removes from the tribes the fear of the consequences of their acts in the Semirun affair of two years ago and also rallies them to Tehran at a time of crisis for the Central Government. Indeed, a noteworthy feature has been the flow of messages to Tehran conveying the loyalty and support of nearly all the tribes of Persia.

Kurdistan.

19. During the past few weeks the Democrats have occupied the stage in Azerbaijan and very little news has been received about Kurdish affairs or Kurdish reactions to the seizure of power by the National Government of Azerbaijan. According to Kurdish sources of doubtful value in Tehran the Kurds are far from happy at the turn which events have taken. They have been drawn into the Russian orbit and have obtained some arms and ammunition, a printing press and a free excursion to Baku. On the debit side they have estranged the Governments of Persia, Iraq and Turkey and have suffered military defeats at the hands of the first two. So far no Russian promises of an independent Kurdistan have been fulfilled. They are not interested in agrarian or labour reforms. They have not

been given posts in the new Azerbaijan Cabinet. They may well be thinking that all they have achieved is the exchange of a Persian Government for an Azerbaijani Democrat Government.

Persian Army.

20. Reference paragraph 13 of Intelligence Summary No. 48, the General Staff has decided to find the battalion for Hamadan from Saqqiz so as not to decrease the Tehran garrison.

21. After the elimination of the Persian army garrisons in Azerbaijan, the only Persian troops remaining inside the Russian Zone (stretching from the Perso-Iraqi frontier near Ushnuyeh to the Perso-Russian frontier near Sarakhs) are the following:—

At Meshed, one infantry regiment, one artillery battery, one battalion of engineers.

At Bujnurd, one cavalry regiment.

Appointments.

22. ("A": Civil)—

- (i) Abbas Quli Ardalan to be Treasurer-General in the Ministry of Finance.
- (ii) Ahmad Salahi to be Governor of Hamadan *vice* Sardar Akram.
- (iii) Hurmuz Ahmedi (Bakhtiari) to be Governor of Burujird.
- (iv) Burzu Kalhor, an Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, to be Governor of Firdaus (formerly known as Tun) in Khorasan.
- (v) Dr. Muhsin Nasr, formerly Governor of Mazandaran, to be Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior.
- (vi) Dr. Ali Akbar Itimad (Hakim-us-Saltaneh) to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Health.
- (vii) Ismail Hakimi to be Governor of the Agricultural Bank.
- (viii) Musa Shaibani (Zika-ud-Dowleh) to be Director of the Direct and Indirect Taxation Department of the Ministry of Finance.
- (ix) Abdul Husein Bihniya to be Director-General of the Accounts and Audit Department and Chief of the Budget Department in the Ministry of Finance.
- (x) Muhsin Gharib to be Director-General of the Inspection Department in the Ministry of Finance.
- (xi) Munir-ud-din Ahmedi to be Director-General of the Ceded Properties and Public Domains Department in the Ministry of Finance.
- (xii) Sadiq Fatemi, Director-General of Supply in the Ministry of the Interior, and Lisan Sipih, a Director-General in that Ministry, have been placed "*en disponibilité*." Mahmud Darakhshan has replaced Sipih and Dr. Muhsin Nasr (see (v) above) has replaced Fatemi.
- (xiii) Abul Hasan Ibtehaj and Abdullah Daftari have been re-elected by the Majlis as Governor and Deputy Governor of the National Bank for a further period of three years.

("B": Military)—

- (i) Colonel Murteza Zahidi to be head of the Personnel Department of the General Staff.
- (ii) Colonel Husain Mutamid to be Deputy Director of the Officers' Training College.

Brazilian Interests.

23. His Excellency Senhor Abelardo Bretanha Bueno Do Prado, the newly arrived Brazilian Minister to Persia, presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 29th December.

Yugoslav Interests.

24. The Persian Government has recognised the new Yugoslav Government.

Tehran, 30th December, 1945.

Appendix A.

Reference Appendix B to the last Intelligence Summary, some short biographical notes of the members of the Azerbaijan Cabinet are given below:—

1. *Seyyid Jaafar Pishehvareh*.—Prime Minister. Age 50. A native of Tabriz, but is little known there, having spent most of his life in Tehran and elsewhere. Was imprisoned in Tehran as a Bolshevik in the time of Reza Shah. A prominent member of Tudeh Iran, he has published the Tehran newspaper *Azhar* for the party. He came to Tabriz in 1944 exclusively for the elections, and his candidature was supported in every possible way by the Russians. His credentials were subsequently rejected by the Majlis. He is supposed to be a careerist rather than a man of firm political convictions. He now appears to have changed his title "Mir" to "Seyyid."

2. *Dr. Salamullah Javid*.—Minister of the Interior. Nothing is known except that he is believed to be a Jew from Meshed.

3. *Jaafar Kavian*.—People's Army Minister. Nothing is known except that he is a Deputy for Marand in the "National Assembly."

4. *Dr. Mahtash*.—Minister of Agriculture. He is a veterinary surgeon formerly in charge of public health arrangements at the Tabriz slaughter house.

5. *Muhammad Birya* (not Birja).—Minister of Education. Age about 40. He is the chairman of the Workers' Union; his appointment to the Ministry of Education is seemingly justified by his reputation as a composer of light verse in Turki. He has shown great energy in organising the workers, but he has no pretensions to any particular education.

6. *Dr. Urangi*.—Minister of Health. Nothing is known of him.

7. *Ghulam Reza Ilhami*.—Minister of Finance. He was formerly head of the Tabriz Municipality and was removed from his post by the Central Government earlier this year for disloyal activities; he has presumably some administrative experience, but is false, wily, hypocritical and a great gambler.

8. *Yusuf Azima*.—Minister of Justice. He was formerly Public Prosecutor for both districts of Azerbaijan and was likewise discharged by the Central Government a few months ago. He was notoriously pro-Russian, an ardent Tudeh member and showed his partisanship openly in the Liqvan affair last August.

9. *Rabi'i Kabiri*.—Minister of Public Telephones and Roads. He is a native of the Maragheh region; said to have been of a wealthy family, but has squandered his patrimony and is now burdened with debts, has been most active in raising the peasants of the south and probably has the blood of several landlords on his hands; he has been in practically absolute control of the Maragheh region for several months past. He is a brother-in-law of General Hasan Muqaddam.

10. *Reza Rasuli*.—Minister of Commerce and Economics. He is a former municipal employee of Tabriz.

CHAPTER V.—SAUDI ARABIA

[E 5328/5328/25]

No. 17

Personalities in Sa'udi Arabia.—(Received in Foreign Office, 5th December, 1945.)

INDEX.

Note on Titles, &c.

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.

2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of Ali.

3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.

4. *Sheykh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, e.g., Sheykh Yusuf Yasin.

5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheykh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheykh" with age or desert life, e.g., Fuad Bey Hamza.

6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, e.g., Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.

7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheykh or anything equally honorific, e.g., Muhammad Effendi 'Ali Ridha.

8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which it is not always easy to distinguish from "al," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) 'Abdurrahman al (son of) Faysal al (of the house of) Sa'ud," and the abbreviated names ibn Sa'ud or bin Sa'ud. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.

9. *Abu*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Colonel Glubb is known in the desert as "Abu Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, e.g., 'Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhl. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where

Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

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1. Royal Family.

(1) *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān al-Faysal al Sa'ūd*.—King of Sa'ūdi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ūd.

Born probably in 1882. Accompanied father on flight from Riyadh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family. Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyadh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahmān survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Hail in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Huseyn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Huseyn's son and successor 'Ali. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated this position by the Sa'ūdi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May, 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najrān. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of Aqaba to just north of Medi in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'ūd has measured his titles by his acquisitions. He became in 1902 Amir of Nejd and Imām of the Wahhābis; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'ūdi Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions, though without express mention of 'Asir.

The hero of this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 foot 3 inches in height and handsome except for a blotch across the left eye due to neglected leucoma. He combines a strong character with courage, much native shrewdness and a charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a persuasion he imposes at least the forms of Wahhābism. His own Wahhābism is sincere, but tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is known to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting. In 1938 it was observed that he walked slowly and stiffly, and Mr. Philby stated that he was not only averse to physical exertion, but also indifferent to public affairs; but he subsequently showed great activity of mind in the Palestine discussions.

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassalish.

Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time of the visit to Riyadh of Sir Andrew Ryan. His relations with Great Britain have been mainly friendly, and since 1939 he has acted as though he firmly believed in his repeated asseverations, that his interests and those of the Arabs in general are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government. In earlier editions he was described as expecting much for love, but his attitude throughout the Palestine crisis of 1937-39 and during Rashid Ali's rebellion in Iraq in 1941 entitles him to the cancellation of that description. He has been unwavering in his sympathy for the Allied cause throughout the present war and he has proved by his acts that he is ready to give "his friends, the British Government," every support possible in his peculiar and only partly civilised country. In January 1945 King Farouq of Egypt visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Yenbo. The visit was ostensibly a private one, but was marked with much oriental pageantry and much publicity. This was followed by a visit from the Syrian President, Shukri Kuwatly, early in February. In the same month, Ibn Sa'ūd, at the invitation of President Roosevelt, who was on his way home from the Yalta conference, went to Egypt on a United States destroyer and met the President at the Bitter Lakes. As Mr. Churchill was also in Egypt at the same time, the King was very anxious to see him, and a meeting was arranged in the Fayoum on the 17th February. He returned to Jedda on a British cruiser, His Majesty's Ship *Aurora*, after an absence of eight days. On the 1st March, Ibn Sa'ūd declared war on Germany and Japan (with reservations in respect of the Holy Places) thus qualifying Sa'ūdi Arabia for membership of the United Nations and participation in the San Francisco Conference. A personal visit by the Viceroy of India to Riyadh, on his way to India, in early June gave the King great pleasure. British army medical specialists who examined the King in February at his request, found that his general physical condition was excellent and his expectation of life unusually good for a man of his age, but warned him against abuse of the stimulants upon which his private life now depends for its satisfaction and prestige.

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best English authority on the Sa'ūd family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

Sons. All Amirs.

(2) *Sa'ūd ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born at Kuwait in 1901 or early 1902 of a lady of Sa'ūdi stock. Has for some years been Viceroy of Nejd, and until 1934 seldom visited the Hejaz. Until 1935 he was less travelled than his half-brother, Amir Faysal, having only left the country once when he went to consult an oculist in Egypt shortly after the "Mahmal" incident of 1926. In 1935, however, he visited Europe and visited several capitals including London where he stayed about five weeks (he received the G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Sa'ūdi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 he visited India.

Sa'ūd's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1933. He resembles his father in appearance and physique. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ūd's "magnetic smile." Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji and Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic, but since his return from Europe has shown many signs of a broadened outlook and little, if any, of the fanaticism which seemed to characterise him earlier. Had commanded on the Eastern front in the Sa'ūdi-Yemen

war. He now affects a European style of entertaining—even serving afternoon tea to his English visitors—and prides himself on his skill in the management of Christian cutlery, to the amusement of his father, who calls him "Sa'ūd the Civilised." He professes a desire to see Sa'ūdi Arabia progress on Western lines (*e.g.*, introduction of air communications, modern architecture, &c.). He claims that he himself designed his country house at Badia near Riyadh, the amenities of which include a swimming pool. He owns a cinema projector and gives regular showings of British news films. When His Majesty's Minister visited Riyadh in February 1942 Sa'ūd broke with Arabian custom by inviting the ladies of the party to dinner. His eldest son, Fahad, was born about 1925, and was married to a daughter of the Amir Faysal, No. 1 (3), in May 1943. Is being allowed by his father to take an increasing share in the internal administration of the country and was present at many of the audiences between His Majesty's Minister and the King in September 1943 and March 1944. Appointed Commander-in-chief of the Sa'ūdi army in March 1944.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhāb in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba. Reported intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe: in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England, France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932, when he headed the Sa'ūdi mission which visited London and many other capitals. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards. At first very listless and rather nervous in European company, but could rise to an occasion, as he showed in 1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. His decorum is not known to have broken down until he reached Kuwait, where his indulgence in night-life scandalised the Sheykh and his subjects. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ūd's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Suleymān, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymān had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyadh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura. Represented Sa'ūdi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last two years or so he has acquired much more self-confidence and tries to fill his rôle as Foreign Minister by showing an up-to-date knowledge of events. He talks freely and intelligently in the company of Europeans whom he knows. He has none of his father's picturesqueness of language, but speaks a very pure Arabic, clearly enunciated, with little trace of the Nejd accent which all his brothers possess. On occasion he is capable of acting with firmness within the instructions given to him by the King, as was shown in the expulsion of the Italian Minister in February 1942. Visited America and England from September to December 1943 with his brother, Khalid (No. 1 (5)). The two Amirs, who were accompanied by the Shaikh Hāfiz Wahba (No. 25), travelled all the way by air. On their return journey, in December 1943, visited the battlefields in North Africa. Headed the Sa'ūdi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. A private

visit to London, where he may require to receive medical treatment for gastric ulcers, is projected for the summer of 1945.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born in or about 1913. Headed the Sa'ūdi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khalid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Sa'ūd in 1937 and 1938. Lives mostly at Riyadh, visiting the Hejaz only for the pilgrimage. Said to be popular with the tribes. Appears to be being brought gradually into his father's counsels; was present, together with the Amir Sa'ūd, at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King at Riyadh in March 1942. Visited India for health reasons in June 1943 together with Mansur No. 1 (9) and Shaikh 'Abdullah Suleiman (No. 11). Owing to their indiscreet and extravagant living their visit was not a success. Returned in October 1943. Accompanied his father to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. He, together with two other joy-riding princes (Fahad and Nawwāf—see list of sons below), accompanied the Sa'ūdi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

(5) *Khalid ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above. Accompanied his brother Faysal when they visited America and England in the winter of 1943.

(6) to (27). Sons of 20 and less in 1939 numbered twenty-two. The following is a correct list in order of age: Nāsir (1920), Sa'ūd (1921), Fahad (1921), Mansūr (1921), 'Abdullah (1922), Bandar (1924), Sultān (1924), Musā'id (1927), Mish'al (1927), 'Abdul-Muhsin (1928), Mūshari (1932), Muteb (1933), Talāl (1933), 'Abdur-Rahman (1933), Turki (1934), Badr (1934), Nawwāf (1934), Navef (1935), Fawwāz (1936), Ma'jid (1937), Sulmān (1938) and (?) (1939). Two of them, Mish'al and Sultān, are said to be adopted sons, of the family of the Beni Rashid.

Mansūr, No. 1 (9), deserves separate notice. His mother, a Caucasian concubine, was the King's favourite until her death in 1938. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He likes machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and spends a good deal of his time at the Royal garage in Riyadh. Usually in charge of arrangements when the King moves from Riyadh to the Hejaz or to camp, and is said to be responsible for the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyadh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jedda he gave an interview (with his father's approval of his remarks) to a representative of the B.B.C., which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jedda and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector. Visited India, for health reasons, in June 1943 with his brother, Muhammad and 'Abdullah Suleiman. In October and again in November he visited Palestine for further medical treatment, returning with Faysal, whom he joined in Egypt, in December 1943. Appointed Minister of Defence in March 1944. Visited Khartoum in December 1944 to arrange for the training there of Sa'ūdi army personnel in driving and maintenance. Accompanied his father for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in Egypt in February 1945. Acting Viceroy during the absence of the Amir Faysal at the San Francisco Conference.

Talāl, No. 1 (18).—One of the King's favourite sons. His mother, Umm Talāl, one of the royal concubines, is the King's favourite. Talāl went to

Egypt in August 1944, on board H.M.S. *Sagitta*, for medical treatment. He was found to be suffering from syphilis, and after not very successful treatment returned by air in October.

Brothers. All Amirs.

No. 28 in 1943 report, *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman*.—Died July 1943 (see obituary).

(28) and (29) Sa'd and Sa'ud, who died in 1916 and 1939 respectively. The former left three sons: Faysal, Sa'ud and Fahad; and the latter two: Muhammad and Faysal.

(30) *'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahman*.—Born about 1894. Described as neat and spruce in appearance and as ambitious in character, so that King keeps him also well in hand. Seems to like ships, as he visited H.M.S. *Emerald* by special request in 1926 and H.M.S. *Clematis* with King's younger sons in 1928. He takes a keen interest in agriculture. Accompanied King on pilgrimage and visit to Jeddah in 1942 and in 1943 and on his visit to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

(31) to (34) *Ahmad, Mus'ud, Sa'd and 'Abdul Muhaim*.—Younger men, the children of the old age of 'Abdur-Rahman ibn Faysal.

'Arâif Branch. Also Amirs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arâif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ud ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyâdh. Their generic name of 'Arâif is one applied to raided camels, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ud in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(35) *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud ibn Faysal*.—Married the King's sister Nûra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ud's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ud al-'Arafa who was described in a report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ud. Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (q.v.) in October 1935.

2. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim.

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor vice the King's son Amir Khâlid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1926 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwan and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the 'Usba, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

3. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mu'ammâr.

Governor of Jeddah until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No. 1 (3)). Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'ammâr of Aynas, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhâbi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyâdh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to

Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajj 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He was keen on riding and other forms of sport until afflicted by paralysis in 1939. He went to India for special treatment in March 1941, but returned incurable in October 1941. Now completely deaf and unable to walk.

4. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mus'ud ibn Jiluwi ibn Sa'ud.

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hail since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwan rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asir rebels, and proceeded from Riyâdh to 'Abbâ and Jizân, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hail. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'udi-Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hail. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyâdh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud.

5. 'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamûd) ibn Zeyd.

Inspector of Bedouin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hail family said to be related to the Beni Rashid. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Ammân in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'udi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'udi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jedda. Sent to 'Ammân in August 1930 as Sa'udi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Bedouin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus in succession to Rusheyd Pasha.

6. 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid.

A leading figure among the Wahhâbi Ulama. Comes from Hail. Qâdhî of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ud, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qâdhî of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhâbi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejdî delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 12 (1)), bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hail. Was thought at that

time to favour the extremists of the Akhwan movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihâd at the time of the Ibn Rifâda rebellion in 1932.

7. 'Abdullah Kâzim.

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'udi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

8. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or 'Aqayil).

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifâda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebûk, but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Ikhwan mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifâda.

9. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhî.

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Principal member of the Fadhl family q.v. Was formerly a merchant in Jedda. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jedda. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ud at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ud and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amir occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ud by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Suleymân by cornering bezine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhlis. Acting Viceroy during Faysal's absence in 1939 and again during Faysal's absence in the winter of 1943.

10. 'Abdullah an Nafisi.

Important as being Ibn Sa'ud's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a

large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

11. 'Abdullah ibn Suleymân al-Hamdân.

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian 'Ancyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 1919. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwân. Rose to be head of the Diwân. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jedda. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al-Fadhî (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawîl mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazîr, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed in 1935 to the specific additional post of Deputy Minister of Defence. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development. In recent years has often spent long periods at Jedda acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking turns in that duty with Yusuf Yasin. The main burden of dealing with the Italian Minister's procrastinations and evasions in January and February 1942 fell on him and he acquitted himself very creditably. He was the originator of the agricultural development scheme at Al Kharj and showed great energy and enthusiasm in the face of much hostility, envy and ill-natured criticism from his brother advisers. A keen fisherman and a tireless traveller, his other pleasures include tobacco and the bottle. He has a good sense of humour and repartee sharpened in many verbal battles with his rivals. His position was weakened somewhat by the dismissal in April 1944 of his friend and protégé Najib Salha (No. 66) whose pro-American enthusiasm he is thought to share. Was a very harassed and worried man during 1944 when faced with the prospect of having to reorganise the country's finances and economy on sounder lines. Accompanied the King to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Is cultivated by the Americans whose increasing tendency to play the rôle of Lady Bountiful to Saudi Arabia naturally appeals to him as Minister of Finance. The abuse of his official position by his brother Hamad, and the latter's sons, is gross and scandalous.

12. Abdul-Wahhâb, Descendants of.

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhâbism:—

(1) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*.—Is one of the leading Wahhâbi Ulama in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926, with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (q.v.), in the Wahhâbi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Ikhwan extremists. Signed

the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qadhī. Proud and fanatical.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sheykh*, nicknamed as-Sahābi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyādh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amīr Sa'ūd.

(3) *'Abdul-Latif Family*.—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihād referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amīr Faysal (q.v.) also probably belong to this connexion.

13. 'Abdul-Wahhāb Abū Malha.

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Sheykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ūd to negotiate with the Imām Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ūdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

14. 'Abdur-Ra'ūf as-Sabbān.

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1888 and 1893. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jeddah and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jeddah, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ūdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbāghs. Given a post by the Amīr 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār-al-Hijāzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ūd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amīr 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Bagdad, where he was understood to have become a private secretary to the late ex-King Ali. Returned to the Hejaz with or at the same time as Ahmad-al-Mujallid in July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a member of the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Ibn Saud in Egypt. Appointed Director-General of Waqfs in December 1942 in succession to Seyyid Abdul-Wahhāb.

15. Muhammad Sa'id al Kurdi.

Formerly Director of Police in Jeddah. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the legation by trying to commandeer a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jeddah in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Was removed from his post in Jeddah and apparently reappointed to Rabigh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jeddah in 1936, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and a real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height.

16. 'Abdur-Rahman al-Bassām.

Second Assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Egypt. Speaks English. Helped Sheikh Yusuf Yasin with the English

versions of the Sa'ūdi-Koweit Agreements signed at Jeddah in April 1942.

17. 'Ali Taha.

Assistant Governor of Jeddah since 1928. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence, but frightened of his own shadow. Serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jeddah from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with His Majesty's Legation. Has a working knowledge of French but is afraid to use it. Reverted to his former post of Assistant Governor on the appointment in April 1945 of a new Governor, Abdurrahman Sdayri (q.v.).

18. Bujād (or Humayd) Family.

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe. A confusing effect is produced by the use in past reports of the names Sultān ibn Bujād, ibn Humayd ibn Bujād and ibn Bujād *tout court*, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is assumed in what follows regarding:—

(1) *Sultān ibn Humayd ibn Bujād*.—Once one of Ibn Sa'ūd's stalwarts and one of the commanders of his troops when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a daughter married to the King's brother Muhammad. Noted early in 1927 as one of the extremists who were then inclining against the King. Became reconciled with him later, but finally stood in with Ibn Sa'ūd's opponents in the Nejd rebellion of 1929 and was accounted second only to Faysal ad-Dawish in importance. Was one of the earlier leaders to fall into the King's hands and was imprisoned at Riyādh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close confinement, as no record has been found of the death of Sultān ibn Bujād, the best known of the names cited above, and "ibn Humayd" was mentioned as one of the prisoners who were receiving more lenient treatment than before, though, unlike the others, he was still not allowed to see his women-folk. May still prove important, as he had a strong hold on his tribesmen, some of whom were reported sullen over his imprisonment.

(2) *Nāif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd*.—A pretender to the chieftainship of the 'Ateyba, but moved to Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by No. (1). Played with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 and sent a minor relative, 'Obeyd, to spy out the land, but was apparently dissuaded by King Faysal from going ahead. Mentioned in 1932 as being still a refugee in Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mazyūna, sister of Faysal ad-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.

19. Dabbāgh Family.

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (i.e., some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifāda and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyādh in June-July 1932, viz:—

- (1) *Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah* and
- (2) *'Isa ibn 'Abdullah*.

More important are the following persons abroad:—

(3) *Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah*, brother of the above. Migrated to Mokalla in or about 1926. Has since done school-mastering in South-West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ūd. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb-al-Ahrār al-Hijāzi and their National Pact. Sought,

and probably enlisted, the support of Shauqat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently at loggerheads with Ibn Sa'ūd at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrār seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jami'at ad-Dif'a lil Hijāz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse attitude of British authorities and seems to have since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Returned to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper Yafa' country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians. Arrested in the Hadhramaut in June 1942. Deported and handed over to the Saudi authorities who detained him in Jizan. Attempted to escape early in 1944 but was unsuccessful and has been kept in chains ever since. Otherwise well-treated by the local Amīr.

(4) *M. 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drowned at Jizān, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *M. Tāhir ibn Mas'ūd*, uncle of the above. Described as "an egg-shaped man." Born in 1890. Had some employment under King Huseyn. Obtained British-protected passport at Cairo in 1926 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahej to Amīr Shākir of the 20th February, 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ūdi Government, and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. Was excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after promulgation of amnesty early in 1935. Returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia that year and in 1936 was appointed Director of Education. Suspected of being involved in the Sherifian plot, 1940-41, but later pardoned by the King.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated, but they all seem to hang together and to have *attaches* with Hashimites. One, Mas'ūd, a hanger-on at 'Ammān, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifāda affair and was killed with Ibn Rifāda. The family also have *attaches* with the Idrisis, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Huseyn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh al-Idrisi.

20. Dawish Family.

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyādh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheykh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in reports from Kuwait.

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ūd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyādh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel

Mutayr and 'Ajman, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises; a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied; and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdullah.

21. Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family.

Nejdis of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original 'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ūd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ūd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention:—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jeddah and does a tidy trade in grain. Disinherited by his father in 1943 as a result of a quarrel.

(2) *Ibrahim ibn Abdurrahman*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amīr Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amīr Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amīr Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahman ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jeddah and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amīr Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of chargé d'affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a legation there with the Sa'ūdi Minister in London as minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymān. Later became Director of Finance in Jeddah, then Government representative to the Arabian-American Oil Company at Dhahran and now Sa'ūdi representative for supply matters in Bahrain. Speaks English.

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Suleymān al-'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-ul-Diwān of the Amīr Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amīr Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions. As a young man spent considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners. Accompanied the Amīr Faysal

to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Has been suggested as a possible minister in London; but for some reason Ibn Saud does not like him.

22. *Fahad ibn Zu'ayr.*

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ud. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ud with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizân. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933.

23. *Fawzân as-Sâbiq.*

Sa'udi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul-general in Cairo. Appointed in August 1930 upon the conclusion of the Sa'udi-Egyptian Treaty of May 1930. Previously Sa'udi agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqayl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammân. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ud's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Sa'udi Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Sir Walter Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work. A keen race-goer who spends much of his time at the races in Cairo and Alexandria.

24. *Fuad Bey Hamza.*

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Abeih, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'id was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Abeih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Danlûji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Danlûji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Danlûji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on

the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'udi Mission under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fuad and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1934 and 1935 and conducted important negotiations with the Foreign Office, and in 1939 went to London with the Amir Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish, but is hampered by lack of more than elementary French. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ud as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Is used by the King as his instrument for foreign affairs, and makes the most of his position, but does not enjoy Ibn Sa'ud's full confidence, so that his power varies. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymân and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'udi Arabia, a name of which was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. Has been spoken of as anti-British, and as pro-Soviet; probably wrongly. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ud. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built out of legitimate savings, even supplemented by a sum of £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

In 1939 was appointed first Sa'udi Minister to Paris. Removed to Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940. Withdrawn from there and appointed first Sa'udi Minister in Angora where he proceeded in April 1943. It is clear that the King does not want him to return to Sa'udi Arabia, and the great power he once wielded has passed entirely into the hands of his rival, Yusuf Yasin.

Incurred the King's displeasure by intrigues and attempts at mediating between the French and the Syrians and the latter and the Lebanese when on a visit to the Lebanon during the troubles in November 1943. Was permitted to return to Sa'udi Arabia in April 1944 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ud in April and May. Left for Angora again in the autumn of 1944 but lingered on in Beirut on the way and meddled in the abortive Franco-Syrian negotiations early in 1945, before returning to Turkey. His record during the Vichy period in France was not reassuring.

25. *Hâfiz (Hâfidh) Wahba.*

Sa'udi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrein at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Sa'ud's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well.

Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ud's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir's Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ud at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fuad Hamza are deadly enemies. Has during his tenure of the legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy. Represented Sa'udi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938.

Hâfiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ud, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ud on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhâbi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect and confidence he commands. He was on leave in Sa'udi Arabia early in 1940 and returned via Koweit, where he settled with the Political Agent the temporary form of the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Accompanied the Amirs Faysal and Khalid on their visit to America and England in the winter of 1943. He returned with them to Sa'udi Arabia in December 1943 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King in March and April 1944. Showed himself genuinely concerned at state of country's finances and general corruption of Sa'udi officials. The King appeared to consider him as one of his most trustworthy counsellors. He returned to England in April 1944. Visited the King again in January 1945 and accompanied him to Egypt in February for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Was a member of the Sa'udi delegation which attended the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Will probably be chosen by Ibn Saud to be first Sa'udi Minister in Washington.

26. *Hamad Suleymân.*

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrein and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his

brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hassa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khâlid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'udi mission to the Yemen in 1933, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at San'a on the situation with Sa'udi Arabia deteriorating. Returned well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1934. In 1935 was a member of a Sa'udi delegation which visited Bahrein, to negotiate the Transit Dues Agreement, and to Kuwait, to discuss the question of the Sa'udi blockade of that neighbouring State. Whilst at Bahrein he was sued by a local Persian merchant, the political agent reported, for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Sa'ud in the spring of 1936 (as he had done at least once previously) but was apparently begged off by his brother 'Abdullah. Of even meaner appearance than his brother, a poor talker and not, apparently, very intelligent. He disclosed to His Majesty's Minister at Taif in 1942 that his favourite outdoor sport was throwing stones. His eldest son, Suleymân-al-Hamad, born about 1917, takes some part in public affairs: he was for a time director of the agricultural project at Al-Kharj, and early in 1943 he went to Egypt to buy machinery and spare parts for the Minister of Finance; Suleymân represented Shaikh Yusuf Yasin as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's absence in October and November 1943. Visited Egypt again from May to July 1944, ostensibly on Government business, but managed to find time to indulge in lavish personal expenditure on the Government's account. He is a shallow, self-seeking young man.

27. *Hamdi Bey.*

Formerly Director-General of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1896. Believed to be an 'Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ud and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became officer commanding in Jedda in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Fawzi Bey Kawokpi. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British staff of the Hejaz air force in 1931-32. Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any important military position and to be confined to duties as A.D.C. to the Amir Faysal. Stated in 1939 that he had resigned and wanted to return to Iraq, but was not allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country. Boon companion of the Amir Faysal's Albanian step-father-in-law, Ibrahim Adham. In spite of a gorgeous uniform gives an impression of seediness and has been known to touch a member of the legation for a loan of 2 riyals.

28. *Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani.*

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Sa'udi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hojazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faysal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen

valuable from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'udi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ud's Diwan in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage, and is now frequently present at meetings of the "cabinet."

29. Hithlayn Family.

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydan ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Nāif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed *Abū 'l Kilāb*).—Succeeded Dhaydan and carried on the revolt, but surrendered in January 1930 to the British authorities in Kuwait, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ud. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyadh, closely confined.

(2) *Hāsim ibn Hithlayn* also took an active part in the revolt, and was one of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Nāif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khālid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "debonair and handsome young warrior." Was one of the Mutayr and 'Ajman Sheikhs living in Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair, apparently to size up the chances of new anti-Sa'udi action. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud and returned to Sa'udi Arabia towards the end of 1934. Appointed Amir al Bādi'a or Governor of the Ajman desert, with headquarters at 'Aweyma (80 miles W.N.W. of Al Qatif) in 1936.

30. Huseyn al'Awayni (or Aouzini).

A young Syrian merchant established in Jedda. An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin and having connexions in Manchester; notably with another Syrian, 'Abdul-Ghani Ydlibi, the naturalised British head of a small company there. This association was closed early in 1932, when Ydlibi visited Jedda in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire, specifically that of the Calico Printers' Association (Limited). It was understood in 1932 that 'Awayni was leaving Jedda for good, but he still returns occasionally. In February or March 1933 he went to Riyadh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khdiva's group for the creation of a national bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used. Closely associated in business with Najib Salha (q.v.). Spends most of his time in Beirut, where he is said to act as Ibn Sa'ud's semi-official purchasing agent. Although nothing has yet been proved against him, the British security authorities regarded him for a long time as suspect and only reluctantly agreed to his return to the Lebanon. Visited Ibn Sa'ud in February 1944 and returned to Beirut in April. Ibn Sa'ud wished to appoint him first Sa'udi Minister in Beirut, but later

agreed with His Majesty's Government that his appointment would be unsuitable.

31. M. Huseyn Nasif.

A well-known Hejazi of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jedda of the Sherifs of the 'Abdillah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jedda and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jedda. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhābi by conviction, even before the Sa'udi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ud up during the years following the fall of Jedda, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace." Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'udi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jedda for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the Palestine Defence Committee in Mecca in 1937-38.

32. Ibrahim al Mu'ammār.

Katmakam of Jedda 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in *The Heart of Arabia* and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Mu'ammār, which he subsequently assumed. In early life travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ud's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Sa'ud in 1932. In 1933 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jedda considerably, is useful in pilgrimage matters, and is helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but is not now trusted by the King or the Amir Faysal in confidential matters.

His eldest son, Abdullah, born about 1920, formerly served under Yusuf Yasin in the Political Bureau at Riyadh and has now (May 1943) been appointed first secretary at the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad. Another son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, born about 1923, is a student at the American University of Beirut. A hearty rogue, he was dismissed in April 1944 as a result of a scandal connected with a slave-girl and his unblushing peculation of Government stores and smuggling activities.

33. Ibrahim Shakir.

Born about 1903 in the Hejaz of Turkish-Syrian parents. Was employed as chief clerk in the Jedda Quarantine Department during the latter part of the Hashimite régime. Next heard of as partner of Hussain al-Awayni (q.v.) in 1927. Has since managed Awayni's piece-goods business in Jedda and acquired a considerable personal fortune in conjunction with Awayni and Najib Salha (q.v.). Acts as land agent for the Amir Faysal. In 1943 built a large mansion outside Jedda, which he has now (July 1944) let to the United States Legation at an

exorbitant rental. Has also built a luxurious villa in Cairo. A close friend of Yusuf Yasin. Director of the "Sa'udi Arabian Trading Company" formed in January 1945 which advertises itself as importers of cars, tyres, refrigerators and miscellaneous machinery. The Dodge car agency formerly held by 'Awayni has been taken over by the company. According to Ibrahim Shakir two-thirds of the capital are owned by him and a third by Najib Salha. Ibrahim Shakir has also obtained the agencies of the Banque Misr and other Misr organisations including the Misr Steamship Line in Sa'udi Arabia, and he is associated with Abdullah Suleyman in the exploitation of a valuable agricultural area near Hadda in the Wadi Fatma. He is used also by American big business.

34. Izzet Din Shawa.

Born about 1905 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well-known family. Educated at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, where he took a diploma in agriculture. Speaks flawless English. Joined the rebels and took an active part against the British during the Palestine troubles in 1937-38. Was at one time private secretary to the Mufti. Violently anti-Jew. Came to Iraq in 1940 with his wife, who is French, and joined Rashid Ali's rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after the rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Sa'ud provided he refrained from political activities. He has been in Sa'udi Arabia ever since and has kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at Al Khari' early in 1944 and in April Director of the Office of Public Works at Jedda in succession to Najib Salha. A sincere Nationalist, he is outspoken about his views on Palestine, but is not really anti-British. The legation has found him to be an intelligent and co-operative colleague in his new job, and therefore a pleasant change from the majority of Sa'udi officials. Has a son at Victoria College. Enjoys the confidence and support of the King and has succeeded to a large extent in clearing out the Augean stables of the Office of Public Works and, as Director of Transport, of the Government garage. He engaged a number of Egyptian technicians for the latter and two Palestinian assistants for the Office of Public Works. In June 1945 he resigned the post of Director of Transport in favour of one of his Egyptian assistants but he still remains in control. Because of his relative honesty and go-ahead methods he is not popular with his Sa'udi colleagues. He professes considerable dislike of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin (q.v.) who is jealous of Izzet Din's prestige with the King. Ibn Saud might give him more important duties, were Shaikh Abdullah Suleyman to die.


35. Muhammad Id Rawwāf.

Formerly Sa'udi Consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ud and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English bank-notes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian Nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ud as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwāf, whom he

succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'udi official life and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad Id Rawwāf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (q.v.) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed Acting Governor (Katmakam, not Amir) of Jedda, but in 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammār. Ceased to be chargé d'affaires at Bagdad in 1938, when a Sa'udi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers.

36. Idrisi Family.

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisi supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abū 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with 'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth:—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.


(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ud in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abbā.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ud by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ud, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud in November 1932, and on its collapse in due course took refuge in Yemen. After strenuous efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ud agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imām's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."

(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masāriha and other tribes in 1924 against an attempt to displace him by his cousin Mustafa, No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeyda, then an Idrisi possession. 'Ali, in turn, lost Hodeyda to the Imām in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyadh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a coup in 'Asir. Attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5), who died on the 5th April, 1935, were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul-Al' or 'Abdul-Mutal'. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt. The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia:—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin 'Ali, No. (3). Died in Egypt in 1930.

(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ud's dominions. Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Was politically active for many years. Worked normally, it was alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'udi rôle in 1926-27, at the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ud's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jeddah on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stonehewer Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'udi, but not pro-Wahhābi. Accused by the Sa'udi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Was at Jizān at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit to Kamaran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senūsīs, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrīsīs have also a connexion with the Mirghāni family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

36A. Kaaki Family.

The war has brought into the limelight the previously unknown family of Kaaki. Reputedly of Syrian origin but long resident in the Hejaz, this family followed the traditional family calling of baking, as their name suggests. They dabbled in the money market and various members of the family were small independent money changers. They are now the real financiers of Sa'udi Arabia, and no money transaction ever now takes place without the Kaakis being directly concerned. They owe their present position first to Najib Salha (q.v.), the venal right hand man of Abdullah Suleyman and former Director of Public Works, and to Abdullah Suleyman himself. Since His Majesty's Government started paying an annual subsidy to Ibn Sa'ud the Kaakis have made money at will. A high proportion of the subsidy goods that come into the country are dealt with by this family, and through their machinations and those of Najib and of Abdullah Suleyman much of the gold presented by His Majesty's Government has eventually found its

way into the coffers of one or other of the various Kaaki firms. In 1944 Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki, the most important combination, were discovered in an attempt to smuggle £.gold 25,000 to Egypt. This money was confiscated and there were rumours of dire reprisals on the law-breakers. These however gradually faded into the background and when Ibn Sa'ud arrived in Jeddah after meeting King Farouq at Yenbo Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki petitioned His Majesty on the grounds that they did not know that they were doing wrong and the King, fresh from his successful entertainment of King Farouq, pardoned the Kaakis and returned them the money. It is certain that Abdullah Suleyman arranged this, Sadaka and Siraj having advanced the money by which Ibn Sa'ud was able so royally to entertain King Farouq. A rough estimate of the family fortune is about £.gold 300,000 of which Sadaka and Siraj have, at the very least, £.gold 175,000, besides valuable property in Mecca. In April 1945 they started to interest themselves in real estate and began by purchasing from the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleyman, the Banque Misr Hotel and several other buildings in Mecca. The Banque Misr building alone cost £.gold 30,000.

The most important members of this family are:

(1) *Sadaka Kaaki* and

(2) *Siraj Kaaki*.—Brothers, these two are partners in the most lucrative business in the country. They are the Government brokers and are represented in every town in the Hejaz and the Nejd with the exception of Medina where the financial activities of Sheikh Mohammed-al-Khuraifi are protected by his son-in-law, Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman. The firm of S. & S. Kaaki is by far the most important of the Kaaki firms. Its 1940 capital was about £.gold 10,000—and is now at least £.gold 175,000. (See also remarks above.)

(3) *Abdul Aziz Kaaki*.—A money changer in Jeddah who also owns a bakery business. Abdul Aziz's pre-war worth was about £.gold 2,000—and now he can boast of something like £.gold 20,000. He also partners his two uncles (see 4 and 5) in another firm of money changers in Jeddah and Mecca, the capital of this being separate from the figure £.gold 20,000—mentioned above.

(4) *Salah Moussa Kaaki* and

(5) *Abdullah Moussa Kaaki*.—These two are brothers and uncles, it is believed, of (1), (2) and (3) above. Before the war they were the most affluent of the Kaaki family and flourished in Mecca with a capital of something like £.gold 15,000. Their present capital exceeds £.gold 60,000—and from their partnership with Abdul Aziz Kaaki (3) above they have a share of a business which hardly existed before the war but is now worth £.gold 15,000.

37. Khālid Al Qarqani (alias Al Hād, alias Abu'l Walid).

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senūsī, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahmān 'Azzām Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senūsī cause, former Egyptian Minister to Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia. Al Qarqani was brought to Ibn Sa'ud's notice, it is said, by Sheikh Hāfiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German Consul, de Haas. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleyman (q.v.) to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idrīsī and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following year, with Turki al Madhi, formed an

equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Sa'udi-Yemen war. Was a Sa'udi delegate to the Bahrain Transit Dues and Koweit Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'udi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (added in 1939). Acted as buyer for certain German goods for the Sa'udi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of Amīr Sa'ud, but later in the year officially appointed to that of Ibn Sa'ud. Said to have a large salary. Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war on a mission to purchase arms for Sa'udi Arabia. Had an interview with Hitler, but was otherwise unsuccessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech. Speaks French and Turkish and perhaps Italian. Claims to have travelled a good deal in Europe, including Russia, and is regarded by Ibn Sa'ud as an expert on European affairs. An interesting talker but can be waspish. Said by some people to be anti-British but is probably only rather sourly pro-Arab. Is now in poor health (1943). Attempts by His Majesty's Legation to obtain permission for Khālid (who has been given only two years to live by his doctors) to settle in Egypt with his family have so far (June 1945) proved unsuccessful.

38. Muhammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mādhi.

A Nejdī, formerly Governor of Jizan. Transferred about 1940 to be Governor of Al Khobar, which post he now holds. Speaks nothing but Arabic and that with a strong Nejdī accent. Comes much into contact with the Americans of the Arabian American Oil Company at Dhahran and was lavish in his hospitality to His Majesty's Minister when he visited Dhahran in March 1942. Earned the gratitude of the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their aircraft force-landed on Tarūt Island in January 1942. A younger brother is Governor of the town of Al-Qatif, and another brother, 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mādhi, is Governor of Dhiba.

39. Mehdi Bey.

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in his functions was announced or observed. An 'Iraqi, who has, however, lived little in 'Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army, in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in King Huseyn's army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A man of organising ability, and the Mecca orphanage, which is under his charge, has been declared by a competent Indian witness to be the best-organised concern in Sa'udi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to Hasa, he was given by Ibn Sa'ud the title of *al Muallih* (The Reformer).

40. 'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Mubārak.

Governor of Wefh. Little known to the Legation, but worth mentioning because of the importance of his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubārak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt.

41. Muhammad at-Tawil.

A native of Jeddah of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jeddah under King Huseyn. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Ali in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqāf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jeddah, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi, but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud after an absence at Riyādh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hasa. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appeared to have tightened up regulations and trodden on Qusaibi corns in the process, but not to have made the Hasa Customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrain, but he fell foul of the Arabian American Oil Company to such an extent that Sayyid Hāshim was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. At-Tawil was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed (against his will) manager of the Nejd Motor Transport Company. Since 1943 appears to have lived in retirement on his estate in Hasa. The company is now defunct.

42. Mustafa Badruddin.

Director of Customs in Jeddah. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jeddah custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu'. Transferred to Jeddah in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, obstructive and not very honest. Popularly supposed to hold "Axis views" and certainly conceals very well any affection he may have for the British. Is reputed to be well in with gangs of dhow-men smuggling goods across the Red Sea. Arrested in May 1944 when a large consignment of gold was caught being smuggled out of Jeddah to Egypt. Released shortly after.

43. Ibrahim an-Neshmi.

Formerly Amir of Jauf. Said to be a Nejdī; to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it; and to have escaped to the Sa'udi side, where his knowledge of the situation in Medina was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at Tebūk and perhaps at Yanbu' in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musā'id (q.v.) about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jauf, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. Reappeared subsequently as Governor of Al-'Ula, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933.

Is now (May 1934) one of the more important subordinate commanders in the Western Army on the Sa'udi-Yemen border. Governor of Turāba in 1934 until September 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Najrān.

44. Qattān Family.

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salim Quattān*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original Qattān family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter Alif from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under King Huseyn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *Abbās Qattān*, an ambitious young man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and still occupies that post. He is the right-hand man of Sheikh 'Abdullah Suleyman, Minister of Finance, and is chief organiser of the hotels at Mecca, Jedda and Medina.

45. Qusaibi Family.

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The legation is indebted to the political agent in Bahrain for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931, and of which the following is a summary:—

Said to be descended from a butcher of Riyādh. Composed of the five brothers mentioned below; children of the same mother by two brothers, Hasan and Ibrahim, who married her successively; partners in business and property; engaged in trade between Bahrain, their headquarters, Hasa and Nejd. Accounted, despite the acquisition of wealth, extremely plebeian and disqualified by Arab custom from intermarriage with women of better birth.

(1) *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Hasan*, simple and wise; the mainstay of the firm; reputed pious; respected by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was Sa'ūdi delegate to the abortive Blockade Conference at Kuwait in 1935.

(2) *'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Hasan*, more enlightened and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possessed of some knowledge of French and English and accustomed to go to Paris on pearl business. Sensible but conceited.

(3) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*, intelligent and sharp, but of mean and low character and meddlesome. Inclined to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ūd.

(4) *Hasan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character as (3). Hot tempered.

(5) *Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim*, permanently resident in Hasa. Not personally known to Captain Prior. Said to be a good "mixer," but similar in character to (3) and (4).

When the above information was supplied in 1931 the Qusaibis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ūd in Bahrain and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. *Abdurrahmān* was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'ūdi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Qusaibis with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by Muhammad at-Tawfī (q.v.). They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived

the Qusaibis of their general agency for him at Bahrain. The Amir Sa'ūd frequently employed the Qusaibis to buy goods for him in Bombay, but was said in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied with them and to be employing other agents.

46. Rashid Family.

Former rulers of Hāil. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, e.g., if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ūd. It is understood that, after the fall of Hāil, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation, and that many persons belonging to the Beni Rashid, or connected with them, passed into his entourage. Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashid lady, whom Ibn Sa'ūd married after their birth. Their names are—

- (1) *Sultān* and
- (2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling Ibn Rashid, as given in the 1917 volume of *Personalities in Arabia*. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the Beni Rashid, viz.:—

(3) *Mansūr ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ūd's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebūk; and his brother—

(4) *Nāsir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ūd, but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan in 1931.

As the information about this family is so meagre, it is worth noting that the following members of it accompanied Ibn Sa'ūd from Riyādh to Jedda in March 1934:—

(5) *Muhammad ibn Talāl* (a daughter of his was married to Ibn Sa'ūd in 1938).

(6) *Mash'al ibn Mas'ūd ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz*.

(7) *Rashid al Muheysin al Jabr*.

(8) *Sultān ibn Talāl al Jabr*.

(9) *Fahad ibn Hamūd al Jabr*.

Of these (6) and (8) may be identical with (1) and (2) given above. The *Umm al Qura* early in 1935 gave a list of the Beni Rashid who came to the Hejāz with Ibn Sa'ūd in March of that year. This list gave all the names, except (6), unless the name *Mash'al al Sa'ūd* in the 1935 list corresponded with the same person. Two other names appear in the 1935 list.

(10) *'Abdullah al Mit'ib*.

(11) *'Ubaid al 'Abdullah*.

At least one Ibn Rashid accompanied the King's son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in April, 1934.

The younger princes are greatly in evidence in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage, being treated generally very much like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid*, born about 1910. Lives at the Court of the King of Iraq (according to a 1935 report), out of whose privy purse he is said to receive a pension of about £20 a month. Twice stated to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar, cross the frontier and take Hāil, but returned on each occasion with standards still unfurled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily a rather dull, brooding young man, and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he would

quickly be off across the desert to recapture his ancestral home.

47. Rifāda Family.

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wejh. The most notable recent member of the family, *Suleymān Afnān*, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the Great War, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, Ibrahim and Ahmed. His brother Salim, who had died earlier, left a son, Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheikship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheikhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a coup at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Billi tribe in the Hejaz, but the Governor of Wejh is now Ibn Mubārak (see No. 40). The family have *attaches* with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.

48. Rushdi Malhas.

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Sa'ūdi Government, but no longer occupied post in 1936, though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position. In appearance a down-trodden little man, but away from his chief he is affable and talkative. Well read in Arabic literature and history. Speaks good Turkish and some French.

49. Sālih ibn Abu Bakr Shāta.

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on Committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jedda after the Sa'ūdi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ūd. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Sālih Shāta was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 67. Referred to in 1943 as "Second Deputy" of the Advisory Council.

50. Sdayri Family.

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ūd through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Six members of the family are worthy of notice, viz.:—

(1) *'Abdullah as-Sdayri*, Governor of Tebūk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1936 to Medina (see No. 2).

(2) *Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Asir, with headquarters at Abha.

(3) *'Abdul 'Aziz as-Sdayri*, Governor of Jauf, with headquarters at Qariyat. Because of the proximity of his Governorate to Transjordan and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country he is the best known and most important member of the family.

(4) *Muhammad as-Sdayri*, younger brother of (3), Governor of Sakaka.

(5) *Ahmad ibn Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Al-Qunfida.

(6) *Abdur Rahman as-Sdayri*, formerly Governor of Dhofar, appointed Governor of Jedda in April of 1945. A handsome, cruel-looking man of about 35. Not particularly bright, but wisely relies on Aly Taha (q.v.) for advice in his new post.

51. Sha'ibi Family.

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi*, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

(2) *'Abdullah ash-Sha'ibi*, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

52. Sherifan Family.

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Alī, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Alī, and whole clans known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abū Numei, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz.:—

The Dhāwī Zeyd,
The Abadilla, a particular branch of whom are the Dhāwī 'Aun, and
The Dhāwī Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhāwī Zeyd and Dhāwī 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhāwī 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify

this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who are worthy of notice:—

(A) *Dhāwī Zayd*.

(1) *Ali Haydar*.—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Auqaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support in obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ūd. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the eldest of whom, Abdul-Majid, is married to a Turkish princess (who is not, however, as stated in a previous Personalities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph 'Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Ali Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles's Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'afar Haidar*, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Ali Ja'far who lived at Lahaj in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul-Mutallib.

(3) *Sharaf Adnān Pasha al Ghālib as-Zayd*.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ūd won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ūd's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Ali brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ūd in 1927 at conference at Jizān to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.

(4) *Sharaf Ridha*, usually called Sherif Sharaf *tout court*.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears now (1943) to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(5) *Khalid*.—A nephew of the 'Ali Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ūd in 1932 and was active in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khalid Sadiq Adnān.

(B) *Dhāwī 'Aun*.

(6) *Ali ibn 'Abdullah*.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi.

(7) *Ali ibn Huseyn*.—Ex-King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jeddah in December 1925. Resided mostly in Bagdad, where he died on the 13th February, 1935.

(8) *Faysal ibn Huseyn*.—King of Iraq. Died in 1934 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, who died in 1939 leaving an infant son Faysal.

(9) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zayd ibn Huseyn*.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. Now resides in Turkey occasionally visiting his nephew the Amir 'Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nāsir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(10a) *'Abdul Hamid Al'Aun*.—Understood to be a grandson of (6). Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ūd in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyādh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) *Dhāwī Barakat*.

(11) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ūd and became Amir-al-Arbān, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. His present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stocks though not of the Dhāwī 'Aun*.

(12) *Shākir ibn Zayd ibn Fauwās*.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Amman in December 1934. Was a tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ūd and much less a play-boy than his master.

(13) *Hamūd ibn Zayd*, brother of the preceding.—Probably the same as the 'Sharif Hamūd' who joined the plot with No. (10a) and was carried off to Riyādh, dying, it is said, on the road.

(14) *Sharaf ibn Rājih*, a cousin of (12) and (13).—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tāhir ad-Dabbāgh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'ūdi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ūd.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila*.

(15) *'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansūr*.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyādh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(16) *'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi*.—One of the Sherifs of Mada'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyādh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jeddah family, one member of which was chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jeddah and sent to Riyādh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. 'Ali* and *Muhammad al-Bedeyri* (a diminutive of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyna tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932. M. 'Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to

get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifāda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

53. *Suwayt Family*.

Leaders in the Dhāfir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936:—

(1) *Ja'dān*, a disgruntled tribe, hovering between allegiance to King Faysal or to Ibn Sa'ūd and too proud to come to terms with either; and

(2) *'Ajami*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ūd.

54. *Abu Tuqayqa Family*.

Formerly chiefs of the Tihāma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweytāt tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhaba. Rafi'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafi'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ūd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'ūdi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifāda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahīm ibn Aḥmed ibn Rafi'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifāda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

(2) *Mahmūd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafi'a*, who rallied on Ibn Rifāda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ūd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

55. *Turki ibn Madhi*.

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fāhād ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ūd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Madhi, who, with Abdul-Wahhāb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imām Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imām early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ūd's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'ūdi Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in May 1943, and in the autumn of 1944 as Ibn Sa'ūd's special envoy to the Imām. The real purpose of his visit was to report on conditions in the Yemen. He described the people as groaning under the yoke of the Imām and anxious to transfer their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ūd.

56. *Yahya an Nasri*.

Principal quarantine doctor at Jeddah. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'ūdi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied

in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ūdi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1943 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmūd Hamdi Hamūda. (See 1937 report.) Reported to have suffered a mental collapse and to have left for treatment in January 1945.

57. *Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh*.

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the 'Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ūd in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdī delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damlūji, who resigned that year, and of Hāfiz Wahba (q.v.). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the 'Amir Faysal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwān in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad Hamza, in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'ūdi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers, except 'Abdullah Suleymān. Is probably a more convinced Wahhābi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a *bon vivant*. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the King and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays the clown when he judges the King to be in the mood. His gluttony and monogamy are standing palace jokes. He is very jealous of 'Abdullah al Suleymān and of the latter's powerful assistant, Najib Salha. Since 1941 has lived almost continuously in the Hejaz, spending most of his time in Jeddah. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Faysal being little more than a figure-head. He was the negotiator for Sa'ūdi Arabia of the Sa'ūdi-Koweit Agreements which he signed at Jeddah on the 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the *Umm-ul-Qura* and drafts official communiqués for publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in

Surbiton when he accompanied the Amir Sa'ud to England for the coronation of King George VI. Speaks Arabic with perhaps greater rapidity than any other man in Arabia and retains something of his native North Lebanon accent. Went on a visit to Lattaqia, where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943. A rapprochement took place between him and Najib Sálhá (No. 69) in 1943 and he bitterly opposed the latter's dismissal in April 1944, remaining in close touch with him after his departure to Egypt. During the discussions between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ud early in 1944 on the reorganisation of Sa'udi finances and economy was mostly obstructive and supported Abdullah Suleiman in opposing any proposals for reform. A pompous busybody, his loyalty to the King appears to be genuine though it occasionally serves as a cloak to hide personal motives. A difficult colleague with the small-mindedness of a Latakian grocer but not unpleasant if taken with a pinch of salt. His English continues to improve, thanks to the successive efforts of legation secretaries.

Was the Sa'udi delegate at the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference at Alexandria in October 1944, and signed the covenant of the Arab League on behalf of Sa'udi Arabia in March 1945. Accompanied Ibn Sa'ud on his visit to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. Was the Sa'udi delegate at the special meeting of the Arab League assembly in June to discuss the Syrian crisis.

58. *Muhammad Surúr as-Sabbán.*

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabbán family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ud when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyádh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed about two years ago to his present post. Became second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of the Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936 to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and said to be most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah, who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surúr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Since the dismissal of Najib Sálhá (q.v.) has rapidly regained his influence. Early in 1945 was reported to have quarrelled with Shaikh Abdullah Suleymán owing to the appointment over him of an Inspector in the Ministry of Finance. Left for Egypt in a huff in June. It is said that the Government owe him over £500,000.

59. *'Abdul Kerim ibn Zeyd.*

Appointed Governor of Qaf in 1936. Nephew of 'Abdul-Aziz ibn Zeyd (No. 5).

60. *'Abdullah Khawaiter.*

Of Nejd origin. Born about 1887. Intimate of 'Abdullah Suleymán and Hamad Suleymán with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surúr (No. 58).

61. *Asaf ibn Huseyn.*

Appointed Governor of Najrán and the "territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Rus.

62. *Ibrahim Shura.*

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Sheykh Hafiz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'udi Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

63. *Jamil Daúd al Musallimi.*

Legal adviser, or assistant, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1906. A Hejazi trained in Egypt. Good knowledge of English. Received his present appointment vice 'Id Rawraf (No. 35) in January 1936. This was notable chiefly as a Hejazi encroachment on what has been for some time almost a Syrian preserve, and was attributed to the influence of Amir Feysal. Jamil Daúd is brother of a pilgrim guide whose activities have come to the unfavourable notice of the legation. Has been found on many occasions obstructive and tactless. Is probably neither very intelligent nor energetic. Has shown himself latterly (1944) to be more co-operative in his dealings with the legation. Accompanied the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

64. *Kámil al Qassáb.*

Syrian. Born about 1875. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz under King Huseyn. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa'ud and became Sa'udi propagandist. Prominent in 1936 during troubles in Palestine on account of his activities as Ibn Sa'ud's go-between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Jerusalem, where he went from Egypt when charged with communications from Ibn Sa'ud. Paid an unobtrusive visit in summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa'ud to take part in a Moslem conference on Palestine. In 1942 was fishing for the post of Syrian representative to Sa'udi Arabia.

65. *Khairuddin Zuraikli.*

Syrian journalist. Born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Sa'ud. Later joined the latter. Adviser to the Sa'udi Agency in Cairo in 1935. Now (1943) Secretary of the Sa'udi Legation there. Counsellor of the legation in 1944. A crony of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin and Najib Sálhá. It is he and not the ageing Fawzan-as-Sabiq (q.v.) who runs the Sa'udi Legation which he skilfully uses as cover for the promotion of his personal interests and those of Yusuf Yasin, Najib Sálhá and other Syrians in the Sa'udi Government. Consequently he has done considerable harm to Sa'udi prestige. A thoroughly unpleasant type, unscrupulous and an intriguer. Attended the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference in Alexandria in October 1944 with Yusuf Yasin and also the discussions which led up to the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in March 1945. King Ibn Sa'ud has now (June 1945) decided to recall Khairuddin from Cairo to Jedda where he is to be Yusuf Yasin's assistant at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

66. *Muhammad Sádiq ibn 'Abdullah.*

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was commandant of the Jedda garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tahir ad-Dabbagh in anti-Sa'udi activities abroad. At instance of Sa'udi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tahir to Sa'udi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Auqáf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.

67. *Seyyid Muhammad Shata.*

Younger brother of Sálh ibn Abu Bakr Shata (No. 49). Born about 1908. Holder of an Egyptian degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia Courts.

68. *Muhsin at Tayyeb.*

Moroccan by origin. Born about 1887. Held police appointments under the Hashimite régime. Under Ibn Sa'ud he was similarly employed. Promoted at the beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa'udi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence. Attached as liaison officer to the British R.A.C. training unit which arrived in Taif in May 1944 to instruct the Sa'udi army in the handling of armoured cars presented to the Sa'udi Arabian Government by His Majesty's Government. An intriguer who is not popular with his colleagues and who in September 1944 was replaced by a younger officer.

69. *Najib Ibrahim Sálhá.*

A young man of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about 1902. Came in 1927 to the Hejaz via the Sudan, where employed for a short time by Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan) (Limited). After a short but troubled period of service with that firm in Jedda, he entered the Ministry of Finance. Speaks English well and has an easy manner. Made himself useful to the Minister of Finance, whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly-created department of the Ministry of Finance, styled the "Office of Public Works," established to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa'udi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah Sulaiman to the detriment of Muhammad Surúr, was employed as purchasing agent for the Government, and was enriching himself almost openly by bribery and commissions. Became indispensable to the Minister of Finance and was specially commissioned by the King to deal with supply matters, but found it difficult to exercise his functions without much interference from Yusuf Yasin. After the outbreak of war he was in constant contact with the legation and showed himself intelligent and frank. He worked very hard and co-operated most helpfully with the legation in the endeavour to organise the provisioning and finances of the country. Was free in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of most of the members of the Sa'udi Government and made many enemies but was loyally backed by 'Abdullah al Suleymán, and was probably the most efficient of all the King's servants. He was said to have enriched himself but this is scarcely remarkable in a country where emoluments are certain of payment only if the official is in a position to help himself. Although he abstains from tobacco and alcohol he makes no pretence of being a Wahhabi or even a very devout Moslem. Early in 1944 evidence came to light which showed him in his true colours. It was found that he had made use of his position to enrich himself, and one of his associates in crime now estimates his personal fortune at £360,000, in addition to a handsome account in the Guarantee Trust Bank of New York. It transpires that he had deliberately misinformed the legation

about the true supply and financial situation of the country in order to ensure the continuance of His Majesty's Government's generous assistance to Sa'udi Arabia and thereby to increase his own fortune. When in Cairo early in 1944 he began intriguing with the Americans, whom he had always sought to play off against the British, and warned His Majesty's Minister that the Sa'udi Arabian Government would ask for his recall if he were not more complacent over the matter of supplies and finance. Ibn Sa'ud, who learned of Najib's activities, was furious and dismissed him in April, in spite of strong pressure from Abdullah Suleiman and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, telling His Majesty's Minister that he had always disliked Najib and had only kept him on because he enjoyed British support. He is at present (July 1944) in Cairo, where he has started a transport company. Ibn Sa'ud, always generous to those that have served him, is said to be paying him a "retaining fee." His place as Director of the Office of Public Works at Jedda has been taken by Izzet Din Shawa (No. 34). Najib remains in Egypt, where he acts as unofficial agent of the Sa'udi Royal Family, and is in close touch with Yusuf Yasin and his associates. He has acquired valuable house property in Cairo, for which he has paid about half a million pounds. He is busy trying to obtain the agencies of American cars and is a partner of Ibrahim Shakir (q.v.) in the Sa'udi Arab Trading Company formed in January 1945.

70. *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi.*

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father in October 1935. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from Bahrein to take an even stronger line with the Bedouin than his father did, and that much of the father's work in the last four years of his life was, in fact, done by the son. Shows nervousness in the presence of foreigners, but this can be overcome. In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

71. *Sa'ud ibn Hedhlál.*

Appointed Governor of Tabúk in 1935 in succession to 'Abdullah as-Sdayri (No. 50(1)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start, partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

72. *Tala'at Wafa.*

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa'udi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa'udi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najrán, and O.C. regular forces in Najrán and Abha in 1936. Appointed Deputy Director of Public Security in 1943.

73. *Ibrahim Tásán.*

A Nejd born and brought up in Asir. Formerly in the Ottoman army. Now Commandant of the Jedda military district and "Director of the Air Force." Served in the Arab army of Sharif Hussein and was associated with Colonel Lawrence.

74. *Asad al Faqih.*

Syrian, a native of Aley in the Lebanon. Counsellor to the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards chargé d'affaires and appointed in 1943 to be minister there. Has some knowledge of English, and speaks French well. Member of the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

75. *Khalil Hajjan.*

Director of Police, Jeddah. Formerly in Turkish army. Captured by the British during the Great War, but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ud after the fall of Jeddah in 1925. A heavy drinker.

76. *Khuraiji, Shaikh Muhammad al-*

Father-in-law to Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

77. *Sa'd ibn Faisal.*

Governor of Duwadmi, 1938. Born about 1898. Son of a Royal slave.

78. *Shaikh al Ardh.*

Family name of two young Syrians, brothers. The elder, Midhat, who is doctor of the Royal ladies, accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee. He came to Riyadh as a penniless refugee and is known to have become rich in a few years, not by doctoring. Stated on very good evidence to have brought with him from Syria as maid to his wife an Armenian girl (entered on his passport as his sister) and to have handed over the unwilling girl to Ibn Sa'ud as a concubine. Accompanied the Amir Mansur on a visit to Egypt in March 1942. The younger brother, Fakhri, who describes himself as an agricultural expert, was in charge of a small experimental garden at Riyadh in 1939, and was also employed that year as Courier to Paris. Fakhri was appointed first secretary to the Sa'udi Legation in Baghdad in 1942 and transferred in 1943 as first Sa'udi Consul to Basra. Midhat was dismissed by the King in July 1943 but later reinstated at the request of Yusuf Yasin (q.v.) and other Syrians in the Sa'udi Government.

79. *Shaikho, Muhammad.*

One of the numerous young Syrians in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Sa'ud to the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 to sign various agreements on behalf of the Sa'udi Government. Assisted Yusuf Yasin in negotiating the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements at Jeddah in 1940-42. Appointed private secretary to the Amir Mansur in February 1945.

80. *Yusuf ibn 'Abdullah al Fauzan.*

Formerly lived in Bombay, where he acted as unofficial agent for Ibn Sa'ud. Appointed consul-

general at Jerusalem in February 1941. An intelligent young man with pleasing manners. Speaks English well.

81. *Bashir as-Sa'dawi.*

A Tripolitan, believed to be related to Khalid al Qarqani (q.v.). Like Khalid, fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ud as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confidential talks between the King and His Majesty's Minister at Riyadh. Holds no definite post but ranks as one of the King's advisers. Talks Turkish in addition to Arabic but no European language. Was not much in evidence during His Majesty's Minister's visit to Riyadh in March 1942, nor during his visits to the King in the spring of 1944. Accompanied Ibn Sa'ud to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

82. *Nasir ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil.*

Director of Finance at Jeddah. A cousin of Ibrahim al Suleyman ibn 'Aqil.

83. *Suleyman Nanih.*

Director of Coastguards. A Nejd, like nearly all the rest of the service. Friendly and helpful. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz, but was reinstated shortly after.

84. *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Fawzan.*

Manager of the Royal garage at Riyadh. A Koweiti by origin who claims, although it is not known on what grounds, to be a British subject. Said to have served with the British Red Cross in Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fat, sly, talkative man. He likes strong drink and has an inexhaustible fund of humorous reminiscences and anecdotes. During the Yemen war he was in charge, under the Amir Sa'ud, of the Sa'udi army's mechanised transport. Although not likely to become a figure of political importance he is worth mentioning as being on intimate terms with the King and his advisers and as having proved from time to time that he has a pretty accurate knowledge of what goes on in the King's councils. He is much in contact with the Amir Mansur who frequents the garage. Appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in December 1944 but resigned in January 1945, owing, according to him, to the intrigues of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin. Seems to be genuine in his dislike of the latter as of the rest of the Syrian gang whose influence in the government of the country he constantly deplores.

Obituary.

(Died since last report—June 1943.)

Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman, No. 28 in 1943 report.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL

[E 7151/175/G]

No. 18

Mr. Bevin to His Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad (No. 279), Cairo (No. 697), Tehran (No. 255), Beirut (No. 239) and Jeddah (No. 182).

Sir,

Foreign Office, 18th October, 1945.

A CONFERENCE of British representatives in the Middle East met in London from Wednesday, the 5th September, to Monday, the 17th September, 1945, under my chairmanship.

2. The Conference was composed of—

- (a) His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Cairo and Tehran;
- (b) His Majesty's Ministers at Beirut and Jeddah;
- (c) The High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan;
- (d) Representatives of the British Middle East Office; and
- (e) The Director-General of the Middle East Supply Centre.

Representatives of the Foreign Office and other interested London Departments also attended.

3. I charged the Conference with the duty of surveying the whole field of foreign policy in the Middle East on the basis that His Majesty's Government would continue to assert their political predominance in that area and their overriding responsibility for its defence.

4. I suggested that the matter ought to be viewed in the light of the following considerations:—

- (a) Influence that rested on military or political props could not be enduring; we should broaden the base on which British influence rests and to this end should develop an economic and social policy that would make for the prosperity and contentment of the area as a whole.
- (b) To reach the right solution of our Middle East problems it was necessary to consider the area as a single region.
- (c) We had the benefit of the war-time experience of the Middle East Supply Centre which had, in fact, pursued a policy of economic co-ordination throughout the region in co-operation with the Territorial Governments.
- (d) We should aim at an economic partnership between the United Kingdom and the Middle East countries and, by promoting developments in that field, move towards a partnership in the sphere of defence.
- (e) Measures for the promotion of British trade in the region should also be formulated.
- (f) Step by step with activities in the economic and commercial field we should do all that we could to promote the social betterment of the people of the region.
- (g) The whole question would have to be studied in relation to the capacity of the United Kingdom to make a contribution to the development of the Middle East by way of capital (where it was needed), equipment or the services of technical experts.
- (h) It would be necessary to take into account the political and economic factors arising out of—
 - (i) the Palestine question, and
 - (ii) the activities of the United States, France and Soviet Russia in the Middle East.

5. The Conference took these various questions into their consideration and a full exchange of views took place as a result of which the following recommendations were made to and approved by the Cabinet:—

- (a) *Palestine.*—This question should be dealt with separately.
- (b) *United States' activities.*
 - (i) The Americans are commercially on the offensive in the Middle East; but their export drive has now been held up by the stringency of the dollar situation in the Middle East countries. This state

of affairs has produced a degree of exasperation in American minds which is not likely to be removed unless some relief in the dollar situation is forthcoming. This circumstance (for which we are blamed, but not responsible) dominates our relationships with the Americans in the Middle East, but we cannot afford to make any concessions in view of our difficult foreign exchange situation.

- (ii) The experiment in Anglo-American co-operation that took shape in the Middle East Supply Centre has survived, but only just survived, the war and does not offer much encouragement for a continuance of co-operation, at least in that form, in fields that are essentially competitive.
- (iii) With the lifting of war-time controls (for which in the Middle East the Americans have been vigorously and prematurely pressing for some time) we shall enter a period of commercial rivalry, and we should not make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into a region which for generations has been an established British market, except as regards the further expansion of their oil concessions, in accordance with the Anglo-United States oil agreement of the 24th September, 1945.

(c) *Relations with France.*

- (i) In the Middle East, our relations with France centre in the situation in the Levant States to the almost complete exclusion of any other consideration.
- (ii) His Majesty's Government have publicly announced their desire to see France maintain her privileged position in that area, if she is able to get it from the States themselves. Our intervention in Syria during the disturbances in the early summer of this year restored our prestige in the Arab world to a point as high as it had ever stood before; but any overt support we might give to the French to secure a position which the States themselves are not disposed to give them in free negotiation, would without doubt be viewed by the whole of the Arab world with hostility.
- (iii) The French appear to have created an impossible position for themselves in Syria and all but done so in the Lebanon. Any participation by French nationals (at least as representatives of the French Government) in administrative or advisory capacities in the Levant States may be ruled out of account until the present animosities have subsided.
- (iv) The Conference endorsed my recommendation that the most fruitful line of approach to a solution of the present difficult situation in the Levant States was by way of a conference of representatives of His Majesty's Government, the French Government and the Governments of the Levant States, after the method and tempo of evacuation had been agreed between His Majesty's Government and the French Government.

(d) *Russian Activities.*

- (i) Our short-term relations with Russia in the Middle East crystallise in the situation in Persia, where the Russians and ourselves are under a Treaty obligation to withdraw our troops within six months of the end of the Japanese War. I have, in an exchange of letters with M. Molotov, given and received undertakings that both the Russian and British troops will be withdrawn from Persia, in accordance with the Treaty, before the 2nd March, 1946.
- (ii) There are increasing signs of Russian political and economic penetration in almost all Middle East territories. These are viewed with extreme apprehension by the Governments and people in those countries. The most effective counter to Russian advances in the area is the economic and social betterment of the people whose lot under the existing social system makes them ready listeners to the propaganda of Communism.

(e) *Defence.*—The Conference had the opportunity of hearing informal views from the Chiefs of Staff on the defence of the Middle East, against the background of my proposal that we should work towards a partnership between the United Kingdom and the Middle East Territories themselves in matters of defence. The question will be further studied by the Chiefs of Staff and formal recommendations made. It was, however, generally agreed by the Conference that the question of defence is susceptible of most effective treatment within the framework of our general policy towards the region.

(f) *British Economic Policy in the Middle East.*

(i) The Conference made certain recommendations with regard to British economic policy in the Middle East which are contained in Part I of the Annex to this despatch.

(ii) Summarised, they are:—

- (1) Economic development and the amelioration of social conditions must go forward hand in hand.
- (2) As the Middle East Governments are among the largest of our creditors our policy should be to give them wise guidance in mobilising and spending their existing ample sterling resources by—
 - (A) encouraging each of them to draw up *itself* its own plan of economic development;
 - (B) by offering to place at their disposal technical and specialist assistance to help them in formulating their schemes; and
 - (C) to steer their plans along lines in conformity with the limitations imposed on ourselves by our own financial and supply situation and with the needs of the region as a whole.
- (3) Certain measures recommended by the Board of Trade for the stimulation of British commerce in the Middle East area should be adopted.
- (4) A start can best be made by placing qualified technical experts at the disposal of the Middle East Governments who require them. These experts should be attached to and operate as part of a British organisation located in Cairo. This British organisation should develop a scheme of regional technical conferences leading up to the eventual establishment of a Middle East Development Board or Council composed of representatives of His Majesty's Government and of the Governments of the various territories in the region. It would be the function of this Board or Council to direct economic and social development along the lines of a coherent, co-ordinated, regional plan.

(g) *Machinery for Regional Co-ordination of British Policy.*

(i) The Conference made recommendations on this subject which are contained in Part II of the Annex to this despatch.

(ii) Summarised, they are:—

- (1) The Conference took note of the decision of His Majesty's Government to establish a Middle East Office in Cairo.
- (2) The Conference recommended the establishment of a "British Middle East Conference," as a standing committee composed of His Majesty's Representatives in the region to co-ordinate and to formulate for consideration by His Majesty's Government British policy in the region. The Conference would meet in Cairo as often as necessary and its secretariat would be provided by the British Middle East Office. For the present, His Majesty's Minister at Beirut shall *not* be a member of the Standing Committee.
- (3) The co-ordination and development of British policy in its economic aspects in the Middle East region should be a function of the British Middle East Office.

- (h) *Relations with the Arab League.*—The Arab League has not yet developed sufficient cohesion to warrant, even if it were desirable, its recognition as a corporate body representative of the Arab States as a whole. It has, however, established an economic committee with the set purpose of achieving some co-ordination of economic policy among the constituent members of the League. It will be inevitable that there should be informal political contacts with the League from time to time, and for this purpose the Conference agreed that, in existing circumstances the focal point of such contacts should be His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo. Contacts with the Arab League shall not deal with questions affecting either Syria or the Lebanon. The Conference also agreed that in economic matters it was desirable, in existing circumstances, that the focal point should be the British Middle East Office. The practical difficulty, however, of drawing a nice line of distinction between matters "political" and matters "economic" will make it essential that the closest possible liaison should be maintained between the Cairo Embassy and the British Middle East Office on all questions affecting the relationship of His Majesty's Government with the Arab League.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

ANNEX TO No. 18.

PART I.

BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

A.—General.

1. The raising of the standard of living of the masses of the people of the Middle East will promote internal stability in the region, and increase its importance as a market for imported goods.
2. British policy in the region, both in the general and economic fields, should therefore be shaped with that end in view.
3. The existing mal-distribution of purchasing power in the Middle East communities is the greatest obstacle in the way of an improvement in the standard of life of the masses. This obstacle can be removed only by action in the political field on the part of the Governments concerned, directed towards, for example:—
 - (a) Reform of the present system of land tenure (including rents), and improvement in wages and conditions of service in the agricultural industry.
 - (b) Reform of the existing systems of taxation, which, in general, fail to preserve a proper balance between direct and indirect taxation.
 - (c) Social reform in the field of public health, labour legislation (including constitutional development of trade unionism), education (including rural education in the widest sense of that term) and improvement of the civil services.
4. Without measures of social reform on the above lines, economic development will do little more than put more money into the pockets of industrialists and landed proprietors, and be largely a waste of capital and effort.
5. It is important, therefore, that social reform should move forward step by step with economic development.

B.—Financial Background.

6. The extent to which British capital and equipment will be available to participate in a large-scale plan of economic development in the Middle East

must be considered against the following background which has been supplied to us by His Majesty's Treasury:—

- (a) The needs of the home market, both for capital and consumer goods, are enormous and cannot be denied. The first charge upon our exports must be the cost of imported food for our people and of the raw materials which we must have if our manufacturing industries are to be kept alive. The second charge upon our exporting capacity must be, for many years to come, to make some contribution towards the liquidation of our overseas liabilities; these now exceed the vast total of £3,500 million sterling.
- (b) We have pressing claims to help those worse off than ourselves—U.N.R.R.A., Colonial development and rehabilitation, Greece and other Allies.
- (c) It will therefore be only in the most exceptional and compelling circumstances that we shall be able to assume yet more charges on our productive capacity—i.e., to grant credits to overseas borrowers.
- (d) The Middle East territories (except Saudi Arabia) are among the largest of our creditors. They already hold sterling exchange to an extent far in excess of the amount needed to pay for any capital equipment that, over any reasonable period of time, they are likely to require and that the industrial capacity of the United Kingdom is likely to be able to provide.
- (e) The internal counter-value of the sterling balances held by these Middle East territories is for the greater part in the hands of a wealthy minority in the communities; the capital needed for schemes of large-scale economic development can well be provided by the Middle East territories themselves, either in the form of Government loans (where Government is the authority promoting the schemes) or by subscription to companies or finance corporations (where development is left to private enterprise).
- (f) We must at present proceed on the assumption that the present dollar stringency in the Sterling Area is not likely to be relaxed for some years to come.
- (g) The process of reconversion of British industry from war to peace production cannot be accomplished otherwise than gradually; heavy simultaneous demands from a variety of sources upon our exporting capacity during the next 12 to 18 months may lead to the disappointment of our potential customers.
7. With the foregoing considerations in mind, we must be careful, therefore, that, in adopting a policy of economic development, we do not—
 - (a) Create a demand from the Middle East territories for the participation of British capital beyond our capacity.
 - (b) Create a demand to spend the sterling balances more rapidly than we could contemplate.
 - (c) Create a demand that we should sell them gold or dollars which we have not got, on the ground that if the United Kingdom cannot supply, our creditors should be enabled to go elsewhere (viz., to the United States).
8. If we take an undue initiative in drawing up, and recommending to the Middle East Governments, a plan of large-scale economic development, there is a danger that we may find ourselves in all of these embarrassments.
9. It is suggested therefore that our policy should be to give the Middle East Governments wise guidance in mobilising and spending their existing ample sterling resources and to this end—
 - (a) To encourage each of the Middle East Governments to draw up, *itself*, its own plan of economic development.
 - (b) To offer to place at their disposal such technical and specialist assistance as they may require to formulate their schemes.
 - (c) To steer their plans, particularly as regards timing, along lines that will be in conformity with the limitations imposed on us by our own financial and industrial situation, and that will take account of the needs of the region as a whole.

C.—British Trade Interests.

10. The fact that most of the Middle East economies have at their disposal large balances in sterling (and are, at the same time, short of dollars) in itself

gives British trade an initial advantage. If schemes of development are proposed and adopted, there should, therefore, be golden opportunities for the British exporter in the Middle East. The Board of Trade and the Department of Overseas Trade have examined the immediate means which should be taken for the promotion of British trade in the region, and their recommendations are attached in a paper annexed as Appendix A. Summarised, they are:—

- (a) The strengthening of Commercial Diplomatic Posts.
- (b) The exchange of trade missions.
- (c) Increased travel facilities, including visas, priorities, &c.
- (d) Restoration of Parcel Post Air Mail and improvement of existing Air Mail facilities.
- (e) Increased facilities for visits by officials of London Departments.
- (f) The opening by British firms of regional offices in Cairo.
- (g) The encouragement of preliminary survey work by British firms of consulting engineers.

Note.—The two objectives mentioned in (f) and (g) above would be assisted (1) by relief from E.P.T. in respect of any expenditure incurred by British firms in activities of this nature and (2) by the release of needed personnel from His Majesty's Forces.

- (h) The provision of British technical experts.
- (i) The speedy conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce and Establishment with Egypt, and consideration of similar treaties with other Middle East Governments.
- (j) Direct participation of British firms in local industries.
- (k) Representation in the Middle East of the Export Credits Guarantee Department.

The Conference endorses these recommendations, and wishes to draw particular attention to the necessity of adequate allowances to meet the high cost of living in the Middle East. The Conference considers that as far as possible passport and visa formalities should be eased and that regard should be given to the importance of cheap air travel facilities as an instrument for furthering British commercial interests in the Middle East. Similarly the Conference considers that there should be an improvement of Air Mail facilities between the United Kingdom and the Middle East even if it does not provide a commensurate postal revenue.

D.—Economic and Social Development in the Middle East.

11.—(1) The directions in which schemes of economic development can best contribute to the welfare of the common people of the Middle East can at this stage be indicated only in broad general outline. They fall, however, into three broad categories:—

- (a) Schemes for the development of the agricultural industry, among which may be mentioned—
 - (i) irrigation;
 - (ii) village development;
 - (iii) afforestation;
 - (iv) agricultural stations;
 - (v) construction of roads;
 - (vi) agricultural housing;
 - (vii) improvement of strains of livestock and seed;
 - (viii) veterinary services;
 - (ix) fisheries;
 - (x) promotion of rural education;
 - (xi) anti-locust measures;
- (b) Schemes of industrial development;
- (c) The promotion of public works of a more general character.

(2) In formulating any development programme of the kind, however, the fact should not be lost sight of that the economy of all the Middle East territories is predominantly agricultural and that the development of, and amelioration of conditions in, that industry should take first priority in the scheme.

(3) At the same time care must be taken to preserve a balanced development and the claims of industrialisation must not be overlooked. *It is, however, important that the local governments should be discouraged from building up*

behind high tariff walls industrial undertakings which, without this protection, would have no chance of survival in face of world competition. Action in the international field would be the most effective, if not indeed the only, means of curbing tendencies of local governments in that direction.

12. A wealth of detailed information on all of these subjects is available in the reports of Professor Peers and Drs. Keen, Worthington, Allen and Wright, and we suggest as a first step that these reports should be examined in detail and if necessary supplemented by further surveys of the same kind in other fields carried out by investigators of the same calibre.

13. Side by side with these measures of economic development the promotion of schemes of social betterment must go forward. In general outline these would include—

- (i) better health services;
- (ii) improved educational systems;
- (iii) the constitutional development of Trade Unionism; and
- (iv) above all, a review of the present system of land tenure.

14. With a programme of economic development and improvement of the social standards of the people of the Middle East of the kind adumbrated in the preceding paragraphs, the question arises how best a contribution can be made by His Majesty's Government to assist and guide the local governments along the desired lines.

E.—Provision of Experts.

15.—(1) We have mentioned that the Middle East communities are amply provided with the financial resources to finance their development. What they are short of is adequate technical and specialist personnel to assist them in formulating their schemes along the most economical and effective lines.

(2) There has been a manifestation of a desire on the part of almost all local governments to obtain and employ specialists in these fields. It is clearly desirable in the political and commercial interests of the United Kingdom that wherever possible these experts should be British and that they should not be second-rate men, but men of a calibre as good as can be obtained elsewhere. It would clearly be difficult and expensive to provide experts of the requisite standing for each Government in the area. It would be less difficult and less expensive to maintain a "nucleus" of technicians attached to a central organisation available to be consulted by any of the local governments at need.

(3) As a beginning the number of these technical experts would be small and should cover the more important fields in which the schemes of development would be likely to emerge, for example, agriculture, health, labour and general economics, public works, engineering and finance. These experts should not be specialists in any particular branch of their subjects. Each expert should, of course, have adequate professional qualifications in his own group of subjects, but need not be (and preferably should not be) an extreme specialist, for example, the chief expert in agriculture would not be expected himself to be a specialist in soil chemistry or in any of the other scientific branches of agriculture. He should be the type of man capable of making a reliable appreciation of a technical problem or set of problems within his general field, and of giving general advice on the lines of their treatment and able to put the authorities concerned in touch with the best technical assistance and resources obtainable in order to supplement his advice.

(4) The experts would also be in touch with any related international organisations (*e.g.*, the I.L.O. and the F.A.O.). Men of this type would also be best fitted to appreciate the technical problems of the region in relation to the wider economic picture and thus to contribute to the co-ordination of British policy in the area.

16.—(1) The Ministry of War Transport have prepared a memorandum on the subject of the provision of experts, which is attached to this report as Appendix B. Summarised, it recommends that three main types of scientific and technical personnel should be envisaged:—

- (a) A small strategic unit attached to the Cairo Headquarters, but making tours as necessary within the Middle East;
- (b) Personnel farmed out for a period to the service of local governments or other agencies; and
- (c) Experts who, owing to their greater eminence or their narrower specialism, would only be called out from the United Kingdom for short periods as and when required.

The Conference endorses these recommendations.

(2) In the present situation of scarcity of experts of the kind contemplated, full use should be made of any resources which the Dominions, India and the Colonial Service may be able to make available, particularly since many of the experts in those countries are likely to be familiar with conditions comparable with those of the Middle East. Moreover, Moslem susceptibilities might best be met by recruitment from India.

17. The nucleus of experts referred to above should be part of a British Middle East organisation and operate from that base.

F.—Regional Technical Conferences.

18.—(1) While it would be a principal function of this British Middle East organisation to arrange for the examination of surveys already undertaken, and for fresh surveys to be conducted, we also envisage the organisation arranging regional technical conferences on the subjects indicated by Drs. Worthington and Keen, and upon other subjects as opportunity offers.

(2) The territories under British administration in the Middle East should participate in these conferences, as past experience has shown that they have much to contribute as well as to gain; there is no reason why their participation should in any way affect the direct relationship between the administrations of such territories and the Departments to which they are responsible in London.

(3) These technical conferences should have as their objective the establishment of regional technical organisations in particular fields; possible lines of progress in this direction are particularly indicated in Dr. Worthington's Report. Such technical organisations should be related in due course to their international counterparts, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Organisation. Some of them would need to cover an area wider than the Middle East: for example, the Anti-Locust Organisation should include East Africa and India.

G.—Middle East Development Board or Council.

19. By means of technical conferences of this character, the way would be paved towards the formation of a Middle East Development Board or Council; but we suggest that this Council or Board should be framed on an advisory and consultative rather than an executive basis, enshrining, nevertheless, the principle of partnership between the local Governments and His Majesty's Government. We feel that in present conditions Middle East inter-territorial rivalries are only too likely to bring to failure any project along more ambitious lines. We must also be alive to the danger of establishing any organisation which would arouse the suspicions or hostility of the Americans.

20.—(1) A Council of this kind would not have the character of a public utility or finance corporation; but would serve as the medium for inter-territorial exchange of information and experience. Under its ægis, projects for economic development could proceed on a territorial basis, backed by capital provided either by Governments or by private interests; but we see no reason to rule out the participation of British capital as soon as our financial position permits. Moreover, opportunities for British trade and enterprise are bound under this scheme to arise through the close collaboration between British experts and interested parties in the Middle East. It would be of the essence of the scheme that every effort should be made to hold the balance, in a regional interest, between schemes promoted by individual territories, although we can have no assurance that any strict system of priorities which might be involved could be implemented by Departments of His Majesty's Government.

(2) It is important, in view of all the factors that we have mentioned, that further consideration should be given to the title of any body such as we have proposed.

H.—Machinery.

21. The activities outlined above, which we suggest might provide the framework of a British economic policy in the Middle East, are, in our view, proper subjects for examination, development and co-ordination by a British organisation located in Cairo with responsibilities extending to all the territories in the Middle East region.

PART II.

REGIONAL CO-ORDINATION OF BRITISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I.—Regional Aspects of British Policy.

22. We have outlined in Part I of this Report the shape of a British Economic Policy in the Middle East, and have proposed that this policy should be developed and co-ordinated through a British regional organisation located in the Middle East.

23. There are, however, certain other aspects of British policy in the region which, while presenting special features in individual territories, are essentially regional in their characteristics and elements, and are susceptible of adequate treatment from the angle of His Majesty's Government only on a regional basis. Among these are, in their economic aspects:—

- (a) Oil.
- (b) Civil Aviation.
- (c) Telecommunications.
- (d) American activities.
- (e) Russian activities. (These, while manifesting themselves most actively in Persia, are by no means confined to that territory.)

24. While these questions (as well as the economic matters mentioned in Part I of this Report) must always be handled in a particular territory by His Majesty's Representative in that territory, it is to the common advantage and in the best interest of His Majesty's Government that a regional approach should be devised, and that policies in one territory should not go forward in isolation and without regard to the circumstances of other territories or of the region as a whole.

J.—Meetings of His Majesty's Representatives.

25. Consultation, discussion and exchange of views, at reasonably frequent intervals, among His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East territories is, in our view, the best method of devising a common approach to these problems and of advising His Majesty's Government on questions of regional policy in general.

26. The occasional meetings of His Majesty's Representatives which have been held in Cairo during the years of the war, on the initiative of Mr. R. G. Casey (as Minister of State) and of Lord Altrincham (as Minister-Resident) have proved the value of regional consultation at that level.

27. We therefore recommend that there should be meetings of His Majesty's Representatives in Middle East territories at least twice a year, and *ad hoc* as circumstances require.

K.—British Middle East Conference.

28. We suggest that it should be a main function of these meetings to co-ordinate, and to formulate for consideration in London, British policy in the region (including the economic questions examined in Part I of this Report) and, with this function in mind, we would propose that these meetings warrant recognition as an integral part of British organisation in the Middle East. We therefore suggest that they should be established in the form of a standing committee to be known, domestically, as "The British Middle East Conference."

29. The Conference would be composed of:—

- (a) The Heads of His Majesty's Diplomatic Missions at Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut and Jedda, and, as required, Tehran.
- (b) The High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.
- (c) The Governors of Cyprus and Aden, as required.
- (d) The Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services in the Middle East Commands.
- (e) The Head of the British Middle East Office (referred to in Section L below).

30.—(a) We would hope that it might be convenient for the Minister of State or the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to attend some of these conferences and to preside over them. Where this was not possible, we would suggest that the senior among His Majesty's Ambassadors should be Chairman of the Conference.

(b) The seat of the Conference should be Cairo as being the most convenient centre in the area and by convention the regional capital.

(c) The Conference should be convened by the Head of the Middle East Office, acting upon the authority of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

31. We would most strongly urge that senior representatives of the London Departments should come out to Cairo and take part in the meetings of the Conference. This would have the double advantage of keeping His Majesty's Representatives in touch with the general policy of His Majesty's Government and of affording to the Home Departments a chance of informing themselves at first hand of conditions and tendencies in the Middle East.

32. The Conference would require the services of a Secretariat, not only to arrange its periodical meetings, and to co-ordinate its documentation, but also to handle, in the intervals between its meetings, day-to-day matters arising out of, or in connection with, the questions with which the Conference would be concerned.

33. The proposals in this Section are not intended to preclude meetings on a less formal basis of His Majesty's Representatives, either in Cairo or elsewhere in the region.

L.—British Middle East Office.

Functions of British Middle East Office.

34.—(a) His Majesty's Government have already publicly announced their intention of establishing in Cairo a British Middle East Office, to carry on certain of the functions formerly discharged by the Office of the Minister Resident. It seems to us to be appropriate that this Office should also handle the development and co-ordination along regional lines of the British economic policy outlined in Part I of this Report. We suggest that this Office should constitute, also, the Secretariat of the British Middle East Conference.

(b) We also recommend that meetings should be held in Cairo from time to time of representatives of His Majesty's Embassies and Legations and of the British-Administered Territories, at a lower level than those proposed in Section K. The Commercial Secretaries, for example, might meet from time to time with advantage. These meetings we suggest should be convened by, and held under the chairmanship of the Head of the British Middle East Office.

Relationship with Diplomatic Missions.

35. It would be essential that no feature of this plan for co-ordinating British policy on a regional basis, and no assignment of function to the British Middle East Office, should interfere with the responsibility of His Majesty's Diplomatic Mission in a particular territory for representing to the Government to which it was accredited the views and policies of His Majesty's Government. Approaches to the independent territorial Governments would therefore be made either through, or with the acquiescence of, the Mission concerned.

36. The correct relationship that we have in mind between the British Middle East Office and His Majesty's Missions could, we think, best be established by appointing the Head of the Office as a member of the staff of each of the Missions in the region in the capacity of a Minister (Economic) or Counsellor (Economic), his rank in a particular case depending on the status of the Mission concerned. Such an arrangement would make it clear that territorial questions (and the territorial aspects of regional questions) fell unequivocally within the scope of the Head of the Mission, through whom representations would be made to the territorial Government and also to the Foreign Office.

37. The British Middle East Office (by virtue of its function as Secretariat of the Middle East Conference) would communicate direct with the Foreign Office. The Office would also communicate direct with the Foreign Office and, through the Foreign Office, with other Departments in London on questions of a regional character arising out of its day-to-day work. Similar considerations would govern communications from the Foreign Office (and other London Departments) to the British Middle East Office.

38. The channel of communication should be through the Cairo Embassy, as for the Office of the Minister Resident at present.

39. Much of the success of the plan proposed would depend upon the maintenance of a close liaison, in both directions, between, on the one hand, His Majesty's Diplomatic Missions and the Governments of British-Administered Territories in the Middle East, and, on the other, the British Middle East Office. Arrangements should therefore be made for telegrams to be repeated and despatches to be copied, in both directions. As well, the Foreign Office should keep the British Middle East Office informed in the same way on all questions likely to affect the regional aspects of the work of the Office.

40. It will not always be practicable, because of expense or because of scarcity of qualified personnel, to attach to each of His Majesty's Missions in the Middle East, on a full-time basis, an officer capable of giving specialised advice in the fields referred to in Section I of this part of the Report. The requirements of the Missions can, we suggest, best be met by arranging that an adequate corps of experts is maintained on the staff of the Middle East Office upon whose services all of the Missions would be entitled to draw at need.

41. Such an arrangement would not exclude the appointment to any Mission of an Attaché specialising in a particular subject (*e.g.*, finance, labour, agriculture or civil aviation) if the duties arising at a particular Mission justified a full-time appointment. The sphere of operations of this Attaché would, however, be confined to the territory to which his Mission was accredited and would not extend to other parts of the region.

Status of British Middle East Office.

42. It is proposed that the British Middle East Office should be established in Cairo. Egypt is an independent territory. It is clearly necessary, in view of the functions which the Office would discharge, that its office premises, archives and staff should have a degree of "immunity." This would be secured if the Office were afforded either (a) diplomatic immunity or (b) military immunity (the Office of the Minister Resident is regarded as part of G.H.Q., Middle East, and, in that guise, has up till now enjoyed the military immunities of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty).

43. The changed circumstances, and the alteration in function now proposed for the British Middle East Office, make it scarcely appropriate that it should operate as a "para-military" organisation. It is suggested, therefore, that the Office should have diplomatic immunity. This could be secured only by giving the Office the "cover" of the Embassy, and it is proposed that this should be done. The Head of the Office would, in Egypt, be a member of the staff of His Majesty's Ambassador with, as we have proposed, the title of Minister (Economic). The members of the staff of the Office could be accorded similar "cover" in the same way and to the same extent as the staff of the Embassy itself.

44. In the other Middle East independent territories the Head of the British Middle East Office, in the quality of Minister—or Counsellor—(Economic), and a very small number of his senior staff whose duties might require them to pay regular visits to the various territories, could be similarly attached as members of the staff of each of the Missions.

45. An arrangement of this kind would ensure that the British Middle East Office stood in a similar relationship to all His Majesty's Missions in the Middle East.

Relationships with Governments of British-Administered Territories.

46. This should present no problem. There would be no direct official communication between the Office and the Colonial Office or the War Office, with which the Governments of British-Administered Territories would deal direct, as hitherto, on all territorial questions. A close liaison on regional questions could be maintained between the Office and the Governments concerned.

Staff of British Middle East Office.

47. The staff and internal organisation of the British Middle East Office would depend upon the functions assigned to it; and we leave these to be determined, in the light of those functions, by the appropriate authorities.

M.—Co-ordination of Middle East Policy in London.

48. It appears to be the general view that the success of any attempt at co-ordination of British policy by a body located in the Middle East itself must depend upon adequate arrangements for co-ordination at the centre in London. The Conference takes note of a paper on this subject prepared by the Ministry of War Transport annexed to this Report as Appendix C. It is important, in our view, that whatever committee or committees are set up in London to deal with Middle Eastern Affairs should be so constituted as to ensure that prompt and authoritative directions and decisions are given to all the establishments maintained by His Majesty's Government in the Middle East. The Conference has no competence to decide by which method this objective should be achieved.

49. A co-ordinating body of this character will require a permanent Secretariat; and we envisage that the normal channel of communication on regional questions will be between the Secretariat of the Middle East Committee in London (through the Foreign Office and in the name of the Secretary of State) and the British Middle East Office in Cairo.

N.—Miscellaneous.

Middle East Defence Committee.

50. We recommend that the Middle East Defence Committee should continue in being, and that the Head of the British Middle East Office should act as its Chairman.

Political Advice for the Commanders-in-Chief.

51. While we see no objection to the Commanders-in-Chief being kept informed by the British Middle East Office on current political and economic developments throughout the region, on the basis of telegrams and despatches received from His Majesty's Representatives in the various territories and from other official sources, we feel that it should be to His Majesty's Representatives in each territory that the Commanders-in-Chief should look for advice and guidance with regard to the political situation and tendencies in that territory, and that military action in a particular territory should be undertaken only after consultation with His Majesty's Representative in that territory. We do not regard it as desirable that an official should be attached to any of the Commanders-in-Chief in the capacity of a "Political Adviser," nor, we understand, do the Commanders-in-Chief desire an arrangement of that kind.

APPENDIX A.

IMMEDIATE MEASURES FOR THE PROMOTION OF BRITISH TRADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

MEMORANDUM BY THE BOARD OF TRADE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF OVERSEAS TRADE.

1. *Strengthening of Commercial Diplomatic Posts.*

Almost all the Middle East posts are at present under-staffed and will require substantial reinforcement if they are to be able to cope with the flow of new work which must be expected with the dissolution of the Middle East Supply Centre, the reopening of trade and the orderly disposal of military surpluses with the minimum of interference with our exports. The importance of providing additional staff is fully recognised and what can be done with the present extremely limited man-power is already in hand. Special arrangements have also been made by the Treasury and Department of Overseas Trade to enable posts to engage local assistance on a temporary basis. In attempting to recruit this staff, however, we are hampered by two particular difficulties:—

- (a) New staff over 30 can be engaged only on a very temporary basis, which is quite unattractive to the right type of man.
- (b) Allowances in Middle East countries have not kept pace with the cost of living so that candidates without private means are discouraged from accepting appointments.

The problem of strengthening our Commercial Diplomatic posts is, of course, a general one and the Middle East position cannot be considered in isolation. The new staff in sight over the next nine months is limited and there are many competing claims for it from our missions all over the world.

2. *Trade Missions.*

It is planned to send a Goodwill Mission to Egypt, probably towards the end of November. Mr. Hanbury-Williams, Deputy Chairman of Courtaulds and a Director of the Bank of England, has agreed to lead it. It is hoped that the same mission (or, at least, some individual members of it) will go on to visit other Middle Eastern countries, including Palestine, Cyprus, Syria and the Lebanon and Iraq. The alternative of sending separate missions to these countries has been dismissed owing to the difficulty of finding the right personnel for a number of missions.

The Mission will not be a selling mission; its function will be to prepare the ground, by a convincing display of the interest of the United Kingdom industry in the Middle East, for the visits of the sales representatives of individual firms who will follow on its heels. It is suggested that the Mission might be sponsored by the F.B.I. It would not be sent as from His Majesty's Government, but it would be made clear that it had the full support of the Government.

Arab and Jewish trade missions from Palestine have already visited the United Kingdom, and it is hoped that missions from other countries will return the visit to be made by the British Mission.

3. *Increased Travel Facilities.*

It is most important that better facilities (including visas, priorities, &c.) be provided for visits in both directions by responsible business men. At present formalities for the average traveller are lengthy and available transport both by sea and air is inadequate to meet the demand.

4. *Restoration of Parcel Post Airmail.*

This is much needed to provide a rapid means of transport for samples, engineering drawings, survey instruments, &c. The Post Office are pressing for a restoration of services, but have been held up by shortage of transport aircraft. Improvement of ordinary Air Mail facilities is also important.

5. *Increased Facilities for Visits by Officials of London Departments.*

More frequent visits by officials of Home Departments are most desirable, both from the point of view of the Home Departments themselves, who should keep in close touch with local developments, and from that of the local officials who should be more regularly informed of the trend of home policy. At present, visits are severely limited by shortage of man-power, but the position in this respect should now begin to improve. Similarly, we should continue to encourage frequent visits home by officials in the Middle East for consultation.

6. *Branch Offices.*

British firms are being advised and encouraged to open area offices in Cairo to supervise their Middle East interests, and to appoint a local director with power to take decisions. Export Groups and similar trade organisations are being advised to open offices in Cairo for co-operative work on behalf of their members. Some, e.g., the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders and the Textile Machinery Manufacturers, have already done so. Action on these lines is likely to have more direct practical results than the opening of "Britannia Houses."

7.

Every effort is being made to encourage British firms of consulting engineers to undertake preliminary survey work for important contracts in the hope that this will lead to the contracts themselves being placed in this country.

8.

Particular importance is attached to the provision of British technical advisers, but this question is being dealt with in another context.

9. *Establishment Conditions.*

In Egypt conditions of residence and establishment for British subjects are far from satisfactory and such limited treaty protection as we now possess will be lost when the Montreux Convention lapses in 1949. It is most important that

this should be remedied and a new draft Treaty of Commerce and Establishment is being drawn up for that purpose. It has still to be submitted to Ministers here but, subject to ministerial approval, we hope to be in a position to begin negotiations with Egypt in November. It may be that at a later date similar treaties will be required with some of the other Middle East countries.

10.

A number of important British firms have already engaged in negotiation, particularly in Egypt, for direct participation in local industries in conjunction with local firms. Although the opportunities of business are considered good, little solid progress has yet been made owing to the threat of restrictive nationalist legislation, *e.g.*, the proposed Egyptian Company Law. Success in this field depends mainly upon the extent of our success in diverting the nationalistic feeling behind these tendencies into more fruitful channels.

11.

The Export Credits Guarantee Department have had a representative touring the Middle East in order to arrange if possible for local departmental representation. Any person appointed would, of course, work in close collaboration with the Embassies concerned. There is no doubt that much work needs to be done on bringing our status information up to date.

12.

Restrictions over exports to the Middle East, both at the importing and at the exporting end, are being relaxed as rapidly as conditions permit.

APPENDIX B.

PROVISION OF EXPERTS

NOTE BY THE MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the proposed policy of economic and social development in the Middle East can only succeed if it is based on an adequate supply of first-rate scientific and technical advice. First-rate scientific and technical men are in extremely short supply, and so far as British subjects are concerned their services are urgently needed in many other directions. It is therefore essential that machinery should be created for obtaining and using their services with the utmost efficiency and economy. There is no machinery at present in view which is adapted for this purpose. Even to make contact with the wide range of specialists who will at one time or another be required is a formidable task calling for a specially qualified establishment officer with a good knowledge of the scientific and technical field, and with excellent personal contacts. After contact has been made the problem of persuading experts to serve in the Middle East is considerable. Even assuming that local Governments (*e.g.*, Iraq) are prepared to offer really adequate salaries, comparatively few good men will throw up or forgo other employment in order to take a relatively short-term contract with the prospect of getting out of touch with their own field and finding themselves in a blind alley. If satisfactory results are to be obtained it will probably be necessary to arrange for the Middle East Office to act as an intermediary in many cases and for its London representatives to arrange not only with the expert in question but with his employer (whether that is a university or industrial firm or a research station) for a loan or transfer of services for, say, six months, a year or even two or more years, according to conditions. It will be essential to be able to safeguard pension rights, &c., if valuable men who are willing to serve are not to be lost. In general it seems desirable that as large a proportion as possible of the experts sent out should retain their status with their previous employers so that new blood can be readily introduced, and the effects of climate and working conditions on health counteracted by a short period of service in the field. It also seems desirable that both non-British local Governments and any regional or international agencies which may be set up in the Middle East should look to the British Middle East Office for at least part of their British scientific and technical staff, who could be seconded to these tasks as Wing-Commander Skilbeck to the embryo Middle East Council of Agriculture.

It will also greatly improve the attractions of the Middle East as a field of service and the speed with which we can progress if frequent opportunities are afforded for journeys home to consult, and if the proposals of Drs. Keen and

Worthington for the provision of technical information (*e.g.*, by the Imperial Bureaux) are fully implemented. The existence of an adequate scientific and technical element in the London Secretariat, backed by a really strong committee of scientific and technical men with Middle East experience, will also assist in getting prompt and effective attention to requests for help from the experts who are sent out, and this again will encourage good men to serve, and by enabling them to do their task more quickly will reduce the strain on man-power which is also heavy elsewhere.

It is recommended that three main types of scientific and technical personnel should be envisaged:—

- (a) The small strategic unit attached to Cairo Headquarters, but making tours as necessary within the Middle East;
- (b) Personnel farmed out for a period to the service of local Governments or other agencies; and
- (c) Experts who owing to their greater eminence or their narrower specialism would only be called out from the United Kingdom for short periods as and when required.

It is submitted that the effective handling of this problem will form one of the most vital elements in the success of any development policy in the Middle East.

APPENDIX C.

LONDON ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS.

NOTE BY THE SUPPLY SECTION FOR THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT.

1. Successive Resident Ministers, Commanders-in-Chief and officials responsible for affairs in the Middle East have emphasised the discouragement and paralysis of effort which results if requests to London for guidance, help and advice on policy and general matters are not handled with a promptitude and effectiveness beyond the capacity of the complex Departments now concerned.

2. Among proposals put forward for overcoming this fundamental weakness at the London end have been—

- (a) appointment of a Minister for Middle East affairs attached to the Foreign Office;
- (b) appointment of a Middle East Ministerial Committee;
- (c) appointment of a new Middle East Official Committee with a strong chairman;
- (d) creation of a Middle East Department within the Foreign Office responsible for all His Majesty's Government's political and administrative relations with Middle East territories including those at present responsible to the Colonial Office. This is proposed by Lord Altrincham in paragraph 24 of his Memorandum; and
- (e) creation of a strong London secretariat acting on behalf of all Departments concerned with economic and technical aspects on the model of the Supply Section for the Middle East in the Ministry of War Transport which has served as the London secretariat of the Middle East Supply Centre. This raises the question whether such a secretariat should be located in the Foreign Office or in the Cabinet Office.

3. These proposals point clearly to the two outstanding needs which are:—

- (a) a sufficiently high level and authoritative channel for giving (or where necessary obtaining from the Cabinet) decisions on matters of Middle Eastern policy; and
- (b) a staff of adequate quality and scale in London giving their whole time and attention to Middle East problems from a regional standpoint, more particularly on economic and technical matters.

To some extent 2 (a) and 2 (b) are alternative ways of meeting the first of these needs and 2 (d) and 2 (e) of meeting the second although none of these courses are mutually exclusive. 2 (c) (the Official Committee) is by common consent necessary in any case.

4. If there is not to be a special Minister for the Middle East either resident in the region or in London a Cabinet Committee for the Middle East will be highly desirable if not essential in order to co-ordinate policy over the whole field. Equally the scope of the policies now under discussion makes it quite clear that if Lord Altrincham's more drastic proposal for an amalgamated Middle East Department is not adopted forthwith the absolute minimum requirement for avoiding a breakdown is the creation of a really strong secretariat in London to do for the new Middle East Office at least as much as the Supply Section for the Middle East has done for M.E.S.C. As an indication of scale, S.S.M.E. has required about the half-time services of an energetic Assistant Secretary and the wholtime of two or three Principals and the equivalent of three of four Assistant Principals with the necessary general staff. In the absence of some comparable establishment of really high quality experience shows that the many and exacting needs of a vigorous British Staff in the Middle East cannot be satisfied.

5. There are now or will shortly be in England several ex-officials who have great experience in problems of Middle East development; there are also Professor Peers and Drs. Keen and Worthington, whose reports are a "bible" for Middle East Development, and others. It is recommended that these men should be invited to join an advisory committee or panel and that it should be the business of a qualified member of the London Middle East Office or Secretariat to see that their advice is sought in all appropriate cases.

[Z 12033/13/17]

No. 19

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Dixon.—(Received 24th October.)

My dear Dixon,

Paris, 4th October, 1945.

I SEND you two memoranda—one on the Secretary of State's conversation with M. Bidault, and another upon my subsequent conversation with Massigli.

2. Other matters were discussed between Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault, namely: the recent Council of Ministers, the Emerald Buddha, the future of the Rhine and the Ruhr, and the establishment of central Secretaries of State in Germany.

3. With regard to the first matter, the Secretary of State said that, in his opinion, Molotov, who had admitted in private that the question of procedure on which the conference had collapsed was of little importance, was, in fact, only interested in two things, namely: the recognition by the other Governments of the present régimes in Bulgaria and Roumania and the satisfaction of Russian ambitions either in Tripolitania or elsewhere in Africa. When Molotov found that he was not going to get satisfaction on either of these points he deliberately wrecked the conference.

4. With regard to the Emerald Buddha, the Secretary of State told M. Bidault that the demand for the return of it was one which was likely to cause a feeling of great humiliation to the Siamese, and he hoped, therefore, that the French would drop it. M. Bidault replied that he was not fully conversant with the facts, but he understood that the Buddha had been stolen at some earlier date and that the Siamese were now proving very intractable; but if they would be more conciliatory on other points this could be dropped. In any case, he asked why the Siamese had made their approach through the British Government. If they felt so strongly about the Buddha, they had better approach the French themselves on the subject.

5. With regard to the future of the Rhine and the Ruhr, M. Bidault suggested that conversations should continue in London between the French, British, and American deputies of the Council of Ministers. He said he had already mentioned the matter to Mr. Byrnes, who had not objected, and he understood that Mr. Dunn would remain in London for some time, as would also the French deputy, M. Couve de Murville. The Secretary of State replied that he would look into this matter without delay, but that he was not at present in a position to take a decision.

6. With regard to the German Secretaries of State, M. Bidault said that he hoped the military authorities would be instructed not to be in a hurry with regard to their appointment. He himself was apprehensive as to the result. We had seen in London during these last three weeks how difficult it was for four Powers to act together. If, in future, Germany had, on the one hand, the

representatives of four Powers attempting to collaborate and, on the other hand, one capable German acting alone, the result would very soon be that the single German would exercise complete control and the divergent efforts of the four Powers would be frustrated.

7. The Secretary of State replied that instructions in the sense desired had already been given both to Field-Marshal Montgomery and to General Eisenhower, and he emphasised that this information was strictly confidential.

8. I might add that the conversation throughout was extremely friendly, that the parting was almost affectionate, and I felt that M. Bidault was highly satisfied.

Yours ever,

DUFF COOPER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19

Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on 3rd October, 1945.

THE Secretary of State began by saying that he did not approve of the suggestion of forming an Anglo-French "front" in the Middle East. He was opposed on principle to the formation of "fronts" and *blocs*. He preferred to settle all matters in dispute between France and England on their merits and he was quite prepared to conclude a treaty with France similar to those which existed already between France and the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

He wished now to get a settlement with regard to the Levant question and he enquired whether the French had any other interests in the Middle East apart from the Levant. M. Bidault replied that they had interests in every part of the Middle East, as there were many French schools and institutes in all the countries concerned. Mr. Bevin suggested that such interests were rather of a cultural nature than political. M. Bidault said that it was very hard to draw a line between the two and anything that happened in the Levant affected French interests in all the other countries.

Mr. Bevin referred to a conversation that he had had with M. Bidault after dinner at Chequers on the 15th September, when he had said that he saw no objection to holding the conference on the Levant in Paris. He had since been told that to hold it in Paris might give great offence to the Syrians and Lebanese, and he asked whether M. Bidault saw any objection to holding the conference in London or elsewhere. M. Bidault said that he would consider this point and there was no need to take a decision immediately. All that was happening at present was preliminary conversations between experts and the time for a conference had not yet arrived. He wished, however, to impress upon Mr. Bevin the difficulty which the French Government would have in agreeing to hold a conference on the one issue of the Levant. The French had long considered that Syria and the Lebanon concerned France only, and if they were to hold a conference with Great Britain with regard to those territories they would feel that they were being placed in the dock. When it was suggested that representatives of Syria and the Lebanon might attend such a conference, M. Bidault rejected such a possibility. The presence of the Arabs would obviously increase the impression that France was being asked to justify herself and her actions. He repeated that in his opinion the time for a conference had not yet arrived, but he hoped that conversations would continue either in London or in Paris. He said that he himself was not very intimately acquainted with the details of the subject, but that M. Massigli (who arrived towards the end of this conversation) was fully informed on the subject.

D. C.

4th October, 1945.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19

Record of Conversation with M. Massigli on 3rd October, 1945.

M. MASSIGLI wanted to see me before I left London, and I called at the French Embassy on the morning of the 3rd October. He referred to the conversation which had taken place earlier that morning between M. Bidault and the Secretary of State, at which he had been present only during the last few minutes. He said he felt that little progress had been made, and that we were very much where we were before the conversation had taken place.

He emphasised the importance, in his opinion, of Great Britain and France having a common policy in the Middle East (he had not been present when this facet of the question had come under discussion). He said that we were going to have trouble in Palestine and might have trouble in Iraq or in Egypt, and surely it would be a good thing if the two countries stood by one another in that part of the world.

I said that I did not think that His Majesty's Government took that point of view. An agreement of the kind that he was thinking of would have the appearance of being an anti-Arab alliance formed in the interest of Franco-British imperialism. I also indicated that we should not require French help in Palestine even if troubles did occur there, and that our position in Iraq was defined by treaty. With regard to the Levant, I suggested that it might not prove necessary to hold a conference. A draft agreement with regard to the evacuation of British and French forces had already been drawn up. If that could be concluded, I myself felt that Great Britain would have no further special interest in that territory and that if troubles occurred there it would be a matter for the new world organisation to arrange.

M. Massigli answered that supposing French and British troops were withdrawn and that, subsequently, the Christian population were maltreated, the Russians, who were not far away, might be glad of an excuse for intervening and seizing the opportunity of establishing themselves on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. It was for this reason, above all, that he thought it important that Great Britain and France should agree upon a common policy.

D. C.

4th October, 1945.

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